INDIA TODAY

Arnold P. Kaminsky and
Roger D. Long, Editors

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India Today

AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE IN THE REPUBLIC

—— VOLUME ONE: A–K ——

Arnold P. Kaminsky
and Roger D. Long, Editors



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Introduction



On August 14, 1947, Jawaharlal Nehru proclaimed that "long years ago we made a tryst with destiny, and now the time comes when we shall redeem our pledge, not wholly or in full measure, but very substantially. At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom. A moment comes, which comes but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to the new, when an age ends, and when the soul of a nation, long suppressed, finds utterance . . . The achievement we celebrate today is but a step, an opening of opportunity, to the greater triumphs and achievements that await us. Are we brave enough and wise enough to grasp this opportunity and accept the challenge of the future?"

Six decades after Nehru's challenge to the nation, India in the 21st century remains the proverbial kaleidoscope of contradictions that has evolved over a period of some 5,000 years, a country that runs on nuclear fuel and puts its own astronauts and space satellites into orbit yet remains fundamentally agrarian, with grinding poverty among a significant number of its population. The Republic of India today has the second-largest population in the world (nearly 18 percent of the world's total), the third-largest active military (1.325 million), the second-largest labor force in the world (516.4 million), and, when Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) is included, the fourth-largest gross domestic product (GDP) in the world. Because of India's vast population, however, it is ranked 154th by the World Bank in gross national income per capita with PPP. Additionally, India moved from chronic dependence on food imports—critically so in the 1960s—to sustained self-sufficiency, primarily thanks to the Green Revolution (the introduction of high-yield seeds after 1965). In short, India is one of the most remarkable, diverse, and fascinating countries in the world. It is not just a country and is more than just a subcontinent, as it is often dubbed. More properly, India should be considered a continent, a civilization comparable in climate, population, and cultural diversity to Europe, the rest of Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Yet India's cultural depth and breadth is greater and more varied than even those great continents. Its religious

diversity is extraordinary and includes those who follow animism, Hinduism in dozens of different guises, Buddhism, Islam in a wide variety of sects and beliefs, Jainism, Judaism, and Christianity. India was reportedly the burial place of one of Christ's companions, the Apostle Saint Thomas, and was the birthplace of the Buddha, the Jain Mahavira, and the Sikh guru Nanak and is now the home of the Tibetan Buddhist Dalai Lama. Just as India's religious diversity is staggering, so too is its physical size. From the freezing Himalayas to the hottest deserts of Rajasthan, India enjoys every climatic condition in between, including forest and jungle. In turn this produces most foods and diets and dietary needs, from sugar in the mountains to salt in the hotter climates. As a consequence, India produces the saltiest and spiciest of foods as well as the sweetest.

To match this vast variety is an enormous range of living conditions. As befits an economy of continental proportions, India has staggering wealth and some of the richest individuals and families in the world and a middle class in the hundreds of millions. Yet in its teeming cities and in its arid rural areas, India also witnesses lives lived out in some of the most grinding and degrading poverty that can be found anywhere on earth.

What is also staggering about India is its vitality and energy. Its great cities and metropolitan areas—Mumbai, New Delhi, Bangalore, Kolkata, and Chennai—but also its smaller cities and larger towns pulsate with energy. It is the energy of people who desperately need to earn a living and to operate an economy of gargantuan size, but it is also an intellectual and creative energy that is second to none. More movies, art, and dance forms are produced there than in any other country on earth; more newspapers and journals are distributed than in any other place on earth; and the book publishing world is the envy of writers and academics the world over. India is still opening new universities, research institutes, and specialized schools of every kind. The denizens of these institutions commune with knowledge of ancient Sanskrit and Pali tracts that most people know little or nothing about and exist in a world of the imagination that for many is so abstract and theoretical as to be chimerical. Other habitués of these worlds achieve results in nuclear engineering, astrophysics, bioengineering, and computer science that are equally almost incomprehensible in the complexity of their inner workings but more readily understandable in their practical outcomes. India produces huge numbers of both kinds of savants.

India's cultural output is equally staggering, and the country produces artists in vast numbers who incorporate all that is Indian from its South Asian tradition with the adoption and adaptation of every Western, Asian, and Middle Eastern tradition, leading to flourishing artistic expressions from art and architecture to music and from literature to, most famously, cinema.

India Today is designed to bring together the latest scholarship on some of the multifarious strains of India's diverse cultures, societies, religions, political cultures, and economic and financial policies. The entries will show that India's long history, especially the civilizational elements of Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Islam, Zoroastrianism, and Christianity and the profound political, institutional, and cultural legacy of the British Raj (British rule), are

fundamentally woven warp and woof into the fabric of contemporary India. It is impossible to disaggregate the interconnected strains of tradition and modernity in today's republic, and this is not an intended goal in *India Today*. This encyclopedia seeks to place India's evolution since independence in 1947 in its historical context and to demonstrate the persistence of tradition in the shaping of modern political, social, economic, and artistic forms. Many of the contributors to the encyclopedia explicitly and implicitly recognize this in their entries by referring back to India's colonial heritage when they describe India in the current millennium: an understanding of India today is impossible without reference to its colonial past. India's role as the world's largest parliamentary democracy is one example.

From its beginning and through the promulgation of its constitution and formal inauguration as the Republic of India in 1950, India has maintained its commitment to secular democracy and is widely acknowledged as the largest functioning democracy in the world. This commitment required a multifaceted strategy to achieve national integration by negotiating the oft-muddied waters of regionalism, linguistic diversity, and religious multiplicity and the huge gap between rich and poor in the new nation. An essential underpinning to translating the anticolonial posture of preindependence into the construction of a well-functioning state was integration of the former British India with the princely states.

Under Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), who served as prime minister from 1947–1964, and the one-party dominant system provided by the Indian National Congress (founded in 1885) in India's first decades, India embarked on an ambitious program of Socialist-oriented economic planning designed to expand and modernize its industrial capacity. The results were mixed. Hamstrung for many years by the residual license Raj inherited, in part, from the British, India finally liberalized its economy in the 1990s, and the results have been dramatic. It is estimated that some 300 million people have escaped extreme poverty as a direct result of these economic reforms, many overseen by India's first prime minister of the 21st century, Manmohan Singh (b. 1932), who began serving in that capacity in 2004. These reforms, however, could not have been successful without the infrastructure and institutions created both before and after 1947.

A dominant theme in the first six decades of Indian independence has been India's distinctive foreign policy posture, both regionally and internationally. The most pressing residual legacy of Britain's partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 has been sustained tension and conflict with Pakistan. Three major wars between India and Pakistan, the last resulting in the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, have conditioned regional relations in South Asia. Fundamental disagreement between India and Pakistan over Kashmir undergirds the long-standing disputes. These tensions have been exacerbated by the reality that each nation has nuclear technology, and each is fully embroiled in the maelstrom of worldwide terrorism and insurgency. Disputes with China over the former Northeast Frontier Agency led to a brief war in 1962, and the recent creation of the state of Arunachal Pradesh remains a source of disputation between India and China. While India professed an international posture of nonalignment under Nehru, nonalignment itself has lost its luster and relevance, and India has

clearly established itself as the dominant power in South Asia. An independent state, Sikkim, was added by popular vote to the Indian Union in 1975. During 1987–1990 the Indian Army participated directly in neighboring Sri Lanka's civil war. Since 1985 India has engaged its neighbors in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in an attempt to foster regional collaboration on a wide range of social, political, and economic issues.

India's commitment to a federal secular state has been severely tested in its first 60-plus years. There have been communal and linguistic riots, two assassinations of prime ministers (Indira Gandhi [1917–1984], who served as prime minister during 1966–1977 and 1980–1984, and her son Rajiv Gandhi [1944–1991], who served as prime minister during 1984–1989), and from the mid-1970s the emergence of a multiparty system and the end of the one-party dominance of the Indian National Congress. The most serious moment in India's political development came in 1975 when Indira Gandhi instituted a state of emergency under India's constitution and imprisoned her political opponents. Notably, the Indian Army did not intervene in the political process; Gandhi released her opponents from prison and then lost in the ensuing election of 1977. The persistence of serious internal security threats, however, such as those from Naxalite and Maoist groups, continue to create stress in the political fabric of the nation.

India's demographic profile is overpowering, to say the least. India's population has tripled since 1947 and is projected to surpass that of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 2030. In spite of increasing urbanization, India remains around 70 percent agricultural. Myriad issues related to transportation, water management, health care delivery systems, environmental dangers, food security, and law and order flow from the pressure of India's population. While 80 percent of the country is Hindu, India has one of the largest Muslim populations in the world. This demographic reality contributes to copious issues in the legal system in which India tries to maintain a balance between personal religious law and the imperatives of the state.

In the 1960s a common lament was "After Nehru, who?" India responded to this challenge by demonstrating that it had a vast array of talented and visionary individuals at all levels of government capable of leading the nation. The current global question is "Whither India in the 21st century?" A corollary question wonders if this is the century when China and India might inherit leadership of the world. No matter how history answers these questions, it is certainly evident that the Republic of India has redeemed quite substantially its pledge and is confidently stepping forward on the path of progress that its first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, had delineated for the stroke of the midnight hour when India became independent.

✦ USING THIS WORK

There are more than 250 entries in *India Today* written by more than 80 scholars and writers knowledgeable about contemporary India. This encyclopedia has also benefited from work done earlier by others. A few experts have published books in Greenwood's

and ABC-CLIO's award-winning encyclopedias and other reference works, such as *Pop Culture India! Media, Arts, and Lifestyle*, by Asha Kasbekar Richards, and their contributions were crafted from those books. Information about contributors is found in the "About the Editors and Contributors" section at the end of the set.

Entries range in size from approximately 300 words to 5,000 words. Each entry includes helpful references and recommendations for further reading on the subject, including websites. Maps, photos, and other illustrations add to the user's understanding of India today. Helpful front matter includes a list of all entries, a list of the entries arranged under broad topics (the "Topic Finder"), and a chronology of events. An extensive selected bibliography of good resources is located at the end of the second volume, as is a comprehensive index to the set.

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During the entire process of soliciting and editing articles for *India Today,* we have been guided by Dr. Damodar R. SarDesai, the first Navin and Pratima Doshi chair in Indian history and professor emeritus of history, University of California, Los Angeles. Professor SarDesai's passion for up-to-date, well-researched, and soundly articulated entries on the story of India was unflagging. His insights were invaluable, as was his encouragement and support. The editors have benefited from his erudition, his openness, and his help since we became graduate students of his several decades ago. His breadth of knowledge encompassing several Indian languages, including Sanskrit, and his passion for India and its history, which he has always been willing to share and discuss with everyone, from first-year undergraduate students to scholars of his own standing, have always been the hallmark of the man. We were delighted and honored that he would invite us to edit this encyclopedia to which he also contributed while serving as its editorial adviser. It has truly been a pleasure.

Each of us has some special debts of gratitude for the support of family, friends, and colleagues. Arnold Kaminsky received indispensable support from Dr. Nancy Quam-Wickham, chair of the Department of History at California State University, Long Beach (CSULB).

Also greatly appreciated was the encouragement of Uka and Nalini Solanki, benefactors of the Yadunandan Center for India Studies at CSULB, and the skilled bibliographic work of Claire Quam-Wickham. Certainly the support of family members—children and grandchildren—was vital. Arnold Kaminsky's wife, Sandy, played an essential role in this effort; her patience, encouragement, and fortitude were unsurpassed. Roger Long is very grateful to Professor Kate Mehuron, chair of the Department of History and Philosophy at Eastern Michigan University, who supported the project in any way she could, from allowing the use of department funds and resources to assigning her very efficient departmental secretary, Claudia Cullin, to assist in any way requested. We are very grateful to them both. Roger Long's wife, Dr. E. L. Cerroni-Long, has lived with this project from its inception, nurturing its development by providing her usual intellectual support and interdisciplinary insights. Her contribution is gratefully acknowledged.

Overall, the outcome of this writing project depends on its many contributor's willingness to share their expertise and to condense it in the format required by the encyclopedia. It has been a pleasure to work with scholars who have enormous amounts of specialized knowledge and passion for their subjects and who have been willing to present their information and insights in a way accessible to all. These contributors range from emeriti professors such as SarDesai, Surjit Mansingh, and Eleanor Zelliott, whose names are readily known by scholars the world over, to PhD candidates or recent PhDs who are at the beginning of their life's service to scholarship; they hail from five of the world's continents and represent numerous disciplinary fields. We are very grateful indeed for their willingness to fashion the individual tassels of the mosaic of information that this encyclopedia aspires to provide. We believe that *India Today: An Encyclopedia of Life in the Republic* offers information that can be enjoyed at various levels and from many different perspectives, reflecting the variety and diversity of contemporary life in the Republic of India.

Alphabetic List of Entries



Topic Finder



Below are the entries for *India Today* listed under broad topics. For more detailed access, consult the index at the back of volume two.

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Space Program

Social and Environmental Issues
Aged
Bhakra-Nangal Dam Project
Bhopal Gas Disaster

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Chronology



August 1947

14–15 British rule ends, and the Indian subcontinent is partitioned into the sovereign states of Pakistan (East and West) and India.

15 Jawaharlal Nehru becomes prime minister, serving until May 27, 1964.

October 1947–December 1948

Indo-Pakistani conflict.

January 1948

30 Mohandas Karamchand (Mahatma) Gandhi is assassinated.

June 1948

21 Chakravarti Rajagopalachari becomes governor-general and serves until January 25, 1950.

September 1948

Police action and annexation of the princely state of Hyderabad occurs.

War occurs with Pakistan over disputed territory in Kashmir.

1949 Orissa is reconfigured, and the state of Orissa is formed.

The Reserve Bank of India is established.

November 1949

15 Nathuram Godse and Narayan Apte are executed for assassinating Mahatma Gandhi.

January 1950

Rajendra Prasad becomes the first president of India and serves until May 13, 1962.

Andaman and Nicobar Islands become Union Territories.

25 The Election Commission is established.

26 The Indian Constitution comes into force.

The United Provinces is renamed Uttar Pradesh.

March 1950

15 The Planning Commission is established.

December 1950

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, known for political integration of India and as the first home minister and deputy prime minister, dies.

1951

First Five-Year Plan (1951–1956).

Railways are consolidated under government supervision.

1952

The Congress Party wins the first general elections.

1953

The state of Andhra Pradesh is formed.

Indian Airlines is formed, and Air India is nationalized.

The first Backward Classes Commission is established under Kaka Kalelkar.

1955

The Asian-African Conference of Non-Aligned Nations takes place in Bandung, Indonesia.

The State Bank of India is created and nationalized.

1956

Second Five-Year Plan (1956–1961).

India's first nuclear reactor, Apsara, begins operation.

The States Reorganization Act takes effect.

The states of Kerala, Karnataka, and Madhya Pradesh are formed.

Rajasthan integration is completed.

Madras is reconfigured (renamed Tamil Nadu in 1968).

Lakshwadeep becomes a Union Territory.

Delhi becomes a Union Territory.

October 1956

B. R. Ambedkar, a Harijan leader, converts to Buddhism along with 385,000 followers; he dies on December 6, 1956.

1957

The states of Jammu and Kashmir are incorporated into India.

May 1957

The second general elections take place. Congress wins 296 seats in the lower house, and Jawaharlal Nehru continues as prime minister.

Kerala elects a Communist government headed by E. M. S. Namboodiripad.

The Copyright Act of 1957 is promulgated.

1958

The Armed Forces Act (Special Powers Act) is passed by Parliament and relates to disturbances in the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura.

1959

The Dalai Lama flees to India from Tibet.

Doordarshan, India's state-owned broadcaster, is established.

1960

Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan.

The states of Gujarat and Maharashtra are formed.

1961

Goa is liberated.

Third Five-Year Plan (1961–1966).

Dadra and Nagar Haveli are formed as Union Territories.

May 1962

13 The third general election takes place. The Congress Party wins, and Jawaharlal Nehru continues as prime minister. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan is elected president of India and serves until May 13, 1967.

August 1962

16 Pondicherry becomes a Union Territory (renamed Puducherry in September 2006).

October 1962

India and China fight a brief border war.

1963

The state of Nagaland is formed.

The Supreme Court of India mandates that reservations cannot exceed 50 percent in any institution.

1964

Vishva Hindu Parishad is founded.

May 1964

27 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru dies. Gulzarilal Nanda serves as interim prime minister until June 9, 1964.

June 1964

9 Lal Bahadur Shastri becomes prime minister of India and serves until his death on January 11, 1966.

1965

The long-term Anti-Hindi campaign in southern India is resolved, and the three-language formula for states is adopted.

August–September 1965

The second war with Pakistan takes place.

1966

The state of Haryana is formed.

Chandigarh becomes a Union Territory.

Miss India, Reita Faria, wins the Miss World beauty pageant in London.

January 1966

10 The Tashkent Agreement with Pakistan ends hostilities.

11 Prime Minister Shastri dies in Tashkent. Gulzarilal Nanda serves as interim prime minister until January 24, 1966.

24 Indira Gandhi becomes prime minister and serves until March 24, 1977.

June 1966

9 The Shiv Sena political party is founded by Bal Thackeray.

May 1967

13 Zakir Husain becomes president of India and serves until May 3, 1969.

April 1967

Fourth general elections. Indira Gandhi continues as prime minister.

May 1967

The Naxalite-Maoist insurgency breaks out in West Bengal.

1968

The Green Revolution begins with the introduction of new high-yield grains.

Dr. Hargobind Khorana wins the Nobel Prize for Medicine.

The state of Madras is reconfigured and is renamed Tamil Nadu.

1969

Fourth Five-Year Plan (1969–1974).

The Indian National Congress splits into two factions: Congress (R) headed by Indira Gandhi and Congress (O) headed by Morarji Desai.

May 1969

3 Varahagiri Venkata (V. V.) Giri becomes acting president of India and serves in that capacity until July 20, 1969.

July 1969

20 Muhammad Hidayatullah becomes acting president and serves until August 24, 1969.

August 24

Varahagiri Venkata Giri becomes president of India and serves until August 24, 1974.

1970

Miss India, Zeenat Aman, wins the Miss Asia-Pacific beauty pageant.

The present boundaries of the state of Punjab are formed.

1971

Princes' privy purses are abolished.

The 20-year Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation is signed with the Soviet Union.

The state of Himachal Pradesh is formed.

March 1971

Fifth General Elections. Indira Gandhi is reelected as prime minister with a majority of 352 votes in the Lok Sabha.

December 1971

The third war with Pakistan over the creation of Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, occurs.

1972

The states of Meghalaya, Manipur, and Tripura are formed.

1973

Miss India, Tara Anne Fonscea, wins the Miss Asia-Pacific beauty pageant.

The state of Mysore is renamed Karnataka.

1974

Fifth Five-Year Plan (1974–1979).

Under Project Smiling Buddha, India explodes its first nuclear device in an underground test in the Pokhran Desert in Rajasthan.

A 20-day strike by 17 million railway workers occurs in India and is suppressed by the Indira Gandhi government.

August 1974

24 Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad becomes president of India and serves until his death on February 11, 1977.

1975

Sikkim is elevated to the status of full state.

India launches its first satellite, Aryabhatta, on a Russian launch vehicle.

June 1975

26 Indira Gandhi declares a state of emergency after being found guilty of electoral malpractice. During the General Emergency, which lasts until 1977, the press is censored, and thousands of political opponents are imprisoned.

1976

The Family Planning Initiative of compulsory birth control (vasectomy and tubal ligation) is introduced, prompting widespread protests. Indira Gandhi's son, Sanjay, is largely blamed for the policy.

February 1977

11 Basappa Danappa (B. D.) Jatti becomes acting president following the death of Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad and serves until July 25, 1977.

March 1977

24 In the sixth general elections, Congress loses. The Janata Party now has 295 seats in the Lok Sabha. Morarji Desai becomes prime minister and serves until July 28, 1979. Desai is the first non–Congress Party prime minister.

July 1977

25 Neelam Sanjiva Reddy becomes president of India and serves until July 25, 1982.

1978

Air India Flight 855 crashes into the Arabian Sea near Bombay, killing all 213 people on board.

Indira Gandhi is reelected to Parliament and then is arrested for breach of privilege and contempt of Parliament.

1979

The B. P. Mandal Commission is established to assess social, educational, and economic criteria for defining Other Backwards Classes.

Mother Teresa wins the Nobel Peace Prize for work with the Sisters of Charity in Kolkata.

Sixth Five-Year Plan (1980–1985).

July 1979

28 Charan Singh becomes prime minister and serves until January 14, 1980.

1980

The Indian field hockey team wins the gold medal in the Moscow Olympics.

January 1980

14 Seventh general elections. Congress wins 351 seats in the Lok Sabha. Indira Gandhi is elected as prime minister and serves until her assassination on October 31, 1984.

June 1980

23 Sanjay Gandhi, youngest son of Indira Gandhi, dies in a plane crash.

1981

Infosys Technologies is founded in Pune.

The National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) and microfinancing for rural sections is launched.

The first nationwide television broadcast by Doordarshan takes place.

July 1982

The INSAT-1A (Indian National Satellite System) is launched for communications technology expansion but is deactivated in September.

25 Giani Zail Singh becomes president and serves until July 25, 1987.

November–December 1982

The Asian Games are held in Delhi.

1983

Dr. Subrahmanyan Chandrasekhar wins the Nobel Prize for Physics.

The India cricket team defeats West Indies in a World Cup victory at Lord's to win the Prudential Cup Crown. Kalpil Dev becomes a national hero.

The "Bandit Queen" Phoolan Devi surrenders.

1984

In Operation BLUESTAR, troops storm the Golden Temple, the Sikhs' most holy shrine, to flush out Sikh militants pressing for self-rule.

India sends its first cosmonaut, Wing Commander Rakesh Sharma, into space with two Soviet cosmonauts. Sharma spends eight days aboard the Soyuz-T11 spacecraft.

October 1984

31 Indira Gandhi is assassinated by Sikh bodyguards, following which her son Rajiv is sworn in as prime minister.

Anti-Sikh riots kill more than 3,000 people, mostly in Delhi.

December 1984

A gas leak occurs at a Union Carbide pesticides plant in Bhopal. Thousands are killed immediately, and many more subsequently die or are left disabled.

Eighth general elections. Congress wins 403 seats in the Lok Sabha. Rajiv Gandhi is elected prime minister.

1985

Seventh Five-Year Plan (1985–1989)

India announces its New Economic Policy, revisiting and revising its extensive government controls on the economy and liberalizing many of them.

Air India Flight 182 explodes off the coast of Ireland, killing the 329 people aboard. Investigators suspect terrorists advocating an independent Sikh state, but after extended investigation, no one is convicted.

The Indira Gandhi National Open University is established by the Indian Parliament.

1986

The Bofors Scandal, implicating associates of Rajiv Gandhi's government, rocks India.

April 1986

30 Operation Black Thunder is conducted to flush out remaining extremists in the Golden Temple.

May 1986

The new National Policy on Education is announced.

September 1986

The Environment Protection Act is passed.

July 1986

6 Jagvivan Ram, a freedom fighter and social reformer, dies.

1987

Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh, and Goa become states.

India deploys troops for peacekeeping operations in Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict.

February 1987

A Sino-Indian skirmish over the contested area of the new Indian state, Arunachel Pradesh, occurs.

July 1987

25 Ramaswamy Venkataraman becomes president of India and serves until July 25, 1992.

1988

A magnitude 6.6 earthquake in Bihar kills more than 1,000 people in India and Nepal.

1989

There is general political instability, and a crisis in foreign exchange reserves occurs. The Five-Year Plan is suspended until 1991.

Union Carbide agrees to pay $470 million to the Indian government for damages from the 1984 Bhopal disaster.

November 1989

Ninth general elections. The Congress Party is defeated.

December 1989

2 Vishwanath Pratap (V. P.) Singh becomes prime minister and serves until November 10, 1990.

1990

Indian troops withdrawn from Sri Lanka.

The Mandal Commission Report (1990–1991) created a cleavage in Indian society over the question of how "backwardness" was determined: by caste or income. The report recommended 27 percent more reservations for Other Backward Classes (OBCs).

November 1990

10 Chandra Shekhar becomes prime minister and serves until June 21, 1991.

1990

The Union Territory of Delhi is redesignated a National Capital Territory.

May 1991

21 Rajiv Gandhi is assassinated by a suicide bomber sympathetic to Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers.

May–June 1991

Tenth general election. There is a hung Parliament, with Congress as the largest party with 232 seats in the Lok Sabha. The Bharatiya Janata Party wins 120 seats in Parliament.

June 1991

20 P. V. Narasimha Rao becomes prime minister and serves until May 16, 1996. He begins an economic reform program that involves liberalization, privatization, and globalization.

1992

Eighth Five-Year Plan (1992–1997).

Hindu extremists demolish the Babri mosque in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, triggering widespread Hindu-Muslim violence.

April–May 1992

An Indian securities scam involving misappropriation of funds of more than Rs. 3,500 crores (US$778 million) engulfs top executives of large nationalized banks, foreign banks, and financial institutions as well as brokers, bureaucrats, and politicians. The functioning of the money market and the stock market was thrown in disarray, leading to a stock market decline of more than 40 percent in the following two months.

1993

A series of bomb blasts rock Mumbai, killing 260. Underworld figures are blamed.

1994

India rolls out the Prithvi missile on Republic Day.

Miss India, Sushmita Sen, wins the Miss Universe beauty pageant.

Miss India, Aishwarya Rai, wins Miss World beauty pageant.

1995

The Delhi Metro Rail Corporation is founded.

Reports of the Hindu Milk Miracle surface; this reoccurs in 2006.

1996

A category 4 cyclone hits Andhra Pradesh, killing 2,000 people and destroying 95 percent of the crops.

A Saudi Arabian 747 jumbo jet and a Kazakhstan Illyshin cargo plane collide near New Delhi, killing 349 people in the world's deadliest midair collision.

Chinese president Jiang Zemin becomes the first Chinese head of state to visit India.

May 1996

Eleventh general elections. The Bharatiya Janata Party wins 161 seats in the Lok Sabha, and the Congress Party wins 160.

16 Atal Behari Vajpayee becomes prime minister for 13 days (until June 1, 1996).

June 1996

1 H. D. Deve Gowdra becomes prime minister and serves until April 21, 1997. He forms the United Front government.

1997

Ninth Five-Year Plan (1997–2002).

Miss India, Diana Hayden, wins the Miss World beauty pageant.

April 1997

21 Inder Kumar Gujral becomes prime minister and serves until November 28, 1997. He heads the United Front government.

July 1997

25 Kocheril Raman Narayanan becomes president of India and serves until July 25, 2002.

1998

India carries out nuclear tests (Pokhran II), and Pakistan follows with its own tests. The United States imposes sanctions on both countries.

Dr. Amartya Sen wins the Nobel Prize for Economic Sciences.

March 1998

Twelfth general elections. The Bharatiya Janata Party leads a 24-party alliance.

19 Atal Behari Vajpayee becomes prime minister and serves until May 22, 2004.

1999

Miss India, Yukta Mookhey, wins the Miss World beauty pageant.

Indian Airlines flight IC 814 is hijacked from Kathmandu and ends up in Kandahar, Afghanistan, supported by the Taliban. Eventually Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh hands over convicted criminals to secure the release of the hostages, some of whom allegedly participated in later terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament.

February 1999

Prime Minister Vajpayee makes a historic bus trip to Lahore, Pakistan, to meet Premier Nawaz Sharif and to sign a bilateral peace declaration.

May 1999

Tension in Kashmir leads to a brief war with Pakistan-backed forces in the icy heights around Kargil in Kashmir.

Thirteenth general elections. The Bharatiya Janata Party–led National Democratic Alliance wins 298 seats in the Lok Sabha.

2000

Uttaranchal, Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand become states.

President Bill Clinton, 42nd president of the United States (1992–2000), makes a groundbreaking visit to improve Indo-U.S. ties.

Miss India, Lara Dutta, wins the Miss Universe pageant.

Miss India, Priyanka Chopra, wins the Miss World beauty pageant.

Miss India, Diya Mirza, wins the Miss Asia-Pacific beauty pageant.

Mrs. India, Aditi Govitrikar, wins the Mrs. World beauty pageant.

May 2000

India marks the birth of its billionth citizen.

2001

A high-powered rocket is launched, placing India in the club of countries able to fire big satellites deep into space.

January 2001

Massive earthquakes hit the Kutch region of Gujarat, leaving at least 30,000 dead.

April 2001

Sixteen Indian and 3 Bangladeshi soldiers are killed in border clashes.

July 2001

Indian prime minister Vajpayee meets Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf in the first summit between the two neighboring countries in more than two years. The meeting ends without a breakthrough or even a joint statement because of differences over Kashmir.

Vajpayee's Bharatiya Janata Party declines his offer to resign over a number of political scandals and the apparent failure of his talks with Pakistani president Musharraf.

September 2001

The United States lifts sanctions against India and Pakistan that were put in place after they staged nuclear tests in 1998.

December 2001

A suicide squad attacks Parliament in New Delhi, killing several police officers. The five gunmen die in the assault. India imposes sanctions against Pakistan to force it to take action against the two militant groups blamed for the attack. Pakistan retaliates with similar sanctions.

India and Pakistan amass troops on their common border amid mounting fear of a looming war.

2002

Tenth Five-Year Plan (2002–2007).

January 2002

25 India successfully test-fires a nuclear-capable ballistic missile, the Agni, off its eastern coast.

February 2002

Interreligious bloodshed breaks out after 59 Hindu pilgrims returning from the city of Ayodhya are killed in a train fire in Godhra, Gujarat. More than 1,000 people, many of them Muslims, die in subsequent riots.

May 2002

Pakistan test-fires three medium-range surface-to-surface Ghauri missiles that are capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

June 2002

The United Kingdom and the United States urge their citizens to leave India and Pakistan while maintaining a diplomatic offensive to avert war in South Asia.

July 2002

25 A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, a retired scientist and an architect of India's missile program, is elected president and serves until July 25, 2007.

July 2003

India and Pakistan resume diplomatic relations.

August 2003

At least 50 people are killed in two simultaneous bomb blasts in Bombay.

September 2003

Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon visits India.

November 2003

India matches Pakistan's declaration of a Kashmir cease-fire.

December 2003

India and Pakistan agree to resume direct air links and to allow overflights.

December 2004

Thousands are killed when a tsunami, caused by a powerful undersea earthquake off the Indonesian coast, devastates southern coastal communities and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

April–May 2004

Fourteenth general elections. The Congress-led United Progressive Alliance wins 335 seats in the Lok Sabha.

May 2004

22 Manmohan Singh assumes office as prime minister.

April 2005

Bus services, the first in 60 years, are operated between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad.

October 2005

An earthquake, with its epicenter in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, kills more than 1,000 people in Indian-administered Kashmir.

2006

Infosys Technologies becomes the first Indian company to enter the elite group of the NASDAQ 100.

February 2006

India launches its largest-ever rural jobs scheme, which is aimed at lifting around 60 million families out of poverty.

March 2006

The United States and India sign a nuclear agreement during a visit by U.S. president George W. Bush, 43rd president of the United States (2001–2009). The United States gives India access to civilian nuclear technology, while India agrees to greater scrutiny for its nuclear program.

May 2006

Suspected Islamic militants kill 35 Hindus in the worst attacks in Indian-administered Kashmir for several months.

July 2006

11 More than 180 people are killed in bomb attacks on rush-hour trains in Mumbai. Islamic militants in Pakistan are blamed.

September 2006

Explosions outside a mosque in the western town of Malegaon, Maharashtra, kill at least 31 people.

November 2006

Chinese president Hu Jintao makes the first visit to India by a Chinese president in a decade.

December 2006

U.S. president George W. Bush approves a controversial law allowing India to buy U.S. nuclear reactors and fuel for the first time in 30 years.

2007

Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2007–2012).

The Taj Mahal is declared number one among new wonders of the world by voters across the world, generating great enthusiasm and pride in India.

February 2007

India and Pakistan sign an agreement aimed at reducing the risk of accidental nuclear war.

March 2007

Maoist rebels in the state of Chhattisgarh kill more than 50 policemen in a dawn attack.

April 2007

India's first commercial space rocket is launched. The rocket carries an Italian satellite.

May 2007

The Indian government announces its strongest economic growth figures for 20 years: 9.4 percent for the period January–March.

July 2007

The Indian Health Ministry announces that the number of people with HIV or AIDS is about half of earlier official tallies, between 2 million and 3.1 million cases instead of more than 5 million.

25 Pratibha Devisingh Patil, from Maharashtra, becomes the first woman to be elected president of India.

October 2007

The BSE Sensex, India's main stock exchange in Mumbai, hits an all-time high of 20,000.

2008

Tata launches the Nano, priced at roughly $2,500, claiming that it is the world's cheapest car.

India successfully launches its first mission to the moon, the unmanned lunar probe *Chandrayaan-1*.

July 2008

The Indian government survives a vote of confidence brought after left-wing parties withdraw support over the nuclear cooperation deal with the United States. Several left-wing and regional parties form a new alliance to oppose the government.

A series of explosions kills 49 people in Ahmedabad in the state of Gujarat. Indian Mujahideen, a little-known group, claims responsibility.

October 2008

U.S. president George W. Bush signs into law a nuclear deal with India that ends a three-decade ban on U.S. nuclear trade with Delhi.

November 2008

26 Nearly 200 people are killed and hundreds are wounded in a series of coordinated attacks by gunmen on the main tourist and business area of India's financial capital, Mumbai. India blames Pakistan's Lashka-e-Taiba for the attacks and demands that Islamabad take strong action.

December 2008

India announces a pause in the peace process with Pakistan.

The Indian cricket team cancels a planned tour of Pakistan.

2009

A Delhi court rules that homosexual intercourse between consenting adults is not criminal, overturning a 148-year-old colonial law.

January 2009

The head of Satyam Computer Services admits false profits and fraud estimated at Rs. 14,000 crore (US$1 billion). The incident is called "India's Enron."

February 2009

India and Russia sign deals worth $700 million, according to which Moscow will supply uranium to Delhi.

April 2009

The trial of the sole surviving suspect in the Mumbai attacks begins.

April–May 2009

Fifteenth general elections. The Congress-led United Progressive Alliance wins with 11 seats short of an absolute majority in the Lok Sabha. Manmohan Singh continues as prime minister.

June 2009

Maoist disturbances continue in the countryside. The Indian government estimates that the Maoists are active in 220 districts in 20 states, accounting for 40 percent of India's geographical area.

December 2009

The Indian government announces the start of a process to create the new state of Telengana from Andhra Pradesh after deliberations of the state assembly in Andhra Pradesh and a national commission of the central government.

January 2010

Bangladeshi prime minister Sheikh Hasina visits India. India announces a $1 billion line of credit for Bangladesh, the highest one-time line of credit assistance to any country by India.

South Korean president Lee Myung Bak visits India.

India and China announce that they will continue joint military exercises in 2011.

Malaysian prime minister Najib Razak visits India.

17 Jyoti Basu dies. Basu helped found the Communist Party of India–Marxist (CPI-M) and served as chief minister of West Bengal (1977–2000).

February 2010

28 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh says that despite the global economic slowdown, India will achieve a growth rate of more than 7 percent in the current financial year and will get back to a growth rate of 9 percent for 2010–2011.

June 2010

A court in Bhopal sentences eight Indians to two years each in jail for "death by negligence" for the 1984 Union Carbide gas plant leak, the world's worst industrial accident.

September 2010

The Allahabad High Court rules that the disputed holy site of Ayodhya should be divided between Hindus and Muslims. The destruction of a mosque on the site in 1992 led to rioting in which approximately 2,000 people died.

October 2010

The United Nations (UN) General Assembly elects India to a two-year seat on the UN Security Council beginning on January 1, 2011.

3–14 The Delhi Commonwealth Games go ahead despite concerns about the state of the facilities.

November 2010

U.S. president Barack Obama became the sixth U.S. president to visit India. During his visit to enhance U.S.-India bilateral trade and security partnerships, Obama endorses India's bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

The housing minister is implicated in mismanaging sales of homes built for war widows.

December 2010

Russian president Dmitry Medvedev conducts a two-day visit to India. India and Russia sign more than 30 crucial deals in key areas including nuclear cooperation, defense, pharmaceuticals, and space technology. India and Russia agree to collaborate in key areas, especially the technology sector, to increase bilateral trade between the countries.

The telecommunications minister is implicated in a scandal for underselling licenses below market value, costing the government up to US$39 billion in revenue.

January 2011

1 India begins a two-year term as a nonpermanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council.

The Srikrishna Committee Report on Telangana is issued for consideration by the Indian Parliament.

24 The United States announces its intensions to lift high-tech nuclear sanctions on India.

25 India and Indonesia sign a bilateral trade agreement during the state visit of Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. The agreement aims to double bilateral trade within five years.

26 India unveils the first India-designed supersonic jet fighter, the Tejas ("Radiant").

February 2011

10 The foreign secretary announces that India will resume formal peace talks with Pakistan in July 2011.

February 19–April 2, 2011

The World Cup of Cricket is played in India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. India wins the World Cup, defeating Sri Lanka by six wickets on April 2.

March 2011

1 Thirty-one men are sentenced for setting fire to a train in February 2002 that triggered violence in Gujarat.

April 2011

1 The 2011 census provisional data show India's population at 1.21 billion, an increase of 181 million over the last 10 years.


May 2011

6 India begins a year-long celebration of the 150th anniversary of the birth of Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore. Worldwide celebrations begin, including the unveiling of busts of Tagore in Shanghai, China, and Seoul, Korea; stamps issued featuring Tagore in San Marino; and university Tagore *adhiveshan* and performances scheduled internationally.

THE ENCYCLOPEDIA

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✦ ADVANI, LAL KRISHNA

Lalchand Kishen Advani (b. 1927), known as Lal Krishna Advani, is a prominent right-wing Hindu politician who became the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha (House of the People, or lower house of Parliament) after the 2009 general elections, which returned the Congress Party to power. Advani has held important cabinet-level positions as minister for information and broadcasting (1977–1979), home minister (1988), and deputy prime minister (1999–2004) in his long political career of more than three decades. His services have been recognized with the Outstanding Parliamentary Award in 1999 and a Lifetime Achievement award by New Delhi Television in 2008.

Advani was born on November 8, 1927, in Karachi, Sindh province (Pakistan). He completed his early education in Karachi and Hyderabad (Pakistan) and then graduated from the Government Law College in Bombay (Mumbai). The author of two books, *The People Betrayed* (1980) and *My Country, My Life* (2008), Advani served as a journalist for nearly a decade as part of the editorial team of *Organizer,* the news magazine of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS; "Indian People's Alliance"), a right-wing political party that was founded in 1951 and was succeeded by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP; founded in 1980). Advani lives in Delhi with his wife and his family.

At the age of 14 (1942), as a volunteer for the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a right-wing fundamentalist party founded in 1925, Lal Krishna Advani was introduced to the ideology of Hindutva (Hinduness). The cultural implications of the RSS were ingrained in him through years of association with Rajpal Puri (1917–1977), the provincial head of the RSS, and Deen Dayal Upadhyaya (1916–1968), the secretary-general of the BJS.

Before Partition in 1947 and his departure for India, Advani rose to become the secretary of the RSS in Karachi.

The tumultuous events of the Partition of India, especially in the city of Karachi, brought Advani to Delhi as a Sindhi refugee on September 12, 1947. For the next 10 years he facilitated the safe passage and rehabilitation of Hindu and Sikh refugees from Pakistan, and then acquired the responsibility of devising organizational strategies for the BJS. The assassination of Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948) on January 31, 1948, by an RSS member plunged the party into its worst crisis since its creation. Advani and other party members were imprisoned. During this period, the RSS decided to lend support to a new party, the BJS, in order to establish a political voice at the national level.

Deen Dayal, the party president, asked Advani, who had settled in Rajasthan, to move to Delhi. This move in 1957 crystallized his transformation into a full-fledged politician, strategist, and organizational analyst of the BJS. He initially assisted Atal Behari Vajpayee (b. 1924; prime minister 1996, 1998–2004) in launching his career as a parliamentarian; subsequently, they became close associates and friends. Advani gained political experience as BJS's secretary-general and as the head of the Delhi Metropolitan Council. His election to the Rajya Sabha, the upper house of Parliament, in 1970 brought him to the center of Indian parliamentary politics. During the Emergency Period between 1975 and 1977 under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984) Advani spent 19 months in jail under MISA (Maintenance of Internal Security Act) in Bangalore (Karnataka). This detention gave him a clearer understanding of south Indian politics, and he used this information to lead his party to gains in state assemblies in the late 1980s.



Leader of the main opposition, the Bharatiya Janata Party, Lal Krishna Advani greets the crowd during a public meeting in Madhopur, Punjab, March 20, 2010. (AP Photo/Altaf Qadri)

To broaden its appeal as a national party, the BJS sought alliances to form governments both at the state and the central level. The first non-Congress coalition government led by the BJS came to power in 1977, and Advani was appointed minister of information and broadcasting. However, internal bickering within the BJS brought the Congress Party back to power in 1980. The defeat convinced some members of the BJS to pressure party members elected to the Lok Sabha

to sever their affiliations with the RSS. This proposal was rejected by all of them but most vehemently by Advani. Later on, BJS members were barred from participating in any RSS-sponsored activities or functions. The BJS members reciprocated by launching a new political party, the BJP, in 1980.

Advani was given the credit for the rise of the BJP into a major political force in the 1980s and early 1990s. In his long career of public service, Advani, unlike many other politicians, has never been implicated in any corruption charges apart from the hawala scandal, where he and others were charged with taking bribes from Jain brokers in early 1996. Hawala is an international underground banking system that allows for the transfer of money but leaves behind no paper trial. Hawala networks can move large amounts of money around the world in a matter of hours. The Supreme Court exonerated Advani from allegations of corruption due to lack of evidence.

Advani is famous for adopting a hard-liner approach toward political issues espoused by the BJP, such as the rise of Hindu nationalism (Hindutva). This stance invokes fears of marginalization among the minorities, especially the Muslims, as Advani admits in his autobiography, *My Country, My Life*. The catalyst in the phoenix-like rise of his party was the movement to build a temple in place of a mosque at the birthplace of the Hindu god Rama in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, in 1990. In many ways, he revolutionalized India's political and cultural environment by staging a journey (*yatra*) to Somnath temple in Gujarat, which had been destroyed several times by Mahmud of Ghazni (971–1030). Advani's campaign to rebuild a temple to Rama led to the destruction of the mosque at Ayodhya in December 1992, and the result was that the country saw the worst communal riots between Hindus and Muslims since Partition.

The BJP was able to reap the benefits of this Ayodhya movement through electoral victories, and with coalition partners Advani formed the government at the center in 1996 and for a full term in 1999–2004, when he served as deputy prime minister. In order to appease coalition parties, the temple issue was left to the legal system. Advani faced many internal and external challenges as deputy prime minister and had to make many compromises, including deals with Kashmir separatist leaders. After being voted out of power, Advani went to Pakistan in 2005. For the first time he deviated from his ideological platform when he praised the famous speech of August 11, 1947, given by the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), citing it as a fine example of the exposition of a secular state. It created an uproar in India, especially among the cadres of the RSS, and Advani resigned as party president.

Nonetheless, Advani was the prime ministerial candidate for the right-wing BJP-led alliance in the general elections of 2009. For the past two decades Indian governments have been coalition governments put together through alliances and through making ideological compromises. Advani not only had to withstand the doubts of skeptical allies due to his controversial comments in Pakistan, but he also became enmeshed in a vicious negative campaign against the Congress Party prime minister Manmohan Singh (b. 1932; prime minister 2004–), accusing him of being weak and indecisive. He also had to defend the anti-Muslim speeches of Varun Gandhi (b. 1980), the great-grandson of the first prime minister of India,

Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964) and grandson of Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984), who were both noted for their affiliation with the Congress Party and for their anticommunalist views and their espousal of secularism. Advani was also criticized for promoting Narendra Modi (b. 1950), the chief minister of Gujarat (2001–), who was accused of complicity in fomenting Hindu-Muslim riots in Gujarat in 2002, as a future prime ministerial candidate. After the results of the 2009 election, which saw the reelection of the Congress Party, Advani faced the task of making the BJP a political force at the national level once again. This required a delicate balancing act of reaching out to coalition partners and making compromises with them without disavowing the Hindutva ideology or the commitment to the Ram temple building project, which galvanized his political base.

FATIMA A. IMAM

See also Bharatiya Janata Party

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✦ AFGHANISTAN, RELATIONS WITH

India has traditionally enjoyed good relations with Afghanistan. Historically, the region was tied to the civilization of South Asia, and the ancient kingdom of Gandhara (ca. 1000 BCE–11th century CE) may have covered what is now the Kabul District. Apart from economic and political interests, India has had significant strategic interests in Afghanistan. The country's geographical location and its proximity to the resources in Central Asia has substantially enhanced Afghanistan's importance for India. New Delhi's relations have remained cordial with most of the Afghan regimes, except for the Taliban government, which ruled in Afghanistan from 1995 to 2001. During this period, New Delhi provided assistance to the anti-Taliban resistance, the Northern Alliance, composed mostly of Tajik and other non-Pashtun ethnic groups. Apart from trade relations, India has also engaged in a number of economic and social projects in Afghanistan, such as rural electrification, irrigation, and small-scale industries.

During the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in 1989, and later with the advent of the Taliban, India was sidelined from the political dynamics of Afghanistan since it was seen as

an ally of the Soviet Union and had been a strong supporter of the Northern Alliance. During the entire period of Taliban rule, India was nearly excluded from Afghanistan. Indian political commentators and academics specializing in the geopolitics of the region regularly advised the government of India not to be complacent with what was going on in Afghanistan and the region. The government was also warned from time to time that the growing influence of the Taliban could be a great setback to India's interests in Central Asia.

The change in political dynamics in Afghanistan after 9/11 also led to a significant shift in India's role and influence in the region. With an active role in the efforts toward the reconstruction of the war-ravaged state, India has now become a partner in its economy and political dynamics. The government also announced a huge aid package for Afghanistan. Since 2001 India has offered $1.2 billion for Afghanistan's reconstruction, making it the largest regional donor to the country. India is also home to around 8,400 Afghan refugees, most of whom came after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, although some came later during Taliban rule. Although India does not recognize them officially as refugees, it allows the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' office in New Delhi to carry out some programs for them. By helping to rebuild a new Afghanistan, India strives for greater regional stability, but also hopes to counter Pakistan's influence in Kabul. Leading Afghan government officials have become frequent visitors to New Delhi. Afghan president Hamid Karzai (b. 1957) has made three official visits to India since he assumed office in 2001.

In March 2003 a preferential trade agreement was signed between India and Afghanistan. As per the terms of the agreement, customs duty on various items was reduced to encourage bilateral trade. Three memoranda of understanding for strengthening cooperation in the fields of rural development, education, and standardization between India and Afghanistan were signed during President Karzai's visit to India on April 9–13, 2006. An agreement providing $50 million to promote bilateral businesses between India and Afghanistan was signed during the visit of the Afghan foreign minister Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta (b. 1954; minister of foreign affairs 2006–) between June 29 and July 1, 2006. During the same year, India raised its aid package to Afghanistan by $150 million, to $750 million. India also supported Afghanistan's bid to become a member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.

Apart from trade relations and reconstruction efforts, there have also been talks of a multilateral pipeline project from Central Asia to India to cater to the region's growing energy needs. First envisaged in 1991, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline project is designed to transport natural gas from the Dawlatabad fields in Turkmenistan through Afghanistan into Pakistan and eventually to India. The initial phase of the project, excluding the pipeline's possible extension to India, would involve the construction of a pipeline about 1,057 miles in length, mostly through Afghan territory, that can transport up to 65 billion cubic feet of natural gas annually. However, troubled relations between India and Pakistan have acted as a stumbling block toward the realization of this project, which is very eagerly pursued by the Karzai government in Afghanistan, as it would significantly assist in providing much needed revenue to the war-ravaged country.

According to Indian officials, there are currently about 4,000 Indian workers and security personnel working on different relief and reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. Since 2006, following increased incidents of kidnappings and attacks, India has sent the country's mountain-trained paramilitary force, tasked with guarding its border with China, to guard its workers; there are currently about 500 police deployed in Afghanistan. India is involved in a wide array of development projects in Afghanistan. In January 2009 India completed construction of the Zaranj-Delaram highway in southwest Afghanistan near the Iranian border; it is constructing Afghanistan's new parliament building, set for completion by 2011; it is constructing the Salma Dam power project in Herat Province; it has trained Afghan police officers, diplomats, and civil servants; and it has provided support in the areas of health, education, transportation, power, and telecommunications. Since 2001 India has opened consulates in Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad, and Kandahar. Bilateral trade between India and Afghanistan has been on the rise, reaching $358 million for the fiscal year April 2007 to March 2008.

The security situation in Afghanistan has been deteriorating continuously. The Taliban have issued serious threats to escalate a campaign of suicide bombings to topple the Karzai government and drive away foreign troops. Beginning in 2002 the Taliban have also been vociferously demanding the departure of Indians involved in developmental activity, and these demands have been followed up with threats and action. The nature of the attacks on Indian targets has varied from abduction and beheading to suicide attacks. For instance, the southwest province of Nimroz saw three separate attacks on Indian personnel on June 5 and April 12, 2007, and January 3, 2008. Around 400 Indo-Tibetan Border Police personnel posted at the Indian embassy in Kabul and working with personnel of the Border Roads Organization (BRO) on the Zaranj-Delaram road-building project have increasingly faced the brunt of these attacks. According to unconfirmed reports, no fewer than 30 rocket attacks have been made on BRO personnel engaged in building the 124-mile stretch of road across Nimroz.

In one of the most deadly attacks, on July 7, 2008, the Indian Embassy in Kabul was attacked by a suicide car bomber. The bombing killed 58 people and wounded 141, including two Indian Army officers. In the investigations that followed, the Afghan government claimed that the Pakistani intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), was involved in the attack. On October 18, 2009, the Indian Embassy in Kabul was attacked again by a car bomb, little more than a year after the previous attack. The attack killed at least 17 people. However, in spite of the violent attacks, India has remained committed to its reconstruction effort in Afghanistan but has now begun to think of effective methods to provide security to the Indian workers in Afghanistan.

India's increased involvement in Afghanistan has been a cause of concern for Pakistan. Pakistan enjoyed good relations with the Taliban, being among the only three countries to recognize the Taliban government in Afghanistan. However, the events of 9/11 and the subsequent U.S. action in Afghanistan turned the political dynamics on its head. The Taliban were overthrown, and the Northern Alliance, with whom India enjoyed good relations, formed the

new government. Pakistan, on the other hand, lost its strategic depth in Afghanistan and also had to bear the burden of thousands of Afghan refugees, including pro-Taliban elements who are supporting dissident movements in Pakistan. Since then, both India and Pakistan have played the blame game. While Pakistan accused India of using its consulates in Afghanistan as headquarters of the RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) to support insurgent movements within Pakistan, the Indian government has claimed that the various attacks on Indian personnel in Afghanistan have been carried out by the ISI in Pakistan.

Despite attacks on its citizens working in Afghanistan, India continues to engage in construction work. India's engagement in Afghanistan has come a long way, from the closure of its embassy in Kabul in September 1996 to the August 2005 visit of the Indian prime minister to Kabul, the first in 29 years. The coalition regime has a lot of goodwill toward India. It is looking forward to investment by India in Afghanistan in a massive way and is seeking Indian expertise in various fields. However, there are many challenges and constraints to India's Afghan policy. The strong element of unpredictability and uncertainty in Afghan politics calls for constant evaluation of India's options in Afghanistan.

STUTI BHATNAGAR

See also Pakistan, Relations with

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✦ AGED

The aged population in India is expected to grow rapidly from 77 million in 2000 to 141 million by 2020 for ages 65 and older. The estimated 2010 population of people 65 years of age and above is 59,735,000, or 5 percent of the total Indian population, of which 31,803,000

are female, and 27,932,000 are male. Estimated life expectancy in 2001 at ages 60 and 70 was 17 and 10.5 years respectively for women, and 15.7 and 9.7 for men. India has the second-largest aged population in the world after China; more than four-fifths of elderly people live in rural areas with females outnumbering males. The United Nations (UN) defines a country as "aging" where the proportion of people 60 and over reaches 7 percent of the total population. India has exceeded this, with ages 60 and over constituting 7.6 percent in 2010, and likely to reach 12.6 percent by 2025. While traditionally India has had a strong joint family system, high levels of poverty for some, increased affluence for others, urban migration, and more women opting for employment have contributed toward the number of nuclear families increasing, and this leads to neglect and abuse of the aged in conjunction with the lack of systematic government provision for their welfare. In November 2007 an enhanced national-level pension scheme for those 65 years or older and below the poverty line (the poor and those who are destitute) was launched; the central government provides 200 rupees per months, and states provide another 200 rupees. Prior to this, in 1995, the National Old Age Pension Scheme was instituted for people age 65 and above, of which the central government funded 75 rupees per month, with states providing another 75 rupees.

The rural elderly, however, are often unaware of available provisions for their welfare, and the general condition of basic public services in India remains abysmal. As a result, most of those over 60 are economically active in some capacity or other. Over 90 percent of the workforce is employed in the informal sector, but the security offered through pension systems is only available to the 10 percent in the organized sector. More than 75 percent of the aged who live in poor rural areas have little or no access to health care services, and it is often nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with mobile clinics that offer basic services. HelpAge India is the leading aged-care NGO and the largest national NGO in India. Kerala state, where palliative care for the aged in rural and urban areas is highly developed compared to other parts of India, has the highest proportion of aged. In 2004 a new contributory-based pension system was introduced by the Indian government and made available to all citizens in 2009. Very few hospitals have geriatric specialists. Thus, in spite of the Indian tradition of venerating elders, most of the aged in India fare very poorly.

RISTO HÄRMÄ

See also Family

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✦ AGRICULTURE

The role of the agricultural sector in economic development has been emphasized by a large number of studies and can be analyzed in terms of its early stages and later stages. In the early stages, agriculture is the provider of food and labor to the nonagricultural sector. In the later stages of economic development, despite the decline in agriculture's share, its importance does not decline. In the later stages, through improved efficiency and high growth, the agricultural sector leads to faster structural transformation and poverty reduction. It is this realization that has led the World Bank to devote its World Development Report for 2008 to agriculture and its role in development, including poverty reduction. The World Bank Report grouped agricultural development of countries into three levels: agriculture based; transforming economies; and urbanized. Within this three-level classification, India falls under the transforming economies group. However, there are large regional disparities within the country, and the states are at different stages of development. Thus, states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar have been categorized as agriculturally based states, while Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu can be termed as urbanized states. West Bengal, Orissa, and Kerala have been placed in the transforming category.

In India, although the share of the agricultural sector in real gross domestic product (GDP) has declined from 18 percent in 2007–2008, 52 percent of the working population is still employed in agriculture. The contribution of agriculture, industry, and services to real GDP is shown in figure 1.This shows that while the contribution of the agriculture sector has declined, the share of services has remained more or less flat. In contrast to the agricultural and industrial sectors, the share for services has increased sharply during the period 1951–2008.

The growth rate of the agricultural sector in the postreform period (1991 onward), however, is relatively low compared to other sectors. The agricultural growth rate peaked during the period 1980–1981 to 1989–1990, when it reached 4.4 percent. During the




Figure 1 Contribution of different sectors in gross domestic product

Table 1 Decadal Average Growth Rates (in percent)

Decades	Agriculture	Industry	Services
1951–1960	2.7	5.8	4.2
1960–1970	2.5	6.2	5.2
1970–1980	1.3	4.4	4.0
1980–1990	4.4	6.4	6.3
1990–2000	3.2	5.7	7.1
2000–2008	2.9	7.1	9.0

Source: Reserve Bank of India, *Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy, 2007–08* (Mumbai: Reserve Bank of India, 2008).

period 1990–1991 to 1999–2000, on average, the real growth rate of the agricultural sector was 3.2 percent, compared to 5.7 percent in the industrial sector and 7.1 percent in the services sector. During the following decade (2000–2001 to 2007–2008) too, the growth rates in the agricultural sector again remained subdued at 2.9 percent, much lower than industry (7.1 percent) and services (9 percent). The growth rate per decade for the three sectors for the period 1951–1952 to 2007–2008 is shown in table 1.

The proportion of the total outlay during the First Five-Year Plan (1951–1956) was 17.5 percent. Agricultural development, including irrigation projects that are so important in a country such as India with its many arid areas, received a high priority. In the Second Five-Year Plan (1956–1961) emphasis was placed on heavy industries, and the share of agriculture in the plan was reduced to 11 percent. The policies that followed to boost agricultural growth during this period were mainly institutional in nature. These included land reforms, service cooperatives, and the development of irrigation facilities. The Second Five-Year Plan in this context stated that during the First Five-Year Plan it was of crucial importance that agricultural programs succeed, for no other consideration had equal significance for the stability of the economy as a whole. In the Second Five-Year Plan agricultural programs were intended to provide adequate food to support the increased population and the raw materials needed for a growing industrial economy and also to make available larger exportable surpluses of agricultural commodities. The Second Five-Year Plan implied, therefore, even more than the first plan, a close interdependence between agricultural and industrial development.

The proportion of the total outlay allocated to agriculture increased to 12.7 percent in the Third Five-Year Plan (1961–1966) and further to 16.7 percent in the Annual Plan (1966–1969). The Third Five-Year Plan coincided with the introduction of revolutionary high-yielding varieties of seeds. The hybrid varieties of maize and millet seeds were adopted in 1960, and the Mexican variety of wheat seeds was successfully experimented with on a selective basis in 1963–1964. The result was that the high-yielding varieties of seeds were adopted as full-fledged programs in 1966. This started a new phase in the agricultural sector as the food grains output jumped to 95.05 million tons in 1967–1968 from 74.23 million tons




Figure 2 Gross capital formation in agriculture and allied activities (as proportion of total gross capital formation)

in the previous year. The sharp increase in agricultural output since the introduction of high-yielding varieties, which was also accompanied with an increase in the use of such inputs as fertilizers and irrigation, is also referred to as the Green Revolution. The impact of this revolution was noticed most of all in the north and the northwestern parts of India between 1966 and the mid-1980s.

The gross capital formation in agriculture as a proportion of real GDP (at constant prices) was 10.6 percent in 1999–2000 but declined to 9.6 percent in 2000–2001 (see figure 2). It improved to 12.5 percent in 2006–2007. The 11th Five-Year Plan (2007–2012) has targeted gross capital formation at 16 percent to achieve a growth rate of 4 percent in the agricultural sector.

Besides food grains, horticultural crops also contribute significantly to agricultural GDP. In 2005–2006 the horticulture sector contributed around 28 percent of GDP in agriculture. The total production of fruits and vegetables was estimated at 57.7 million tons and 111.8 million tons respectively in 2006–2007, constituting 15 percent and 11 percent of total world output. The livestock sector also contributes over 4 percent to the total GDP and about a quarter of the GDP originating from agriculture and allied activities. India ranks first in the world in milk production, the production of which rose from 17 million tons in 1950–1951 to about 102 million tons by 2007–2008. The per capita availability of milk also increased from 112 grams per day in 1968–1969 to 246 grams during 2006–2007. This, however, is still lower than the world average of 265 grams per day.

The government, to increase agricultural output and reduce inequality in the rural areas, initiated several measures relating to inputs in the agricultural sector. The four major inputs are land, credit, fertilizer, and electricity.

The government introduced land reforms soon after the country gained independence in August 1947. However, as agriculture comes under the jurisdiction of the states and not the central government, the onus for implementing these reforms rested with the states. Land

reform programs, which were given a place of special significance both in the First and in the Second Five-Year Plans, had two specific objects. The first was to remove impediments in order to increase agricultural production from the agrarian structure inherited from the past. This would help to create conditions for evolving as speedily as possible an agricultural economy with high levels of efficiency and productivity. The second object, which was closely related to the first, was to eliminate all elements of exploitation and social injustice within the agrarian system, to provide security for the tiller of soil, and to assure equality of status and opportunity to all sections of the rural population.

The four major components of land reforms were: abolition of the *zamindari* system; tenancy reforms; land ceilings; and land consolidation. *Zamindari* derives from the word *zamindar,* which means feudal landlords, and refers to a system wherein landlords collected tribute from cultivators in exchange for land tax paid to the British rulers. The tenancy reforms aimed at improving contractual reform for the tenants, including a share of the crop assigned to the tenants, and security. The primary objective of imposing a land ceiling was for the purposes of redistributing the land. The actual redistribution of land was, however, limited due to very high land ceilings and political power held by the large farmers. The redistributed land in October 1992, for example, formed only 1.92 percent of the operational holdings in the 18 major states of India. Another reform was the consolidation of landholdings, according to which small portions of land belonging to the same small landowner, but situated at some distance from one another, could be consolidated into a single holding.



Some 60 percent of India's population lives off the land, and India ranks second in the world in agricultural output. Modern machinery and modern farming techniques, even in remote areas, contribute to India's huge agricultural production. (Samrat/Dreamstime.com)

Credit constitutes an important input in agricultural operations. Recognizing the importance of agriculture to the economy and the large number of people dependent on agriculture for their livelihood, the Reserve Bank of India has stipulated that bank advances to agriculture should be 18 percent of the net bank credit of domestic banks. The targets have been linked to adjusted net bank credit (that is, net bank credit plus investments by banks in non–statutory liquidity bonds) or the credit equivalent amount of off-balance sheet exposures, whichever is higher, with effect from April 30, 2007. The lending of both public and private sector banks has, however, fallen short of the targeted 18 percent. Other measures that have been taken up are the introduction of a special agricultural credit plan (SACP), within which banks are required to fix self-set targets for achievement during the year, and the targets are usually fixed about 20–25 percent higher than the actual credit given in the previous year.

The government has taken a number of measures to ensure the availability of quality seeds, fertilizers, and irrigation facilities, as well as the provision of electricity to the agricultural sector. Although the use of these inputs needs to be stressed, the Economics Survey reiterated that the consequences of climate change on Indian agriculture also needs to be factored into the strategy for the development of agriculture.

The 11th Five-Year Plan (2007–2012) outlines a number of challenges in the agricultural sector identified since the 1990s. These are the slowdown in agricultural growth; the widening of disparities between irrigated and rain-fed areas; the impact of volatile world commodity prices on crops such as cotton and oilseeds; low technology adoption; inefficient use of technology and inputs; inadequate institutional support; and the degradation of natural resources, such as the worrying decline in the groundwater table. The stagnation in agricultural productivity since the 1990s has been attributed to lack of growth in crop yield, lower response of seeds, decline in agricultural investment, poor extension services, low resilience to moisture stress, pests, and high input costs. It has also been observed that the slower growth rate in public expenditure in agriculture inhibited the development of adequate research and an extension system for supporting farming. Also it was found that the practice of farmers borrowing short-term credit to meet expenses on inputs did not lead to long-term capital formation and inhibited investment in agriculture.

To boost agricultural development, greater attention needs to be placed on modernizing the agricultural research system. This is imperative in view of the degradation of the natural resource base, especially the depletion of the groundwater table, as this has particularly adverse impacts for small and marginal farmers. Other measures required for agricultural development are increased investment, diversification of agriculture with increased focus on horticulture and livestock, improved agricultural marketing, modern methods of grading, postharvest management, and development of cold storage facilities. To improve the incentive structure and bargaining power of the small farmers, it has also been suggested that collective access, instead of individual access, of small farmers to product and credit markets should be promoted. Creating a legal framework that enables and encourages the emergence of autonomous organizations (cooperatives, producer companies) is essential to improving

the bargaining power of farmers generally (and of small and marginal farmers in particular), thereby strengthening incentives for faster, more efficient, and more equitable growth.

Also, efficient use of such inputs as water, seeds, and fertilizers should be emphasized by building up appropriate sets of incentives. In the medium term, targets laid down for irrigation and watershed development need to be met, along with development of yield-improving technologies for crops such as oilseeds and pulses. Institutional development and good and effective implementation of agricultural schemes are also essential to achieving better agricultural performance.

Among the initiatives to boost agricultural output is the National Food Security Mission, launched in 2007 by the Ministry of Agriculture with the objective of increasing production of rice, wheat, and pulses. The mission aims at increasing production through expanding the area under cultivation and increasing productivity in certain districts of the country, restoring soil fertility, and creating employment opportunities. The state governments have also been urged to increase their share of public investment for agriculture in state plans. The National Policy for Farmers, 2007, was also adopted by the government of India to improve the economic well-being of the farmers. The broad areas covered include asset reforms to improve the farmers' access to productive assets and marketable skills, and the promotion of water-use efficiency and technological improvement. Furthermore, a nutrient-based pricing regime for all subsidized fertilizers was approved by the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs on June 12, 2008, to create an incentive structure to promote the balanced use of fertilizers.

The government has also approved a rehabilitation package of 169.79 billion rupees for 31 districts with high incidents of farmer suicide in the four states of Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Kerala in 2007–2008. The rehabilitation package consists of establishing sustainable and viable farming and a livelihood support system through debt relief to farmers; improved supply of institutional credit; assured irrigation facilities; watershed management; and subsidiary income opportunities through horticulture, livestock, dairies, and fisheries. The government of India in its annual budget for 2008–2009 raised the Rural Infrastructure Fund. Agriculture is still fundamental to the economy and in the lives of most Indians; it will remain so for the foreseeable future.

RASHMI UMESH ARORA

See also Green Revolution

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✦ AID

Aid is defined broadly as externally provided assistance, including international, emergency humanitarian, and development sources, with the latter including postwar reconstruction. Aid may be further categorized as bilateral when it is between two public (official) governments, or in other words, aid from one country to another country. Examples include the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), Sweden's Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), and others. Multilateral aid is that provided by a group of countries or an organization representing a group of countries to another country. Most aid from bilaterals and multilaterals is called Official Development Assistance (ODA) and is given through the Development Assistance Committee (DAC), which is the coordinating aid body of all Organization

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World Economic Terms



ADB – Asian Development Bank
DAC – Development Assistance Committee
DFID – Department for International Development (UK)
IBRD – International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA – International Development Association
NGO – Nongovernmental organization
ODA – Official Development Assistance
OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
SIDA – Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
USAID – United States Agency for International Development

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for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, and includes the European Commission of the European Union (EU), and through multilateral development assistance, such as international development banks like the World Bank and its divisions, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and its low-cost lending arm, the International Development Association (IDA); and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Aid also includes private (unofficial) assistance provided by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), for example, Oxfam and others. In addition, the development banks' aid is in loans at noncommercial rates of interest and payment periods (soft loans). Bilaterals give soft loans and grants, and NGOs give grants. Official development assistance includes technical assistance and transfers from bilaterals and multilaterals via NGOs. Finally, the United Nations (UN), like NGOs, gives grant aid. The developed countries give aid through the DAC.

While India itself has become an aid donor in recent years, the nation is nevertheless in need of funding for social development, including physical infrastructure needs, on a massive scale, given that it has, using the World Bank measures of absolute poverty, 41.6 percent of its population living in extreme poverty on less than $1.25 a day, and 75.6 percent in moderate poverty living on less than $2 a day. In 2003 the Indian government announced that it would no longer accept what it called small bilateral aid, citing the high cost and lead time required to agree on the conditions of DAC aid packages. It said that it planned to continue with aid only from the European Commission, Japan, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Consequently, other bilaterals with small aid amounts should use NGOs operating in India to channel aid. It simultaneously announced its own external aid program as the Indian Development Initiative. Subsequently, in 2004, the incoming Indian government modified this policy, stating that a minimum threshold level of aid of $25 million would qualify bilaterals as donors to India.

Multilaterals involved in India are the World Bank with, in 2006, a net disbursement (actual loan minus repaid amount) of aid of $606.2 million; the IDA with $239.2 million; the ADB with $564 million (in 2008 the ADB figure was $8.2 billion); UNICEF with $38 million; the UN World Food Program (WFP) with $9.6 million; and "other" UN agencies with $65.4 million. The European Commission is grouped with DAC donors. Total bilateral aid to India from the DAC is currently the disbursed net outstanding (actual loan minus repaid amount) of $862.8 million. This is broken down, with all figures for 2006, between the DAC's 10 major donors: (1) DFID, United Kingdom, $349.3 million, (2) European Commission of the EU, $209.7, (3) USAID, United States, $96.8, (4) Germany, $55.7, (5) Japan, $29.6, (6) Canada, $25.5, (7) Norway, $18.3, (8) Sweden, $17.1, (9) Netherlands, $13.1, and (10) France, $4.3; along with a total amount of $42.6 million from other DAC donors. This is, however, a net amount so that using the "$25 million" minimum rule (for gross amounts) is not valid. The following set of donors show aid disbursement for 2007 to India: to NGOs; these countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland. In 2006, total DAC ODA net disbursements to India represent 1 percent of total net DAC ODA aid outstanding

for all DAC ODA aid recipients; a total of 16 developing countries receive net aid of $1 billion or more (2006), while total net DAC ODA to low- and middle-income countries in 2006 was $86.425 billion. It has been pointed out that what is much more interesting than the total amount of aid is the way in which it is distributed. ODA is allocated in some strange and arbitrary ways, if development need is taken as the primary criterion. South Asia (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka), where nearly 50 percent of the world's poorest people live, receives $6 per person in aid. The Middle East and North Africa, in 2005, with well over triple South Asia's per capita income, receives 14 times the per capita aid.

While it is extremely difficult to list all the NGOs and the amounts of aid they channel to developing countries such as India, it can briefly be stated that there are an estimated 2 million NGOs of all sizes and mandates, domestic and foreign, working in India. Recent major humanitarian emergencies, in which NGOs will have played important relief aid and reconstruction roles, are the Bihar floods in 2008, floods across India in 2007 (in Bihar alone 10 million people were affected), the Kashmir earthquake in 2005, the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, the Gujarat earthquake in 2001, and the Orissa cyclone in 1999. It is important to note that the ADB worked on post-tsunami infrastructure reconstruction.

Major focuses of DAC ODA and NGO aid in India are on health, education (primary education as the sole focus), and infrastructure development (roads, flood management, transport, water, sanitation, and energy).

Under the heading of aid effectiveness, in addition to the key issues of sufficient funding, absorption capacity, and tied versus untied aid, is the critical problem of corruption. It is an unfortunate fact that the poorest countries are often the most corrupt, and hence, are the least likely to benefit from aid while being the most in need of it. The poorest and most underdeveloped states of India, specifically Bihar, Jharkhand, and Uttar Pradesh, are the most corrupt; in the case of Bihar, it is described as a case of "virtual statelessness." Of great concern is the fact that by the Indian government's own admission, most Indian government development spending fails to reach its intended recipients. Against this backdrop, the DFID, the ADB, and the World Bank are involved in a "governance reform program" in Bihar. With this program, continuous program monitoring of the situation on the ground becomes crucial, especially when faced with claims about aid's success, such as in the case of the India-wide primary education improvement program, the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, which, supported by international donors, is credited at present with reducing out-of-school children from 42.2 million in 2001, to 7.8 million in 2005.

RISTO HÄRMÄ

See also Economy; World Bank, Relations with

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See HIV/AIDS

✦ AKALI DAL

Commonly known as Akali Dal, the Shiromani Akali Dal (Akali Religious Party) is a Sikh political party based in the Indian state of the Punjab. It was founded on December 13, 1920, following the formation of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC), a religious body formed to manage Sikh Gurdwaras (temples) and to take the management away from corrupt priests. Since its establishment, the Akali Dal has changed its character and its structure several times. It continues to retain its predominant nature of representing the Sikhs in the Punjab, particularly the peasant Jat Sikh community; however, over the years the party has focused on several religio-political issues in the state, sometimes placing it at loggerheads with the Union Government and sometimes colluding with the party at the center.

Before the establishment of the Shiromani Akali Dal, the Central Sikh League guided the affairs of the Sikh community. The SGPC and the Shiromani Akali Dal were formed after the Gurdwara Act of 1925, which was a culmination of the Gurdwara Reform Movement. In 1944, seeking to protect Sikh political rights and representation, the Shiromani Akali Dal and the SGPC sponsored the creation of the All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF). In independent India, the AISSF became closely linked as the youth arm of the Akali Dal, and it became the nation's leading student political organization.

Sardar Sarmukh Singh Chubbal was the first president of the Akali Dal, but it was under Master Tara Singh (1885–1967) that the Akali Dal became a powerful political force. Under the leadership of Master Tara Singh in the 1950s and 1960s, the Akali Dal launched the Punjabi Suba agitation to secure a Sikh-majority state based on the Punjabi language. The language divide became an instrument of struggle as Punjabi Hindus took up the cause of Hindi and as the Sikhs under the leadership of the Akali Dal intensified the demand for a Punjabi-speaking state. Various solutions were suggested to resolve the dispute and,

in November 1966, through the Punjab Reorganization Act, the new state of Haryana was demarcated out of the Punjab on linguistic lines.

In October 1973 the Akali Dal released its manifesto, the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. The resolution outlined several key objectives, namely transfer of the federally administered city of Chandigarh to the Punjab; readjustment of the boundaries of the Punjab to incorporate certain Sikh Punjabi-speaking areas contiguous to the state; the provision of a measure of provincial autonomy for all Indian states; land reform; nationalization of key industries; Union Government investment in establishing heavy industry in Punjab; promulgation of an all-India *gurdwara* act to bring all Sikh shrines and temples under the control of the SGPC; protection for Sikh minorities outside the Punjab; and nonreduction of the recruitment quota for Sikhs in the armed forces. The party actively pursued the implementation of these demands during the 1980s while Hindu-Sikh and Center-Punjab relations deteriorated.

Between August 1980 and September 1981, the Akali Dal held several peaceful agitations. In February 1981, under the leadership of Harchand Singh Longowal (d. 1985), the party decided to strive for the implementation of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. During this phase, the party demonstrated a predominantly religious character focusing primarily on Sikh interests, which in turn alienated the Hindu population of the state. The Dharam Yudh Morcha (battle for righteousness) of 1981–1984 was thus launched. The *rail roko morcha* (rail blockade), *rasta roko morcha* (road blockade), and the *kaam roko morcha* (work stoppage) were launched during this time. The demands were, however, refused by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984), and the Punjab was placed under the president's rule in October 1983 following increasing violence in the state. This was also the time that the Khalistan movement (the campaign for a Sikh homeland) began to gain in popularity in the Punjab under the leadership of Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale (1947–1984). Though initially sympathetic to the cause of the Khalistanis, following increasing violence in the state, the Akali Dal supported the Union Government in trying to curtail this movement. However, the political disaster of Operation BLUESTAR on the Golden Temple in June 1984 led to the alienation of the Union Government in the state and to a decade of violence and strife. On October 31, 1984, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards in retaliation for the attack on the Sikh holy shrine. The brutality of the attack and the increasingly violent situation in the state compelled the Akali Dal to join hands with the Congress Party to establish peace in the state through the Rajiv-Longowol Accord. Signed between Akali Dal leader Harchand Singh Longowal and new Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991; prime minister 1984–1989) in July 1985, the accord recognized the religious, territorial, and economic demands of the Sikhs articulated previously in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution by the Akali Dal. The agreement provided a basis for a return to normalcy in the troubled state. It was, however, denounced by a few Sikh militants who refused to give up the demand for an independent Khalistan. The accord also failed to achieve many of its other objectives relating to territorial disputes and disputes regarding the

sharing of water from rivers in the state. Severely criticized for its failure, it also harmed the alliance between the Akali Dal and the Congress.

Along with the volatile political environment of the Punjab, the Akali Dal as a party has also witnessed many internal tensions, divisions, and factionalism, with each faction claiming to be the real Akali Dal. As of 2003, the Shiromani Akali Dal headed by Parkash Singh Badal (b. 1927) was the largest faction. Other factions have included the Sarb Hind Shiromani Akali Dal, led by Gurcharan Singh Tohra (1924–2004); the Shiromani Akali Dal, led by Simranjit Singh Mann (b. 1945); the Shiromani Akali Dal (Panthik), led by Amarinder Singh (b. 1942); the Shiromani Akali Dal Delhi; the Shiromani Akali Dal (Democratic); the Haryana State Akali Dal; and the Shiromani Akali Dal (Longowal). As of August 2008, there were six groups claiming to be the Akali Dal. They are the Shiromani Akali Dal (Badal), the Shiromani Akali Dal (Simranjit Singh Mann), the Shiromani Akali Dal Delhi, the Haryana State Akali Dal, the Shiromani Akali Dal (UK), and the Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar (Panch Pardhani).

Apart from the internal factionalism within the party, there has also been a shift in the electoral pattern in the postmilitancy Punjab. Politico-economic issues of development have increasingly replaced issues of ethno-religious character. The restoration of civilian rule witnessed the Akalis moving away from the *miri-piri* (two words which were adapted into the Sikh tradition to connote the close relationship within it between the temporal and the spiritual) and the inseparability of religion and politics syndrome. It evolved gradually from an agitation party of the Sikhs to a political party that belongs to all Punjabis. Also discernable is a shift within the Shiromani Akali Dal from an anti-Center stand to cooperative federalism, and from the politics of confrontation to peace and Hindu-Sikh unity.



Supporters of Shiromani Akali Dal raise banners as they listen to a speaker at a farmers' rally in New Delhi, February 26, 2008. (AP Photo/Gurinder Osan)

At the February 2007 Punjab state elections, the Shiromani Akali Dal led by Parkash Singh Badal won 48 of the 117 seats, becoming the largest party in the East Punjab State Assembly. The alliance of the Shiromani Akali Dal led by Parkash Singh Badal and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) took over the state government from the Indian National Congress (INC), taking advantage of the faction-ridden Congress Party led by Amarinder Singh. In spite of its victory, the Akali Dal continues to be riven by internal divisions and other problems. Owing to its history and support for the Khalistan movement during the 1980s and its pro-Sikh image, it fails to attract the support of the Hindu population in the state. It also finds less support from the lower-caste Sikhs, thus continuing to be a party of the landed Jat Sikhs and the Khatri community. According to election surveys the Akali Dal needs to reform its social base in order to continue playing a dynamic role in the electoral politics of the Punjab.

STUTI BHATNAGAR

See also Punjab

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✦ AKSAI CHIN

Aksai Chin (an Uyghur name meaning "desert of white stones") is a plateau in the western Himalayas that has been subject to a border dispute between India and the People's Republic of China (PRC) and is currently part of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region in the PRC. With virtually no permanent population, Aksai Chin is about 14,000 square miles in size and varies between 15,000 to 18,000 feet in elevation.

Prior to the 20th century, Aksai Chin was subject to vague territorial claims by numerous governments, including those of Ladakh, Kashmir, India, Tibet, Xinjiang, and China, although it wasn't until the 1950s that any government sought to enforce its claim on the ground by establishing border posts. Efforts by both China and India to establish effective control over the plateau led to several border clashes in 1959 and

eventual war in 1962. While China has been in full possession of Aksai Chin since then, India has never relinquished its claim to the territory.

There has been relatively little evidence of the exact location of political boundaries in the high Himalayas until quite recently. Up to the 17th century, the eastern border of the kingdom of Ladakh appears to have been located in or around Aksai Chin. In 1681 a failed invasion of Ladakh (then part of the Mughal Empire) by Tibet led to the treaty between Ladakh and Tibet of 1684, which referred to the fixed boundaries between the two countries but did not attempt to further define them. In 1819 the Sikh kingdom based in Lahore, Punjab, conquered Kashmir, and in turn, Ladakh was conquered by Kashmir (independently of Lahore) in 1840. In 1841–1842, war between Kashmir and Tibet led to the treaty of 1842 between Kashmir, Tibet, and China that reaffirmed "the old established borders" between Ladakh and Tibet but, again, without specific definition. However, the PRC has since argued that this treaty was not ratified by the Chinese government and is therefore invalid.

Following the first Anglo-Sikh War in 1846, Britain annexed parts of the Sikh kingdom, including Kashmir. Rather than rule Kashmir directly, the British installed Gulab Singh (1792–1857; maharaja 1846–1857), the governor of Jammu province, as maharaja of Kashmir (including Ladakh). As part of this agreement (the Treaty of Lahore, 1846), the British set out to formally demarcate the boundaries of Kashmir, which included the old Ladakh-Tibet border.

The British survey team produced a map drawn by W. H. Johnson in 1847 that placed in general terms Aksai Chin as part of Kashmir. This map proved controversial among British government officials by defining a border with Tibet that was in practical terms unenforceable due to the rough terrain and extreme altitude. Furthermore, Johnson's map did not denote the Kashmir-Tibet border with a solid line but instead with an imprecise color wash (or ink smudge). Nevertheless, the map served as the basis for various atlases published by the British over the next several decades. Despite their claim to Aksai Chin, the British made no effort to set up border posts or otherwise enforce the boundary.

In 1892 Britain and China made an agreement that identified the Karakoram Pass (just west of Aksai Chin) as a fixed point on the India-China border but did not attempt to define the border either to the west or east of the pass. Later in the decade, China reasserted its claim to Aksai Chin but made no effort on the ground to enforce the border.

Upon gaining independence in August 1947, the new government of India published maps showing Aksai Chin to be part of Kashmir. These maps were based on Johnson's 1847 map and included the color wash with the edge marked as "boundary undefined." However, in 1954 new maps were published that replaced the color wash with a solid line indicating a fixed boundary. Maps produced by the PRC continued to show Aksai Chin as part of China.

In 1956–1957 the PRC built a road (now with the name China Highway 219) through Aksai Chin connecting Tibet with Xinjiang. Upon learning of the road, India sent a diplomatic note to China making a formal claim to Aksai Chin, arguing that the plateau had been part of India for centuries. It also sent two army patrols to the area. China replied that India's

patrols had illegally crossed into Chinese territory and insisted that Aksai Chin was part of Xinjiang and had always been under Chinese jurisdiction. In 1959 there were several clashes between Chinese and Indian border patrols.

The government of India decided in 1961 to pursue what it called the Forward Policy in order to enforce its border claims on the ground. Troops were sent throughout the territory claimed by India to set up border posts staffed by as few as 10 men each. The Chinese responded by initiating a large-scale offensive on October 20, 1962, that pushed the Indian Army out of Aksai Chin. Chinese forces moved as far west as their existing border claim and then declared a unilateral ceasefire on November 21, 1962. However, the two countries have never negotiated a formal peace treaty, so there remains no agreed border between them in the western Himalayas.

ERIC STRAHORN

See also Himalaya; Jammu and Kashmir

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Ali Akbar Khan. *See* Khan, Ali Akbar

✦ ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY

Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) is located in the city of Aligarh, 81 miles southeast of Delhi, in the state of Uttar Pradesh. With some 40,000 students and 2,000 faculty, it is a university of international repute and attracts students, irrespective of their caste, creed, religion, or gender, from all over India and other countries in South Asia and many parts of the world. Its library has one of the world's most renowned collections of Oriental manuscripts and paintings of the Mughal era (1525–1858). Centrally located, the city of Aligarh is well connected by road and rail on the Delhi-Kolkata railroad and the Grand Trunk road. Aligarh was one of the most important educational institutions for Indian Muslims set up in the final years of the 19th century. Originally, it was known as Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College (MAO) and established in 1875 by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1917–1898), a renowned Muslim social and educational reformer.

In the 1830s the British colonial government made the crucial decision to replace the use of the Persian language with English in government and as the language of the courts of law. In the aftermath of the unsuccessful and traumatic events of the War of 1857, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and his associates felt the need for the Muslim community to learn the English language and to master the Western educational curriculum in order to ensure their upward mobility in social, financial, and political circles. With this in mind, he set up the Scientific Society of Aligarh in 1864. With the aim to build a college along the lines of those at Oxford and Cambridge universities in England, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan started MAO.

Some landmarks related to the checkered history of AMU include:

January 8, 1877. Lord Lytton (1831–1891), the viceroy and governor-general of India (1876–1880) laid the foundation stone of the central library, which was named after him as Lytton Library.

January 1, 1878. Intermediate classes started, and the college became affiliated with Calcutta University.

December 22, 1886: The All-India Mohammedan Educational Conference was inaugurated to discuss the educational needs of Muslims and the introduction of Western education.

November 16, 1887. MAO became affiliated with Allahabad University, one of the major centers of higher education in India at the time.

March 7, 1906. The Prince of Wales (1841–1910), the future King Edward VII (1901–1910) of Great Britain and Ireland, visited the college.

July 25, 1914. The main gate of the college was named Victoria Gate after Queen Victoria of Great Britain (1819–1901; queen 1837–1901).

December 1, 1920. The Central Legislative Assembly passed the Aligarh Muslim University Act (1920), which transformed the college into a university named Aligarh Muslim University (AMU). It had 13 departments in various disciplines. With financial backing from Sultan Mahommed Shah, Aga Khan III (1877–1957), Sultan Jahan, Begum of Bhopal (1858–1930; ruler of Bhopal, 1901–1926) was appointed to be the first chancellor, and Mohammad Ali Mohammad Khan, Maharajah Mahmudabad (1879–1931) became the first vice chancellor of the university in December 1920 and served as vice chancellor until February 1923.

December 28, 1922. The first convocation of the university took place, and 228 Science and Arts graduates received their degrees.

January 23, 1938. The Aga Khan laid the foundation stone for the Technical Laboratories.

December 8, 1951. The first president of India, Dr. Rajendra Prasad (1884–1963; president 1950–1962), delivered the convocation address.

November 6, 1955. Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), the prime minister of India (1947–1964), laid the foundation stone of Maulana Azad Library. The seven-storied building is surrounded by 4.75 acres of land. The library has more than a million books,

periodicals, manuscripts, paintings, and photographs. Among the works in the rare collection is the Latin translation of the Arabic work on Optics, by Ibn-al-Haitham (965–1039 CE), published in 1572. Also housed in the library are several important *farmans* (decrees) of the Mughal emperors.

The first amendment to the AMU Act was made in 1951 by the Nehru cabinet, which made important changes affecting membership of the AMU Court (Senate), which was made open to non-Muslims. Further, the composition of the University Court, the Executive Council, and the Academic Council were to undergo changes in accordance with the new act. When some Muslim leaders took offense at AMU being deprived of its Muslim character and challenged the government in the Supreme Court, the Court ruled that AMU was established by the Act of 1920 by the British government and hence the issue of Muslims administering the main bodies of AMU did not arise. In 1981 the central government led by Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984) restored the Muslim character of the university, which was again removed by another amendment in 1985.

Since its inception AMU has produced a large number of eminent personalities who have made a mark in their own fields. They include such political leaders as Sheikh Abdullah (1905–1982), Maulana Mohammed Ali Jauhar (1878–1931), Maulana Shaukat Ali (1873–1938), Dr. Zakir Hussein (1897–1969), Liaquat Ali Khan (1895–1951), and Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan (1907–1974); cricketer Syed Mushtaq Ali (1914–2005); vice president of India Mohammad Hamid Ansari (b. 1934; vice president 2007–); historians Irfan Habib (b. 1931), Mushirul Hasan (b. 1949), and Z. H. Zaidi (d. 2009); oceanographer Syed Zahoor Qasim (b. 1926); and film star Naseruddin Shah (b. 1950).

AMU offers more than 300 courses in various branches of education and hosts more than a dozen faculties, including the Faculty of Agricultural Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Faculty of Commerce, Faculty of Engineering and Technology, Faculty of Law, Faculty of Management Studies and Research, Faculty of Life Sciences, Faculty of Medicine, Faculty of Social Sciences, and the Faculty of Theology. A number of secondary schools and women's colleges are also affiliated with AMU. The university has also earned a reputation for the high quality of its interdepartmental research centers. These include the Center for Nehru Studies, the Center for West Asian Studies, the Center for Nanotechnology, the Center for the Comparative Study of Indian Languages and Culture, and the Center for Biotechnology.

In 2009 the university administration in Aligarh made the decision to set up five regional centers around the country. They are located in Bhopal (Madhya Pradesh), Pune (Maharashtra), Murshidabad (Bengal), Malappuram (Kerala), and Katihar (Bihar). This has been done to provide opportunities to economically backward and disadvantaged Muslim students who lack the necessary financial means to stay and study at Aligarh. In the new millennium AMU continues to be considered a premier university, not only in India, but also among the world's leading universities.

MOHAMMED BADRUL ALAM

See also Jamia Millia Islamia University; Muslims

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✦ ALL INDIA RADIO

All India Radio (AIR), or *Akashvani* in Hindi, is the national radio broadcasting service of India. Radio broadcasting in India began in 1927 under the name of the Indian Broadcasting Corporation, and when the government took over radio broadcasting in 1936, it renamed the service All India Radio. Since its founding, AIR has faced the challenge of providing service to a nation both physically vast and linguistically and culturally diverse. To this end, AIR broadcasts programs in 24 languages and 146 dialects across India, covering about 99 percent of the population. In the 1950s, however, AIR's popularity suffered as a result of a ministerial decision to decrease the time allotted to popular music. Additionally, the network's credibility in news reporting was strained from the beginning by governmental intervention. AIR was part of the government until 1990 and had a monopoly on broadcasting until 1999, when other stations were given licenses. Despite being reorganized as a public corporation in 1990, AIR continues to be harmed by the perception that it is primarily a government mouthpiece. Nonetheless, because of its wide range and quality of programming, AIR remains an important source of news, information, and entertainment.

AIR broadcasts on national, regional, and local stations. The national service includes the National Channel that runs at night. The main broadcasting center in Delhi broadcasts hourly news reports in Hindi and English and is the headquarters of the news division. It also covers national events—such as elections—in programs that are produced for broadcast across the nation. National programming also includes broadcasts from Parliament, sports commentary, and coverage of the yearly Independence Day and Republic Day parades in New Delhi.

Programs produced regionally are meant to address local concerns and are often broadcast in regional languages or dialects from regional hub stations. These programs reflect the nation's regional, cultural, and linguistic differences. Regional programs can be sent to smaller stations within the region, as well as sent out nationally. Regional stations keep lists of local musical talent who would be acceptable for local music programs and create most of the daily programs heard from their stations. Many regional stations also produce daily news updates



All India Radio (AIR) helps survivors of the Tsunami on a phone-in program in 2005. (Deshakalyan Chowdhury/AFP/Getty Images)

in addition to broadcasting the national news from Delhi. This means that AIR can have different features in the various regions of India under the guise of a national institution.

The local AIR stations serve under-covered areas by broadcasting from small stations. Local programs are used to air issues of largely local concern, to relay emergency announcements, and as a way to include languages and dialects that are not present in regional and national programming. AIR, however, has been slow to embrace extensive local programming and community radio. Many people feel that despite an increased emphasis on local radio production, their voices are not welcome on AIR.

In addition to the national, regional, and local broadcasts, AIR has several branches that serve other audiences. AIR, for example, produces an extensive External Service, which was developed initially to combat German World War II propaganda in Afghanistan and the Middle East. The External Service still broadcasts programs to more than 100 countries. In the 1950s, in order to compete with Radio Ceylon, AIR developed *Vivdh Bharati* so it could broadcast light music and other entertainment programs. Since 1999 AIR has broadcast Hindi and Western popular music from several FM channels (called FM Rainbow and FM Gold), in an attempt to retain listeners who might shift to the commercial and university channels that began to operate that year. These FM channels are commercial stations, with advertising from a limited number of government-approved venders. To keep up with the World Wide Web, AIR streams audio on the Internet and has created a news-on-phone service for cities around the country.

Particularly since India's independence in 1947, AIR has emphasized the role that broadcasting can play in increasing Indian unity and the sense of nation. Over the years, it has expanded its network of stations and modes of transmission to include the entire nation in its programming. Since 1952 it has focused on national issues through a series of programs called National Programs, which are broadcast on every AIR station. The network has also run series of programs devoted to educating the public on such issues as National Plans drawn up by the government of India, communal harmony, and the wars India has fought against the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Pakistan. As national integration and unity remain important, AIR programs are often criticized as being overly circumspect and conservative because they avoid causing offense to any single constituency. The focus on the national interest has also been used to explain and promote government initiatives, and this strains AIR's credibility as an independent news source.

One of AIR's greatest strengths has been its awareness of radio's ability to be informative and educational in a country where there is a high level of illiteracy and a lack of basic education. The station has led several initiatives to raise education levels across the country, including broadcasting Hindi lessons, hosting talks outlining new developments in agriculture, and offering modified university courses. In addition, radio provides news for listeners who do not have access to newspapers, television, or the Internet. Finally, AIR has produced programs designed to reach out to specific segments of the population, such as farmers, women, and students, in an effort to include these marginalized but substantial groups in the nation.

EMILY ROOK-KOEPSEL

See also Radio

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✦ AMAR CHITRA KATHA

Amar Chitra Katha (ACK) is arguably the most important Indian publisher in the modern era. Its comic books are among the most widely recognized staples of Indian culture and have provided generations of Indians with access to the wealth of myths, legends,

and history in their cultural heritage. What started as a home printing project for relatives has since grown into ACK Media, which is based in Mumbai and has created more than 600 comic-book retellings of Indian narratives, established various sub-brands, and forged links with global media partners. Since the publisher's early days, ACK's comics have been incorporated into the school curriculum throughout India, thereby continuing to influence future generations of Indians. The company has sold close to 100 million copies worldwide and continues to add approximately 1.5 million copies a year, which are published in more than 20 languages.

The company lauds itself as the reinventor of "quintessential Indian stories." Thus, the creators have incorporated into their publications many aspects of Indian culture, which are enmeshed in the religious and philosophical systems that we now call "Hinduism" and the many related levels of social structures (caste, *varna* and *jati*, and gender relations, among other things). The comics also reflect India's political and colonial histories as they have been discussed by many scholars. ACK is a product of the larger Indian culture from which it comes, and the stories told within the pages of its publications are constructions that reflect the cultural, historical, and political milieu from which they were created.

ACK was founded and is edited by Anant Pai (b. 1929) of Mumbai. He is popularly known as "Uncle Pai." As a young man, he worked for the *Times of India* on the superhero comic strip *The Phantom*. But this experience with the hero genre was not the catalyst for ACK, only the tool for its eventual establishment. The initial concept was the product of two forces—television and *Classics Illustrated*. *Classics Illustrated*, published by the Gilberton Company of New York from October 1941 to spring 1969, published 169 comic books that retold the Euro-American literary "classics," such as *Moby Dick* and *Cyrano de Bergerac*. The comics repackaged the lengthy novels and dramas into 50-plus-page condensed retellings. The series attempted to maintain literary integrity by adhering closely to the original work while simultaneously making the narratives available and palatable to a wider and younger audience. In fact, many of the *Classics Illustrated* stories concluded with the following statement: "Because of space limitations, we regretfully omitted some of the original characters and sub-plots of this brilliantly written novel. Nevertheless, we have retained its main theme and mood. We strongly urge you to read the original." *Classics Illustrated* provided the format that Pai would adopt.

Television provided another inspiration for the creation of ACK. In 1967 while in Delhi, Pai saw a television show for the first time. The show that he watched was an Indian game show in which Indian children were answering trivia concerning mythology. Pai was shocked when the children, who had masterfully answered questions concerning Greek mythology, could not answer a question about Ram, an incarnation of the Hindu deity Vishnu and protagonist of the widely popular story, the *Ramayana*. Pai realized that there was a need for an easily digestible medium that could impart "Indian" stories to the youth of India. Thus, ACK began publication in 1967 with its first issue, *Krishna*, in an attempt to provide education in an enjoyable medium for the children of India.

The educational goal of ACK followed the paradigm of the *Classics Illustrated* franchise. It condensed large narratives into small digestible volumes that attempted to remain true to the overall mood of the original. But in the Hindu tradition, where a multiplicity of narratives abounds, there is no single authoritative text from which all stories may be taken. Even if such a text existed, the literary tradition is not the sole proprietor of narratives in the Hindu tradition. The literary tradition is intertwined with the history of visual representations, which is evident in numerous illustrated manuscripts, paintings, and sculptures within the Indian context and is incorporated into ACK's publications. Thus, visual representations must also be accounted for in the production of ACK's comics. Another factor that must be considered is the role of the retelling of the narratives through the performing arts. Pai cited *Ramlila* when discussing the original narrative modes that taught children the cultural histories of India. However, the performative genre is only incorporated in minimal depth with respect to the reliance on the literary and visual arts.

The most easily perceived source of the narratives contained within the pages of ACK is the encyclopedic (*Purana*) and epic (*itihasa*) traditions—the literary sources. In this manner, ACK follows its literary guru, *Classics Illustrated*, in the construction of many of its narratives. An example of this comes from ACK £506 *Shiva Parvati*. The narrative of Parvati is primarily constructed from summaries of the *Shiva Purana*'s "Rudra Samhita" (SPR) Section III Parvatikhanda. The comic remains true to even very minute details in the literary narrative. It includes elements that are only described in one verse and have received little to no attention in previous artistic representations of the story. In the beginning of the comic (page 3) the youthful sporting of Parvati mentioned in SPR 3.7.1 is depicted. Later in the issue, Parvati is shown collecting the finest flowers, twigs, and *kusha* grass for Siva's sacrifice; cleaning his set (i.e., area for sacrifice); and fanning him through the heat of the day. Each of these small details is lifted directly from the text of the *Purana* (SPR 3.13.42, 46) to which an entire page (page 8) of the comic book has been devoted. Other such literary allusions persist throughout the ACK comics.

In addition to the literary sources, ACK replicates the visual representations that can be found in both ancient and modern iconography. While the plots closely adhere to the textual tradition, although extremely adumbrated, the illustrations tend to follow the overall themes of the popular iconographic images. The comics incorporate popular representations of the deities that immediately register in the minds of the devoted. This takes place in the *Tales of Durga* (ACK £514). In this retelling of an episode found in the *Devi Mahatmyam* (Glorification of the Goddess), Durga is illustrated following a paradigmatic image of the goddess based on Ravi Varma's *Ashtabhuja Devi*, which had been subsequently reworked in the production of popular calendar art and depicts the slaying of Mahishasura (the Buffalo-demon). The depiction of Shiva also provides an example of ACK's comic books' inclusion of popular iconic representations, which sometimes conflict with the textual description. Shiva is described in the *Shiva Purana* as having resplendent white skin and a blue throat, the result of him consuming the poison from the churning of *amrita* (the nectar of immortality)

(SPR 2.17.4–6). However, the ACK comics typically depict him as green or blue/gray. The incorporation of the various Indian visual representations allows the creators of the comics to introduce manifold genres of Indian culture into this accessible format.

ACK has in recent years widened its comic book offerings to include a broader range of topics. Though ACK published mostly Hindu mythology in its early days, titles have been added to include stories from other faiths, including Islam, Sikhism, Buddhism, Jainism, and Christianity. It has also published issues on modern and contemporary Indian heroes, such as Kalpana Chawla (1962–2003), an Indian-born NASA astronaut who died in the Columbia shuttle explosion on February 1, 2003, and Bhagat Singh (1907–1931), an Indian nationalist who some consider a terrorist because he was hanged for shooting a police officer in 1928. ACK has also created regional collections that shift the focus from a monolithic Sanskritic and northern Indian spotlight to tales that are important within the many regions of India, like Tamil Nadu and Kerala.

Though ACK seeks to educate Indians about their past, they are also poised for the future and have continued to adapt themselves for the increasingly globalized world. Electronic versions of ACK's most popular titles can readily be downloaded by readers all over the world through various formats, such as the Kindle format through Amazon.com, and as an iPhone "app" through Apple's iTunes store. The ACK Media Group has also expanded beyond the comic book format and branched into television, film, and children's periodicals. The company has also teamed with the international communications company Vodafone for the creation of e-books and games that can be downloaded to any cellular phone. ACK Media Group is integral in the understanding of India today and is poised to continue to be vital in the construction of Indian identity for many years to come.

CALEB SIMMONS

See also Television

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✦ AMRITSAR

With a name literally meaning the "lake of the holy nectar," the city of Amritsar is located in the northwestern part of India and is the administrative headquarters of Amritsar District in the state of the Punjab. Founded by Guru Ram Das (1534–1581), the fourth Sikh guru in 1574, Amritsar is home to the Harmandir Sahib, also known as the Golden Temple, the spiritual and cultural center of the Sikh religion. The Shiromani Gurdwara

Prabandhak Committee (SGPC), a religious body formed to manage Sikh Gurdwaras (Sikh temples) and to take the management of the temples away from corrupt priests, and the Shiromani Akali Dal were established here in 1920. As of 2007 Hindus formed a majority in Amritsar city, accounting for 73 percent of the population; the Sikhs at 23 percent constituted the largest minority.

The partition of the Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan in August 1947 had profound effects on the demography, economics, social structure, and culture of Amritsar. The state of the Punjab was divided between India and Pakistan, and Amritsar became a border city, often finding itself on the front lines of India-Pakistan wars. Prior to partition, the All-India Muslim League (founded in 1906) wanted to incorporate Amritsar into Pakistan because of Amritsar's proximity to Lahore (a distance of 30 miles) and because nearly 50 percent of its population was Muslim, but the city became part of India. The Indian National Congress (INC), founded in 1885, had similar aims of incorporating Lahore into India since Lahore was the cultural, economic, and political capital of undivided Punjab, and Hindus and Sikhs constituted nearly 50 percent of Lahore's population, but the city became part of Pakistan. The cities of Amritsar and Lahore experienced some of the worst communal riots during the partition.

Amritsar is also known for the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre in April 1919 during British rule. The controversial Operation BLUESTAR, launched by the Indian Army in 1984 under orders given by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977,



The Golden Temple in Amritsar, Punjab, is the holiest Sikh shrine. Officially renamed the Harmadir Sahib in 2005, it is still commonly called the Golden Temple and draws Sikh pilgrims—and tourists—from all over the world. (Shutterstock)

1980–1984), also happened in the Golden Temple complex in Amritsar. The operation was launched to evict a group of pro-Khalistani militants (adherents of an independent Punjab) who had taken refuge inside the premises. In the gunfire between the army and the militants many innocent pilgrims lost their lives.

Following the adoption of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution in October 1973, the Shiromani Akali Dal further demanded changes involving greater symbolic recognition of Sikhism. These demands included the recognition of Amritsar as a holy city. At the height of militancy in the state, on October 5, 1983, a bus going from Delhi to Amritsar was hijacked by some Sikh militants, and six Hindu passengers were separated from the rest and killed. The attack, known since as the Amritsar Bus Killing, took place during a phase of agitations, protests, and violence following the refusal of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to accede to the demands by the Shiromani Akali Dal regarding the implementation of the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. Following the attack, the government led by Darbara Singh (1916–1990; chief minister 1980–1983) was dismissed, and president's rule was proclaimed in the state.

In the postmilitancy phase, Amritsar has been in the news for arrests of important militants and for the location of their hideouts. It has also played an important role in the emerging peace process between India and Pakistan, often finding itself at the center of initiatives toward people-to-people diplomacy because of its proximity to the India-Pakistan border and the Pakistani city of Lahore.

STUTI BHATNAGAR

See also Punjab; Sikhism

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✦ ANDAMAN AND NICOBAR ISLANDS

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are located in the Bay of Bengal and are closer to Myanmar and Indonesia than to India. The Andamans cover nearly 2,500 square miles, and the Nicobar Islands cover just over 700 square miles. Nearly 400,000 people live on

the islands. The capital, with a population of some 80,000, is Port Blair, and the islands are divided into two districts. A lieutenant governor governs the islands and sends one member to the lower house of Parliament, the Lok Sabha, in New Delhi. The islands are renowned for their tribal peoples and for being an ecological paradise.

ROGER D. LONG

See also Territories

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✦ ANDHRA PRADESH

Andhra Pradesh, the fifth most-populous state in India in the census of 2001, is located in southern India on the east coast and covers a great deal of the area known as the Deccan. With a rocky terrain in 80 percent of the state, and with forest covering much of the remaining 20 percent, Andhra Pradesh is a dry state with only the coastal plains being fertile. The plains are irrigated by the Godavari River in the north, the Krishna River in the center, and the Penner River in the south. Because of its rich fertile areas, especially in the deltas, Andhra is known as the "Rice Bowl" of India. Rice constitutes nearly 80 percent of the state's crops. Between June and October Andhra receives the bulk of its yearly average of 36 inches of rainfall. The state covers just over 106,245 square miles and has a population of some 76 million. The largest city (with its adjoining twin city Secunderabad) is Hyderabad, a cultural, political, and educational center and the state capital, with a population of 3.5 million people. It is the seventh-largest city in India. With its schools of architecture and painting and Urdu literature, it is renowned as a center of Muslim education and culture and for its Urdu speakers. Nine other cities are located in Andhra. Visakhapatnam, a port city, is the second-largest city and the home port of the Eastern Naval Command of the Indian Navy.

The state of Andhra Pradesh was formed in 1956 as a result of the States Reorganization Act, which merged Telegu-speaking areas in Hyderabad with those from Madras. In 1966 the official language became Telegu, and more than 80 percent of the people speak that language,



Women sift rice grains in Andhra Pradesh, the "Rice Bowl" of India. (David Watts Jr./Dreamstime.com)

but there are Tamil speakers, mostly in the south, next to the state of Tamil Nadu, and people who speak Kanarese or Kannada in the west, adjacent to the heartland of Kannada culture, Karnataka. Muslims, who mostly live in Hyderabad, speak Urdu. The western part of the state, however, and one of the three regions of Andhra (the other two are Rayalaseema and Kosta Andhra), is known as Telengana; it has been the center of a secessionist movement because its inhabitants feel that they have been neglected and misused by the state government as the supply of water, revenues, investment, and employment opportunities routinely benefit the eastern part of the state to the detriment of Telengana. In December 2009 the government of India announced that it would begin the process of bifurcating the state and creating the new Union state of Telengana. Due to local protests, however, the plan was put on hold.

While the history of the area can be traced back to the Vedic age, when Aryans reputedly migrated south to mix with the native Dravidian people, its special characteristics as a center of Muslim Urdu-speaking culture can be dated to the 14th century with the creation of the Bahmani kingdom in 1347. It became part of the Mughal Dynasty (1526–1858) in 1686 when Emperor Aurangzeb (1618–1707; emperor 1658–1707) annexed the state, but in 1724 Nizam ul-Mulk Asaf Jah (1671–1748) declared his independence and created the Nizami Dynasty. That dynasty would rule until the state, Hyderabad, was invaded by India

and forced into the Indian Union in 1948, the last nizam, Osman Ali Khan (1886–1967; nizam of Hyderabad 1911–1948) having tried to maintain his independence. As a princely state outside the direct control of the British, the ruling nizam was reputedly the richest man in the world, with his vast wealth based on the state's renowned diamond mines.

The head of government in Andhra Pradesh is the chief minister, and the state is divided into three regions and 23 districts. The state's lower house, the Legislative Assembly (Vidhan Sabha), contains 295 members, and the upper house, the Legislative Council (Vidhan Parishad), has 90 members. The state sends 42 representatives to the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament in New Delhi, and 18 to the Rajya Sabha, the upper house of Parliament. The main political parties in the state are the Indian Congress Party and the Telegu Dasam Party.

Andhra Pradesh is a relatively prosperous state. In addition to its rice production, its cash crops include sugarcane, ground nuts, tobacco, and chilies, which are used in its renowned hot cuisine. It is the second-largest state in India with regard to mining, producing some 42 valuable minerals. It produces the third-largest capacity of power in the country, and this feeds a very sizable manufacturing industry from shipbuilding to watchmaking. Above all, however, especially in the city of Hyderabad, Andhra since the 1990s has become renowned as one of the world's leading information-technology and computer-outsourcing centers. Around one-quarter of India's vast number of software developers are from the state. Hyderabad, like Bangalore, the capital of Karnataka, has become a byword for computer outsourcing.

The state is also renowned for its rich cultural life, especially in Hyderabad, and for its tourist industry, especially its Hindu temples, such as Tirumala Venkateswara in Tirupati, the home of the god Venkateswara, which attracts huge numbers of devotees. Buddhist sites at some 13 locations in the state also bring their share of followers. Cave temples, golden beaches, and the summer hill resort at Horsely Hills, at 4,150 feet, round out some of the many attractions of Andhra Pradesh.

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See also Hyderabad

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✦ ANGLO-INDIANS

According to the franchise rules of the Government of India Act of 1935, an Anglo-Indian is one who is born of a male parent of European descent but is himself/herself a native of India. This definition of Anglo-Indians was formally accepted and affirmed by the Constitution of India in 1949. The Anglo-Indians are a tiny minority in India. According to the census of 1940 they totaled approximately 800,000. Of these, 81 percent were employed in the Indian railways; 9 percent in the post and telegraphs; and 10 percent in the police, defense, and other services. Of these only 4 percent were professionals and university graduates. Since English is their mother tongue, the Anglo-Indians were often sought after as English-language teachers by English-medium schools.

The Anglo-Indian community came into existence some 400 years ago, back when Europeans first set foot on Indian soil. They are typically the product of a male progenitor of European descent and a female from India. With the British defeat of the Portuguese, the French, and the Dutch, the Anglo-Indian community came mostly from the intermixing of (male) British and (female) Indian lineage. Due to this lineage, the Anglo-Indians were inclined to identify themselves with British customs and habits, and in the 19th century they came to represent British interests in India. The community was initially favored by the British colonizers with government jobs in the railways, the postal services, and education. Numerous Anglo-Indian schools were established in Calcutta, Bangalore, and Madras. Two major schools in Calcutta were St. Xavier's College, founded in 1834, and La Martiniere College, established in 1836. Two influential figures from the community who made significant contributions to education were David Hare (1775–1842) and Col. W. Kirkpatrick. Another prominent personality from the community was Henry Lois Vivian Derozio (1809–1831), a celebrated poet and lecturer at the Hindu College of Calcutta (founded 1817). In the 20th century some renowned singers from the Anglo-Indian community included Britain's successful singer Cliff Richard (born Harry Roger Webb in Lucknow in 1940), and the superstar Engelbert Humperdinck (born Arnold George Dorsey in Madras in 1936).

Despite all efforts to "ape" the British, the Anglo-Indians were never treated as equals. Their mixed parentage invited scorn and rejection from both the Europeans and the Indians. In the second half of the 19th century, as the freedom struggle began to gain momentum, the Anglo-Indians were faced with the difficult choice of either accepting Indian status and joining forces against the British or of demanding a separate status. In 1925 a delegation to the secretary of state generated a response specifying that Anglo-Indians and Europeans, whose permanent residence was India, were indeed natives of India.

Though constitutionally accepted in 1949 as a distinct minority community of India with political representation and education grants and quotas in government services, Anglo-Indians in general have remained underprivileged. In 1960 the prominent Anglo-Indian spokesperson Frank Anthony (1908–1993) was able to secure special representation for the community in the Lok Sabha, the House of the People, or the lower house of Parliament, and in the legislatures of the major states of India as before, but he was unable to save reservation of places in different government services.

The number of Anglo-Indians in India dwindled considerably in the postindependence period due to emigration. Many were driven to emigrate to Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada due to fears of retaliation for their support of the British prior to 1947, insecurities due to their uncertain status, and the incentives of better opportunities abroad. Consequently, this wave of migration has decreased their number to less than half of what it once was. Approximately 200,000 Anglo-Indians migrated in the 1950s, mostly to the United Kingdom, because many considered it their native land. The 1960s saw another exodus when reserved places in the railways and the post and telegraph ceased. Since then, the Anglo-Indian community has been emigrating in waves and in steady trickles to other parts of the world. In retrospect, the system of reservations gave the Anglo-Indians little incentive to pursue studies beyond high school. With the ceasing of reservations and the competition for jobs, however, many Anglo-Indians have been pressed to pursue higher studies. As a result, the All India Anglo-Indian Education Trust was established, and scholarships were awarded to students. Between 1980 and 2001, the percentage of Anglo-Indians who became graduates and professionals rose from 28 percent to 57.4 percent.

In the 21st century, the Anglo-Indians are spread across the world, and though they are citizens of different countries, they remain conscious of their Anglo-Indian heritage. Their efforts to maintain a collective identity and to nurture a collective spirit are celebrated through the World Anglo-Indian Day and the World Anglo-Indian Reunion. Like other minorities struggling to maintain their identity, the Anglo-Indians are aware of the need to maintain their distinct identity. Hence, even as they emigrate to Europe or other parts of the world, they maintain their affiliation with India and with their place of origin. They recognize that their survival as a community depends on their efforts to preserve their cultural organizations, their educational institutions, and their use of the English language—factors that are central to their notions of identity.

The two main Anglo-Indian associations in India are the All India Anglo-Indian Association and the Anglo-Indian and Domiciled European Association of Southern India. *The Anglo-Indian Review* gives voice to the opinions and activities of the former, while the latter is advocated by *The Anglo-Indian* journal. In recent years The All India Anglo-Indian Association has become concerned about the exodus of young Anglo-Indian people and has offered them scholarships as incentives to remain in India. Two seats are reserved for Anglo-Indian nominees in the Lok Sabha, as is one seat in every state legislature. However, the Anglo-Indians continue to be a dwindling minority, comprising less than 3 percent of a population of more than 1 billion people in India.

YOSAY WANGDI

See also Christianity; Diaspora, Indian; Diaspora in the United Kingdom; Diaspora in the United States

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✦ ARCHAEOLOGICAL SURVEY OF INDIA

The Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) is the principal government authority entrusted with the study and preservation of India's historical monuments and cultural remains. As part of the government of India's Ministry of Culture, the ASI conducts archaeological excavations, operates an institute of archaeology, manages site museums (i.e., museums at archaeological sites), maintains and preserves sites and monuments, catalogs and analyzes epigraphy (inscriptions), and serves as a regulatory body for the protection of Indian artifacts and antiquities. Twenty-four "circles" or geographical subdivisions of the ASI maintain 3,667 monuments throughout India. A director-general heads the ASI, while superintending archaeologists manage regional circles.

Originally formed by the British during the colonial era, the ASI emerged from the need to analyze, catalog, and preserve the cultural heritage of India. Sir Alexander Cunningham (1814–1893), a former British army officer who later served in the official capacity of archaeological surveyor, advocated the creation of the ASI and became its first director-general in 1871. The ASI evolved from a survey-and-excavation team consisting of Cunningham and a pair of assistants into a centralized government bureaucracy, with regional offices documenting and preserving sites throughout British-controlled South Asia. While often eclipsed by their British counterparts, archaeologists and administrators of Indian descent served in the ASI previous to independence and rose through its ranks. Among them, Daya Ram Sahni and Kashi Nath Dikshit served as director-general in 1931–1935 and 1937–1944, respectively. Thus, the ASI experienced an orderly transition from colonial to Union administration as the British retired from their involvement in the governmental affairs of India. In 1948 the position of director-general passed from Sir Mortimer Wheeler (1890–1976), the last British archaeologist to hold the post, to N. P. Chakravarti, who ascended to the office after serving as chief epigraphist and in other high administrative positions of the organization.

Political geography affected both the jurisdiction and research trends of the ASI in the Indian republic. After the partition of colonial India into the separate nations of India and Pakistan, the ASI relinquished its control over sites and monuments in the east and northwest, including archaeological sites in Pakistan central to the study of the Harappan (Indus Valley) civilization, the earliest known civilization in South Asia. Subsequently, the

ASI and other institutions embarked upon the identification and excavation of sites within India's borders relevant to early habitation patterns in South Asia. This research identified Harappan settlements in western India that greatly enlarged the known scope of this civilization and also brought about a greater knowledge of remains from pre-Harappan eras. Even today, the ASI maintains a prehistory branch, and the analysis of early sites remains a significant focus of archaeological work in India. Despite the loss of monuments after Partition, the mission of the ASI actually expanded as the government of India integrated former princely states into the nation. This integration brought more sites and monuments under ASI control and provided a greater area in which archaeological exploration could occur.

The enormous responsibility of preserving and maintaining several thousand monuments is but one of the challenges facing the ASI in its recent history. The richness of India's cultural legacy, its religious strife, and its burgeoning population all complicate the administration of the ASI's duties. Lucrative global trade in Indian art has encouraged the theft and unlawful export of Indian antiquities from India. In attempts to stem the looting and export of Indian artifacts, the ASI composed rules to implement the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act of 1958 and the Antiquities and Art Treasure Act of 1972. Despite the enactment of Indian government legislation and international treaties to stem the illegal trade in artifacts, smuggling remains a persistent problem in the region. The dispute in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, that culminated in the destruction of the 16th-century Babri mosque by Hindus on December 6, 1992, also speaks to the limitations of the ASI's ability to protect India's entire historical legacy. In addition to the 3,667 monuments directly under ASI control, another 3,500 are protected by local governments. Countless other monuments, like the Babri mosque at the time of its destruction, lack any formal protection or preservation scheme. Many other monuments less well known than the Babri mosque suffer from encroachment that threatens their preservation and thwarts conservation efforts.

The ASI maintains an impressive schedule for archaeological excavations amidst its myriad responsibilities. The excavation of hundreds of sites in India since the 1950s, mainly by the ASI, has provided the nation unparalleled insight into diverse phases of India's history. Alongside its excavation schedule, the ASI publishes annual reports on recent activities, an epigraphy periodical, guidebooks for popular monuments, and detailed archaeological reports of excavated sites. However, the publication of archaeological reports has been sporadic, potentially restricting the flow of information about recent discoveries to a wider audience. While publication has lagged, excavations have continued unabated, resulting in a backlog of approximately 200 archaeological reports yet to be published. In 2008 the ASI took steps to reform its practices and enact a policy to facilitate the documentation of excavated sites. This policy seeks parity between its excavation schedule and published documentation of findings. Its enactment reflects an ongoing trend of the Indian government to provide greater transparency and accountability in the performance of its public policies.

DAVID EFURD

See also Asiatic Society of Bengal; Asiatic Society of Mumbai

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✦ ARMED FORCES

Ever since 1947, but especially since 1962–1965, the governments of India and Pakistan have paid close attention as to the capacities and potential of each others' armed forces and this remains true today, though in the early 21st century India is more concerned with China's capabilities than with Pakistan's.

The supreme command of India's armed forces is vested in the president. In addition to armed forces of 1.325 million personnel in 2004, there were nearly 1.090 million active paramilitary forces, including 174,000 members of the Border Security Force based mainly in the Jammu-Kashmir regions. Military services are voluntary, but under the amended constitution it is regarded as a fundamental duty for every citizen to perform National Service when called upon.



Soldiers of the Indian Army's 8 Gurkha Rifles march during the 57th Indian Army Day Parade in New Delhi, January 15, 2005. The Indian army is the third largest in the world. (AP Photo/Manish Swarup)

Defense expenditures in 2003 were $15.508 billion ($15 per capita and 2.6 percent of GDP). In the period 1999–2003, India's spending on major conventional weapons was second to that of China, whose 2001–2002 expenditure was higher, although in 2003 that of India (at $3.6 billion) was high. In September 2003 India announced that it would be buying 66 Hawk trainer fighter jets, with delivery expected by 2009. In October 2003 agreement was reached for India to purchase Israel's sophisticated Phalcon early warning radar system. India has nuclear and chemical weapons, and its biological weapons research program is another indicator of what future conflict between India and Pakistan might entail.

Army. The army is organized into five commands, each divided into areas, which in turn are subdivided into subareas. The strength of the army in 2004 was 1.1 million. There are four RAPID divisions, 18 infantry divisions, 3 armored divisions, and 2 artillery divisions. In all, there are 355 infantry battalions, 300 artillery regiments, 62 tank battalions, and 22 helicopter squadrons. Officers are trained at the Indian Military Academy, Dehra Dun (Uttaranchal). An Aviation Corps of 14 squadrons operates helicopters that are locally built under license. Army reserves number 300,000, with a further 500,000 personnel available as a second-line reserve force. There is a volunteer Territorial Army of 40,000. There are also numerous paramilitary groups, including the Ministry of Defence Rashtriya Rifles (numbering 40,000), the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (32,400), the State Armed Police (400,000), the Civil Defence (453,000), the Central Industrial Security Force (95,000), and the Ministry of Home Affairs Assam Rifles (52,500).

Navy. The Navy has three commands: Eastern (at Visakhapatnam), Western (at Bombay), and Southern (at Kochi), the last a training and support command. The fleet is divided into two elements, Eastern and Western; and well-trained, all-volunteer personnel operate a mix of Soviet and Western vessels. In May 2003 India held joint naval exercises with Russia in the Arabian Sea for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The principal ship is the light aircraft carrier *Viraat*, formerly HMS *Hermes*, of 31,976 tons, completed in 1959 and transferred to the Indian Navy in 1987 after seeing service in the Falklands War. In 2003 India began construction of another aircraft carrier and began negotiations to purchase a third from the Russian navy. The fleet includes 12 Soviet-built diesel submarines and four new German-designed boats. There are also 24 destroyers and frigates. The Naval Air Force, 5,000 strong, operates 35 combat aircraft (including 20 Sea Harriers) and 32 armed helicopters. The main bases are at Bombay (Mumbai, the main dockyard), Goa, Visakhapatnam, and Kolkata on the subcontinent and at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands. Naval personnel in 2004 numbered 55,000, including 5,000 Naval Air Arm and 1,200 marines.

Air Force. Units of the Indian Air Force (IAF) are organized into five operational commands: (1) Central at Allahabad, (2) Eastern at Shillong, (3) Southern at Thruvananthapuram, (4) South Western at Gandhinagar, and (5) Western at Delhi. The air force has 170,000 personnel.

The equipment includes nearly 690 combat aircraft, in 46 squadrons of aircraft, and about 40 armed helicopters. Major combat types include Su-30s, MiG-21s, MiG-23s, MiG-27s, MiG-29s, Jaguars, and Mirage 2000s. Air Force reserves numbered 140,000 in 2004.

PETER LYON

See also Space Program

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✦ ART, MODERN

Modern Indian Art of the postindependence period (since 1947) has made immense strides and garnered global international attention, particularly in the field of creative painting. Famous artists, such as Maqbool Fida Husain (b. 1915) and Tyeb Mehta (1925–2009), who have been ranked along with Pablo Picasso (1881–1973) and Wassily Kandinsky (1866–1944), have captured the world art market. The collecting boom has led to an increase in prices, about 20 times in value since 2001, and the total value of Indian art at auction has changed from $5 million in 2003 to nearly $150 million in 2009. Artists such as Syed Haider Raza (b. 1922) and Husain have become household names, particularly in the major cities of Delhi, Mumbai, and Kolkata, which form the nucleus for an ever-increasing market for the consumption and patronage of a pluralistic art.

The story of modern Indian art can be narrated in many different ways. Unlike Western art, Indian creativity does not fall into movements or styles and cannot be grouped stylistically, as most Indian artists navigate through a variety of trends—expressionism, symbolism, impressionism, abstraction, surrealism, and minimalism—while classical, folk, and popular art also color their imaginations and lead to a synthesis of Indian and Western art forms. In the absence of a critical visual language and aesthetic theory, as in traditional Indian art, modern and contemporary painting and sculpture pose a challenge. Two terms, modern and contemporary, are used frequently to describe Indian art and need to be defined. While modern Indian artists from the early 20th century sought to identify with their Indian heritage and attempted to create a synthesis with new Western art forms, contemporary Indian artists in the late 20th century were more involved in a global dialogue and with contemporary art ideology and worked within a global art market.

Since the advent of modern Indian art, there has been an ongoing debate concerning the degree to which it is comparable to that of the West and how the artists have chosen to adopt or reject Western art conventions. The issue has been viewed through diverse lenses. Those that support Indian traditions demand that contemporary Indian artists be "authentic," that is, they should paint hallowed and traditional subjects with undeniably Indian aesthetics. Works that compare favorably with Western art have been described as appropriation, hybridization, or imitation. The Western avant-garde prides itself in becoming primitivist modern, although it easily characterizes contemporary non-Western art as derivative. In this context, it is necessary to reconsider the notion of "modernity." The word "modern" and its

cousin "modernity" have been degraded to fashionable concepts under which one can think anything. Modern was identified with the now, with capitalism, with being empty, and with struggles to leave the past behind. Regarding modernity, there have been numerous attempts, in various fields, to understand what it constitutes. In current sociological contexts, "modernity" may describe the positive aspects of advanced technology, or it may characterize the Western system of international capitalism. From one point of view, modernity is a relativist term, given to a type, mode, or stage of society. In sociological terms, it is a departure from tradition and religion toward what is individualistic, rationalistic, and scientific. In cultural terms, a wide variety of terms are used to describe a "modern" society: progress, chaos, mass society, homogenization, unification, hybridization, diversification, and mechanization. In addition, modern Indian visual culture embraces the phenomenon of modernity and includes its consciously nurtured pluralistic values and multiple realities, which are culture specific.

With such vast and seemingly contradictory and paradoxical characteristics ascribed to modernity, what it is depends on the story we want to tell. In the context of "Indianness" it cannot be subsumed under a single descriptive concept that can adequately capture diverse realities. Modernity may be understood as a paradigm expandable to include the individual and the collective, the local and the global. Its contours are flexible, and its pluralism transcends geography and ideologies. Within the framework of such a revised, expandable, undefinitive, and suggestive paradigm, "modern" works of art are a reflection of a society that desires to relate its art to its modernizing trend and its changed environment. Modern art includes a way of experiencing problems and issues in a continually transforming society, assimilating selectively from old and new. This mode of experiencing modernism, that is, the kind of reception given to modernist values, ideology, events, and issues, has been embodied in India's visual arts.

Embedded in the Indian social ethos, particularly the psychological and social complexities of modern urban life woven through a personal expression, the Indian artist identifies himself with Indian culture, land, predicaments, traditionalism, mythology, and history. The cultural or stylistic component, or "Indianness," is obvious in subject, theme, perception, style, or iconography. Even the diasporic Indian artist who lives abroad identifies himself as Indian first, due to India's long, rich, and vibrant historical art tradition dating from ancient and medieval times. Modern Indian art is characterized by simplicity of form, flatness, conceptualization, relevance to contemporary times, and usage of nontraditional techniques. Many artists have a tendency to disengage from traditional art. However, traditional art is very much alive; it is more popular than modern art, and the two exist side by side, with no sense of confrontation between them.

Indian painting did not follow a linear trajectory but evolved from the historical situation of the dynamics of cultural transfer. From the first quarter of the 20th century, Indian artists sought to identify with their Indian heritage and attempted to create a synthesis with new European Western art forms imposed on them as a result of British colonial rule, indigenous styles, and the impulses created by the Indian nationalist movement. With the introduction

of Company Style or Company Painting in the 18th and 19th centuries and by art schools, Indian artists, many of whom worked for British and European patrons, created works of art that were British in style but Indian in content. Creating for a tourist market, they painted in an Indo-European style using Western linear perspective, shading, and English watercolors, the latter often used by amateur painters. The result was an eclectic mix of folk *patas* and provincial miniatures. They did not, however, develop a viable iconography or figural type.

The most celebrated professional painter during this time was Raja Ravi Varma (1848–1906), of the princely state of Travancore in Kerala, whose iconic and figural portraits of Indian women, mythological gods, royalty, literary figures, and national heroes and heroines were an amalgamation of European realism, techniques, and materials but Indian in subject and narration. He modified the European style of perspective and composition with Indian iconography and adapted oil to the Indian light, recounting the ancient Indian ideal of beauty in a mythological genre. His color oleographs gained immense popularity, largely due to their bright inexpensive technique and mass production.

One important indigenous school of art was the Kalighat school, originally created in the 19th century by folk artists, or *patuas* (the migrant community of scroll painters), who exhibited and sold their paintings near the Kali temple in Kolkata. Distinguished by simple forms and bright colors, their works combined Western shading and perspective with Indian frontal forms and a simple background. These gouache-on-paper images were remarkable in their statements on the daily life of the elite in Bengal and as a response to social and economic change. The paintings served the political purpose of the nationalist cause.

The postindependence era, beginning with the independence of India in August 1947, saw a changed political and cultural environment of Indian nationalism; Nehruvian secularism, inspired by the Western-educated prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964); and Western modernism. This change was reflected in the art's visual imagery and gradual yet prolific growth toward modernism.

Bengal School. The year of India's independence, 1947, witnessed the flowering of the Bengal School. It gained momentum in the 1920s with its centers in Santiniketan and Kolkata. The school was to have far-reaching consequences due to the vibrant resurgence of national identity it inspired by reviving traditional Indian art. The school was spearheaded by Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), the first Asian Nobel Laureate (1913), who had previously created the Art Department, or the Kala Bhavan, in his school, Visva Bharati, at the ashram Santiniketan, which he founded in 1901. There artists began to construct their postcolonial national identity as students were introduced to Indian craftsmen and reworked traditional materials and techniques. Influenced by the 19th-century intellectual movement and the Bengal Renaissance, and inspired by the nationalist struggle, they embraced modernist Western idioms. Art with its thematic, contemporary, and expressionist ways of seeing offered a new weapon of anticolonial sentiment, particularly to Tagore whose art forms of the subconscious are reminiscent of German Expressionism. Abanindranath Tagore (1871–1951) and his students set a new trend at the school by breaking away from

Western styles and sought aesthetic standards and techniques rooted in Indian and Japanese traditions. Abanindranath's elder brother, Gaganendranath Tagore (1867–1938), expressed a critical sensibility through his expressionistic cartoons and evoked magical worlds using a cubist-influenced style. Nandalal Bose (1882–1966) adopted the Kalighat style for his art, particularly for the posters of the Haripura Congress of 1938. Others, such as Benode Behari Mukherjee (1904–1980), Mukul Chandra Dey (1895–1989), and Asit Haldar (1890–1964), consciously incorporated indigenous styles. The Bengal School served as a pervasive influence for many artists throughout India, as major practitioners of this school became heads of art institutions.

Outside the Bengal School, the renowned Bengali painter, Jamini Ranjan Roy (1887–1972), who in 1955 received one of India's highest civilian awards given by the president of India, the Padma Bhushan, understood the language of tribal forms and adopted a decorative iconic style based on folk scrolls. He had a powerful influence on later artists. Another approach was taken by Amrita Sher Gil (1913–1941), who trained in the École des Beaux-Arts in Paris and adopted painterly values for her chosen subject of Indian village life. She fashioned a personal artistic style combining the Postimpressionism of Paul Gauguin (1848–1903) with the frescos of Ajanta (second century BCE–seventh century CE).

Calcutta Group. The phenomenon of looking to the West for an international idiom gained momentum in the 1940s, with the formation of a number of artists' collectives in major cities such as Kolkata, Mumbai, Delhi, and Chennai. One of the first art groups to emerge and propose a radical break with the Bengal School was the "Calcutta Group" of 1943. Substantial changes from the Bengal School can be found in the works of Paritosh Sen (1918–2008), Subho Tagore (1912–1985), and Nirode Majumdar (1916–1982), and in the woodcuts of Somnath Hore (b. 1921). In the 1960s the Society of Contemporary Artists was formed in Calcutta when Bikash Bhattacharjee (1940–2006), Ganesh Haloi (b. 1936), Ganesh Pyne (b. 1937), Lalu Prasad Shaw (b. 1937), Sunil Das (b. 1939), and Shyamal Dutta (1934–2005) created their own unique expressionist styles that were devoid of "Indianness," while Jogen Chowdhury (b. 1939) became known for his personalized interpretation of contemporary reality. A radical change came about when the extraordinary artist K. G. Subramanyam (b. 1924) trained in Santiniketan and, influenced by the works of the Kalighat School and the style of Jamini Roy, came up with an expressive figurative imagery that incorporated urban and folk and primitivist forms simultaneously in oil paintings and in glass paintings. However, the lack of an art market in Calcutta led to the proliferation of regional centers. At the same time, a stimulus for the creation of modern art was given by the establishment of the Indian Council of Cultural Relations in 1950 and by the National Gallery of Modern Art in Delhi in 1954. The founding of regional centers of art in Mumbai, Baroda, Chennai, and Delhi provided new regional stimuli to artists whose styles, however, transcended geographical boundaries.

Progressive Artists' Group (PAG). The most radical group of artists that played a pioneering role in the contemporary international art scene was PAG, founded in 1947. The founding

members of this group were Francis Newton Souza (1924–2002), K. H. Ara (1913–1985), Sadanand Bakre (1920–2007), Hari Ambadas Gade (1916–2001), Sayed Haider Raza (b. 1922), and Maqbool Fida Husain (b. 1915). Contrary to the nationalist Bengal School, the PAGs rejected the traditional Indian style and favored modern internationalism. Each of the artists had an individual style that incorporated one or more Western expressionist, surrealist, cubist, or primitivist tendencies but cast their own interpretations on such Western masters as Picasso, Amedio Modigliani (1884–1920), and Mark Rothko (1903–1970). Although as a group the PAGs faded away, their works transcended their time and are valuable for their creativity and vibrancy. Souza had an individualistic style, and his paintings exerted powerful expressionistic distortions to landscapes and human forms, suggestive of a sexuality intensified through repression. Husain, considered the father of Indian contemporary art, carved a niche for himself by his authenticity to traditions and creativity. His works incorporate Hindu tales, Islamic subjects, national histories, rural figures, and Bollywood actresses. With an individualistic harmony in composition and a balance of line and color, action and image, his works capture the dynamism of movement by their angularity and bold outline, where his figures come to life. However, in 2009 some of his nude images of Hindu mythological women raised a controversy regarding his aims. To the art historian, the controversy was about the right of representation through images and whether this right is bound by community and embedded in religion; the role of the Muslim artist in defining the nature of Indian secular cultures; the status of mythology in contemporary India; the relationship between cultural symbols and secular politics; the redefining of modernity by artists where they transcend both cultural and subjective particularities; and the power of art in Indian culture.

Each of the PAG artists had his own distinctive style and perspective. The distinguished artist, Raza, who was trained in Paris, used the language of geometric abstraction through symbols embedded in Indian Tantric art. Using both formalistic and expressionistic tendencies, his works are technically exquisite and intensely moving. The group reflected the freedom of artistic expression gained at independence in 1947 while they also looked back to the past as a repository of a rich heritage of styles and spiritual values. The PAG artists offered a formalist manifesto that was to help the first generation of artists in independent India position themselves internationally.

The influence of the PAGs extended to a second group of artists between the 1950s and the 1960s: Vasudeo S. Gaitonde (1924–2001), Krishen Khanna (b. 1925), Mohan Samant (b. 1952), Ram Kumar (b. 1924), K. K. Hebbar (1911–1996), Tyeb Mehta (1925–2009), Akbar Padamsee (b. 1928), Laxman Pai (b. 1926), Sudhir Patwardhan (b. 1949), Jehangir Sabavala (b. 1922), N. S. Bendre (1910–1992), Satish Gujral (b. 1925), and Atul Dodiya (b. 1959), who celebrated their solitude and had a commitment to social transformation.

The Baroda School. Initiated by N. S. Bendre, the Baroda School arose out of the newly formed Faculty of Fine Arts at Baroda University in 1957, under the leadership of Santiniketan-trained artist K. G. Subramanyam who, while moving away from abstraction, developed into figuration and developed a critical eye in the 1960s. Two major artists, Bhupen

Khakhar (1934–2003) and Gulammohammed Sheikh (b. 1937), opened up urban popular space for Indian modernism. J. Swaminathan (1928–1994), whose own paintings showed a mysticism similar to that of K. C. S. Paniker (1911–1977) of the Cholamandal Artists' Village, drew on Indian folk and tribal patterns as well as the iconic arrangements of Paul Klee (1879–1940), with the aim of expressing an immediacy based on regional and local experience. Members of the Baroda School experimented with narrative and figurative subjects. Also, the creativity of such Baroda School artists as K. Laxma Goud (b. 1940), Manjit Bawa (1941–2008), T. Vaikuntham (b. 1942), Ratan Parimoo (b. 1936), Rekha Rodwittiya (b. 1958), Jyotsana Bhatt (b. 1940), and Vivan Sunderam (b. 1943) can be seen in a wide variety of subjects.

Cholamandal Artists' Village. Southern India took another course when K. C. S. Paniker formed the Cholamandal Artists' Village, a few miles outside the city of Chennai, in April 1966. He endowed it with a permanent gallery, and it became the largest artists' commune in India. Paniker set a new trend influenced by figurative folk art and miniatures. He also turned to abstract expressionism, which he recognized as the mystical art language of indigenous Tantric art. Other notable artists of this school include Velu Viswanadhan (b. 1940), A. P. Santhanraj (1932–2009), Reddeppa M. Naidu (1932–2001), and K. Ramanujam (1941–1973), in whose works reality, mythology, and fantasy merge in an intense, vibrant, and unique manner.

Delhi Art School. Another important group of artists arose in 1948 when K. S. Kulkarni (1918–1994) founded the Triveni Kala Sangam and served as the director of the Art Department until 1968. The school provided a platform for young artists. Those who thrived under Kulkarni's direction were Hari Ambadas Gade (1917–2001), Vasudeo S. Gaitonde (1924–2001), and Laxman Pai (b. 1926). Other names from Delhi include Anjolie Ela Menon (b. 1940), Arpana Caur (b. 1954), Arpita Singh (b. 1937), Krishen Khanna (b. 1925), Paramjit Singh (b. 1935), Rameshwar Broota (b. 1941), Ram Kumar (b. 1924), and Satish Gujral (b. 1925), in whose works modernity is based on technical skill.

While the 1940s and 1950s were dominated by the aesthetic values of the art schools of Paris, the 1960s witnessed a change in direction, and there was a reinvention of traditional visual language by such artists as Jagadish Swaminathan (1928–1994) in New Delhi, K. G. Subramaniam from Baroda, K. C. S. Paniker from Chennai, and Ganesh Pyne from Kolkata. Art acquired official support from the Lalit Kala Akademi, the National Academy of Arts, which held annual national art exhibitions, and from the Jehangir Art Gallery, Mumbai's most famous art gallery, which was built in 1952 and has four exhibition halls.

Art of the 1970s. The period from the 1970s transcends regionalism. A generation of Indian modernists were attracted once again to Europe, especially to Italy and Spain. Artists such as Jeram Patel (b. 1930), Jagadish Swaminathan, Jyoti Bhatt (b. 1934), and Himmat Shah (b. 1933) responded to the informal aesthetics of the Catalan abstract expressionist Antoni Tapies (b. 1923); the spatialism of its founder, the Argentinian Lucio Fontana (1899–1968); and the abstract paintings of the Italian Alberto Burri (1915–1995), and they showed their work in a group exhibition in 1963, with a manifesto written for the exhibition by

Swaminathan. The indigenism of ritual and occult signs produced a playful modernist vocabulary replete with metaphorical allusions. Influenced by the magical realism of the film industry, Krishen Khanna, Ramachandran, Gieve Patel (b. 1946), and Bikash Bhattarcharjee (b. 1940) turned to a variety of expressionist styles with a social message. The artist was now a social critic creating a school of social realism to which Jahar Dasgupta (b. 1942), Bion Coudhuri, and Jogen Chowdhury (b. 1939) belong. On the other hand, exuberant forms of abstraction can be traced in the works of such artists as Ram Kumar and Akbar Padamsee (b. 1928).

Art of the 1980s. The art of the 1980s defies categorization. The period saw an emergence of powerful styles and statements by socially conscious artists who negotiated several traditions simultaneously. The works of Sudhir Patwardhan (b. 1949) display the chaotic urban realism of Mumbai, while Bhupen Khakhar's voice echoes subversive tendencies in social and sexual directions. Gulammohammed Sheikh's art is provocative, while Jogen Choudhury portrays an excess of sexual signs that embody his personal and social perception. The work of Paresh Maity (b. 1965) is popular because of his romantic imagination. During the 1980s a number of Indian artists assumed enough authorial confidence to handle multifarious references.

Neotantrism. In the meantime, neotantric artists articulated themselves and constructed a modern Indian aesthetic that had universal appeal. Inspired by Ajit Mookerjee, whose books on tantrism and its art and rituals were widely consulted, this trend was termed "neotantra" after the traveling exhibition of that name, which toured Europe and North America in 1984. The artists who exhibited in the Neo-Tantra show—Sayed Haider Raza, Gulam Rasool Santosh (1929–1997), Biren De (b. 1926), Sohan Qadri (b. 1932), and P. T. Reddy—gained a national status. However, the beginnings of this genre may be traced back to Paniker in Chennai. The abstract geometric symbolic form of tantra is a complex powerful iconic device used in ancient Indian art, whose formal properties and visual metaphors parallel the visual elements of modern modes. The neotantric artists perceived a visual parallel in the geometric abstractions of Klee, Kandinsky, and Rothko. Particularly famous is Raza's series *Bindu*—the *bindu* or point representing the seed of the eternal and the infinite manifest through the impregnation of time and space, becoming immanent in every instant and every particle. Others in this group are the extraordinary artists Natwar Bhavsar (b. 1934), who arrived in the United States in 1962 and settled in New York; Shobha Broota (b. 1943); Sunil Gawde (b. 1960); and Seema Ghurayya (b. 1964). Neotantra becomes fused with American op art in the paintings of diasporic artist Anil Revri (b. 1956), who is resident in Washington, D.C. It may be said that through the PAG, the Cholamandala, and the neotantric school, the modernist visual vocabulary manifested itself powerfully between the 1950s and the 1980s and made a tremendous contribution to Indian art.

Art of the 1990s. The 1990s witnessed the flowering of postmodern, or what we may term contemporary, art. It is characterized by diversity of form and content, lack of meaning, and decontextualization. It is a pluralistic art that reflects the politics of emergent

ethnicities and defines the politics of community and a variety of nationalist and communal allegories. While using the sap of Indian culture to construct and invigorate their work along with contemporary perceptions, the artists deconstruct traditional meanings. Their work is often devoid of historical reference and is replete with a false version of time and narrative amid an exposure of an unprecedented intensity to the influence and competition of international cultures. Supported by new art institutions, transnational galleries, and the market, contemporary artists turn toward an exploitation of cultural codes and the confrontation of traditional genres. Sometimes a sense of subversion can be found. Postmodernism has released a new productivity and is dictated by multinational capitalism. In the works of the female sculptor, Navjot, heroines are dehumanized, devoid of character, and their meanings are ambiguous.

The postindependence period witnessed the flowering of women artists, although it took almost 50 years after the emergence of the first important female artist, Amrita Sher Gil (1913–1941), known for her realistic depictions of women and who died an early tragic death at the age of 29, for women artists to come to the forefront. Until the 1970s, works by women artists were characterized by a creative assimilation of Western art forms and were dominated by acceptably feminine subjects, such as idyllic renderings of mothers and children, floral still lifes, and scenes of everyday home life. Later, women artists developed a feminist strain conscious of the position of women as they internalized their own status and predicament. Soon they became representatives of a liberal society. Their works are technically and artistically stunning and voice a social position unique to gender. Among the many well-known women artists are Arpita Singh (b. 1937), who depicts urban outer realities and feminine internal spaces. Nalini Malini (b. 1946) is noted for her powerful imagery of narratives of oppression while using a variety of mediums. Anjolie Ela Menon of the Delhi Art School shows bare-breasted women. Nilima Sheikh (b. 1945), who studied history at Delhi and was trained in art at the Faculty of Fine Arts, Baroda, was influenced by Japanese *ukiyo-e* prints. Using a variety of motifs, images, and styles, from the *jataka* tales to Kangra painting, and from Mughal miniatures to *thangkas,* she offers keen observations of Indian living conditions in her portrayals of the daily life of marginalized Indian women. Anupam Sud (b. 1944), who studied art at the College of Art, New Delhi, and printmaking at the Slade School, London, was one of the founding members of GROUP8 (1968), a collective of printmakers. Working mainly with intaglio prints, she shows women's desire, difference, and power, as well as women's territories of being and working. In the works of Arpana Caur (b. 1954), a largely self-taught artist who continues the line developed by Amrita Sher Gil, one discovers links that are destroyed and discovered and where social commentaries are implied. In the works of Vasundhara Tiwari (b. 1955), traditional landscapes, portraits, still life, and figure painting remain especially strong. They convey a deep subtle meaning. In contemporary Indian art, a large number of women experiment with materials, techniques, and subject matter where tension appears to exist between personal experiences, narrative, and formal criteria of style.

Modern Indian sculpture represents a total break from the rich, ancient stone tradition of religious art. Its emergence began with the establishment of Western art schools in the colonial era (1757–1947). Sculptors such as Debi Prasad Roy Choudhury (1899–1975) and V. P. Karmarkar, a 1965 Fellow of the Lalit Kala Akademi, were creative, and while their content was Indian their forms followed the style of Auguste Rodin (1840–1917). The most prominent postindependence modern sculptor was Ramkinkar Baij (1906–1980), from Bengal. The "Pioneer of Modern Indian Sculpture," his originality, coherence, and iconic forms derived from tribal and folk art, particularly the art of the Santals, a tribal community mostly found in eastern India in West Bengal, Jharkhand, and Orissa, gained him national status. The 1970s were characterized by experiments in the balance between material, form, and theme. Particularly noteworthy were the woodcuts of Somnath Hore (1921–2006), as well as his contorted bronze figurines recalling the agonies of famine and war; the abstract sculpture of Sankho Chouduri (1916–2001); the wood sculptures of Dhanraj Bhagat (1917–1988); the stone and metal works of Amar Nath Sehgal (b. 1922); and the bronzes of legendary sculptor Prodosh Dasgupta (b. 1912). Meera Mukheree (1923–1998), whose innovative trend in bronze is monumental, is also adept in different mediums. Atul Dokiya draws from diverse areas: mass media, comics, internal contradictions in Indian political life, the Kargil incident, and nuclear power stations. Shantanu Lodh (b. 1967) refers to self-obliteration; Ranbir Singh Kaleka (b. 1953) develops art that takes on psychologically buried narratives. Contemporary sculptors such as Surendran Nair (b. 1956), Anita Dube (b. 1958), Sudarshan Shetty, Anandajit Ray, Jitish Kallat, Shibu Natesan, and Subodh Gupta have used radical forms and icons tinged by popular culture and mass media. Their usage of nonconventional materials, such as architectural objects and materials from such new technologies as xeroxes, faxes, and the Internet; new methods of assemblage and installation; and new artistic media forms such as video, have become common. Sculpture, like painting, reflects the sociocultural transformation that has taken place during the last several decades, when modern communities moved from welfare to materialism, colonialism to independence.

A surging international outlook has increased the aspiration of contemporary Indian artists for cultural sovereignty and in doing so to establish a new synthesis of traditional cultural norms and new lifestyles. They are now creative technicians of the new advanced technology and members of the newly modernizing and technically trained intelligentsia who incorporate a variety of media. As innovators with their own conceptions of life, values, and the past, they draw upon the changing societal theater, empowering themselves with international styles in a unique way with descriptive and hermeneutic strength. Whether the artist's work is a simple expression of an issue in a local context or of a personal subject matter or of an international theme, or even a commentary on society or global style, it will move us beyond the work to the audience.

The acceptance of the visual vocabularies of Western modernism has led to diasporic Indian artist groups who are presented with the reverse dilemma of articulating global experiences in terms of a subjectivity often formed in India. Several artists who established themselves in India

have gone on to reside abroad and have become prominent. A few major ones are the sculptor Anish Kapoor (b. 1954) in the United Kingdom and Natwar Bhavsar (b. 1934) in New York. Artists such as the Singh twins are redefining the Indocentric point of view and are also addressing global issues and icons. Kartik Triveni's *Welcome Home* was selected for the private collection of U.S. president Ronald Reagan (1911–2004; president 1980–1988) in the White House.

Contemporary Indian artists weave styles with aesthetic forms and concepts that are largely local to their place of production and reflective of experiential thought processes. Hybridity, a historical legacy of colonialism, is not seen here as a negative term but a positive, relevant product of dynamic interaction. While the Bengal School and the Progressives were concerned with transfer and reception, today the discourse is beyond East and West, native or modern, even cubist or expressionist; it is internal to the art world and aesthetics. In the past, Indian artists were self-conscious of their separateness from the cultures of the West. Today they realize that only by recognizing their own self-worth and by establishing their own experiential identity can their art play a cultural role in society. Their regional culture can be compatible with their selections from the West to draw inspiration toward a progressive movement. With no assumption that modernity is an exclusive characteristic of the West, but that which also incorporates transformed realities within the Indian context, the subject of art discourse becomes internal. It is a debate in terms of reality and distortion, reflection and interpretation, and one that incorporates the new realities of city life, mass media, and a global outlook.

In global society, the geographical, cultural, or material borderlines are obscured. Art created by Indians living in India or abroad is undeniably a major driving force in the formation of today's international scene. Indian contemporary art weaves modernity with its own threads to create a fabric that becomes individually and socially relevant. With the richness of its long cultural traditions, values, forms, and concepts, it readapts to the modern. As independent art work, it brings a variety of living cultural and aesthetic values into a transformational engagement with modernity. It provides new ways of being modern in a global world. The creativity of modern Indian art may be said to be a manifestation of the cultural heritage of India and its visual and pictorial traditions. The reemergence of that heritage with a new identity is due to the vibrancy of its creative artists.

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See also Consumer Culture

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✦ ARUNACHAL PRADESH

The state of Arunachal Pradesh ("land of the dawn-lit mountains"), located in the extreme northeast corner of India, is a state known for its rich biodiversity; serene landscapes; and cultural, linguistic, and ethnic heterogeneity. It is bordered by Bhutan on the west, China to the north and northeast, Myanmar on the east and southeast, and the Indian states of Assam and Nagaland to the south. The state has a territory of 32,333 square miles and a population of 1.1 million people. With 34 persons per square mile, Arunachal Pradesh has the lowest population density in any of the states of India. The state is home to around 26 major tribes and more than 100 subtribes, each having its own distinct language or dialect and culture.

Arunachal Pradesh is a mountainous state. Much of the state is covered by the Himalayas. Parts of eastern Arunachal are covered by the Patkai hills. Of the total area of utilized land, about 94 percent is covered by forest, and about 12 percent is under permanent snow covers and glaciers. It has a varied topography, and the climatic condition varies from subtropical and hot in the plains to cold and alpine in the higher altitudes. The state receives heavy rainfall of 80 to 160 inches annually, most of it between May and September.

Little is known about the early history of Arunachal Pradesh, as there are hardly any written historical records about the region. From the oral literature and the ruins of many historical sites in the foothills, it is known that early settlements in the area date back to the beginning of the Christian era. The region has witnessed waves of migration from the neighboring areas of Tibet, Myanmar, Bhutan, and Yunan. This area came under British influence as early as 1826, with the consolidation of British rule in Assam after the Treaty of Yandaboo between the British and the Burmese, which ended the First Anglo-Burmese War of 1824–1826.



Newly-built homes on a hillside in Arunachal Pradesh. (Samrat/Dreamstime.com)

Much of the area, in fact, remained free of direct British control and administration during the entire colonial period, that is, until Indian independence in August 1947. In 1914, however, the hill areas of northern Assam were separated to form the Northeast Frontier tracts. After independence, this area, known as the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA), was the focus of the Indo-China border conflict in 1962, when China invaded India due to a dispute about the location of the India-China border. China still disputes the 553-mile-long northern boundary of the state, known as the McMahon line, which came about as a result of the Simla Treaty signed between Great Britain and Tibet in 1914. In 1972 NEFA was renamed as Arunachal Pradesh; it became a Union Territory and then in 1987 became the 24th state of the Indian Union.

The most remarkable aspect of local governance in Arunachal Pradesh is the tribal policy pioneered by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964) and Verrier Elwin (1902–1964), a self-trained anthropologist and tribal activist who became an adviser to the prime minister on tribal affairs. The tribal policy laid emphasis on the continuation of the traditional community institutions of the tribes. By and large the traditional village-level institutions in Arunachal Pradesh can be categorized into three categories: (1) those within a hierarchical structure under the Buddhist monasteries, particularly found among the Buddhist tribes of the West Kameng and Tawang districts of western Arunachal Pradesh; (2) the chieftaincies found in the easternmost corner of the state; and (3) the republican village-councils among the Tani group of tribes in central Arunachal Pradesh. Although, at present, local governance in the state is run through the *panchayati raj* system, whereby an assembly of five (*panch*) elders chosen and accepted by the community governs the affairs of the village or area, traditional community institutions continue to play a significant role.

According to the 2001 census, the Scheduled Tribe population—those tribes that in the 1850s became loosely referred to as "Depressed Classes," and often called untouchables, although they are also known by the term Adivasis—constituted 64 percent of the total population. Some of the main tribes of the state are Monpa, Miji, Aka, Shedukpen, Nysihi, Apatani, Tagin, Hill Miri, Adi, Digaru-Mishmi, Idu-Mishmi, Khamti, Miju-Mishmi, Nocte, Tangsa, and Wancho. As many as 40 languages are spoken in the state, although many of them do not have scripts of their own and use either the Roman script or the Assamese script. Most of the languages are Tibeto-Burman in origin. Apart from the languages of the tribes, English (which is the medium of instruction in schools), Hindi (which is the language of communication by the people), Assamese, and Nepalese are also spoken and understood by many. A large population of the state follow shamanistic-animistic religious traditions (such as Donyi-Polo in the Tani area and Rangfra in eastern Arunachal). Tibetan Buddhism predominates in the western districts of Tawang and West Kameng, and Theravada Buddhism is practiced by people living near the Burmese border. Few of the Scheduled Tribe people follow Vaishnavite Hinduism, the largest sect in Hinduism. Around 19 percent of the people are Christians.

Almost all the people of the state depend on agriculture for their livelihood. Slash-and-burn or shifting cultivation, called *jhum*, was the traditional system of cultivation among

the tribal groups. In recent years there has been a gradual decline in the area under shifting cultivation. However, the traditional wet rice cultivation practiced by the Apatanis in Zero Valley in central Arunachal has been widely studied as a unique example of an indigenous irrigation system. The major crops grown in the state include rice, maize, millet, wheat, pulses, sugarcane, ginger, and oilseeds. Recently there has been a significant expansion in the cultivation of fruits, vegetables, and spices. The *mithun* (*bos frontalis*), a large, dark-coated forest animal, found both in its wild and semidomesticated form, has great significance in the social and cultural life of the people of the state. Traditionally, the *mithun* was the medium of exchange and the indicator of the wealth of a person. Arunachal Pradesh has a long tradition of handicrafts, including textiles, carpets, and cane and bamboo objects and carvings. Although the state has very few modern industries, the rich hydroelectric potential of the state has attracted considerable investment in recent years. Arunachal has also entered into the tourist map of India.

In 2001 the literacy rate of Arunachal was only 55 percent. Although there has been a remarkable growth of education and health facilities in the state, the performance of the state in the area of human development has come in for a great deal of criticism, as there are considerable interdistrict variations in the levels of services and performance.

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See also Northeastern States

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✦ ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

India is a founding member, the fourth-largest shareholder, and the largest borrower of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), a multilateral development financial institution run by its 67 member countries. It was established in 1966 to promote economic and social development in Asian and Pacific countries through loans and technical assistance. The ADB India operations started in 1986, when India borrowed its first loan. The India resident

mission (country office) established in 1992 is one of ADB's largest country missions. In 2001 an additional mission was established in Gujarat as part of the Gujarat earthquake rehabilitation and reconstruction project. Currently, poverty reduction through infrastructure-led growth, as emphasized in the government of India's 11th Five-Year Plan (2007–2012), is the core focus for the ADB in India. The priority sectors in India that come under the ADB are energy, transport, urban development (including water and sanitation), water resource management, agribusiness infrastructure, finance, and governance. The scale of the impact of ADB assistance is impressive. For example, with the aim to improve road connectivity in 70 percent of India's rural areas, the program has, since 2003, improved the road infrastructure in Assam, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and West Bengal; the intended impact of this is enhancement of poor people's access to health, education, markets, and employment opportunities.

As of December 2008, ADB's portfolio in India included 44 ongoing loans for $8.2 billion, with $3.3 billion to transport, $1.7 billion to urban infrastructure, $1.5 billion to the energy sector, and $1 billion to the financial sector. The ADB's tsunami emergency assistance project for India was created after the Indian Ocean tsunami caused by an undersea megathrust earthquake on December 26, 2004, devastated parts of India. The project helped to rebuild safer roads, houses, and public infrastructure in 364 villages and 13 districts of Tamil Nadu state, and 160 villages in 9 districts of Kerala state. However, when in 2005 ADB funded Water Aid, an international nongovernmental organization (NGO), to conduct an independent review of ADB's water policy implementation in South Asia, including India, the impact of the projects were questioned and criticized for failing to reach the wider objectives of helping the poor.

In June 2009 China opposed a $2.9 billion ADB funding to India, as $60 million of the funds would go toward flood-management systems in Arunachal Pradesh state, which is at the center of a long-standing territorial dispute between the two countries. The ADB maintained that its mandate focuses only on economic issues and not political affairs. The ADB recognizes India as one of the key players in the South Asian region and in 2008, under the bank's South Asian Regional Cooperation project, awarded $750,000 to India and Pakistan to promote and improve policy reforms between the two countries.

In July 2009, as part of the ADB-funded project to help improve water management and reduce water-borne diseases in 30 urban centers in India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, the ADB urged India to raise its water tariff to conserve water and to improve the water supply. In its annual economic publication, *Asian Development Outlook 2009*, the ADB pegged India's economic growth at 5 percent in 2009–2010, a low growth rate for recent years that reflected in large part the global economic downturn. The ADB, however, expects the country's GDP growth to rise to 6.5 percent in 2010–2011 on the back of the various stimulus measures that are being implemented.

SHEEBA HÄRMÄ

See also Central Banking, Development Aspects; Economy

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✦ ASIATIC SOCIETY OF BENGAL

The Asiatic Society of Bengal, located in Kolkata at 1 Park Street in a four-story building that opened in 1965, is dedicated to the study of all areas of knowledge, especially those regarding the Asian continent. Its founder was Sir William Jones (1746–1794), the noted British scholar of Indian and Asian culture, who sought to establish a haven for research and scholarship on matters relating to India. The society maintains a museum and in addition possesses an impressive library that contains numerous valuable manuscripts and editions. Scholars from all regions of India and from all around the world visit the society's library to conduct research. Members of the society publish and oversee the publication of important books and articles on Asia and India, while conferences and seminars are also conducted to exchange and disseminate knowledge.



A woman browses the archives of the Asiatic Society in Kolkata, West Bengal. Containing one of the finest collections of its kind in the world, the society was founded in 1784. (Subir Halder/The India Today Group/Getty Images)

The society has a history of 225 years, and it has had numerous name changes over these years: the Asiatick Society (1784–1825), the Asiatic Society (1825–1832), the Asiatic Society of Bengal (1832–1935), the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal (1936–1951), and a return to the Asiatic Society of Bengal in July 1951.

Jones and the other luminaries of the early society set the project on a sound footing by publishing research in a host of disciplines: languages, mathematics, science, art, literature, history, archaeology, geology, economics, law, and politics. These original studies greatly contributed to the development of Asian and Indian research, and the contemporary society strives to pursue research on similar subjects. Among the many tasks the society has pursued over the centuries is the translation of Hindi and Sanskrit works into English. During the early years, Sanskrit and Indian epics, such as the *Ramayana,* the *Bhagavadgita,* the *Puranas,* and the *Gitagovinda,* were translated into English. Some books were also translated into German and French. In addition, the translators worked on texts from such languages as Arabic, Persian, Bengali, and Tibetan.

The society has an impressive museum and library. The museum contains paintings, sculptures, bronzes, coins, manuscripts, and inscriptions. Among the paintings owned by the museum are masterpieces by such noted artists as Guido Regni (1575–1642), Joshua Reynolds (1723–1792), Jacques-Louis David (1748–1825), and Peter Paul Rubens (1577–1640). The museum also possesses portraits of the governors-general of India Warren Hastings (1732–1818; governor-general 1773–1785) and Richard Colley Wellesley (1760–1842; governor-general 1798–1805).

The manuscripts collection contains numerous editions in various Indian languages—some quite ancient—as well as a few in other Asian languages. The coins also reflect the history of India and nearby countries.

The library has a collection that spans centuries, and the volumes are in numerous languages. It contains 149,000 printed books and almost 80,000 journals. To highlight its collection, the society organized a rare book section in 1978. The library supports research in almost every known area and even offers fellowships for scholars so that they can use its vast and varied collection. The many bound volumes housed in nearby Metcalfe Hall assist scholars in their research activities.

The society is quite active in publishing, above all in its own periodical, the *Journal of the Asiatic Society,* which is an important resource first published in 1848. Recent publications include works on geography, the *Gitagovinda,* biology and physics, and the scholar Kumar Bose (1901–1972).

The society conducts seminars and conferences on pressing matters or intellectual issues such as diabetes, the India-China divide, the life and career of the poet and social reformer Madanmohan Tarkalankar (1817–1858), or anthropology and human life. A March 2009 conference, held jointly with the Department of Indo-Tibetan Studies at Visva-Bharati University, addressed the work of the Hungarian philologist and orientalist who specialized in the Tibetan language, Krösi Csoma Sándor (1784–1842), who is also known as Csomo de Koros.

The society's website contains the names of past and present presidents and secretaries, in addition to the members of the executive council. Methods of contacting the members are also listed. A general email address for the society is aslibcal@cal.vsnl.net.in.

STEVE WALL

See also Asiatic Society of Mumbai; Orientalism

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✦ ASIATIC SOCIETY OF MUMBAI

The Asiatic Society of Mumbai (formerly Bombay) was established in 1804 under the rubric of the Literary Society of Bombay. That was two decades after its senior sibling, namely, the Asiatic Society of Bengal, was founded in 1784 by the well-known scholar-judge Sir William Jones (1746–1794), with the unconcealed patronage of the first governor-general of British India, Warren Hastings (1732–1818; governor-general 1773–1785). A notable fact is that two of its founding members—Jonathan Duncan (1756–1811) and William Erskine (1773–1852)—were also the founding members of the Bombay body; its founder, James Mackintosh (1765–1832), was also a judge. As governor, Duncan hosted the inaugural meeting at his official residence in Parel, in what was later to house the Haffkine Institute when it was founded in 1899. Both the societies maintained close and valuable links with the high officials of the East India Company, including successive governors-general in Calcutta (Kolkata) and governors of Bombay (Mumbai), and Madras (Chennai). They were associated with those two societies as president or patrons, and the government, directly or indirectly, helped them with funds and space to house their books, valuable manuscript collections, and rare antiquities. Later, in 1829, when the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (RAS) was created, the three learned societies of Bengal, Bombay, and Madras, although they were older than the newly established RAS in the imperial capital, were made its "branches." Thus, the Literary Society of Bombay was renamed the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (BBRAS). With the advent of Indian independence in August 1947, appropriately enough, BBRAS shed its imperial connection and became the Asiatic Society of Bombay.

In the first phase of the society's history, which ended in 1840, membership was restricted to Europeans. It was opened to Indians after the dramatic entry into the society's premises of Sir Maneckji Cursetji, one of Mumbai's affluent Parsi philanthropists, who had, during his visit to London, joined the RAS, whose members were entitled to use the

facilities of its branches anywhere in the world. Having admitted Cursetji, albeit reluctantly, the BBRAS opened its doors to other Indians.

With the adoption of English as the medium of instruction following the infamous but consequential 1835 "Minute on Indian Education" of Thomas Babington Macaulay (1800–1859), who served as the law member of the Governor-General's Council from 1834 to 1838, and even more so after the establishment of Bombay University, many Indian scholars joined the society and contributed to its research activities. Indian participation in the society's activities, in fact, marked the second phase of the society's history. Scholarly efforts by Englishmen were now ably complemented by Indians of the caliber of Pandit Bhagwanlal Indraji (1839–1888) and Bhau Daji Lad (1822–1874). Among the eminent European scholars of this second period was the Scottish missionary John Wilson (1804–1875).

The third phase, from about 1885 until India's independence in August 1947, was clearly dominated by Indian scholars, some of them eminent also in public life. Among them was Kashinath Trimbak Telang (1850–1893), the first Indian president of the BBRAS, a judge of the high court, and vice chancellor of Bombay University. In the same category of eminent scholars during this phase were Sir Ramakrishna Bhandarkar (1837–1925), Sir Jivanji Mody (1854–1933), and K. R. Cama (1831–1909).

The fourth phase, beginning with independence, produced only one bright spot, arguably the brightest in the two centuries of the society's life, luminously marked by the publication of *Mahamahopadhyaya*, P. V. Kane's multivolume *History of Dharmashastra (Ancient and Medieval Religious and Civil Law)* (published 1930–1962), which brought him the highest civilian honor in the land, the Bharata Ratna, in 1963. Kane (1880–1963) had spent more than a half century using the society's library for his monumental project, and he had also served for periods of time on the society's Managing Committee and as the committee's vice president.

A review of the first phase acquaints us with the British agenda and goals at the inceptions of such learned societies as part of their burgeoning empire and in seeking scholarly assistance in understanding India's history and traditions. In the last few decades, a large body of thought and literature has appeared linking the scholarly preoccupation of some of the first generation of British officials in the postconquest phase of the East India Company in the late 18th and early 19th centuries with the pursuit of power, à la French scholar Michel Foucault (1926–1984). The debate was initiated in 1978, arguably by one of the most influential books of the last century, *Orientalism*, by the Palestinian scholar and Columbia University professor Edward Said (1935–2003). He notoriously questioned European, particularly British and French, motivations in studying "Other" societies and cultures.

First, a word about Edward Said's *Orientalism* and his strictures against Orientalists and their attitude toward the "Other." Said is widely regarded by postmodernists, and students of literature and cultural studies, as one of the founders of the postcolonial movement in criticism and of multiculturalism in politics. The numerous commemorative meetings following his death underscored his high place among such intellectuals worldwide. Said makes three major claims. The first is that although Orientalism posed as an objective, disinterested

pursuit, in reality it provided the means through which European nations could conquer and administer Oriental lands. This would patently be wrong in the case of India, where Oriental scholarship did not pave the way for conquest but followed it. Secondly, Said argued that Orientalism enabled Europe to construct its self-image; that the construction of such identity in every age and every society involves the creation of opposites and "Others"; and that in this process of studying the East, the West had dominated it and, what was worse, manipulated it "politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively."

It would be unfair and incorrect to apply such strictures to men like William Jones, who, far from glorifying the self-image of Europe, helped to glorify that of India. As Ibn Warraq (b. 1946), the well-known secularist and European Islamic scholar of Pakistani origin, asserts, Said had difficulties understanding the very notion of "disinterested intellectual inquiry, knowledge for knowledge's sake." In his view, Said's attempts to smear every single Orientalist with the lowest of motives were not only "reprehensible, but fail to give due weight to this golden thread running through Western civilization." For many such Orientalists, their research stemmed out of a genuine love for India. To quote Warraq again, "much Oriental research gave back to . . . Indians, their own rich and varied heritage of which they themselves were not aware."

The goals set by William Jones as the founder of the Asiatic Society of Bengal applied also to its counterpart in Bombay. Jones followed the course officially set by Warren Hastings—and later by Richard Colley Wellesley, Marques Wellesley (1760–1842; governor-general of India, 1798–1805)—of studying India's past in order to form the basis of the law and administration of what would grow into subcontinental responsibilities. Jones was proud of India's past, knowledge of which would help England and Europe in understanding human achievements around the globe. Not only was he the "first seriously to consider that India's golden period as a culture lay in a remote, unchartered period in world history," he successfully persuaded scholars in India and Europe that the languages of the Indo-European people had a common source in Sanskrit. His tribute to Sanskrit was characteristic of his conviction that ancient India had pride of place in human history:

> The Sanskrit language, whatever be its antiquity is of a wonderful structure, more perfect than the Greek, more copious than the Latin, and more exquisitely refined than either, yet bearing to both of them a stronger affinity, both in the roots of verbs and in the form of grammar, than could possibly have been produced by accident; so strong indeed, that no philologer could examine all three without believing them to have sprung from some common source.

The founder of the Literary Society of Bombay, Mackintosh described himself as a "representative of Europe's curiosity in India." Many of the society's members, notably Sir Charles Wilkins (1749–1836), Jonathan Duncan (1756–1811), and Mountstuart Elphinstone (1779–1859) genuinely labored in the tradition of Jones, Henry Colebrooke (1765–1837),

and H. H. Wilson (1786–1860) in the cause of highlighting the glories of India's past. In that first phase of the society's history, their researches were periodically published in *Transactions* until the society started an annual journal in 1841, which, with changes in nomenclature, continues to be published as *The Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay*.

It was while Elphinstone was the governor of Bombay (1819–1827) and president of the society (1819–1827) that most of the work on his notable *The History of India* (1841), which was the only serious rebuttal of James Mill's notorious and prejudiced, but highly influential, *History of British India* (1817), was carried out at the society. It may be out of his appreciation for the society's library that he donated to the library its well-known jewel, Dante's *Divine Comedy*, published in the period of the incunabula, in 1350, within a couple of decades of Dante's death and for which the society was reportedly offered in the late 1930s a million pounds by Italy's dictator, Benito Mussolini (1883–1945). The offer was, indeed, turned down.

In the postindependence era, the society suffered on all fronts. With the nationwide emphasis on science and technology and the dire devaluation of the humanities, most particularly of Sanskrit, the society was a low priority in the general scheme of building a modern India. The financial situation of the society was so bad that it jumped at the opportunity in 1954 to accept an annual grant of a mere 60,000 rupees from the government in exchange for responsibility to administer the Central Library, one of four libraries in the country. Under the Delivery of Books Act, the Central Library was required to receive, catalog, and preserve books published in all Indian languages anywhere in India. What began as a trickle soon became a flood of materials competing with the society's materials for shelf space, finances, and administrative attention. In the process, the society's own reserve fund was all but exhausted, and the society had increasingly to depend on the state government's grudging subventions for its basic maintenance needs. Scholarship became subsidiary to the struggle for sheer survival. In 1976 a government committee chaired by the noted scholar Niharranjan Ray (1903–1981) recommended that the society be divested of responsibility for the management of the Central Library. The recommendation was accepted "in principle," which in government jargon meant shelved. The society regained its independence after four decades when fiscal dependence on the government ended through a court-ordered separation of the Central Library, effective July 1, 1994. Despite such extraordinary hardships, the society continued in its mission to explore India's glorious past. Its journal, with only a few delays, continued to be published. A small band of Sanskritists bore the brunt. In the 1990s a massive fund-raising campaign was undertaken, and about 60 million rupees were collected. This enabled the society to launch multiple projects to preserve and modernize the society's physical facilities, including the computerization of the catalog and the establishment of two laboratories for microfilming rare collections, and for the preservation of books through the removal of excess acidity. Attention also was paid to the society's research mission. The society's center for postgraduate studies, named after P. V. Kane, received permanent recognition from the University of Bombay for its doctoral program. An annual seminar in honor of MM's memory (MM stands for the honor accorded him, Mahamahaupadhyay, "the greatest among the great teachers") was funded; it has been organized every year since the mid-1990s.

Half a dozen annual lectures were endowed, and they would be printed over the years in the society's journal, thereby helping to raise its quality. The 3,000-plus Sanskrit manuscripts in the society's possession were given a further lease on life through microfilming and laboratory conservation procedures. The catalog of the manuscripts, first published between 1926 and 1930 by the eminent scholar H. D. Velankar (1893–1967), was reprinted.

DAMODAR R. SARDESAI

See also Asiatic Society of Bengal; Orientalism

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✦ ASSAM

The state of Assam is located in the northeastern part of India and covers an area of 30,285 square miles. The term Assam was coined by the Ahoms, who ruled the territory for 600 years, from 1228 CE prior to its annexation by the British in 1826. Assam is bounded by the kingdom of Bhutan and the state of Arunachal Pradesh to the north, by the states of Nagaland and Manipur to its east, and by the states of Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram to the south. To the west of Assam lies Bangladesh and the Indian state of West Bengal. The neighboring states of Nagaland, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, and Mizoram were once part of Assam until they became constitutionally recognized as individual states of India. Until 1972 Shillong (in present day Meghalaya) was the capital, and since then Dispur, in the locality of Guwahati (previously Gauhati) has been the state's capital and administrative headquarters.

The Brahmaputra and Barak valleys dominate the physical landscape of Assam, and hills comprise nearly one-fifth of its total geographical area. The Brahmaputra, a unique "male" river ("Brahma-putra" literally means son of Brahma), and its numerous tributaries drain a valley stretching nearly 373 miles in length and 32 to 49 miles in breadth. The valley gently slopes down to 32.8 yards at Guwahati and 142.1 yards at Sadiya over the 372-mile stretch. The highly braided river is scattered with numerous riverine islands, of which Majuli (251 square miles in area) is the largest in the world in spite of heavy erosion by annual floodwaters. Majuli is an important center of Satriya culture, and several *satras* (or centers of Vaishnavite learning) started by the medieval saint Shankardeva (1449–1568) and his most prominent disciple, Madhabdeva (1489–1596), are located in Majuli.

A few scattered hillocks and monadnocks dot the otherwise uniform lowland landscape of the Brahmaputra Valley. The Barak Valley, drained by the Barak River in the southern

part of the state, is a smaller river system though no less important to the agricultural economy of the area. Hills are almost entirely confined to the two districts of Karbi Anglong (4,029 square miles) and North Cachar Hills (1,887 square miles), and much of the state's forest wealth, apart from the national parks and the reserve forests, lies in these districts.

The climate is tropically humid, and rainfall is heavy, averaging 5.6 feet but reaching as high as 11.4 feet at certain places. The bulk of the rainfall occurs during the monsoon season between June and October; winter rain is scanty and infrequent. Temperatures range from 38°C in the peak of summer to 4°C during winter. A surfeit of rain falls during the summer months, and following a few days of consistent rain, the water levels of the larger rivers rise rapidly and inundate extensive areas. Annual floods ravaging the state are a routine affair, and very little has been achieved in terms of controlling the flood hazard, although embankments are built along the main rivers and flood protection measures and relief efforts are undertaken routinely, although with limited success. Although the Brahmaputra Board was set up to tackle the damage from floods, it has not been very successful, and floods continue to badly impact rural life and property. It was estimated that during 2006, 14 million acres of land were affected by floods in 17 (of 28) districts, as 19 embankments (or dykes) were breached at 28 places totaling 1,196 yards. Floodwaters affected 916 villages, and 25,711 acres of crops were lost. In 2004, when floods were particularly severe, 1.29 million acres of cropped land were ravaged, and crops worth 3,747 million rupees (1 U.S. dollar = 49 rupees) were lost. Residential property worth 2,109 million rupees was damaged, 497 people lost their lives, and 118,772 cattle were killed.

The population of Assam comprises the descendants of Austric, Mongolian, Dravidian, and Aryan races that migrated to Assam in various streams at different times from southeast Asia and mainland India. A great deal of intermingling among the races, however, has taken place. Large-scale migration of Bengali Muslims from present-day Bangladesh, however, caused ethnic tensions in Assam's multiethnic society. With rising numbers of undocumented illegal aliens threatening local power equations, the state erupted into a six-year-long mass movement against aliens (1979–1985) and demanded their expulsion from Assam. Although a specific law was promulgated in 1983 to specifically handle illegal migrants in Assam, it was struck down by India's Supreme Court in 2005. A fence along the India-Bangladesh border attempts to keep out illegal immigrants, and the issuance of national identity cards in Karimganj District, along with a few other districts in India, attempts to regulate the flow of illegal aliens.

The population has grown rapidly, and this puts greater pressure on agricultural land and on natural resources, particularly on the collection of wood for fuel. Assam's population, in fact, grew faster and doubled faster than any other state in India, and it is often stated that illegal immigration is the underlying factor behind the rapid growth. This was the claim in a report issued by the governor of Assam and given to the president of India in 2005. The population of Assam, 26.6 million in 2001, is estimated to be more than 30 million, with a density of 990 persons per square mile by 2011.

Agriculture forms the mainstay of Assam's economy, and the overwhelming proportion of the people in the state dwell in the rural areas. The land in the flat valleys, which are annually replenished by floodwaters from the rivers, adds to the fertility of the alluvial

soil and encourages peasant agriculture. The main features of this agriculture are the lack of mechanization, the low levels of investment in agricultural operations, the small size of landholdings due to the growing population pressure, and the fragmentation of landholdings.

As in the neighboring states, rice is the staple diet and the principal subsistence crop. A marketable surplus in rice, however, is minimal, and the state has only recently become self-sufficient in the crop. Tea, jute, cotton, oilseeds, sugarcane, and potatoes are also important cash crops. Some 800 sprawling tea plantations established by British tea planters during the late 19th century dot the landscape, and Assam produces more than half of India's tea and about one-sixth of the world's tea. Small-scale tea growers have been established, and these sell their produce to the large tea estates. Apart from tea, petroleum is the only other industry of substance in the state. Oil (along with natural gas) is found in the Naharkatia, Moran, Lakwa, and Rudrasagar areas of upper Assam, while refineries at Digboi, Guwahati, and Numaligarh, established in 1901, 1962, and 1999 respectively, process the crude oil.



Workers gather top leaves from tea plants. India is the second largest producer and the largest consumer of tea in the world. (**Maxwell Attenborough**)

Apart from tea plantations, which attract visitors to the cool hilltops, Assam boasts of the one-horned rhinoceros, which attract many foreign tourists to the well-known wildlife sanctuaries Kaziranga and Manas. The Kaziranga National Park is home to two-thirds of the world's one-horned rhinoceros population.

ANUP SAIKIA

See also Northeastern States

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✦ AYODHYA

Ayodhya is a town located in the northwest state of Uttar Pradesh and is situated on the banks of the Sarayu River. The region is peninsular in shape, with an area of elevation at the center. Ayodhya is one of the *Saptapuri*, the seven most holy cities in India. Archeologists have noted that the area was inhabited by the eighth century BCE. The first settlement for which we have a recorded name (ca. sixth–fifth centuries BCE) identifies the region as Saketa. However, that name was eventually replaced as the region became identified with the kingdom of Rama, the seventh avatar of the Hindu god Vishnu. In the *Valmiki Ramayana*, composed between 200 BCE and 200 CE, and in the many narratives of the *Ramayana*, the ideal king Rama of the Raghu Dynasty presides over a kingdom known as Ayodhya. His kingship inaugurated a period of unparalleled peace, abundance, and just rule. In Hindu texts, *Ramarajya*, "The Kingship of Rama," is said to have lasted for 10,000 years.

The identification of the town Saketa with Ayodhya probably began with the Gupta Dynasty (ca. 320–467 CE). The Guptas reputedly moved into the area occupied by the ancient city of Saketa and renamed it Ayodhya after the epic kingdom. As the kingship of Rama was perfect in all ways, the Gupta kings wanted to identify their own sovereignty with the epic perfection of *Ramarajya*. By the fifth century, Ayodhya became popularly known as the very place where King Rama had been born and ruled.

Kalidasa (ca. fourth–fifth centuries) was the first poet to textually elaborate on the history of Ayodhya in the *Raghuvamsha*, the stories about the lineage of the Raghu Dynasty. Other legends about Ayodhya emerge much later during the 1700s as part of a reclamation process of sacred Ramaite sites. These legends tell of another mythic king, Vikramaditya, who rediscovered the holy city of Ayodhya in the *Kali Yuga*, the modern era. The Vikramaditya of this legend may refer to a historical king, but in any case, he is depicted as the king who remapped modern Ayodhya's places of pilgrimage, including the Ramajanmabhumi, or "Birthplace of Rama." The holy sites are also enumerated in the *Ayodhya Mahatmya* (ca. 16th–17th centuries), the text that extols and details the whole of the Ayodhya region.

By the 16th century, the area in and around historical Ayodhya was controlled by the Mughals, who referred to the town and the provinces around it as Awadh. In 1527 the first Mughal emperor of India, Babur (1483–1530; emperor 1526–1530), had a mosque constructed in his honor. It was called the Babri Masjid (Mosque of Babur), on a site popularly known as the Ramjanmabhumi. It is believed by many Hindus that a temple commemorating the birthplace of Rama had to be destroyed by the Muslims to make room for the Mosque of Babur. As such, Awadh/Ayodhya became a site of contention between Hindus and Muslims. In the 19th century, the communal tensions in the area were further fanned by the "Cow Protection Movement," a movement to prevent the slaughter of cows, which are sacred for Hindus but not for Muslims. As Ayodhya is part of India's agricultural "cow belt," it became one of the major areas of Hindu/Muslim unrest.

The problems surrounding the Ramjanmabhumi/Babri Masjid site did not subside when India gained its independence from Great Britain in August 1947. Ayodhya has continued

to be a focus for communal conflict between Hindus and Muslims ever since. The Indian government even cordoned off the disputed area in 1949 to try to prevent violence from breaking out because of the conflicting claims by Hindus and Muslims over the site. It locked the site to both Hindus and Muslims and did not remove the locks until 1986. Notwithstanding such actions, nearly 2,500 people were killed in Ayodhya in 1969 in the region's worst violence between Hindus and Muslims since the subcontinent was split into India and Pakistan. A series of communal riots took place again in the 1980s. By the end of that decade, various Hindu political parties made the temple/mosque a primary issue and published plans for building a new temple to Rama near the disputed spot. Politicians and various Hindu religious leaders continued to stir up passions over the issue, and on December 6, 1992, a Hindu mob, which some estimated to be as many as 200,000-strong, stormed and demolished Babri Masjid.

The demolition of the mosque in 1992 ignited a firestorm of communal violence between Hindus and Muslims throughout India, and many people were either killed or injured. A makeshift temple to Rama was built almost immediately near the demolition site, but violence continued to erupt over the Ramjanmabhumi/Babri Masjid question. Throughout the 1990s communal tensions centering on the temple/mosque issue arose sporadically. In 2001 the alleged burning to death of Hindu Ramjanmabhumi activists in a train car



Hindu fundamentalists stand on top of one of the three domes of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya after storming the security cordon, December 6, 1992. The 430-year-old mosque was razed to the ground to clear a site for a proposed Hindu temple. (AP Photo/Udo Weitz)

coming back from Ayodhya brought about additional violent and bloody communal riots. Nearly 2,000 people were killed or injured in these riots, which, while not taking place at Ayodhya, were sparked by the temple/mosque controversy. In 2005 six heavily armed Muslim men attacked the guarded site of the demolished Babri Masjid. Security officials stopped the attack almost immediately, and all of the attackers were killed. The six Muslims are believed to have been from the Pakistan-based terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba, "The Army of the Pure," the same group that would claim credit for the Mumbai massacres in 2008.

On September 30, 2010, with the whole nation watching anxiously on television and listening on their radios, the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court issued its judgment on a suit first brought before a court in 1950, with other suits following in 1959, 1961, and 1989. Four suits were combined in 1989, and the court was finally making its decision over the claim of possession of the complex. More than 200,000 troops were deployed in Uttar Pradesh, text messaging was suspended to prevent mobs from being summoned, a curfew was imposed in Kashmir, and many schools and shops selling alcohol in Uttar Pradesh were ordered closed in order to prevent communal riots from breaking out when the findings of who owned the land, the Muslim Central Sunni Wakf Board or the Hindu sect Nirmohi Akhara, were announced. In a finding of more than 8,000 pages, the three members of the bench consisting of two Hindus, Justices Sudhir Agarwal and D. V. Sharma, and one Muslim, Justice S. U. Khan, split the 2.7 acres of disputed land into three parts. One-third of the disputed site would be managed by the Sunni Wakf Board, one-third by the Hindu sect Nirmohi Akhara, and one-third by the party of Ram Lalla, a Hindu group that tends to the idol of Rama at the center of the site; the main disputed area, however, would be under the control of Hindus. The three justices agreed on this division of the property, but the Muslim justice, S. U. Khan, did not agree that a Hindu temple had been demolished to build the mosque, taking the Muslim position that the mosque was built on the site of the ruins of Hindu temples. Both the Sunni Wakf Board and the Hindu Sri Ram Janmabhoomi Trust announced that they would appeal the verdict to the Supreme Court of India.

Despite the continuing disputes and archaeological claims over the temple/mosque site, Hindu pilgrims still flock to Ayodhya. Brahmins continue to preside over the sacred landscape, filled with markers of Rama and his rule. *Itihasas*, or "History Pamphlets," are sold everywhere in the area and entwine modern geographical realities with ancient and classical mythic scenarios, rituals, and legends. Pilgrimage remains the main "industry" of Ayodhya as Hindus continue to relive and commemorate the god Rama and his ideal rule.

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See also Hindutva; Muslims; Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh; Uttar Pradesh

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✦ AYURVEDIC MEDICINE

Ayurveda is an Indian traditional medicine that is still widely practiced alongside Western medicine. Long before there were written languages, the peoples of the countries now called India and Pakistan, following patterns established farther back than memory could reach, set broken bones, treated wounds, and tended the disease-stricken. Some of these practices included strong doses of religious belief in disease-causing demons and healing deities, others were based on astrological cults, and still others on the observations of empirics. Elements of some of these manifold traditions may remain in contemporary folk medicine, but only one major strain has survived, having been recorded first in Sanskrit during the fifth century BCE, about the time of the Greek Hippocrates (ca. 460–ca. 370 BCE), and over centuries after. These texts served medical students in schools that taught the "knowledge for longevity," one translation of the Indian term "ayurvedic," an elite and learned tradition. Ayurvedic medicine remains actively studied and practiced today alongside Western medicine in India, and the Indian government even supports its teaching and practice. In the West, ayurveda is often treated as a trendy "alternative" medicine.

Distinctively nonreligious, ayurveda does share with Buddhism a concern for moderation or "the middle way" in all things, especially diet, mood, and morality. Practitioners believe that the human body consists of tissues, the three humor-like *do.sas* or *trido.sa*, and wastes awaiting removal. To these are added the body's seven "constituents": chyle, blood, fat, flesh, bone, marrow, and (the highest) semen. The *trid sa*—wind, bile, and phlegm—are by-products of foods that move through the body's tubes, and blockages in these cause many of the conditions labeled disease. Regulation of these through a regimen of diet, exercise, and bathing is the key to good health.

But the body is also acted on by the environment, which is what brings on epidemics, or *janapada-uddhvamsa*. When a single disease afflicts many in a given area, the cause clearly must be in the place: its air, water, vegetation, pests, and even earthquakes and ghosts. Time (seasons, conjunctions of events) also plays a role, and ayurvedic texts reflect this concern with their inclusion of astrological material. The earliest surviving text, *Caraka's Compendium* from northwestern India, equates epidemic preconditions with "corruption" of the air, water, locale, and time. Essentially, each is unusual or abnormal in one or more distinctive, negative ways: the air is too humid or smoky, the water is sour or cloudy. These four corruptions are rooted in "bad judgments" made recently or in the past by the social leaders in the area, which resulted in bad acts or unrighteousness. In a kind of cascading effect, the unrighteousness grows, virtue is overwhelmed, the gods abandon the area, and the abnormalities of corruption

set in. These affect the inhabitants in roughly the same fashion, and an epidemic arises, the specifics of the disease being dependent on the specifics of the corruption. Bad karma corrupts. The role in epidemic disease of contagion, or spread of disease by personal contact, is hinted at but never fully developed in ayurvedic texts.

In Caraka's account, the appropriate medicines must be gathered before conditions deteriorate, or their potency will likewise drain away. Ayurvedic doctors used long lists of both animal and plant materials as medications, and Caraka's text asserts boldly "when people are treated [prophylactically] with medicine they will not become sick." The use of emetics, purgatives, enemas, sinus clearing, and later bloodletting, douches, sweating, massage, and other therapeutic procedures meant to affect the *trid sa* took their place as well, both as prophylaxes for and treatments of disease. Though highly traditional, ayurvedic medicine changed and evolved over time: minerals appear in the pharmacopoeia around 1000 CE; syphilis (French/*phiranga* disease) appeared among treated diseases around 1500; and more effective means of diagnosis replaced less reliable ones over time. Though practiced in India by at least 1700, inoculation is never mentioned in ayurvedic texts.

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See also Diet and Health

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
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B



✦ BACHCHAN, HARIVANSH AMITABH

Amitabh Harivansh Bachchan (b. 1942) is a Bollywood film star of the first magnitude. The name Bachchan comes from his father, Harivansh Rai Srivastava (1907–2003), a famous Hindi poet who used Bachchan as a pen name. Amitabh Harivansh Bachchan first came to prominence in *Zanjeer* (*Chains*) (1973), in which he debuted his signature character, the angry young man, a role he replayed successfully throughout the 1970s and 1980s. In doing so, Bachchan single-handedly redefined the physical and psychological character of the male star in Bollywood films. Tall, lean, brooding, and handsome, Bachchan starred in over 70 films between 1973 and 1980 playing the active, socially aware man of action who fought against injustice from both sides of the law. He became famous for singing his own songs, rather than relying on the usual playback singer, and performing his own often demanding and dangerous stunts. In 1982 he was badly injured performing stunts in *Coolie* (1983) and his life seemed endangered. India came to a standstill. It is alleged that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984) cancelled a trip to Washington to be at Bachchan's bedside. He recovered and continued his career, which went into decline in the mid-1980s. After an unsuccessful stint as a Congress representative in the Indian lower house, the Lok Sabha, between 1984 and 1987, in support of his long-time friend Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991; prime minister 1984–1989), Bachchan resurrected his career with a transfer to television, where he hosted *Kaun Benega Crorepati* (KBC) (*Who Wants to Be a Millionaire*). In a revived career in film after 1987 Bachchan has specialized in playing avuncular statesmen.



Indian film icon Amitabh Bachchan during the Dubai International Film Festival, December 9, 2009. (Creativei/Dreamstime.com)

In 1973 Bachchan married Jaya Bhaduri (b. 1948), a Bengali actress who is a star in her own right but famously appeared in three films with Bachchan in the mid-1970s—*Zanjeer, Abhimaan* (1973), *Chupke Chupke* (1975), and *Sholay* (1975)—that with their style defined the new Bollywood. She subsequently retired from active filmmaking only to return in 1999 to star in films with her husband and son, Abhishek Bachchan (b. 1976). In a sabbatical from filmmaking in 2006 Amitabh Bachchan became politically active as a member of Parliament in the upper house, the Rajya Sabha, for the Samajwadi Party, a political party based in Uttar Pradesh and founded in 1992.

Abhishek Bachchan's first starring role was in *Refugee* (2000). After a moderately successful career he shot to international stardom with his role in *Guru* (2007). In 2007 he married the former Miss World (1994) Aishwarya Rai (b. 1973), who became another superstar of Bollywood after 1994. Together they form the supercouple of Bollywood; their personal and professional lives are widely scrutinized in the Indian film press and popular culture. Both are active in Amitabh Bachchan's production company AB Corp. Ltd., which is involved in film production. Collectively the four members of the Bachchan clan form a powerful influence on the shape of contemporary Bollywood.

BRIAN SHOESMITH

See also Bollywood; Film Industry; Maharashtra; Mumbai

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✦ BANGALORE

Bangalore or Bengalūru (in the Kannada language) is the capital of the south Indian state Karnataka and is India's third largest city. Located at 3,000 feet above sea level on the Deccan Plateau, Bangalore is known for its salubrious climate and beautiful gardens and parks. In December 2006 the state voted to restore the city's Kannada name and list it officially as Bengalūru.

A demographically diverse city of approximately 9 million people, Bangalore is a major economic and cultural hub and the fastest growing major metropolis in India. Women make up 47.5 percent of Bangalore's population, and the city has the second highest literacy rate (83 percent) for an Indian metropolis. According to the 2001 Census, 79.37 percent of Bangalore's population is Hindu, mirroring the national average; Muslims are 13.37 percent of the population, again the same as the national average; while Christians and Jains account for 5.79 percent and 1.05 percent of the population respectively, double that of their national averages. Anglo-Indians also form a substantial group within the city, as do members of Scheduled Castes and Tribes, who account for 14.3 percent of the city's population. Apart from Kannada, Urdu, and English, major languages spoken in the city are Tamil, Telugu, and Hindi. Debates about linguistic and regional chauvinism have become more strident as immigration from other parts of India to Karnataka in general, and Bangalore in particular, have risen with the increasing prosperity of the region.

References to the city date from 900 CE. Bangalore in 1537 was settled by local *palegar* (chieftain) Kempe Gowda I, who established it as a provincial capital of the Vijayanagar Empire and built a mud-brick fortress and called it Gandubhūmi (Land of Heroes). His successor, Kempe Gowda II, built four granite towers on the outskirts of the city delineating the city's territory. Between 1638 and 1687 Bangalore fell to Muslim and Maratha rule. In 1687, the Mughal general Kasim Khan sold Bangalore to Chikkadevaraja Wodeyar (1673–1704), the ruler of Mysore, for 300,000 rupees. After Krishnaraja Wodeyar II's death in 1759, Hyder Ali (ca. 1722–1782), commander in chief of the Mysore Army, proclaimed himself the ruler of Mysore and established the *pētē* (city) as a commercial cotton trading capital and as a military outpost. Hyder Ali's son Tipu Sultan (1750–1799; sultan 1782–1799), known as the Tiger of Mysore, built a palace and a fort in the city. Under Tipu Sultan's instruction a great public garden was built to the south of the city called Lal Bagh (red garden), which was filled with imported flowering and fruiting trees and shrubs. After the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War (1799) and the defeat of Tipu Sultan, Bangalore became a British military center. The British returned administrative control of the Bangalore *pētē* to the maharaja of Mysore, but they built and retained a British military cantonment quarter to the northeast. Two important developments during this period contributed to the rapid growth of the city: the introduction of telegraph connections in the midnineteenth century and a rail connection to Madras in 1864. The influx of migrants led to overcrowding in the city and an outbreak of plague, and new housing extensions in Malleshwaram to the north and Basavanagudi to the south of the *pētē* were built. Telephone lines were laid to help

coordinate antiplague operations, and a health officer was appointed to the city in 1898. In 1906, Bangalore became the first city in India to have electricity, powered by the hydroelectric plant situated in Shivanasamudra on the river Cauvery some 70 miles away.

In 1927 Bangalore began a series of urban landscaping and beautification projects; parks were built and avenues of serial flowering trees such as the jacaranda, *gulmohar,* and *tabubea* were planted, leading to its popular sobriquet "the garden city of India." After Indian independence in August 1947, Bangalore was declared the new capital city of the state of Mysore, later renamed Karnataka. Bangalore experienced rapid growth in the decades 1941–1951 and 1971–1981, with the arrival of many immigrants first from northern Karnataka and later from other parts of southern India. By 1961, Bangalore had become the sixth largest city in India, with a population of 1,207,000.

By the early 1980s Bangalore was an acknowledged brain-trust metropolis with a track record of innovation, drawing educated immigrants from across India. Between 1980 and 2000 Bangalore consolidated its position as a premier "knowledgeware" city in India, growing to approximately 8 million people in 1999. Bangalore is now known as the Silicon Valley of India because of its position as the nation's leading IT exporter, contributing 33 percent of India's $32 billion IT exports in 2006–2007, with over 300 multinational and Indian knowledgeware companies doing business in the city. It is also gaining a reputation as a biotechnology hub and a growing health care center. The city is home to some of the most highly regarded colleges and research institutions in India, such as the Indian Institute of Management and the Indian



Employees at the Infosys campus in Bangalore, Karnataka. (AP Photo/Gautam Singh)

Institute of Science; numerous public sector heavy industries; numerous software companies; and aerospace, telecommunications, and defense organizations. In the early 2000s Bangalore became the center of the outsourcing industry as America and European companies transferred many service jobs overseas to take advantage of English-speaking, young, and cheap labor. Bangalore became home to several hundred outsourcing companies and medical transcription facilities, and to "be Bangalored" implied the shifting to Bangalore of service industry jobs. This led to a backlash against the city in the media in the United States.

Currently the city is administered by the Bruhat Bengalūru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP, Greater Bangalore Municipal Corporation). It was formed in 2007 by merging 100 wards of the erstwhile Bangalore Mahanagara Palike with the neighboring 7 City Municipal Councils (CMC), one Town Municipal Council, and 110 villages around Bangalore. It has 198 city wards. Bangalore's rapid growth has created several problems relating to traffic congestion and infrastructure that the BBMP has found challenging to address. There is much debate about the nature of infrastructure between citizens' groups and NGOs as the city has grown and basic services are inadequate. Water scarcity, lack of electricity in the summer, and clogged roads have all become the bane of Bangaloreans' lives despite the city administration's controversial moves to build flyovers through the city, cut down old tree-lined avenues, and build a much debated subway system called Namma Metro (our metro) through the center of the city.

TULASI SRINIVAS

See also Karnataka

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✦ BANGLADESH, RELATIONS WITH

India and Bangladesh share a common history, geography, and culture. With the Partition of British India in August 1947, Bangladesh, formerly known as East Bengal, became a part of Pakistan. Bangladesh is bounded by India on three sides—the north, east, and west—making it virtually dependent on India for access to water resources and for a great deal of its vital supplies. They share land borders of over 2,500 miles and maritime borders of 111 miles.

India played a pivotal role in the establishment of Bangladesh as an independent sovereign nation in December 1971, providing shelter to 10 million East Pakistani refugees and losing nearly 20,000 soldiers in the war to liberate East Pakistan. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1921–1975; prime minister 1972–1975; president January–August 1975), the founding father of Bangladesh, paid rich tribute to Indian soldiers for making the supreme sacrifice and expressed his profound gratitude to India for extending unconditional support and matériel to the struggle for independence.

The New Delhi-Dhaka relationship, in fact, commenced on a very positive note with Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi's official visit to Bangladesh in March 1972. Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984) was given a rousing welcome by her Bangladeshi counterpart, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who expressed his desire to maintain friendly and stable ties between Bangladesh and India. Both leaders signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Peace on March 19, 1972, for a period of 25 years, committing themselves to maintain fraternal and good neighborly relations and transform their borders into a "border of eternal peace and friendship." After the assassination of Mujibur Rahman on August 15, 1975, however, Major General Ziaur Rahman (1936–1981; president 1977–1981) seized power in a coup in November 1975 and, embracing an Islamic ideology, rejected outright Mujibur Rahman's policies of secularism and Socialism at home and nonalignment abroad. More significantly, Ziaur Rahman pursued a strategy of favoring China and forging closer religious and political ties with Pakistan in order to counterbalance India in South Asia. At the same time, Ziaur Rahman perceived India to be a threat to his country's security and stability, and this prodded him to cultivate special ties with Beijing and Islamabad.

Ziaur Rahman was assassinated in May 1981, and in a flurry of coups and counter coups, Lieutenant-General H. M. Irshad (b. 1930; president 1983–1990) assumed power in a bloodless coup in March 1982, became the president the following year, and remained president until 1990. During his military regime, a host of bilateral issues cropped up and figured prominently, most notably the influx of Chakma refugees from the Chittagong Hill Tracts into India, the transfer of the Tin Bigha corridor, and the allotment of the water of the Ganges River.

The tribal Chakma refugees were forced to flee into India's northeastern states in the 1980s following the seizure of their land and the destruction of their property by landed interests, including landowners. The refugees not only caused an additional financial burden on state and federal governments but also posed a potential threat to internal security as they engaged in smuggling and narcotics trafficking. After protracted negotiations between the Bangladeshi government and Chakma refugee leaders, the problem was resolved in February 1997, with a 20-point economic package for the resettlement of 50,000 Chakma refugees.

Another thorny issue straining India-Bangladesh relations was over the Tin Bigha corridor, a piece of land nearly 195 yards by 93 yards that enabled Bangladeshi people to travel to mainland Bangladesh to the Angarpota and Dahagram areas. It was resolved in June 1992

when the corridor was transferred to Bangladesh on a perpetual lease in accordance with the 1972 and 1984 agreements signed between New Delhi and Dhaka. On the sovereignty question—that is, who owned the land—the Indian Supreme Court in its ruling said that leasing Tin Bigha to Bangladesh did not amount to a dilution of India's sovereignty. The court was emphatic in its judgment, stating that no right to administer Tin Bigha had been granted to Bangladesh nor had it been given the right to construct buildings or fortifications on the property.

A more complex issue, and one that has remained a potential source of friction between Bangladesh and India, is over the distribution of the water of the Ganges River. The controversy initially arose over India's construction of the Farakka barrage near Manoharpur in 1975, built to prevent the accumulation of silt in the port at Calcutta during the dry season. An interim agreement was signed in 1977 between the two governments on the sharing of Farakka waters to enable Bangladesh to use the maximum amount of water except during the dry season. From time to time, Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) were signed between India and Bangladesh to work out modalities of reasonable and equitable use of the waters. However, the Bangladeshi government often accused India of blocking the flow of water.

The New Delhi-Dhaka relationship suffered a setback when Prime Minister Begum Khalida Zia (b. 1946; prime minister 1991–1996, 2001–2006) sought to internationalize the Ganges water issue by raising it at the United Nations in October 1995. She lambasted the Indian government for the unilateral withdrawal of Ganges water, for chronic problems of desertification, for environmental degradation, and for unemployment in Bangladesh. The Indian government dismissed these charges as a complete canard. However, after a change in regime in Bangladesh, the issue was resolved when Bangladeshi prime minister Sheikh Hasina (b. 1947; prime minister 1996–2001, 2009–) and her Indian counterpart, H. D. Deve Gowda (b. 1933; prime minister 1996–1997), signed a 30-year treaty on sharing the Ganges waters in New Delhi on December 12, 1996. The treaty was a major breakthrough in the nations' hitherto ruptured ties. Bangladesh, however, complains that India has not entered into a similar accord for the remaining 53 rivers that flow through both countries.

Despite the resolution of some outstanding issues, India-Bangladesh relations have scarcely been free from tension, especially over the fencing of the border, clashes between India's Border Security Forces and the Bangladesh Rifles, illegal migration from Bangladesh, and anti-India activities carried out by Bangladeshi jihadi groups such as Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami and Indian insurgent groups such as the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), including Pakistan-based terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba operating from Bangladesh.

New Delhi's most serious concern is that Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) has been proactive in Bangladesh in order to conduct activities against India. The latter has even handed over to Bangladesh a list of more than 170 insurgent camps inside Bangladesh and has also provided maps and the exact locations of these camps. But no concrete action

has been taken by the Dhaka government. Indian intelligence agencies claim that the ISI and various Pakistan-based militant organizations have changed their modus operandi by using Bangladesh as a transit point for pushing terrorists into India. The Indian government has also stated that consignments of weapons were being ferried from Bangladesh into the northeastern states of India to militant outfits such as ULFA and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), posing a threat to India's internal security and stability. India has also sought extradition of ULFA's secretary-general Anup Chetia (b. 1967), but the Bangladeshi government has refused to oblige since there is no extradition treaty between the two countries.

Bangladesh returned to democracy in January 2009 after a gap of two years since the assumption of power by the military-backed caretaker government in 2007. Sheikh Hasina's Awami League won a landslide victory in the December 2008 elections, increasing optimism in New Delhi that India and Bangladesh would now be able not only to resolve outstanding bilateral issues but also to strengthen and intensify cooperation in wide-ranging areas of mutual concerns and interest both at the regional and the global levels. Hasina visited New Delhi in January 2010, during which time five agreements were signed between two countries. These included agreements on mutual legal assistance on criminal matters; the transfer of sentenced persons; and approaches to combating international terrorism, organized crime, and illicit drug trafficking. India has also offered a $1 billion line of credit to Bangladesh to build its railroad tracks and to improve the trading and investment environment.

Although bilateral trade is increasing, Bangladesh's major grievance is that it has a massive trade deficit with India. In the financial year 2007–2008, Bangladesh's trade deficit with India stood at $2.8 billion, second to China's trade deficit of $3.8 billion. To offset the trade imbalance, India has debated the idea of undertaking joint ventures to step up bilateral trade between the two countries. In response, Bangladesh has also agreed to reduce the number of items from being imported to facilitate bilateral trade and commerce. The Indian government has undertaken various steps to reduce the trade deficit. The measures include initiatives to export more duty-free commodities to India under the South Asia Free Trade Arrangement, the formation of a secretary-level Joint Working Group on Trade for the removal of nontariff barriers, and steps for development of the physical infrastructure of land customs stations and roads.

China's strategic move to expand military and security cooperation with Bangladesh is a matter of serious concern to India. In New Delhi's perception, the move is aimed at weakening India's political, economic, and strategic influence in South Asia and encircling it strategically. In April 2008, Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi and Bangladeshi chief of army staff General Moeen U. Ahmed held intensive discussions in Dhaka and reached agreement over numerous issues, which included the supply of upgraded Chinese military hardware and small arms to Bangladesh. This is a cause of concern to India as China is the biggest supplier of small firearms to Bangladesh and the weapons easily fall into the hands of jihadi and terrorist organizations.

Although China has been denying the charge that the transfer of arms to Bangladesh is directed against India, New Delhi has been urging Chinese officials to desist from supplying small arms, including missiles, to Bangladesh. China's leaders have, however, discounted India's concerns that small weapons falling into the hands of terrorist outfits could further exacerbate internal security problems in the region. Another factor is that China fully understands the psychology of rightist forces and anti-India fundamentalists in Bangladesh who wish to bring Chinese influence into South Asia to counter India. Bangladesh and China entered into a defense cooperation agreement during Prime Minister Khalida Zia's visit to China in December 2002. During Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's visit to Beijing in March 2010, both countries established a "Closer Comprehensive Partnership of Cooperation." Although cooperation between Bangladesh and China is apparently aimed at modernizing and upgrading the Bangladeshi defense sector, India believes that China's real motive is to restrict India's strategic space in the region. The result is that expanding security and strategic cooperation between Dhaka and Beijing poses a threat to Indo-Bangladeshi relations.

Although serious differences continue to persist over various issues, India and Bangladesh have an enormous opportunity to work together in the economic and trade field as well as to harness natural resources. Bangladesh and India can boost both the value and volume of trade through border trade, ecotourism, and the aviation business as suggested by a high-powered Indian business delegation visit in July 2009. It urged the government of Bangladesh to increase connections between the two countries in order to enhance bilateral and regional trade. On their part, the Bangladeshi government asked the Indian side to remove nontariff barriers for Bangladeshi exports.

India and Bangladesh also need to resolve the remaining problems of the demarcation of the maritime boundary. It is also in the interests of both countries to use waters of the common rivers. In brief, economic cooperation synchronized with improved political ties offers better opportunities for joint investment in various fields and to an improvement of Indo-Bangladeshi relations.

B. M. JAIN

See also China, Relations with; Look East Policy

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Banking. *See* Central Banking, Development Aspects

✦ BEDI, KIRAN

Kiran Bedi (b. 1949) is the first woman police officer in India and a prominent social activist, author, TV anchor, and journalist. She has a national and international reputation for introducing groundbreaking reforms and innovative solutions in police work and for her outstanding record of public service. Among her many honors and awards (more than 32) are an Asian Nobel Prize and a United Nations (UN) medal for outstanding service as the first female civilian police advisor.

Bedi was born and brought up in Amritsar, Punjab, where she completed all her early education. In Chandigarh, she earned a graduate degree and started working as a lecturer in political science. She credits her success to her parents, who encouraged her and her three sisters to have large dreams and to excel in both academics and sports. She won Law Tennis tournaments and fame both in India and Asia before making history by becoming the first female IPS (Indian Police Service) officer in 1972. Bedi holds a PhD from the Institute of Technology, New Delhi (1993), honorary doctorate degrees from Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, Punjab (2003), and a law degree from Cuny School of Law (2005). She was also awarded a prestigious Jawaharlal Nehru Fellowship (1994–1998) for her writing about Tihar Prison, which she published in 1999 and saw become a best seller, *It's Always Possible: Transforming One of the Largest Prisons in the World*.

In her impressive 35 years of service, she became famous as "Crane Bedi" in 1982 when she ordered the removal of a car belonging to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984). While serving as deputy director of narcotics in 1986, she founded a nongovernment organization for the rehabilitation of drug-addicted individuals. This organization is the first one in India to offer holistic treatment for addiction and it has treated over 12,000 patients.

Bedi used innovative reform methods as the inspector general of prisons at Tihar Jails, New Delhi (1993–1995), becoming the first woman to operate one of the largest prisons in the world, which housed around 8,000 inmates. Within two years this notorious prison was transformed into a self-sufficient unit. As a result of her work there are 50 nonprofit organizations working inside Tihar Jail to keep its inmates safe, literate, healthy, and self-reliant. Bedi's accomplishment earned her many awards, including the Ramon Magsaysay Award (Nobel Prize for Asia) for her work improving the living conditions of the prisoners. In 1994 she helped form the India Vision Foundation to promote, support, and introduce projects that help rehabilitate the children of prisoners. Projects have included programs in education, such as the Gali-street school projects, vocational training, rural development, health awareness programs (including HIV awareness in prisons), and scholarships and internships to residents of the slums of New Delhi and Mumbai.

Such is her renown that she became the subject of research projects, including academic studies (*Kiran Bedi—The Kindly Baton*, by Meenakshi Saksena, reader in the Department of Psychology at Indraprastha College, Delhi University), a short film (*In the Footsteps of Gandhi: Kiran Bedi*, directed by Oystein Rakkenes, 2006), management case studies (such

as "An Interview with Kiran Bedi, India's First Woman IPS Officer, Former DG, Delhi Police" on Ibscdc.org, where she was interviewed by Nagendra V. Chowdhary, released May 18, 2009), and a 2009 documentary film (*Yes Madam, Sir,* directed by Australian Megan Doneman).

In January 2008, after retiring from the police force in 2007, Bedi launched saferindia .com, a website where people can seek redress if they have complaints that have not been addressed or were improperly handled in police stations. The complaints are forwarded to the agencies involved along with all documentation necessary to facilitate the resolution of cases. In an attempt to make justice affordable, fair, and efficient, she anchors a TV show called *Aap ki Kacheri* (*Your Court*). Over two or three sessions she adjudicates small cases of domestic and family disputes with the help of a small legal team.

FATIMA A. IMAM

See also Judiciary System

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✦ BENEGAL, SHYAM

Shyam Benegal (b. 1934) was born a Saraswat Brahmin in Andhra Pradesh and is a cousin of Guru Dutt, or Vasanth Kumar Shivashankar Padukone (1925–1964), an important figure in the 1950s Indian film industry and director of such classics as *Pyaasa* (1957). Benegal worked in the advertising business before entering the film industry and is credited with over 900 advertisements and 11 corporate films. He is generally regarded as the founder and leading practitioner of the New Indian Cinema, or Middle Cinema, which was popular in the 1970s. New Indian Cinema was viewed as an alternative to the formulaic Bollywood productions, but it was not as austere and intellectualized as the cinema of directors such as Mani Kaul (b. 1944) or Kumar Shahani (b. 1940). A major characteristic of Benagal's films is his presentation of topical popular subjects in an interesting way without resorting to song and dance. Benegal made his name with a quartet of films: *Ankur* (1973), *Nishan* (1975), *Manthan* (1976), and *Bhumika* (1977). This last film, *Bhumika,* epitomizes Benegal's approach to filmmaking. *Bhumika* is ostensibly a biopic of the 1940s Maratha film star Hansa Wadkar (played by Smita Patil), but in reality it is a meditation on the 1940s Indian regional

cinema, combining historical characters with a somewhat fictionalized account of Wadkar's life as an oppressed Indian woman despite her fame. The film also combines black-and-white sections with color and is accompanied by a soundtrack that draws on radio broadcasts from the 1940s. These formalistic developments contributed to Benegal's reputation as an innovative and unconventional film director. In the 1980s he shifted his activity to television, where he directed 53 episodes of *Bharat Ek Khoj*, a serial based on Jawaharlal Nehru's *The Discovery of India*. Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964) wrote his renowned volume, which covers aspects of Indian history, culture, and philosophy, between 1942 and 1946 while he served his ninth and final term of imprisonment for his activities in protest against British rule, and he published it in 1946. After Benegal directed the serial, he continued to work in both film and television. He is regarded as versatile and a survivor in an industry that is notorious for discarding producers and directors. His longevity is probably due, in part, to his unorthodox funding methods for films. Rather than rely on the usual sources of funds, such as distributors and moneylenders, Benegal raised money for his film *Manthan* (1976) from independent sources, such as the National Dairy Development Board, and for his documentary *Aarohan* (1983) he tapped the resources of the government of West Bengal. His contribution to the Indian film industry has been widely acknowledged, and he received the Dadasaheb Phalke Award, the industry's most important award, in 2005. He remains an influential figure in Indian cinema.

BRIAN SHOESMITH

See also Bollywood; Film Industry

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Bengal. *See* West Bengal

✦ BHAKRA-NANGAL DAM PROJECT


The Bhakra-Nangal Dam Project of the latter 20th century helped sire what today is the mightiest of economic, political, and technological tigers of Asia. The Republic of India echoes the roar coming from the massive Bhakra Dam as waters of the Sutlej River, which flows from the sacred Himalayan mountain of Kailash—home of the Hindu god Lord Shiva—to the Arabian Sea via the venerable river Indus, burst through the dam's four floodgates or roll

through large turbines in the power stations located on either side of the dam. From the state of Himachal Pradesh the Sutlej reaches into the Punjab, where 8 miles downstream from Bhakra is the smaller Nangal Dam, which diverts water to the Nangal-Hydel Channel and Anandpur Sahib Hydel Channel in a feat of engineering that epitomizes the grand purpose of this four-decades-old project: to provide hydroelectric power, irrigation water, and flood control to the states Himachal Pradesh, the Punjab, Rajasthan, and Haryana, and the city New Delhi—all in northwestern India.

India maintains the world's most extensive network of national waterworks. The complex system of dams, canals, and reservoirs that makes up the Bhakra-Nangal is significant in both its geographical extent and its political purchase. Though India has had effective indigenous irrigation systems in place for centuries, particularly in the northwest, it was not until after independence in August 1947 that the country actively set out to modernize its procurement and use of natural resources in order to raise the standard of living of its citizens. Following the Soviet model of economic development, five-year plans initiated benchmarks for industrial, urban, and agricultural development, which were to be achieved through cooperation between private business and government.

The first five-year plan, covering 1951–1956, looked to develop energy resources fundamental to the achievement of other projects. One focus was on India's great rivers and their tributaries flowing from the Himalayas, the "house of snow," out of which springs an almost endless stream of water, much of it stored in receding alpine glaciers. Three hydroelectric dams were to be constructed, Bhakra in the Sivalik Hills in the lesser Himalayas being one. Canals were built first to bring water to the Hissar and Rohtak districts of the Punjab (now Haryana) suffering from years of severe drought. By 1954 the Nangal-Hydel Channel and the network of Bhakra canals opened and irrigation from the Bhakra-Nangal Project had begun reinforcing the Green Revolution taking place in India at the time. After several revisions, the design for the Bhakra Dam was accepted, and turbines began turning in the power stations in 1960, four years before the dam was actually completed.

Upon completion, the Bhakra Dam was the tallest concrete straight gravity dam in the world. Today it is ranked second at almost 741 feet above the bedrock. The dam extends 1,706 feet across a narrow valley in the Bilaspur region of the Sutlej and the width of its top is almost 30 feet. The structure holds back water from a catchment area of some 35,000 square miles to form the Gobind Sagar, a reservoir named after the 10th guru of the Sikh religion, Gobind Singh (1666–1708). The Sagar or "sea" has a gross storage capacity of 10,214 million cubic yards that can create a water surface area of 103 square miles. Every year more than half of the reservoir's water derives from melting snow and glaciers; the rest primarily comes from monsoon rainfall. The Sagar, however, was never able to reach its storage potential until 1976 when an open channel and two tunnels with a combined length of 15 miles began to funnel water from the river Beas into the Sutlej. Together with the Nangal Dam, which is 95 feet high and stretches 1,000 feet across the valley, the system can generate 1 million kilowatts of electricity, most of which is now carried to the megacity New Delhi, the capital of India.



Bhakra-Nangal Dam across the Sutlej River near the Punjab/Himachal Pradesh border. (Kawal Singh)

India's first prime minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964), said that the "Bhakra Nangal Project is something tremendous, something stupendous, something which shakes you up when you see it." He continued, "Bhakra, the new temple of resurgent India, is the symbol of India's progress." Critics of the project see it differently. They point to myriad problems it has caused that cannot be reconciled with the notion of progress. Of these problems, perhaps three are the most serious.

The first involves the displacement of 36,000 people, whose homes were submerged by the Gobind Sagar. Many have yet to receive compensation from the government. The second is the collapse of wheat and rice farming in the Punjab, which was once a very prosperous and self-sufficient agricultural state. The decrease in soil fertility caused by hyperirrigation has waterlogged the land. Too much water leaches nutrients from the soil and leaves behind salts. Farmers have now come to depend on expensive synthetic fertilizers to enrich their lands to increase yields but in the process have accrued huge debts. For many desperate farmers the only way to solvency has been suicide, which recently became almost epidemic in the region. Finally, critics stress that these waterlogged conditions go hand in hand with the inefficiency by which hydroelectricity is produced by the project. During October, November, and early December, the postmonsoon, rabi-sowing season, demand for irrigated water peaks. By this time monsoon rain and mountain snow and glacier melt from the previous few months almost fills the Sagar. Yet demand for electricity does not spike at this time, and so large amounts of "excess" water is drained into irrigation canals and over spillways rather than piped through turbines to produce electricity. In a sense, water is electricity and electricity is money, and much of that is wasted. It should be remembered though that the Bhakra-Nagal Project was also built to protect people of the Sutlej region from the devastation wrought by flooding.

In any case, numbers of tourists visit the waterworks every year not only to fish, sail, swim, and ski in what is now the Gobind Sagar water fowl refuge but also to gaze on a sublime cultural landscape said to have given rise to the tiger of Asia.

KEN WHALEN

See also Water Conflict; Water Policy; Water Resources

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✦ BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY

Few nationalist organizations in India have risen as quickly and brought as much respectability to the Hindu political right as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), or Indian People's Party. The BJP evolved from a small right-wing organization to the peak of its popularity in 1998 and is the leading political party in opposition to the National Congress Party. Self-described as having a modern and progressive outlook, the BJP advocates a secular government, social and economic justice, and democracy.

The BJP is arguably the most politically powerful group within the family of right-wing nationalist organizations known as the Sangh Parivar, which was established in 1925. While various branches of the Sangh Parivar played small roles in the political landscape, no single group had managed to effectively dominate or had a majority representation in the Indian Parliament in opposition to the legacy of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964) and the Nehru dynasty, the Indian National Congress Party. In recent decades, the BJP has been led by three political figures: Lal Krishna Advani (b. 1927), Atal Bihari Vajpayee (b. 1924), and Rajnath Singh (b. 1951).

Much of the BJP's ideology relies on the concept of Hindutva or "Hindu-ness." This concept draws directly from a 1923 publication by V. D. Savarkar titled *Hindutva—Who Is a Hindu?* and outlines India's historical identity as synonymous with a Hindu identity. According to Hindutva ideology, because Hinduism is inherently tolerant and pluralistic, a Hindu hegemony would not impinge on the varying religious traditions of India but rather provide a secular framework for government. To identify oneself as a Hindu, therefore, was not a religious designation but a national designation that was legitimized by the history, languages, traditions, and cultures of India.

Hindutva became a household word during the 1980s, when nationalist politics became visibly heightened. It was at this time that the BJP appeared on the scene, first organized in 1977 from a reassembling and crystallization of the less successful Janata Party of the 1970s. Led by Advani, who by his own admission was not so religiously Hindu as much as nationally Hindu, the BJP organized itself against the backdrop of the tumultuous last years of the prime ministership of Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984). After her assassination in 1984, the sympathy generated toward her family and her Congress Party and the backlash against other parties yielded a mere two seats to the BJP in Parliament, with less than 8 percent of the votes, in the parliamentary elections in 1984.

At this time, the BJP found two issues that would resonate across party and caste lines. The first was the Babri Masjid mosque. This mosque was built in the mid-16th century by Mughal emperor Babur (1483–1530; Mughal emperor 1526–1530) and had been a site of pilgrimage and worship at Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh. Some believed it was the site of Lord Ram's birthplace; others believed that the mosque was merely one of many buildings and artifacts attesting to the plurality of India. While there had been testimony from anthropologists and historians upholding both sides of the argument, the allegation was that a temple to Ram had been destroyed to make way for the mosque at the time it was built, thus supplanting a highly sacred space in the Hindu narrative with an object from Muslim rule. Capitalizing on anti-Muslim sentiment, the BJP began putting the Ayodhya dispute front and center in their political campaign.

The second issue upon which BJP capitalized was the Shah Bano court case in the mid-1980s. The ruling to override Muslim Personal Law in a divorce case and allow a woman named Shah Bano of Indore, Madhya Pradesh, who in 1978 when she was 62 years of age and the mother of 5 children, was divorced by her husband, to receive

ongoing financial support from her former husband—which she was previously denied—yielded the controversial Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act of 1986. Created in the wake of protests by Muslims who objected to the government intruding in personal religious law, this act reversed the court decision and allowed maintenance only for the *iddat* (period of waiting), or three lunar months. For this reason the law was seen as discriminatory as it denied divorced Muslim women the rights to which Hindus and people of other religions had access in a secular India. Furthermore, the BJP took the act as evidence of appeasement to the minority community. It was at this time that Advani coined the term "pseudosecularism" as an accusation leveled toward the Congress Party, which made special allowances for minorities. The BJP's definition of secularism was total indifference toward all religions, with no special privileges to any one group. For this reason, the BJP supports the notion of a uniform civil code, which would negate personal religious laws of any kind.

Through the propagation of "true secularism" in the wake of the Shah Bano controversy and the proposition of replacing the Babri Masjid with a temple dedicated to Ram, Advani cleared the way for Hindu revivalism. In 1989 the BJP won 86 seats in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of Parliament), and in 1991 they emerged as the leading opposition party against the Congress Party by winning 120 parliamentary seats. In 1996 they were the single largest party in Parliament, with 161 seats, and their popularity peaked in 1998 with an impressive 180 seats and 26 percent of the vote. As of 2009, the BJP remains the dominant opposition party, with 116 seats in the Parliament.

While implicated in and accused of various anti-Muslim activities ranging from the destruction of the Babri Mosque in 1992 to the Gujarat Riots in 2002, the BJP have found themselves increasingly at odds with their more conservative and militant Sangh Parivar counterparts, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) (National Volunteer Corps), which was founded in 1925 at Nagpur, Maharashtra. Strides to reach out to Indian Muslims, whether for true inclusivity or merely for the Muslim vote, have garnered criticism from more conservative nationalist parties who accuse the BJP of softening their strict definitions of secularism and Hindu hegemony. Yet the RSS remains at odds with the National Congress Party, who are accused of being soft on terrorism, being dynastic rather than democratic, and compromising military autonomy in any agreement with the United States over an Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. Thus the BJP represent neither the liberal party nor the right-wing nationalism in which they have traditionally been categorized. The close electoral race in 2009, from which the Congress Party emerged triumphant, and the dissent from within the BJP have designated the party as more moderate in the political spectrum than other Sangh Parivar organizations.

JULI GITTINGER

See also Hindutva; Shah Bano Case

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✦ BHOPAL GAS DISASTER

Just before midnight on December 2, 1984, hundreds of gallons of water accidentally poured through corroded pipes at the Union Carbide pesticide plant in Bhopal, India. Inexplicably, those pipes were connected to a tank that contained chemicals used to produce the pesticide Sevin. Contrary to proper plant procedure, which required that the water and chemicals remain separated, the water rushed into the tank containing the chemical compounds and triggered a runaway reaction. Nearly 50 tons of the lethal chemical methyl isocyanate (MIC) formed a massive toxic cloud and burst out of the storage tank and into the surrounding air. The deadly fog descended on Bhopal residents as they slept in the early hours of a Monday morning on an unusually cold and still winter night for central India. The toxic miasma, three to four times heavier than air, hovered menacingly up to twenty feet off the ground, pushed into the surrounding slums, and through the open windows and doorways of the shanties. In the course of a few hours, at least 2,000 residents suffocated to death. At first, Union Carbide officials insisted the gas was a minor irritant, though in actuality the gas destroyed the mucous lining of the lungs and other sensitive parts of the body, suffocating and blinding victims.

As the fog moved over the lake separating the slums of old Bhopal from the middle- and upper-class residences of Bhopal in the hills, it dissipated, largely sparing the privileged of Bhopal from the deadly fog. All the ingredients for political controversy were in place: stark evidence of the inequitable burdens of pollution borne by the poor and powerless, the seeming victimization of a former colonial power by a U.S.-based multinational corporation (Union Carbide was headquartered in Connecticut), and the concentration of suffering among poor Muslim Indians (who lived in the slums) rather than the privileged Hindus (who were less affected). Aggravating the situation was the assassination of India's prime minister Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984) less than three months earlier, an act that had created a national political atmosphere of paranoia, hysteria, and suspicion.

In the following days, doctors treated nearly 200,000 people for severe burns, blindness, and a variety of respiratory ailments; this was nearly a quarter of Bhopal's population. Perhaps 10,000 died in the first week, but no one knows for sure since hundreds of unidentified bodies, many of whom were beggars with no identification, were cremated before an accurate count could be made (some say deliberately, in order to minimize the human toll). The effects of the disaster linger: groundwater has been contaminated and children of the survivors suffer from birth defects.



Two men carry children blinded by the Union Carbide chemical pesticide leak to a hospital in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, on December 5, 1984. Thousands were killed and seriously injured in the industrial disaster. (AP Photo/Sondeep Shankar)

The accident resulted from a number of factors. Investor pressures to reduce costs had created an atmosphere in which safety was sacrificed. A plant model that would allow the possibility of water entering the tank suggests a fundamental design flaw. Finally, the Indian government, which was part owner of the plant, overlooked safety procedures because they were eager to increase the production of pesticides for India's agricultural sector, which had suffered from chronic famine.

The Bhopal tragedy is an example of good intentions gone awry. When Union Carbide opened its pesticide plant in Bhopal in 1969, government officials hailed the move as part of a "Green Revolution" to boost production in the agricultural sector and to end food shortages and famine. The Green Revolution meant the application of the petrochemical industrial revolution to Indian agriculture. In this endeavor, U.S. companies helped produce new types of crops, pesticides, and chemical fertilizers. The effort did end chronic famine and transformed India into an exporter of grain by the late 1970s. For many, however, the Bhopal accident suggested that too high a price had been paid.

The documentary evidence for carelessness on the part of corporate and government officials is overwhelming. Neither the company nor local police and government officials had an emergency evacuation plan. In order to fulfill Indian state requirements for native-Indian staffing of the plant, many poorly trained individuals were hired. The Bhopal plant routinely

exposed workers to toxic chemicals and workers lacked the equipment recommended in the safety manuals, which, in any case, were only available in English, even though many workers could not read English.

Indian regulators were also complicit. When Union Carbide opened its factory in 1969, it was located, as Indian industrial regulations required, at least 3.7 miles away from human settlement, at that time, on the far outskirts of Bhopal. In the intervening years, however, the population of Bhopal grew rapidly, especially the population of squatters in the older and less developed sections of the city. By the late 1970s, illegal shanty towns had been built in all the open ground between the original settlement and the factory so they pushed up against the walls of the factory.

The company's explanation of the accident also fueled the controversy surrounding the incident. According to the official company narrative, which the company (since 2001 owned by Dow Chemical Company headquartered in Midland, Michigan) maintains to this day, a disgruntled employee (in some versions, an antigovernment Sikh terrorist) added water to the storage tank as an act of sabotage. Union Carbide's sabotage theory paralleled unfounded conspiracy theories among residents of Bhopal and various activist groups. According to one theory, fed by sensationalist local press reports, the chemical release was supposedly part of a Pentagon experiment to test new chemical weapons.

Alarmed by the mounting controversy, Union Carbide and the Indian government settled without trial in February 1989 for $470 million. It was the largest such settlement in Indian history but far below the $3 billion the Indian government initially demanded.

The settlement initiated a prolonged struggle to determine just who should receive the money. Real victims, often illiterate and incapable of understanding the byzantine bureaucratic system set up for awarding the compensation, lacked the required proof that they were victims: evidence of treatment immediately following the disaster. Many who had not suffered paid bribes to doctors to qualify for settlement money. The net result was that payments to individuals was delayed and it created the impression among victims that the entire process of compensation was unjust. By 2004, officially recognized victims had received $1,000 each (often minus large bribes to officials to register as victims). Warren Anderson (b. 1921), the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Union Carbide at the time of the accident, was convicted in absentia in Indian court of "culpable homicide," the equivalent of manslaughter, but the Indian government never insisted on his extradition to face Indian jail time as it wished to maintain India's reputation as a desirable place for foreign investment. In March 2000, Anderson went into hiding to avoid being served a summons in a civil lawsuit against him in American courts filed by Bhopal victims but he currently resides in one of his three houses in Bridgehampton on Long Island, New York; Vero Beach, Florida; or Greenwich, Connecticut.

ANDREW L. JENKS

See also Economy; Madhya Pradesh

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✦ BIHAR

Bihar is the third largest Indian state in terms of population, with 82,878,796 people according to the 2001 census. The name of the state comes from the Sanskrit word *Vihara* ("abode") and connotes Buddhist monasteries. The state has long been recognized as one of the most backward in the Indian Union. In recent years, however, it has experienced rapid economic growth and has been declared to be the second-fastest growing economy in India, with a growth rate of 11.03 percent in gross domestic product (GDP), fiscal years 2004–2005 to 2008–2009, which is just below Gujarat's 11.05 percent. It is also considered to be one of the most socially and politically conscious states. Major languages spoken are Bhojpuri, Maithili, Magdhi, Angika, Bajjika, Urdu, and Hindi.

Located in the eastern part of India on the Gangetic plain, Bihar is surrounded by Nepal in the north, West Bengal and Jharkhand in the east and south, and Uttar Pradesh in the west. It is 58,510 square miles in area, with the state divided into two by the river Ganges, which along with its tributary rivers creates a vast stretch of very fertile flat land. It is an entirely landlocked state with a monsoon climate having an average annual rainfall of 47.24 inches. Notified forest area is 4,203 square miles. The state is rich with water resources (both groundwater and surface water). Major rivers in addition to the Ganges include Song, Kosi, Saryu (Ghaghra), Gandak, Budhi Gandak, Bagmati, Punpun, Karma-Nasa, Kamla-Balan, and Mahananda.

Bihar boasts an illustrious history as it gave the world the Buddha (563–483 BCE) and the Jain, Mahavira (599–527 BCE). This is also where India witnessed the first experiment with republican government in the form of 16 Mahajanapadas in the sixth century BCE. The first dynastic empire, the Magadha Empire, also came from Bihar. Similarly, it continued to be the political epicenter of India under the Mauryan Empire and its great emperors Chandragupta Maurya (340–298; emperor 320–298 BCE) and Ashoka (304–232; emperor 269–232 BCE). Bihar was also a great seat of learning and education as Nalanda and Vikramshila universities attracted students and teachers from across Asia who came to study Buddhism. Pataliputra, which is now called Patna, and which is now the capital of Bihar, was an important center of trade and commerce. Bihar is also the birthplace of Guru Gobind Singh (1666–1708; guru

1675–1708), the tenth and probably the most popular guru of the Sikh religion. In medieval times Bihar was briefly a seat of political authority under Sher Shah Suri (1486–1545; emperor 1540–1545), the "Lion King," an Afghan who was based at Sasaram before moving to Delhi and who issued the first rupee, a silver coin. With the advent of British rule in the eighteenth century, Bihar became part of Bengal Presidency.

Bihar acquired the status of a state in 1912 when Bihar and Orissa were separated from the Bengal Presidency and became a single province. Later, Orissa and Jharkhand were separated (in 1935 and 2000, respectively), giving Bihar its current borders. Bihar was a leading province in terms of its participation in the freedom movement. It was here in Champaran that Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948) launched his first peasant movement in 1917. In the colonial period, Bihar experienced strong antilandlord movements, among which the movement led by Swami Vidyanand in 1920 and the Kishan Sabha (Peasants Union) movement of the 1930s and 1940s under the leadership of Swami Sahajanand Saraswati (1889–1950) are particularly noteworthy. These movements demanded the abolition of the zamindari (landlord) system, minimum wages for agricultural labor, the licensing of moneylenders, and security to tenant cultivators. In the postindependence phase the state again took the lead when in the 1970s Jayaprakash Narayan (1902–1979) launched his Total Revolution.

The economy of the state is heavily dependent on agriculture, which is itself quite backward and dependent on the monsoon rains. Before the separation of Jharkhand, Bihar was rich in the production of coal, iron, and minerals but currently it is left with industries like oil refinery (Indian Oil Corporation), leather finishing (West Champaran, Muzaffarpur and Barauni), fertilizer manufacturing (Hindustan Fertilizer Corporation Ltd at Barauni and Pyrites, Phosphates and Chemicals Ltd at Amjhor), jute mills (Katihar and Samastipur), sugar mills, and other small-scale agro-based food-processing units.

The main agricultural crops are rice, paddy, wheat, sugarcane, jute, maize, and oil seeds. Fruit crops like mango, banana, jackfruit, and litchis are significant additions to the economy. Lacking badly in scientific application and irrigation, agriculture in the state is further affected by annual floods, which not only ravage crops but also sweep away swathes of topsoil every year. The state is largely feudal and land reforms have not been implemented, and as a result, surplus labor has not been moved out of agriculture. Marginal and small farmers, who constitute more than 95 percent of the total landowning community, own 66 percent of the land. Medium and large farmers, which amount to a meager 3.5 percent of landowners, own nearly 33 percent of the land. The large farmers among this latter group constitute merely .1 percent of the total but own 4.63 percent of the total land. This high concentration of landholding combined with archaic agricultural relations is an important obstacle to agricultural growth. The lack of industrial development has also contributed to the burden of agriculture. Another crucial obstacle to the growth of the economy is the lack of infrastructure and an unattractive environment for direct investment from outside Bihar.

In recent years, however, Bihar's growth rate has accelerated. Performance was slightly below the national trend in the 1980s and witnessed zero growth rate in the first half of the 1990s. This resulted in a drastic fall in the income and consumption levels. However, since 2004–2005 the state has experienced more than 11 percent GDP growth. This occurred despite three years of floods and a year of drought. A major reason behind this growth is new political leadership and the attitude of the state government toward development. The construction sector has averaged a steep growth rate of 47 percent per year for the last five years. Road construction has seen an impressive rise from 238 miles in 2004–2005 to 1,501 miles in 2008–2009. Motorable roads have linked districts and regions, thereby facilitating the movement of capital, machinery, and labor. Law and administration have improved dramatically, further helping the economy, particularly in real estate and construction. Yet, this growth still lacks backing from the manufacturing sector and is often termed government-induced growth. It is largely due to a boom in agriculture and the service sectors. Private investment in the manufacturing sector has been very low in the last four years but there has been a huge increase in the flow of funds from the central government. Unlike under previous administrations, there has been better utilization of these funds. Government development expenditure has zoomed eightfold. The state also made concerted efforts to mobilize internal resources and there has been a tremendous rise in its own revenue collection, which doubled between 2003 and 2009. Nonetheless, in spite of this good news, more than half of the state's population still lives below the poverty line. The State Investment Promotion Board, formed to attract investment from outside Bihar, received some significant proposals. Yet, most of them, particularly the larger ones, still remain in the planning stage.

The vulnerability of the economy in Bihar is also linked closely to a wide range of non-economic factors. The literacy rate in Bihar is only 47 percent, with merely a 33.6 percent female literacy rate while the national literacy rate is 65.4 percent. Despite this, Bihar has undergone a rapid social transformation. From the second half of the 1980s the state witnessed the militancy of backward caste groups at the highest political levels. In this period with its defining slogan of social justice, three caste groups—the Yadavs, the Kurmi, and the Koeri—rose to prominence, successfully replacing the dominance of the upper castes—the Bhumihar, the Brahman, the Rajputs, and the Kayasthas. Other castes (commonly referred to as Dalits, formerly "untouchables") at the bottom of the caste hierarchy, such as the Paswans, have also seen the consolidation of their caste identities and have effectively used the opportunities offered by an electoral democracy. However other *jatis* (castes) like Kahar, Kumhar, Lohar, Tatwa, Teli, and Dhanuk, which constitute the lower strata of the category of Other Backward Castes, have not enjoyed much political influence. This is also true of the Muslim community, which is also divided into upper and lower *jatis*. The Muslim Dalits of Bihar include Jolaha, Nutt, Bakkho, Bhatiyara, Kunjra, Dhunia, Kalal, Dafali, Halakhor, Dhobi, Lalbegi, Gorkan, Meershikar, Cheek, Rangrez, and Darji. A good majority of these *jatis* do not benefit from government programs and social welfare measures.

Table 2 Changing Percentage of the Social Composition of the Bihar Legislature, 1967–2000

	1967	1969	1985	1990	1995	2000
Upper caste	41.8	38.3	36.4	32.5	17.1	29.9
Backward caste	24.2	26.7	24.6	29.7	45.0	36.4
Muslim	5.6	5.9	10.1	6.1	7.1	9.3
Women	3.4	1.2	4.0	4.0	2.8	7.4

Source: Kumar, Sanday, "New Phase in Backward Caste Politics in Bihar (1990–2000)," in *Caste and Democratic Politics in India,* edited by Ghanshyam Shah (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2002), 14.

In recent years a new category of *mahadalits* has emerged and has been given patronage by the ruling state government. Based on the assessment that a considerable section of the Scheduled Castes has remained socially and economically backward, the state government created special projects and earmarked special funds for the overall development of the most deprived groups among the Scheduled Castes. The commission known as the State Mahadalit Commission was formed in 2007 and it identified 18 castes as *mahadalits.*

The genesis of the contemporary political scene in Bihar goes back to 1990 when Lalu Prasad Yadav (b. 1947; chief minister 1990–1997) became the chief minister. Yadav, a charismatic leader of the yadavs, was a student leader at Patna University before being elected in 1977 to the lower house of Parliament, the Lok Sabha, at the young age of 29. In 1990 he succeeded in bringing Muslims (around 16 percent of the population) and yadavs (around 12 percent) together in a political alliance and not only prevailed over upper castes and other backward castes but equally important managed to keep the state away from violent outbursts of communalism. This was significant given that other parts of India experienced severe bouts of communal violence during his years of office. This was a notable achievement on his part.

However, the politics of social justice for the lower echelons of society ignored crucial issues of development and good governance. Caste politics under the disguise of social justice soon alienated other backward castes and made Kurmis and Koeries political rivals of the yadavs. As a result the Janata Dal broke into two major political parties, the Rashtriya Janata Dal under the leadership of Yadav, and Janata Dal (United), which was formed under the leadership of Sharad Yadav and Nitish Kumar (b. 1951). Janata Dal (United) with its core constituencies of Kurmi and Koeri entered into an alliance with the Bharatiya Janata Party, founded in 1980. The alliance won the state election in 2005 and formed the government in Bihar under the chief ministership of Nitish Kumar.

SADAN JHA

See also Yadav, Lalu Prasad

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✦ BIJU JANATA DAL PARTY

Biju Janata Dal (BJD) is a regional political party in the state of Orissa that was formed by Naveen Patnaik (b. 1946) in 1997. The party believes in a secular ideology and in this regard the pristine image of Naveen Patnaik is considered to be responsible for the success of the BJD. The party also believes in the rapid industrialization of Orissa and it also advocates the welfare of the poor, the tribal people, and the minorities. Critics, however, argue that the party has ignored the real interests of the poor and the tribal people and it has caused damage to the environment in the process of rapid industrialization. Despite such criticisms, the party continues to enjoy widespread support among the people of Orissa.

BJD's founder, Naveen Patnaik, entered politics in 1996, just before the death of his father, Biju Patnaik (1916–1997), the former state chief minister of Orissa (1961–1963, 1990–1995) and the leader of the Janata Dal political party, which was formed in 1988. He was first elected as a member to the 11th Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament, in the by-election (special election) from the Aska parliamentary constituency in Orissa. He formed his own party after the split of the Janata Dal in 1997.

The party won a majority in the Orissa legislative assembly elections of 2000 in alliance with the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), founded in 1980, and Naveen Patnaik became the chief minister of Orissa. The party won the elections in 2004 as well. In the national and assembly elections of 2009, the party severed its alliance with the BJP over differences regarding the communal violence against Christians that broke out in the state in 2007–2008. Despite this, the party won a resounding victory and Naveen Patnaik was appointed the chief minister for the third consecutive term.

TABEREZ AHMED NEYAZI

See also Orissa

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✦ BIKANER

Bikaner refers to both the Bikaner District in the Thar Desert, located in the northwestern part of the state Rajasthan bordering Pakistan, and its largest city, which is the administrative headquarters of the district. Both originally comprised part of the princely state of Bikaner, founded by Rao Bika Ji in the late 15th century. He came from the Rathore clan of Rajputs, which ruled Marwar from Jodhpur; the Rathores are still a prominent fixture in the economic and political life of Bikaner, and Marwari is the local dialect of Rajasthani.

Bikaner came to particular prominence in the early 20th century during the reign of Maharaja Ganga Singh (1880–1943), who fought in World War I as commander of the Bikaner Camel Corps and was the only non-British member of Britain's Imperial War Cabinet. He later served on the Peace Commission at Versailles and was twice a member of the Indian delegation to the League of Nations. A progressive ruler, Ganga Singh introduced extensive rail networks, irrigation projects, and increased education opportunities for the people of the state.

Today, the city of Bikaner, with a population of somewhat over half a million, is the fourth largest city in Rajasthan and a center of the Indian military, of education, and of tourism. It is the home of the Rajasthan State Archives, with documents from all of the erstwhile princely states. As part of what is referred to as the "Desert Triangle" of Jodhpur-Jaisalmer-Bikaner, it has in recent years developed a substantial tourist infrastructure. The major tourist destination, which dominates the central area of the city, is Junagarh Fort, a mammoth palace complex built in the late 16th century of local sandstone and inhabited by the royal family until the early 20th century. Other attractions include the Victorian-style Lallgarh Palace, Rajasthan's largest camel-breeding farm, the intricate architecture of the old city, and the royal resort at Gajner, now a heritage hotel. Curious tourists also flock to the infamous "rat temple" of Karni Mata, 19 miles south of the city at Deshnoke.

The majority of the district population of 1.9 million is still rural or semirural, occupying over 900 villages. Pastoralism and agriculture are significant elements of the economy. Given the terrain, it is not surprising that sheep and goats are primarily the animals reared, followed by cattle and buffalo. Camels are less numerous but also form a significant element of the economy. Crops include pulses and grains such as millet, as well as oil-producing seeds. Major industries include wool production, leather goods, and ceramics. In recent decades Bikaner has also become famous for its snack foods, especially its *bhujia* (deep-fried vermicelli made of chickpea flour).



Junagarh Fort in Bikaner, Rajasthan. (iStockphoto)

Bikaner District is home to a number of significant Hindu temples and shrines, several of which attract hundreds of thousands of visitors during annual pilgrimages. Notable among these are the temple of Karni Mata, the temple of Kapil Muni at Kolayat, and the tomb-shrine of Jambhoji at Mukam.

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See also Rajasthan

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✦ BIRLA FAMILY

The Birlas are a business family with a 150-year history; members of the family continue in the new millennium to be major players in the economic life of the Indian subcontinent. The origins of the family business can be traced to the mid-19th century. The Birlas belong to the Maheshwari subcaste of the diasporic mercantile community of the Marwaris. Originally money lenders and traders based in the small town of Nawalgarh

(Jhunjhunu District) in the Shekhawati region, Rajasthan, the family grew, by the 1950s, to be the second largest business group in the Indian subcontinent, second only to the Tatas.

The first member of the family about whom some details are known is Shobharam Birla, who worked as a *munim* (chief clerk) with a banking firm of the Ganeriwalas early in the 19th century. His son, Sheth Shivnarain (1838–1910) had a small retail shop in Pilani, a village of 3,000 inhabitants at the time. In 1858 Shivnarain set off from his village in search of wealth in the emerging metropolis of Bombay. At the time this was quite characteristic of young Marwaris of Shekhawati as they were migrating to the port cities to take advantage of the new commercial opportunities opening up with the establishment of British hegemony. In Bombay they served the new economic order as subcontractors and chief brokers to European trading houses, financiers of crops and goods, alongside trading and speculating, and thus they, along with a whole host of other compradors, became an indispensible part of trade and commerce in the bustling city.

Much like other members of his community, Shivnarain, who was soon joined by his son Baldeodas (1863–1956), acted as a broker for European businesses, engaged in forward trading in commodities such as cotton, piece-goods, wheat, rapeseed, and silver, traded in jute and gunny, and speculated on the stock exchange, especially in opium. A milestone in the story of family fortunes occurred in 1875 when father and son set up a *gaddi* (independent firm) in Bombay named Shivnarain Baldeodas. However, an unexpected event threatened the fortunes of the new firm when bubonic plague spread in Bombay in the 1890s, and, like many other Marwari firms, Shivnarain Baldoedas relocated to Bara Bazaar, the Marwari cosmos in Calcutta.

In the meantime, Baldeodas was joined by his four sons—Jugalksihore (1884–1967), Rameshwardas (1892–1973), Ghanshyamdas (1894–1983), known as G. D. Birla, and Braj Mohan (1905–1982). The most illustrious of the four was G. D. Birla, who by the years of World War I stood at the helm of the family firm. With the help of his brothers, G. D. led the family business to make the transition from old-style trading to modern industry. Thanks to the windfall profits in trading and speculative activity accrued during World War I (1914–1918), the family firm was able to venture boldly into European-dominated jute manufacturing by establishing the Birla Jute Manufacturing Company Limited in 1919. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Birlas expanded into cotton textiles, sugar mills, publishing, paper and insurance, and in the 1940s, banking, textile machinery, automobiles, engineering, and plastics. Following the independence of India in August 1947, further diversifications followed into challenging areas like chemicals, rayon fiber, engineering goods, aluminum, and fertilizers. These years saw enormous growth in the Birla business empire with a doubling of gross capital stock of the Birla public companies from 65,260,000 rupees in 1951 to 15,214,000 rupees by 1958 and a jump in the number of private companies controlled by the group from 61 in 1951 to 105 by 1958.

The family took an active interest in public life as well. Their earliest involvements were restricted to Marwari public affairs and initiatives in Calcutta such as the Marwari

Association, but in the 1920s they grew active in India politics. In 1921, G. D. Birla was nominated to the Bengal Legislative Assembly, and the 1920s also saw the family support regional leaders such as Madan Mohan Malaviya (1861–1946) of the United Provinces and Lala Lajpat Rai (1865–1928) of the Punjab. In the mid-1920s the brothers, especially G. D. Birla, also grew close to a range of nationalist leaders, especially to Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948) and Vallabhbhai Patel (1875–1950) of Gujarat. Gandhi became something of a guru to the family and they supported many of the causes that were dear to the Mahatma. From the 1920s onward G. D. Birla also played the role of spokesperson of Indian big business. A protagonist of solidarity among Indian business, he helped establish the Indian Chamber of Commerce in Calcutta in 1925 and two years later played a leading role in the formation of the first apex association of Indian business that brought together regional chambers of commerce, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI). The FICCI played a critical role in the struggle by Indian big business against the European domination of the Indian economy. For over three decades between 1927 and the 1960s, Birla remained a powerful voice within FICCI as well as its chief strategist. Birla continued to provide visionary leadership to private enterprise through the 1950s and 1960s, and his main concern was that economic policies in free India must create an enabling environment for private enterprise so that it could contribute meaningfully to national development. In the post 1960s years, however, Birla increasingly distanced himself from the political arena.

Birla died in 1983, leaving behind 200 group companies with reported assets worth 25 billion rupees and sales of over 30 million rupees. Of the top 250 largest private sector firms of the time, 30 belonged to the Birla group. His business legacy was, however, much disputed and the empire was divided into at least seven different groups.

The groups that have been most active since then are those of K. K. Birla (1918–2008), the second son of G. D. Birla, whose interests included fertilizers, textiles, media, sugar, and rail wagon manufacturing; the descendants of Braj Mohan Birla, Ganga Prasad and Chandra Kant, with interests in automobiles, paper, fans, building materials, and bearings; and the descendant of Rameshwar Das, Madhav Prasad (1918–1990), whose interests include jute fiber, cement, vinyl flooring, and cables.

The most energetic has, however, been the Aditya Vikram Birla Group, founded by the Birla branch of the family led by Basant Kumar Birla (b. 1921), the son of G. D. Birla, headed first by Basant Kumar's son, Aditya Vikram Birla (1944–1995) and now his grandson Kumar Mangalam Birla (b. 1966). Aditya Birla was responsible for steering the group to great heights even in the adverse circumstances of the 1960s and 1970s, which marked the height of the License Raj, that is, the era of pervasive government controls of the economy, the nationalization of private sector banks and coal, and increased government regulation and restriction of private enterprise. Aditya Birla responded to the restrictive industrial environment at home by searching for investment opportunities abroad, especially in the developing world. Thus, his group entered Thailand in 1970, where they set up Indo-Thai Synthetics,

a yarn manufacturing company, and this marked the beginning of a global empire. Between 1970 and 1985 the group entered Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Egypt. This made the Aditya Vikram Group emerge as India's first genuine multinational corporation.

Since 1995, the Aditya Vikram Birla (AVB) Group, has been led by Kumar Mangalam Birla, and he has maintained their core interest in the commodity business, but he has led the group into such expanding areas as information technology, information technology enabled services, telecommunications, financial services (insurance, stock and equity broking), apparel, and retail (supermarts and hypermarts). Kumar Mangalam Birla has also led a spate of acquisitions with the main ones being Novelis from Canada, Mount Gordon and Nifty Copper mines in Australia, and Ultra Tech, Indal, Madura garments, and PSI Data Systems in India. At the same time, the group is rapidly changing its persona and is increasingly becoming professionalized under Kumar Mangalam Birla as he transforms a patriarchal group into one organized around managerial capitalism. In 2010, it was a $29.2 billion corporation with global assets in excess of $22 billion, had operations in 25 countries, and employed 130,000 people. The Aditya Vikram Birla Group epitomizes the energy that Indian business has displayed since the 1991 liberalization of the economy; it is positioned to remain a major player within India and as a global conglomerate.

MEDHA KUDAISYA

See also Economy

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✦ BOLLYWOOD

The movie industry in India is commonly referred to as Bollywood, which is a combination of the words *Hollywood* and *Bombay* (now called Mumbai), the latter of which is where many of the movies are made. Most of the movies produced by Bollywood are spoken in the Hindi language with some English. Modern Bollywood films are using English more and more frequently both in the dialogue and in the song lyrics. However, a few of the movies that contain other Indian dialects are considered to be Bollywood films as well.

Compared to movies made in Hollywood, Bollywood films are fiscally moderate. This has allowed the Bollywood film industry to be one of the largest, if not the largest, in the world. The Bollywood budgets from the studios are modest, and much of the funding comes from private investors and distributors. This practice has been heavily scrutinized and recently

banks were prohibited from contributing funds to Bollywood-produced films. There have also been reports that many of the films were being funded by criminal sources and this is a claim that has been examined by the Central Bureau of Investigation.

However, Bollywood films without adequate funding have often been criticized for their low production quality. Global influences and the influx of Western cinema have encouraged Bollywood film producers and studios to reconsider the production value of their films. This led to a re-evaluation of Bollywood film standards and the desired quality that movie producers wish to attain. Lately, production has gone overseas and it is common to see background shots from Europe, Australia, the United States, and New Zealand.

While the production quality of Bollywood has escalated, the genre of films made has stayed about the same. Most of the Bollywood films contain musical numbers, with very few containing less than one musical act. The stories of many of the films are standard: usually there is a love triangle, a physical altercation, a hero, and a villain. There are also a large number of Bollywood films whose story lines seem to be heavily influenced by popular Western films.

As Mumbai is India's Hollywood, it is where many aspiring actors and actresses gravitate to try and make it in the movie business. Actresses featured in Bollywood films are often former beauty contestants or models, though that is not the standard. The Bollywood film industry employs a large number of people, and often actors and dancers enjoy a long career



A dance sequence is shot for an Indian film. The Indian motion picture industry, known as Bollywood, has a long and fascinating history. Though topics and styles have run the gamut from morality plays to romances and action movies, the inclusion of elaborate musical routines has been a constant since the beginning of Indian film. (Jeffrey L. Rotman/Corbis)

playing extras and performing as back-up dancers. However, a popular hit or a box office bomb can determine the fate of an actor or actress. While stardom in Bollywood is difficult to attain, career longevity can be out of reach for many actors and actresses. Many of the performers who achieve fame for a well-received movie are often offered many other opportunities to showcase that same winning talent. This then leads to a saturation of that actor or actress in many of the upcoming films. But this tactic does not guarantee that this particular actor or actress will remain popular among fans. Careers can, therefore, be short indeed.

It is also common for there to be many members of a family in the Bollywood film industry at the same time. Many famous actors and actresses encourage their children and siblings to enter the business. There have been several famous acting lineages that have stood the test of time and remained active in the Bollywood acting community. It is these types of connections that make it easier for succeeding generations to enter the Bollywood industry if they choose, though this does not always guarantee success.

It is not required that every Bollywood actor be an accomplished dancer, but it does help his or her chances of becoming popular, as almost every movie requires both the male and the female actors to dance and lip-synch. What is defined as Bollywood dancing is actually a range of popular, classical, and traditional folk dances from various parts of India. Many of the newer films feature more of a hip-hop influence in the dances, as demonstrated in songs that have a rapping staccato or a heavy dose of English in the lyrics. Many of the routines often require back-up dancers of both sexes to accompany the lead actor and actress.

It is not usually the case that the actor in the musical number is also the singer of the song being played. Almost all of the songs are sung by professional singers, called "playback" singers, who lend their vocals and their musical talent, and the actors and actresses lip-synch while dancing. In these cases, it is apparent that the song is being lip-synched. There have been a few instances in which the actor wanted or had been requested to provide his or her own vocals for the musical numbers, and they have been received with mixed reviews. The playback singers are generally favored over actors. In fact, playback singers are so popular that it is not uncommon for them to head their own concerts based on the fact that they have provided vocals for a popular song in a well-received movie. As the musical numbers are such an integral part of the film industry, they are considered a large part of a movie's potential success. It is quite common for a musical number to be one of the major reasons why the film does well in box-office sales. There has also been an increase of cameos by actresses in the musical numbers who appear only to lip-synch a certain song. These actresses then become referred to as "item-girls," as they have lent their talent to the musical item. Musical numbers featured in Bollywood movies often become more popular than the film itself. Many of the lyrics featured in these songs are also in Hindi with some poetical Urdu wording, and some contain English lyrics as well.

It is difficult to estimate how many Bollywood movies are actually produced and distributed and how many tickets and DVDs are sold each year. This is because of the large piracy issues that currently plague the Bollywood film industry. The pirating

of DVDs has become a lucrative business for many individuals who are able to get an advance copy of an upcoming movie. This then is copied illegally onto DVDs or onto VHS, or can often be shown in underground movie theaters. It is also not uncommon for small network and cable television channels to broadcast upcoming movies in their programming without going through the proper and legal channels to obtain permission. Due to the strict import laws in Pakistan, the piracy of Indian movies has become an on-demand and common occurrence. Even Indian retailers abroad in the United Kingdom or the United States carry pirated copies of Bollywood films. Therefore, while a film may be viewed by many individuals it does not guarantee that it will actually make enough of a profit to cover the production cost of the movie. This has become a worry among Bollywood studios and a continuing problem for the industry.

However, the demand of Bollywood films has grown rapidly due to the popularization of all things Indian in Western countries. Additionally, the insurgence of Indian immigrants in these countries has helped create a demand for the latest Bollywood movies and music. Many movie theaters that specialize in independent or foreign films carry Bollywood films to accommodate a growing audience. Recent Bollywood films have received critical acclaim from foreign audiences, prompting more venues to play the films for a growing market and higher ticket sales. Indian cable television channels in Western countries have become another venue to watch Bollywood films. Recently, American film studios such as 20th Century Fox and Warner Brothers have built offices in India. It is unclear whether more Western films will be shot in India or if these companies plan on contributing to the Bollywood film industry.

There are several awards presentations for the Bollywood movie industry. Some of the more popular include the Filmfare Awards, the Zee Cine Awards, the Stardust Awards, the Indian government–sponsored National Film Awards, and the International Indian Film Academy Awards. Many of the awards are presented to movies that have received great commercial success as opposed to those that have been acclaimed for their remarkable acting or story lines. Many of the award shows feature popular musical items performed by the actors and actresses themselves, songs sung by the playback singers, and montages to Bollywood movies.

SHEREEN BHALLA

See also Bachchan, Harivansh Amitabh; Film Industry; Maharashtra; Mumbai

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
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Bombay. *See* Mumbai

Burma, Union of. *See* Myanmar, Relations with

C



✦ CABINET

Parliamentary democracies, including India, are more accurately described as cabinet governments. While the Council of Ministers has constitutional status in India, the cabinet does not get a mention in the constitution. Its powers are defined instead by convention and usage. The Council of Ministers consists, in order of precedence, of:

Cabinet Ministers
Ministers of State
Deputy Ministers
Parliamentary Secretaries

The full executive is the Council of Ministers, with the cabinet being but one of its four components as listed above. In reality, though, the cabinet is much more important, influential, and powerful than the full council. While the latter meets rarely, the cabinet meets frequently. In some respects ministers of state and deputy ministers are closer to being departmental heads than cabinet ministers. With coalition governments and the resulting need to accommodate various political parties, the numbers of ministers have gone up dramatically. In August 2009 there were 32 cabinet ministers (26 of whom were from the Congress Party) in addition to the prime minister, and 45 ministers of state (of whom 32 were from Congress). Every minister must be a member of Parliament (MP) of either the lower house (Lok Sabha) or upper house (Rajya Sabha). If this is not the case upon appointment to the cabinet, he or she must become an MP within six months of appointment either through nomination or

by election. A minister may take part in the proceedings of either house of Parliament, but voting rights are restricted to the house to which he or she belongs.

The cabinet of India serves three principal functions:

1. It is the body which determines government policy for presentation to Parliament;
2. It is the executive body responsible for implementing government policy; and
3. It carries out interdepartmental coordination and cooperation.

Interestingly, the cabinet does not consider the budget. The latter is the responsibility, not of the cabinet as a whole, but of the finance minister, the prime minister, and other related ministers.

The power and influence of the cabinet collectively, or of cabinet ministers individually, depends firstly on whether the prime minister is assertive and domineering or a delegator; and secondly on how independently powerful and independent-minded cabinet ministers themselves are. On the one hand, they are rival centers of political gravity within the ruling party and therefore a potential threat to the continuing position of the prime minister as head of government. On the other hand, they are of immense help to the prime minister in articulating and defending government policy in Parliament and in the nation at large, to party faithful and political opponents alike. And the knowledge that the government is not a one-person band can be greatly reassuring to the people and to business and investor confidence.

For all his commanding stature in the country, even Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964) had to contend with his rival and long-time colleague within his party Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (1875–1950), home secretary and deputy prime minister, who was second only to Nehru in influence in the cabinet and the party. In contrast to her father, Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984) established a more personalized and centralized form of prime ministerial government. Efforts by the Janata government (1977–1980) to restore the principle and substance of collective responsibility fell victim to internecine warfare within the cabinet. Mrs. Gandhi reverted to her *durbar* (the royal court) of family and personal advisers after reelection in 1980. The maintenance of the tradition by her son, Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991; prime minister 1984–1989), meant that the cabinet continued to languish as an institution. The influence of individual ministers was not a function of cabinet office but of the prime minister's patronage. In Lal Krishna Advani (b. 1927), the deputy prime minister and home minister during the 1998–2004 period, the government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee (b. 1924; prime minister 1996, 1998–2004) had one of the most powerful seconds-in-command in decades of Indian politics. In 2009 the two powerful ministers beyond Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (b. 1932; prime minister 2004–) were Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee (b. 1935) and Home Minister P. Chidambaram (b. 1945), both of whom had served with Singh in the 2004–2009 government as well. At the same time, the power behind the politics was really Rajiv Gandhi's widow, Sonia Gandhi (b. 1946), from her position as party president and custodian of the Nehru-Gandhi political dynasty.

"Responsible government" ensures that the head of state acts only on the advice of responsible advisers. A trifle confusingly, and as in other parliamentary governments, the Indian cabinet operates on the basis of the two further working principles: "cabinet responsibility" and "ministerial responsibility." While cabinet responsibility places individual ministers under the cabinet as a collective entity, ministerial responsibility puts them in charge of government departments. Thus the former is more political and the latter more bureaucratic in nature.

All cabinet ministers must accept the principle of collective responsibility. That is, under collective leadership each minister accepts and agrees to share responsibility for all decisions of the cabinet. Doubts and disagreements may be expressed either diplomatically or forcefully, but they must be confined to the privacy of the cabinet room. Cabinet decisions are rarely taken by formal vote. Instead, the cabinet proceeds by a sense of the meeting after the discussion has taken place. If any member of the cabinet is unable to support government policy in public, in Parliament, or in the country at large, he or she is morally bound to resign from the cabinet. A dissenting member may neither vote against government policy in Parliament nor speak against it in public.

Members of cabinet accept full political responsibility for all acts of commission and omission by officials of the department that falls under their portfolio. Officials advise the minister and implement the minister's decisions. The decision itself is a matter for the minister's political judgment, and it is the minister rather than any official who reaps the rewards for policy successes, or pays the political price for flawed decisions by resigning or being fired. Ministerial responsibility is the doctrinal assertion of the supremacy of politicians over the entire machinery of government. Cabinet ministers accept responsibility for departmental acts because in the system of cabinet government they are expected and required to exercise firm control over the bureaucracy.

The cabinet is assisted in its many tasks by several committees. The most important of these deal with parliamentary, political, foreign, defense, and economic affairs. The key cabinet committees are always dominated by the senior ministers, starting with the prime minister. Important issues are usually examined in committee before being taken to the cabinet as a whole for debate and either approval or rejection.

The cabinet's central role in government makes it the focus of most interest-group activity and lobbying, which in turn makes it one of the chief mediators and conciliators of sectarian and sectoral interests. It tenders advice to the president for the exercise of all her functions, and provides legislative leadership in Parliament, political leadership in the country, and administrative leadership of government departments. The cabinet is also the final arbiter of India's external relations, from a declaration of general principles of foreign policy to decisions of war and peace, as well as negotiations of trade agreements and military alliances.

RAMESH THAKUR

See also Constitution; Parliament; President; Prime Minister

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Calcutta. *See* Kolkata

✦ CENTRAL BANKING, DEVELOPMENT ASPECTS

The major functions of the central banks established in the 17th century and later were to finance commerce, foster growth of the financial system, and bring uniformity in note issue. Various crises too have played a major role in the evolution of financial institutions and their functions. The functions of the central banks have evolved based on the needs of the economy. These functions vary in nature and with the stage of economic development of the country where the central bank is situated, the nature of the bank's mandate, and the degree of operational independence it enjoys.

The major functions of central banks around the world are monetary policy, banker-to-banks, banker-to-government, and developmental functions. The core monetary policy functions are currency management and note issue, maintenance of internal and external values of the currency, and promotion of growth. Transparency in communication has also assumed crucial importance in recent years. Central banking communication these days plays a major role in forming market expectations, predicting economic performance, and informing the general public of the economic outlook. The other functions which have gained importance in recent years with globalization are financial-sector regulation and supervision, maintenance of financial stability, and payment functions.

Traditionally, the central banks also often have a strong research department. A governor who is backed by an absolutely and relatively strong research department carries more weight vis-à-vis the treasury and other branches of government. The reason is probably that the governor is perceived as a relatively impartial provider of reliable information about the economy. A possible indicator of the quality of the bank's research department is the quality of the annual report it produces. The dissemination of information through coordination and cooperation thus has evolved as an important function of the central bank.

The central banks in developing countries play a major role in economic development. They perform not only the traditional functions required of central banking but also developmental tasks, and they are proactive in meeting the developmental needs of the economy. They adapt their policies in keeping with structural changes in the economy. They also promote financial-sector development to meet the varying needs of the economy. The central banks in developing countries had the challenging task of developing credit policies that catered to the needs and requirements of such developing sectors as agriculture and industry. On the difference between the roles played by the central banks in developed and developing countries, the central banks in developed countries came into existence to support and supervise the banking system that was already in place, whereas the central banks in developing countries had to first develop the banking system and financial markets and thereafter put in place the regulatory framework for their efficient oversight and supervision.

As in other developing countries, the central bank in India, besides performing its traditional functions, has played an important role in the development of the financial system and economic development. The phase of evolution of central banking in India can be grouped into three phases: 1935–1950, foundation phase; 1951–1990, development phase; and 1991 onward, reform phase. During the period 1935–1950, the bank functioned largely as a private bank. The launch of Five-Year Plans led to a shift in focus to developmental issues; nation building and institution building gained priority. The bank, which was in the private sector for more than decade, was nationalized on January 1, 1949, under the Reserve Bank of India (Transfer of Public Ownership) Act, 1948. During this phase the social control and nationalization of 14 major banks took place. With the changed focus to developmental functions, the Reserve Bank's role as banker to the government also changed. Although it provided temporary finances to the central government even during the foundation phase, this was not done frequently. During the planned phase of development, the bank's role as banker to the government expanded, and it became a significant source of financing for India's Five-Year and other official plans and for financing of government loans. Over time, the practice of replenishing the government's balances by the creation of ad hoc treasury bills attained a permanent character and became an alternative source of financing government expenditure. Similarly, the state governments also began drawing unauthorized overdrafts from the bank. As such, the Reserve Bank became a source of cheap credit not only for the central government but also indirectly for the state governments.

Another role of the bank during this period was that of institution building and development of the financial market. The financial system in the country during the postindependence period was underdeveloped, and the presence of banks in the rural areas was negligible. The Rural Banking Enquiry Committee set up by the Reserve Bank showed the lack of branching networks in the country. Provision of credit to rural areas and agriculture also gained importance as the focus of Five-Year Plans moved from industrial growth to the development of the agricultural sector.

The bank introduced selective credit control for the first time in May 1956. Faced with the twin objectives of financing for economic growth and also maintaining price stability at the same time, the Reserve Bank adopted additional instruments of credit control during the 1970s. The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) was introduced in 1973 to conserve resources required for development. As exchange control measures, the Reserve Bank selected certain commercial banks to function as authorized dealers in foreign exchange and issued directives to authorized dealers and others, such as airlines, shipping companies, travel agents, and insurance companies, regarding foreign exchange.

The economic reforms since 1991 marked another turning point in the functions of the central bank, as the profitability of banks and the removal of institutional, technological, and legal barriers took priority for the development of the financial sector. There was a shift in the functions of the bank from institution building to institution restructuring and consolidation, technological upgrading, strengthening financial regulation and supervision, ensuring financial stability, and improving access to finance by the poor and disadvantaged regions. The bank's role also shifted to discharging its core function, that of monetary policy.

RASHMI UMESH ARORA

See also Economy

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✦ CHANDIGARH

Chandigarh, known as "The City Beautiful," was designed by the Swiss-French architect Le Corbusier (1887–1965) and built as the capital of the Punjab. In 1966 it became a Union Territory and the capital of both the Punjab and Haryana. It covers 44 square miles and has a population of about 1 million. While services dominate the economy, it also has a small industrial area and is a commercial and financial hub.

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See also Haryana; Punjab

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Chennai. *See* Tamil Nadu

✦ CHHATTISGARH

Chhattisgarh or Chattisgarh, is a state in central India, which was separated from the state of Madhya Pradesh in November 2000. The name combines the Hindi language words "chhattis," meaning 36, and "garh," meaning forts, even though there is little present evidence of those forts. The area combined princely landholdings into one new state distinguished by the use of the Chhattisgarhi dialect of Hindi common to the area. Hindi, as well as a number of south Indian languages, is spoken in the state. Chhattisgarh is bordered by the states of Orissa to the east, Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh to the west, Andhra Pradesh to the south, and Uttar Pradesh to the north. Forested land covers 44 percent of Chhattisgarh and comprises 12 percent of all the forested land of India.

The capital, Raipur, has a population of approximately 700,000 and is the largest city in the state. The area in the center of the state is a major producer of rice. Chhattisgarh is distinguished by its large number of tribal peoples, who constitute about 33 percent of the state's total population of 21 million. In the Bastar District, they comprise almost three-fourths of the population. These tribal groups are also known as "adivasi," or "first people." The tribes in all of India fall under the aegis of the Ministry of Tribal Affairs, which has singled out Chhattisgarh for special assistance because of its need for development. The goals include training in better methods of agriculture; the building and support of schools, and especially programs to improve the literacy rate of women; providing health care; and building infrastructure of all kinds for the area.

The main tribes are the Gonds, subdivided into the Marias, Murias, and Abjumarias, and the non-Gond groups, the Bhatra and Halba. They live in villages away from cities in forested areas and sustain themselves by small farming and by hunting and gathering. For necessities such as salt, cloth, or farming tools, the tribal people sell their forest products at local weekly markets. Traditionally, barter or the exchange of cowrie shells were the main means



Muria tribe members perform a traditional dance. Living in the district of Bastar in the new state of Chhattisgarh, only formed in 2000, the Muria are one of the oldest original Indian tribes and speak a Dravidian language. (Frédéric Soltan/Corbis)

of exchange, although the Indian rupee is now the common currency. Local markets exist on a daily basis so that goods can be bought and sold by visiting different villages on each day of the week. The Hindu caste groups with whom the tribal people interact and coexist, including blacksmiths, potters, weavers, leatherworkers, and distillers, are mostly low in the Indian social structure. These castes live in neighborhoods close to the tribal villages and sometimes adjacent to them.

The tribal religion is basically animist, comprising the worship of the Earth Mother as well as clan and village ancestors who have become gods. The form that the local gods take can be as simple as logs and bamboo. Through acculturation with local Hindu populations, the Earth Mother has taken iconic form as Dantesvari or Mauli Mata. The images of her are flat with multiple geometric patterns and dots as decoration, rather than the curved, well-rounded, sinuous forms of classic Hindu sculpture.

Chhattisgarh contains very early Hindu and Buddhist archaeological monuments at Sirpur and Rajim dating from the eighth century CE. Remains of ancient temples exist throughout the state and provide a means of generating income to the region; the Chhattisgarh Tourism Board encourages visitors for pilgrimage and art historical tours.

The towns of Kondagaon, Narananpur, and Jagdalpur in the Bastar District are famous as centers for handicrafts made of terracotta, metal, wood, silk, and cotton. Originally

marketed and used locally as devotional objects or as offerings at sacred sites and village shrines and festivals, they have now become items for the tourist trade and are purchased for use as home decorations in urban houses.

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See also Madhya Pradesh

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✦ CHILD LABOR

Child labor has received a great deal of attention from Indian and international researchers and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), not all of it high quality, while the Indian central government's interventions against child labor have been sporadic. Controversy originates from the large differences among the estimates on child labor, which range from approximately 10 to 100 million for children between the ages of 5 and 14 years. Many of these estimates date from the 1990s. The 2001 census of India recorded a total child population of 253,163,648 ages 5–14, against which to compare these earlier figures. The Indian government child labor estimates are just above 10 million, with NGO estimates making up the higher range. The child labor figure in the 2001 census is 12.6 million (ages 5–14), or 3.15 percent of the total Indian workforce, compared to an Indian Ministry of Finance estimate for 2000 of 10.4 million. In international perspective, the International Labor Organization's (ILO) global child labor estimate for the year 2000 is 186.3 million for those ages 5–14.

Some NGOs and researchers feel that government estimates are too low; given the level of poverty in the country, it is assumed that more children are working than are recorded. There is some credence to this hypothesis, given that any child labor statistic depends on the definition used, and the definition currently in use by several bodies appears to be a narrow one. The most accepted definition of child labor used to compile a statistic is that the work performed by the child is concretely harmful to that boy or girl. The literature on the subject, however, suggests that even this definition can be open to debate. The Indian government definition uses the traditional definition of economic activity (TDEA) to identify gainful work (work performed to "make a living"), as does the United Nations (UN), the ILO, and most governments. However the TDEA does not take into account all the work in developing countries performed outside of cash transactions, which is usually performed within the family. Families in developing

countries tend to spend greater time and effort in productive activities, as opposed to advanced countries, where a higher proportion is spent in consumption activities. This means that children's domestic work, when time spent on it per week nears full-time work hours, is not simply a marginal convenience to parents but an integral part of family survival and therefore should be defined as economic activity. The international standard for child labor was provided by the ILO and first formulated in 2002 in the report *Every Child Counts*. It too however, does not include domestic work undertaken by children in their own home as economic activity, although the ILO acknowledges that this work "can be substantial."

Using the narrower child labor definition led to what Indian child labor specialist D. P. Chaudhri called "nowhere children." Once children attending school are accounted for, a large number of children, some 92 million (ages 5–14 in 2001), are not in school or not working as child labor. Professor Kristoffel Lieten, of the University of Amsterdam, another specialist on Indian child labor, cautions against assuming that significant numbers of "nowhere children" must in fact be child labor; hence, he warns against overestimating the amount of child labor. Another body of research provides evidence that "nowhere children" are not all simply idle. It shows that boys' and girls' time, other than for recreation, is taken up by a combination of schoolwork, paid work, and/or domestic work at home.

An approximate north-south divide exists in India, whereby, as systematically shown in 2008, researchers using a multivariate probit model (an advanced statistical technique)



A child, one of India's vast child labor force, works in a sewing factory in Delhi, February 26, 2008. (Paul Prescott/Dreamstime.com)

demonstrated that girls in the south tend to spend more time in domestic work in their households, rather than in paid work or school, than do girls in northern India. This is directly linked to restrictive social norms for women, and consequently girls, who are covered in the same research. (An exception to this is northeastern India, where women have a higher status than in many other parts of India and therefore have less constrained lives.) What this often means is that at least one girl sibling is designated as a full-time home worker alongside her mother. Girls are more likely to be in this role if they have male siblings. This can also be the case if the family is income-poor. Given that about 60 percent of the total Indian population (adult and child) is located in the north (not including the northeastern states), it appears that a sizable part of the 92 million "nowhere children" may be girls in domestic work in their households. The northern population is also growing faster than the southern population, implying the potential for a growing child labor population in northern India, given that the north also contains the vast majority of the people in poverty, suffers low economic growth, and receives low-quality government services. A qualification for the 92 million figure is the reported dramatic increase in school enrollment since 2000 under the government primary education universalization program (Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan). It remains to be seen whether enrollment has translated into attendance.

According to the 2001 census, 6.8 million boys and 5.8 million girls were in child labor, where, as a percentage of the total child population aged 5–14, male child labor was 5.3 percent, and female, 4.6 percent; a total of 5.77 million were full time ("main workers") and 6.88 were part time ("marginal workers"); the total number of children in hazardous work was 2 million. Regionally, the north-south divide produces some anomalies: Andhra Pradesh, a southern state, has a rural work participation rate for children of 7.7 percent, while another southern state, Karnataka, also had a high rural work rate, in contrast with a .5 percent rate in Kerala, in the southwest. Two of the poorest states, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, had rates of 4.7 percent and 4.1 percent respectively. More than 50 percent of all child workers are located in the five high-poverty states of Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh (four of which are northern states).

Other than agriculture, child labor is found in low-productivity, small industries, which are structured as small workshops dealing with jewelry, glass items, cigarettes, matches, locks, bricks, fireworks, circus entertainment, restaurants, carpet weaving, laundry, retailing, street selling, stone quarries, prostitution, and the garment industry.

Indian child labor still routinely finds its way into the supply chains of Western clothing retailers due to the use of outsourced production and the lack of effective supply-chain monitoring. This is compounded by microscale sub-subcontracting that takes place for specialty work, such as the time-consuming process of sequin stitching, which is cheaply done by paying children less than adults, or simply to meet production deadlines. It is also due to the outsourcing model that has developed, which takes a hands-off approach to production

beyond quality and design specification. Buyers put relentless pressure on supplier margins with the threat of taking their business elsewhere if suppliers do not meet their demands. It is also the result of Indian business laws, which have only gradually liberalized since 1991. Indian business laws are a widely overlooked cause of child labor. These highly restrictive laws amounted to a command economy (some still exist), restricting (legal) sources of labor and capital; official restrictions were placed on what size of firm could produce what product, and with what technology and variable inputs. This resulted in a proliferation of small firms that could not grow legally, or had limitations on their ability to raise capital, hence making small units the norm. The infamous Dharavi slum in Mumbai is a classic example of the spread of small firms paying abysmally low wages.

As a result, economies of scale could not be achieved, product quality was limited, and costs had to be kept low. One strategy used to achieve this was to use very lowly paid, or even free, child labor. In addition, labor laws make it very difficult to fire workers, adding an incentive to hire children. One result was very low economic growth and not enough adult employment; another was that in 2002, India had only 6.2 million jobs in the formal manufacturing sector, while China now has 160 million. Both countries' total populations are comparable at just over 1 billion.

Occupational hazards in low-technology manufacturing for children come from lack of safety and long hours: in the lock industry children work with such dangerous products as potassium cyanide, trisodium phosphate, sodium silicate, hydrochloric acid, and sulphuric acid. Commercial domestic work is also extremely dangerous, with continuous examples of abuse amounting to torture, in addition to rape. Prostitution is also particularly hazardous. For example, of a group of 12 girls aged 13–15 who were rescued from forced prostitution in brothels on Falkland Road, Mumbai, all had been infected with HIV/AIDS. Of Mumbai's estimated total sex-worker population of 200,000, 20 percent is said to be HIV positive. The child-rescue NGO Odanadi (India) reported that boys under the age of 10 were employed in Mumbai brothels for the purposes of providing oral sex. Both male and female child prostitutes are available at beaches in the states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu.

Other causes of child labor also result in controversy, with a debate focused on the role of poverty versus poor government services, for which the blame is laid solely on the lack of quality free primary education. The latter is posed by proponents who use the example of Kerala state where, in spite of a sluggish local economy, mass school attendance and mass high levels of health have been attained. While very poor social service provision is clearly part of the reason for child labor in northern India, where the school system is of very low quality, other factors are at least as important.

Finally, another cause of child labor also comprehensively overlooked in the Indian child labor policy debate is the lack of a welfare state. An effective welfare state would remove the need for single parents, such as widows with children, having to resort to children's paid work to support their families. This is crucial, for example, because in a large part of the country, mainly in the northern states, women suffer serious labor market

disadvantage. A reason for child labor often posited by economists is the lack of properly functioning credit markets. This argument says that families would otherwise be able to borrow enough money to deal with income shortfalls, thus avoiding removing children from school and putting them to work. This argument is very implausible, given that high quality credit markets take a more skeptical view of risks, such as individuals without incomes. It is precisely the loose nature of local credit markets that allows the poor to borrow because lenders know unethical means of repayment are possible. These include bonded child labor, where a child is given to the creditor to work off the debt, and borrowers are cheated out of any assets they may have, such as small land plots.

RISTO HÄRMÄ

See also Economy; Family

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✦ CHINA, RELATIONS WITH

On April 1, 1950, India was one of the earliest countries in the world, the second in the non-Socialist world and the first in South Asia, to recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC). Four years later, in 1954, India and China enunciated the five principles of peaceful coexistence known as Panch Sheel.

The five principles of Panch Sheel are:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
2. Mutual nonaggression.
3. Equality and mutual benefit.
4. Mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs.
5. Peaceful coexistence.

Panch Sheel provided basic foundations for:

1. Beneficial relations between China and India based on trust, equality, and mutuality of interest.
2. A cooperative security system based on peace and justice.
3. Improved trade, commerce, and technology for mutual benefit of the people of both countries.

However, the Sino-Indian war of 1962 led to a serious setback in bilateral relations, although the two nations restored diplomatic relations in 1976. In 1979, after two decades of estrangement, the then External Affairs Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (b. 1924) made a landmark visit to China, which led to the renewal of contacts at the highest political level.

The visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991; prime minister 1984–1989) to China in December 1988 was an important milestone in the improvement of relations. It marked the resumption of political dialogue after an interval of 28 years. Both sides agreed to develop and expand bilateral relations in every area possible. It was also agreed to establish a joint working group on the contentious boundary question to seek a fair, just, reasonable, and mutually acceptable solution. Among the key confidence-building measures that were put in place by several rounds of joint working groups were:

1. Military-to-military meetings to be held twice a year along the eastern and western sectors of the border at Burn La Pass and Spanggur Gap.
2. Establishment of hotlines between military headquarters.
3. Military-to-military communication links to be established at strategic points.
4. Frequent meetings between local commanders on both sides.
5. Mutual transparency on location of military positions along the entire border.
6. Military-to-military communication links to be established at strategic points along the eastern and western sector.

Besides the joint working groups on the border issue and the joint economic group on economic and commercial issues, there are bilateral exchanges in areas of science and technology, outer space, mining, defense, personnel, and culture. As a result, relations improved steadily after 1988 as high-level exchanges led to the renewal of good relations between the two neighbors. The Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the India-China border area is a case in point.

President Jiang Zemin (b. 1926; secretary-general of the Communist Party of China 1989–2002; president of the PRC 1993–2003) paid a state visit to India in November 1996. This was the first visit by a Chinese head of state in recent times. During his visit, the two countries agreed to work toward a constructive, mutually beneficial, and cooperative relationship while continuing to address outstanding differences. Four agreements were signed, of which

the most important was one on confidence-building measures in the military field along the LAC in the India-China border areas. Each side agreed to:

1. Seek a mutually acceptable settlement of the border dispute and, pending a final settlement, to respect the LAC.
2. Not use military might against each other.
3. Limit or reduce their respective military forces and major categories of armaments within mutually agreed geographical zones along the LAC.
4. Avoid large-scale military exercises involving more than one division.
5. Prohibit flights of combat aircraft within 6.2 miles of the LAC without prior and adequate notification.
6. Prohibit firing, blasting, or hunting within 1.2 miles of the LAC.
7. Hold regular flag meetings between border commanders of both sides at specified border points.
8. Assure the maintenance and security of the consulate-general of India in Hong Kong.
9. Combat drug trafficking and related crimes.
10. Agree on maritime transport between the two nations and extend most-favored nation treatment on each other's vessels at ports.

Bilateral relations, however, suffered a setback after India's Pokhran-II nuclear tests in May 1998, as India became one of the nations in the world to possess nuclear weapons. In early 1999, both countries made efforts to resume an official-level dialogue, with foreign ministers of both sides holding talks in February. Both sides also reiterated that neither country is a potential threat to the other. Commerce and Industry Minister Murasoli Maran (1934–2003; minister for commerce and industry 1999–2002) visited China in February 2000, during which an India-China Bilateral Agreement for China's Accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) was signed. The two countries jointly commemorated the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations on April 1, 2000, through staging a number of events held in both New Delhi and Beijing.

President K. R. Narayanan (1920–2005; president of India 1997–2002) made a visit to China in May–June 2000, only the second visit by an Indian head of state to China in the previous 50 years, and it was significant as it marked a shift to normalcy in bilateral relations. The president of India and the president of China held official talks coinciding with the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations.

In response to Narayanan's visit to China, Premier Zhu Rongji (b. 1928; premier of the PRC 1998–2003) visited India in 2002, and he was accompanied by a high-level delegation that included the Minister for Labor and Social Security Zhang Zuoji (b. 1945; minister for labor and social security 1998–2003) and Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Shi Guangsheng (b. 1939). Six memoranda of understanding/agreements related

to cooperation in tourism, provision of hydrological data by China to India, peaceful uses of outer space, science and technology, and phytosanitary certificates were signed during the visit.

During the visit of Jaswant Singh (b. 1938; minister for external affairs 1998–2002) to China from March 29 to April 2, 2002, the two nations agreed to institute regular meetings at a number of levels. The second meeting of the India-China Eminent Persons Group was held in Beijing on May 28–29, 2002. The Speaker of the Lok Sabha, Manohar Joshi (b. 1937; Speaker 2002–2004), paid a visit to China on January 5–10, 2003, and this enhanced parliamentary cooperation between the two countries.

Leaders of both countries have also maintained regular contacts, meeting frequently during international gatherings. President Jiang Zemin, for example, met Prime Minister Vajpayee at Almaty during the CICA Summit (the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia Summit) on June 4, 2002, and Vajpayee met the new Chinese president Hu Jintao (b. 1942; president 2003–) for the first time in St. Petersburg, Russia, on May 31, 2003. Both India and China have instituted a wide-ranging dialogue on security issues, counterterrorism, and policy planning. Consultations between the Foreign and Commerce Ministries, which are held on a regular basis, provide an opportunity for a frank exchange of views. There is also regular interaction between various strategic and foreign-policy think tanks at the Track-II level.

Prime Minister Vajpayee made an official visit to China on June 22–27, 2003, with the result that 10 agreements and a Joint Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation between India and China were concluded. It was the first ever joint document of its kind to be signed by the leaders of the two countries.

As a result of the talks, Vajpayee and Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao (b. 1942; premier 2003–) agreed to increase cooperation in science, technology, commerce, and education; to ease visa rules; to set up joint infrastructure-development projects focusing on water and energy resources; and to establish cultural centers in each other's countries. During this visit, India stated explicitly that it recognizes the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) as "part of China." It further agreed not to allow "anti-China activities" organized by Tibetans in India. China, on its part, agreed to restart border trade with India through Sikkim, a state in northeastern India where travel and trade have been limited because of border tension.

While India viewed the opening of the Sikkim trade route as the first time China had recognized India's de facto sovereignty over Sikkim, China's Foreign Ministry spokesperson Kong Quan praised India's statement concerning Tibet as "an important and positive expression." For domestic political purposes, however, both countries played down the political significance of their own moves.

The two leaders also discussed the possibility of economic collaboration. The most significant step was the aim to increase bilateral trade to $10 billion by the year 2005. (In 2002 it was around $5 billion.) Vajpayee also addressed China's information technology (IT) industry, proposing closer interaction between China's and India's IT industries, which total a volume of at least $75 billion annually. Business officials from both countries also

agreed to coordinate their strategies in support of the developing countries in Asia within the WTO. Although Vajpayee's trip was widely viewed as the beginning of a friendly and economically beneficial relationship, it did not address some of the more sensitive issues. The India-Pakistan-China triangle is still problematic, as China is suspected of supporting Pakistan's military establishment. India's enhancing ties with the United States, one of the largest business clients of China, also adds to the complexity of India-China relations.

First, both countries made peaceful overtures by moving to settle an old border dispute. Second, China indicated diplomatic support for India's bid to become a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council. Both parties also initiated discussion of a possible bilateral free trade agreement. Last, and by far most important, they called for combining the might of Indian software technology with Chinese state-of-the-art hardware technology to achieve world leadership in the field of global IT. Thus, India and China are reinventing the wheel of globalization, thereby becoming two major powers in Asia.

During Chinese president Hu Jintao's vist to India in November 2006, India and China agreed on a 10-pronged strategy to increase cooperation in all areas, including the controversial area of civilian nuclear energy. The two countries also downplayed the border dispute. Thirteen agreements were signed between the two nations, including one to set up a Chinese consulate in Kolkata and an Indian one in Guangzhou, while a dispute over the property of the Indian Consulate in Shanghai was also settled. Stressing the comprehensive economic and commercial engagement between them, both India and China pledged to raise the volume of bilateral trade to $40 billion by 2010. The two countries also agreed to join hands in dealing with the global issues of sustainable and equitable development, energy security, peace and prosperity in Asia and the world, environmental protection, and the fight against terrorism and cross-border crimes.

The visit by Indian prime minister Dr. Manmohan Singh (b. 1932; prime minister 2004–) to China in January 2008 culminated in the signing of *A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of China and India*. It was another important milestone in the development of bilateral relations, as the two countries made a commitment to build a harmonious world of durable peace and common prosperity, thus further advancing the Indo-Chinese strategic partnership.

The two sides made serious efforts to promote confidence-building measures through steadily enhanced contacts in the field of defense. The two sides welcomed the commencement of the China-India Defense Dialogue and expressed their satisfaction at the successful conclusion of the first joint antiterrorism training between their armed forces in December 2007. They also welcomed efforts to set an example on transborder rivers by continuing the cooperation on the issue established in 2002. The assistance extended by China on the provision of flood-season hydrological data has assisted India in ensuring the safety and security of its population in the areas along these rivers. These steps have contributed to building mutual understanding and trust.

In the first quarter of 2008, China became India's number one trading partner apart from the European Union (EU). Encouraged by this economic growth, the two sides increased the

target for trade volume from US$40 billion to US$60 billion by 2010. Mutual investments are also expanding in a number of sectors.

Contentious issues, such as the issue of Tibet, the status of Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim's accession to the Indian Union, and a number of other issues, are being mutually resolved through active and ongoing dialogue between leaders of both China and India.

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See also Foreign Policy; Look East Policy

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✦ CHRISTIANITY

Christianity is also an Indian religion. According to tradition, the Apostle Thomas reached Kodungallur on the Malabar (presently Kerala) coast in 52 CE. Twenty centuries later, according to the 2001 census, the Christian population of India is 24,080,016, or approximately 2.4 percent of the population, making Christianity India's third-largest religion after Hinduism and Islam. The constitution of the country states that India is a "secular state," which affirms the noninterference of the state in religious matters and recognizes the freedom of religion for all citizens.

The Apostle Thomas is believed to have preached the gospel, baptized several families, and established seven churches in the southwest of India. Subsequently, he traveled to the east coast and, in Mylapore (which is now part of Chennai), became a martyr. The present-day Thomas Christians consider themselves to be the descendants of the families baptized by the apostle. A second wave of missionary activity occurred in the fourth century when Christians from Persia, under the leadership of Thomas of Cana—a Mesopotamian merchant and missionary—landed with some Christian families on the coast of Kerala and made that their home. This colony of Christians became the first recorded Christian community in India. There was a close ecclesiastical and liturgical connection between the Christians in Kerala and the Church in Syria. Due to this link, a section of the Christians in Kerala are also known as Syrian Christians.

Christianity in other parts of India also has a heritage that goes back several centuries. In western India, Cosmas Indicopleustes, a Greek traveler, is believed to have seen a church

at Kalyan (near Mumbai) in 545 CE and found a bishop appointed from Persia. In the early modern period, Jordan Catalani of Severac, a French Roman Catholic priest who came to Thana (also near Mumbai) and lived there for some time in the early 14th century, found Nestorians who had settled at Kalyan, Thana, Sopara, and Broach (in Gujarat) in the 7th century. He ministered to them and established the first Roman Catholic Church in the region.

Following the arrival of the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama (ca. 1460–1524) on the Malabar coast in 1498, Portuguese missionaries attempted to connect the Thomas Christians to the Roman Catholic Church, leading to the formation of Roman Catholics in Kerala. Roman Catholics today comprise both the Thomas Christians who accepted the Latin rite as well as the Christians converted through Portuguese influence and other missionary work. Owing to the Portuguese and the Roman Catholic connection since the mid-16th century, there are more than 17 million Roman Catholics in India. (Apart from the Latin Catholics, the Syro-Malabar Catholic Church and the Syro-Malankara Catholic Church are the prominent Eastern rites among the Catholics in India.)

The Protestant form of Christianity began in India in 1706 with the arrival of the Danish-Halle Lutheran Pietists Bartholomaus Ziegenbalg (1682–1719) and Heinrich Plutschau (1676–1752) at the Tranquebar coast (now in Tamil Nadu). Over the centuries,



Saligao Church, Goa. Christianity has an Indian tradition reputedly going back to the apostle St. Thomas. (Arun Bhargava/Dreamstime.com)

the Lutheran faith spread to other parts of the country, and today there are 11 Lutheran churches in India under the federation of the United Evangelical Lutheran Church in India. A major milestone in the history of the Christian mission in India was the arrival of William Carey (1761–1834), the English Baptist missionary, in 1793 on the east coast. Carey, along with Joshua Marshman (1768–1837) and William Ward (1769–1823), made Serampore (now in West Bengal) their base. Among their numerous activities was the founding in 1818 of Serampore College, a theological university today, to which more than 50 seminaries of the Protestant and Orthodox churches are affiliated.

Indian Christians believed that their division on denominational lines was the impact of the missionary movement. The influence of the ecumenical movement, which developed in the West around this time, also began to be felt in the country. All these developments led in 1947 to several prominent south Indian churches (including Congregational and Presbyterian/Reformed traditions, Anglican churches, and the Methodist Church in southern India) coming together to form the Church of South India (CSI). Later, church unity discussions in northern India similarly culminated in 1970 in the formation of the Church of North India (CNI), which includes the Anglican Church; the United Church of Northern India, a combination of Congregationalist and Presbyterian churches; the Methodist Church; the Council of Baptist Churches in Northern India; the Church of the Brethren in India; and the Disciples of Christ. The Mar Thoma Syrian Church, a Reformed Eastern church, also established full communion with the CSI and CNI, and the three churches have now come together in conciliar unity. Another prominent Protestant church, the Methodist Church of India, was inaugurated in Chennai in 1981. The Methodist Church runs a number of educational institutions aimed at serving the socially and economically deprived. The Baptist churches, too, have a visible presence in several parts of the country, particularly in northeastern India and in the state of Andhra Pradesh.

Following the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), the Catholic Church also showed a remarkable openness to new ideas concerning the Church in India. Beginning a process of "indigenization," the Church incorporated Indian languages and symbols, especially from the Hindu tradition, into worship services. The Catholic Church also displayed an ecumenical openness with regard to other churches and a spirit of dialogue with the other religious faiths. Another significant development in the Church was the adoption of a clear position in favor of social justice and a "preferential option for the poor."

Christianity reached northeastern India only toward the latter part of the 19th century. The American Baptist missionaries who reached there initially were followed by missionaries of several other denominations. This region has seen the greatest growth of Christianity in the country. Three states—Nagaland, Mizoram, and Meghalaya—have a Christian majority population. Another state, Manipur, also has a significant Christian presence. Apart from the Baptists, the Presbyterian Church has a strong presence in northeastern India. The churches in this region are self-supporting, and they send out hundreds of missionaries to other parts of India and abroad.

The two Orthodox churches of India—the Malankara Syrian Orthodox Church and the Jacobite Syrian Orthodox Church—are closely linked to the St. Thomas heritage of India. While both these churches are based in Kerala, they have diaspora parishes and dioceses in several parts of the country and abroad. Pentecostalism is also a rapidly growing movement in India. The major Pentecostal churches in India are the Assemblies of God, The Pentecostal Mission, and the India Pentecostal Church of God (IPC). Apart from the established Pentecostal churches, there are thousands of house churches and neo-Pentecostal groups scattered across the country. The Charismatic movement brings in certain characteristics of the Pentecostal movement to the traditional churches—especially to the Roman Catholics—and in the process urges the ecclesiastical leadership to address more vigorously the spiritual and social needs of the laity.

Over the centuries, Christianity has become established in India as a significant force. Today the Indian Church stands at a crossroads, trying to redefine its identity and mission so as to be of current relevance. In this context, there are three areas of paramount importance for the Church.

The image of Indian Christianity. Due to a variety of factors over the centuries and particularly during the colonial period, the Indian Church, despite its numerical weakness, has been seen to be a powerful institution in the country. The Church possesses great assets, and the continued flow of "foreign money," primarily from its partners in Western Christian agencies, has contributed significantly to this image. The Church also runs numerous institutions, adding to its influence. The high educational and social levels of Indian Christians, too, put them at an advantage over most other Indians. Christians have also been noted for their social outreach programs, especially among the marginalized sections of society. The hundreds of social action groups and voluntary agencies run by Christians across the country have played a significant role in promoting the values of justice and dignity among all sections of society, particularly among the poor. In modern times, Mother Teresa (1910–1997), through her Missionaries of Charity, which she founded in Kolkata in 1950, has perhaps best exemplified Christian service to the poor and needy. The challenge before the Church today, therefore, is how the image of the Church as a rich institution compares with its mission as a compassionate and serving community.

Conversion. Going back to the missionary period and the nationalist movement in India, interreligious conversion has always been an emotive issue in the country. While the work of the missionaries among the Dalits and the Adivasis (the indigenous people) resulted in mass conversions to Christianity, several nationalist leaders, including Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948), believed in the truth of all religions and, therefore, viewed conversion as not only unnecessary but something that strikes at the core of interreligious harmony. The Constitution of India, however, includes not only the right of every citizen to preach and practice any religion but also the freedom to "propagate" religion. Conversion, in this sense, is not only a religious freedom but also a political right. The liberating potential of interreligious conversion is also important. When the Dalits and Tribals converted to Christianity in large

numbers, their conversion was seen not only as a change of faith but also as a liberation from age-old oppression and marginalization. The movement led by the Dalit leader Dr. B. R. Ambedkar (1891–1956) in the 1950s, which resulted in a large number of Dalits leaving Hinduism in order to embrace neo-Buddhism, was also seen primarily as a step toward the emancipation of a downtrodden people. In more recent times, however, interreligious amity has been challenged by partisan politics and extremists. While conversion has neither been attempted nor achieved by most Christian activists, charges of forced conversion have often been leveled against Christians. In the current context, therefore, the Church needs to radically address the meaning of conversion in a pluralistic context.

Dalit Christians. Though the exploitation and discrimination of Dalits has been officially declared to be illegal, atrocities directed at them are common. The Indian churches, too, have not been free from exclusion and discrimination against Dalits. In addition, caste continues to be a reality that governs the social life of Indian Christians. Today, Dalits constitute 70 percent of India's Christian population, but the Dalit presence in the Indian Church has remained largely a numerical factor while the power structure in the Church continues to be in the hands of the urban educated sections, often from the dominant castes. Despite 60 years of independence and 500 years of Christianity, the marginalized sections have not yet built up a just and inclusive community. In the ultimate analysis, there is an anomaly between the image of the Indian Church as a rich institution and the reality that a majority of the Indian Christians are Dalits still living in poverty. This anomaly, perhaps, constitutes the greatest challenge for the Indian Church in the 21st century.

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See also Communalism; Religion

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✦ COMMUNALISM

In the context of the Indian subcontinent, the English term *communalism* is used to refer to persistent antagonism and conflict between religiously defined communities, primarily Hindus and Muslims, but also extending to Sikhs, Christians, and other religious groups.

While communalism in India possesses distinct features, it is nevertheless in some ways similar to the concepts of religious fundamentalism, ethnic chauvinism, ultranationalism, and political extremism. It includes phenomena ranging from individual prejudice against members of another religious community to institutionalized discrimination, as well as violent conflict in the form of riots and pogroms. Communalist groups typically advocate the putative superiority of their own religion while disparaging other religions and often demonizing the adherents of those religions. However, while communalist discourse overtly focuses on religious identity, specific communalist conflicts are frequently linked to efforts at political mobilization or stem from economic considerations, such as forced land acquisition or property disputes. Violence due to communalism has wreaked great devastation on Indian society and has been responsible for a large number of deaths. While India experienced periodic religious conflict prior to the onset of British colonialism in the 18th century, it was only during the period of British rule itself, with the politicization of religious identities, that communalism emerged as a widespread social, economic, and political problem. The years leading up to the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 witnessed increasingly frequent communal clashes, as political parties and organizations made appeals based on religious identity to mobilize support, and they often did so by demonizing members of another religion. Social and political groups promoted exclusivist identities for Hindus and Muslims respectively, emphasizing the differences between the communities while downplaying shared histories and cultures. This process culminated in the conflagration of the partition of British India in 1947 into a predominantly Hindu but secular India, and a Muslim-dominated Pakistan, a process accompanied by over a million deaths and the creation of millions of refugees.

While the experience of widespread violence and devastation during Partition served to further entrench communalist attitudes among some in independent India, many Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and others have supported a secular government and a tolerant, multireligious society. In January 1948, shortly after independence, a Hindu extremist who resented the empathetic attitude of Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948) toward Muslims, along with his rapprochement with Pakistan, assassinated the much-revered leader. His action, delegitimized communalism among the numerically predominant Hindu population, and for decades communalism was able to exist only on the political margins. However, the passage of time and the changed circumstances saw the resurgence of Hindu communalism as a serious political force in the 1980s, with the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) gaining substantial power under the guidance of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. Communal tensions and outbreaks of violence further increased throughout India when Hindu nationalist organizations undertook a campaign to destroy a 16th-century mosque in the north Indian city of Ayodhya, with the aim of building a Hindu temple in its place.

In contemporary India, communalism continues to represent a widespread social and political challenge for the country. Some ultraconservative Muslim organizations hold vituperative views toward Hinduism, while right-wing Hindu communalists or

nationalists have at times operated with the support of state apparatuses, including the police and governmental authorities, at both the national and the state level. Additionally, many places and cities that have had a history of intercommunal violence (often referred to as "communally sensitive" areas) have, as a result, become relatively segregated, with Hindus and Muslims residing in separate neighborhoods. In January 2002 one of the worst communalist episodes since independence occurred when 58 Hindu pilgrims were killed in a railway carriage in Gujarat. Hindu communalist organizations, including the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), used the excuse of this event to launch a systematic attack on Muslims in the state. In the ensuing violence, thousands of Muslim citizens were killed, with hundreds of thousands forced to flee their homes. Many of these refugees have remained in camps, while others have sought security by moving into segregated Muslim neighborhoods.

Yet, despite such dire developments, India's pluralist and secular traditions have remained strong, receiving support from large swathes of the population across religious denominations. A number of organizations, such as Citizens for Peace and Justice, Khoj, and Sahmat, work to oppose communalism through educational campaigns, pursue justice through legal remedies, and organize social and cultural events to build social ties between communities and to promote interfaith harmony.

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See also Christianity; Islam; Religion; Secularism

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✦ CONSTITUTION

Constitutionalism is the technique of striking the proper balance between establishing a system of government that has sufficient enabling authority and power to permit it to perform the necessary tasks, and restricting the government with a system of restraints to preclude the creation of a tyranny. A constitution sets out the rules of the game in order to ensure fair competition between the contenders vying for the authoritative allocation of scarce resources through control of political office. It establishes the framework within which competing individuals and groups can pursue the struggle for power in a stable and orderly manner. Every political system needs clearly understood agents and

rules to make, interpret, implement, and enforce public policy. The constitution does this by specifying the organs of government; the manner of their creation and organization; their powers and limits in relation to one another and to citizens; the procedures for formulating and executing laws and resolving conflicts among members of the political community; and the conditions under which the polity may be defended against internal and foreign foes.

The Constitution of India tries to strike a balance between the liberty of citizens, the authority of the state, and the cohesiveness of society. The key to the successful establishment of constitutional democracy in India is the long gestation period of parliamentary democratic institutions under British tutelage. The principle of gradualism guided the widening of suffrage to new classes of citizens, the extension of elective government from local to national levels, and the deepening of power-sharing arrangements between elected representatives and appointed officials.

India inherited the basic organizational structure of government from the British Raj ("Rule"), including a unitary system of government, albeit with strong federal features. The lineage of the Parliament of India created by the 1950 constitution includes the Indian Councils Act (1861), the Morley-Minto reforms (1909), the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms (1919), and the Government of India Act (1935). These various reforms represented the two trends of democratization and indigenization, both of which were completed with independence and the adoption of parliamentary government modeled on the British system at Westminster. As well as the organizing principles, India inherited some of the actual institutions of government, including central and provincial legislatures, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, and the security services; and the conventions of parliamentary democracy.

The new constitution of independent India, drafted by a specially convened Constituent Assembly, completed the democratization of politics begun by the British. Reflecting its triumphs in the provincial elections of 1945, the Constituent Assembly was dominated by the Congress Party, which was founded in 1885 as the Indian National Congress (INC), and led the struggle for independence. The president of the assembly was Dr. Rajendra Prasad (1884–1963), who later became the first president of India (1950–1962). The drafting committee was chaired by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar (1891–1956). Elected indirectly by the provincial assemblies in 1946, the Constituent Assembly aimed to set up a system of government that would facilitate social change and economic development within a democratic structure. The debates in the Constituent Assembly are a rich mine of information on the thinking and philosophy, and the fears and hopes, behind the Indian constitution.

Divided into 22 parts of 395 articles, plus another 12 schedules, 94 amendments, and 5 appendices, India's constitution is among the longest in the world. It came into effect on January 26, 1950, and established a republic, with no hereditary rulers. The date of January 26 is celebrated every year with due pomp and ceremony as Republic Day. The philosophy underlying the Indian constitution reflects both attraction and aversion to aspects of Western

liberal democracy and Soviet-style Marxism. This simultaneous attraction and aversion is particularly apparent in the chapters entitled "Fundamental Rights" and "Directive Principles of State Policy," respectively. Under the terms of the 1950 constitution, India is democratic, secular, Socialist, federal, and republican. It promises social, economic, and political justice; liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship; equality of status and opportunity; dignity of the individual; and unity and integrity of the nation.

India has a representative and parliamentary system of government formed on the basis of elections held at prescribed intervals under the auspices of an independent electoral commission. Every adult citizen may vote in the elections and seek public office. A distribution of powers between a federal center and component states was adopted as the best institutional means of accommodating India's need for unity-in-diversity through appropriate power-sharing on a geographical basis. The history of difficulties in neighboring Pakistan, which broke apart in 1971, and Sri Lanka, which has struggled with demands for greater autonomy for the Tamils, has vindicated the formula adopted by the Indian constitution. Secularism was a logical corollary of the Congress Party's passionate rejection of the two-nation theory on which Pakistan had been severed from India through Partition. The decision to become a republic was an assertion of freedom and independence from the British crown. Nevertheless, India was allowed to remain a full member of the Commonwealth of Nations through the creative formula of accepting the British monarch as the symbol of the free association of the member-nations, and as such, the head of the Commonwealth.

Precisely because the constitution is prescriptive in such detail, it needs frequent amendments to reflect changing circumstances that throw up voids or render some prescriptions inoperative. There are four methods for amending the constitution. Some clauses may be amended by a simple majority of Parliament, in consultation with or at the request of the states. A second category of clauses may be amended by a simple majority in Parliament. A third group requires a majority of the total membership of each house plus a two-thirds majority of members of Parliament (MP) present and voting in each house. The final class of clauses, pertaining to state borders and rights, requires, in addition to the preceding, ratification by half the number of state legislatures. The 113 constitutional amendments have not altered the "basic structure" of the system of government established in 1950, whose custodian is the Supreme Court of India.

In some respects the Indian framers borrowed ideas from the U.S. constitution, starting with the need for a written constitution. The functions of rule making, rule enforcement, and

Table 3 Constitutional Amendments in India, 1950–2011

	1950–59	1960–1969	1970–1979	1980–1989	1990–1999	2000–2011
Number of amendments	7	15	22	18	16	35

rule interpretation are separated into three institutions: the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. The U.S. influence is strikingly evident in the institution of the judiciary, including a Supreme Court as the final court of appeal, and the principle of judicial review.

The Indian constitution lacks the longevity of its U.S. counterpart, and reverence for it is diminished also by the ease and frequency of amendments. Still, it has proven to be remarkably resilient.

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See also Cabinet; Election Commission; Parliament; President; Prime Minister

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✦ CONSUMER CULTURE

The economic liberalization embarked upon by the Indian government in 1991 unleashed the pent-up dynamism of the Indian middle classes. What followed was an economic boom—not just in the big towns and cities, but also in the smaller towns in the Indian hinterland. The growth in the industrial and service sectors of the economy led to a steady increase in the numbers of the middle classes, who, it is estimated, now number between 200 and 300 million. Those who could afford to do so began to enjoy the pleasures of consumerism epitomized by the shopping malls that have mushroomed across the country. After decades of austerity, these middle classes were offered the opportunity to enjoy better household appliances, better clothing, and even designer wear, fine dining, bars, cafés, and other forms of entertainment and pleasurable pastimes.

The most visible signs of a new consumer culture that began in the 1990s are the shopping malls that have sprung up in all the major towns and cities across India. Unknown in India until the late 1990s, the appearance of the shopping mall was both sudden and surprising. More than 22 malls were built between 2000 and 2003, and more than 240 have been built since then.

At first the real estate developers chose the busy shopping districts of the big cities—Bangalore, Chennai, Delhi, Hyderabad, Pune, and Mumbai—in a bid to attract the urban upper middle classes. Crossroads, the first shopping mall in Mumbai, opened in the crowded downtown area in August 1999, and local traffic came to a complete standstill as families rushed to witness the historic event.

The unprecedented success of Crossroads led to more malls being built in other parts of the city. In Mumbai, a teeming metropolis made up of five long, narrow islands sustaining a population of around 16 million, land is extremely scarce for new development. Many of these new shopping malls were built on the premises of abandoned textile mills. Mumbai was once the center of thriving textile mills that were gradually killed off by a combination of sustained union-strike actions by workers and steady asset stripping by the owners.

What these malls offer is something Indians have never enjoyed before—a total shopping and entertainment experience in cool, air-conditioned comfort with a variety of well-made products. For decades Indian manufacturers had operated in a protected market thanks to the ban on imports, producing substandard substitutes for a waiting list of consumers. It was



A middle-class shopper, part of India's huge and rapidly expanding consumer market, takes a break in a massage chair in a mall store. (B. Gopal/Dreamstime.com)

also a time of all kinds of scarcity and food rationing. (Food rationing is still in place, but this is to ensure that the poor get the essential foodstuffs at government-controlled prices.) A few decades ago it was the consumers who chased the providers; today it is the producers who pursue consumers with easy credit and a variety of goods.

With greater spending power and exposure to international trends, what has emerged over the last 15 years is a spending culture where the middle classes, estimated at between 200 and 300 million people, are being encouraged to embrace conspicuous consumption in glitzy malls that offer ready-to-wear clothes, food, leisure activities, and entertainment.

The emergence of the shopping malls has transformed urban family life. Hitherto, middle-class families had few places to spend a Sunday together, the choices usually being restricted to eating out in restaurants, going to the movies, staying home and watching television, or visiting relatives. Today the malls have provided a revolutionary way for families to spend Sundays and their leisure time together. Mall developers have put together a series of enjoyable activities, standardized the concept, and sold it as a destination in the hope of capturing four or five hours of the consumers' time. Shopping malls have become one-stop destinations with retail, recreation, entertainment, and eating opportunities that may include theaters, art galleries, cinemas, cyber terminals, and pubs. These malls also offer parking facilities for 300–800 cars. The latest in the development of malls is the growth of specialty malls that focus on wedding trousseaux, gold, and jewelry.

In the early years of the mall culture, despite crowds of visitors to these new temples of consumption, few showed an inclination to purchase any goods; most people preferred to just wander around and ogle the merchandise on display. The young, who in any case could not afford most of the products, tended to use the malls as a meeting place for friends. In fact, so great were the crowds and so few the actual purchases that some malls began to restrict entry to those with credit cards and mobile phones, these being deemed signs of bona fide purchasers. However, over the years, more and more consumers are being lured into parting with their money.

The corollary of the frenetic construction of shopping malls has been a boom in the construction industry, and now specialty malls dedicated to construction-related materials as well as flooring, furniture, lighting, acoustics, and hi-tech electronic goods have begun to be built across India.

The new consumerism has also begun to challenge Indian tradition. The young, freed from the qualms felt by their parents, who were brought up austerely with Nehruvian Socialism and ancient Hindu ideals of renunciation, positively relish conspicuous consumption.

Second, and potentially of vast significance for a country as stratified as India, the young and affluent across the country have begun to define themselves not by caste, creed, and language, but by a shared stake in the consumer culture, whose spread has been helped along by television programs and advertising, which now reach over half of all Indian homes. As a result, spending patterns are changing. In the cities, for example, young consumers now change their cars every two years whereas for the previous generation a car was kept for life.

Economic liberalization and the concurrent boom in information technology–related services have created a generation of wealthy Indians who are distinct from the traditional business families. These newly rich and educated Indians have developed a taste for international luxury brands in cars, watches, shoes, and jewelry. Although they represent just 1 percent of the entire population, they nevertheless number around 10 million consumers, a substantial market. This new breed of consumers of luxury goods enjoys spending, seeing it as a pleasure not a fear. Thanks to their demand, sales have been brisk for Fendi and Louis Vuitton bags and accessories, Cartier watches, Bulgari jewelry, Canali and Hugo Boss suits, and cars, including Porsche, Bentley, Rolls Royce, and Ferrari. In fact, most international brands have now opened stores in the big cities.

In addition to spending on clothes and luxury brands, more and more Indians have begun to frequent cafés, pubs, and restaurants.

In 1957 some disgruntled employees of the state-run Coffee Board decided to part ways with the parent company and set up their own Indian Coffee Workers' Cooperative Society. The idea was to set up coffee bars and offer the public affordable coffee. For four decades their 160 outlets across the country were the only dedicated coffee bars that Indians were aware of. The simple interiors and the somnambulant pace of the waiters made it a haven for writers, journalists, artists, poets, and politicians—so much so that the late prime minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi saw the coffee bars as havens of dissent and even had one coffee bar in New Delhi closed down.

This old world of coffee houses was rudely exposed to the rigors of competition when in 1997 the Indian government removed coffee from its list of restricted commodities. A new breed of indigenous coffee bars along the lines of the Starbucks chain emerged. While the Indian Coffee House chain of coffee shops catered to the older generations, who generally spent the entire day perusing newspapers while nursing a single cup of coffee, the new coffee bars such as Barista, Café Coffee Day, Amarettos, or Qwiky's began to cater to the young and trendy by offering live music, books, and even message boards where patrons could staple their random thoughts, while they sipped exotic concoctions such as frappuccinos, macchiatos, and lattes. What these coffee bars, where a cup of coffee costs the price of a meal, offer above all is a stylish place for youngsters to "chill out" and more importantly to gaze and be gazed at by their contemporaries. It is estimated that the four coffee chains cater to more than 40,000 customers a day.

Accompanying the emergence of the coffee bar are the new liquor bars known in India by the British name of pubs. For decades after India achieved independence, the Indian government was opposed to the consumption of alcohol. The reasons for this were manifold. The most important was that Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the nation who spearheaded the independence movement, was totally opposed to alcohol. This was largely because he saw it as a direct road to ruin for millions of poor workers in the cities and the villages. Gandhian principles apart, socially there has always been distaste, both Muslim and Hindu (particularly Brahminical), for imbibitions of alcohol.

Prohibition was (and still remains) a matter for state governments. As each state enacted its own legislation regarding the sale and public consumption of alcohol, some states were dry (with prohibitions in place) and others were wet. Some states preferred a compromise with dry days and wet days, and some states regularly changed from being dry to wet and vice versa with each change in the regional government. Each state also has its own laws about the construction of liquor stores, licensing hours, and so on. In some states, licensed liquor shops are closed on the first and seventh day of each month to prevent men from frittering away their wages. In fact, for decades legislators in some southern states were wary of lifting the ban on alcohol sales for fear of provoking the wrath of women, who were vehemently opposed to it. Licensing laws also vary according to the different states, but most bars tend to close early—by 11:00 P.M., and usually no liquor is served after that hour.

Some pubs operate mainly in the afternoons, so that the youngsters can be home by dusk and their parents are none the wiser. Although the young do not have the same spending power as the older clients and often sit clutching a pitcher for the entire afternoon, they give the bar owners profit by virtue of volume because they comprise the largest bar-frequenting segment of the population. Loud music and jammed dance floors constitute their attractions. Many of these bars are located near the colleges to be convenient for frequent visits. The popularity of these bars is such that they are often the venue for celebrations (birthdays, success in examinations, end-of-year parties, and such).

The economic regeneration of India has also led to an increased interest in eating out. Traditional Indians are deeply suspicious of dining-in restaurants. Different customs governing the multiplicity of religions that are practiced in India; fiendishly complicated varieties of vegetarianism; social intricacies concerning caste, both of the diners and the cooks; and traditional prohibitions surrounding dining with members of certain castes, in addition to economic constraints such as the lack of disposable incomes, had inhibited interest for fine dining in restaurants.

Until recently, varieties of Indian cuisines were enough for most diners—Punjabi snacks, Gujarati *thalis,* south Indian *dosas* and *idlis,* Bengali sweets, and the ubiquitous Moghlai cuisine. The only foreign food was Chinese, which was adapted to an Indian palate by the small Chinese communities living in Mumbai and Kolkata. Western cuisine, whether French, Italian, or another type, was either uninspiring or considered too bland to be popular.

Haute couture is a nascent industry still in its infancy. For decades skilled Indian workers and small companies have been a reservoir of resources for the main fashion houses in the United States and Europe, but few Indian couturiers have managed to make a name for themselves on the catwalks of Milan, Paris, London, or New York. Many have survived on "brown dollars"—clients from the Indian diaspora shopping for weddings and other important occasions when Indians overseas feel the need for traditional yet modern Indian clothing and a fashion statement that would reflect their dual cultural realities.

Now, India has a sizable class of nouveaux riches seeking couture. Their financial muscle has led to millions of additional square feet of retail space for designers to display prĕt-à-porter

lines in the new shopping malls. The early designers of the 1980s, such Satya Paul and Ritu Kumar, had already carved out niche markets for themselves with the upper-class Indian consumers, while Abu Jani and Sandeep Khosla revived age-old Indian techniques in embroidery and mirror-work for those who could afford it. The new crop of contemporary designers feature Tarun Tahiliani, Rohit Bal, Sabyasachi Mukherjee, Suneet Varma, Aki Narula, Raghavendra Rathore, Rajesh Pratap Singh, Wendell Rodricks, Malini Ramani, and Monish Jaisingh, among others, all of whom are still struggling to create a viable industry.

Designers in India face many problems. First, Indian women still prefer to wear Indian clothes—saris and *salwar* (or *chudidar*) *kameez* for reasons of tradition. Also, Western attire does not always flatter the wider-hipped Indian female form. Dresses, skirts, and suits are worn infrequently, although the younger generations, weaned on FTV and MTV channels, have embraced Western clothing with greater passion than before. But the young prefer to purchase their clothes from Fashion Street and other such makeshift pavement stalls that offer knockoffs at affordable prices for students.

Not all consumption takes place in the shopping malls, and over past years there has been a marked increase in e-commerce. The increase in Internet access through the earlier growth of cyber cafés and private Internet connections, and a growing base of credit card holders has led to an increase in online shopping.

Travel-related transactions account for nearly a quarter of total online transactions, followed by books and a variety of impulse purchases such as jewelry, flowers, and gifts. Home appliances, television sets, and music systems are increasingly being purchased from websites such as Fabmall.com and Baazee.com. Similarly, Sify has seen the value of its transactions rise dramatically thanks to alternative payment options such as cash-on-delivery that help to address security concerns. Recently, nearly half of all online shoppers in India were said to have opted for cash-on-delivery.

However, the Internet facilities are also increasingly being availed in payment of bills, home loan applications, credit cards, or other online financial services. Apnaloan.com undertakes home loan transactions and processes credit card applications. Remittances sent by Indians working overseas are also transacted on the Internet.

The services industry has also joined the e-revolution. Virtually all bills (telephone, electricity, water, and so forth) and loan installments can be paid online. Banks have become the interface between their customers and service providers. There has also been a growth in online banking because it offers convenience to the customers and lower operational costs to the bank. Online bookings for railway tickets operated by Indian Railway Catering and Tourism Corporation Ltd. (IRCTC) have been particularly popular.

Mobile phone commerce (m-commerce) is beginning. However, with millions of cellular users in the country and telecommunications firms aggressively pushing for m-commerce, m-commerce may prove popular with buyers. India has the second largest wireless cell/mobile phone network in the world. As of 2009, 457 million people in India have wireless connections, and there are reports of 15 million cell phone users being added each month in India.

For those less inclined to spirituality and religion, there is a bewildering array of new spas and luxury hotels that have been quick to offer all kinds of massages, fitness clubs, and beauty parlors at their in-house spas. The growing trend is now toward spas in resorts tucked away from business activity centers. Most spas offer traditional oil massages, yoga, fusion food, Thai massage, and other international treatments. The Golden Palms Spa and Resort, owned by Bollywood film star Sanjay Khan, markets itself as a "life enhancement center." It has a gym and a beauty parlor and offers therapeutic massages, ayurvedic massages, Turkish baths, and Swedish massages.

As one aficionado of alternative treatments and new spirituality, Vikas Malkani declared: "The new age spirituality isn't about pursuing nirvana in the next life but attaining mind-body-spirit harmony in this one. Renunciation is for the feeble. The struggle is to find peace in the cacophony of the commonplace. The aim is to combine consumerism with happiness."

There are two major issues that stand out in the consumer culture that India has so eagerly embraced. The first has to do with the lack of basic amenities amid the growing consumerism, and the second relates to the uneven distribution of wealth between the urban middle classes and the rural poor.

According to the census report of 2001, there were 192 million households in India (each household comprising on average 5.5 persons) but only 179 million residential houses. This leaves 13 million households with no place to live. Of those who do have a dwelling, only 52 percent live in *pukka* houses, while the rest live in houses with no permanent walls or roof. For one-third of urban Indian families, the dwelling does not include a kitchen, a bathroom, and a toilet—and in many cases there is no power or water supply.

Relative to their incomes, Indians enjoy fewer basic amenities, such as drinking water, power, and cooking fuel, than they do consumer products. Only 56 percent of households have both water and electricity supplied to the home; only 65 percent of urban households have water supplied to the home, and the average water supply in the cities is often only available for four hours a day. In the countryside, only 29 percent of rural households have access to water at home.

As for electricity and power, only 88 percent of urban households have electricity while in the rural areas the figure drops to 44 percent. Not a single Indian state electricity board provides power to all its citizens, and even the best performing states, such as the Punjab, Himachal Pradesh, and Goa, provide only 90 percent of electricity needed by households.

However, despite the lack of basic infrastructure, many homes without kitchens or toilets possess cars, two-wheelers (scooters and motorcycles), and television sets. In fact, the 2001 census revealed even more startling results: in most states, more households have television sets than toilets, and there are more places of worship (2.4 million) in India than schools, colleges, and hospitals combined.

The biggest benefits of market reforms enacted in 1999 have gone to the better-educated, cell phone–toting middle classes rather than the poor peasants, and hundreds of millions of Indians have not seen any of the benefits of the country's economic success. Almost a quarter

of India's total economic output is still accounted for by agriculture, and farming accounts for two-thirds of India's employment. Thus, 700 million people live in the countryside far away from call centers and "without even a whiff of cappuccino."

ASHA KASBEKAR RICHARDS

See also Media and Telecommunications; Radio; Soap Operas; Television

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✦ COOKING

In India, as in the rest of the world, cooking is usually done by the women of a household. In rural areas, women spend half their waking hours preparing meals. In a joint family, where several generations live in one household, the mother-in-law is in charge of the food preparation, aided by her daughters and daughters-in-law, all under her strict supervision. Middle-class families hire professional cooks and other domestic help. In orthodox Hindu homes, the cook is usually a Brahmin, since everyone could accept food from his hands.

(In the past, being a professional cook was the second most common profession of Brahmins after the priesthood.) For special occasions, such as weddings, families hire professional chefs who bring their own cooking equipment and staff.

Starting in the 1920s and 1930s, an increasing number of cookbooks were published in Indian languages. The breakup of joint families meant that young housewives found themselves without the benefit of an elder's culinary example and advice. Since the 1980s, there has been a rapid increase in the publication of cookbooks in English and Indian languages, as well as women's and lifestyle magazines. Popular television cooking shows help to spread awareness of Indian regional dishes and non-Indian cuisines.

Indian ingredients are not as standardized as those in the West, so their flavor and intensity varies considerably. Thus, while there may be a general concept of what, say, constitutes a *korma* or a *sambar* in terms of main ingredients and basic methods (frying, steaming, etc.), the proportion of different ingredients and actual cooking times are left up to the individual cook.

Presentation and appearance are not very important in Indian cuisine. Although sweet dishes and desserts are sometimes decorated with edible silver foil, generally food is presented without embellishment.

Even in affluent homes, Indian kitchens are simple, even austere, by Western standards. Almost all cooking is done on top of a stove or a burner. Traditional fuels have included dried cow patties (dung), charcoal, coke, twigs, or wood shavings. The use of cow patties is an ancient form of recycling that also provides a source of income for the people who collect, dry, and sell them. They provide a gentle heat, ideal for slow-cooking dishes with gravies and liquids, which are sometimes left overnight on hot coals. In middle-class urban households, the standard cooking device is a small stovetop with two burners fueled by bottled gas (propane). It is astonishing what elaborate feasts can be prepared on this simple piece of equipment. Pressure cookers, invented in France in the 17th century, are popular in India and owned by three-quarters of all urban households. A sealed lid increases the air pressure, lowering the temperature at which water boils and significantly reducing cooking times.

A *tandoor* is a large clay oven with a small opening in the top that is either built into the ground or freestanding. In northern India, it is used for baking many kinds of bread and roasting meat, which is plastered on the sides or strung on skewers. The *tandoor* originated in Iran or Central Asia and did not enter mainstream north Indian cooking until the early 1950s. Most Indian households do not have *tandoors* because they are expensive and difficult to use, but some north Indian villages have a communal *tandoor* for baking bread and roasting meat. People may also take meat to local bakeries for roasting.

One of the most frequently used receptacles is a deep pot (*karahi*) with two handles and a flat or slightly concave bottom made of stainless steel or cast iron that is used for sautéing and deep frying. Rice and curry-like dishes with a liquid gravy are prepared in a straight-sided pan with a lid. The lid is saucer-shaped, so that live charcoal can be placed on it as needed for certain dishes. A flat, heavy, iron griddle eight or nine inches in diameter with a long handle,

called a *tawa*, is used for roasting spices and preparing breads that require little or no oil. A perforated metal spoon is used for frying and draining, and a ladle is used for stirring.

In some parts of India, the cook crushes spices, onions, garlic, and herbs by pressing and rolling them with a small stone rolling pin without handles on a large stone slab. In southern India, a mortar and pestle is more often used for this purpose. Modern cooks use electric grinders and blenders. Very large kitchens, such as those in a wealthy home or a restaurant, may employ a person whose sole job is to grind spices. Spices and flavorings are often ground early in the morning for the day's meals. Spices are kept in a spice box next to the stove.

Spices and other flavorings (e.g., garlic, onions, ginger, chilies) are the heart and soul of Indian cooking. No other cuisine uses so many spices in so many ways; indeed, the range of possibilities is almost infinite. Contrary to popular myth, Indian food need not be searingly hot. The doyenne of Indian cooking wrote that the excessive use of spices has probably been fostered by various restaurants and eating houses both inside and outside India, who camouflage with the help of spices the flavor of a dish that they are unable to prepare properly. The art of Indian cookery lies not in high spicing, but in the delicacy of spicing. It is the use of selected spices in a particular manner to bring out the dormant flavors of a dish or to drown the undesirable ones which is the real art.

The kind and amount of spices used depends on the dish, the geographical region, and the preferences of a household and its cook. The greatest number of spices are used in north Indian meat and rice dishes. For example, a recipe for *rogan josh*, an aromatic meat curry with a creamy gravy, calls for ginger, garlic, onions, red chilies, coriander leaves, saffron, black pepper, asafetida, black cumin seeds, cumin powder, cardamom seeds, cloves, cinnamon sticks, poppy seeds, turmeric powder, chili powder, paprika, nutmeg powder, mace powder, and a final sprinkling of powdered white and black cumin seeds, cardamom seeds, black peppercorns, cloves, fennel seeds, cinnamon sticks, and mace. South Indian vegetarian dishes typically are made with far fewer spices. A rather elaborate recipe for south Indian *sambar*, for example, uses turmeric, chilies, onions, asafetida, coriander, cumin seeds, fenugreek, black peppercorns, mustard seeds, and curry leaves.

Spices may be added in several forms—whole, crushed, ground, or mixed with water as a paste—and at different stages in the cooking process. Sometimes the same spice is used both whole and powdered in the same dish, especially cumin and coriander. Whole peppercorns, cloves, cardamom seeds in their pods, and cinnamon sticks are essential ingredients in north Indian meat and rice dishes. At the start of many meat and vegetable dishes, whole spices are sautéed in *ghee* (clarified butter) or oil in order to release their essential oils into the cooking medium and impart their flavor to the other ingredients. Whole spices may also be boiled with water, vegetables, or meat and bones to make a stock called *yakhni*, in which rice is cooked to make *biryanis* and *pulaos*. Crushed cardamom seeds (removed from their pods) are an ingredient in *payesh* and other milk-based desserts. For some reason cinnamon, a popular flavoring in Western rice pudding, is never used in Indian sweet dishes.

Another way of using spices is to grind them into a powder, which in northern India is called *garam masala*, which means "warm seasonings." Usually the spices are dry-roasted before grinding to bring out their aroma, and they can be stored in air-tight bottles for a couple of weeks. A few pinches are added to a dish just before serving in order to add bouquet. A standard north Indian *garam masala* contains cumin seeds, coriander seeds, cinnamon, cloves, and cardamoms. In southern India, *dals* are flavored with *sambar* powder that typically includes *urad dal*, coriander seeds, white cumin seeds, fenugreek seeds, and black pepper. Powdered turmeric and chili powder may be used as a dry marinade for fish and chicken.

Curry powders are ready-made spice mixtures that are sold commercially in India, the United Kingdom, and throughout the world. They were first produced in England in the late 18th century for English colonials who returned home after living in India and missed Indian food and flavorings. Most commercial curry powders contain coriander, cumin, black pepper, fenugreek, and turmeric. They are usually a poor substitute for freshly ground spices, although they are extremely appropriate for an English-style curry. One of their drawbacks is that most curry powders contain turmeric, which must be cooked to a fairly high temperature to bring out its flavor. Coriander and cumin powders, by contrast, require less cooking, so either they are burned or the turmeric is undercooked, leaving a raw aroma.

Whole, ground, and powdered spices are often sprinkled near the end of the cooking process to add an extra dimension of flavor. This procedure, unique to Indian cooking, is called *baghar*, *tarkha*, or *chaunk* in Hindi and *tempering* in English (from the Portuguese *temperado*, meaning "to season"). A little *ghee* or oil is heated to the smoking point; then, seasonings and spices are added one after the other. Once the spices begin to crackle or change color, they are combined with the main dish—either the seasoned oil is added to the food or vice versa—and cooked for a while to meld their flavors. In northern India, tempering ingredients often include fried onions and garlic as well as whole spices and/or *garam masala*. A final garnishing of sliced onions, fried until they are brown and crispy, may be placed over the dish. In southern India, a mélange of lightly sautéed mustard seeds, asafetida, fenugreek seeds, red chilies, and *urad dal* is a standard finishing touch for *dals*, vegetable dishes, chutneys, and salads.

Another method of adding spices is to grind them into a wet paste with onions, garlic, ginger, yogurt, coconut milk, vinegar, or some other liquid. This mixture becomes the basis of a gravy. Onions and garlic play an important role in north Indian cuisine but are used less frequently in western and southern India. Gujaratis make a paste from green chilies and ginger. Bengalis sometimes use ground poppy seeds to make a paste. In northern India, yogurt, cream, and/or ground nuts may be used to thicken the gravy. In southern India, coconut milk and grated coconut serve the same purpose.

Indian cooking requires more or less the same techniques as Western cuisine: deep frying, sautéing, boiling, steaming, braising, and grilling. Baking and roasting are done relatively less frequently, since few people have ovens in their homes. Lentils are gently boiled to produce *dals*. Rice is steamed or boiled.

A very common Indian cooking technique that has no exact equivalent in Western cuisine is a combination of sautéing, stir-frying, and stewing. The amount of liquid added and the cooking time determine whether the dish will be wet or dry.

Frying is a very popular cooking method: pan frying or sautéing in *ghee* on a griddle and deep frying in a pot using peanut, safflower, or canola oil. Many popular snacks and breads are deep fried. *Qorma* or *korma,* sometimes translated as "braising," is a technique that involves marinating meat and sometimes vegetables in yogurt, wet spices, and seasonings, then slowly cooking it in the marinade over very low heat, sometimes adding cream and butter at the end. The goal is to produce a thick, rich sauce that coats the meat pieces.

Roasting and grilling are popular in northern India. Pieces of lamb, goat, chicken, fish, or *paneer* (Indian cheese) are impaled on a stick and grilled over hot coals or in a *tandoor.* Such dishes are called *kabobs,* a word that means "without water" in Persian. The meat may be marinated in yogurt and spices before cooking. There are many kinds of kabob, including chunks of mutton (*boti kabob*), marinated chicken (*tikka kabob*), flattened pounded meat (*chapli kabob*), and sautéed meat and chickpea patties (*shammi kabob*).

In Lucknow, capital of the state of Uttar Pradesh, a school of cooking developed called *Dum Pukht,* which means "steam cooked." It may have originated in Persia, where a prepared dish was sealed and buried in hot sand to mature. Vegetables, potatoes, and/or pieces of meat are fried with spices and seasonings in a liberal amount of *ghee* or oil in a large pot until they are lightly browned. The lid is sealed with flour dough and the dish cooked very slowly in the aromatic vapor. In the past the pot was placed on smoldering coals, with live coals placed on top, and sometimes left overnight. The *dum* technique is also used in the final cooking of north Indian rice dishes.

Pickling, a very old Indian technique, is essential in a country where the climate is hot most of the year. Pickling is a way of preserving fruits, vegetables, meat, or fish by impregnating them with acid, which discourages the growth of most microbes. This can be done either by adding an acid, usually vinegar, or by soaking them in a strong salt solution, which encourages acid-producing bacteria to grow. Indian pickles come in countless varieties, and are eaten at most meals to add an accent or a contrasting flavor. They can be sweet, sour, salty, cooling, hot, or very hot indeed. Pickles are considered to have many health benefits—spices such as ginger, asafetida, and turmeric are digestives, while red chilies are antiseptic. Traditionally women made pickles at home, but today about half of all households buy them commercially.

Chutneys are a sweet and sour relish usually cooked ahead of time. They can be made from tomatoes, mangoes, papayas, mint leaves, and grated coconut, which are blended with spices, yogurt, vinegar or lime juice, and a little sugar. Under the British, the word *chutney* came to mean a preserve of slightly spiced mango slices in sugar syrup that is still manufactured under colonial-sounding names like Major Grey's and Bengal Club.

Orthodox Hindus—those who follow their caste traditions—developed elaborate rules for the handling, preparation, and serving of food based on their concerns about purity and pollution. High status is associated with purity and low status with pollution. In traditional

orthodox households, the kitchen is considered an area of sanctity, similar to the inner sanctum of a temple. It is located far from waste disposal areas and near the place of worship. Only a family member (generally the senior woman) is supposed to do the actual cooking, although she may be assisted by outside workers.

When it comes to what kind of food is served, different standards may apply even within households, which are composed of people of different ages and different degrees of Westernization. Teenagers might ignore some rules entirely—for example, they might eat onions or eggs, whereas their grandparents will avoid these foods—a state of affairs that can place a considerable burden on the overworked cook. Some homes have a secondary cooking area, often located outside the house, where dishes are prepared using onions, garlic, chicken, and other ingredients shunned by orthodox family members but enjoyed by more modern family members and their friends. Very affluent households may have entirely separate kitchens with different sets of pots and pans for preparing Hindu vegetarian food, Hindu nonvegetarian food, and Western-style dishes.

Hospitality is very important among all religious and social groups in India. "A guest is god," says a proverb. Indians often have many guests for meals and as overnight guests. Even in the poorest homes in villages, people will sacrifice to make sure that visitors eat and drink well and that the choicest portions are offered to them.

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See also Consumer Culture; Food Security

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✦ CRICKET

"Every nation has a preoccupation," wrote the cricket writer Vijay Barve in 1971. "In China, it is Mao; in Latin America, it is Revolution; in India, it is cricket." But while China and Latin America have overcome their love for Mao and guns, India's obsession with cricket continues unabated. How cricket, the slow, stately, and quintessentially English game with roots in a cold and damp island thousands of miles away, could have been so successfully transplanted into the hot, dusty, and crowded playing fields of noisy India has been an enigma to most sociologists, social historians, cricket writers, and all other fellow travelers of the sport. But whatever the reasons, it remains India's national sport, with a

mass following as considerable as that of cinema, and cricketers jostle with film stars to be the nation's reigning deities. Important cricket matches bring the machinery of government and business to a halt as unprecedented numbers of blue- and white-collar workers take sick leave to watch the matches either in person at the stadiums or on television. The audiences for cricket matches reach hundreds of millions, and it is estimated that during the cricket match series held in March–April 2003 between India and its archenemy, Pakistan, the total number of viewers watching on television per day exceeded the entire population of Europe.

There are just a handful of cricket-playing nations around the world, all of them former British colonies. The major cricketing countries are the West Indies, England, South Africa, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Australia, and New Zealand, while Kenya, Zimbabwe, Canada, and Bangladesh represent the less important teams. Most of these former British colonies have very little in common other than their love for cricket, which has been described as the "invisible cord" that binds these Commonwealth nations together.

The origins of cricket are blurred, but it is assumed that some form of a game resembling cricket was played in the English countryside around the 13th century. By the 15th century it had gained in popularity, and by the 17th century rules governing the sport were formulated. The first cricket match was played in Sussex in 1697. In 18th-century England, the game became gentrified, with players dressing in lace shirts and knickerbockers, and bowling underarm. By the 19th century, the sport had acquired "gentleman" players and aristocratic patrons who introduced an "elaborate ritualization" and even created a lofty ideology around the concept of "amateurism." The sport made its way onto the playing fields of the public schools of Eton and Harrow, where it was injected with Victorian values.

According to Arjun Appadurai, cricket, seen as a quintessentially masculine activity, was considered "the most powerful condensation of Victorian elite values. . . . It expressed the codes that were expected to govern all masculine behavior: sportsmanship, a sense of fair play, thorough control over the expression of strong sentiments by players on the field, subordination of personal sentiments and interests to those of the group, unquestioned loyalty to the team."

The sport and its philosophical baggage was introduced to the Indian subcontinent by British colonels and popularized by the British Army. Soon the game became one of the central activities at that great bastion of British social life in India—the "Club." The Club, or *gymkhana*, was, as cricket historian Ramachandra Guha points out, the refuge of the expatriate British. There amidst its all-white members, the expatriate could take comfort in English food and English entertainment and escape for a few hours from the dirt, chatter, smells, people, and chaos of India.

Gymkhana is an Anglo-Indian word incorporating both the English gymnasium or gymnastics and the Hindustani *gend khana*—a "ball house" or racquet house. In the *gymkhana* the British whiled away the time by indulging in tennis, billiards, rifle shooting, whist, and cricket. Many of these clubs were devoted to cricket, as was the Calcutta Cricket Club, founded in 1792, the first of its kind outside England. However, it was Bombay (now Mumbai) not Calcutta (now Kolkata) that was to establish itself as the

cricket capital of India, and unlike its pastoral origins in England, cricket in India was to remain an exclusively urban form of recreation.

The British had never intended to impart the intricacies of the game of cricket to the Indians. It was after all *their* game, which *they* played in the safety of *their* clubs. In Bombay, it was played at one end of the esplanade or *maidan*, a large open space outside the city fort area that had been cleared to provide a range of fire in the eventuality of a French attack. The inquisitive inhabitants of Bombay watched the British indulge in their sport, and the Parsis (or Parsees) first decided to imitate this new and exotic form of recreational sport by improvising with makeshift equipment. They used umbrellas for cricket bats, chimney pots for wickets, and a ball sewn together from rags.

Today, India ranks high among the handful of countries that play cricket. It has its fair share of victories and losses, and world-class performances by its cricketing stars. However, as a national team, it is constantly criticized for lacking consistency and team spirit. All too often players display bouts of brilliance before succumbing to dismal performances. Apart from the variable performances of the team, the game of cricket in India today is colored by three attributes that lie outside the actual mechanics of the game but nevertheless end up informing the sport at home and abroad. These attributes are sporting nationalism, commercialism, and match fixing.



India's batsman Sachin Tendulkar makes a run off South Africa's bowler Lonwabo Tsotsobe, unseen, during the second One Day International cricket match at the Wanderers stadium in Johannesburg, South Africa, January 15, 2011. (AP Photo/ Themba Hadebe)

Cricket has become the arena for an expression of sporting nationalism among some of its supporters, a nationalism that borders on xenophobia. During the British *raj*, cricket was the arena wherein scores could be settled with the colonizers. A victory over the English by the Parsis at the Bombay Gymkhana was the reversal of their humiliating defeat in Persia by the invading Arabs and subsequent exile to India in the eighth century. Similarly, when the Hindus won over the British team of the Bombay Gymkhana, the victory was a soothing balm for their humiliating status as a colonized people. It also gave birth to the realization that if the Indians could beat the British at their own game in the sporting field then they could surely wrest independence from them in the political field.

India's performance in sports other than cricket has been especially abysmal, as proved by its performance at successive Olympics. At the 2004 Olympics held in Athens, India won just one silver medal, while four years earlier at the 2000 Olympics held in Sydney, Indian athletes came home clutching a solitary bronze medal to show their country's billion-strong population. (In sharp contrast, China, a similarly developing nation with an equally sizable population, was one of the biggest winners at the Olympics.)

Advertising companies were quick to take advantage of the advertising bonanza that hosting the World Cup offered. Pepsi and Coca-Cola, once banned during the prime ministership of Indira Gandhi, fought a bitter battle to become official sponsors of the match; makers of consumer electronics and fast foods could not get enough air time, so great was the scramble to advertise on television. The advertising frenzy astounded Indian and international observers. In 2002 Indian television networks spent 9 billion rupees (US$200 million) to buy the telecast rights to international cricket matches, and the figure had grown by 350 percent for the 2003 World Cup.

Cricket stars are used for their personal endorsements, and so great is their commercial worth that it was feared that India might boycott the 2003 World Cup because Indian cricketers stood to lose several million dollars as a result of the seven-year US$550 million exclusive agreement between the International Cricket Council (ICC) and the Global Cricketing Corporation (associated with Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation) in 2000. Much as they would have liked to, the ICC was in no position to challenge India, whose participation brought in 60 percent of the revenues and half of the world's viewers. While the English and Australian cricketing boards were wealthy enough to withstand the financial strain of a reduced income, the smaller countries such as Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Kenya would have found it very difficult to continue. This is because broadcasters in India usually buy advertisements in all the tournament matches, and if India were not to participate, their advertising revenues would also not be forthcoming to these countries.

Sociologists and historians of the sport have not touched on one aspect of cricket. Cricket, like field hockey and tennis and unlike football, rugby, and ice hockey, requires very little physical contact among the players. This must have also been most appealing to the middle-class Hindus, particularly the Brahmins, who embraced the game in the late 19th century because it allowed them to enjoy a game without "polluting" the purity of their caste. This was particularly true if the lower castes could be persuaded, as was done with Palwankar Baloo by the Poona Brahmins, to take their water and meals outside the perimeter of the *gymkhana,* thus avoiding intercaste dining, a taboo for the upper castes.

When one adds to these peculiarities of the game the fact that cricket is the only game in which India can compete with the best in the world; the fortuitous arrival of television in India and the nation's first ever World Cup victory; the patronage offered to the sport, first by the maharajas and then the business houses, banks, railways, and other public and private bodies; and the indigenization and vernacularization of the game early in its developmental stages, then the popularity of the game appears natural enough.

Today, cricket is a very lucrative sport in India. It is the most important vehicle for advertising, and cricketing stars are besieged with offers for personal endorsements. This has made the cricketing bodies and the players extremely rich. However there is a serious mismatch between the commercialization of the game and the actual standards of the game as it is played on the cricket fields. While India is ranked among the top cricket-playing countries, it is not the topmost cricketing nation. That honor, which used to belong to England and the West Indies, currently rests with Australia. India has several star batsmen and bowlers, but the team's performance tends to be unpredictable and maverick.

Indian cricket's financial muscle is driven by a buoyant economy and the popularity of the sport, but India has had far too few wins in the important matches to justify the huge advertising revenues. Mihir Bose has warned that the Indian public could easily be turned off the sport, which is fast degenerating into all hype and little substance. It is therefore very possible that the television viewers and the advertising media could turn to international football as a more interesting form of entertainment. Indeed, there are reports that public interest in football, already popular in Kolkata and Goa, is growing.

The next decade is critical for Indian cricket. Currently the sport is full of stars but no winning team, full of money from cricket but no cricketing victory. The question that remains is: Will the riches of the Board of Control for Cricket in India be used to encourage young players and nurture new talent?

ASHA KASBEKAR RICHARDS

See also Consumer Culture

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✦ CUISINE

The cuisine of India is as varied as the people and the many cultures that inhabit the country. As religious and cultural beliefs have created the wide spread of vegetarian practices, additional factors such as the diverse climate in the region, the crops produced, and the resources available have helped establish Indian cuisine as what it is today. Despite the

diversity of what essentially is Indian cuisine, there are many ingredients that have contributed to the traditional taste and smell of Indian cooking.

There is an assortment of spices commonly found in Indian cuisine, with the most commonly used being chili pepper, black mustard seed (rye), cumin (*jeera*), turmeric (*haldi, manjal*), and a spice mixture known as *garam masala*, which includes cardamom, clove, cinnamon, and anise. However, *garam masala* blends differ from region to region, as some may be sweeter and some may be spicier. Indian cooking almost always contains fenugreek (*methi*), ginger (*adrak*), coriander (*dhania*), and garlic (*lassan*). It is also common to see curry leaves in many Indian dishes. However, that is more popular among south Indian food as opposed to north Indian cuisine. Many of the Indian desserts contain cardamom, saffron, nutmeg, and rose-petal essences as seasonings.

In addition to the various spices, the principal ingredients in Indian cuisine include rice (usually *basmati* or long-grain) and whole wheat flour (*atta*). The *atta* flour is instrumental in making such Indian flat breads as *roti, parantha,* and *puri*. These carbohydrates are seen as staples. Another fundamental part of Indian cuisine is lentils. Boiled down and with the addition of spices and various ingredients, it forms a hearty soup. Some lentils are eaten as a dry accompaniment to a traditional Indian meal.

Due to religious and cultural beliefs, some parts of India are vegetarian, with some even being vegan, and some parts have large meat- and fish-eating populations. The Hindu concept of *ahimsa* (nonviolence) has created a popular vegetarian diet among many Hindus. As the climate dictates the crops available and the farming patterns, *ahisma* allocates a specific mental or physical healing power or effect to particular foods within the food classification system. Grains, fruits, and vegetables allow for a vegetarian diet that is in tune with the traditional healing power of the ayurveda system, a holistic belief incorporating the mind, body, and spirit. The evolution of Indian cuisine has also been heavily influenced by neighboring countries such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Iran, and by states in West Asia, which all have contributed to the evolution of Indian cuisine. It has also seen modern adaptations, with many of the cooking practices being tweaked to fit diet and health restrictions.

In Indian cuisine it is customary to eat with the fingers of the right hand, in particular the first two fingers and the thumb. Indian breads are often used as little scoops to eat curry and other sauce-heavy dishes. However, this traditional way of eating is being influenced by Western culture, and it is not uncommon to see spoons and forks at the table, although knives are rarely available.

The many regions of India allow for a variance of what is considered Indian cuisine. With the availability of different resources and spices, each region of India has its own specific take on Indian food. For example, in northern India where there is a large meat-eating population, many of the recipes include chicken, goat, and lamb meat. Other popular north Indian foods include kebabs made with ground meat and *tandoori*-style cooking (where food is cooked in a cylindrical clay oven traditionally heated by wood or charcoal). The people in the eastern part of India bring such ingredients as cumin paste, nuts, and mustard seeds to their cooking,

making their dishes milder in flavor. Southern Indian cuisine is heavily influenced by coconut and tamarind, making that cuisine quite distinctive. Both the southern and eastern parts of India use rice as the staple grain in their diet. In the northeast the Assamese cuisine is chiefly based on fish and rice, while in the far northeast, in Arunachal Pradesh, there is a large number and variety of boiled and fermented types of dishes.

Historically, Indian spices and herbs were one of the most sought-after trade commodities, and even today the effect Indian cuisine has had on other food varieties is readily apparent. A good example of this is the popularization of curry, which originated in India and has spread across Asia with many different varieties and imitations. There are several Indian dishes that have become immensely popular. Chicken *tikka* ("tikka" means marinated meat) and chicken *tikka masala* (*masala* means a mixture of spices used to add spice and flavor) are commonly found in dishes in the *tandoori* style of cooking of chicken and in *kabobs* found in almost every nonvegetarian Indian restaurant around the world. The north Indian snack *samosa* (fried or baked pastry shell with vegetable or meat fillings), commonly made with potato filling, is now found across the globe with a variety of fillings, such as ground meat, chickpeas, and even lentils. *Samosas* are often served with chutney, especially mango chutney, or curd.

As Indian food has such a unique and flavorful taste, it is common practice to drink water to let the different flavors come out. However, there are also several drinks that are considered to be an instrumental part of Indian cuisine. The most well known is *masala* tea, often referred to as *chai* (tea) or *masala chai*. As *chai* is Hindi for tea, it is also a word commonly used for the *masala* style of tea since this variety is so popular and is the type most commonly prepared. The preparation of *chai* requires the tea leaves to be boiled in water, where spices such as cloves, cinnamon, cardamom, and possibly ginger are added. A large amount of milk and sugar are eventually added, giving it a sweet and milky texture. Much of the tea comes from the Darjeeling and Assam regions in the northeast of India. However, despite tea being a staple beverage throughout India, the varieties and flavors are often prepared differently to suit the diverse tastes of the country. Other popular beverages are coffee, which is served frequently in southern India; lemonade (*nimbu pani*); a yogurt-based drink that can be served sweet or savory (*lassi*); almond milk (*badam doodh*); rose water; and coconut water. There are several regionally produced alcoholic beverages that are indigenous to particular parts of India and include wine and beer, but it is rare to see Indian cuisine served with an alcoholic beverage in India.

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See also Consumer Culture; Cooking

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D



✦ DADRA AND NAGAR HAVELI

Comprising 190 square miles in the western part of India 19 miles from the coast and with a population of some quarter million people, Dadra and Nagar Haveli was, until 1954, part of Portuguese India. In 1961 it became a Union Territory. It is characterized by its tribes, who largely maintain a traditional agricultural way of life and constitute over 60 percent of the population. The administrator governs both Dadra and Nagar Haveli and the nearby Union Territory of Daman and Diu. The capital is Silvassa. Marathi, Hindi, or Gujarati are the most commonly spoken languages.

ROGER D. LONG

See also Constitution; Gujarat; Maharashtra

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✦ DALAI LAMA, 14TH

The 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso (Bstan ʻdzin rgya mtsho, b. 1935), was the political and spiritual leader of Tibet after he was recognized in infancy as an incarnation of the previous head of state, the 13th Dalai Lama, Thubten Gyatso (Thub bstan rgya mtsho, 1876–1933). In 1959, the People's Republic of China assumed complete sovereignty over Tibet, which led the Dalai Lama to flee to India in self-imposed exile, where he remains an icon of Tibetan culture and religion. He was the head of the Tibetan government-in-exile until 2008.

The current Dalai Lama's authority derives from the important Tibetan Buddhist belief in the incarnation (*Sprul sku*) system. This system initially appeared in Tibet during the 13th century CE and is based on the concept of the ability for religious masters to transfer their wisdom after death to an infant, who will grow up to assume the responsibilities and inherit the capacities of the previous incarnation. The system quickly became a crucial part of the Tibetan spiritual and political landscape and is found in the present day in all traditions of Tibetan Buddhism.

The Dalai Lama institution is based on such an incarnation series and began in the 14th century in the personage of Gendun Drup (1391–1475), a student of the founder of the Gelugpa tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, Je Tsongkhapa (1357–1419). In 1578, the third incarnation Sonam Gyatso (1543–1588) became a religious teacher to Altan Khan, an ascendant Mongol chief, who in return bestowed the title of Dalai Lama on the monk. The title was retroactively conferred on Sonam Gyatso's previous two incarnations. This appellation translates as the Mongolian term for ocean, "dalai," which corresponded to the Gyatso part of Sonam Gyatso's name, and "lama," which is the common Tibetan term for religious teacher. While the title has become popular, in Tibetan communities the Dalai Lama is often referred to as Gyalwa Rinpoche instead.

Following the creation of a patron/priest (*Mchod yon*) relationship between the Khan and Sonam Gyatso, the institution of the Dalai Lama became increasingly politically powerful. In 1642, Gyatso's student Gushri Khan (1582–1655), the leader of the Mongolian Khoshot clan of the Oirat, installed the fifth Dalai Lama, Lobzang Gyatso (1617–1682), as the ruler of Tibet. The lineage remained in control of the central Tibetan government (*Gaden Phodrang*) until 1959, but in reality, for much of the 19th century a regent ruled Tibet while the Dalai Lama incarnations died at a young age.

The current incarnation of the Dalai Lama is the 14th in the lineage, and he was born as Lhamo Dondrup on July 6, 1935, in the village of Takster on the northeastern Tibetan border with the Chinese province of Qinghai. After receiving a series of prophecies

traditionally associated with the recognition of the Dalai Lamas, a search party was dispatched by the central government. Lhamo Dondrup was recognized as the incarnation and installed in Lhasa in 1940 where he was given the new name of Jetsun Jamphel Ngawang Lobsang Yeshe Tenzin Gyatso (which is often abbreviated to Tenzin Gyatso). He began his studies in traditional Buddhist philosophy at the age of six.

The People's Republic of China came into existence in 1949 under the chairmanship of Mao Zedong (1893–1976) and claimed that, as Tibet was originally a part of China, it intended to reunite Tibet with China. In 1950, the Chinese People's Liberation Army established control over the eastern Tibetan province of Kham. This led the central Tibetan government to make the Dalai Lama the formal head of state at the age of 15 on November 17, 1950. A Tibetan representative was sent to Beijing to negotiate with the Chinese government in April 1951. The result of the negotiations was the 17-point agreement, which made Tibet a part of China but guaranteed continued Tibetan political and cultural autonomy. In the following eight years, Chinese representatives were sent to Lhasa and the Dalai Lama continued to attempt cooperation between the Tibetan and Chinese governments. He also continued his studies and sat for his *geshe* degree, which signified the end of his formal philosophical studies, in early 1959. However, after confrontations between eastern Tibetans and the Chinese army, many refugees fled to the capital. Relations broke down between China and Tibet, and the People's Liberation Army began shelling Lhasa on March 17, 1959. On the advice of the state oracle, the Dalai Lama left for exile in India that night and arrived on March 30, 1959.

The Indian government supplied the Dalai Lama with accommodation and living expenses and also attempted to accommodate the 80,000 refugees who followed him. He met with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964) shortly after his arrival and began the process of setting up the infrastructure for the Tibetan government-in-exile, which includes schools, cultural institutions, and monasteries. The government-in-exile headquarters is currently located in McLeod Ganj in Himachal Pradesh. There are, however, Tibetan refugee communities throughout India, with significant groups located in southern India, Delhi, and Himachal Pradesh, and large communities throughout the world.

Since 1959, the Dalai Lama has worked to raise Tibet's international profile. In the 1960s and 1970s he attempted to raise the issue of Tibet at the United Nations. In 1988 in Strasbourg, France, the seat of a number of European institutions such as the Council of Europe and the European Union (EU), he proposed a plan in which Tibet would become an autonomous zone in cooperation with the People's Republic of China, rather than completely independent.

The Dalai Lama travels widely and has become renowned internationally as a spokesperson for nonviolence, peace, and interfaith dialogue. He also has a strong interest in science. The Dalai Lama has received several prominent awards, including, in 1989, the Noble Peace Prize.

While the Dalai Lama remained the head of the Tibetan government-in-exile for many decades, he also actively encouraged the democratization of Tibetan politics. On December 17,

2008, the Dalai Lama announced that he would step back from an active role in the government-in-exile and enter semiretirement. He has urged the Tibetan community to support the Tibetan government-in-exile, a democratically elected body, in decisions regarding the administration of the Tibetan community.

Controversy continues over the future of the Dalai Lama incarnation lineage. The Dalai Lama himself has said on several occasions that the next Dalai Lama would not be born in Tibet to avoid the Chinese government attempting to manipulate the recognition of the incarnation. He has also stated that the lineage may not continue if it is no longer helpful to people. The Dalai Lama has never returned to Tibet but still expresses hope that he will have the opportunity to do so in the future.

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See also Religion; Tibetan Diaspora

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✦ DALITS

"Dalit" is currently the most-used term for India's untouchables, replacing the Gandhian term "Harijan" ("people of God"). It includes more groups than the official word for untouchables in the 1935 government list of "scheduled castes," those eligible to receive governmental benefits and parliamentary reservations. At times it encompasses any of India's oppressed. A Sanskrit and Marathi term for "broken, ground down," "Dalit" was used before 1935 in translation for the British census term "Depressed Classes" and then in the 1970s became a defiant self-chosen name, much like the term "black" for African Americans. The Dalit Panthers, a short-lived but famous militant group of educated youth, and Dalit literature became well-defined phenomena, with literature continuing to spread geographically and in genre through the years.



Cobbler Suva Lal repairs shoes in New Dehli, 1997. In Hinduism, Lal and other cobblers are considered Dalits, formerly known as "untouchables." (AP Photo/John Moore)

The occupations of Dalits vary from caste to caste and geographical area. Everywhere, two groups are considered polluted: those who work with human waste and those who work with leather. Others, however, can be designated village servants, such as watchman, with many responsibilities but few polluting duties other than dragging away dead cows from the village. The origin of untouchability is debated. The classical orthodox Brahmanical scripture Manusmriti (200 BCE–200 CE) notes the individual figure of the Chandala who lives outside the village but does not indicate an untouchable caste. Scholarly opinion generally assigns the development of specific castes, *jatis,* to the fourth century. The earlier *varna* system indicates only four groups, Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya, and Shudra; a group below Shudras was not in the classical system. Theories include a Brahmin-Buddhist conflict with Buddhists relegated to a position outside the village and an Aryan-Dasya conflict with the original inhabitants assigned to an inferior position, which is a racial theory gaining currency in southern India today. Most Dalit castes have their own theory of origin, usually involving some cosmic error or misunderstanding. Few accept the orthodox idea that karma, the effect of past deeds, is responsible for their low status.

The best-known name in Dalit history is that of Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (1891–1956), often called Babasaheb (honorable father/master) as an honorific, or Bhim as an affectionate nickname. Born to an army school headmaster and encouraged by caste Hindu non-Brahmin reformers, he secured a remarkable education: MA and PhD from Columbia University, MSc and DSc from London University, and passage to

the bar at Grey's Inn in London. He returned to Bombay in the early 1920s and began his work of uplifting and securing rights for untouchables by holding conferences, publishing newspapers, establishing hostels and later colleges, and attempting to win political power for untouchables through political parties and a reservation system, which, unlike American affirmative action, was extended to governmental bodies. A crisis encounter with Mohandas K. Gandhi in 1932 in which Ambedkar gave up the British endorsement of a separate electorate that would have enabled only untouchables to vote for untouchable representatives for a greater number of reserved seats in all governmental bodies, is still remembered resentfully today.

Mahatma Gandhi created the Harijan Sevak Sangh (organization for service to Harijans) after the 1932 encounter; it at first included Ambedkar but soon was limited to caste Hindus. Gandhi felt the answer to the idea of untouchability, which he despised, was a change of heart among higher castes. In contrast, Ambedkar stood for legal and political rights. Education was stressed by both men, although Ambedkar's emphasis was on higher education. In the 1920s and 1930s Ambedkar unsuccessfully attempted temple entry. He gave up in 1935 and announced he would not die a Hindu. He also began the first of three political parties, the Independent Labour Party.

During World War II, Ambedkar was taken into the central government's cabinet as labour minister. In 1946 he was elected into the Constituent Assembly by Bengali scheduled castes and then named chair of the Drafting Committee by Congress leaders in a surprise gesture of reconciliation. His work there was so important that he is known as the "architect of the Constitution." The statues of Ambedkar that dot the Indian landscape in ever-increasing numbers usually show him with a book, the Constitution, in one hand and the other raised in an exclamatory position, and he is always in the suit and tie he wore to show the possibilities of untouchables entering the modern world.

In spite of Ambedkar's increasing fame, the final political party he founded, the Republican Party, is split into five factions in Maharashtra and not influential at all outside the state. A Ravidasi Sikh from the Punjab, Kanshi Ram (1934–2006), established an institution for social work by Dalit government employees from backward and minority groups, All India Backward and Minority Communities Employees' Federation (BAMCEF) in 1973, which then evolved into a political party, the Bahujan (majority) Samaj (BSP). Kanshi Ram's chief aide, a Chamar schoolteacher who goes by the single name of Mayavati, has guided the party into dominance in Uttar Pradesh, most recently winning a five-year term as chief minister. Mayavati is by far the most dominant political leader among Dalits in the north, making her mark through monumental building projects and by including other castes, including Brahmins, in her party, the BSP.

Although Ambedkar had announced he was leaving Hinduism in 1935 and had been interested in Buddhism for decades, political parties, educational institutions, writing, and unexpected service in the government occupied his time, and he did not convert until 1956. That year, two months before his death, he announced his conversion in Nagpur. Loyal

followers arranged for the ceremony with the oldest bhikshu in India officiating, and on October 14 huge crowds, numbering in the hundreds of thousands, gathered in a field to hear Dr. Ambedkar's call to conversion. After his death on December 6 of that year, Buddhists—including the venerable Anand Kausalyayan and the venerable Sangharakshita—traveled to untouchable localities to conduct ceremonies. Ambedkar's guide to Buddhism, *The Buddha and His Dhamma,* was published in English in 1957 by the college Ambedkar had founded, Siddharth College in Bombay.

Conversion has continued, with some surprising converts. In 2007 tens of thousands of nomadic tribespeople and "Backward Tribes," a governmental designation, converted under the leadership of Lakshman Mane, who had won fame with his book, *Upra* (*Outsider;* 1980), one of the first Dalit autobiographies. The conversion, with bhikshus officiating, took place at the Mumbai Mahalakshmi Racecourse. Another unusual mass conversion took place on March 22, 2010, at the Kalachakra Ground in Bodh Gaya, organized by the Bharatiya Bouddh Sangh and the Sant Ravidas Railway Workers Sangh. The venerable Mahathero, who was present in 1956, was present at this ceremony also. The conviction that the Ravidasi were returning to their original faith was printed on the invitation to the ceremony.

The most recent trend among Dalits is internationalism. Dalits attended the United Nations World Conference against Racism held in Durban (South Africa) in 2001, even though the Indian government denied any semblance of a relationship between caste and racial prejudice and declared the issue an internal matter. Large international conferences organized by Dalits have since been held in Malaysia, Vancouver, and Bhopal. Internet sites such as Dalit-International and BuddhistCircle, both Yahoo groups, indicate that Dalits and Buddhists now have jobs, generally in high tech, all over the world. Group migration is strongest among the Punjabis and there is now a Buddhist movement in the United Kingdom and Ravidasi Sikh centers in four European countries. Ravidas, a 16th-century Chamar saint-poet, has become a central inspirational figure for Chamars. Many Chamars prefer to call themselves Ravidasi. The split between Ravidasi Sikhs and higher caste Sikhs surfaced in the killing of a Ravidasi leader in Vienna in 2009, an event that revealed the importance of Ravidasis in Europe and the extreme tension between the two groups.

One of the most unusual international events is the linkage of Hungarian Roma (also known as gypsies) to the Ambedkar movement. Two leaders, Tibor and Janos, visited Maharashtra in 2005 and 2007, embraced Buddhism, founded a Jai Bhim ("victory to Ambedkar," a common Dalit greeting) network, and opened three Dr. Ambedkar high schools in Sajokaza, Oxd, and Hegymeg.

There is no one central Buddhist organization. Recent conversions among nomads and among Ravidasi indicate continued growth, but most activity is on the local level, with one exception. The English Friends of the Western Buddhist Order has established a center in India that has been building *viharas* ("temples"), schools, and retreat centers for years. Offshoots, Manushi and Jambudvipa, centered in Pune, are lively institutions for retreats, teaching, and meditation. A related center near Nagpur, Nagaloka, makes successful efforts to involve

international Buddhists with Ambedkar Buddhists. Often its conferences are timed to coincide with the anniversary of the 1956 conversion in October, which draws hundreds of thousands of Buddhists from many parts of India to Nagpur. Taiwanese Buddhists have been prominent in this effort as well as in conducting ordination for bhikshus and bhikshuni at Bodh Gaya. One of the most prominent bhikshus in Nagpur is Surai Sensai, originally from Japan.

The main thrust of Dalit literature in Marathi has moved from poetry to autobiography. Three autobiographies translated into English and published in the United States illustrate the range of Dalit life. Valmiki's *Joothan* (*Leftover Food*) delves into the almost impossible suffering of a north Indian child. Narendra Jadhav narrates a Marathi family's push for education that has given him the stature to be a member of the central government's Planning Commission. Vasant Moon's *Growing Up Untouchable* illustrates the lively world of a Nagpur slum and the commitment that has led him to edit 17 volumes of *Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches*. The publishing of Dalit poetry and other forms of literature continues to expand throughout almost all the language areas of India.

Violence against Dalits who overstep traditional boundaries, especially in villages, is still a daily issue. The most recent highly publicized incident took place in an eastern Maharashtra village called Khailanji in 2006. An attack on a family that had opposed the building of a road through its land was especially cruel, particularly to the women in the family. News of that atrocity spread to Mumbai and when word of a beheading of an Ambedkar statue in Kanpur was added to the distress, Dalits erupted in violence, burning buses and two carriages of the Deccan Queen, a train that symbolized Pune Brahmin dominance. The anniversary of Ambedkar's death on December 6 led to increased security, but the anniversary was marked by silent sorrow, not violence.

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See also Religion; Religious Pollution

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✦ DAMAN AND DIU

Daman and Diu is composed of two pieces of territory on the Gulf of Khambat: Daman is nearly 45 square miles while to the north the separate island of Diu is nearly 25 square miles. They are both surrounded by Gujarat close to the border with Maharashtra. Until 1954 they were part of Portuguese India, and they became a Union Territory in 1961 along with Goa from which it separated in 1987. The economy is dependent on fishing and tourism. The administrator governs both Daman and Diu and Dadra and Nagar Haveli from the capital Daman.

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See also Constitution; Goa

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✦ DANCE

Dance in India has a rich tradition with various regional forms: tribal, folk, and classical. All the mainstream classical forms share some common elements with the ancient Indian manual *Natyasastra,* a Sanskrit text, supposedly composed by the legendary sage Bharata in the early centuries of the Common Era (CE). *Natyasastra* is a compendium on dance, music, and theater.

According to the *Natyasastra*, there are several components to dance. These include *nritta* ("pure dance"), *nritya* ("drama"), and *natya* ("mime"). *Nritta* is an abstract, pure, and simple dance meant to convey beauty to the beholder but without any special meaning. *Nritya*, however, is employed to convey a specific meaning or idea to the spectator through various expressions and gestures. The third component, *natya*, consists of both *nritta* and *nritya*, along with *abhinaya* (all that contributes to expression and its successful transmission to the spectator), which gives the dancer the necessary ingredients to reach the hearts and minds of the audience. What are the necessary ingredients that *abhinaya* provides? The *Natyasastra* spells out four: *angika*, *vachika*, *aharya*, and *satvika*. *Angika* is a technique of using various parts of the body to show gestures and expressions to convey meanings. *Vachika* is the art of melodiously using the voice to convey a story as well as emotions. *Aharya* aids the dancer in the form of costumes, jewelry, makeup, hairdo, and so on. *Satvika* is integral to *abhinaya* as it pertains to the evocative feelings that the dancer brings to the audience. So, *abhinaya* transports *rasa* (cumulative essence) to *rasika* (a beholder who is transported to the world presented by the dancer). *Rasa* is born out of *bhava*, an emotional and intellectual sensibility that the dancer employs to convey different moods.



A Bharatanatyam dance performed by members of the Kalakshetra Dance Institute of India. Originally from Tamil Nadu, Bharatanatyam dance is widely performed throughout South India and is considered the national dance of India. Through the Indian diasporic community and touring dance troupes it now has an international following. (AP Photo/Mario Suriani)

There are many classical forms of dance mentioned in Indian literature, but only some of them survived through colonial times. Prominent among them are Bharatanatyam, Kathak, Kathakali, Kuchipudi, Manipuri, Mohiniyattam, and Odissi.

Bharatanatyam. Bharatanatyam is the result of centuries of collective genius from *bhakti* ("devotional") poets, *nattuvanars* ("dance teachers"), *devadasis* (god's female servant or dancers), *rajanartakis* ("courtesans"), and *pundits* ("scholars"). The dance flourished over the centuries under the patronage of Tamil, Telugu, and Maratha rulers incorporating various devotional elements from Saivite and Vaishnavite traditions, as well as compositions in praise of Maratha rulers. The music for this dance form is believed traditionally to have been the gift of four brothers, Chinniah, Ponniah, Vadivelu,

and Sivanandan, who served the Maratha ruler Serfoji II at Thanjavur in the early 19th century. In the last century, the dance was taken out of its ritual and courtly contexts and developed for public performances by well-known performers such as Krishna Iyer, Rukmini Devi, and Balasaraswati. Bharatanatyam uses Hindu devotional songs and poetry composed in four different languages: Sanskrit, Tamil, Telugu, and Kannada. During the 16th century, a strong component of Telugu *nataka* ("drama") became part of this dance tradition.

Bharatnatyam is basically a solo performance. The dance form employs *nritta* and *nritya* in equal measure. In *nritta*, the various body parts move in geometric accuracy. In the *nritya* mode, the dancer uses song along with other facial expressions to show the height of emotions. It is not uncommon for the dancer to use supporting musicians for this purpose. The *natya* aspect comes into play in the dance-drama part of Bharatanatyam, where all aspects of *abhinaya* are used to their fullest extent. The dominant *rasa* is *sringara* ("love"). The music is of the South Indian Karnatak school with a vocalist accompanied by musical instruments such as *talam* (a pair of metal cymbals to maintain time), *mridanga* (a drum), flute, and violin. The *aharya* for a female dancer consists of long pants attached to fanlike pleats extending to the knees and then to the ankles with a matching blouse over which a veil with pleats is attached to cover the breasts. The material used to make this dress is usually a brocaded Kanjeevaram silk sari with a matching blouse piece. The dancer is bedecked with matching ornaments for the neck, upper and lower arms, fingers, girdle, head, hair, ears, and nose, and she wears flower garlands in her braided hair. Makeup for the face, especially kohl, highlights the eyes. The palms and soles are dyed with red patterns. A male dancer costume consists of long pants with attached pleats to represent the traditional dhoti and various ornaments decorating the neck, ears, and upper and lower arms. From 50 to 100 small ankle bells are worn by both males and females.

While some choreographers incorporate new techniques from the tribal and folk dances of southern India, honing traditional themes to make them relevant to the contemporary world, others introduce revolutionary trends to resonate with modern audiences.

Kathak. This dance derives its name from the Sanskrit word *katha* ("story") and developed in northern India. The origins of Kathak lie with male bards who were attached to temples and whose dance and song were modified to incorporate the principles of *Natyasastra*. Story themes come from the great epics, *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata*, as well as from the *Puranas* (Hindu mythology focusing on a particular god or goddess). The formative period of Kathak was in the 15th and 16th centuries in Mughal courts, where many elements of Persian dance, music, and poetry were incorporated. At this time, female dancers were introduced, bringing sensuality and voluptuousness to the dance. Through a fusion of Hindu and Muslim cultural elements, Kathak evolved into a highly technical and yet aesthetically sophisticated dance. It is an elegant mixture of reciting poetry, thereby conveying emotions, moods, and sentiments through subtle *abhinaya*, and dancing with lightning speed, employing *nritta* (intricate rhythmic footwork) going in circles and ending with sensuous poses. Under the patronage of Hindu and Muslim rulers, Kathak branched out into *gharanas* ("schools") associated with

Lucknow, Benaras, and Jaipur. Some, as the Jaipur Gharana, specialize in Hindu devotional themes focusing on the *nritta* aspect, while others specialize in Muslim Ghazals, Khayals, and Tumris with stress on *nritya* and *bhava*. The music is classical Hindustani employing a range of instruments such as *tabla* (one-sided drum), the *tanpura* (drone), *sitar* (string), *surmandal* (harp), *santur* (hammered dulcimer), harmonium, *bansuri* (flute), and *pakhawaj* (barrel-shaped drum). The costume of Hindu female dancers consists of embroidered *lehenga-choli* (ankle-length pleated skirt with a blouse) with a long scarf covering the head and shoulders. Muslim female dancers wear the *kurta-churidhar* (a tunic shaped for a female form but with a flair at the bottom and a pair of leggings) with a translucent scarf. Male dancers also wear the *kurta-churidar*. All the dancers wear as many as 150 small bells on their ankles and female dancers also wear extensive jewelry.

Kathakali. The name "Kathakali" literally means "story-play," indicating that this is a dance-drama involving many dancers, traditionally male, who impersonate various gods, goddesses, demons, and mythical characters. Kathakali has been enriched by drawing its resources from age-old popular ritual plays for the goddess Bhagavati, techniques from Sanskrit story tellers, moves from local martial arts, and themes from folk plays that are based on the *Puranas* and epics. For 200 years starting in the middle of the 17th century, Kerala rulers promoted this art.

Kathakali demands exercises of the body extending even to the brow, eyebrows, eyeballs, cheeks, lips, and chin. Dancers animate their faces and use several hand gestures. *Abhinaya* plays an important part in this dance-drama where the use of face and voice are maximized to show *sancharibhava* ("changing moods"). The hand gestures, as many as 24, aid the facial expressions, followed by short breaks of *nritta* with heavy stamping of the feet. Imbued with energy and expression, the dancer brings forth the setting appropriate to the situation, such as killing a demon or meeting a lover on an otherwise empty stage. The music is Karnatak and played at the back of the stage, starting with a thunder of drums, one with a low pitch, *chenda* (cylindrical drum held vertically and played with a pair of curved sticks), and the other with a high pitch, *maddalam* (suspended horizontally and played with hands). Two singers, one using *chengalam* (a metal gong) and the other using *elatalam* (cymbals), maintain the rhythm.

The dancers thickly paint their faces, hands, and feet using natural ingredients such as rice flour, soot, vermilion, and lime. Following convention, different color combinations are used to paint different players. For example, red painted feet and reddened eyes symbolize the evil intent of the character. In general, male characters wear full-sleeved colored jackets along with heavily pleated skirts and elaborate headdresses. Heavy jewelry, such as necklaces, armlets, bangles, ankle bells, and breastplates, is worn. Female characters wear lighter costumes of full-sleeved jackets paired with ankle-length skirts and head-to-waist veils. Apart from the usual female ornaments, the female characters also sport artificial gilded breasts.

Kuchipudi. Taking its name from a village in the heart of coastal Andhra Pradesh, this dance-drama traces its genesis to two Telugu Brahmins of the early 16th century, Tirtha Narayana and Siddhendra Yogi, who were part of the Bhakti movement. The two Brahmins, as devotees to Lord Krishna, developed this unique style of dance by mixing components of

traditional Telugu folk drama with classical dance techniques from texts such as *Natyasastra* and *Abhinayadarpana*. The dance thus displays a fine balance of *nritta, nritya,* and *natya,* moving swiftly from one component to another. Established for nearly five centuries, this dance-drama was usually enacted by a group of Brahmin males playing both male and female roles of devotional episodes from the great epics and *Puranas* but at times performing solos to showcase the high achievement of a single performer. An example of this is a famous pot dance in which the dancer carries a pot full of water on the head while moving a brass plate rhythmically with feet placed on its rim simultaneously showing gestures with both hands. Like Bharatanatyam, Kuchipudi employs Karnatak music and instruments with a vocalist. Costumes and jewelry are similar to that of Bharatanatyam.

Manipuri. Manipuri is a dance associated with royal courts as well common people from a very early period. Scanty sources agree that its antiquity goes back to the early centuries CE. The present form, however, owes its modification to the 18th-century ruler Bhagyachandra, who embraced Vaishnavism and Bengali culture. Bhagyachandra, with the help of Manipuri dance teachers, codified and regulated the many existing forms of Manipuri dances by incorporating the basic elements of *nritta, nritya,* and *natya*. Since then, the Vaishanvite dance *Rasa Lila* (Lord Krishna's divine play with Gopis) has become the main feature of this dance. Many Vaishanvite songs written by devotional poets such as Chaitanya, Jayadeva, Chandidas, and Vidyapati have provided the repertoire for Manipuri. In the early 20th century, Rabindra Nath Tagore promoted Manipuri by introducing it into the academic curriculum offered at his institute, Shanti Niketan.

Manipuri is performed both in social and religious contexts. Most of the dance items involve a group of dancers who dance around the central figures, Radha and Krishna. Unlike most other dance forms, the dancer's gaze is not at the audience but at other players. The aim of the dance is to transport the audience to a devotional realm. The body movements are supple, nuanced, and intricate, without any sudden jerks. The *nritta* aspect is subdued, with the dancer's heel barely touching the ground but translating into rhythmic body movements. The *abhinaya* comes through not so much from facial expression but through fluid movements, hand gestures coupled with intensely emotional high-pitch singing. There are other female and male singers sitting at one side of the stage accompanied by instrumentalists using an earthen drum, a flute, a pair of cymbals, and an *esraj* (string). The music is lyrical following the Sankirtan tradition. The dancers are females with a boy playing the role of Krishna. The boy wears a saffron-colored dhoti and a dark tunic with a cap decorated by peacock feathers. Female dancers wear a richly embroidered long cylindrical silk skirt and blouse with a rectangular belt across the chest and a transparent veil over a head cap with peacock feathers. Ornaments are worn on the head, face, neck and arms, and around the girdle.

Mohiniyattam. Mohiniyattam is the most recent dance form. The name literally means the dance of Mohini, the divine enchantress. According to tradition, Vadivelu, one of four gifted brothers who provided music for Bharatanatyam, came to serve at the court of Maharaja Swati Tirunal at Trivandrum with some Bharatanatyam dancers. Inspired by these dancers and

drawing resources from Kathakali and other folk dance-dramas of Kerala, Mohiniyattam evolved to serve high-caste social gatherings. Unlike other dance forms of Kerala, Mohiniyattam became the prerogative of female dancers.

Mohiniyattam shares its technique and gesture language with Bharatanatyam and Kathakali. It also shares some repertoire along with its preference for *sringararasa* ("erotic love") with Bharatanatyam. However, the *nritta* in Mohiniyattam is smoother and lighter, showing grace and delicacy. Mohiniyattam is primarily a solo dance. In the past, dancers sang on the stage, but it has now become a common practice to have a playback singer. Typically, the performance keeps rhythm with a pair of cymbals. The music is Karanataka. The instruments are *topi maddalam* (drum), *mukhaveena* (a version of flute), and *tooti* (drone). The costume consists of a white sari and white blouse with white jasmines in the hair, which is often secured into a knot. Makeup and jewelry are more or less similar to that of a Bharatanatyam dancer.

Odissi. Odissi or Orissi, a highly stylized dance, may date at least to the time of the composition of the *Natyasastra* insofar as the *Natyasastra* identifies this form as distinctive. Supported by rulers, there is a long tradition of this dance being performed both in religious and courtly contexts. Like the *devadasi* tradition in the south, there is a long tradition of girls from the Mahar caste dancing in the temple as part of daily ritual. In the 17th century, a sub-tradition of boys (*gotipuas*) dancing in the temples as well as in public came into being. Since the 18th century, political turmoil in the Orissa region has contributed to a break in girls dancing. The revival of Odissi took place in the second half of the 20th century when resources from various traditional dances were pooled on the basis of sculpted dance poses of the 10th to 13th centuries. As a result, the art is highly conventional.

In *nritta*, body poses are given priority, where the dancer bends the body in unusual angular ways accompanied by rapid foot movements but with the hands swaying gracefully. The *abhinaya* is conformist with a focus on virtuosity. Jayadeva's *Gita Govinda* forms a main theme of Odissi. The music is classical, drawing elements from both Hindustani and Karnataka styles. The traditional musical instruments are a pair of cymbals, flute, and *mardala* (drum). The costumes and jewelry are mostly similar to that of Bharatanatyam.

SREE PADMA

See also Music, Devotional

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Darjeeling. *See* Himalaya

Delhi. *See* New Delhi

Delhi, National Capital Territory of. *See* New Delhi

✦ *DEVADASI*

The tradition of *devadasi*, or "servants of god" as it is derived from Sanskrit, refers to the tradition of women linked to a temple for the purpose of divinely sanctioned sexual practices. The practice remains controversial today and is hotly contested by human rights groups that oppose the sex trade, while other groups claim that *devadasis* are part of an authentic tradition in India, preserving a religious function in the same way as traditional dance.

A *devadasi*'s life begins when she is dedicated to the temple. This vow of dedication can occur when the girl is very young or even before she is born. As a promised gift to the deity, she is the property of the temple and is initiated as well as secured financially with her coming of age. The actual dedication ceremonies vary from region to region but may include fasting, anointing the girl with oils or turmeric, and giving a small "dowry" to the temple or a small "bride-price" to the parents. While scholars offer several reasons for parents' dedication of a female child to a temple, the most common is believed to be exchange for a religious boon. This could be an appeal to the deity for a son, a cure for the girl's illness, or as an offering of a first-born to the deity itself. Regional tradition could also be a reason, as in some communities of Bombay where one girl of each family is customarily dedicated to the service of a deity.

Another impetus for dedication of women to the temples was to provide actors for the rituals between god and consort. Just as the king had courtesans in his palace to mimic the gods and their court of lovely women, so the Brahmin priests had women of the temple who could not only act as the goddess-consort for the deity she was "married" to but also transact with the priest of the temple who was acting as proxy for the god. A *devadasi* considered herself to be married to the deity of the temple and underwent two ceremonies. The first service dedicated her to the temple as a prepubescent girl and was her "marriage to the deity." The second service occurred at the onset of menarche and was more like the traditional wedding ceremony performed at a groom's house when a bride has reached puberty (called *punaha bibaha*). It was at this time that the *devadasi* consummated her marriage to the deity with either the king or a Brahmin of the temple.

The *devadasi* tradition has historical roots in India, which is one reason some feel the tradition is authentic and should not, therefore, be banned. Divine prostitutes can be found throughout Sanskrit literature, often listed as *ganika* or *veshya*. The author Vatsyayana, whose classic text the *Kamasutra* was written between the first and fourth centuries, clarifies that a prostitute or *veshya* who is endowed with beauty, temperament, and other good qualities

receives the title of a *ganika* and holds a high social position among the people. In other words, *ganika* is the highest degree of prostitution—a courtesan.

The term *devadasi*, however, is listed separately by Kautilya in the early fourth century in his work on statecraft the *Arthashastra* (*Treatise on Polity*) as "sacred courtesans" or "temple prostitutes." Although both *devadasi* and *ganika* are said to have been maintained by the king financially, were given rigorous training in the performing arts, and were recognized by the government as taxable professions, there was a distinction between ladies of the palace court and those who were aligned with the temple. The English term "courtesan" typically was used by writers and scholars to denote a prostitute of higher social standing and not necessarily a member of a royal court per se. These were women who were educated, enjoyed a degree of financial and social independence, and were part of a recognized profession that moved among the upper tiers of society. Therefore, *devadasis* are construed as courtesans catering to the more noble classes in the sex trade.

While there are no documents that indicate how the tradition precisely began, later literature discusses the contributions *devadasis* made in social, religious, political, and economic landscapes across many different regions and eras. The earliest epigraphic records referring to *devadasis* come from Nandivaman Pallavamalla, the Pallava king who reigned from 731 to 796 CE in southern India along the east coast. Among a list of the Kuktesvara Temple's 54 employees, 32 were dedicated dancing girls. The number of epigraphs referring to *devadasis* increases century by century up to the 11th and 12th centuries. From the 11th century, the inscriptions relating to the tradition appeared from almost every region of southern India, running concurrent to the increase in temple construction during the 10th and 11th centuries. This would account for the increase of *devadasi* employment during this time period.

While the tradition didn't seem to be officially recognized and written about until the Chola period (11th century), the entire process of social formation from the 5th century onward seems to be inseparable from the development of religious structures and rituals. From the 1st century CE, the Cholas had ruled as chieftains in the Tamil-speaking regions of southern India. Through conquest they established an independent state by the mid-9th century. By the 11th century, King Rajaraja I (985–1014 CE) had raised the Chola Dynasty to prominence in southern India. Dravidian style architecture reached its apex in the 11th century and came to influence subsequent constructions of temples in the south. It was within the temple itself that classical south Indian dance came to maturation.

The seat of royal power during the height of the Chola period was the capital Tanjavur. It was the home to the Rajarajesvara Temple, one of the greatest monuments of the period. Administrative inscriptions are found in the temple, as decreed by Rajaraja I that all wealth donated by notable members of the royal family and of society be recorded on the walls of the structure. Among these inscriptions are lists of administrative transactions and the funding and staffing of the temple, including priests, service workers, domestic workers, and temple dancers. It is here that perhaps the first details of the *devadasi* and their legitimate role in the temple can be found. A list of essential transactions required for the continued staffing

and maintenance of the temple is found to include supplies of oil and milk for offerings, musicians, accountants, tailors, potters, and ritual specialists. Most notably the list includes, in its own category, a total of 398 temple women recruited from smaller temples throughout the Chola kingdom.

The *Arthashastra* clearly states that the courtesans received a fixed salary from the king's treasury, jewelry (which added to the value of a courtesan), objects necessary for performance of their duties, special training in the arts, and a guarantee of continued protection if they were unable to continue performing their duties. Epigraphic evidence from the Thanjavur inscriptions (11th and 12th centuries) note that land was the most common source of income. In addition to property, provisions for food and maintenance, as well as grants, were given to the women of the temple. The property was hers to maintain and pass down to her daughters—a luxury denied other women in India who had no authority except through male familial connections. The *devadasis* were a social class in and of themselves and they had laws of inheritance, customs, and etiquette. This further distinguished the temple women from the general "prostitute."

With the coming of the Mughal rulers in the second decade of the 16th century, the symbiotic relationship between temple and ruler dissolved and was replaced with a centralization of religious authority around the ruler himself. Mosques operated to support Muslim law, the Sharia, and the Islamic jurisprudence of the ruler; they did not legitimize the ruler nor did they uphold the ruler as any divine representation. While the Hindu temples and worshipers were protected under Muslim law to practice their own religion, artisan groups and merchants followed the urban trend and converted to Islam. Therefore, as the *devadasis* were no longer needed as consorts to the king, the temple authority was detached from its political power and land revenue, and elite patronage began to recede.

In 1947, the Devadasi (Prohibition of Dedication) Act passed in the state of Karnataka in southwestern India, outlawing the tradition. However, *devadasis* still exist today even if they only lead a marginal existence. They are found predominantly in southeastern India in Andhra Pradesh and in Karnataka.

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See also Dance; Hinduism; Music, Devotional; Religion

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Development Education. *See* Education, Development

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Devotional Music. *See* Music, Devotional

✦ DIASPORA, INDIAN

The inhabitants of India have a long history of international migration, a trend particularly pronounced over the last century and a half. Today, this dispersed collectivity of overseas Indians, or "diaspora," has come to possess significant economic, political, and cultural weight. In terms of size, the Indian diaspora is second only to the Chinese, although estimates vary dramatically, depending on the criteria used to define "Indian," from the commonly cited figure of 9 million to as high as 30 million (a figure favored by the government of India and that includes the children of "mixed" couples). This statistic includes various communities whose reasons for migration, experiences overseas, and social and cultural adaptation to their new circumstances vary dramatically; overseas Indians are as diverse as those of the subcontinent itself. Sociologically, then, it is debatable whether there exists a unitary Indian diaspora. Nonetheless, as a form of political and cultural consciousness, the image of the "Great Indian Diaspora" has found favor with several different audiences over the last quarter century.

The Indian diaspora can broadly be divided into two segments, often labeled the "old" and the "new" diaspora. This distinction signifies far more than simple chronology; rather, these two branches vary in terms of their destination, context for emigration, socioeconomic background, and the degree of contact sustained with the "homeland." Their social, cultural, and religious adaptations to their new surroundings have been similarly diverse. The old diaspora generally demonstrated a greater level of homogenization across communities as its links with India waned; while the new diaspora has maintained much closer links with the motherland and preserved specific markers of locality, caste, sect, region, and language.

The earliest migrants from South Asia were cosmopolitan traders and merchants from coastal communities, whose business ties stretched across the Indian Ocean from East Africa to Central and East Asia; elements of these networks have survived until today. It was not until the era of the British Empire in the 19th century, however, that substantial numbers of

Indians began leaving the subcontinent to form the mass of the underresearched old diaspora. More than a million Indians, primarily from the densely populated northern provinces of contemporary Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, were transported as indentured laborers to fill the labor gap that had arisen in the British and French island colonies with the end of slavery. They formed particularly sizable blocs in Trinidad (40 percent of today's population, according to the CIA *World Factbook*), Suriname (37 percent), Guyana (43.5 percent), Fiji (37.6 percent, down from 49 percent before 1987), and Mauritius (68 percent). On the latter two islands ethnic Indians formed an economically and politically dominant segment of the population until the anti-Indian coups of 1987 and the pro-Melanesian constitution of 1990 triggered massive Indian migration from Fiji to New Zealand and Australia. The relationship between these laborers and their employers was contractual, although often at first their working conditions in mines and on sugar and rubber plantations were little better than those of the slaves they replaced. Nonetheless, most of these laborers chose to stay on even after their contracts were completed—a testament to the difficulty of their previous lives in India.

Substantial numbers of Indians also traveled to South Africa and East Africa as both indentured laborers and petty merchants, this time primarily from the province of Gujarat on India's western coast. Hundreds of thousands of Tamil-speaking laborers traveled under a separate contractual system, *kangani,* to Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Burma, though many were later forced out as resentment toward them by the local communities developed. These Indian communities have now, however, been present for five or even six generations, often becoming almost entirely divorced from their regions of origin and evolving unique forms of institutions and identity such as in caste, organized religion, and ethnic identity. Nonetheless, perhaps because of their substantial size, these communities resisted thorough integration with the local population. As the British Empire waned in the 20th century, they were forced to adapt to rapidly altering situations, often including aggressive postcolonial nationalisms hostile to such unassimilated populations in their midst.

In contrast, more recent postcolonial waves of migration have mostly taken Indians to the industrialized West—especially the United States, Canada, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands—where they have often enjoyed enviable levels of success and integration. Many of these migrants came from groups with a history of migration or those displaced by the bloody partition of India and the creation of Pakistan (primarily Punjabis and Sindhis) in and after 1947. At first a primary destination was Britain, with its open access for Commonwealth citizens and demand for unskilled and semiskilled labor at a time when the United States, Canada, and Australia kept their doors closed to Indians. During the 1970s, however, Britain tightened its immigration restrictions and several other Western countries relaxed theirs to educated, skilled, and English-speaking migrants. The most striking phenomenon of postindependence Indian migration, then, has been the very visible wave of highly skilled professionals arriving in the West: first, doctors, lawyers, academics, and students and second, the famous "IT wave" of software professionals.

The line between the old and new diasporas is, of course, rather artificial. Not only indentured laborers but also merchants, soldiers, civil servants, and other imperial auxiliaries traveled outward from the subcontinent during the colonial period. Into the 20th century, for example, the Hong Kong police was dominated by Sikh and Muslim Punjabis (the so-called martial races favored by British conscription). Given this tradition of mobility, it is unsurprising that Sikh farmers had already begun arriving in California and Canada during the early decades of the 20th century, despite facing fierce racial intolerance and restrictive marriage and immigration laws. Nor have all recent migrants been wealthy professionals. Sikhs from rural backgrounds continue to emigrate to Australia, New Zealand, the United States, Britain, Italy, and, especially, Canada. Many others are "twice-migrants," who have left—by choice or by coercion—their homes in East Africa, Sri Lanka, Fiji, Guyana, and Suriname for greater security in the West.

The economic activity of the contemporary Indian diaspora ranges far beyond wealthy software engineers. Indians often enjoyed a comfortable relationship with the colonial authorities and South Africa's apartheid regime, disproportionately occupying civil service and trade and supply positions. The background of the typical IT and business migrant is almost exclusively upper-middle class, high caste, and Anglophone. Nonetheless, the phenomenon of their widespread economic success goes beyond these favorable roots, including many Indians of humble origins: the old labor diaspora was overwhelmingly drawn from economically deprived sections of rural lower castes. Indians are highly visible in many countries, tending to cluster in particular urban areas as self-employed entrepreneurs, merchants, and shopkeepers—such as the pioneering founder of Nakumatt, Kenya's largest supermarket chain—even where their overall population is tiny (less than 1 percent in Kenya).

In the field of commerce, the commercial Indian diaspora appears to form a close-knit "global tribe." Smaller transnational communities such as the Marwaris and Sindhis continue to possess an economic weight disproportionate to their size. The 200,000-strong Sindhi diaspora, for example, is immensely wealthy and dispersed, its members acting as traders and middlemen even in western Africa and Latin America, where few other Indian migrants have ever arrived. As with the early Indian Ocean trading networks of their predecessors, these "tribal" loyalties may not be activated during times of plenty—when competition among Indian businesses can afford to be fierce—but such deep relationships are invaluable for loans, connections, and support during hard times. In the United States, Indian success has also been attributed to Indians' willingness to combine this proud sense of culture and community with hard work, public and economic integration, and educational attainment. Consequently, they have been described as a "model minority." The rise of Piyush "Bobby" Jindal, the handsome young governor of Louisiana and a possible future Republican presidential contender, marks the high watermark of this trend. In many other countries, however, their success has prompted deliberately anti-Indian measures: chronic Indophobia in East Africa, from the attacks of Mau Mau rebels on Kenyan Indians to Idi Amin's expulsion of the 80,000 Indians in Uganda in 1972; the ejection of Indians from

their privileged places in the civil service in favor of ethnic Creoles, Sinhalese, and Malays in Guyana, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia, respectively; and anti-Indian coups and partial disenfranchisement in Fiji.

Far from all Indian migrants are rich, however. A contemporary example of a "proletarian" branch of the diaspora is developing apace in West Asia. Since the 1970s large numbers of both legal and illegal migrants have traveled to the oil-rich Gulf states, taking on typically menial or semiskilled labor jobs that local inhabitants are often culturally reluctant to do. Many of these are young, unmarried, Muslim males from the southern Indian provinces of Andhra Pradesh and Kerala; an estimated 20 percent of the latter's gross domestic product is derived from migrant remittances. Faced with hostile local populations and extremely restrictive citizenship laws, however, this migration is almost exclusively transitory.

Divergent trends have long characterized Indians' cultural responses to their new locations. At the level of "high" literature and academia, many authors, usually drawn themselves from the most privileged segments of Indian society, propose a model of creative multicultural exchange. Expatriate scholars and cultural figures, such as the novelist Salman Rushdie (b. 1947) and the anthropologist Arjun Appadurai (b. 1949), have put forward an influential model of overseas Indian experience as one of fluidly overlapping boundaries and composite identities above and beyond the crudity of nationalism or race. Such theories have been very influential in the nascent fields of diaspora and transnationalism studies.

However, such metaphors of unabridged "flux" and "hybridity" perhaps have less relevance to ordinary Indians. Here, again, there is a visible distinction between the old and new diasporas. Many newer migrants are temporary sojourners wealthy enough to afford frequent communication with and visits to India, connections that are facilitated by 20th-century technological advances. Even the longest-serving of these migrants have only been in the West for around 50 years. These features have helped to preserve lines of caste, locality, and language, particularly in the United States and among East African Gujarati twice-migrants in Britain, even while these same communities are publicly very well integrated with the host society. Many encourage their children to study the mother tongue and to take part in other cultural activities such as traditional dance; Telugus in the United States even claim that they are more Telugu culturally than those back in Andhra Pradesh. Cultural and social associations are frequently created along caste, local, or linguistic lines. "Outsider" groups such as Surinamese Hindustanis in the Netherlands have found it very difficult to become accepted by more established Indian communities, and Dalits (former untouchables) have long complained that they face persistent prejudice in ostensibly pan-Indian overseas organizations.

The old diaspora has demonstrated a paradoxical mixture of greater cultural autonomy and greater cultural adaptation than the new. These Indian communities resisted conversion, intermarriage with other groups, and protected select customs and rites. Given that these migrants have generally shown little desire to return to the motherland and have lost most of their links with their regions of origin, it is this reproduction of "Indian" culture that is their most decisive connection to the diaspora. "Indianness" has become, in part, a cultural and

ethnic identity externally imposed by other communities and is abstracted from the physical entity of India itself.

However, the exigencies of their mass migration in the 19th century made certain adaptations inevitable. In East Africa, for example, many "third-generation" migrants (born between 1960 and 2000) may speak Gujarati with their parents, but they are often unable to read or write it. Over the years, the community appears to have made individual and collective decisions to turn toward Swahili and especially English as the languages of commerce and education. In the Caribbean, where in any case most migrants shared lower-caste origins, caste has become largely invisible save for the extremes of the highest (Brahmins) and lowest (untouchable Chamars) castes. Even in these cases, caste has become disconnected from its original moorings in a complex of reciprocal interactions and instead bears a rather detached symbolic meaning. Religion has similarly been altered by the changed context; unlike the individual or family-based worship typically practiced in India, Caribbean Hinduism took on a more homogenous, communal, and congregation-based aspect in order to counter the challenge of Christianity. Mauritius appears virtually unique in the old diaspora for its encouragement of regional-linguistic fragmentation of the Indian community. However, even here the original linguistic identity (for example, Telugu) has lost its practical basis—Creole has been universally adopted as the lingua franca—and has instead been transformed into a cultural sense of identity.

For all this seeming diversity, for the first time something approaching a global Indian culture may be emerging, even if it fails to attract all Indians equally. This is overwhelmingly Hindu; many Muslims find themselves excluded from the Indian diaspora even if they have little historic reason to identify with Pakistan. It also has a pronounced north Indian inflection in terms of cuisine, dress, and language (the very powerful south Indian presence in the United States and elsewhere notwithstanding). An enormously significant factor has been the success of Bollywood movies and their Hindi-language songs, which have frequently been impressively innovative in fusing Western music styles, from hip-hop to rock, with more traditional and more "Indian" styles. Bollywood has been quick to pick up on the new prestige of overseas Indians and the vast global market power of the diaspora. Several blockbusters, such as *Dilwale Dulhania Le Jayenge* (1995), and *Kuch Kuch Hota Hai* (1998), have had wealthy nonresident Indians (NRIs)—usually Hindu Punjabis, it is implied—as their protagonists, though these heroes must also remain "true to the traditions" if they are to find true love. From East Africa to east London, films such as these and the hit music of composers such as A. R. Rahman (b. 1966), a double Oscar winner for the 2008 movie *Slumdog Millionaire*, have commodified Indian culture for a younger, wealthier diasporic audience and for Western eyes.

The term "diaspora" has only recently become fashionable in the popular, academic, and governmental vocabulary. It remains a controversial and heavily political term, recently deployed as a new and potent vocabulary of minority rights, globalization, and transnational linkages. It was first used in Greek scriptural translations to describe the dispersal and spiritual exile of the Jews. Although the word's connotations have broadened from these narrow origins, it still retains a certain emotive and mythical power, with emphasis on the

preservation of cultural and "ethnic" boundaries, a sense of belonging to a global community, and an almost sacred loyalty to the "homeland." Its rehabilitation was explicitly political and owes much to the vision of a global African community advocated by African American activists such as W. E. B. Du Bois (1868–1963).

The term "diaspora" is used by various parties to stress the unity of "Indians" overseas, despite their immense diversity. One particularly influential actor has been the Indian state itself. Many developing countries reap handsome rewards from connections with and money remitted by their overseas citizens; recently India has similarly tried to capitalize on this, attempting to facilitate connections between India and persons of Indian origin (PIOs) and NRIs, for example with new visa cards and improved investment and business access. This excludes the significant numbers of Hindus and Muslims who now live in Bangladesh or Pakistan, and the Indian state also stands accused of favoring richer rather than poorer PIOs.

The discourse of diaspora is not confined to state control. Other political groupings have also attempted to use the demographic and economic weight of their overseas networks, deploying the language of diaspora as a rhetoric of self-assertion and community. Hindu nationalist associations have enjoyed notable success in courting sustained financial and moral support from their diaspora branches. In the new homelands, especially the United States and Britain, organizations such as the right-wing Vishva Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council), founded in 1964, have at least partially succeeded in dominating the public persona of Indians abroad, with their particular narrow construction of Hindu doctrine given prominence in cultural festivals. They have proven particularly adept at using summer camps, university associations, and even social networking websites such as Facebook to reach a young audience.

The significance of such diaspora support should not be underestimated; part of the decline of the notorious Sri Lankan separatist group the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam can be attributed to the sudden reduction in its financial support from the wealthy Tamil diaspora, as the United States finally tightened its stance on funding "terrorist organizations" after September 11, 2001. During the agitation for an independent Sikh homeland or "Khalistan" ("land of the pure") that shook the Punjab in the 1980s, overseas Sikhs were absolutely central as militant separatists came to dominate many *gurdwaras* (Sikh temples) abroad—just as militant Islamism in the last decade has drawn much of its manpower from disaffected young Muslims in the West. Such transnational activism has caused governments much anxiety about migrants' "divided loyalties," especially in the stark aftermath of the 9/11 atrocities.

Nonetheless, active diasporans, those who consciously reiterate their political links with a second homeland, are in the minority. The majority sees the migratory experience and new homeland less through the prism of divided loyalties or multiple identities than through labor market participation. Claims to "diaspora" status are usually made under the aegis of an ambitious, upwardly mobile elite, without which migrant communities are likely to remain unorganized and disenfranchised. Both the Sikh nationalist and orthodox Hindu claims fit this pattern. A diasporic mentality must be continually reimposed, both through

participation in collective action (festivals, protests, and parades) and through everyday immersion in culture and symbols such as music, language, food, dress, and constant media and community references to "us" and "ours." Through these processes, diasporas are constructed and galvanized by a committed leadership elite.

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See also Diaspora in the United Kingdom; Diaspora in the United States

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Diaspora, Tibetan. *See* Tibetan Diaspora

✦ DIASPORA IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

In the 18th and 19th centuries, Great Britain's empire in India led to many Indians migrating to the United Kingdom as manual laborers, ayahs (children's nannies), lascars (merchant sailors), domestic servants, lawyers, doctors, and professionals, of which members of the Gujarati, Parsi, and Punjabi communities were at the forefront. Large-scale Indian immigration into the United Kingdom, however, only came after 1947 following Indian independence and the aftermath of World War II as a result of reconstruction and adult male labor shortages in the industrial sector. This was followed by a second wave of migration from East African countries of people mainly of Gujarati origin, following expulsion in large numbers from Uganda by military dictator and president Idi Amin (1925–2003). These migrants set up very successful businesses in the United Kingdom and have boosted the U.K. economy mainly in the food and beverage industries. However, further large-scale primary immigration was restricted by the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 and the Immigration Act of 1971. According to a study on global Indians by the UK-India Business Council, there are approximately 1.6 million people of Indian origin in the United Kingdom and they are the single largest community within the U.K. ethnic minority population. It has been estimated

that this section of the population will triple within the next 40 years. In Leicester, a city in the East Midlands of England, one out of five residents is of Indian origin, and the city is reputed to have the largest population of Indians living outside India. London is estimated to have a third of the overall Indian diaspora in the United Kingdom, with Southall, in west London, being the heart of the Indian community. Punjabis form the largest subgroup within the Indian diaspora and are well known for mainstreaming and popularizing Bhangra music. With twice as many Indian companies listed on the London Stock Exchange than the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, there are several support networks for these companies, including the Indian High Commission, the Confederation of Indian Organisations, the UK-India Business Council, and Asian business associations within regional chambers of commerce across Britain. In London, the wider Indian and South Asian communities have established the largest Hindu and Sikh temples outside India and the largest mosque in Western Europe.

The Indian diaspora in the United Kingdom comprises people who fall into several categories: British citizens of Indian origin (from India, East Africa, or other countries); Indian citizens who have the right to permanently settle in the United Kingdom as Commonwealth citizens (under immigration laws); and Indian migrants to the United Kingdom. With over a third of the Indian diaspora having been born in the United Kingdom, the second and third generations consider themselves culturally and socially British; they have an overall disposable income of more than £6 billion. Their cultural values contribute significantly toward making Britain the vibrant, dynamic society that it is today. Young people of Indian origin are going on to higher education in ever-greater numbers, there is a greater representation of Indians in the professions, and there are a growing number of successful Indian businessmen and women and entrepreneurs. This vibrant community has its own television programs, newspapers, media, and its own business associations, local societies, and large philanthropic interests in India. In addition to Indian community-run radio stations such as Sunrise Radio, Yarr Radio, Radio XL, and Sabras Radio, the BBC operates the Asian Network channel devoted to South Asian news and culture. The Asian publication



Indians living in the United Kingdom attend a Diwali festival in Trafalgar Square, London. (Francesco Carucci/Dreamstime.com)

Eastern Eye produces an annual magazine, *Britain's Richest Asians*, and the list of multimillionaires is dominated by members of the Indian community. From Britain's most expensive private home worth more than 120 million pounds and owned by steel magnate Lakshmi Mittal (b. 1950), the richest man in Britain, to chicken tikka masala being Britain's most popular dish, the Indian diaspora has been largely successful in the United Kingdom. In addition to the popularity of Indian cuisine and more than 9,000 Indian restaurants, many British Indians have excelled in politics, sports, business, and in the entertainment industry. Notable films like *East Is East* (1999), *Bend It Like Beckham* (2002), and *Provoked* (2006); comedians such as Meera Syal (b. 1961) and Sanjeev Bhaskar (b. 1964), who stars in the famous British sitcoms *Goodness Gracious Me* and *Kumars at No. 42;* and the 2009 success of British Indian actor Dev Patel (b. 1990) in the Oscar-winning film *Slumdog Millionaire* (2008) highlight the growing Indian influence in the U.K. entertainment industry. In addition, diaspora Indians have made remarkable contributions in the areas of the visual arts, music, and fashion and most famously in the higher education and literary fields. While in 1892 Dadabhai Naoroji (1825–1917) became the first Parsi to sit in the House of Commons, in 2006 Karan Faridoon Bilimoria (b. 1961), founder of Cobra Beer, became the first Indian Parsi, as Baron Bilimoria, to sit in the House of Lords.

In addition to increasing Indian business investments in the United Kingdom, such as Tata's acquisition of Corus in 2006, there are now closer business, political, and development ties between the United Kingdom and India where diaspora links play an important role. In 2004, there were 19 direct flights between the United Kingdom and India and two airlines to choose from, whereas in 2009 British Airways alone had 43 flights per week to Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore, Chennai, and Kolkata, with flights to Hyderabad being added.

A 2007 study by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation found that among the diverse ethnic communities in the United Kingdom, British Indians have the lowest poverty rates and rank second behind white British poverty rates. Despite the large-scale successes and presence of this community, instances of racial discrimination, racial slurs, and harassment persist, even hitting the headlines over actress Shilpa Shetty (b. 1975) in the 2007 *Celebrity Big Brother UK* contest, which she eventually won with 63 percent of the vote after allegedly being the subject of racist taunts from fellow contestants. Caste discrimination is also reported to be practiced within the Indian community, with a number of cases reported of caste abuse toward the Dalits (formerly known as untouchables). In addition, Oxford University and BBC research reported in 2007 that son preference and female feticide are practiced within the Indian community in the United Kingdom, even among British-born Indians. At the same time, British Indian women, particularly those from more educated backgrounds, appear to be ahead of sociobehavioral change with respect to the family. Some increasingly see men's inability to effectively negotiate traditional norms of family formation, as well as individual family roles, as producing too much risk with respect to wives' economic and emotional security. These women, therefore, are taking a more cautious approach to marriage, placing a high degree of emphasis

on their education and career development as prerequisites for getting married. The effect of this trend is greater intrafamilial bargaining power for British Indian women and the demise of many traditional gender practices.

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See also Diaspora, Indian; Diaspora in the United States

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✦ DIASPORA IN THE UNITED STATES

Diaspora, the Greek word for "dispersion," refers to the movement of an ethnic group from its homeland to other parts of the world. It was originally used to refer to the forced exile of Jewish people from Judaea by the Babylonians and later by the Romans. In modern usage, diaspora refers to any voluntary or involuntary migration of peoples outside their country of ethnic origin and their adaptation and cultural process in their new host countries.

From the isolated arrival of an Indian merchant from Madras who found his way to Massachusetts in 1790 to the Indian adventurer who was reported in California's gold mines in 1857, the Indian diaspora peaked in the late 19th and early 20th centuries during British colonial rule in India (1858–1947). It surged again in the 1960s with the passage of the landmark liberal immigration law of 1965 and in the 1990s during the technology boom in California. In 2010, the Indian diasporic population in the United States was approaching 3 million.

Since India is the seat of many world religions, Indians in the United States may be Sikhs, Hindus, Muslims, Jains, Parsis, Buddhists, Jews, or Christians. In addition to English, they speak different Indian languages, such as Hindi, Gujarati, or Urdu. The highest concentration of Indians can be found in California, followed by New York, New Jersey, Texas, and Illinois. Indian immigrants and their descendants in the United States have variably been called "South Indians," or "East Indians," with the U.S. census preferring to use "Asian

Indians" to distinguish them from Native American or West Indians. Among Indians themselves, overseas or diasporic Indians are called *desi* ("countryman") or nonresident Indians (NRIs).

The catalysts for the Indian diaspora in the 19th and early 20th centuries were both economic and political. In line with Britain's commercial interests after it abolished slavery with the Slavery Abolition Act 1833, the British used Indian indentured workers in their overseas plantation colonies. Indian indentured servants found their way to many parts of the world, from Britain to South Africa, Mauritius and Tanzania, to Fiji, Guyana, Trinidad, Mauritius, and Southeast Asia. The Indian diaspora in the United States, while comparatively smaller and more recent than other migrations from Asia, was also part of the international migration of workers from undeveloped countries when workers were lured by the economic opportunities in developed countries, especially in Great Britain, the United States, and Canada.

The statistically significant migration of Indians to the United States began in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The Indians who migrated to the United States in 1899–1914 primarily came from a single source: the Punjab region of northern India. They were mostly farmers and peasants who settled on the West Coast. They worked in the lumber mills of Washington and in the agricultural fields of California. Just like Chinese immigrants, Indians also worked with the Western Pacific Railways in California to build the western section of the transcontinental railroad that linked the country together by rail in 1869. Since most Punjabis are adherents of Sikhism, a monotheistic religion that originated in the Punjab in the 15th century, most early Indian immigrants were Sikhs. Wearing turbans and beards as prescribed by their religion, the Sikh men were distinct and considered "unassimilable" by mainstream American society. As such, like other Asian immigrants and sojourners, they faced intense discrimination. The racist Asian Exclusion League, for example, resenting Indians for competing with white laborers for jobs, staged the 1907 anti-Hindu riot in Bellingham, Washington, where a mob of about 500 white men attacked the Indian enclave in the town.

After the Punjabi pioneers, the next group of Indians who arrived in the United States were students on scholarships. While these students studied in universities in various parts of the United States such as Harvard, Columbia, the University of Illinois at Urbana, and in universities in Nebraska and Iowa, most Indian students studied at Pacific coast universities such as the University of California at Berkeley, Stanford University, and the University of Washington. Many of these students worked in California's agricultural fields and orchards during the summer and also became part of Indian political movements.

In fact, Indians from British India found the United States a favorable environment for their revolutionary activities and political aspirations to end British rule. A small percentage of Indians even arrived as political refugees. In 1913, the Ghadr ("Revolutionary") Party, primarily a movement of political refugees, young intellectuals, and students, was founded in San Francisco with the aim of bringing down the British Raj (rule) in India. It even gained financial support from the German government. In February 1915 Ghaderites chartered vessels from

California with arms purchased from Mexico to stage a revolution, the Ghadr Conspiracy, in India. However, the plot failed. Many were imprisoned or executed. The Indian Home Rule League, mirroring the All India Home Rule League created in India two years earlier, was a less radical group of Indians formed in New York in 1918 with similar nationalist aspirations. The Indian struggle for equality in American society was inevitably linked to an independent and sovereign India. As British subjects residing in the United States, Indians concluded that they would be treated better if India were an independent and sovereign nation.

A highlight of the history of Indians in the United States was the controversy involving their racial classification. Since Indians are of a hybrid stock, they have been variably considered as "Caucasians,""whites," or "blacks." This racial classification was critical since it was linked to policy on immigration quotas and rights to citizenship and property. With racism against immigrants and people of color prevalent at that time, laws premised on race and ethnicity were used to exclude Asian Indians. In 1910, in the *United States v. Balsara,* the Supreme Court ruled that Indians were eligible for citizenship because they were Caucasian like "whites." In a dramatic reversal in 1923, the Supreme Court ruled in *United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind* that being "Caucasian" was not enough to be considered "white" since "white" meant a person of European origins. Since Indians were not of European descent, they were not "free white persons" and therefore not eligible for citizenship. Since Indians were not eligible for citizenship, they were not allowed to own private property.

Due to antimiscegenation laws of the time, which were only reversed in 1948, Indians were also prohibited from marrying whites. Since few Indian women migrated to the United States, Indian men then married Mexican women, giving rise to a number of Punjabi-Mexican marriages.

With the end of British rule of India in August 1947, what was known as unified British India was divided into the two independent states of India and Pakistan. This partition, which turned violent and bloody, triggered further migrations to Britain and to other British Commonwealth countries such as Australia and Canada. From Canada, many crossed the border into the United States.

The 1960s was a landmark period for Indians and other Asian immigrants as the passage of the 1965 Immigration Reform Act, also known as the Hart-Celler Act, allowed the immigration of Indian professionals and this led to an influx of doctors and nurses and scientists and engineers. This was in sharp contrast to the early wave of peasant migration. It also allowed for family reunification, as family members of early immigrants could also enter the United States.

In the 1990s, Indians made dramatic contributions to the computer and information technology industry in California's Silicon Valley as entrepreneurs and professionals. About 900 high-tech companies in Silicon Valley had Indian chief executive officers, engineers, and technicians. Highly educated and technically highly trained, many of whom were educated in the prestigious Indian Institutes of Technology, they provided a good percentage of the brains and labor that fueled high-tech growth in California.

As the number of Indian immigrants continues to grow, the diasporic community continues to celebrate its ethnic and cultural heritage. After the first Sikh *gurdwara* ("temple") was built in Stockton in 1912, other *gurdwaras* followed in other states. Today, Sikh *gurdwaras*, Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain temples, and Indian churches and mosques can be found nationwide. Indian Americans celebrate Hindu festivals, such as Diwali (festival of lights), Holi (spring festival of colors), Navaratri (nine nights) fall celebration, and the Muslim Eid-ul-Fitr, which marks the end of Ramadan.

Ethnic enclaves, known as "Little India" flourish, such as those on Devon Avenue in Chicago, Jackson Heights in New York, and Artesia in California, where Indian stores, restaurants, and residences abound and Indian culture thrives. Many Indian Americans are considered transnationals—that is, those who straddle two cultures, as they engage in entrepreneurial business ventures and international trade involving India and the United States, travel between the two countries, and celebrate both American and Indian cultures. Nonetheless, after the Al Qaeda attack on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001, a number of Indians suffered racial violence at the hands of Americans who confused the turban-wearing Indian Sikhs with Muslims.

Today, Asian Indians are among the wealthiest and best educated of all the ethnic groups in the United States The U.S. census American Community Survey for Asians in 2004 reported that Indians enjoy the highest median household income at $69,000, even exceeding that of whites at $49,000. As the group with the highest educational attainment in the United States, 68 percent of Indians have a bachelor's degree or higher degrees. They also have the highest number in management and professional occupations. They are the third-largest Asian diasporic community in the United States, after the Chinese and Filipinos.

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See also Diaspora, Indian; Diaspora in the United Kingdom

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✦ DIET AND HEALTH

In India, as in China, ancient Greece, medieval Europe, and other civilizations, food is inextricably linked to spiritual and physical health. "You are what you eat" is the dominant theme of Indian medical and philosophical systems. Unlike modern Western systems, which take a mechanical approach to treating disease and diet, Indian systems are holistic; that is, they treat the entire individual, including specific mental, emotional, and physical makeup, rather than symptoms alone. A person's mental and emotional state is believed to determine physical health, and these conditions, in turn, are affected by diet. Today alternative systems of medicines, especially ayurveda, are gaining adherents in Western countries and are being studied by the U.S. National Institutes of Health and other organizations.

The Indian government officially recognizes seven systems of medicine and supports colleges, research institutes, and clinics in these disciplines. They are

1. Allopathy, or Western medicine
2. Homeopathy, a system developed in Germany in the early 19th century that uses small doses of a substance to cure diseases
3. Naturopathy, a German system based on the premise that the basic cause of disease is the accumulation of morbid matter and that nature is the greatest healer
4. Unani, the Islamic school of medicine with close ties to ancient Greek medicine
5. Ayurveda, the ancient indigenous Indian system of medicine
6. Siddha, a variation of ayurveda practiced in southern India
7. Yoga therapy

Many Indians are eclectic in their approach to medicine and health. Patients may seek treatment from physicians belonging to different schools—an estimated 10 percent of Indians use homeopathic medicines—while Western-trained doctors incorporate ayurvedic or yogic medicines and dietary advice into their practices. The official systems of medicine are supplemented and paralleled by homegrown ideas about food and nutrition based on local, family, or even individual beliefs. As American ayurvedic practitioner Robert E. Svoboda puts it:

> India's people daily talk, knowingly or not, in the ayurvedic idiom. Even the most illiterate resident of the most remote village knows that yogurt causes phlegm to accumulate in the chest, and everyone makes use of simple herbs like vetiver which removes heat from the body and makes life during the hot season a little more bearable. . . . Ayurvedic thought is part of the conceptual universe of every Indian who thinks like an Indian, and has been part of India's collective consciousness since, probably, prehistoric times. . . . Medicine in India is not now and never has been the exclusive province of physicians.

Ayurveda, Sanskrit for "science of life," has its roots in the *Ajur-veda* ("Science of Longevity"), an appendage to the *Atharva-veda* that was compiled by Aryan priests around 5000 BCE and

written down thousands of years later. Some historians believe it incorporates medicinal ideas from the Indus Valley. It describes such conditions as fever, leprosy, consumption, heart disease, headache, parasites, rheumatism, and epilepsy and their treatments, which include charms and incantations, natural forces such as the sun and water, and herbs.

The rise of Indian nationalism at the turn of the 20th century saw a revival of interest in Indian science and medicine, and ayurveda underwent a renaissance that continues today (although Western medicine still receives the bulk of government support). Ayurveda is particularly well developed in the state of Kerala, where ayurvedic hospitals, pharmacies, and health spas flourish. Ayurveda is now being popularized in the West by the writings of Deepak Chopra and others.

The basic principle of Vedic thought, of which ayurveda is a part, is that the entire cosmos is part of one absolute reality. Everything that exists in the vast external universe, the macrocosm, also appears in the internal cosmos of the human body, the microcosm, which consists of both the relatively unconscious body and the conscious mind and spirit that dwell within it.

All matter is made up of five elements or states of matter: earth, water, fire, air, and ether (the field from which matter is created). We experience these elements in terms of different qualities, which are classified into 10 pairs of dualities, denoting a continuum: heavy and light, cold and hot, oily/moist and dry, slow and intense, stable and mobile, soft and hard, clear and sticky, smooth and rough, subtle and gross, and solid and liquid. A substance that is heavy, rough, hard, slow, stable, clear, subtle, and gross is made up mainly of the earth element; one that is liquid, oily, cold, slow, soft, and smooth consists mainly of water; and so on.

All body parts, such as bone and cartilage, are mainly earthy in nature. Fat and vital bodily fluids, such as lymph, blood, semen, and mucus, are predominantly watery. Digestive fluids, endocrine secretions, body heat, and substances that produce mental awareness are fiery substances. Everything mobile, including the nervous systems, is air in nature. All channels though which things pass—blood and lymph vessels, pores, the nerves—are ethereal.

Foods are characterized by their taste—sweet, salty, sour, astringent, bitter, and pungent—and the 10 properties listed earlier. The two categories are related in complex ways. Generally sour, salty, and pungent substances are hot, while sweet, bitter, and astringent substances are cold. A person's choice of food is determined mainly by its taste: everyone craves the taste they are missing. But people should not follow their predilections blindly; rather, under the guidance of an ayurvedic practitioner, they have to consciously select those tastes and other qualities to help balance their *doshas*.

The proper diet depends on a number of factors, including how a person eats, the climate and season, the natural quality of the food, its preparation, the combination of foods consumed, and the amount. Charaka laid down rules for eating that are just as applicable today as they were thousands of years ago.

- Eat properly combined food after digestion of the previous meal to allow a free passage for all substances.

- Eat in a congenial, quiet place—either alone or with affectionate people—so that the mind is not depressed.
- Eat neither hurriedly nor leisurely to appreciate the qualities of the food you are eating.
- Eat without laughing or talking, with concentration, considering your constitution and what is good and not good for you as you eat.
- Do not eat when you are not hungry and do not fail to eat when you are hungry.
- Do not eat when you are angry, depressed, or emotionally distraught or immediately after exercise.
- Keep as large a gap as possible between meals.
- Sit to eat whenever possible facing east.
- Pray, thanking the Creator for the food you are offering your digestive fire. [In ayurveda, both the cooking and digestion of food are considered equivalent to offering a substance to the sacrificial fire; the digestive principle is even referred to as fire (*agni*).]
- Never cook for yourself alone; the gift of food is the best gift of all.
- Feed all five senses: look at the food and savor its appearance and aroma; listen to the sounds it makes, especially when cooking; eat with your hands to enjoy its texture; chew each morsel many times to extract its flavor.
- Stroll about a hundred steps after a meal to assist the digestive process.
- Do not eat heavy or *kapha*-producing food like yogurt and sesame seeds after sunset and eat nothing within two hours of going to bed.
- Never waste food.
- Food should be "alive" in order to give life to the eater. Raw food is more alive than cooked food. Overcooked, undercooked, burned, bad tasting, unripe or overripe, putrefied, or stale food should never be eaten. Leftovers should be heated up as soon as possible or, ideally, avoided altogether. Spices should be ground fresh for each use. Cold food and ice water are not considered healthy.

The 10 qualities are innate in all foods. Their presence or absence determines the effect a particular food has on the *doshas*. For example, dry fruits, apples, melons, potatoes, tomatoes, eggplant, ice cream, beef, peas, and green salad have qualities that tend to aggravate *vata* and thus should not be taken in excess by a person with a *vata* constitution. However, sweet fruits, coconut, brown rice, red cabbage, bananas, grapes, cherries, and oranges are beneficial for *vata* types. *Pitta* is increased by spicy foods, peanut butter, sour fruits, bananas, papayas, tomatoes, and garlic and is inhibited by mangoes, oranges, pears, plums, sprouts, sunflower seeds, asparagus, and mushrooms. Bananas, melons, coconut, dates, papayas, pineapples, and dairy products increase *kapha* while dry fruits, pomegranates, cranberries, basmati rice, sprouts, and chicken inhibit it.

Food combinations are very important. When two or more foods having different tastes and attributes are combined, the digestive fire can become overloaded, resulting in incomplete

digestion. Generally, a person should avoid eating fruits (especially melons) with any other food or even different fruits at the same time; lots of raw and cooked foods together; fresh foods with leftovers; or milk with bananas, sour fruits, fish, meat, and yogurt. The addition of spices and herbs can help to make foods compatible.

Ayurveda is not vegetarian; in fact, meat is recommended for certain ailments. Charaka calls meat juice "nectar itself" for people who are wasted, emaciated, convalescing, and desirous of increased strength. Even beef has its place as a means of calming an unusually intense digestive fire and for treating diseases caused by *vata* alone. Meat in general is heavy, but meats from animals that live in arid areas are relatively lighter. The meat of very fat, very old, or very young animals should be avoided, as should meat from an animal that was not killed while roaming freely in its natural habitat. Fatty meats are supposed to be eaten in winter and game birds in summer. Venison enjoys a special place in ayurvedic medicine, since it is considered particularly nourishing and beneficial and can be eaten all year. Still, meat is basically regarded as a condiment, better consumed as a broth or soup rather than as a steak or chop.

Fish is generally considered hot (because it lives in cold water) and sweet, so it can strengthen the body without aggravating *kapha,* as most sweet foods do. Fish from a pond are considered preferable to river or sea fish, because they control *pitta.* The opposition to alcohol found in many Hindu texts is absent from ayurveda. Charaka listed 7 sources of wine and 84 liquors and advocated moderate drinking for its digestive, nourishing, and stimulating effects and as a source of pleasure. Susruta believed that alcohol induced *pitta* but nonetheless listed 30 types of wine that were acceptable to drink.

Garlic and onions, avoided by some Hindus, are remedies in ayurvedic medicine. Garlic, an ingredient in many pills, relieves *vata* and *kapha* and increases *pitta* and is prescribed for certain ailments, including worms, cough, and asthma. Onion is an astringent and a diuretic.

How can these recommendations be reconciled with Hindu and yogic proscriptions? An ayurvedic practitioner explained it in the following way: "All substances are available to Ayurvedic practitioners as medicine. While the tradition advocates self-realization, one still needs to use whatever is available or necessary to restore balance. The protracted use of otherwise proscribed substances is not implied. Hence garlic may help restore health and thence be unnecessary as a dietary item. The same is true of meat."

According to the ancient ayurvedic physicians, diseases fall into seven categories: genetic, congenital, metabolic, traumatic (physical or mental), temporal, divine, and natural (hunger, thirst, fatigue, old age). The mind and emotions play a very important role in causing disease, as do dietary imbalances.

Whether or not a disease manifests itself depends on the strength or weakness of the digestive fire, which, in turn, can be affected by many factors: overeating or undereating; overconsumption of heavy food, especially meat; overuse of cold and liquid substances; consumption of food inappropriate for the time of year; the climate; a person's age; and mental causes, especially fear, anger, greed, misery, and sorrow. Poor digestion leads to the production of *ama,* a Sanskrit word that means food that is absorbed into the system without being properly digested.

The ancient physicians were aware of the existence of microorganisms and parasites but believed that exposure would lead to disease only in people whose conditions are ripe for it because of *ama*. The obstructions it causes prevent the *doshas* from flowing freely through the system, so that they accumulate in the body and initially cause lethargy, indigestion, heaviness, and other symptoms. They are easiest to remove at this stage by purification and diet. If they are not removed, they begin to wander around the body, "wreaking havoc in the system wherever they roam." Once they escape their reservoirs, they must be removed or neutralized with medicine and purification techniques, such as enemas, laxatives, and fasting.

It's important to eat the right foods to prevent imbalance and disease, but once a disease has been contracted, food is one of the methods prescribed to cure it. Treatment begins with fasting, "the first and most important of all medicines," in order to unclog the *ama* and restore the appetite. Fasting can mean many things: going without food or water; living on water, liquids, or a single food such as *khichri;* or eating a number of different foods specific to a particular condition. Vegetables are sometimes avoided during therapy, since they are considered astringent and will cause the channels to close up. The consumption and external application of oil, fat, bone marrow, and ghee are considered beneficial for some conditions and people, especially for those who are deprived of love. (The Sanskrit word for fat, *sneha,* also means love.)

Once the acute stage of the disease has passed, the patient is given a pacifying diet accompanied by appropriate medicines. Medicines are always given in a vehicle, such as honey, medicinal wine, fruit juices, jams, butter, ghee, or meat soup. They are mainly derived from plants; every plant in the world is said to have an ayurvedic use. Some of these ancient herbal remedies were adapted by Greek and Western medicine; for example, reserpine, extracted from *Wauwolfia serpentina,* is effective for reducing blood pressure while psyllium seed is a popular remedy for bowel problems. The three most important medicinal plants are the fruits called *amalaki, haritaki* (myrobalan), and *bibhitaki.* They are combined to make the most popular ayurvedic medicine, *triphala* (Sanskrit for "three fruits").

Yoga therapy and Siddha are closely related to ayurveda. Yoga is more than a series of physical postures; it is a profound philosophy of life that strives to develop a balance between the body and the mind in order to reunite the individual self with the Absolute, or pure consciousness. (*Yoga* means "joining" or "uniting" in Sanskrit.) Paths that lead the yogi (practitioner of yoga) to enlightenment include moral restraints and observances; study of the sacred texts; hatha yoga, which means control of the body through postures; and *pranayama,* correct breathing. The last two methods are means to the end of meditation, the goal of which is to become aware of the unity of the self with the Absolute.

Yoga does not deal with the physical body but rather with certain invisible sheaths (*kosas*) that parallel the physical organs. Yoga deals with people not on the physical but the mental and astral plane, where three *gunas* ("attributes" or "virtues") determine our fundamental being. The five elements of the universe (earth, water, fire, air, and ether) combine in various ways to create these *gunas.* The first is *sattva,* often translated as "lucidity," "purity," or "dispassion"; it is

the source of knowledge and enlightenment and leads to joy and good health. *Rajas,* translated as "passion," "distraction," or "restlessness," leads to action but also to sensuality and suffering if we do not harness and direct its energy. The third element, *tamas,* translated as "dark inertia" or "dullness," is manifested in sloth, lethargy, anger, and ignorance.

All life evolves from the interplay among these forces, and all three are needed for life to continue. *Tamas* gives us the desire to rest and stop our activities. Without it there would be no consistency or solidity in our lives; however, with too much *tamas* we will never do anything. *Rajas* gives us the urge to organize, to work, and to push forward with our projects, but if we have no direction or goal, *rajas* will take us anywhere our uncontrolled senses pull us. *Sattva* enables us to experience our true nature. It also gives us curiosity and the ability to think and reason and to set higher goals.

Diet is believed to have an intimate connection with the mind, which is formed out of the subtlest portion of the food. Yogis and those aspiring to spiritual advancement should eat *sattvic* foods that render the mind pure and calm and are conducive to enlightenment and serenity. *Sattvic* foods include fresh fruits and vegetables, wheat, rice, cow's milk, dry ginger, cucumber, green vegetables, honey, kidney beans, nuts, and seeds. Ghee, or clarified butter, is considered particularly *sattvic,* since it helps to stimulate the healthy flow of fluids throughout the body.

Rajasic foods stimulate energy and creativity as well as passion and aggressiveness. They include items that are sharp, sour, pungent, and hot, such as sesame and mustard oil, fish, yogurt, goat meat, chilies, venison and wild game, fish, eggs, coffee and tea, white sugar, and spices. Some people class garlic as *rajasic,* others as *tamasic.* People trying to lead a spiritual and ascetic life are advised to avoid garlic, which is believed to interfere with meditation and arouse the passions. A vegetarian diet with moderate intake of food is the ideal.

Tamasic foods fill our minds with anger, darkness, confusion, and inertia. These are foods that are rotten, stale, overcooked, and decaying, including red meat, leftovers, fast foods, fried foods, processed foods, plus tobacco, alcohol, and drugs. Practitioners of yoga shun them.

Some writers have tried to equate the three *gunas* with the three *doshas* of ayurveda: *kapha* with *tamas, pittha* with *sattva,* and *vata* with *rajas.* However, they cannot be specifically correlated and probably come from entirely different traditions. Whatever their relationship, an ayurvedic physician is supposed to be familiar with the presence and functioning of the *gunas* and to be able to determine which predominates when he treats a patient.

Siddha (Sanskrit for "pure") medicine may have originated among the ancient Dravidian inhabitants of the subcontinent and developed in southern India in the seventh or eighth century. Today it is practiced in Tamil-speaking regions of the south. The principles and doctrines are very similar to those of ayurveda: the human body is considered a replica of the universe, as are food and drugs. The main difference is the extensive use of metals and minerals in treatment, especially sulfur and mercury.

The most widespread concept is the hot/cold dichotomy, which is strongly entrenched even among people who do not follow ayurvedic practices, especially in northern India. This

medical theory probably traveled from India to Arabia and the Middle East in the sixth century BCE and later to Greece and Europe. Today most Indians can tell you whether a food is hot or cold, although the classification varies in different parts of the country. For example, wheat is considered a very hot food in southern India (where historically it was not grown), but only moderately hot in the north, where it is a staple. Most varieties of lentils are considered cold in western India and hot in the north. Papayas are regarded as extremely heating in southern India but not in the north. Most spices are considered hot everywhere, although a few, such as cumin and fennel seeds, are said to be cold. Jaggery is hot, but sugarcane juice is cold. Because alcohol, yogurt, and honey are all heating, other hot food should not be taken with them lest the *doshas* be thrown out of balance.

Is there some basis to the hot/cold theory? In an experiment in southern India, scientists fed one group of volunteers a diet of only cold food and another group only hot food over a period of 10 days. The diets were identical in terms of nutrients. Those who ate the hot foods had highly acidic urine, indicating that the acid-base balance of the body was altered. Those who ate cold foods showed much lower excretion of sulfur and a lower retention of nitrogen.

The Unani system of medicine (*Unani tibbia*) was introduced into India by the Muslim conquerors in the 14th century. The theoretical framework is derived from the writings of the Greek physicians Hippocrates (460–377 BCE), who is considered the father of both allopathic and Unani medicine, and Galen (died ca. 200 CE). The Arabic word *Unan* means Greece, although a proposed alternative derivation is that Unani comes from China's Yunnan Province, perhaps because there are so many similarities between Chinese and Indian medicine, including the hot/cold classification. Unani practitioners are called Hakims.

Over the centuries, the corpus of Greek medicine was enriched and developed by physicians in Egypt, Persia, Iraq, and other Middle Eastern countries and in China and India. During the golden period of Arab civilization (749–1258 CE), Greek and Sanskrit texts were translated into Arabic, renowned ayurvedic physicians were invited to Baghdad and other cities to teach and practice, and learned physicians wrote treatises on medicine. When the Mongols invaded Persia and Central Asia in the 14th century CE, many physicians and scholars fled to India. The Delhi sultans and later the Mughal emperors provided state patronage to physicians and scholars from all over the world and hired them as court physicians. Delhi became a center of Unani medicine, which reached its peak between the 13th and 17th centuries. During the British rule, Unani medicine suffered because of withdrawal of government support, but official interest returned after Indian independence in 1947. Today India is the world leader in Unani medicine, which has its own licensed physicians, hospitals, and educational and research institutes.

Unani medicine is based on the humoral theory of Greek medicine, which assumes the presence of four humors in the body: blood, phlegm, yellow bile, and black bile. Humors are applicable to any fluids found in the body, including cellular, tissue, and vascular fluids. These humors are composed of the four basic elements—earth, water, air, and fire—each of which has two qualities: warm and dry for fire, warm and moist for air, cold and moist for water, and

cold and dry for earth. The seasons also have qualities, as do an individual's temperament, which can be of four kinds: sanguine, choleric, cold or phlegmatic, and melancholic.

Every person is born with a unique humoral constitution, which represents his healthy state and determines his personality. When the amounts of the humors are changed and thrown out of balance with one another, it leads to disease. Restoring the quality and balance of humors is the goal of treatment, using the body's natural power of self-preservation and adjustment.

The causes of the imbalance can be either external (e.g., excessive heat or cold, a polluted atmosphere, or injuries) or internal. Hakims use four kinds of therapies: regimental (exercise, massage, steam baths, emetics, bleeding, and purging); surgery; medicines, based on herbal, animal, and mineral drugs; and diet. Many of the drugs are based on herbs and plants that are cultivated in special gardens.

Digestion plays a central role in the Unani system. Minor and even some major ailments can be prevented by regular, normal digestion; conversely, poor digestion can cause disease. Digestion can be damaged by overeating, eating meals too closely together, eating rapidly, consuming too much water, or insomnia. Certain foods can cause indigestion: those that putrefy quickly (milk and fresh fish), those that take time to digest (such as beef), stale foods, spices and chilies, alcohol, strong tea, coffee, and oily food. However, any food is acceptable in moderation. Aids to digestion include decoctions and teas made from *ajwain* seeds, mint, fennel, and coriander seeds; pomegranate juice; and other herbs and spices.

Diet therapy treats ailments by regulating the quality and quantity of a patient's food. When a disease is advanced, treatment often begins with a total fast, which gives the patient's system a chance to rest, or the restriction of food when the patient needs to regain strength through certain nutrients. A liquid diet, consisting of fruit juices or soups made from meat or vegetables, is prescribed for digestive failure. A semisolid diet comprising yogurt or *khichri* is recommended in the case of poor or incomplete digestion.

People are also advised to eat foods that have the opposite quality to their temperament. A person who has too much of the sanguine humor, which leads to increased heat, should eat cold food such as barley water or fish and take cooling herbs; if there is a thinning of the sanguine humor, warm and dry foods are prescribed. What is cold and hot is to some extent determined by local and regional beliefs and customs. Some of the cures no doubt reflect folk remedies; for example, a recommended treatment for influenza includes long pepper powder mixed with honey and ginger juice in the early stage and milk and turmeric powder to mitigate the aftereffects. For diabetes, bitter and astringent foods, such as bitter gourd juice, are prescribed. Weaknesses of specific organs are corrected by eating the same organ of an animal.

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See also Ayurvedic Medicine; Cooking; Cuisine

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✦ DISTRICT PRIMARY EDUCATION PROGRAM

Designed as a nationwide program to be tailored to local conditions, the District Primary Education Program (DPEP) was launched in 1994 in 42 districts in 7 states: Assam, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Tamil Nadu. It now includes Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal; there are 275 DPEP districts in 18 states (nearly half the country). DPEP consisted of four phases, Phase I (1994–2001), Phase II (1996–2002), Phase III (1998–2003), and Phase IV (1997–2002), and was funded by the World Bank, European Union (EU), the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and UNICEF. DPEP was in effect superseded in 2001 by the primary education universalization program Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), with 2010 as the target for completion and World Bank support.



Children from a small school in the village of Dapoli, Maharashtra. (Nikhil Gangavane/Dreamstime.com)

DPEP was therefore designed as a time-limited "specific intervention program." Prior to DPEP and some smaller projects, education funding was from individual state government budgets only, none of which included money for expanding education; around 90 percent of spending was on teachers' salaries. DPEP therefore represented an opportunity for the central government to expand primary education, provided as it was by the economic crisis of 1991 and the liberalization policies that followed. The criteria for DPEP were that it should focus on districts with large education disparities between girls and boys and social groups (measured respectively by literacy, enrollment, and dropout rates) along with improving school infrastructure and teacher training. In addition, R.S. Pandey in a 2000 report for the World Bank, noted that districts were "selected on ability to show success in a reasonable time frame," and these were not typically districts with the lowest female literacy. This was directly related to the relative effectiveness of the local education administrative machinery. The DPEP's greatest impact appears to have been partial contribution, among other programs, to increasing enrollment and attendance—that is, increasing demand for education among social strata for whom education previously was seen as irrelevant.

SHEEBA HÄRMÄ

See also Child Labor; Economy

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Diu. *See* Daman and Diu

✦ DOORDARSHAN

Doordarshan is the public television broadcaster of India. It is a division of Prasar Bharti, a public service broadcaster selected by the government of India to broadcast public television programs. It was started as a tiny experimental operation in 1959 in Delhi. Today

Doordarshan is one of the largest terrestrial networks in the world. Its network of 1,400 terrestrial transmitters reaches over 91 percent of India's population.

The initial expansion of Doordarshan was very slow. The first daily one-hour service started in 1965, nearly six years after the advent of television. The transmission included news bulletins in Hindi and agricultural programs for farmers. But it could only be accessed mostly by bureaucrats and politicians who had television sets in their homes. In 1972, Bombay service was started. It was followed by Srinagar and Amritsar services in 1973. Until the 1970s, Doordarshan's programming was mostly developmental and educational in nature and there was very little in the way of entertainment.

However, early in the 1980s Doordarshan began to be a popular station after it telecasted the Asian Games, which were held in New Delhi in 1982. The broadcasting of the Asian Games also witnessed the introduction of color transmission, which popularized television across urban India. This led to the rapid proliferation of television broadcasting in India. In 1983 the government sanctioned a gigantic scheme for the expansion of the national network involving 680 million rupees, and this further boosted the growth of television. The mid-1980s saw the increasing popularity of television serials such as *Hum Log*, the first Indian soap opera, which combined entertainment with story lines dealing with some of the social evils that plagued modern urban societies. This triggered a dramatic increase in the sale of television sets. Thus, the number of households with television increased from 4 million in 1984 to 22.5 million in 1989. *Hum Log* also started the process of commercialization of Indian television by in-program advertising and commercial sponsorship. It also secured the future of soap operas on Indian television.

The late 1980s witnessed the further popularization of Doordarshan with the serialization of the Hindu epics *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata*. This attracted millions of people to television. Even people in the villages would crowd around a TV set to watch these epics and become hooked by television. Other popular programs included *Chitrahaar* and *Rangoli*, which popularized Hindi film songs, and the crime thriller *Karamchand*.

The 1990s heralded stiff competition for Doordarshan. In 1991 privately operated channels were allowed to broadcast in India for the first time. This resulted in the mushrooming of television channels. Today India has more than 300 channels.Doordarshan has been trying hard to compete with the private networks by launching specialized channels. It currently has 24 channels that include national and regional programming, news, sports, and international channels. However, Doordarshan does not have independent editorial control, and it has been accused by opposition political parties of supporting the ruling party in power. It has also been criticized for the low quality of its programs and for the poor quality of the telecast and the presentation of its programs. It also fares badly in attracting advertising revenue. Despite havingthe highest number of viewers, Doordarshan's advertising revenue falls far below that of the private networks.

TABEREZ AHMED NEYAZI

See also Television

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✦ DOWRY

Dowry in India has changed over time. During 1000–500 BCE, bridal gifts between royal families included ornaments, trousseau, livestock, and slave girls. Such wedding presents came from both families at the time of marriage. However, this was not an equal responsibility. One family had higher obligations than the other. Which family was to become the principal donor depended partly on which regional, cultural, economic, or other factors were predominant at a particular period.

From about the 4th century BCE it was specified that girls should receive the *stridhana* and *sulka* from the boys or their families. The *stridhana* (literally, "a woman's wealth"), as it is still known among Hindus, consisted of a fixed sum of maintenance, ornaments, and clothes. The *sulka* remained undefined, with later lawgivers interpreting it as "bride-price." Both *stridhana* and *sulka* acted as a security deposit against premarital defects of the partners. If marriage could not take place because of the boy's fault or girl's defect, the aggrieved party retained the *stridhana* and *sulka*. After the wife's death, the *stridhana* went to her children, husband, or his family, and the *sulka* to her natal family.

Whether the marriage was sacred or secular affected a woman's absolute right over her property. In sacred marriage, a husband had limited rights over his wife's property; in secular marriage, he had none. The difference in the man's right to control his wife's property reduced the incidence of secular marriages and increased that of sacred marriages, especially among the rich. Consequently, the husband gained and the wife lost control of her property.

The scope of a woman's property was further restricted when the sacred literature came out strongly against "selling" a daughter through "bride-price" and advocated instead the "gift" of a girl. "Gift" implied not only the permanent transfer of the girl but also that she should not be given empty-handed. Thus, the man was exempted from giving anything to his prospective bride before marriage, and the onus of providing her with the wherewithal for her future life lay entirely with her parents.

This shift from bride-price to dowry occurred sometime between the fourth century BCE and the second century CE, when basic socioeconomic changes were taking place. Extension of powerful states over previously independent people, plow cultivation generating an agricultural surplus, and growth of trade, commerce, mining, and other industries increased the social division of labor. Therefore, an elaborate hierarchical social structure was evolved

by the Brahminical orthodoxy, which returned to power after a short spell of heterodox religious upheaval.

The triumph of orthodoxy was reflected in changes in the status of women. Inheritance of private property by a natural son who alone was entitled to perform ancestor worship became a dominant feature in society. Women were debarred from inheritance and from performing religious rites. Widow marriage was discouraged, and divorce, which had been previously possible under certain circumstances, was totally prohibited. Marriage became an obligatory sacrament for a girl, and the husband became a god. To assure the paternity of the heir, child marriage for girls was preferred. Married young, a woman had no access to education, nor was she equipped for anything other than domestic work. In lieu of the social losses thus suffered, her *stridhana* increased by including whatever she received, in cash or kind from any source, connected with her marriage.

Among the peasantry and the working people, where women worked before and after marriage, bride-price continued for some time. However, women's dependent status eventually percolated downward from upper-class and upper-caste values. Even the Muslims, who settled in India after 1000 CE and among whom dowry was unknown, reinterpreted one sura of the Quran in favor of dowry. Today, the dowry system is no less prevalent in Pakistan and Bangladesh than in India. The *Mehr-Namäh* (i.e., pledge money) from the groom's family before the marriage has lost its significance, and now only a token sum is guaranteed to the woman.

Thus, the *stridhana*, once a woman's property given voluntarily by her father, is now a boy's prerogative to demand. It is set in a bargain made between two families before the marriage, and even after the marriage the expectation of more continues. The torture and occasional death of girls on account of inadequate dowry have led to protests against the custom.

The issue became a problem when the Indian Parliament passed legislation in the 1950s outlawing polygamy among the Hindus and giving girls a right to paternal property. In a patriarchal society, inheritance and concentration of private property, continuance of lineage, and ancestor worship are carried through a male heir. Therefore, girls are induced to forego their property claims in favor of their brothers. In this context, dowry is supposed to compensate the girl for giving up her right. Families stretch to their limit to give the daughter jewelry, clothes, cash, and articles for her new home and to give presents to the groom and his family. However, all these "gifts" constituting the dowry belong to the husband and his family, not to the wife. The size of the dowry depends on the boy's qualifications and status. It is erroneously assumed that a substantial dowry will improve the girl's status in her in-laws' family.

The demand for cash before and after marriage is noticeable in the merchant communities, where it is used as capital for business purposes and among other groups as an easy way to acquire expensive consumer goods such as videocassette recorders (VCRs), color televisions, and so forth. The Indian Parliament has passed more legislation against dowry, and women's organizations are working to implement the laws. However, the magnitude of the problem is apparent from the fact that in Delhi alone there were 311 cases of bride burnings in 1977 and 810 in 1982. Of course, not all cases were related to dowry. Incompatibility, the stigma of

divorce, economic and social insecurity, and the absence of support systems for women may be behind some of these deaths. In any case, the number is increasing everywhere.

Reasons for the increase in the incidence of dowry are ascribed to greed, consumerism, a quicker way to get rich, and the like. Experience proves that as long as dowry is regarded as a moral or legal problem alone, it will not be eradicated from society. Women activists demand that a woman's property be completely delinked from her husband's. She would thus be the absolute owner, and after her death the property would go to her children or natal family. Women's organizations are also campaigning for giving useful gifts such as income-generating assets to a bride instead of such things as ornaments. According to feminists, marriage is neither obligatory nor inviolable and indissoluble. More important, they argue that existing values should change in favor of gender equality.

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See also Feminism; Women, Status of

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✦ DRAVIDIAN MOVEMENT

The Dravidian Movement is a movement in the south of India, especially in Tamil Nadu ("Country of the Tamils"), formerly the Madras Presidency, for equal rights for members of the lower castes, especially the Dalits (untouchables). In any popular description of Indian society, the Brahmin caste (the Hindu priests and the highest caste in the Indian caste system) is often seen as the upholder of Hindu high culture and had socially, culturally, and politically dominated India since the dawn of Indian civilization. In southern India, however, particularly in the Tamil area and in surrounding areas where Tamils, an ethnically recognizable group speaking the Tamil language, predominate, this is far from true. As a result of the Dravidian Movement, the precipitous demise of Brahmin political power in the early to mid-20th century was one of the most significant developments in Indian history. The shifting of political power was due to the long and often bitter campaign waged by a succession of militant non-Brahmin parties whose primary agenda, since their foundation in the early 1900s, was the marginalization of Brahminical influence from all spheres of the Madras Presidency's public life.



Supporters of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (founded 1949), a major Tamil political party, in a 2007 rally to protest naval activity by Sri Lanka off the coast of Tamil Nadu. (AP Photo/M. Lakshman)

The earliest of the non-Brahmin political organizations to be created was the Dravidian Association of Dr. C. Natesa Mudaliar (1875–1937), who also founded a hostel for non-Brahmin Students in Madras called the Dravidian Home in 1919. The Dravidian Association was soon followed by the more politically active South Indian Liberal Federation, popularly known as the Justice Party. This was led by the highly articulate Dr. T. M. Nair (1868–1919) and the prominent Tamil industrialist Sir P. Thengaraja Chetty (1852–1925), who was also the author of the *Non-Brahmin Manifesto*. The Justice Party also attracted members of the Christian and Muslim professional classes as they were equally alarmed by the rise of Brahmin political dominance. A newspaper, *Justice*, was founded in 1917; its name was taken from the radical Parisian newspaper *La Justice* founded in 1880 by radical politician, anti-imperialist, and future French prime minister Georges Clemenceau (1841–1929; prime minister 1906–1909, 1917–1920). In 1944 the Justice Party was reorganized as the Dravida Kazagham (Dravidian Federation), better known by its initials DK, and became a militant mass organization.

At the end of World War II in 1945, Indian nationalist sentiment was running high, even in Tamil country, and the Congress Party won a sweeping victory in both the national and provincial elections of 1946. At the time of the partition of India, August 14, 1947, E. V. Ramaswami Nayakar (1870–1973), better known as Periyar (much-venerated leader) and one of the most colorful and perhaps the most controversial political actor ever to emerge on the south Indian political stage, tried to enlist the support of Mohammad Ali Jinnah

(1876–1948), who headed the campaign for the separate Muslim state of Pakistan, for a triple division of British India into Pakistan in the north and Dravidistan in the south sandwiching a Hindu north Indian core. Jinnah, however, refused to help, and the British ignored the DK's demands. Nayakar saw this as the British betrayal of the Dravidian people as they turned over the central government to a Brahmin oligarchy. He also refused to honor the Indian tricolor national flag and boycotted Independence Day celebrations.

Not all DK Party members agreed with Nayakar's boycott of India's independence, especially his chief lieutenant C. N. Annadurai (1908–1969), a member of the Mudaliar upper caste. Annadurai saw India's national independence as the accomplishment of all Indians, and it was won not only for the benefit of the Brahmins or the Hindi-speaking northern Indians. Nayakar, however, refused to budge, overruled Annadurai, and ignored his plea to democratize the leadership within the party.

Nayakar's popularity within the party, however, suffered a crippling blow when he decided in 1949, at the age of 70, to marry a 28-year-old party worker, Mani Ammaiyar, and make her his successor to the party's top post. He claimed that he had lost confidence in his chief lieutenants, and he was marrying a young woman whom he fully trusted to lead the DK Party after his death. As a result of this and other serious policy differences, a breakaway faction formed its own party under Annadurai's leadership. This new splinter group called itself the Dravida Munnetra Kazagham (Dravidian Progressive Party), or DMK. It was more subdued in its anti-Brahmin rhetoric and used less provocative tactics. It even admitted Brahmins into its membership, thereby indicating that it was not against the present-day Brahmins as a caste group but rather the past injustices committed by the members of the Brahmin caste. The attack on popular Hindu rituals and on the great Sanskritic tradition of Hinduism lessened. Its flag is a black bar above a red bar, indicating the revolutionary fervor (represented by the red bar) by which it chose to overthrow social injustice (represented by the black bar).

The two Dravidian parties have also organized differently. The DK Party had always been the public organ of its charismatic leader Nayakar, who had absolute control. The DMK Party was a more highly organized political party, with a branch in every major village. It also had a democratic constitution that was at least publicly observed. As for their core values, both the DMK Party and the DK Party were very similar, as they opposed the introduction of Hindi as India's official language and sought partition of the Dravidian areas from the Indian union. They also celebrated a putative Independence Day for which the top DMK Party leadership was jailed for sedition.

In the first general election in independent India, in 1951–1952, the Congress Party captured 133 out of a total of 190 seats. Both the DK and the DMK Dravidian parties did not contest the election. There was, for a short time, an alliance between the DK Party and the Communist Party. The DK Party publicly endorsed a number of Communist Party candidates and nearly all of them got elected, which bears testament to its popularity among the general public. The DMK Party, however, did not endorse the Communists, as the Communists were totally opposed to the idea of a separate Dravidistan. The DMK Party chose

to support independent candidates of the two opposition parties, the Tamil Nadu Toilers Party and the Common Weal Party. Both parties were Vanniyar caste parties. The Vanniyar is a mid-level non-Brahmin caste and one of the largest caste groups in the Tamil area. With the DMK Party's support, both these rival Vanniyar caste political parties were able, in spite of their narrow caste-based appeal, to secure seats for a number of their candidates. As non-Brahminism had become more and more mainstream and had greater electoral appeal, the Congress Party also began to put up non-Brahmin candidates for election and the Brahmin domination of the local Congress Party became a thing of the past.

As the DMK Party grew rapidly throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, the idea of separation from India as a Dravidian state began to lose its appeal. Part of the reason was that India since 1956 had been reorganized into linguistically based provinces. The Dravidian majority Madras Presidency was now stripped of its Kerala, Kannada, and Andhra regions, each speaking a separate Dravidian language. The remaining core, Madras, was the Tamil majority region and changed its name to Tamil Nadu in 1968. As the public and the politicians in each of these linguistically based southern provinces began to focus more on their own local issues and agendas, there was little enthusiasm for an overarching Dravidian unity and this also undermined the secessionist-based politics of both the DK Party and the DMK Party.

During the 1962 India border war with China, India's humiliating defeat stirred up nationalistic sentiments and the DMK Party used this opportunity to recant its former demands of secession from the Indian union. This public act, more than anything else, cleansed the party of its radical past; it became seen as a more mature and serious political party and acceptable to the mainstream voting public. Brahmin baiting was also seen as a thing of the past and, by 1967, it appeared to be as respectable as the Congress Party or any other mainline party. The party also had a trump card in its continuing opposition to the imposition of Hindi as the national language. This had support among all sections of Tamil society. The local Congress Party, however, was towing the national agenda of the Congress Party in the central government at New Delhi and, for the sake of party unity, it had to support the government's unpopular language policy.

The DMK Party was also fortunate that among its leadership there were intellectuals, gifted orators, and accomplished writers, including its leader Annadurai, who was a former student of economics at the prestigious Pachayappa College in Madras. Annadurai was also a writer and a social activist who had authored a number of books highly critical of the prevailing Hindu social system. He also wrote plays focusing on social issues, some of which became movies. For his literary output, he won the honorific title of *arignar* ("scholar"). In the early 1960s, when there was unity within the DMK Party's hierarchy, its political rallies were real crowd pullers, as people flocked to listen to its candidates' eloquent oratory in chaste Tamil. Among its leadership there were screenwriters such as M. Karunanidhi (b. 1924), a member of the *devadasi,* or Isai-Vellala caste, who was Annadurai's protégé. Annadurai himself was intimately connected with the Madras film industry as a writer, director, and producer of Tamil films—films that were also openly propagandistic. Popular Tamil film actors were

also drawn to party platforms to increase their own cinematic popularity. One was M. G. Ramachandran (1917–1987), a Nair caste actor from Malabar more commonly known by his initials, MGR, or by his many honorific titles, who rose to cinematic fame after being associated with the politics of the DMK.

By the mid-1960s, the screen hero image of MGR had developed into a larger-than-life image, and he had a cultlike following among the social underclass. His well-publicized acts of charity further reinforced his screen image as a champion of the downtrodden. The DMK Party, in fact, had used cinema as a cheap and effective means to politically mobilize many discontented sectors of Tamil Nadu to the party's cause. In its capacity for clever and emotive manipulation of the powerful core symbols of Tamil culture and using social injustices as its focus, the DMK was able to win over a large section of the voting public. By the mid-1960s, the DMK Party had come a long way from its earlier lackluster electoral performance and its party leadership had now become the new political superstars of Tamil Nadu. As for the Congress Party, already battered by its support of the unpopular national language policy, it could not produce any candidates or issues that could rival the DMK platform. When this was translated into electoral votes in the 1967 elections, it turned out to be a DMK landslide. The DMK Party had won 138 out of 234 seats in the State Assembly and all 25 seats it had contested for the lower house, or Lok Sabha, of India's national Parliament in New Delhi.

As the electoral majority party, the DMK formed its first ministry under Annadurai, who had led his party to its greatest victory, but he did not live long enough to carry out his goals. He died in 1969 and the party leadership fell to his lieutenant M. Karunanithi (b. 1924) who is popularly known as Kalaianar (artist). The DMK Party scored an even greater electoral success in the 1971 general and state elections by forging a broad coalition with Socialists, Communists, and caste and communal (Muslim League) parties. They won 210 out of 234 seats. The Congress Party, expecting a major electoral defeat, did not even contest the statewide elections that year.

The DMK Party remained in power and its dominance in provincial administration remained unchallenged for the next nine years. However, soon after this victory, major cracks began to appear in the party as unity dissipated. One of the chief dissidents was MGR, who was expelled from its ranks in 1972 for openly criticizing Karunanithi for monopolizing power as both the chief minister and party president, as well as hinting at party corruption. MGR founded his own party, the Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, and it was later renamed the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and known by its acronym AIADMK. The party flag was the original red and black DMK Party flag with a superimposed bust of Annadurai. It was as if to inform the voting public that the AIADMK was the true Dravidian Party that would faithfully follow the policies of Annadurai who had, by this time, become a deified figure.

In the 1976 election, and confounding poll forecasters, the AIADMK, deriving its strength from 2,000 statewide MGR movie fan clubs, scored an upset political victory over the DMK

Party. The AIADMK captured 130 seats for itself and its allies while the DMK Party and its allies won only 48 seats. The Congress Party snared a mere 32 seats. The AIADMK Party remained in power and dominated Tamil politics until the death of its founder, the movie idol MGR, in 1987. Since that year, the two rival Dravidian political parties, the DMK Party under Karunanithi's leadership and the AIADMK under MGR's widow and former mistress, the convent-educated Jayalatha, ran the state through a succession of rotating ministries. Paradoxically, in what may seem like the final triumph of non-Brahmin politics, the Brahmins may well have had the last laugh since the AIADMK, as the latest political pedigree of the party that saw every Brahmin as its archenemy and was at the vanguard of a militant Tamil nativistic movement, has now been for many years under the absolute control of an Iyangar woman and a native of the neighboring state of Karnataka. The Iyangars are the most prestigious and elite Brahmin subcaste in southern India.

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See also Dravidian Munnetra Kazhagam Parties; Tamil Nadu

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✦ DRAVIDIAN MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM PARTIES

"Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam" is a Tamil term usually translated as "Dravidian Progress Federation." Respectively, the three words mean Dravidian, progress, and federation or organization. This term appears in the names of several south Indian political parties such as the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham; Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam; All India Latichiya Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, and the Marumalarcci Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam. It indicates a common origin that dates back to the foundation of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu in 1949 and its predecessor, the Dravidian Movement (Dravidar Kazhagam), founded in 1925. The latter, in particular,

provided the basis for the evolution of the current Dravidian parties, which inherited and re-elaborated several of the original ideas of the Dravidian Movement.

The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam originated directly from the preindependence Dravidian Movement led by E. V. Ramaswamy (1879–1973), better known as Thanthai Periyar (in Tamil *thanthai* means "father" while *periyar* is an adjective meaning "great" or "noble") or simply Periyar. After being a militant in the Indian Congress Party, founded in 1885, he started the Self-Respect Movement in 1925. The main purpose of the movement was to promote the interests of non-Brahmin castes and social groups, especially untouchables. The domination of Brahmins within south Indian society was perceived as unjust and fundamentally iniquitous. The movement founded by Periyar aimed, therefore, at the education of non-Brahmins in order to free them from the condition in which they had been kept by Brahmins. Most of these ideas converged in the ideology of the Dravidar Kazhagam, which was established in 1944 after a merger between the Self-Respect Movement and the Justice Party. The latter, also known as the South Indian Liberal Federation, was a party founded in 1917 within the South Indian Welfare Association whose overriding objectives were justice and social equality. The guiding principles on which the Dravidian Movement was based were the abolition of the caste system and castes themselves, the development of backward groups, and liberation from restrictive Hindu religious practices. Another important aspect of the Dravidar Kazhagam was the role given to women and the promotion of a women's liberation movement.

Over the years the Dravidian Movement acquired a rather marked regional connotation, identifying itself as the party of the Dravidian people. It took an openly anti-Sanskrit and anti-north stand, promoting the Tamil language and culture against the cultural dominance of Sanskrit and Brahminism. The movement was also skeptical about the independence movement led by the Congress Party, fearing that the withdrawal of the British meant simply the substitution of the colonial power of one people for another, that is, the Hindi-speaking elite from northern India would replace the old British masters.

In 1949, soon after India became independent in August 1947, Conjeevaram Natarajan Annadurai (1909–1969), who was an active member of the Dravidar Kazhagam, broke with the party and founded the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam. The political ideology behind the new offspring of the Dravidian Movement was based on the main principles already put forward by Periyar with some modifications. The new party, in fact, gradually changed its claim for an independent Dravida Nadu (Dravidian Land), which had been previously proposed by Periyar himself and had been one of the main goals of the Dravidian Movement.

The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam became one of the most important political parties in postindependence southern India. It is currently a major party in the state of Tamil Nadu and is led by Muthuvel Karunanidhi (b. 1924) who served as chief minister of Tamil Nadu five times from 1969 to 1971, 1971 to 1976, 1989 to 1991, 1996 to 2001, and from 2006 to the present. However, the DMK split in 1972 and the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) was created by M. G. Ramachandran

(1917–1987), who had been a popular Tamil actor before entering politics. The split between the two parties resulted in part from personal disagreements between Ramachandran and Karunanidhi. The AIADMK is led by Jayalalitha Jayaram (b. 1948), a renowned actress and singer who began a very successful acting career at the age of 15 and who was also reputed to be the former long-time lover of Ramachandran. She is popularly called Amma or Mother. She was elected the chief minister in 1991 and served a full term until she was defeated in the elections of 1996. She returned as chief minister in 2003 and served until 2006.

Over the past three decades, the DMK and the AIADMK have been the major parties in Tamil political life. The former is characterized by a strong party organization, the result of many decades of social and political activism. By contrast, its rival, the AIADMK, has a comparatively weaker organization. The most recent offshoots of the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam are the Marumalarcci Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK) and the All India Latichiya Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AILDMK). The former emerged in 1994, and its founder was V. Gopalsamy (b. 1944), who had been actively involved in the DMK but who was expelled from the party due to his personal popularity as it was seen as a threat to Karunanidhi's son, who wanted to take over the leadership of the party from his father. The party's name means "Dravidian Progress Federation of Renaissance." Between 1998 and 2004 the MDMK was part of the National Democratic Alliance, a coalition of Indian parties led by the Bharatiya Janata Party, a right-wing party founded in 1980. Shortly after the 2004 general elections, the MDMK became a member of the United Progressive Association and contributed four members of Parliament to a coalition of political parties led by the Congress Party, although the party withdrew its support in March 2007.

The All India Latichiya Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, which means "All India Ideal Progress Federation," was created by Vijaya Thesingu Rajendar (b. 1955), another Tamil film actor (who is also a film director, composer of film scores, screenwriter, and playback singer), in 2004. He was a former member of the DMK, which he left to found the new party.

In spite of the plethora of parties emanating from the Dravidian Movement, both directly or indirectly, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam remains the most powerful political party. In 2010 it was governing Tamil Nadu and the party leader, Karunanidhi, was the chief minister.

ANTONELLA VIOLA

See also Dravidian Movement; Tamil Nadu

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✦ ECONOMY

India's economy is among the largest and the fastest-growing economies in the world. It is ranked fourth in purchasing power adjusted dollars. The country's population of 1.213 billion in mid-2011, second only to China's, makes it the second-largest national market in the world. Varied geoclimatic conditions and a wide variety of natural resources have given the country a diversified agriculture and industry. The country became independent from British rule in August 1947. Its Constitution, which came into force in 1950, describes India as a sovereign, Socialist, secular, and democratic republic. It is a union of 29 states and seven Union Territories (including the National Capital Territory). Central and state governments are elected by universal adult suffrage and operate with bicameral houses.

Since independence, the economy has passed through two distinct phases corresponding to two different development strategies. The first, characterized by dirigisme and import substitution, was adopted as the official strategy for economic development soon after independence. This phase ended in 1991 when the government announced plans for wide-ranging market reforms. Since then, the economy has become progressively decontrolled, more open to international influence, and welcoming to private initiative.

Soon after independence, the Indian Parliament adopted an Industrial Policy Resolution (1948), which made clear that the government would be vitally involved with the economy. With this as the backdrop, the Planning Commission was set up in 1950 to promote a rapid increase in the standard of living. In 1951 the Planning Commission launched the first of a series of five-year plans, each of which would typically focus on a few selected sectors and tasks, set goals, and provide for investment to achieve them. The commission is chaired

by the prime minister and it formulates, executes, and monitors the plans. Five-year plans were, however, not conceived to centralize production in the government but to complement private initiative. At the time of independence, the anticipated private profit from infrastructure and core industry projects was small compared with the sizable external benefits they would produce. So it was thought that the government should invest in these areas. The first five-year plan focused on agriculture, community development, irrigation, communication, and transport; the second plan invested heavily in core industries; and the third plan spent on agriculture and industry fairly evenly. Early five-year plans led to significant investment in infrastructure such as irrigation, roads, railways, telegraph, power, and core industries such as steel, coal, cement, heavy engineering, heavy electricals, and chemicals. This created an impressive array of industries. The focus of subsequent plans varied depending on the needs of different ministries. India continued with five-year plans after the reforms of 1991. In 2010, India started on its 11th five-year plan. Its objectives are to increase gross domestic product (GDP) growth to 10 percent and agricultural growth to 4 percent, create 70 million new jobs, and establish electric power connections to all villages in the country. It also set several goals associated with development indicators such as infant mortality and malnutrition.

Government control took a further step in 1954 with an important resolution of the Parliament. The resolution stated that the government's social and economic policy would be to build a "socialist pattern of society." It was explained that this implied emphasis on more egalitarian distribution of income and opportunities along with economic growth. As time passed, several other means of intervention in the economy were legislated. The Industrial Licensing Policy came in force in 1956, whereby industries would require a license for investing and also for subsequent expansion. According to the policy, infrastructure and core industries were reserved for the public sector alone. A license would be granted to private business only in other sectors. Licensing soon became the central institution of industrial policy. In the same year licensing was introduced, 245 Indian and foreign insurance companies and provident societies operating in life insurance were nationalized. With this step, the life insurance industry came completely under government ownership and control. General insurance, however, remained in private hands for the time being, although under tight government supervision. Later, in 1972, general insurance, too, was nationalized. Four large government companies were formed from 107 private business units. Similarly, commercial banking was nationalized in two steps. In 1969 the government nationalized 14 banks, and this was followed up in 1980 by nationalizing another 7. After this, banking came to be almost entirely in the public sector.

India had a deficit in food grains at the time of independence. In spite of significant investment in irrigation and agricultural services, the food deficit continued to widen. With a fast-growing population, the problem acquired a serious dimension within a decade of independence and raised alarms both in India and in international forums. Finally, in 1965 the government launched a concerted program of agricultural activism based on the use of high-yielding varieties of seeds, double cropping, and an aggressive push to increase acreage under

cultivation. It induced farmers to introduce a package of high-yielding seeds together with chemical fertilizers and irrigation. The program was supported with subsidized fertilizers, electric power, and credit to farmers from public sector banks. The program became known as the "Green Revolution" and it was very successful in northwestern states such as the Punjab, Haryana, and western Uttar Pradesh, although it was not so successful in other states around the country. The crop area under high-yielding seeds expanded rapidly, showing the government's resolve and the private response it drew. From fewer than 12,000 square miles in the early 1960s, the area under high-yielding grains grew to about 96,000 square miles in 1970; 268,000 in 1980; and nearly 400,000 square miles in 1990. Overall, the Green Revolution made India self-sufficient in food grains production. The growth rate of grains production, however, has significantly slowed down recently and, according to some observers, diminishing returns to the input package has set in. At the same time, the cultivable area has reached a plateau. There are also issues about the environmental impact of large-scale use of artificial fertilizers and overuse of groundwater.

In 1947, India was one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita income of $439. Partition of British India into India and Pakistan created millions of homeless refugees, and the number of people in poverty and distress was astounding. The growth rate of the economy was too small to produce any significant trickle-down effect on poverty of this magnitude.



Indian National Congress Party president Sonia Gandhi, center, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, and Andhra Pradesh chief minister Y. S. Rajashekar Reddy give a job card to a villager, second left, during the inauguration of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Program at Bandlapalli, Andhra Pradesh, February 2, 2006. (AP Photo/A. Mahesh Kumar)

Hence, poverty alleviation required direct measures. Successive governments approached the problem with two types of intervention. The first was to create work for unskilled rural workers. The strategy was to employ jobless workers to build rural infrastructure, so that the wage expenditure would also create some permanent assets. The first such program was the Rural Manpower Programme, which was started in 1960. State governments also started similar programs, for example, the Employment Guarantee Scheme in Maharashtra, begun in 1972. The central government project, Food-for-Work Programme, was introduced in 1977 and was later replaced by the National Rural Employment Programme in 1980. In 1983 a new project called the Rural Landless Employment Guarantee Programme was started to address the problem of the landless workers in particular. The two programs were later merged into one and its scope expanded. The new program, called the Jawahar Employment Programme after India's first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964), became the biggest such program ever and anywhere in the world. Employment programs continued after the 1991 reform. The cost is shared by the central government and the states. Together the programs create an impressive number of rural jobs; the Jawahar Employment Programme alone creates about 650 million man-days of unskilled employment per year. Yet the scale is modest compared to the needs.

The second type of program promotes self-employment among the poor in rural and urban areas by helping beneficiaries acquire productive assets. One such program, the Integrated Rural Development Programme, covers approximately 3 million beneficiaries each year with the aim of taking the beneficiary households above the poverty line. The coverage of 3 million beneficiaries per year could make a significant impact over time if the program is effective. Recently the government has started housing programs for the urban poor. The implementation of poverty-related programs rests on state governments. The utilization of central government funds, therefore, depends on the commitment and efficiency of state governments. Hence, there is wide variation in the impact of the programs across India. Further, in some places, there are allegations of misuse and diversion of funds.

Starting from independence until the beginning of the 1991 reforms, the economy remained virtually closed to foreign trade, investment, and finance. In 1990, the year before liberal reforms started, merchandise export and import were 5.8 percent and 8.8 percent of GDP, respectively, making India one of the least open countries outside the Soviet bloc. Though import substitution had created production capacity in a wide range of industrial products, they were not competitive in the world market in quality or cost. India, however, managed with relatively few industrial imports because of her wide resource base. Most of her import bill was from a few major items: crude oil, gasoline, and natural gas; machinery; minerals; and food grains. After the Green Revolution, India became self-sufficient in food grains and did not need to import food. India had developed a close political and defense relationship with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), as the country imported a large part of the USSR's crude oil, gas, and mineral requirements. Imports from the USSR were settled bilaterally, thus minimizing India's need of earning U.S. dollars or other hard currency.

During that period, either high tariff or small import quotas protected most Indian industries, and the import of many items was banned. In terms of the official development strategy, protection was necessary for Indian industry to utilize the country's comparative advantage and grow in scale to develop international competitiveness. The World Bank estimated that in 1985 the nominal rates of protection on intermediates, capital, consumer goods, and manufactures were 146.4, 107.3, 140.9, and 137.7, respectively. This level of protection made India's import to GDP ratio the lowest among Asian countries, and hence export to GDP was also one of the lowest. However, with the price of oil increasing as a result of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, India was in increasing difficulty with regard to its balance of payments. As a result, foreign currency reserves stagnated. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 ended the bilateral trade avenue adding to the difficulty. Finally, in 1990–1991 foreign exchange reserves became precipitously low compared to the country's import requirement, leading to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan.

Over the four decades of the controlled economy era, there were attainments such as industrialization of a continent-sized economy, the Green Revolution, the eradication of many dreaded diseases, the development of a nation out of diverse races and linguistic groups, the establishment of an open democracy, and advances in research and higher education, to name just a few; but there were many failures too. The biggest failure was the government of the day's inability to make any dent on poverty. Per capita real gross national product (GNP) increased annually at 1.8 percent between 1950 and 1990, the year before the reforms started. This was seriously disappointing, given that the country had started with an extremely low level of income. Estimates of poverty vary widely depending on methodology. But even the lowest estimate in 1990 had assigned 30 percent of the population, or around 250 million people, to below the poverty line. The second failure was the inability to foster an internationally competitive industrial base in spite of having adequate natural resources and human capital. The failure is attributed to the perverse incentives generated by the regime of industrial control. Big business houses cornered a disproportionate share of government licenses. They often acquired licenses for strategic purposes to preempt potential licensees—that is, to prevent competition from other companies rather than actually acquiring them for investment and production purposes. Many analysts have commented that the existence of centralized control made it relatively easy for big business to "capture" the points of control. This hampered the growth of new enterprises and industrial concentration increased throughout the period. Licensing in effect was a strong entry barrier, and big industries remained uncompetitive. Also, the number and complexity of clearances needed to conduct business had increased through the years. The clearance-giving offices were widely used for rent seeking by officials, making it even more costly to start a business. Therefore, an unduly large part of small and medium investment went to land, retailing, and construction activities. It also led to the proliferation of unlicensed business units, the so-called informal businesses. Also, incentives for industrial development were often utilized in a perverse way. For example, incentives for the creation of businesses in the small-scale sector induced businesses to work as two small industries rather

than one bigger than the size that qualifies for the incentive. Naturally, this deprived the country of economies of scale and specialization. There are many similar instances of incentives and disincentives working contrary to their intended purpose. All in all, small and medium investment driven purely by economic need was mostly absent throughout the period.

The regime also failed in building an adequate infrastructure. Roads and railroads were inadequate and in a poor state. Public infrastructure for health care and education were congested and overcrowded and of poor quality. Large tracts of rural India were not connected to power lines. At the same time, there were severe power shortages for those who were connected, leading to the rationing of power. About 60 percent of industries owned and used captive power generating sets in 1990.

The problem connected with power and infrastructure is generally attributed to the poor state of fiscal management. The government had tied itself up by committing to large subsidies on such commodities as oil, food, power, and fertilizer for farmers. Added to the expenditure side of the budget was the wage bill for a stupendously large army of government employees, whose number had increased in proportion to the extent and variety of government control. These, with a nearly stagnant tax base and many loss-making public sector businesses, weakened the government's ability to invest in infrastructure, power, health care, and education.

By the middle of the 1980s, the development strategy was drawing more critics than supporters. Shortcomings became more glaring as the newly industrializing economies of Asia such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea succeeded in checking absolute poverty, building a good infrastructure, and attaining high rates of growth. Widespread dissention, mass protests, and agitation took hold of public life from the late 1970s and continued unabated. Younger generations were not impressed with inefficiency and rent seeking and were ready to support change. However, even though the problems were widely acknowledged, it was also understood that changing course would lead to confrontation with beneficiary groups, who were well organized and well represented. In the late 1980s the central government headed by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991; prime minister 1984–1989) started a process of reform in a few areas, but the process was short lived, as the government did not last long after he commenced his campaign of reforms.

The decisive change came in 1991. Meanwhile, major assumptions of import substitution and government-led development had been challenged by the collapse of the Soviet Union and East European Socialist states. The opening up of China and her market-oriented reforms of 1979 had convinced many that there was no contradiction between Socialist commitment and the free market. In 1991, India developed a serious payments problem and was obliged to ask for a sizable IMF loan. The country's external debt had been steadily increasing in the 1980s due to a rising oil import bill, particularly after the 1979 energy crisis following the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1980 and an uncompetitive export sector. The collapse of the USSR in 1991 deprived India of the bilateral trade route, and the need for hard currency increased. Most of India's commercial loans were in the form of short-term debt, which added to the concern. In 1991–1992, the debt peaked at

38.7 percent of GDP, with the debt-export ratio at an alarming 563 percent. While granting accommodation to India, the IMF pressed for significant policy changes. The insistence of the IMF helped the government to introduce reforms. The national financial emergency had rendered domestic opposition softer, at least temporarily. So the government initiated significant reforms aimed at reducing control and increasing the role of the market and the private sector. As time went by, beneficiaries of the dirigisme, which included trade unions, relatively well-to-do farmers, and government employees, got themselves organized and offered political resistance. These groups are numerically large and politically well organized with powerful representation in the political system. Reforms have often been halted because of opposition, and many important reforms are still incomplete. Though important items remain pending, the economy received a boost from the overall change of philosophy.

In 2008 India's GDP in market dollars and international dollars was 1.233 trillion and 3.388 trillion, respectively. Per capita income adjusted for purchasing power parity was $2886.07. GDP at constant prices has grown by 7 percent on average since the reforms started. Estimated composition of GDP in 2007 was agriculture, 17.8 percent; industry, 29.4 percent; and services, 52.8 percent.

India has a greatly diversified production structure. Major agricultural products are wheat, rice, coarse grains (sorghum and millet), pulses, oil seeds, tea, sugarcane, cotton, jute, tobacco, and silk. Sorghum and millet are dry land crops and pulses are a major source of protein. Rice is India's most important food grain and the country is the second largest producer of rice. In 2007–2008, rice and wheat production were 96.43 million tons and 78.4 million tons, respectively, and total food grains production was 230.67 million tons.

Agriculture, however, is beset with a number of long-running problems. The Green Revolution of the 1960s was successful in states with controlled irrigation but did not do well in states with rain-fed agriculture. In the states where it was initially successful, the early growth rates from increased land productivity cannot be sustained in the long run, because of diminishing returns. Further, it is reported that land has become fatigued through the nonstop use of chemical fertilizers over four decades. There is virtually no scope for increase of land area under agriculture. Agriculture is also facing a transitional problem after the reforms. The cropping pattern is changing and is expected to change for some time as market incentives replace tradition-bound cropping and those based on the government's support prices. A significant effort is, therefore, being made to increase land productivity through a number of measures, including the better utilization of rain and groundwater, new irrigation projects, improved organization of farming, research on new crops and high-yielding species, and the encouragement of market-oriented crop selection.

Because of sustained efforts in recent years, horticulture, viticulture, fish production, and the production of vegetables, flowers, medicinal plants, and herbs have been growing rapidly. The government also has been encouraging traditional crops such as silk, jute, coconut, palm, bamboo, and sugarcane by providing market support and research into new product application. Animal husbandry was always a major activity in India. Traditional husbandry

has been replaced by modern practices and methods in many places. India has emerged as the largest producer of milk, producing 105 million tons in 2008, and has the biggest cattle stock in the world. Inland and coastal fisheries are huge industries and employ a sizable number of people. Private investment is modernizing this sector fast by introducing the mechanized catching of fish, large-scale processing, and preservation techniques.

India is endowed with a wide variety of minerals, and mining and metallurgical activities go back at least 6,000 years. Major minerals are bauxite, copper, bituminous coal, diamonds, gold, iron ore, manganese and zinc, and a number of industrial minerals such as limestone. The country ranks among the world's leading producers of bauxite, bituminous coal, iron ore, and zinc. The exploration and production of minerals falls under the jurisdiction of the central government. The industrial licensing regime had visualized a leading (though not exclusive) role of the government in this sector, and hence most mineral activities were in the public sector. After the reforms, the private sector has invested heavily in a number of minerals, in both mining and refining, and the government is trying out alternative business models in order to more fully involve the private sector. Private involvement is now significant in all metallic and nonmetallic minerals.

The oil and gas industry has contributed significantly to the economy's rapid growth. This sector, including refining, transport, and marketing, contributes to over 15 percent of GDP. In 2007–2008, the production of both crude oil and refined oil output touched 34.11 million tons and 156.10 million tons, respectively. The production of natural gas in that year was approximately 33 billion cubic yards. The sector is also India's largest foreign exchange earner, contributing 17.24 percent of the total export revenue in 2007–2008. Since the reforms, the government has been auctioning oil and gas exploration blocks in different parts of the country. It has allowed 100 percent foreign direct investment in private refineries and 26 percent in government-owned refineries. But the principles of foreign investment are still evolving. Alongside the giant Indian public sector companies, a vibrant private sector has grown up in exploration. Between them, the public and private sectors have listed significant new finds of reserves. Some already have been put into operation. The sector is expected to attract investment worth $120 billion to $150 billion over the next five years according to a recent Confederation of Indian Industries–KPMG report.

The end of licensing and a transparent policy toward business have boosted industrial investment and production. The central and state governments have simplified the permits required for setting up in business. Foreign direct investment, foreign technology agreements, and the hiring of foreign technicians are all easier. State governments now compete to attract foreign direct investment and investment from overseas Indians. The changes have encouraged private investment, technology import, collaborations, and joint ventures. Between 1991 and 2009, the cumulative amount of direct foreign investment was $117 billion. Industry has also benefitted from the general change in philosophy and attitude.

The range of industrial products produced in India is exceedingly large. Major items in value terms are steel and steel products, railway engines and coaches, passenger and commercial vehicles, tractors and earth movers, heavy electricals, drugs and pharmaceuticals, cotton and synthetic yarn, and cloth. Alongside large-scale production and business, there is now a vibrant medium and small-scale sector, which supplies large units where the product is an intermediate and directly to market when it produces final goods. This sector produces light engineering and light electrical goods, chemicals, cement, paints, auto parts and ancillaries, furniture, metal goods, plastic and plastic goods, paper and tissues, tires, apparel, shoes, food products, and a wide variety of consumer goods and toiletries.



A worker at a bolt manufacturing plant in the Punjab. India's manufacturing industry is one of the driving forces impelling the country's rapid economic growth rate. (Chris Schmidt)

Today's industries have a mixed ancestry. Some started and grew during World War II (1939–1945) because supply from England was disrupted and the British imperial government wanted production for the Japanese front. Several others are the product of the import substitution regime of free India. Yet others are technology-oriented projects started as small ventures in the 1970s and 1980s and, having succeeded, have grown to be large industries over time. There are yet others that appeared on the scene after liberalization opened up space for private investment.

The service sector contributes the largest part of GDP. Major items are banking, insurance, and other financial services; hotels and restaurants; health care and surgery; education; airlines and shipping; and telecommunications, railways, e-services, software, print and electronic media, and entertainment. Some services such as banking, insurance, telecommunications, and airlines were almost entirely in the public sector before 1991. After the reforms a large amount of private investment has taken place, and the regulatory regime has quickly evolved in response. In education and health too the government is changing the regulatory environment and actively promoting private participation. The country is a major exporter of business process services, software, and intellectual property. India is the largest producer of feature films in the world; and it has a very active entertainment industry based on Indian films, television, performing arts, and cricket.

The central government, state governments, and local bodies can levy taxes according to statutory provisions. The main central taxes are income tax, customs duties, central excise, and the central sales tax. Taxes at the state level are land revenue, sales tax on intrastate sales, stamp duty on transfer of property, state excise duty on production of alcohol, entertainment taxes, and tax on professions. Local bodies can levy taxes on property, use of local utilities, tax on markets, and octroi (a tax collected on various articles imported into a district for local consumption). Part of the tax collected by the central government is distributed to state governments according to the recommendation of the Finance Commission appointed by the president of India. The rules of allocation change and evolve and are sensitive to current demography, economic growth, and the circumstances faced by different states.

Like many countries around the world, India's public finances are not too healthy. The government's commitment to various subsidies has continuously increased since the second five-year plan. Large subsidies are provided on petroleum products, fertilizers, and food, and there are a large number of small subsidies as well. Until very recently, the tax base was small compared to GDP and the size of the government. Governments were, and still are, reluctant to introduce an agricultural income tax. All this produced a perennial deficit of the public budget. Interest payments on public debt exacerbated the problem. The central government's gross fiscal deficit increased steadily from 1970 until it reached 10 percent of GDP in 1987. It remained around that level until the reforms, when the insistence of the IMF led to serious attempts to reduce the deficit. It came down steadily to about 3.4 percent in the 2007–2008 budget, but the level was expected to go up significantly as a result of the recession that began in late 2009. Note that the state governments also run significant deficits that are not included in these figures. The total liability of the central and state governments together at the end of 2007–2008 was 76.79 percent of GDP.

The state of public finances called for reform of taxes and spending. The tax system has gone through significant reforms after liberalization in 1991. These reforms aimed (1) to simplify and reduce direct taxes so as to increase compliance; (2) to replace the variety of indirect taxes levied by the central and state governments by fewer taxes and reduction in the cost of tax collection and administration; and (3) to reduce customs duties generally. So far, the important changes that have been accomplished are reduction in customs and excise duties, lowering of corporate taxes, and a significant simplification of income tax rules. Further, in 2005 most of the states introduced a value added tax to replace their complex sales tax system. The reform of spending, particularly cutting down the volume of subsidies, has not been successful yet because of stiff political opposition.

Liberalization increased the interaction with the outside world significantly. Exports received a boost from the general cut in tariff rates and the liberalization of foreign currency transactions. Overall, exports grew at an average annual rate of about 27 percent in quantum terms between 1991 and 2008. In spite of the fast growth of GDP, the export to GDP ratio increased to 15.1 percent of GDP in 2008–2009 from 5.8 percent in 1990–1991. The government has acted as a facilitator in this process. It has simplified the procedure of exporting

and export financing. It now conducts regular consultations with industry associations to gather suggestions on procedures and works to implement them.

India's major export items are petroleum products, gems and jewelry, textiles, engineering goods, chemicals, leather manufactures, metallic and nonmetallic ores, organic chemicals, steel and steel products, engineering, business services, software, and films. The most important imports are gasoline and crude oil, fertilizers, and a large variety of machinery classified as capital goods. The largest export partners are the European Union (EU) countries, the United States, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and China. There has also been significant growth in trade with East Asia and Australia, and within the South Asian region. Currently, India is negotiating a free trade agreement with New Zealand, and a South Asia Free Trade Area comprising the countries of South Asia was discussed in the last regional summit of the South Asian countries.

The economy has a number of long-standing issues. The most important are poverty, land productivity, infrastructure, and environment. The problems grew over time because governments were unable to dedicate sufficient resources for them. Governments now are in a better position to address them as the tax base is increasing with economic growth and the reformed tax structure. If the government can also rid itself of some of the subsidies and loss-making public sector units, its fiscal resources would be significantly increased. Some of the long-standing problems have also been affected by center-state politics—that is, the tension between a state government and the central government when they are run by different political parties or coalitions. The cooperation of state governments is extremely important and every government at the center is aware of this and tries to establish forums at which center-state issues about implementation can be resolved.

Poverty alleviation programs have been mentioned earlier. By 2010 the thinking was that while the programs are well designed and well funded, implementation and targeting at the ground level are seriously wanting. Accordingly, the government has focused on the issues of implementation and targeting. It has indicated that it is planning to alter the model of implementation, to tie up target-fulfillment with states' finances and introduce e-governance to increase transparency and minimize pilferage. For urban poverty, the government has started an ambitious housing initiative for slum dwellers in partnership with private developers.

The government understands that for an increase in land productivity there needs to be a large investment in irrigation, groundwater conservation, forestation, and land improvement together with continuous counseling on farm practices, crop choice, and farm management. These initiatives not only require central funds but also the serious involvement of state governments, local bodies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

Much of India's infrastructure was inherited from the British period (1858–1947) or from the early five-year plans. They are wearing out or economic development has rendered them inadequate. This applies to most items of infrastructure. Roads, railroad tracks, rolling stock, airports and airport facilities, and seaports and their handling capacity are all in seriously short supply or in disrepair. The shortfall in power supplies is also increasing with a

rapidly growing industry. Some rural areas are not yet connected to an electrical power supply. The 11th plan is trying to address rural electrification and the long-term targets envisage a large expansion of power generation.

Other items of infrastructure, however, face a different class of problems. For them funding is only a necessary condition, and private-public partnership formats that have succeeded in the new millennium are expected to ensure the availability of funds. But most infrastructure investments face issues such as disputes over land acquisition, the environment, the rehabilitation of the displaced, and contractual issues. The issues have political undertones and hence take a long time to resolve, creating project delays and cost overruns and increases in costs. The central government has been trying to draft a number of bills that when passed by Parliament might facilitate a smoother resolution of these issues. But there is still a lack of consensus about the actual form of legislation required among political parties to ensure that the Indian economy will continue its rapid and dynamic growth.

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See also Agriculture; Central Banking, Development Aspects; Economy, Informal; Financial Institutions, Development; Monetary Policy; Reserve Bank of India

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✦ ECONOMY, INFORMAL

The informal economy is generally described as a residual category and one that falls outside the orbit of the formally regulated and organized sector of the economy. While economic dualism, which refers to the simultaneous existence of a traditional, low productive sector, and a modern, industrial sector, has been noted as a pervasive feature of many developing economies, including India's, the concept of the informal economy began to gain prominence in the 1970s. There is a multitude of definitions and different measurements of the informal sector.

It is, however, widely accepted that the Indian economy has a substantially large informal or unorganized sector, as it is called in India. The recent upsurge in economic growth in India is intertwined with this informal economy in complex and diverse ways.

While in earlier conceptualizations of the informal sector informality was seen as an attribute of the enterprises and not of employment relations, the 1993 definition proposed by the International Labor Organization covers all forms of informal employment, within and outside the informal enterprises. In 2007, the National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganised Sector (NCEUS), an advisory body set up by the government of India, defined the unorganized sector as consisting of "all unincorporated private enterprises owned by individuals or households engaged in the sale and production of goods and services operated on a proprietary or partnership basis and with less than ten workers." Thus, it includes most of Indian agriculture, except the plantation sector and other types of organized agriculture, as well as a large part of the manufacturing and service sector that is operated at a small scale. The informal sector is generally outside the ambit of the law—the unorganized sector enterprise has "no legal personality of its own (other than the person who owns it)," is small in terms of employment size, and is generally associated with low capital intensity and low productivity. The informal sector workers, on the other hand, are defined as all those workers "working in the unorganized enterprises or households, excluding regular workers with social sector benefits, and the workers in the formal sector without any employment/social security benefits provided by the employers." The various categories of workers in the informal economy include wage workers in the unorganized sector; the self-employed in the unorganized sector; unprotected workers in the organized sector; and regular unorganized workers.

In 2004–2005, the total employment in India was estimated to be 457.6 million, while the estimated informal sector workers numbered 394.9 million. Unorganized sector workers accounted for over 86 percent of the total workers, and if those working in the formal sector without any social security benefits are added to it, the share of informal sector employment is as high as 92 percent. Out of the total workers in the unorganized sector, 64 percent were employed in the agricultural sector, 15.28 percent were in industry, and 20.61 percent were in services. Informal employment is particularly significant in agriculture, trade, and construction. The unorganized sector contributes around 60 percent of the net domestic product.

A substantial majority of workers in the informal economy are self-employed. In terms of location, the majority of informal workers live in the rural areas. The share of the female workers is higher in the informal sector and is higher than their share in the workforce. Women constitute a third of the total informal workers. As per NCEUS, 79 percent of informal or unorganized sector workers are poor and vulnerable. The informal sector workers generally have a lower level of education, and the socially disadvantaged groups, such as the lower castes, Dalits, tribal groups, and some religious minorities, have a disproportionately higher presence among these workers. A substantial majority of such workers own little or no land at all. The vulnerability of the informal sector workers arises from their poor resource endowment (such as landlessness, illiteracy, and poor health and nutrition) as well as their low social

and economic status in society. Thus, informality is deeply embedded in social and economic exclusions of diverse kinds. These diverse forms of vulnerability reinforce one another. For example, among the unorganized sector workers the scheduled tribe workers have the lowest average years of schooling. Among occupational groups, poverty ratios are highest among casual laborers, and in terms of social groups, the scheduled castes (SC) and scheduled tribes have the highest poverty ratios. Although there is significant overlap between poverty and informality, it is simplistic to assume a 1–1 correspondence between the two. While the majority of the informal sector workers labor under pitiable conditions with low earnings, and they face a range of social and economic discrimination and exclusion, there are forms of "informal economy" work at the top end of the income pyramid as well.

Recent research on the informal economy has clearly brought out the significance of this sector. Not only is the informal sector growing, it is far from a transitory phenomenon. It is not just a residual of the past; rather, it is an important feature of modern capitalist development in India.

The first kind of informal economy is the economic activity of companies and individuals that is not registered for the purpose of taxation and/or regulation by the state. There are four reasons why an economic activity might not be regulated by the state: (1) it involves production and exchange that do not take the form of market transactions (for example, noncapitalist and/or family production); (2) it consists of market transactions by units or firms that fall below the threshold for direct taxation or licensing; (3) it involves various kinds of mobile exchange and production; (4) it is illegal or a criminal business activity. The small size of the firm or economic unit might be autonomous or it might be a deliberate strategy to escape legislation. The second kind of informal economy refers to informality within the formal economy. These are activities undertaken by firms in the formal economy that are not covered by state regulation and bookkeeping. With the liberalization of the economy since the early 1990s, there has been a rise in "flexible production," outsourcing, and the informalization of work within the formal economy itself. Even the state-owned enterprises have resorted to diverse ways of employing labor through informal contracts.

Although the informal economy is considered to be outside the legal framework of the economy, it is regulated and disciplined in a number of ways. In many ways the informal economy is socially regulated. The nonstate ways through which the informal economy is regulated include the use of trusted family labor; social networks; trust and power exercised through repeated and interlocked contracts; social norms and selective use of tradition; and regulation through collective institutions and private protection forces. The informal economy intersects with the institutions of caste, religion, ethnicity, and gender. The social institutions and the networks of trust and reciprocity built around them play a significant role in defining access to crucial inputs such as credit and, perhaps more important, information. In many cases these institutions also create barriers to entry by nonmembers and thereby act as instruments of exclusion. Often, when such caste groups double as trade associations of diverse kinds, many of the negotiations with the state and its representatives

and other nonstate agents exercising power at the local level (such as collective bargaining for fixing rates of bribery and the returns from such "investments") as well as provisions for services of diverse kinds are carried out collectively. In 2010, according to Barbara Harriss-White, these informal institutional structures "police entry, organize apprenticeships, calibrate weights and measures, regulate derived markets (labor, porters, transport), adjudicate disputes, guarantee livelihoods, respond to individual or collective misfortune and accumulate the funds necessary to represent their interests, shape the way policy is implemented and collectively evade tax." In the absence of the state's willingness or ability to intervene, these identities make a structure of accumulation that may also pervade the state. These social structures of accumulation form an integral part of the way India's informal economy operates and sustains itself.

Globalization has led to a reorganization of production systems toward "flexible specialization." Although the linkages and complementarities between the formal and informal sectors have been noted earlier, flexible specialization has added an entirely new dimension to it. The outsourcing of production at different levels of the global commodity chains have resulted in reconfiguration of the production organization in some of the informal sector activities. Certain forms of informal economic activities are being pushed out to the margins as a result of economic reforms and globalization. The entry of corporate and multinational corporations into retail business is expected to adversely affect the millions of small street corner traders and vendors. State policy is increasingly hostile to vendors, mobile workers, and many such occupations, particularly in the megacities. There is some evidence that neoliberal policies and ideologies have made the megacities increasingly hostile to migrants and workers in the unorganized sector. It is not just that they are being pushed out of the cities through the demolition of slums and city beautification drives, but many of their crucial means of livelihood (such as rights of passages, permission to open shops on pavements and public places) are being increasingly rationed through a combination of legal and extralegal means. The attempt to outsource parts of the production process to the self-employed in the informal sector is increasingly becoming part of the manifold attempts to cut down costs, even by firms producing for the global and high-end domestic markets.

Given the diversity that exists within the informal economy, it is hardly surprising that unionization and collective mobilization are nearly absent among these workers. Notwithstanding the many attempts to forge alliances and put forward sector-specific demands by many national and local trade unions, nongovernmental organizations, and other groups, informal sector workers do not have a strong voice at any level. Nevertheless, there have been attempts to provide a minimum level of social security to these workers. In December 2008, the Indian Parliament passed the Unorganised Workers' Social Security Bill, which seeks to provide social security benefits to workers in the unorganized sector.

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See also Economy

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✦ EDUCATION, DEVELOPMENT

Using the World Bank's definition in its Development Education Program, development education "produces tools and resources for teachers and young people to explore social, economic, and environmental issues of sustainable development in their classrooms, communities, and around the world." Development education, therefore, covers every aspect of education from the earliest level to higher education.

After India attained its independence in August 1947, the Education Commission called for the creation of new institutions to undertake the task of higher education in technology, agriculture, and management. Three models of higher education were imported. In the field of technology, the "MIT model" was advocated by the Sarkar Committee, first established in 1946 and headed by Nalini Ranjan Sarkar (1882–1953). The five Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) were the result. The "land-grant university model" provided the basis for development of agricultural universities. The "business school model" was instrumental in the creation of the Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs) at Ahmedabad and Kolkata.

India's higher education system is the third largest in the world after China and the United States. As of 2009, India had 20 central universities, 215 state universities, 100 deemed universities, 5 institutions established and functioning under the State Act, and 13 institutes that are of national importance. Other institutions included 16,000 colleges, including 1,800 exclusive women's colleges, functioning under these universities and institutions.

In rural India, solar-powered vehicles equipped with PCs and Internet connections are used by villagers interested in accessing e-mail or checking out crop information. These initiatives for wider educational opportunities were undertaken by companies such as Direcway Global Education (Direcway), Wipro, and the National Institute for Information Technology (NIIT).

Wipro teamed up with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) across the country to train teachers on effective teaching methods through its Applying Thought in Schools program. It proved immensely beneficial to teachers. Wipro devised a teachers' training program called the Teachers Empowerment Program (TEP). Commenting on the motive behind the launch of the program, a Wipro official stated, "The 'Chalk and Talk' method of teaching does not lead to the enhancement of problem-solving skills and creative thinking."

There are other innovations in development education such as green schools and the bride school concept promoted by the M. V. Foundation in Andhra Pradesh. In Bihar (Bihar Education Project) and Rajasthan, similar programs called Lok Jumbhish and Shiksha Karmi have also been set up. The Lok Jumbhish program signifies a vigorous people's movement and emphasizes the correlation between education and the empowerment of women. In 2001–2002 a mammoth effort was made by the central government with the cooperation of state governments to launch the Sarva Siksha Abhiyan (SSA). The goals of the SSA included schooling for all children ages 6–14 who should complete five years' primary education by 2007, the improvement of elementary education, and education for life.

Significant shifts in the regulation of the nonprofit sector and philanthropy have taken place in the last few years. This is partly because of the good reputation that NGOs now enjoy in India and partly because of an attempt to overhaul the legal and fiscal regulations relating to nonprofit organizations (NPOs). Policy shifts in some cases have led toward greater control over the nonprofit sector and its activities and in other cases have led toward greater autonomy. The National Policy of 2007 on the Voluntary Sector, though not a law, was a welcome move on the part of the government. In addition, the right to information is enshrined in the Constitution of India. The Right to Information Act 2005 has now laid down the process of making this right a simple yet powerful and practical option. These policy developments will further trigger innovations in the development education sector.

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See also Child Labor; Economy; Indian Institutes of Technology

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Education, Primary. *See* District Primary Education Program

✦ ELECTION COMMISSION

The Election Commission of India was founded on January 25, 1950, as a constitutional body (Article 364) to operate fair and impartial elections in the largest democracy in the world. In 1947, postcolonial India adopted a parliamentary democratic system and a centralized Election Commission based on the British model. Despite several external and internal challenges, elections have been held every five years. In March–April 2009, the Election Commission handled the monumental task of supervising the 15th Lok Sabha (lower house) elections with 714 million voters in over 800,000 polling stations.

Article 364 of the Indian Constitution postulated an effective and centralized body that became fully functional at the time of the first general elections in 1952. As a result, the Election Commission is responsible for all elections of the Indian central and state legislatures and of the offices of the vice president and president of India.

The central authority of the Election Commission as a single body was emphasized by the framers of the Indian Constitution, most notably by Dr. B. R. Ambedkar (1891–1956), a member of the scheduled (untouchable or Dalit) caste. He reminded everyone that the Indian political environment is riven along caste, religion, gender, and linguistic lines and this marginalizes many communities during the electoral process. Accordingly, the Election Commission's charge was to see that everyone could exercise their right to vote. The commission became a multimember body in 1989 and has, apart from a short period between October 1989 and January 1990, remained that way. In 1993, a constitutional amendment (324) made changes in salaries, prerequisites, and tenures of the election commissioners. The chief election commissioner salaries became equivalent to those of the judges of the Supreme Court, and the salary of two commissioners became equal to the judges of the high court. The law stated that the commissioners could be removed through the impeachment procedure carried out in Parliament.



Voters display their identity cards as they line up to cast their votes in the fourth phase of the Bihar state elections at Fatuha, November 1, 2010. India is the world's largest democracy and elections are mammoth undertakings. (AP Photo/Prashant Ravi)

The Election Commission is supported by a secretariat in New Delhi consisting of 300 officials and deputy commissioners who are selected from the Indian civil services. In addition, there are election officers in every state, district, and city in India. The election commissioners

are appointed by the president of India based on the recommendations of a committee that consists of the prime minister, a judge of the Supreme Court, and the leader of the opposition party in Parliament. There are no constitutional requirements for the judges or required academic qualifications for these election commissioners, as selection is at the discretion of the president of India. The term of office for election commissioners was five years with possible three-year extensions, but in 1971 the term became fixed at five years and an age limit of 65 was also added.

For the first four decades after 1950, the Election Commission had to consult the central and state governments in every facet of the electoral process, including the announcements of polling dates, decisions to postpone elections, delimitation, and the extension of dates for the completion of elections. This resulted in many awkward situations and controversial decisions, especially in the case of the Jammu and Kashmir election of 1996. On January 15, 1997, the commission was finally vested with jurisdiction over the entire electoral process.

To fulfill its obligation for the holding of impartial elections, the Election Commission formulated a code of conduct in 1998 that laid down specific rules and conditions for candidates and political parties. T. N. Seshan, the chief election commissioner between 1990 and 1996, became renowned for creating apprehension among the candidates during the 10th Lok Sabha elections in 1991 as they were fearful they were not meeting the standards of the code of conduct.

The Election Commission also operates internationally, as India is a founding member of the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) in Stockholm, Sweden, and provides election experts and observers during elections held around the world. One such example was when India sent observers to the elections held in Iraq in 2004.

The Election Commission has introduced many electoral reforms to combat fraudulent activities, corruption, and malpractice since its inception in 1950. An innovative project was the use of electronic voting machines (EVMs). They were used partially in 1999 and replaced paper ballots completely in the 2002 elections. The lightweight, portable EVM is powered by a battery and controlled by a centralized system. It can easily and economically be transported to the remotest areas, such as the mountains of the Himalayas and the deserts of Rajasthan. It has facilitated the electoral process in a country where illiteracy, election rigging, and geographical remoteness have been major challenges in the successful implementation of a sustainable democracy. In the election of 2009, more than 1 million (1.368 million) EVMs were used by a staff of 4 million polling personnel in conjunction with 2 million police and security officers in 543 constituencies.

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See also Constitution; Election of 2009

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✦ ELECTION OF 2009

India—the world's largest democracy—held parliamentary elections in the spring (April–May) of 2009. For its sheer scale and size, the Indian election of 2009 was "the greatest exercise of democratic will anywhere in the world at any time in human history." Roughly 714 million eligible voters elected 543 federal lawmakers to the lower house of Parliament, the Lok Sabha, in five phases of polling spread over one month, using 1.5 million electronic voting machines, 828,000 polling stations, and 4 million polling officials and costing approximately $240 million.

The 2009 general elections—the 15th since India became a republic in 1950—witnessed a triangular contest among three electoral coalitions: the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Congress Party; the leading opposition—the National Democratic Alliance (NDA)—headed by the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and the "Third Front" pulled together by the left parties. Each coalition was a patchwork of disparate political parties brought together by the compulsions of coalition politics.

The weakening of the Congress Party in the 1980s and the simultaneous proliferation of smaller, caste- or region-based parties signaled the arrival of a coalition era in Indian politics, fundamentally altering its electoral arithmetic. During the first 40 years of India's democratic life, the Congress Party, founded in 1885, continuously won majority governments (except for a brief interregnum during 1977–1979), while no single party has been able to win power single-handedly since 1989. Post-1980s, it became impossible to win a plurality of seats (272 out of 543) without electoral alliances and adjustments with numerous smaller parties. Thus, in the last two decades or so, the balance of power shifted from national parties to fringe parties, resulting often in programmatically incoherent pre- and postpoll alliances bereft of a common agenda for governance. Described as the fragmentation of Indian polity, these developments, however, cannot be dismissed as the regression of democracy. To the contrary, they deepened and widened India's democracy. They certainly made Indian democracy messier, more fractious, and unwieldy, but they also expanded the political arena by providing political space to actors and interests hitherto unrepresented. A case in point is the political mobilization of former "untouchables" by the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) founded in 1984 in Uttar Pradesh, India's most populous state.

Key national issues that had an impact on voting behavior in 2009 were the Mumbai terrorist attacks of November 2008 and the effects of the global recession that began in 2007.

Table 4 General Election Results, 2009

Party	Seats Won
United Progressive Alliance	262
Congress	206
Trinamool	19
DMK	18
NCP	9
Rest	10
NDA	159
BJP	116
JD(U)	20
SS	11
RLD	5
Rest	7
Third Front	24
CPI(M)	16
CPI	4
RSP	2
AIFB	2
Others	98
SP	23
BSP	21
BJD	14
AIADMK	9
TDP	6
RJD	4
Rest	21

Big business and the middle classes were preoccupied with the Congress government's handling of these two issues, while the poorer voters were engaged by issues such as the price of rice, agrarian distress, and rural welfare policies. Contrary to the recent pattern, identity politics played a lesser role in 2009.

Prior to the polls, speculation about political uncertainty was rife as analysts predicted no clear mandate for any of the major blocs. Most exit polls predicted a hung Parliament with no single party or bloc able to achieve a simple majority. However, when the results were announced on May 16, 2009, the ruling UPA had pulled off a surprise victory, winning 262 out of 543 seats. The UPA was 10 seats short of a simple majority, but it had won a larger share of the seats compared to the previous election in 2004. The results were widely interpreted as a mandate for continuity/stability and an endorsement of the UPA's record and its handling of key issues; although by no means was the election result an unqualified endorsement of all its policy initiatives.

The 2009 election returned, for the first time since 1984, an incumbent government to power for an immediate second term. The stronger mandate for the UPA was the result of a

higher share of seats won by its chief constituent, the Congress Party. The latter increased its tally from 145 seats in 2004 to 206 seats in 2009, making it less dependent on smaller parties inside and outside the coalition. These facts were interpreted as emblematic of a shift of balance from smaller and regional parties to national parties, an early sign of the transformation of the coalition dynamics from multipolar to bipolar between Congress-led and BJP-led blocs and a reversal of the decline of the Congress Party. While it is too early to pronounce a definitive verdict on whether some of these predictions will come true in the long run, some favorable drifts are discernible.

The causes of the outcome are complex and multidimensional. However, it appears that the substantial electoral gain of the Congress Party had a lot to do with its politically astute strategy of pursuing a dichotomous policy package that simultaneously prioritized the interests of two extremes of Indian society, the richest and the poorest—that is, India Inc. (corporate India) and the proverbial *aam aadmi* ("common man"). While continuing to aggressively defend and expand policies of economic liberalization largely benefitting big business, the UPA government of 2004–2009 made the protection of the rural poor, especially in preventing them from bearing a disproportionate share of the social costs of liberalization, a bigger priority than in the past. Its policies contained the paradoxical impulses of center-right and center-left positions, opening more and more sections of the Indian economy to the free interplay of global market forces while at the same time striving to protect the rural poor from their adverse consequences. Its two flagship programs—the farm-loan waiver scheme and the rural employment guarantee scheme—highlight the paradox. The policy support for the rural poor also served as a legitimation mechanism for the growth process that surely generated significant new wealth but also caused considerable dispossession and disempowerment in rural India.

Thus, one of the salient macro trends of the 2009 general election is that it signaled the emergence of a semblance of class-based social coalition building by the Congress Party, albeit dichotomous and departing marginally from its past practice of relying on caste and community vote banks. This by no means negates the considerable and continued clout of caste/religion permutations and dynastic charisma on Indian democracy, especially in its micro settings, but suggests they are reaching the saturation point. Economic themes have a higher resonance among the Indian electorate. India may finally be ready for developmental politics.

Another important feature of the 2009 election was the use of electronic media for campaign-related activities, the higher share of young voters, and the synergy from the interaction of the two. Twenty-four percent of Indian voters—that is, more than 170 million—are between the ages 18 and 35. Fifty-four percent of the Indian population is under the age of 25. Fifty-six percent of voters under 25 years of age cast a vote in the 2009 elections. Mathematically then, young voters can swing the outcome one way or the other, even accounting for the fact that the vote of the young does not accrue uniformly to any single party or bloc. Young voters are more urban, educated, tech-savvy, and aware of global trends. The necessity to attract youth has pushed political parties to new modes of campaigning and outreach

through mobile phones, the Internet, and private television channels. This is changing the nature of political communication and indicates the impact of communication on participation and voting behavior.

It is a remarkable achievement for India to have sustained a democracy successfully through 15 general elections, when predictions of gloom and imminent disintegration were commonplace in its early days of independence after August 1947. Against considerable odds of widespread poverty, illiteracy, mind-boggling diversity, and a highly unstable neighborhood in South Asia, India has not only held together as a democracy but has deepened and widened it. The highly competitive, yet largely smooth and fair periodic elections with relatively high levels of participation across all segments of the population, along with the peaceful transfer of power, are a testament to the entrenchment of the democratic ideal in the Indian psyche. Despite its considerable failings, democracy as a system of governance continues to enjoy the confidence of Indians across the socioeconomic divide, as testified by the steadily rising voter turnout (from 45 percent in 1951–1952 to 60 percent in 2009). Research shows that the poor are more likely to cast their vote in India. It can be inferred from this that, despite its imperfect record on governance, Indian democracy continues to thrive.

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See also Constitution; Election Commission

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✦ ENVIRONMENT

Covering an area well over a million square miles and stretching nearly 2,000 miles both north to south and east to west, India encompasses a diversity of natural environments, with large differences in physical relief and climatic conditions across the country.

The broadest division of India's geomorphic structure traditionally comprises three parts: the block of peninsular India that is part of the Indian Plate, the Himalayas and other mountain ranges that surround all land approaches to the subcontinent, and the Indo-Gangetic Plain that lies between them. The peninsula contains a variety of rock formations,

but most are very old, having existed in a form similar to their current structure since before the Indian and Eurasian Plates were joined. Ancient mountain ranges surround the peninsula on many sides: the Western and Eastern Ghats on the southwestern and southeastern seaboards and the Vindhya and Satpura Ranges running east-west on the northern side. In the interior lies the Deccan Plateau, drained by rivers that rise in the mountains and over the millennia have deposited alluvial soils to form narrow plains on the west and east coasts.

The relief of the subcontinent exerts an important influence on its climate. The Himalayas form a high barrier that shelters India from the cold northerly winds which sweep down from Siberia across Central Asia. As a result, the climate of all of South Asia is warmer than it would otherwise be, so much so that the Intertropical Convergence Zone (where weather systems originating in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres meet) moves as far north as the Indo-Gangetic Plain in the midsummer months. The Himalayas and high temperatures of the subcontinent are important factors in the system of the monsoon, the rains that bring most of India up to 80 percent of its annual rainfall between the months of June and September.

After the winter ends in late February, the surface of the subcontinent warms up rapidly, particularly the Deccan, the Thar Desert, and the rest of the northwest. The rise in temperature creates a trough of low pressure over South Asia, which sucks in moisture-laden winds from over the Indian Ocean, known as the southwest monsoon. The first rains usually reach the west coast by early June and Bengal by the middle of the month. They spread rapidly up the featureless Gangetic Plain and have usually reached most of the country by July. As temperatures begin to cool at the end of the summer, the clouds retreat, depositing the last rains on the southeast coast in late autumn (the much weaker northeastern monsoon also passes over southern India around the same time). Like the winds, the monsoon rainclouds are not able to cross the divide of the Himalayas and instead shed all of their load on the southern side of the mountains, meaning that the Himalayan foothills receive high loads of rainfall (especially in the east). The Western Ghats perform a similar role on the west coast. The monsoon clouds are able to pass over the Ghats but cool quickly as they rise, shedding most of their load on the coast and thus losing most of their moisture before they reach the Deccan.

Biogeographical classifications of regions are based on the types of plant and animal species that inhabit them. The highest level in this system is the world's eight biogeographical realms (or ecozones), which represent the broadest division of the plant and animal kingdoms into relatively autonomous regions, many of which developed in isolation from the others. The Himalayas form the boundary between the Palaearctic Realm (which encompasses most of Eurasia and North Africa) and the Indo-Malayan Realm (which includes South Asia, mainland and maritime Southeast Asia as far as the Wallace Line). India therefore straddles two realms, and its flora and fauna reflect both these influences (it is also worth remembering that the peninsula was an island isolated from all other continents for millions of years). In terms of ecosystem types, India contains regions exhibiting most of the world's biomes (types of ecosystems), according to the classification of the World Wildlife Fund (WWF). These

include tropical and subtropical moist broadleaf forests (mostly in the east of the country and the Western Ghats, as well as Indian Ocean islands belonging to India: Lakshadweep and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands); tropical and subtropical dry broadleaf forests (mostly in the Deccan and other parts of the central highlands); tropical and subtropical coniferous forests (in the Himalayan foothills and northeastern hills); temperate broadleaf and mixed forests (in the Himalaya mid-altitudes); temperate coniferous forests (approaching the tree line in the Himalayas); tropical and subtropical grasslands, savannahs, and shrublands (at the foot of the Himalayas); montane grasslands and shrublands (in the high Himalayas); flooded grasslands and savannahs (the Rann of Kutch); deserts and xeric shrublands (in the northwest of the country and the Deccan); and mangroves (at the deltas of the major rivers such as the Ganges, Krishna, and Godavari).

With such a wide range of physical structures, climatic regions, and ecosystems, and its huge geographical extent, it may not be surprising that India is one of the most biodiverse countries in the world. It is designated as one of the world's 17 "megadiversity countries" and contains an estimated 15,000 species of flowering plants, 350 species of mammals, 1,200 species of birds, 400 species of reptiles, 200 species of amphibians, and 2,500 species of fish. High proportions of the plant, reptile, and amphibian species are endemic (unique to the region). Of the 34 "biodiversity hotspots" that have been identified by the environmentalist Norman Myers and adopted by many international environmental organizations, 3 fall partially within India: the Himalayas, Indo-Burma, and the Western Ghats and Sri Lanka. To qualify as a hotspot, a region must contain at least 1,500 species of vascular plants (i.e., more than .5 percent of the world's total) as endemic species and must have lost at least 70 percent of its original habitat. While having the honor of being a vital store of the planet's biodiversity, India also has to face the urgent issue of the environmental destruction and serious degradation of its most diverse regions. All 3 of the hotspots are forested regions. Through the colonial and postcolonial periods, the forests that once covered most of India's hills have been dramatically reduced, largely due to commercial activities such as logging. While there already exists a network of protected areas across these regions and other parts of India, environmental organizations such as Conservation International are campaigning for more strategic and international planning of conservation areas, including strategies such as transboundary conservation initiatives, biological corridors, and particular attention to key biodiversity areas (KBAs).

In 2009, India contained a total of 99 national parks, 513 wildlife sanctuaries, 41 conservation reserves, and 4 community reserves. Of the reserves, 15 are designated as biosphere reserves, 7 of which are listed in the World Network of Biosphere Reserves by UNESCO. The Wildlife Protection Act of 1972 was passed at a time when concerns about the natural environment and its conservation were rising fast on the international agenda. While the aim of the act was to relieve the pressure on India's many threatened species and environments, it has been widely criticized for adopting the "pristine wilderness" approach to conservation, which was developed in the national parks of North America. This approach,

which effectively seeks to exclude human influence from protected areas, is particularly badly suited to a country such as India, where most landscapes have long been used by humans for activities such as shifting cultivation, collection of forest produce, and hunting, even if they are not under permanent cultivation, meaning that there is little or no true "wilderness." The 1972 act empowered the state to designate areas or species as protected and restrict or ban outright human access to them, with high penalties for those who violated the prohibition. The resulting spread of protected areas over the country alienated many people from land and practices that were critical to their livelihood and increased levels of poverty and deprivation among certain groups. The restrictions on killing various animals have also caused problems for farmers living near protected areas, who are effectively powerless to stop protected animals that eat or damage crops close to the reserves. The development of biosphere reserves represents an attempt to redress these problems, recognizing the needs of human as well as animal populations living in and around environmentally sensitive areas, and they typically involve less rigid restrictions on the use of wild resources than those that were applied in the older national parks.

As India's population rose sharply from the early 20th century, the pressure on land steadily grew, and by the time of independence in 1947 many of India's natural resources were severely depleted, having also been exploited extensively during the two world wars. The country was in a food deficit and could not produce enough grain to keep up with its burgeoning population, which stood at 361 million in the 1951 census. Increasing the country's agricultural production therefore became a priority of the Indian government, and in 1951 it began five-year plans in the agricultural sector. The early plans strove to raise production by bringing more land under cultivation, extending irrigation works, and large-scale planning using techniques such as soil surveys. Land reform was also high on the agenda at independence and was theoretically a component of the first plan (1951–1956). Although land redistribution made some progress in states such as West Bengal, Kerala, Maharashtra, and Karnataka, it was blocked across most of northern India by the powerful *zamindari* ("landowning") class and eventually fell by the wayside as memories of the independence struggle and its principles began to fade. Production of cereal grains did rise quite significantly during the 1950s, but it was with the Green Revolution, beginning in the mid-1960s, that India finally managed to overcome its national food deficit.

The Green Revolution refers to the series of agricultural technologies that were introduced into the farming systems of many developing countries between the 1940s and 1970s, allowing them to increase both overall agricultural production and productivity per unit of land. India began to introduce the new technologies in the mid-1960s and witnessed dramatic increases in grain production. The national crop of wheat, which stood at roughly 7 million tons in 1951, rose to 40 million tons by 1981, and 84 million tons in 2000. The rice crop rose from roughly 22 million tons in 1951 to 99 million tons in 2000. These huge increases came partially from increasing the area of land under cultivation but above all from intensifying the cropping of existing farmland. High-yielding varieties (HYVs) of wheat and

rice, most of which had been developed in the United States, were used in India from 1965 onward. Such varieties produce more grain per unit of land but require large inputs of water and chemical fertilizer in order to do so. Chemical herbicides and insecticides are also necessary in order for HYVs to produce maximum yields. The Indian government facilitated the supply of irrigation water in regions selected to pioneer the new technologies and heavily subsidized the prices of the chemical inputs that were necessary to maximize productivity. The result has been that India has moved from a net importer to a net exporter of grain over a period in which its population has nearly tripled. It is difficult to imagine how such an increase of population could have been sustained without the massive increases in the country's grain production.

The greatest rises in national yields from the Green Revolution were achieved between the 1960s and 1980s. Since the early 1990s yields have still risen but at a much slower rate. There are various reasons for the slowdown, but one of the most important is that by the 1990s, Green Revolution techniques had been extended to more or less all the areas where they were feasible and could not move farther for lack of water. In fact, many now believe they have been extended too far: as water from canals cannot be stretched any farther even in well-irrigated areas, increasingly water has been pumped up through bore-wells from underground. Attempts to extend the Green Revolution to drier areas of the country without large rivers have had to rely on groundwater from the start to sustain the thirsty high-yielding crop varieties. Richer farmers and commercial operations have usually been able to put in the capital to sink bore-wells for their crops, but the result has been a drop in the water table and drying out of the topsoil, so poorer farmers have found that their already meager water supplies have dwindled even further.

Although India's irrigated land accounts for a high proportion of the country's agricultural production, it should not be forgotten that roughly 60 percent of cultivated land still depends on rainfall to water its crops as the majority of India's farmers still do not have dependable access to irrigation resources. The overexploitation of groundwater also presents serious risks for the sustainability of Indian agriculture—a problem that will need to be addressed in the very near future.

Although many parts of India receive more than 39 inches per year in precipitation, and some areas well over 78 inches, the seasonal nature of most of South Asia's monsoonal climate means that a very large proportion of this falls in the summer months, between June and September (except for the southern parts of the peninsula, where much of the rain falls with the retreating monsoon in November and December). Providing enough water for the crops has therefore been a traditional problem of Indian agriculture, particularly in years when the rains have arrived late or failed. A great variety of small-scale systems for irrigation and water harvesting, involving devices such as tanks, wells, wheels, channels, and lifts and often constructed with considerable skill and knowledge of local conditions, were traditionally employed across the country. The Indian government has, however, largely disregarded traditional water management systems and the knowledge associated with them, instead

investing in modern engineering and structures such as dams, canals, and bore-wells. Many of the community water systems have been taken over by the state and have subsequently fallen into disuse and disrepair.

About 40 percent of India's agricultural land is irrigated. It was a fraction of this until the 19th century, when the British began to build large-scale canal irrigation works in the valleys of the Ganges and the Indus and on some of the southeastern peninsular rivers. The new year-round supply of water brought significant changes to cropping patterns: whereas northern India had traditionally planted drought-hardy crops such as barley and gram in the dry season (the *rabi* crop), it was now possible to plant wheat, which had previously only been a *kharif* or summer crop that ripened during the rains. Extension of irrigation has also been a major concern of the government of independent India, which included dam and canal building in the five-year plans, increasing the net irrigated area from 51 million acres in 1951 to 136 million acres in 2004. Intensive irrigation played an important part in the Green Revolution during which the country multiplied its food production many times over.

Whereas these developments enhanced India's capacity to feed its large and still growing population, the proliferation of large-scale irrigation works, many involving raised channels that interfere with the drainage of the land, brought problems of waterlogging in areas close to the channels and a rise in the instance of malaria in many areas. Leeching and salination of the soil near irrigation works have also rendered extensive areas of once fertile lands unproductive. Furthermore, whereas the colonial extensions of irrigation above all involved harnessing rivers, the massive increases since the 1950s have been largely based on extracting water from underground aquifers through wells, to the extent that 70 percent of India's water for irrigation now comes from groundwater. As the aquifers are sucked up and sink deeper below the earth's surface, it is necessary to dig ever deeper to reach the water. While businesses and richer farmers can afford to do this, the poor—as so often in India—are left behind. Despair at the increasing scarcity of water has been an important factor in the tragic rise in farmer suicides in recent decades.

India's most ambitious water engineering plan to date is the Interlinking of Rivers Project, which—if constructed—would aim to divert water from wetter to drier areas of the country. Two sections are envisaged: the Himalayan section, to bring water from the upper parts of the Ganges, Yamuna, and Brahmaputra toward Haryana, Rajasthan, and Gujarat; and the peninsular section, which would link the southeastern rivers to transfer water to drier areas of the east coast. The project is controversial in India and internationally. Estimates suggest it would cost between $120 billion and $200 billion, a sum of money that the Indian government cannot raise on its own. Moreover, it is estimated that it could displace up to 5.5 million people, who would have severely limited opportunities for resettlement in an already crowded country. The changes in flow of the subcontinent's main rivers would also no doubt have many unpredictable effects on the ecosystems of the rivers themselves and the surrounding lands. These would likely affect aquatic plant and animal life, including river fish, which provide a major part of the diet in eastern India, and alter the level of the water table over huge areas.

The challenges and potential consequences of the project are in fact so immense that it is still difficult to imagine at this stage that the government could both quell all the dissent and secure enough money to pay for it.

India's rivers represent a huge potential to generate electricity through hydropower. Many water projects—the Interlinking of Rivers Project included—comprise multipurpose goals for irrigation, the generation of electricity, and the regulation of high waters (and floods) in the rainy season. Despite the electrification of most parts of India since independence, the 2001 census reported that 44 percent of households across the country still had no access to electricity. As electricity is often diverted from rural areas to keep power on in the cities, large parts of the countryside, even if they are connected to the network, are frequently without power. It is estimated that the Himalayan rivers of India alone contain the potential capacity to generate almost 100,000 megawatts of electricity through hydro-projects. Up until the present time, dam building has been concentrated for the most part on the rivers of peninsular India, which are generally more accessible and present fewer engineering difficulties than the Himalayan rivers (which exhibit very large seasonal variations in flow, carry heavy loads of silt, and flow through seismically active areas with high danger of earthquakes). However, with only an estimated 11,000 megawatts of unexploited hydro-potential left on the peninsula's rivers, the government is now serious about harnessing the Himalayan rivers for power as well. More than 100 large hydro-projects are planned for the northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh alone, which together are hoped to generate more than 50,000 megawatts.

The most controversial dam project in India has been the Sardar Sarovar Project to build a dam on the Narmada River, which rises in Madhya Pradesh and flows into the Arabian Sea in Gujarat. The project is estimated to have displaced more than half a million people. Opposition developed in the 1980s and grew into one of India's most famous social movements, the Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save the Narmada Movement), headed by the activist Medha Patkar (b. 1954). For decades the movement has campaigned against the progressive rise in height of the Sardar Sarovar Dam and for the adequate compensation of those affected by it. Despite this, the movement has not been able to stop the raising of the dam, which, following a ruling by the Supreme Court in 2006, currently stands at 396 feet. The campaign has drawn particular attention to the fact that the vast majority of those displaced by the project are "tribal" people, who are distinct from the mainstream of Indian culture and economy, and frequently still practice traditional livelihoods closely dependent on natural resources.

The pollution of India's rivers is a major concern. Few cities have systems for the treatment of human waste, and in many cases the sewers, if they exist, simply discharge sewage into nearby rivers. A large amount of water pollution is also generated by industrial installations. The Ganges and the Yamuna are particularly notorious—both flow through heavily populated areas and contain frighteningly high concentrations of industrial chemicals and pathogens from human and animal waste, which are markedly denser just downstream from major cities such as Delhi, Agra, and Allahabad. Similar problems beset most of the larger rivers in the country and many parts of the coastline. In 2001, the Water Quality Assessment

Authority was set up by the central government with a remit to assess and improve the quality of India's water by extending treatment systems for human and industrial waste. The mission of the authority is extremely welcome although the complexity of India's government and civil service means that a relatively small department is likely to encounter considerable difficulty in achieving its aims if they are in conflict with other powerful interests, such as those of the industrial sector and various bodies of local government. The Ganga Action Plan was closed in 2000 after limited success in curbing pollution on the river, however, the environment minister, Jairam Ramesh, has recently announced that India will borrow $1 billion from the World Bank to deal with the state of the Ganges, with a target of ending the discharge of raw sewage into the river by 2020.

While the colonial government was concerned about the impact of the small-scale activities of native people on the forests, it also sold large areas of forest at very low prices to Europeans who wished to set up plantations for tea, coffee, rubber, and other high-value products. Perhaps surprisingly, the two pillars of colonial forest policy—namely, restriction of forest resources from small-scale users and the allotment of forest lands for costs below their true value to large commercial interests—were continued more or less undisturbed after independence and were upheld in the 1952 Forest Policy. However, the major beneficiaries were no longer colonial interests but Indian businesses, industrialists, and entrepreneurs, who frequently had close connections to the workings of government. The industrialization of India was a national priority in the decades following independence, and the interests of the industrial and commercial sectors were thus put above those of India's poor and tribal groups. Raw forest products such as timber were made available to industrial enterprises at a fraction of their market costs, and as the demand increased with the growth of industry, ever-larger areas of reserved forests were denuded. Many forests that formerly contained a wide variety of species have been substantially replanted with monocultures of commercially valuable species such as teak and eucalyptus, both removing species that were useful to local people for purposes such as building or medicine and severely damaging the biodiversity of the very areas where it is richest. Since the 1980s, various parts of the government (in particular state governments) also began to form joint-sector companies with the private sector, allowing the private wings of these the captive use of large forest areas for plantations. Since the economic reforms of the 1990s, it has become even easier for companies, both Indian and multinational, to appropriate forest lands for plantations, as well as much more environmentally damaging activities such as opencast mining. It was villagers' outrage at these policies that gave birth to the famous Chipko Movement in Chamoli District of the Uttarakhand hills. Incensed that the Forest Department granted permission to a sports equipment company from the plains to fell ash trees close to their villages but had denied them permission to fell trees for farm tools, villagers protested against the fellings by hugging the trees, and eventually the decision was reversed. The movement became known all over the world as an example of a successful rural grassroots campaign against rigid and unsympathetic bureaucracy.

One of the more famous recent cases is the dispute between the British company Vedanta Resources and the Dongria Kondh of Orissa, over the company's plans to build an opencast bauxite mine on forest land on the mountain Niyamgiri, which is sacred to the Dongria. While Vedanta was barred from building the planned mine by the Supreme Court in 2007, in 2009 the court gave permission to the company's Indian subsidiary, Sterlite Industries, to build the mine as a joint venture with the Orissa state government.

India's forest dwellers were those who suffered most from the forest laws. Their situation was compounded by the Wildlife Protection Act of 1972, which allowed the government, in a similarly unilateral fashion, to declare lands "protected areas" and restrict or ban collection of firewood, plants, and the like. The problem with all of these acts was that they ignored the customary rights of forest dwellers to use the land they lived on, simply because their use of the land did not coincide with the colonial government's definition of cultivated land. After years of campaigning, predominantly by tribal rights groups, this oversight was finally addressed in the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (or "Forest Rights Act" for short). The Forest Rights Act recognized various traditional rights over forest land belonging to people who reside primarily in the forest. These include land rights to up to 10 acres (which must have been under cultivation on December 13, 2005), use rights for collection of nontimber forest products and grazing, "right to rehabilitation" (i.e., to return to land from which they have been illegally evicted), and rights to protect and manage forest lands as a community resource from those who would seek to damage or remove the forest, such as industrial enterprises or illegal loggers. The act also acknowledges forest dwellers' intellectual property rights over traditional knowledge related to forest biodiversity. To claim these rights, a person must prove either that they are a member of a scheduled tribe in their area of residence, or that they have been a resident in the forest for 75 years. The act came into force on January 1, 2008. Campaigners disputed various sections of the act before its passing, particularly the fact that the stringent criteria that had to be met to claim one's rights over the forest could lead to the exclusion of many people who depend on it for their livelihood but do not live inside the forest or cannot prove 75 years' residence, among other things. Since the act came into force, there have also been numerous disputes about its application, such as the process of application for recognition of forest rights and disregard of the act by various parts of local government. At the time of this writing many such disputes rumble on across the country.

Much of India's industrial growth has been based on heavy industry and carbon-intensive energy sources such as coal. Air pollution is a problem: the World Health Organization found that Delhi, Kanpur, and Lucknow were among the 10 most polluted cities in the world according to air quality, and for much of the winter a thick cloud of smog hangs over large areas of the Gangetic Plain. India is currently the world's fourth-largest emitter of greenhouse gases, producing about 1.3 billion tons per year, although as India's special envoy for climate change, Shyam Saran (b. 1946), has pointed out, the country's per capita emissions, at 1.3 tons per year, are much smaller than those of developed countries. Like most countries,



A crane segregates garbage in a waste dump on the outskirts of Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, May 11, 2010. India's greenhouse gas emissions grew by 3.3 percent between 1994 and 2007, ranking it fifth in aggregate emissions behind the United States, China, the European Union, and Russia. (AP Photo/Mahesh Kumar)

India is reluctant to set targets for emission cuts that might reduce its rate of economic growth. While the government is prepared to act on its emissions (it has announced plans to reduce its carbon intensity by 20–25 percent by 2020), it argues that countries with higher per capita emissions should be expected to make significant cuts before comparatively low-intensity economies like India.

In 2001, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicted that temperatures in the subcontinent are likely to rise by 3.5°C to 5.5°C by 2100, larger increases than many other areas of the world. The potential consequences of temperature rises on the Tibetan Plateau are also sobering. The Ganges receives roughly 9.1 percent of its water from glacial melt, the Brahmaputra 12.3 percent, and the rivers of the Punjab probably even more. If temperatures rise significantly in Tibet and the high Himalayas, this is likely to affect the amount of meltwater (both glacial and annual snowmelt) that flows down into South Asia. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has estimated that temperature rises and increased water stress could reduce crop yields in South Asia by 30 percent by the middle of this century. If this happens, India's ability to feed its population would once again be placed in jeopardy. Two of the most worrying scenarios are the catastrophic consequences that the whole of South Asia would face from substantial sea-level rise or an interruption of the monsoons. When the monsoon arrived late in 2009 drought was declared in nearly half the

districts in the country, and the sowing of the summer crop was reduced by some 20 percent. With hundreds of millions depending on the summer rains, any significant disruption could be disastrous. With such high stakes, India cannot afford to disregard these risks, and in 2009 the country announced large increases to the budget for climate research.

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See also Economy; Water Resources

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F



✦ FAMILY

The Indian family at its best offers a formidable array of benefits to its members, paying for education, actively lobbying to find jobs for family members, accommodating younger family members until they get married, and providing a financial safety net. At the same time, the Indian family's strengths produce corresponding weaknesses.

Misconception often applies to accounts of "the Indian family," as if it were a monolithic institution that operates the same for all families in India. The idea that the Indian family provides complete support, even under extremely adverse circumstances, to individual family members continues to shape the socialization experiences of children and young adolescents and maintains the institution of "family" as one in which all Indian individuals aspire to be part. This is, in fact, not the case. For example, the family doesn't always offer complete support when women become widows (whether they are young or old), or in the case of the treatment of girls and newly married women. In the vast cultural context of India, with 18 official languages, generalizations that are broad enough to be applied to the main social groups in the country often need to be made. Using religious affiliation, 80.5 percent of the Indian population are Hindus, 13.4 percent Muslim, 2.3 percent Christian, and 1.9 percent Sikh. While there are matrilineal groups in the northeast in Mizoram and Meghalaya states, in the southwest in Kerala and Tamil Nadu, and in the Lakshadweep Islands, the main family structure in India is patrilineal, where family headship is typically male. The Indian family is strongly hierarchical, and in addition to gender, hierarchy is firmly based on age; in both cases, gender and age determine family members' roles, with commensurate responsibilities, benefits, status, and decision-making power.

The perception of "complete support" for individuals within the family cannot be understood in isolation from the near complete lack of a welfare state in India. Given this situation, the family, and sometimes the wider religious and ethnic community within which a family sits, is the *default* "support" option, which is doubly the case for women, given the restrictive attitudes to their public role that are widespread in India and South Asia. As such, members of a family find themselves bound together, out of material necessity, and what may appear as the aspiration to be a part of a family is often a discipline imposed on individual family members by the lack of alternative material means of support outside the family. This guarantees a high level of conformity. The extent to which this conformity is consciously recognized, or is even a relevant issue, depends on the social and economic means of the family. In addition, among the least "modern," that is, in the most traditional strata of Indian society, social norms and individual family behavior are indistinguishable. For example, females are socialized to see fulfillment of their individual aspirations in the service to other family members.

Furthermore, the role of the family's contacts in gaining employment, due to the importance of contact networks in Indian society, especially for younger family members, adds a further disincentive against family members' unsanctioned actions that might cause parents' support to be withdrawn. In addition, rigid social norms with respect to family formation, employment, sexuality, and women's roles, add an additional layer of incentives to conform. For example, with the exception of an elite section within the university educated class, it is typically still the case that family members remain in parents' homes until they are married. This is further reinforced by landlords' reluctance to rent middle-class housing to unmarried adults, particularly if they are young. Successful transgressions outside these limits are typically only the preserve of the very affluent and the very poor, who typically go as migrants to urban centers.

There are many young Indian people from affluent and middle-class backgrounds, including those in the diaspora, who continue to marry individuals against their will. These are not truly "forced marriages" because many young people do not voice their position during the process or to the individuals they are being introduced to. Many of them continue the love affairs they had with others after they have accepted and married the person who was chosen for them.

Widows, together with the female child and the newly married woman, often find themselves in especially difficult circumstances. Abandonment of widows and their ill-treatment within families occurs when the male family headship passes to non-spouses, typically sons. Widows have also been seen living on their own even in rural settings and are often evicted from their land through deception and criminal violence by immediate family members, underscoring the role of the husband as literal protector of women across large parts of Indian society. In addition, younger widows fall victim to sexual advances by other male family members, whether in affluent urban or poorer rural settings, making a mockery of the idea of "complete support."

The most serious danger to newly married women in the Indian family is dowry violence, where the husband and/or his family threaten and/or conduct violence against the new bride in an attempt to extract money and consumer goods from her family. This process sometimes ends in murder of the bride, typically through burning. Dowry violence is an occasional but persistent middle-class phenomenon.

Girls routinely suffer from premeditated neglect on the part of parents in lower-income groups with respect to nutrition, education, and health care. This is due to a significant extent to the need to ensure that sons survive into adulthood; sons, therefore, are given a larger share of scarce resources. In agricultural settings, which covers 70 percent of the population, adult sons plant crops and in general can engage in paid employment. Women are less likely to work and are paid less when they do. Favoring the son ensures that the family land stays in the family, thereby ensuring, in principle, the financial security of the parents in old age, and the bringing in of a dowry through marriage. Girls, even in low-income groups living in poverty, increasingly require a dowry. This has been a cause of female infanticide, still practiced in parts of the country among low-income groups, while more affluent groups now routinely resort to sex identification of the fetus through ultrasound and the abortion of female fetuses.

It is therefore clear that the Indian family can be either an unrivaled support or be repressive or even fatal for individuals, typically more so for female family members, especially those vulnerable to dowry murder.

RISTO HÄRMÄ

See also Female Feticide; Feminism; Widows; Women, Status of; Women's Reform Movements

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✦ FEMALE FETICIDE

Female feticide poses the most formidable challenge to sex-ratio patterns in northern India. It is a practice whereby, after detecting the sex of the fetus, a female fetus is aborted. Due to the bias against having girls, especially in the states of the Punjab and Haryana, the population of females in India has been falling drastically. The census of 2001 shows that out of the 10 districts in the country with the fewest ratio of girls to boys, 7 are in the Punjab. Significantly, this is not related to illiteracy, as Muktsar District in the Punjab, with a literacy rate of 50.3 percent, has a ratio of 811 girls to 1,000 boys, and Ropar District, with a 71.4 percent literacy rate, has a ratio of 794 to 1,000. Certain areas in the Punjab, such as the villages of Azimgarh and Gobindgarh in Abohar Tehsil, Ferozepur District, show general ratios as low as 556 and 566 respectively.

These kinds of statistics on sex ratios continue to show up due to the proliferation of ultrasound-scan centers, which detect the sex of the fetus. Legislation, such as the Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act (PNDT), 1994, has not been effective. The Medical Termination of Pregnancy (MTP) (Amendment) Bill was introduced in the upper house of the Indian Parliament, the Rajya Sabha, in 2002 to amend a similar act enacted almost 30 years earlier in 1971. Governments have been trying to regulate ultrasonography clinics, but coercive measures do not provide a solution for a problem which is rooted in social prejudice.

A survey conducted by the State Health Department of the Punjab in 2005 showed that the rate of female births in Bathinda varied monthly for the period January–June from 888, 863, 747, 768, 885, to 792 for 1,000 males. Although the department claims to have been successful in restricting the operations of ultrasound centers, the ratios may only be temporary. Newer findings reported in the *Tribune* in September 2005 show that clinics have mushroomed all over the Punjab, and are run by homeopathy or ayurvedic practitioners, lab assistants, nurses, and midwives, and abortions are performed at great risk to women. There are even a large number of scan centers without any trained radiologists available at all.

The practice of female feticide has its precursor in colonial India in the form of female infanticide. British imperial policies offer a critical insight into the reasons for the survival and continuity of female infanticide in contemporary India. The activity of the colonial state and the large-scale, long-term effect of its agrarian development and revenue policies, which purported to modernize the world of the Punjabi peasants, transformed it into an even more unambiguously masculine domain where, of necessity, fewer women would survive. The British generated new job opportunities for "martial races" in the Indian Army and the police. The effects of recruiting Punjabi peasants, particularly the land-tilling Jats, generated a demand for strong, young men who, after retirement, would be given land, and this led to the preference for a "gender targeted family." At that time, it could have been done only through selective female infanticide. Such a "masculinization" of the economy made male children desirable.

Colonialism also perpetuated the emulation of such upper-caste practices of dowry, replacing the bride-price practiced by the low castes. Social reformers appropriated this colonial discourse and branded bride-price as the "selling of girls," thereby reorganizing women's relationship with land and with public spaces. The emerging notion of "honor" was also instrumental in situating gender in colonial Punjab. Middle-class men sought a higher status as they engaged in intellectual and practical pursuits and devoted energy to reorganizing women's lives, reiterating norms of correct behavior for them and regulating their relationship with public spaces and with the "low" castes and classes. In the quest for achieving appropriate class behavior, women were resituated within caste boundaries. Such behavior is still seen today, where aside from some rare cases of polyandry in contemporary India, there is no dearth of instances of buying brides in the Punjab and Haryana from other regions of the country, even from as far as Assam and West Bengal.

The colonial government treated the question of female infanticide as one of policing and dealt with the practice merely as a problem of social practice. The legal enactments of the present governments, such as the MTP Act of 1971 and the PNDT Act of 1994, also perpetuate the colonial perspective on the problem, one that cannot be solved merely through punitive measures. As long as women remain absent from the workforce and do not occupy powerful positions in social space, there will continue to be gender bias against women.

Female feticide is not merely a crisis in religion but also a social crisis of a serious magnitude. Thus, any amount of *hukmnamas* or edicts from the Akal Takth, the supreme Sikh authority, or sloganeering from the social reformers of the Arya Samaj, will have little effect as long as there is gender bias. Further, the attitude of the government of the Punjab and neighboring Haryana does not help. While the government of Haryana abrogates its responsibility by announcing pensions for parents having two daughters, the government of the Punjab tightens controls of sex-detection centers as the solution to the problem. These inherently flawed approaches need to be replaced with academically nuanced and socially relevant interventions.

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See also Feminism; Women, Status of; Women's Reform Movements

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✦ FEMINISM

Feminism in India is a tricky concept and an even more complicated process. Due to its strong precolonial history and the effects colonization has had on Indian culture, feminism has been uniquely constructed and conceived. Added factors such as a strong patriarchal hierarchy, entrenched religious and cultural traditions, and socioeconomic status have all played a role in the construction of feminism. Similar to other identity-driven constructs, feminism in India is not a solid concept but instead it is an ongoing negotiation. Feminism and women's rights are considerably different than in Western societies. It is, however, extremely difficult to define feminism without applying Western ideals and norms to the concept. Additionally, with the definition of feminism comes the acknowledgement of gender inequality, which many people find difficult to acknowledge.

India has typically been a patriarchal society, in which the elder males (often fathers and/or husbands) are the heads of the households. It is usually the oldest male who becomes the patriarch of the family, though there are several communities that exhibit matriarchal tendencies. Sikh communities typically are gender neutral. In a patriarchal household the duties of the head of the household can range from allocating money to the assignment of duties or jobs in the house. This male lineage has been in existence for so long that it has become traditional and has played a subsequent part in women's roles; as such it has led to the oppression of some women.

Other cultural and religious customs have also helped shape the role women play. One example of this is the practice of suttee, which encouraged newly widowed women to commit suicide by throwing themselves on their husband's funeral pyre. This practice demonstrates that a woman's value is connected to her role as a wife. Suttee still occurs, although very rarely, despite the practice being banned in 1829. There is still, however, a great amount of stigma attached to widowed women, who often remain single after becoming widowed and very rarely remarry.

Other religious and cultural practices that are harmful to women and children, such as child marriage and *devadasi*, the practice of ritually marrying girls to Indian deities and then having them serve the god as temple prostitutes, have been made illegal. However, there are many more traditions and customs that have existed for hundreds of years and are deemed to be a part of religious expectations and culturally based "personal laws." The Government seeks to eliminate practices that are harmful to women and children, but it is often impossible to interfere with religious laws and customs even though they jeopardize the rights of women.

Education for women has not always been seen as a priority. In a patriarchal household where the eldest male is in charge of the household, he is able to decide whether to continue a girl's education or to direct her to help out more in the household. As a result, females have a higher drop-out rate in middle and secondary school than males, and the literacy and numeracy levels are lower. They are encouraged to leave school to assist with home duties and chores, as domestic work is seen as more of a priority and a lifestyle choice for many females. This helps contribute to the low levels of female literacy and results in the loss of empowerment and an economic dependency on men.

The National Policy on Education (NPE), however, has created a women's empowerment program called Mahila Samakhya ("Education for Women's Equality") to help create a learning environment for women, to encourage them to attain further education, and to help them acquire the knowledge necessary to take control of their lives. This program has met with varying degrees of success around the country. Efforts are continually being made to help raise enrollment rates for girls, and for the hiring of female teachers. This program has also recognized that there are huge discrepancies between the level of education received by males compared to females.

Without the education and skills to support themselves, women often become dependent on their male family members. This creates the view that women are an economic liability. Although the workplace is starting to see a rise in the level of female employment, the ratio of men to women is still unbalanced. Additionally, with low literacy rates women are often subjected to lower paying, unskilled jobs. Even in higher paying positions, women are likely to be paid less than men for the exact same amount of work. In addition, labor unions, which have been seen as insensitive toward women's rights, have often failed to protect women in the workplace.

The struggle for women's rights has required women to participate in the struggle, but they are often unaware of the rights afforded to them, or they have become so accustomed to a particular role that they do not see a reason to take advantage of their rights. Women who do see their rights being constrained have worked to develop advocacy groups so that civic rights will be protected under the constitution. There have also been attempts to



Women demonstrate for civil rights and a healthy environment in Goa, November 26, 2007. (Dreamstime.com)

improve women's rights through programs of affirmative action, child care, and maternal health care. Such women's organizations as the All India Women's Conference, founded in 1927, and the National Federation of Indian Women, founded in 1954, actively work on women's issues.

Globalization has played a large role in the modernization of women's roles. This is especially apparent in younger generations, where appearances and clothing styles have begun to take on a more Western look. Relaxed attitudes regarding women's roles have also started to develop, leaving behind gender roles and stereotypes. Issues such as dating and divorce are still seen as slightly taboo, although they are becoming more open. This is more visible, however, in the cities. Women's roles in the rural areas, towns, and small cities are still much more traditional. Despite the modernization of women's roles, there is a lot of resistance to the changes that modernization brings.

SHEREEN BHALLA

See also Women, Status of; Women's Reform Movements

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✦ FILM INDUSTRY

It is now commonplace for people to say "India has the world's largest film industry." Each year India produces around 900 films in a number of languages that are circulated globally and viewed by millions of viewers. However, it can be argued that there is no such thing as an Indian film industry but rather Indian film industries. Each industry is based in a particular city and is linguistically and culturally based, reflecting the diversity of India. For example, the Tamil cinema is based in Chennai (Madras), the Bengal cinema in Kolkata (Calcutta), and the Telugu cinema in Hyderabad. Each film industry is culturally based, and it is rare, but not unknown, for Tamil filmmakers to produce Hindi language films, or Bengali filmmakers to produce Telugu films, and so on. It is frequently claimed that the cultural differences are too great for a Bengali to be able to produce a Malayalam (Kerala) film, not just in language but

also in custom and tradition. A comparison with Europe would be an appropriate analogy. Few people talk about European cinema as a category but do speak of Italian cinema, Swedish cinema, or British cinema because of the cultural and linguistic differences involved. Consequently, to be accurate we should think of Indian cinemas, each with its own characteristics, production centers, stars, and audiences. However, within this framework, there is one cinema that thinks of itself as an all-Indian cinema, and that is Bollywood, based in Mumbai (Bombay).

The reasons for the status of Bollywood are historical and economic. Bombay has always promoted itself as the "Gateway to India." That is, it is a cosmopolitan city, which has always been at the forefront of change in India. It was the port through which most overseas goods and ideas entered India, and film was no exception. Young men attracted to filmmaking in the 1920s and 1930s came from all over India, and in order to make films they had to shed their regional cultural identities and forge new ways of thinking and talking about India. They chose to make modernize film by developing new narrative strategies based on traditional models, and after the introduction of synchronized sound to India in 1931, they opted to use the Hindi language as their medium of expression. The Nationalists were committed to Hindi as a national language, so by adopting it the Bollywood filmmakers were not only creating a new industry but also making a political statement. The filmmakers were also astute businessmen who understood the value of promotion, distribution, and exhibition on a national scale, and they achieved all-India domination by linking these basically economic activities with cultural activity through the creation of a particular narrative strategy, the use of music and songs, and the creation of a star system. Today the Hindi *fillum* song is inescapable, and images of the stars dominate the urban landscape. Bollywood has been branded the preeminent Indian cinema, and it is now regarded as a global brand.

Finally, Nigeria has surpassed India as the world's most prolific filmmaker, but the modes of production are entirely different. Filmmaking in Nigeria is largely a digitally based enterprise undertaken by individuals on a small scale somewhat like an earlier cottage production phase of the Indian production scene. By contrast the principal centers of filmmaking in India boast large investment in filmmaking with large studio complexes matched by multiplexes in shopping malls, where the middle classes increasingly go to be entertained.

Generally speaking, film finances are a closely guarded secret, and everyone who has written on the economic aspects of filmmaking in India has complained about the lack of data. However, estimates suggest that Hindi films account for around 50 percent of all revenue generated by the industry. Furthermore, some general observations can be made. The film industry has been one of the largest industries in terms of gross income measured by box office returns since the late 1930s. However, the commercial film industry has never been viewed as a nation-building industry by any government from the British era on, and consequently it has never attracted any government support or subsidy. In fact, economists and politicians have viewed the industry for much of its existence with disdain.

Traditionally, film producers have sought funding from the indigenous money markets, which has led to a particular mode of production dominating the film industry. Producers

package a film, sign a star, put together a crew, hire a studio, and then seek sufficient funding to shoot a segment of the film. If this is judged successful then further funding is forthcoming. There are three outcomes stemming from this method of financing. First, the stars and film crews may be shooting multiple films at any one time. In the 1980s Amitabh Bachchan (b. 1942), the dominant male star of the time, was making eight films simultaneously. Second, young filmmakers who can attract funds can enter the industry quite easily compared to any structured approaches to filmmaking found elsewhere. Third, this method of financing has allowed the film distributors to dominate the industry in the postwar, postindependence era.

More recently, stars such as the Bachchans and Shahrukh Khan (b. 1965) have formed their own production houses, and this has enabled them to have greater control over their output and thus their careers. Moreover, the major television companies like Zee TV, UTV, and Adlabs have become involved in film production, distribution, and exhibition. (Films are an important part of Indian TV screening schedules.) Finally, the prospect of foreign film companies producing films in India without having to engage in coproductions concerns local producers. These last two factors have made the economics of Indian film more transparent and may indeed transform film finance in the country.

The major regional cinemas are located in Andhra Pradesh (Telugu), Assam (Assamese), Karnataka (Kannada), Kerala (Malayalam), the Punjab (Punjabi), Tamil Nadu (Tamil), and West Bengal (Bengali). Each cinema has its primary production center and its own raft of stars and cultural significance. For example, Bengali films are usually seen as more intellectual and atmospheric than their Tamil counterparts. Satyajit Ray (1921–1992), India's acknowledged master filmmaker, came out of the Bengali film tradition, which has strong links to the Bengali renaissance made famous by Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), India's first Nobel Laureate (1913). Each regional cinema industry has deep roots in the regional culture, with individual films exploring themes relevant to that particular culture. At the same time each of the regional cinemas exists in an ambiguous relationship with Bollywood, which tends to set the pace with its excess and reliance on star vehicles.

Telugu cinema is the closest rival to Bollywood among the regional cinemas and is frequently referred to as Tollywood. (Tollygunge is the popular name for the Bengali film industry.) Tollywood produces approximately 300 films each year (275 in 2008) and boasts Ramoji Film City, located in Hyderabad, the world's largest film complex.

By contrast Tamil cinema operates within a different set of conventions to other regional cinemas. First it is a center for filmmaking in other south Indian languages as well as in Sri Lanka. Second, Tamil politics have been dominated by links to the film industry. The first non-Congress chief minister, C. N. Annadurai (1909–1967), was a director and scriptwriter. The action hero M. G. Ramachrandran (1917–1987) dominated Tamil politics in the 1980s, and his successor J. Jayalitha (b. 1948) was an actor who specialized in romantic roles. The current chief minister, M. Karunanidhi (b. 1924), was also a director and scriptwriter before becoming a politician. Tamil filmmaking is sometimes referred to as Kollywood because it is based in Kodambakkam, a suburb of Chennai (Madras).

Other major regional film industries are Assamese, Kannada (Karnataka), Punjabi, Bhojpuri (Bihar and Uttar Pradesh), Marathi, and Gujarati.

The pioneers of film production in Bombay looked to Hollywood for inspiration. One aspect of the Hollywood system that caught their attention was the star system. By the 1930s Bollywood already had a recognizable star system. By the 1950s the stars had become the single most important aspect of film production in all regions. They were the "hook" whereby the producers raised their revenue from the film distributors. A whole industry relating to the stars' personal lives emerged through the myriad magazines and journals devoted to stars. Their presence in the urban streetscapes was unavoidable as the large hand-painted advertising boards dominated the skyline. With the advent of satellite television in the 1990s, the position of the stars as the arbiters of film culture was confirmed.

Each region has its own stars. For example N. T. Rama Rao (1923–1996) starred in more than 300 Telugu films and specialized in playing the gods, which he transformed into a political career by becoming the chief minister of Andhra Pradesh (twice between 1983 and his death in 1996). M. G. Ramacharandran specialized in playing action heroes, a role he translated into the chief ministership of Tamil Nadu (1977–1987). Bengali stars tend to be more intellectual and poetic, a portrayal epitomized by the work of Guru Dutt (1925–1964), a Konkakan Brahmin, in the 1950s and 1960s. However, the greatest stars are always associated with Bollywood.

From the beginning male stars were supposed to conform to an ideal type of masculinity. In the all-India extravaganzas they were expected to conform to a set of characteristics derived from imperial notions of martial races, that is, from the north, usually the Punjab or the Northwest Frontier provinces. Many of the early male stars, such as Dilip Kumar, whose real name was Yusef Khan (b. 1922), were Muslims who "Hinduized" their names for a range of complex reasons, including the appeal to an essentially Hindu audience. Interestingly, female stars such as Waheeda Rehman (b. 1936) and Nargis (1929–1981) were allowed to retain their Muslim identity.

The current crop of Bollywood stars conforms to the earlier traditions of masculinity, although the three Khans—Shahrukh (b. 1965), Aamir (b. 1965), and Salman (b. 1965)—have retained their Muslim identity. Other major male stars of the present are Abhishek Bachchan (b. 1976), Akshay Kumar (b. 1967), and Hritik Roshan (b. 1974).

The cultural position of female stars is more complex than that of the males. Initially there were cultural prohibitions against women acting in films, which only began to crumble in the 1930s. The arrival of Durga Khote (1905–1991), a Brahmin, as a star in 1932 is viewed within the industry as an important landmark, as previously female stardom was confined to Anglo-Indians (Solochana [Ruby Meyers, 1907–1983], Patience Cooper [1905–1983], Nadia [Hunterwalla], and Helen [b. 1939]). Subsequent to Durga Khote the Indian screens have been graced by an endless array of nubile young actresses who appear onscreen and then disappear from view. A number of female stars, such as Nargis, Jaya Badhuri (b. 1948), and Rekha (b. 1954), have managed to have extensive careers, but compared to males such as Dilip Kumar,

Dev Anand (b. 1923), Raj Kapoor (1924–1988), Sunil Dutt (1929–2005), and Amitabh Bachchan their numbers are quite small. Indian cinema remains an essentially masculine concern.

Prominent contemporary Bollywood actresses include Katrina Kaif (b. 1984), Shilpa Shetty (b. 1975), Aishwarya Rai Bachchan (b. 1973), and Frieda Pinto (b. 1984), star of *Slumdog Millionaire* and reportedly the highest paid star in contemporary Bollywood. There are thousands of websites devoted to the lives and films of the stars.

The regional cinemas have developed their own star systems, with the stars having great cultural cache in the various cinematic traditions of India. The links between Tamil cinema and politics have been replicated elsewhere. As in Bollywood, the regional stars such as Kiran (Tamil cinema) and Bhumika Chawla (b. 1978), who transcends cultural boundaries by starring on both Tamil and Telugu films, have thousands of websites devoted to their activities. Interestingly N. T. Rama Rao's grandson (NTR Jr., b. 1982) has become a star of Telugu cinema in his own right, providing another parallel between Bollywood and the region.

Since 2009 India has witnessed a revolution in cricket with the formation of the Indian Premier League (IPL), which now commands a television audience in the millions worldwide. Bollywood stars have become an integral part of the IPL circus, attending matches and, in the case of Shilpa Shetty (Mumbai Indians), Sharrukh Khan (Kolkata Knight Raiders), and Priety Zinta (Kins XI Punjab), actually owning team franchises.

Few Indian films are made without a music track featuring up to 12 song routines. Indeed it is the music that characterizes Indian films. A. R. Rahman (b. 1966), who won an Oscar for his soundtrack of *Slumdog Millionaire*, receives star billing for any film he is involved with. The recent box-office success *My Name is Khan* (Shahrukh Khan) is a film where the soundtrack is used to enhance the narrative by combining Islamic-influenced tunes with popular Bollywood tracks. One film without songs but with a strong soundtrack is *Chak Dhe! India* (Sharukh Khan), which provides a fictionalized account of the Indian women's hockey team success at the Melbourne Commonwealth Games in 2006. Music is thus used in Indian film at a number of levels.

The songs and tunes of Bollywood are ubiquitous in India. They are played endlessly on radio, they constitute a major part of MTV and other youth-oriented television programs, and they are widely circulated throughout the country on either cassette tapes or compact discs (CDs). The music is one of the major promotional aspects of the film industry.

The narrative patterns of Bollywood films allow for the insertion of a number of musical interludes. Originating as costume dramas in the 1930s, the films morphed into the *masala* formula by the 1960s. *Masala* means spicy. The films are a mixture of genres—the romance, the adventure film, the musical, and so on—that are combined together to make a specific type of film that has been refined into Bollywood spectaculars. These are characterized by adventurous camera work, split-second editing in action and musical sequences, and the excessive use of color and emotion.

Song sequences are frequently shot in a particular manner, in which characters change clothes and location several times during the duration of a song, seamlessly and effortlessly,

with great color effects. Thus, a female star may change from a sari, to Western dress, and back to a sari within a song sequence. The action of the song might change from Kashmir (in the past at least) to the tulip fields of Holland to Sydney Harbor within one sequence, which is shot and edited with great skill. Audiences seem to expect these travelogues.

Attending the cinema in India is quite different than attending elsewhere. Indian audiences are very involved with the films they watch. Snack foods are in endless supply, and people talk loudly and endlessly until a song they admire comes along, at which point they will join in and sing along. There are frequent interjections from the audience warning the hero about the approaching villain and so on. There is a dynamic relationship between audience and films in India not found elsewhere, and the music is at the core of this relationship.

Finally, there is a long tradition of filmmakers using film to comment on characters, to advance the narrative, and even introduce new narrative trajectories. Often what seems to be a love song may in fact be a political commentary. When analyzing Indian films it is necessary to pay close attention to the lyrics of the songs.

A unique feature of the Indian cinema is the role of the playback singer. In most cases the stars mime the words and the voice belongs to a singer, such as Lata Mangeshkar, who is famous in her own right. Indeed, the playback singer receives a prominent billing in the advertising and is central to marketing campaigns associated with the films. Mangeshkar has sung literally thousands of roles during a career that has stretched more than 50 years.

India has a long tradition of alternative cinema, often called parallel cinema or art film, which defines itself in opposition to Bollywood. There is also a documentary film tradition that has suffered from lack of funds over the years, although satellite television has led to a recent increase in the number of documentaries produced.

Parallel cinema has been greatly influenced by European cinema, in particular by Italian neorealism and the French New Wave. Long associated with Bengal through the films of Satyajit Ray, Mrinal Sen (b. 1923), and Ritwick Ghatak (1925–1976), parallel cinema has expanded to incorporate Tamil film, Malayalam film, and Hindi cinema. Recently, the trend has been applied to Indian films that straddle the European tradition and the Bollywood style, such as those made by Shyam Benegal (b. 1934).

Important filmmakers of parallel cinema include Kumar Shahani (b. 1940), Mani Kaul (b. 1944, Hindi), Adoor Gopalakrishnan (b. 1941, Malayalam), Girish Karnad (b. 1938, Kannada), and Arpana Sen (b. 1945, Bengali).

Over the years parallel cinema has faced a number of problems, not least of which is the absolute domination of Bollywood in the popular imagination. These problems include textual piracy and the general lack of finance. In 1960 the Film Finance Corporation was created to finance alternative film production. It subsequently became the National Film Development Corporation (1975), with the slogan "fostering excellence in cinema." To date it has funded 300 films.

In India the authorities have always had an ambivalent relationship with film. On the one hand, they have always regarded film to be culturally insignificant, ephemeral, and crassly commercial. On the other hand, they have always imprisoned it in a complex and rigid

censorship system. Every film exhibited in India has to display a Censorship Certificate issued by the Board of Film Censors. If it is not shown, then the screening is deemed illegal. Censorship is usually justified on moral grounds, but in many respects it is governed by a suspicion on the part of the authorities that film has the potential to cause profound social and political unrest, especially among the poor and illiterate, if it is not strictly regulated. Thus, every act of film censorship in India has a political dimension.

The elaborate censorship system was invented by the British, who passed it on to their nationalist successors who, in many respects, extended the system and made it even tougher. For years, kissing on the Indian screen was prohibited on moral grounds, but the censorship code is much more extensive than that and includes prohibitions on depicting foreign governments or the military in a disrespectful manner, depicting crime or drug taking in an attractive manner, and showcasing many other arcane subjects.

The close links between the regional film industries in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu have been mentioned. A number of Bollywood stars have also entered federal politics with varying degrees of success. The best known was Sunil Dutt, the husband of Nargis, his costar in *Mother India* (1957), who became the minister for youth and sport in the Manmohan Singh (b. 1932) Congress-led government between 2004 and 2005. By contrast Amitabh Bachchan, who sat in the upper house of the Indian Parliament, the Rajya Sabha, between 1984 and 1987 was generally regarded to have failed in politics. The popular view is that south Indian film stars make successful politicians while the Bollywood stars fail, largely because they lack a rural or local base from which to operate.

Nevertheless, in the mid-2000s there was a vogue for the major political parties to seek out film stars for endorsement of their political platforms. Bachchan, Rajesh Khanna (b. 1942), Dilip Kumar, and Govinda (b. 1963) were well-known supporters of Congress, while Vinod Khanna (b. 1946), Hema Malini (b. 1948), and Dharmendra (b. 1935) all supported the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), founded in 1980.

Apart from Sarah Dickey's *Cinema and the Urban Poor in South India* (1993) there have been few detailed sociological studies of film in India. Most current scholarship seems to be devoted to historical issues or textual analysis augmented by a number of biographies of stars. Given the popularity of the medium throughout India, this is surprising. However, a new generation of scholars emerging from the American film studies programs focusing on Asia will, no doubt, rectify this situation.

Indian films were exported to Indian diasporic communities from the 1920s on, and a number of pioneers of the industry, such as Ardeshir Irani (1886–1969), who made the first Hindi talkie, *Alam Ara,* in 1931, began his career as a showman in Southeast Asia; he imported and exhibited films in what are now Indonesia and Malaysia. Moreover, from the 1950s Indian filmmakers established extensive markets for their films in the old Soviet bloc, West Africa, East Africa, and the Caribbean, thereby creating an international market for their films. In the 1990s the situation changed, and Bollywood became a global brand. This came about through a combination of factors.

In the 1990s Indian directors began shooting sequences in overseas locations, usually for the major song section. This expanded, and filmmakers began shooting whole sequences overseas and then moved to making entire films in foreign locations that explored Indian preoccupations. Thus Indian film narratives became more global and less parochial in their scope and appealed to a wider audience.

International film festivals more frequently picked Indian films to show. This trend began with the work of Satyajit Ray in the 1950s and subsequently focused largely on the small but important parallel cinema industry. This began to change in the 1990s, when films starring Amitabh Bachchan and later Shahrukh Khan were included in international programs. Inclusion in an international festival further extended the reach and audience for Indian films. In many respects this development reached its apogee when Shahrukh Khan attended the 2009 Golden Globe Awards in Hollywood while he was in America making a sequence of *My Name is Khan* (2010). Seeing how important the international market was to their collective success, Indian filmmakers began to tailor their films for a more cosmopolitan audience, while being careful not to alienate their core Indian audience, and to market their films more aggressively in Europe and North America.

The largest contributor to the global reach of Indian film is, without doubt, technology. It began with VHS and Beta tapes, which made Indian films more widely available to old and new markets. This success was followed by the introduction of DVDs, which has revolutionized the circulation of films throughout the world. Although plagued by film piracy, DVDs have proved an economic boon to producers. They no longer have to rely on cinema box offices as the principal source of revenue. Money now comes from a mix of domestic and international markets: from traditional showings and the sale of DVDs and so on. In addition, the DVD market is augmented by CDs that feature the soundtracks of popular films. Finally, satellite television has also extended the scope of Indian film. The many Indian satellite television channels are dominated by film screenings, which bleed over into neighboring countries. Audiences in Nepal, Pakistan, and Bangladesh regularly watch Indian films on television.

One other aspect of the globalization of Indian film to be considered is the arrival of a number of versatile filmmakers of Indian ethnicity who make films in both India and their home country. Among these are Shekhar Kapur (b. 1945), who made *Mr. India* (1987) as a Bollywood film, followed by *Bandit Queen* (1994), which adhered to the parallel cinema approach, before making the Oscar-winning *Elizabeth* (1998) followed by *Elizabeth: The Golden Age* (2007). In Hollywood M. Night Shyamalan (b. 1970) has made the box-office successes *The Sixth Sense* (1999), *Unbreakable* (2000), *Signs* (2002), and *The Happening* (2008). The Kenyan-born, British-raised Gurinder Chadha (b. 1960) has successfully released *Bhaji on the Beach* (1993), *Bend it Like Beckham* (2002), and *Bride and Prejudice* (2004), the latter a reworking of Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice*. The Canadian-based Deepa Mehta (b. 1950) has made a remarkable trilogy of films, *Fire* (1996), *Earth* (1998), and *Water* (2005), that have been successful in the West but controversial in India because of their subject matter. *Fire* dealt with lesbianism, *Earth* with the trauma of Partition in 1947, and *Water* with the treatment of widows. Finally,

Mira Nair (b. 1957) has made a number of highly successful films that explore Western and Indian themes in tandem in films such as *Salaam Bombay!* (1988), which won 25 international awards; *Monsoon Wedding* (2001); *Vanity Fair* (2004); and *The Namesake* (2006). Collectively this group of film directors has won wide recognition for their skill as filmmakers. They have also enhanced the reputation of India as a filmmaking destination and of the industry as a whole.

India has a wide diversity of languages and cultures, and this is reflected in the production of Indian films with the industry divided into three streams—the parallel cinema of directors like Mani Kaul; the regional cinemas, such as Tamil or Telugu cinema; and the all-India cinema commonly known as Bollywood. The star system dominates the regional cinemas and Bollywood, and both cinemas follow the *masala* film formula in which every film has a little romance, a little adventure, a lot of confusion, and many song-and-dance sequences. Initially, Indian films were confined to the subcontinent and the diasporic communities located throughout what was the British Empire. In recent years Bollywood in particular has become a global brand, and audiences throughout the world enjoy and appreciate Indian films.

BRIAN SHOESMITH

See also Bollywood

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✦ FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, DEVELOPMENT

A development financial institution (DFI) is an institution promoted or assisted by the government mainly to provide development finance to one or more sectors or subsectors of the economy. The institution distinguishes itself by a balance between commercial norms of

operation, as adopted by any private financial institution, and developmental obligations; it emphasizes the "project approach," meaning the viability of the project to be financed, against the "collateral approach"; apart from provision of long-term loans, equity capital, guarantees, and underwriting functions, a development bank normally is also expected to upgrade the managerial and other operational prerequisites of the assisted projects. Its insurance against default is the integrity, competence, and resourcefulness of the management; the commercial and technical viability of the project; and above all the speed of implementation and efficiency of operations of the assisted projects. Its relationship with its clients is of a continuing nature and of being a "partner" in the project rather than that of a mere "financier."

The origin of financial institutions can be traced to the state-driven planned development policies followed by the government of India. While banks, through their large branch network, catered to the needs of different sectors and groups, the DFIs mainly met the need for long-term finance by the industrial sector. The first DFI established in India was the Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI), which was created in 1948. It was followed by the state financial corporations (SFCs) at the state level after the passing of the SFCs Act in 1951. In 1955 the second India-wide financial institution, the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India, was established as a company under the Indian Companies Act, 1913, with the primary objective of promoting industries in the private sector and meeting their foreign-exchange requirements.

On July 1, 1964, the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) was established under the Industrial Development Bank of India Act, 1964, as the principal financial institution for industrial development in the country. It was designed to coordinate, in line with the national priorities, the working of institutions engaged in the financing, the promotion, and the development of industry and in assisting the development of institutions for providing credit and other facilities. EXIM Bank (also known as the Export-Import Bank of India) was established as a statutory body in 1982 for providing financial assistance to exporters and importers, and for functioning as the principal financial institution for coordinating the working of institutions engaged in financing the import and export of goods and services. The Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) was established as a statutory body in 1990 and took over the outstanding portfolio and activities of the IDBI pertaining to the small-scale industrial sector. Besides these, a number of other development financial institutions were set up during the period 1948–1974. In 1974 the existing financial institutions were defined as public financial institutions under Section 4A of the Companies Act, 1956. The central government also obtained the right to categorize any institution as a public financial institution.

Despite the large number of state financial institutions in India, the commercial banks account for 66 percent of the assets of financial intermediaries, while investment institutions account for 18.1 percent, and the balance is covered by the rest of the financial institutions. At the national level these can be classified into term-lending institutions, refinance institutions, and investment institutions. Their categories and major activities are given in table 5.

Table 5 Categories of financial institutions

Types of Financial Institutions	Names	Major Activity	Regulatory Body
Term lending	EXIM Bank	Direct lending such as term loans and investments	Reserve Bank of India
Refinance institutions	NABARD, SIDBI, and NHB	Provide refinance to banks and nonbanking financial intermediaries (NBFIs)	Reserve Bank of India
Investment institutions	Life Insurance Corporation (LIC)	Deploy assets largely in marketable securities	

Source: Reserve Bank of India, *Annual Report, 2007–08* (Mumbai: Reserve Bank of India, 2008).

Table 6 Selected financial indicators of the indian financial sector

Item	Banks	Urban Cooperative Banks	Development Finance Institutions	Primary Dealers	Nonbanking Financial Companies
CRAR	13.1	11.9	26.3	37.5	22.4
Gross NPAs to gross advances	2.4	14.2	0.6	N/A	2.6
Net NPAs to net advances	1.1	2.3	0.1	N/A	0.3
Return on total assets	1.0	0.7	1.3	2.5	1.0
Return on equity	12.5	N/A	6.1	10.7	8.6
Cost/Income ratio	49.2	56.2	21.2	25.4	17.3

Source: Reserve Bank of India, *Report on Trends and Progress of Banking in India, 2007–08* (Mumbai: Reserve Bank of India, 2008).
CRAR = capital to risk assets ratio; NPA = nonperforming asset.

Two national-level financial institutions, the Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI) and the Tourism Finance Corporation of India (TFCI), which were earlier being regulated as financial institutions, have since 2007 been back within the regulatory structure of nonbanking financial companies. The Industrial Investment Bank of India, due to its poor financial position, was in 2010 in the process of winding up its operations. Besides the national-level financial institutions there are also state-level financial institutions, such as the state financial corporations, the state industrial and development corporations, and the North Eastern Development Financial Corporation Ltd. These have also been certified as public financial institutions by the government of India under Section 4A of the Companies Act, 1956.

When financial reforms opened up the Indian market to international competition and investment in 1991, the India-wide financial institutions faced difficulties as their sources of cheap funds dried up. Historically they had access to low-cost funds, such as access to

long-term operations (LTO) funds from the Reserve Bank of India at concessional rates. They also had access to cheap funds from multilateral and bilateral institutions guaranteed by the government of India. They were also allowed to issue bonds that qualified as investment for the purpose of maintaining statutory liquidity ratios. These low-cost funds were withdrawn at the time of the reform, and the DFIs had to approach the market to raise funds. Since the reforms, two financial institutions have been converted into banks. Four institutions—the EXIM Bank, NABARD, the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development, the National Housing Bank, and the SIDBI—came under the regulatory purview of the Reserve Bank of India. They also had to face competition from commercial banks in term lending. The selected financial indicators of the Indian financial sector are shown in table 6. It shows that financial institutions have performed well compared to others.

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See also Central Banking, Development Aspects; Monetary Policy; Reserve Bank of India

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✦ FOOD SECURITY

The World Food Summit of 1996 offered this definition of food security: "Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life." The three key dimensions of food security are availability, access, and utilization. Food availability requires adequate food production at the national/global level; access depends on both the physical access as well as the financial access to food. The utilization aspect is dependent upon health, the quality of living, and sanitation conditions. In other words, food security is a multifaceted concept that has both supply-side as well as demand-side dimensions. In view of the long history of hunger and malnutrition in India and the explosive population growth over the past century leading to vast numbers of new mouths to feed every decade, food security concerns have been at the center stage of public policy in postindependence India, that is, since 1947. From the days of food shortages and dependence on

food aid and imports, to the relatively comfortable position of having an excess food supply during the post-Green Revolution phase, India's journey on the food security front at the national level has been a remarkable achievement. However, the challenges of ensuring food security at the household and individual level are far from over.

The cornerstone of food security at the national level is the adequate production and availability of food grains. The net availability of cereals in India has been on the rise since 1951, but after 1996 there has been a declining trend in the net per capita availability of cereals. In the case of pulses there has been a spectacular decline in per capita net availability. The remarkable achievement in cereal production came through the Green Revolution, which was a strategy of intensifying agriculture in irrigated areas through the application of improved seed varieties, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides. India's total production of food grains was around 231 million tons in 2007–2008—a significant increase from 82 million tons in 1960–1961—but at the same time there was a significant decline in the growth rate of food-grain production in the 1990s. As reported by the government of India in 2008, between 1980–1981 and 1989–1990, food-grain production increased at the rate of 2.85 percent per year, but it went down to 2.02 percent during 1990–1991 and 1999–2000, and was 2.09 percent during 2000–2001 and 2006–2007. Despite the recent slowing down of growth in agricultural production, India has been able to maintain self-sufficiency at the macro level. However, disturbing evidence suggests that the relatively comfortable situation at the national level has coincided with food insecurity in some parts of the country.



Part of India's vast acreage of rice cultivation. India is the second largest producer of white rice in the world with rice production having increased 350% since 1950. (Anna Kandelaki/Dreamstime.com)

One of the pieces of evidence that is disturbing is that the total consumption of cereals has declined in India over the past 25 years. As per National Sample Survey data, average calorie consumption in rural areas was about 10 percent lower in 2004–2005 than in 1983. There are two broad views on this contradictory development: some analysts argue that the decline in consumption of cereals, coarse cereals in particular, reflects the changes in the dietary preferences of people as the economy is moving to a higher level of per capita income. It is also argued that calorie requirements have declined because of better health, as well as due to lower activity levels. The other view is that, despite the improvements in the production of cereals, the food security condition in India has deteriorated. The high level of undernutrition among children supports this argument. Although the incidence of severe malnutrition has been declining, the overall levels of child undernutrition are still very high, both in absolute terms as well as relative to other countries. As per the 2007 World Development Indicators, only two countries—Nepal and Bangladesh—have higher proportions of underweight children than India. Notwithstanding the significant improvements in per capita income, close to half of all Indian children are underweight, and about half suffer from anemia.

Strong government intervention in terms of a guarantee of a minimum support price (MSP) for producers and the direct procurement and distribution of subsidized food grains through a public distribution system (PDS) have been the hallmark of the food management system. One of the outcomes of the policy is the relative stability in the prices of food grains, although during the late 1990s there was a significant increase in fluctuations in cereal prices relative to the prices of other commodities. The role of the Food Corporation of India (FCI), a public sector enterprise responsible for procuring and maintaining adequate foodgrain stock and making it available to the deficit regions at a reasonable cost, has been the subject of intense debate. While the PDS has been instrumental in ensuring food availability across the length and breadth of India, its high cost of operations, inefficient management, loosening of quality control measures, and geographical concentration of procurement have been severely criticized. In order to reduce leakages and fiscal burdens, there has been a move toward the Targeted Public Distribution Program (TPDS). The TPDS was introduced in 1997 throughout the country with the objective of limiting the food subsidy to identified poor households. In 2000–2001, another scheme called the Antodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) was introduced especially for destitute households. It has been argued that the TPDS has not been able to reduce the food deficit, nor has it been able to strengthen food security for the poor. The method, as well as the process, of identifying the poor has also been criticized by many people. Further, there are indications that food insecurity is typically high among socially marginalized and vulnerable groups. Thus, India faces considerable challenges in ensuring food security for all, and that is unlikely to change.

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See also Agriculture; Economy; Green Revolution

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Foreign Exchange Markets. *See* Money and Foreign Exchange Markets

✦ FOREIGN POLICY

Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964), India's first prime minister, was the philosopher, architect, engineer, and chief spokesman of independent India's foreign policy. He set out its goals and broad parameters before independence on August 14, 1947, in a radio broadcast on September 7, 1946. He and other officials subsequently elaborated these in forums ranging from the Indian Parliament to the United Nations (UN), explaining that they flowed naturally from India's geostrategic location, long history, rich culture, extremely heterogeneous population, and uniquely nonviolent freedom struggle led by Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948). Nehru projected a role for India in the world that would transcend the many vertical and horizontal divisions in the country and appeal to the widest strata of Indian public opinion, with the goal of aiming for an independent and respected voice in world councils. He articulated his positions in normative and high-sounding phrases. Nehru identified India's national interest with socioeconomic development at home and peace abroad. His approach to interstate problems was legalistic and pacific, not militaristic and belligerent. He sought moral influence rather than to play power politics, and he was an ardent proponent of universal nuclear disarmament in a world rent asunder by the Cold War.

Nehru proposed that India participate cooperatively in the UN and other international venues as a fully sovereign state, maintain friendship with neighbors and all major powers, but keep away from the entangling alliances of Cold War power politics, so that India could take the lead in the emancipation of colonial countries and renew close and friendly ties with the peoples of Asia, especially with neighboring China. For the most part, Nehru's successors continued his tradition, especially in emphasizing India's strategic autonomy, though some of his basic assumptions proved to be mistaken. These included the expectation of a peaceful subcontinent (with India partitioned by the British in 1947 into the sovereign states of India and Pakistan), ready acceptance by others of an Indian leadership role, and uninterrupted

goodwill from China. Moreover, changes in the domestic or external environments brought about modifications of style and substance in Indian foreign policy, leading, for example, to excessive dependence on American assistance in the 1960s and a relationship with the Soviet Union in the 1970s that was perhaps too close.

Indian foreign policy in the period since independence falls naturally into four stages. First, under Nehru's leadership through the 1950s, was the formulation and successful practice of an active and independent foreign policy that came to be known as nonalignment. This was followed by about two decades of rhetorical continuity but inward focus necessitated by foreign aggressions, economic crises, and domestic political turbulence. Efforts were made in the mid-1980s and early 1990s to broaden relationships, liberalize the economy, and improve India's overall international standing. In the new era of the 21st century India is widely seen as an emerging power of consequence, undoubtedly facing many challenges, but economically dynamic, politically democratic, and participatory in efforts to resolve the major international issues of the day as an aspirant permanent member of the UN Security Council and a full member of the G-20 nations—the group of 20 finance ministers and central bank governors that was established in 1999.

India first demonstrated its nonalignment status in its autonomous and mediatory diplomacy at the UN during the Korean War (1950–1953) and other international crises. India, in fact, became a mainstay of UN peacekeeping missions, beginning with the UN Emergency Force in 1956 and contributing 85,000 troops, military observers, and police officers to 42 such UN missions by 2006. The stance of nonalignment also appealed to some other newly independent nations, as was evident at the Afro-Asian conference held in 1955 at Bandung, Indonesia, and in Non-Aligned Summit meetings first held at Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in 1961 and regularly from that time. The United States and other Western countries recognized their stake in the success of India's democratic political system and extended substantial economic assistance to India. At the same time, leaders in both the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Soviet Union (USSR) came to acknowledge India as being independent of the Western bloc. An India-China Agreement of 1954 incorporated the Panch Sheel, or five principles, of peaceful coexistence as the basis of their relations. Post-Stalin (1953) Soviet leaders made a long tour of India in 1955, which was followed by significant diplomatic, economic, and then military support from Moscow, some of which has continued despite the profound changes in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Early American dismissal of nonalignment as immoral neutralism led to prolonged political estrangement between Washington and New Delhi, and was compounded by multiple U.S. military alliances with Pakistan and a steady supply of sophisticated military assistance to Pakistan, including weapons that were often used against India. But changed international circumstances of the post-1991 Cold War era and policy initiatives on both sides enabled the United States and India to forge a strong partnership in the first decade of the 21st century.

Nonalignment was not salient to security threats on India's borders. The first threat came from newly created Pakistan in 1947, when tribesmen backed by the Pakistan Army invaded

the princely states of Jammu and Kashmir, whose ruler, Maharajah Hari Singh (1895–1961; maharajah 1925–1961) had acceded to the Indian Union. Early efforts in the UN to devise solutions to the disputed territory did not succeed, Pakistan's repeated and multifaceted attempts to wrest Kashmir away from India have failed, and India's efforts to secure normalcy in Jammu and Kashmir have had uneven results. More than 60 years, three wars, and voluminous writings later, the territorial division is unaltered. Despite composite peace talks and other peace initiatives, hostility persists between the neighbors, and it is exacerbated by terrorist attacks on India originating in Pakistan. The second threat arose on India's long and mountainous border with Xinjiang and Tibet, incorporated into China in 1949–1950. India voluntarily abandoned its formerly privileged position in Tibet and did not dispute China's control there when signing the 1954 agreement on trade but did not get explicit Chinese recognition for the traditional border in return. Official maps published by the Indian and Chinese governments showed vast discrepancies in territorial claims, and periodic military skirmishes erupted along the border. In 1959 the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso (b. 1935), fled a Chinese military crackdown in Tibet and received asylum in India on humanitarian grounds. Rising tensions culminated in a full-scale border war in October–November 1962 for which India was unprepared and in which it was defeated. Repeated attempts by Indian and Chinese officials since the 1980s to define a mutually acceptable Line of Actual Control (LAC) along which to maintain peace, much less a border agreement, have not yet succeeded. India's diplomatic and security challenges increased as China and Pakistan cemented their relationship over the decades to include military and nuclear supplies. Sections of Indian public opinion show impatience with their government's forbearance in not responding militarily to terrorist attacks originating in Pakistan and its pacific speeches with respect to China, but New Delhi is likely to continue seeking diplomatic and political solutions to security problems.

Nehru died in 1964, and his immediate successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri (1904–1966; prime minister June 1964–January 1966), unexpectedly passed away in 1966. Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984), Jawaharlal Nehru's daughter and only child, was then elected prime minister and held that position until 1977 and again from 1980 to 1984, when she was assassinated. She was succeeded by her son Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991; prime minister 1984–1989). Three years of monsoon failure in the mid-1960s threatened famine, which was only prevented by huge shipments of food grains from the United States on what India regarded as humiliating conditions. One result, however, was India's Green Revolution and subsequent self-sufficiency in food. Indira Gandhi was acutely conscious of her country's weaknesses but is remembered for her assertive style and grasp of realpolitik. She met the crisis posed by Pakistan's genocidal repression in its eastern wing of East Bengal, or East Pakistan, and the resulting influx of 10 million refugees into India with vigorous diplomacy and ultimately a military operation that led to the liberation of East Pakistan in December 1971 from West Pakistani control, and the transformation of East Pakistan into the sovereign state of Bangladesh. In August 1971 Indira Gandhi

approved an Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship in response to the rapprochement between the United States and China, which both supported Pakistan. In May 1974 Gandhi also authorized India's nuclear scientists to demonstrate the nation's technical capability in what was termed a "peaceful nuclear explosion," but eschewed a nuclear weapons option advocated by some in the wake of China's nuclear tests of 1964. India's advocacy of universal nuclear disarmament remained constant, especially in UN forums, but its objections to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 (NPT) as "discriminatory" in laying few obligations on existing nuclear weapons states, including China, while demanding much of other states, prevented India from signing it as a non-nuclear state then or later. The 1995 review of the NPT froze division between recognized nuclear weapons states and others. This helped push an Indian coalition government, led by the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), founded in 1980, to end the ambiguity of what was called India's "recessed deterrent," and as a result it authorized five underground nuclear tests in May 1998. New Delhi then declared a voluntary moratorium on testing along with the intention of building a "minimum credible nuclear deterrent." The international sanctions that resulted because of India's nuclear development were easily tolerated and lifted within 10 years as India and the United States reached agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation in 2005.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) greatly expanded its membership in the 1970s and 1980s, and India steered a middle course between the radical rhetoric of some members, such as Cuba, and the pro-Western leanings of others, such as Singapore. But the NAM could not create the equitable international economic order it demanded, and it was ineffective in ending either the Iraq-Iran War (1980–1988) or the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1988), which dominated the 1980s and adversely affected India's immediate security environment. Nor did nonalignment apply to India's relations with its smaller neighbors in South Asia, all of which faced serious economic and political problems of their own and appeared both dependent on India and afraid of possible domination by India. For many years New Delhi preferred to pursue bilateralism to formulating a regional policy, and it was apprehensive of its smaller neighbors being manipulated by an outside power and combining against India. The small Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan was uniquely considerate of India's concerns and appreciative of India's cultural sensitivity and economic assistance, while the ruling kings of neighboring Nepal looked northward to China for "balance" as their people sunk deeper into poverty and strife, resulting in the eventual abolition of the monarchy in 2008 and increasing reliance on China. To the south, Sri Lanka was riven apart by a violent civil war between 1978 and 2009. The two sides of the civil war were initially unresponsive to India's mediatory diplomacy and resistant to India's peacekeeping force, sent at the request of the Sri Lankan government in late 1987 and withdrawn in January 1990. Current relations between Colombo and New Delhi, however, are warm and friendly. India found Bangladesh to be unpredictable and increasingly troublesome after 1975, as military and radical Islam gained strength at the expense of mutually hostile democratic political parties, and Bangladeshi migration into India aroused contention.

Not surprisingly, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), founded in 1985, laid out only modest goals and met with limited success for many years as a forum for discussion. It was not equipped to tackle the big regional problems of water resource management, migration, investment, security, regional trade, or terrorism. India accounted for about 80 percent of the area, population, resources, wealth, and talent of SAARC, but its contributions to regionalism were relatively low as long as its economy was autarkic, bureaucracy-ridden, and sluggish, and its plural polity was focused on domestic challenges. Since the mid-1990s, however, successive governments in India, of different political parties, have strongly supported regional cooperation through SAARC institutions and have offered nonreciprocal commercial concessions to neighbors, which Sri Lanka, for one, gladly embraced. Since 2006 India has encouraged the formation of a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) but has not yet obtained most-favored nation treatment from Pakistan or transit rights from Bangladesh or Pakistan. SAFTA is not yet a reality. The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government led by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh (b. 1932; prime minister 2004–) since 2004 has emphasized economic growth and regional cooperation with the expectation that over the long run all of India's neighbors would find its economic dynamism both a magnet and the cement for a peaceful South Asia.

The Persian Gulf region is in India's proximate neighborhood and within its security parameter. It is the principal source of India's hydrocarbon energy supplies and the employment destination of about 4 million Indians, whose remittances home exceed $7 billion annually. The countries of the region have no bilateral disputes with India, though their international perspectives often vary, and events such as the 1979 revolution in Iran, Iraq's attack on Kuwait in 1990, and prolonged wars have disturbed the strategic picture and caused hardship to resident Indian communities. By the end of the first decade of the new millennium, economic dynamism and recognition of common interests had led to substantial cooperation and the institutionalization of ties between India on the one hand and Iran, Saudi Arabia, and members of the Gulf Cooperation Council that was created in 1981 (Bahrain Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates), on the other.

Two events in 1991 dramatically pushed India toward new directions in its foreign policy. An acute financial crisis threatening India with international default made the long-discussed liberalization of its economy imperative, and the Congress government led by Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao (1921–2004; prime minister 1991–1996) introduced a first round of economic and financial reforms as well as a Look East policy. Subsequent governments of varied composition carried reforms forward, albeit slowly. The collapse of the Soviet Union the same year as the introduction of liberal economic reforms, 1991, made Indian overtures to a wider world, east and west, both necessary and possible. Some progress had been made in the mid-1980s with the United States and China, but initiatives taken in the early 1990s had profound and beneficial effects on Indian foreign relations.

Rajiv Gandhi's ice-breaking visit to China in 1988 made it possible for the two countries to reach important agreements such as "maintaining peace and tranquility on the Line

of Actual Control" in 1993, instituting confidence-building measures in 1996, elevating the level of talks on border settlement from the technical official level to the political in 2003, and laying out principles for settlement in 2005. Spectacular increases in bilateral trade and investment, and other interactions, occurred in the first decade of the 21st century. The visit to New Delhi in 2005 of Premier Wen Jiabao (b. 1942; premier 2003–) was the occasion for announcing a strategic partnership and cooperation in many areas, including access to energy resources. Bilateral relations between Asia's two giants are multifaceted and complex. They include elements of both cooperation and competition for influence, resources, and status, and pique the interest of other governments and analysts around the world. Both India and China are seen as "rising powers" engaged in building new ties in Africa and elsewhere, and in undertaking military and other forms of modernization, but with China well in the lead. For reasons not entirely clear, rhetorical and border tensions rose sharply after 2006 to the point in 2009 when media expressions of mutual suspicion and hostility were frequent. Both governments pledged to dampen public anxieties and use existing mechanisms to resolve problems. As the second decade of the century begins, war appears unlikely.

Members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded in 1967, particularly Singapore, welcomed Rao's Look East policy and responded favorably to India's economic opening. India quickly became a full dialogue partner with ASEAN and in 1996 became a member of its Asian Regional Forum (ARF), which includes China, Japan, and the United States. It is a forum for discussing all matters of common interest, including security. Trade, investment, and exchange visits of eminent persons between India and ASEAN members grew steadily in volume and in significance, as on October 8, 2003, when India signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, a peace treaty created in 1976 by ASEAN but opened up to non–Southeast Asian nations in 1987. India was welcomed, as ASEAN tried to avoid being dominated by China. ASEAN-India summit meetings have been held annually since 2002, and the framework for creating an India-ASEAN free trade area was introduced in 2003, as was joint action to combat international terrorism; a free trade agreement was signed in 2009. Soon after honoring democracy leader of Myanmar, Aung San Syuu Kyi (b. 1945), in 1992, New Delhi engaged directly with the military junta controlling Myanmar in an attempt to control the smuggling of arms, drugs, and persons across a long land border between the two countries. India also undertook road building in that country and angled for access to its gas and petroleum reserves. Further east, South Korea and Japan have become prominent trading partners and providers of foreign direct investment to India. Japan and India signed a strategic and global partnership agreement in 2005 and also instituted joint naval exercises. India has been a member of the East Asia Summit since its formation in 2005 and an associate of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization (SCO), founded in 2001, which brings together the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with China and Russia in a mutual security organization. After the initial defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, India initiated a substantial program of developmental and humanitarian assistance in that war-torn country and has a high stake in the restoration of democracy, peace, and stability there.

Rao's 1992 decision to raise diplomatic relations with Israel to ambassadorial level resulted in the subsequent purchases of sophisticated defense equipment, the sharing of intelligence in countering international terrorism, and all-around cooperation. It also encouraged influential sections of American political opinion to embrace India. Economic liberalization and the prowess of Indian entrepreneurs, especially in information technology (IT) and services, boosted India's relations with members of the European Union (EU) as well as with the United States. The Clinton administration (1992–2000) recognized India as "an emerging market" worthy of attention. Senior emissaries conducted a high-level dialogue after India's 1998 nuclear tests that, for the first time, made Washington aware of India's security concerns. The five-day visit of President Bill Clinton (b. 1946; president 1993–2001) to India in 2000 opened the gate for more significant steps taken by President George W. Bush (b. 1946; president 2001–2009) in his two administrations and successive governments in New Delhi, led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee (b. 1924; prime minister May 16–June 1, 1996) and Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, to forge a "strategic partnership" based on a community of interests and values. A large, highly educated, and increasingly influential community of Indian Americans as well as the successes of regular joint exercises involving branches of the armed forces of the two countries greatly assisted this process. Agreements for long-term cooperation in commerce, defense, education, energy, high technology, science, and space technology were signed in 2005 along with the dramatic civil nuclear cooperation agreement that reversed decades of U.S. nonproliferation and technology denial policies. Before this agreement could come into effect in 2008, India separated its civilian nuclear power facilities from its strategic ones and accepted inspections of the former by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA; founded in 1957), while the United States helped persuade the Nuclear Suppliers Group (founded in 1974 as a response to India's nuclear test of that year) to make an exception for India so that other countries were also free to trade nuclear materials and technology with India for peaceful purposes. India sought and gained equality of treatment with "leading countries with advanced nuclear technology"—at least on paper. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's state visit to President Barak Obama (b. 1961; president 2009–) in November 2009 served to reemphasize the new Indo-American partnership.

Notwithstanding growing recognition of its many successes, India's foreign policy faces serious challenges. Some originate in the fragile, unstable, and violence-prone neighborhood of South Asia where India is located. Others arise from the global impact of economic recession, climate change, power shifts, and aggressive nonstate actors, especially terrorist groups. Still more are rooted in the inadequacies of India's institutional and intellectual infrastructure for playing an important role in world affairs. The contrast with China in this respect is as striking as the contrast between China's well-developed infrastructure for commerce and industry and its absence in India. Few Indian colleges or universities impart instruction in international studies. Even fewer independent think tanks attempt to educate the public. The Indian Foreign Service of about 750 officers currently is too small to do justice to the large number of diplomatic missions India maintains, and the low ratio of positions at headquarters to positions

abroad dilutes the implementation of any decision. More serious is the lack of coordination or cooperation between different wings of the government dealing with national security issues such as defense, foreign affairs, and intelligence, and insufficient manpower in the office of the national security adviser. If India's profile in world affairs is to rise, and 21st century expectations at home and abroad are to be met, rectification of these shortcomings is imperative.

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See also China, Relations with; Look East Policy; Pakistan, Relations with; United States, Relations with

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✦ GANDHI, FEROZE VARUN

Feroze Varun Gandhi (b. 1980) is a politician and member of the Nehru dynasty (the Nehru-Gandhi family) that has dominated Indian politics since independence in 1947. Varun Gandhi's great-grandfather, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), served as prime minister during 1947–1964. The Nehru dynasty goes back to Motilal Nehru (1861–1931), president of the Indian National Congress during 1919–1920 and 1928–1929. Varun Gandhi was elected to the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament, with a huge margin in the 2009 elections from the Pilibhit constituency in the state of Uttar Pradesh. Varun Gandhi has the most famous surname in India and was very close to his grandmother, Indira Gandhi (1917–1984), who served as prime minister during 1966–1977 and 1980–1984. His father, Sanjay Gandhi (1946–1980), a politician very close to his mother and who served as an adviser to her, died in an airplane crash when Varun was just three months old. He was brought up singlehandedly by his mother, Maneka Gandhi (b. 1956), a renowned public figure and politician in her own right and a woman of international stature due to her reputation as an advocate of animal rights.

Varun Gandhi was educated at the Rishi Valley School in Andhra Pradesh and the British School in Delhi. He obtained his bachelor of science degree in 1992 through a distance learning program from institutions affiliated with the London School of Economics. In 1999 he joined his mother on the campaign trail in Uttar Pradesh. He also composed a book of poems titled *The Otherness of Self* (2000) that was illustrated by three of India's most renowned artists: Anjolie Ela Menon (b. 1940), Manjit Bawa (1941–2008), and Manu Parekh (b. 1939).

Controversially, Varun Gandhi and his mother joined the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a right-wing political party widely regarded as a Hindu communalist organization. This was

controversial because the Nehrus had always been associated with the Congress Party and with a secular modernist viewpoint. In February 2004 Gandhi was offered a seat on the BJP ticket to contest the elections. At that time he refused, but the BJP secretary-general Pramod Mahajan (1949–2006) used Varun Gandhi as a star campaigner in the general elections of 2004. Gandhi refused, however, to make negative comments about or criticize his first cousins Rahul Gandhi (b. 1970), widely tipped to be a future prime minister of India, and Rahul's younger sister Priyanka Gandhi (b. 1972), not to mention his aunt, Sonia Gandhi (b. 1946), who all remained loyal to the Congress Party and in fact headed the party and were now Varun Gandhi's political rivals. During an interview on October 17, 2005, with Stephen Sackur, host of HARDtalk, a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) current affairs interview program, Gandhi said that he wanted to fulfill his late father's dream of making India an industrial and economic superpower with equal access and opportunities for everyone.

In November 2004 Gandhi was inducted into the BJP's national executive committee, and he agreed to run on the party's ticket for the Lok Sabha during the 2009 general elections from the Pilibhit constituency, which his mother had vacated for him. During the campaign TV and other mass media claimed that on March 6 he made a speech that was regarded as a hate speech toward Muslims. A recording was made of the speech and widely distributed on CD. Gandhi denied making a hate speech and said that the recording had been doctored. The Election Commission of India ordered an inquiry and then recommended that the Uttar Pradesh election office file court notice on him for violating the Model Code of Conduct. He was, however, placed in jail for nearly 20 days under provisions of the National Security Act. He was released on orders from the Supreme Court. Gandhi, not wanting people to judge him on the basis of just one incident, claims that his negative comments about Muslims were a reaction toward injustices committed against the Hindu community in Pilibhit.

The BJP-led alliance lost the 15th Lok Sabha elections in 2009, and blame for the defeat was placed on Varun Gandhi's speeches. The party, however, stood behind their decision to give the Pilibhit constituency ticket to Gandhi despite the Election Commission's recommendation to the party that it withdraw his candidacy. In part this was because the party concurred with the sentiments of his speech about Muslims.

Gandhi won his first election from a constituency where his mother had been elected in the past, thereby claiming the family mantle in an area regarded as the Nehru heartland. The challenge for him as a freshman member of Parliament was to demonstrate how he would fulfill his father's dream of creating a modern and ethnically and culturally integrated India. Despite Gandhi's overwhelming victory in the election, if he is to establish himself as the leader of a political dynasty that has been a major political factor in India for nearly a century, he had to strengthen his political base and to eschew making controversial or contentious speeches.

FATIMA A. IMAM

See also Bharatiya Janata Party; Gandhi, Maneka; Gandhi, Rahul; Gandhi, Sonia

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GANDHI, MANEKA

Maneka Gandhi (b. 1956) is a politician, a former journalist, an animal activist, an environmentalist, and a member of the lower house of Parliament, the Lok Sabha, having been elected for the fifth time in 2009. She entered politics in 1982 and subsequently has held four ministerial positions in four governments and created the animal welfare ministry. After 1989 she won elections from the Pilibhit constituency in Uttar Pradesh before giving the ticket in the constituency to her son Varun (b. 1980) and moving to the neighboring constituency of Aonla. Her electoral victories while being affiliated to different parties have been attributed to her personal popularity and to the care with which she nurses her constituency.

Maneka Gandhi was married to Sanjay Gandhi (1946–1980), the youngest of two sons of Indira Gandhi (1917–1984) and prime minister of India during 1966–1977 and 1980–1984. Maneka Gandhi was a 17-year-old model when she met Sanjay, and they were married within a year on September 23, 1974. Sanjay Gandhi, who was a close political adviser to his mother, died in a plane crash in 1980 when their only child, Varun, was three months old. Maneka Gandhi wanted to continue the political legacy of her late husband and became alienated from her brother-in-law, Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991), who was prime minister during 1984–1989 and was chosen as heir to leadership of the Indian National Congress (INC) after Sanjay's death.

Maneka Gandhi's political ambitions led to a rift in the family, and much against the wishes of her mother-in-law, who doted on her three grandchildren, she left the prime minister's house, taking her son Varun with her. The relationship between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law deteriorated and led to court cases regarding Sanjay's property. In 1983 Maneka announced the formation of Rashtriya Sanjay Manch, a political grouping named after her husband, and the following year she ran against Rajiv in the family constituency of Amethi in Uttar Pradesh but was badly defeated. In 1988 she joined the Janata Dal Party and became its secretary-general. After her first election to the Lok Sabha in 1989, she became the minister of state for social justice and empowerment in a government led by the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party. She made history by initiating reforms in the pension plan, the New Pension Scheme, and as Minister for Culture, and as an animal rights activist she was also responsible for the creation of the Department of Animal Welfare.

Gandhi became an internationally renowned figure and won prestigious awards in recognition of her services for the protection of animals and the environment in India. Her pioneering efforts to bring changes in the Indian law regarding the protection of animals led to the founding of Peoples for Animals in 1992. This nonprofit organization has around 250,000 members, 160 units, and 26 animal hospitals. People for Animals has been successful in canvassing for some groundbreaking rules by the Indian government to ban 300 animal sacrifices, improve maintenance standards for racehorses on race courses, and promote sterilization of stray dogs.

Gandhi's journalistic skills, especially at *Surya* (a political magazine) from 1976 to 1980, helped expose the affair of Suresh Ram (b. 1932), the son of Janata Party leader Jagjivan Ram (1908–1986), with a student, Sushma Chaudhury (b. 1957), 25 years younger than him. The scandal and the photographs of the two lovers engaged in sex, which Gandhi controversially published, helped the INC storm back to power in 1980. Gandhi has anchored TV shows dedicated to animal rights and the cruelty meted out to animals by their owners. In addition, she has written books on a variety of subjects, including a book on her late husband Sanjay, and on subjects such as etymology, animal rights, and Hindu names for children.

Gandhi has become embroiled in many political controversies because of her political rivalry with her in-laws. She filed a libel suit in British court against the American but British-based biographer Katherine Frank for the comments she wrote in the biography of her mother-in-law, *Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi* (2002). Gandhi claimed that Frank defamed her late husband and herself. Gandhi has accused the INC and her relatives of conspiring against her son Varun, who was charged and briefly imprisoned under the National Security Act for an alleged hate speech against Muslims. Her son continues her political message, and both continue the memory and the program of her husband.

FATIMA A. IMAM

See also Gandhi, Feroze Varun; Gandhi, Rahul; Gandhi, Sonia

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✦ GANDHI, MOHANDAS KARAMCHAND

In late 2009, when U.S. president Barack Obama was asked at the Wakefield High School in Arlington, Virginia, what person, alive or dead, he would like to dine with, he replied that "I think it might be Gandhi, who is a real hero. . . . It would probably be really a small meal

because he didn't eat a lot." A month later, on the occasion of the International Day of Nonviolence, Obama elaborated that "The America of today has its roots in the India of Mahatma Gandhi and the nonviolent social action movement for Indian independence which he led. . . . Gandhi's teaching and ideals, shared with Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. on his 1959 pilgrimage to India, transformed American society through our civil rights movement."


It is easier to see the impact of "Mahatma" (Great Soul) Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948) globally through several well-known figures such as Nelson Mandela (b. 1918) of South Africa, Desmond Tutu (b. 1931) of South Africa, Martin Luther King Jr. (1929–1968) of the United States, the Dalai Lama (b. 1935) of Tibet, and Aung San Suu Kyi (b. 1945) of Myanmar, all professing to follow Gandhi's teachings and nonviolent techniques and awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace (although Gandhi was, to the astonishment and regret of recent Nobel Committees, not awarded the prize). Gandhi also missed being *Time* magazine's "Man of the Century." The honor went to Albert Einstein (1879–1955), the German-born Swiss American, but the same issue named all of the Nobel Prize winners listed above and Lech Walesa (b. 1943) of Poland, Cesar Chavez (1927–1993) of the United States, and Beningno Aquino Jr. (1932–1983) of the Philippines as "Children of Gandhi" and his spiritual heirs to nonviolence. In the last quarter century, universities and colleges in the Western world have increasingly offered courses on Gandhi, and statues bearing his likeness have been installed in towns and cities, public squares, and halls around the globe.

Every Indian city has a major street, a public square, schools and libraries, and hospitals and nursing homes named after Gandhi, who is known as the Father of the Nation and is referred to as Bapu (father). His likeness in statues in marble and bronze and in photographs and oil paintings is ubiquitous, including in government offices. The nation celebrates his birthday (October 2) as an official holiday and observes the day of his assassination (January 30) as a day of mourning, with the president, the prime minister, politicians of diverse stripes, and the public joining in a prayer meeting and offering flowers at the nation's memorial to Gandhi in Delhi, not far from the spot where his mortal remains were consigned to the flames of his funeral pyre, with millions following his funeral cortege. The occasion is also marked by large numbers of persons, particularly top-ranking politicians of the Indian National Congress (INC), founded in 1885 and also known as the Congress Party, spinning on a *charkha* ("spinning wheel") as Gandhi did or working in street-cleaning campaigns in the less privileged parts of the cities, again following the Mahatma's practice. The day is observed as Martyrs' Day to commemorate those who lost their lives in the service of the nation.

In the 60-plus years since the Mahatma's death, the INC that he headed, officially or not, for most of the time has been holding the reins of power at the federal level and in most of the states. It is no wonder that INC leaders pay periodic tribute to Gandhi in Parliament, in the press, and in public, exhorting everyone to "follow the Mahatma's path" and to practice his ideals. Officially the government has heavily subsidized the activities of the Khadi and Village Industries Commission, and the Publications Division of the Central Department published the 100-volume *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*. This multivolume work is

a tremendous blessing to researchers and writers of India's independence movement and opens a large window on the diverse social reform activities affecting the weaker sections of society, as the Mahatma called the poor and the illiterate, the tribals, and the untouchables (now called Dalits). On December 31, 2008, the government declared the *Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi* to be "in the public domain." There are also several Gandhi museums, the most notable being the Gandhi Smriti in the location where he was assassinated in Delhi. Other museums are located in his hometown of Porbandar (Gujarat); in the Aga Khan Palace in Yeravada, Pune, where Gandhi was interned by the British between 1942 and 1944; and in Mani Bhavan on Laburnum Road in Mumbai, where he stayed while in that city. Additionally, Gandhis's *ashram* ("hermitage") at Wardha and at Sabarmati are maintained, although not fully at public expense.

Such external trappings of honor and recognition apart, have Gandhi's teachings been implemented in independent India? Gandhi himself had summarized his agenda for himself and, by implication, for the "New India" that would emerge after British rule had been ended, as it did in August 1947. A quote from his writings of September 1931 displayed at the entrance of the Gandhi National Museum in India's capital states that "I shall work for an India in which the poorest shall feel that it is their country, in whose making they have



Mohandas Gandhi, with All-India Congress president and India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, at a meeting of the Congress in Bombay in 1946. (Library of Congress)

an effective voice; an India in which there shall be no high class and no low class of people. . . . There would be no room in such an India for the curse of untouchability or the curse of intoxicating drinks and drugs. Women will enjoy the same rights as men."

Such a utopia would be hard for any state to achieve. Gandhi's chosen heir, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964), followed the Marxist rather than the Mahatma's economics in the planned industrialization of the country. The Founding Fathers, Nehru included, approved a constitution granting equal rights to all: rich and poor, educated and illiterate, men and women. Untouchability was outlawed, and members of that class as well as other so-called backward classes benefited from fellowships and scholarships in educational institutions and from quotas in public services and representative bodies so they could achieve personal success. Women did likewise, holding the highest positions in the land and in representing the country abroad. In 2010 the Indian Parliament reserved 30 percent of the electoral seats in the country for women.

How much of this success could be attributed to awareness among legislators of the Gandhian mantle? The answers are not easy. Two of the several universities opened in response to Gandhi's Non-Cooperation Movement of 1920–1922 are still continuing to function. These are the Gujarat Vidyapith in Ahmedabad (founded in 1920) and the Mahatma Gandhi Kashi Vidyapith (founded in 1920), the latter located in Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh. Both were to function outside the British academic machinery and control and very much as educational institutions to be run by Indians for Indians. Gandhi himself acted as chancellor of the Gujarat Vidyapith until his death. Both universities, in addition to a normal curriculum, emphasize Gandhian thought, including social service. After the country's independence, both of the schools were certified as universities by the government's University Grants Commission, which provided funding for the schools.

In the six decades since Gandhi's death, India has not been sparing in its efforts to industrialize, being today one of the top 10 in the category of industrialized countries. The planning from the top enabled economic entities to emerge, which placed the public sector at the commanding heights of the economy and gave the government and its bureaucrats power to deny rather than facilitate a better life for millions of poor citizens. Such an apparatus would be far from Gandhian economics, whose numbers below the poverty line swelled into the hundreds of millions. The economic liberalization instituted in 1991 has pulled some 300 million above the poverty line. Would Gandhian economics have transformed the predominantly rural (75–80 percent), overwhelmingly illiterate (14 percent literate), and capital-starved India that the British left behind in 1947 to acceptable levels of education and economy? Would Gandhi have allowed the buildup of the Indian Army to the level of being the third largest in the world? Would he have fasted in protest in the face of India's space, missile, and nuclear programs? Would people have accepted his views on celibacy, a rigid vegetarian diet, simple living, and high thinking? The fact is that the same people who were mesmerized by his leadership in the independence movement and by the downfall of mighty British imperialism were feeling

that he was more like a divine avatar, an incarnation that had outlived his divine role. His views outside of the domain of anticolonialism were not acceptable to most people.

But what about the Gandhian spirit, his passion for nonviolence, and his insistence on truth, or *satyagraha*? Indians glowed in the praise for Gandhi worldwide but had no use for his philosophy at home. Just at the time when Gandhism was at its lowest ebb in India came a movie in 2006 that delighted people and indicated how fascinated they could be with the practical aspects of Gandhian techniques. *Lage Raho Munnabhai* (Carry on Munnabhai) was a slick comedy in which a Mumbai gangster is struck by a vision of Gandhi that appears before him and successfully persuades him to adopt Gandhi's ways. The gangster is transformed enough to advise his associates to better ways. Various persons in the movie, including an old man qualified for a pension but denied it by a bureaucratic minion wanting a bribe, strips to the bare minimum in the view of all, embarrassing the corrupt clerk enough for him to immediately approve the old man's pension. This was termed "Gandhigiri," not "Dadagiri" or extortion. Numerous similar real-life incidents in which Gandhigiri was adopted to solve the problems of the common people were reported as a result of the inspiration drawn from the movie. The movie, which grossed more than 700 million rupees, played for weeks to full houses and won four National Film Awards and four Filmfare Awards. It was seen by the high and the mighty including Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (b. 1932; prime minister 2004–), who talked about the "universal and timeless" relevance of Mahatma's message. His INC Party recommended that everyone in the party see the movie, and several state governments exempted the movie from the entertainment tax. There was a special screening in November 2006 at the United Nations (UN) Headquarters in New York, the first Hindi film to attain that distinction. On June 15, 2007, the world body adopted a resolution declaring Gandhi's birthday, October 2, the International Day of Non-Violence. The Indian government's Public Information Office release of November 11, 2006, admitted that the movie had provided the immediate inspiration for the adoption of a new Public Services Bill to combat corruption. The spectacular surge in public interest in Gandhi may also have led the Ministry of Culture in April 2006 to constitute a panel for identifying and documenting sites associated with Gandhi so that they can be better cared for and conserved for posterity.

Many in India, however, particularly the young—excepting the environmentalists and the naturopaths—know little about Gandhi. Ordinary people are too busy earning their livelihood and the rich are too engrossed in making millions or in evading taxes to bother about Gandhi. Outside India, Gandhi is the most impressive modern-day monument to simple living, indiscriminate compassion, and uncompromising nonviolence.

Young people attending courses on Gandhi are likely to see Richard Attenborough's movie *Gandhi* (1982), which won eight Oscars, and wonder, in the words of Albert Einstein reacting to Gandhi's assassination, "Generations to come, it may be, will scarce believe that such a one as this ever in flesh and blood walked upon this earth."

DAMODAR R. SARDESAI

See also Hinduism; Religion

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✦ GANDHI, RAHUL

Rahul Gandhi (b. 1970) is a former businessman and politician who is a member of Parliament of the Lok Sabha (lower house of Parliament) representing the family constituency of Amethi in Uttar Pradesh. He is the secretary-general of the Indian National Congress (INC) Youth Congress and the National Students Association of India. His entry into politics in March 2004 marked the entry of a new generation of the Nehru dynasty (the Nehru-Gandhi family) at the center of INC politics, as they have been for almost a century. He is the son of Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991), who served as prime minister during 1984–1989, and Sonia Gandhi (b. 1946), the current INC president. His grandmother Indira Gandhi (1917–1984) was also prime minister of India (1966–1977 and 1977–1980), as was his great-grandfather Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), who served as prime minister during 1947–1964 and 1947–1964. Rahul Gandhi's younger sister, Priyanka Gandhi Vadra (b. 1972), has also been involved in politics, although not as an elected official. Rahul Gandhi was credited with the INC victory in the 2009 elections and the turnaround of INC's fate especially in the largest state of India, Uttar Pradesh, which sends 80 members of Parliament to the Lok Sabha. He addressed 125 political rallies across the country in six weeks during the campaign, presenting the INC as the party of good governance, growth, and secularism. In doing so he established himself as the charismatic and energetic leader of the new generation and the future of the party.

Gandhi attended Delhi Modern School before studying at the renowned Doon School, the school that his father attended. Rahul Gandhi studied for one year at St. Stephen's College in Delhi and left in 1990. He went to the United States to complete his undergraduate degree at Harvard but transferred to Rollins College in Florida in 1994. He then received a master's of philosophy in development studies from Trinity College, Cambridge University, in 1995.

After the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by a suicide bomber in Sriperumbudur, Tamil Nadu, in 1991, the pressure has been on for Rahul Gandhi to assume the responsibilities of the INC as his father's heir. Rahul, however, continued with his studies and later joined a consultancy firm in London before returning to India in late 2002 to run an engineering and technology outsourcing firm in Mumbai for two years. In 2004 he finally entered politics by contesting the 2004 Lok Sabha elections from the family constituency of Amethi in Uttar Pradesh that had been held by his uncle Sanjay Gandhi (1946–1980) and his mother Sonia. Sonia was reelected to Parliament from another constituency, Rae Bareli. The voters elected Rahul Gandhi with a resounding margin of more than 300,000 votes. He declined a cabinet position that was offered to him by the prime minister but continued to play a central role in the work of the INC.

Politics in India have been fought on the basis of caste, religion, and region and mostly have been dominated by upper-caste and influential families with extensive political backgrounds. Rahul Gandhi is the heir to that tradition, but in a move to rejuvenate the party he became secretary-general of the All India Congress Committee and was given charge of the Youth Congress as well as the National Students Union of India. With that authority he started a grassroots movement to recruit young people to the party. His aim was to bring a generational change, flush out the older cadre from the party, and encourage the involvement of a new generation who had no experience in politics. The result has been that the number of young entrants into the party doubled after the elections held in 2004.

Gandhi's ambitious plan for the INC is to enlist more than 10 million youth workers and hold elections within the party to produce a new generation of leaders. He faces tremendous challenges ahead in reconstructing the party; providing equal opportunities to all Indians irrespective of caste, religion, or region; and addressing the problems of the poorest sections of society. Political analysts, however, believe that Gandhi, the fifth generation of his family to be a leader of the INC, is now in politics for the long haul, and they are predicting that he will be the fourth generation of his family to become prime minister of India.

FATIMA A. IMAM

See also Gandhi, Feroze Varun; Gandhi, Maneka; Gandhi, Sonia

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✦ GANDHI, SONIA

Sonia Gandhi (b. 1946), the widow of Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1989), the prime minister of India from 1984 until 1989, is president of the Indian National Congress (INC); a member of the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament; and chairperson of the Rajiv Gandhi

Foundation. An Italian, she was born and brought up in Ovassanjo, 43 miles from the city of Turin in northern Italy. She met Rajiv Gandhi, the eldest son of Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977 and 1980–1984), during her stay in a language school at Cambridge, England, in 1965. They married in 1968. Rajiv became a pilot with Indian Airlines, and they settled down to a quiet life in Delhi. Sonia became busy as the mother of her two children, her son Rahul (b. 1970) and her daughter Priyanka (b. 1973), and the official hostess of the extended Nehru household. Rajiv and his wife remained aloof from politics and removed from political activity until 1980, when Rajiv's younger brother Sanjay (1946–1980), who was her mother-in-law's closest adviser and political heir, unexpectedly died in a plane crash in Delhi. Rajiv decided to resign from Indian Airlines to become his mother's chief adviser and to be recognized as her political heir in his younger brother's stead. Sonia Gandhi only supported her husband's decision with the greatest reluctance. Her worst fears for the safety of her husband as well as her children were confirmed when a suicide bomber belonging to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelem assassinated Rajiv in June 1991.

Sonia Gandhi decided to pursue the unfinished projects of her late husband by founding the Rajiv Gandhi Foundation in 1991. This nonprofit organization supports several projects that promote literacy, rural growth, health, welfare, and educational support for children affected by terrorism as well as empowerment programs for women and physically disabled children across the country. In addition to these projects, the foundation has established the Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies in the areas of education, policy analysis, economic and land reforms for the poor, and global cooperation.

The INC pressured Sonia Gandhi to take an active part in politics and to lead the family in its rightful place at the center of Indian politics, as it had done for the past 70 years. She resisted for almost 6 years before deciding to formally join the party in 1997. In 1998 she was elected president of INC. Her election to Parliament in 1999 from Amethi, her husband's constituency in the family stronghold in Uttar Pradesh, also made her the leader of the opposition in the Lok Sabha. For 5 years she sharply criticized the government's policies, especially the slow pace of the investigation into her husband's murder. Her opponents attacked her for not being of Indian heritage and also for being a Roman Catholic, and this criticism was also used, if not always openly voiced, by rivals within her own party.

The right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party, founded in 1980, and its allies unexpectedly lost the general election of 2004, and the INC was on the verge of returning to power with Gandhi as the undisputed elected leader of the party and the prime minister of India. However, in a move that stunned many in the nation, she decided that she would not follow her husband as prime minister of India, bowing to the criticism that a foreigner should not hold that office. Instead she recommended Manmohan Singh (b. 1932), who was sworn in as prime minister on May 22, 2004, as the leader of the INC-led United Progressive Alliance. The INC took new directions under her leadership, and the success of the party in the 2009 elections, after which Singh was reappointed prime minister, can be regarded as the highest point of Gandhi's leadership. These elections also saw her son, Rahul, play



Indian National Congress Party president Sonia Gandhi waves to supporters during a rally in New Delhi, April 29, 2009. (AP Photo/Saurabh Das)

a very active part, after which he assumed an enhanced leadership role in the party, while she continues to exert a strong leadership role herself. The United Progressive Alliance government, with Sonia Gandhi as its chairperson, promised to introduce a Women's Reservation Bill, which guaranteed 33 percent of the seats in Parliament to women in the central and regional legislative assemblies, a revised education policy, and stronger responses to internal and external terrorist threats.

FATIMA A. IMAM

See also Gandhi, Rahul

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✦ GANDHI PEACE FOUNDATION

The Gandhi Peace Foundation is a Delhi-based institution devoted to researching and disseminating information about nonviolence and truth, as based on the teachings and writings of Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948). The foundation was established with an initial grant of 10 million rupees by the Gandhi Smarak Nidhi, also known as the Mahatma Gandhi National Memorial Trust, a trust run by the government of India to commemorate Gandhi's life and work. In 1955 the Gandhi Smarak Nidhi approved the creation of an international center for research on Gandhian nonviolence, but not until early 1958 was a pilot committee charged with establishing the foundation of the center. The eight-member pilot committee was made up of notable political leaders and *satyagrahis*, people who follow the Gandhian philosophy and practice *satyagraha* ("truth force") of nonviolent resistance, including Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964) and India's fifth prime minister Morarji Desai (1896–1995; prime minister 1977–1979).

According to the Gandhi Peace Foundation's 1958 preamble written by Prime Minister Nehru, Vice President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888–1975; vice president 1952–1962; president 1962–1967), and politician and freedom fighter Jivatram Kripalani (1888–1982), the foundation's primary objective is "to promote the acceptance by all people of the principles of truth and nonviolence in the conduct of social, national and international affairs." Throughout its 50-year history, the foundation has carried out this objective through the sponsorship and publication of research by both independent scholars and the foundation's research staff; the convening of periodic seminars, symposia, and lecture series; and the publication of books and the quarterly journal *Gandhi Marg.* The foundation also holds regular youth camps on Gandhian themes and serves as a resource to international- and India-based scholars doing research on Gandhi's teachings and the contemporary applications of Gandhian nonviolence. Among its notable activities, the foundation organized a three-day conference in 1962 on the cessation of the manufacture, testing, and stockpiling of nuclear armaments and sent a series of international delegations to elicit widespread support for the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. The foundation also played a key role in building public support for the Bangladesh liberation movement in the lead-up to the 1971 Bangladesh War of Independence. At the national level, the foundation was involved in the surrender of *dacoits* ("bandits") in the Chambal Valley of northern India in the early 1970s, the promotion of India's National Adult Education Programme in the late 1970s, and the Youth Against Famine Campaign of the early 1990s.

The Gandhi Peace Foundation's Delhi headquarters houses the administrative offices of the foundation and the *Gandhi Marg.* The headquarters also houses a library containing extensive

titles on nonviolence and peace, an auditorium, and a guest hostel with a canteen. Notable guests at the foundation's hostel have included the American civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. (1929–1968) as well as international scholars and peace activists. In addition to the Delhi headquarters, the foundation maintains 18 Peace Centers throughout India. In January 2008 the Gandhi Peace Foundation put an end to a lengthy court battle over the lease of its Delhi headquarters. After allegations of unauthorized construction led the Indian government to suspend the foundation's lease 21 years earlier, the Delhi High Court finally ordered the lease to be restored and the foundation to be allowed to continue its "noble work" unimpeded.

LIZA WEINSTEIN

See also Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand

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
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Gandhism. *See* Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand

✦ GLOBALIZATION

Globalization is a phenomenon that has been seen through both positive and negative lenses. The positive views globalization as a means through which developing countries such as India have been able to sell crops and goods that are in high demand to a worldwide free market. The negative views globalization as the prospect of a larger global market having allied the state with multinational corporations so that the state only pays attention to the production of export and foreign exchange products at the cost of the local market, thereby making daily life harder for both national consumers and producers.

Until the 1990s, the globalization process in India was slow as the state placed restrictions on trade. With the liberalization of trade and investment, however, the Indian economy became increasingly linked to a global economy, and India's foreign currency reserves soared. The largest growth sector was that of information technology, where skilled English-speaking graduates were employed by companies in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries for customer services. This increased the number of working women in the country and helped produce a middle class that has increased the consumer base for technology-based industries. Some critics argue that such global services have broken the link between the state and the people, with the result that public sector projects benefiting all strata of society are slowly being outnumbered by private sector projects that benefit the few.



One of McDonald's increasingly ubiquitous fast-food restaurants, Delhi, September 15, 2007. (Paul Prescott/Dreamstime.com)

In the media, the 1990s saw state hegemony in broadcasting give way to private Indian channels such as Star Plus and global channels such as MTV. The effect of this globalization of the media has allowed the exchange of ideas and the intrusion of Western culture into India. Thus, in 1996 when India hosted the Miss World pageant, globalization was seen as the return of imperialism and the imposition of Western values. In contrast, television programs that reach a global audience have reintroduced the West to India's classical music and allowed nonreturning Indians (NRIs) to connect and to stay in touch with their homeland.

Globalization impacted the Indian economy in a haphazard manner. With Indian business unable to make sufficient structural adjustments or to develop a strong system of checks and balances, the result was that 2.7 million small-scale industrial units closed between 1997 and 2002, resulting in the retrenchment of 10 million regular workers. The lack of security of employment and free competition has led to social frustration and a high suicide and crime rate. Another impact of the global economy has been that it has encouraged the Indian state to ignore its traditional economic base, agriculture, which now accounts for only 6 percent of the budget, and promote the industrial sector. Agricultural workers form almost 25 percent of the total workforce and are largely nonunionized and unorganized. Most lack the barest minimum health and safety protection and social security. Furthermore, pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the World Trade Organization (WTO) and

other international commitments have resulted in the decline in the subsidies on fertilizers, electricity, and other outputs. Many import restrictions have been removed, and this competition from foreign agribusinesses, often state supported, and trading companies has caused enormous losses for Indian farmers.

The construction industry, in which more than 10 million people from the rural areas are employed, is the biggest economic activity after agriculture in terms of investment and employment. Global trade led to multinational corporations entering into this sector as well. Without state controls, the workers have employers they never know or see; the nonregistration of employers and employees; mobile jobs; an exploitative system of contracting and subcontracting; a high degree of exposure to hazardous materials, as the government does not want to ruin a cozy relationship with multinational corporations and therefore does not enforce health and safety standards; and the lack of proper or adequate housing, sanitation, drinking water, and medical benefits. The same conditions occur in other industries as well such as the textile and tobacco industries, which have witnessed similar effects as a result of global competition.

One dimension of the global market is the continuous growth of the informal economy. Thus, 93 percent of the Indian workforce belongs to the informal sector and has no job security or benefits, receives extremely low wages, enjoys no payment for overtime, works under intense lawlessness, faces occupational health hazards, and suffers from the dislocation of home and family due to the fact that many workers have migrated to other areas of the state or the country in search of work, leaving their family and loved ones behind. At the same time, the global informal economy has produced more employment opportunities—particularly in the textile, jewelry, gem, and entertainment industries—and has allowed workers to earn higher incomes than the formal sector can offer.

The misgivings about globalization in various sectors of the Indian economy have led to the formation of many workers' organizations. In 1993, the Center of Indian Trade Unions (CITU) organized an All India strike to demand the cessation of the infiltration of Indian and foreign monopolies in the unorganized and small-scale industrial sectors. The Self-employed Women's Association (SEWA) is a trade union, established in 1972, that works to win jobs and benefits for women hawkers, vendors, cart drivers, and loaders and unloaders. The National Center for Labour (NCL), formed in 1991, works to organize informal sector workers and secure for them a national minimum wage, regulatory control over natural resources, and wages proportional to work. Still, there are others such as the National Alliance of Street Vendors of India (NASVI) and the state- and national-level federations of the *beedi* ("cigarette") workers. Nongovenmental organizations also champion the cause of workers as they face the dire consequences of global competition.

Globalization, however, has not been passively accepted or totally resisted. The fast food company McDonald's, for example, still struggles with its relatively bland Maharaja Mac goat burger as it continues to lend status to middle-class Indian consumers, in particular

the young. India continues to participate in the debate on the benefits of globalization and how to reduce its high hidden costs.

SANAA RIAZ

See also Economy; Look East Policy

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✦ GOA

Goa, a former Portuguese colony (along with Daman and Diu in distant Gujarat) that became a part of the Indian Union on December 19, 1961, as a Union Territory, is located on India's west coast some 250 miles south of Mumbai. In 1987 the Indian Parliament approved the status of a state for Goa, leaving Daman and Diu as a Union Territory. Goa has been ranked in several polls the best state in the country. It is the smallest in area of India's 28 states at 1,429 square miles and is the fourth-smallest in population, with nearly 1.344 million people according to the 2001 census. Goa has one of the highest literacy rates in the country at 82.30 percent. Its capital is Panaji, and its main port of Mormugao constitutes the principal iron and manganese port in the country. Despite intensive exploitation of those minerals, Goa is environmentally conscious and has retained its natural beauty thanks to its famous beaches, rivers, and verdant paddies and hills. Goa is well known in the country for its places of worship, both Hindu and Christian. The state is a popular destination for both domestic and international tourists. There are frequent chartered flights to Goa from several points abroad, notably Israel, Germany, and Russia.

Goa was acquired for the Portuguese in 1510 by Affonso de Albuquerque (1453–1515) only 12 years after Vasco da Gama (ca. 1460–1524) landed in Calicut in 1498. Goa was made

the capital of the pompously called Estado da India (State of India) under a governor-general with command over Portuguese colonies in Africa and Asia. Goa was dubbed the "Rome of the Orient" thanks to its cluster of Catholic religious structures and its position as the headquarters of papal activity in the East. The city is divided into 11 *talukas* (administrative districts) acquired by the Portuguese in two phases: the Velhas Conquistas (Old Conquests) of Tiswadi, Bardez, Salsette, and Mormugao acquired in the 16th century, with the remaining 7 *talukas* being the Novas Conquistas (New Conquests) of Pernem, Sanguem, Quepem, Ponda, Sattari, Bicholim, and Canacona, acquired in the 18th century. By that time the infamous Inquisition that forced conversions and destroyed Hindu temples had become a thing of the past, which is why the Old Conquests held a majority of the Christian population, while the New Conquests contained a preponderant Hindu majority and the Hindu places of worship. At the time of the end of Portuguese rule, Hindus accounted for 60.8 percent of the total Goan population, while the Catholics accounted for 26.4 percent of the population. Both the Hindus and Christians speak Konkani, which was recognized as the language of the state, with Devanagari as its script. Despite their long rule, the Portuguese did not settle in Goa. When Portuguese rule ended in 1961, there were only about 750 Portuguese in Goa, all of them either military or administrative personnel.

The first elections to the Goa Legislative Assembly on an adult franchise basis, the same as in the rest of India, were held in 1963. For the next 17 years, Goan politics remained divided on the question of Goa's identity: whether it should be merged into the neighboring Maharashtra state or whether it should have a separate political status. The leading parties were the Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (MGP) and the United Front of Goans, which was overwhelmingly supported by Christians and some upper-class Brahmans, who opposed merger with Maharashtra and advocated the adoption of Konkani as the official language. In January 1967 the central government resolved the question through an opinion poll, with the majority of respondents voting against the merger. The MGP, however, continued to hold a majority in the assembly until 1979 under the leadership of Dayanand Bandodkar (1911–1973), who served as chief minister from 1963 until his death in 1973, and his daughter Shashikala Kakodkar for the next six years. The MGP continued to win majorities in the assembly elections of 1967, 1972, and 1977. Bandodkar did not take a salary, lived in his own house, and used his own means of transport. He was known for his munificence and love of sports and for getting things done. With lavish financial assistance from New Delhi that had very few strings attached, he was able to transform Goa from a backward entity to a path of progress, meeting the interests of industry and mining as well as of the common people.

The greatest development was in building infrastructure: roads, small bridges, and culverts connecting all villages; electrification; and public transport connecting the remotest parts of Goa to its major urban centers. Educational facilities were now available to Goans, who previously had no funding at all for non-Portuguese education. The need for young people to go to Mumbai or Dharwar for college education was obviated by the opening of several colleges of the arts, the sciences, law, engineering, and technology as well as the upgrading of

the Goa Medical College, built by the Portuguese in 1842 as the Escola Medico-Cirurgica de Goa. Politics after 1979 has been marked by factions, by politicians changing parties mostly for personal benefit, and by the frequent change of administrations. The three decades since have witnessed 16 governments and 4 short periods of president's rule, when the political process was suspended and the administration was carried out by New Delhi's mostly bureaucratic nominees. For most of the period, the government was led by the Indian National Congress (founded in 1885) or one of its factions except for October 2000–February 2005, when the Bharatiya Janata Party (founded in 1980) led by Manohar Parrikar (b. 1955) held the reins of government. Despite their differences, most of the governments have maintained a balance between the two principal communities of the Hindus and Christians and have supported the economic, educational, and cultural development of the territory, whose status was changed to a state of the Indian Union in 1987 soon after adopting Konkani, with the Devanagari script, as the official language. The state continues to be a tourist haven and has also attracted movie celebrities thanks to Goa becoming a permanent venue for an annual international film festival.

DAMODAR R. SARDESAI

See also Daman and Diu

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✦ GREEN REVOLUTION

The Green Revolution refers to the dramatic change in agricultural productivity through the use of a package technology that includes irrigation, high-yielding varieties of seeds, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides, which is often accompanied by mechanization of farm operations through the use of tractors, thrashers, pump sets and motors, and combine harvesters and reapers. The development of the high-yielding varieties of seeds at the International Center for the Improvement of Corn and Wheat (CIMMYT) in Mexico and the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines in the 1960s became a turning point in the history of the development of agriculture in the Third World in general and in Asia in particular.



A farmer scatters fertilizer on a paddy field on the outskirts of Ahmadabad, Gujarat, August 18, 2009, as part of India's remarkably successful expansion of agricultural production using modern seeds and chemical fertilizer, called the Green Revolution. (AP Photo/Ajit Solanki)

With its alarming growth in population but only slowly expanding agricultural base, one of the most significant challenges that the newly independent India faced in 1947 was the need to eradicate hunger and malnutrition. During the British colonial period (1858–1947), agriculture in India stagnated and even declined, and the memories of the Bengal famine of 1943, in which nearly 4 million people perished, was still fresh in the minds of policy makers. With this as the backdrop and on the basis of the recommendations of a team of experts sponsored by the Ford Foundation, India opted for a gradualist policy toward the introduction of the new technology through massive state support. This program, initiated during 1965–1966, was initially confined to a few irrigated districts, but very soon it was expanded to include new areas, particularly in Punjab, Haryana, and western Uttar Pradesh. Comprehensive land consolidation and other land reform measures in these states also facilitated a rapid seizing of the new opportunities. The initial breakthrough came in terms of a threefold rise in the growing of wheat, to be closely followed by a similar but less impressive increase in the growing of rice. Another significant difference is that while in the earlier period most of the improvements were due to an increase in the area under cultivation, in the second phase they were largely because of improvements in productivity.

This limited success of the Green Revolution was responsible for the creation of the large state-funded public distribution system that remained the hallmark of the management of the

food economy in India. However, the Green Revolution has been criticized for its restricted emphasis on wheat and rice and has often been termed a "grain revolution." Even on the question of yield improvement as a result of the Green Revolution, it has been pointed out by many researchers that for the country as a whole, there has not been a marked improvement in the growth in production of all food grains or all crops when pre- and post–Green Revolution periods are compared. Notwithstanding the fact that the contribution of the Green Revolution in terms of growth rates does not seem very impressive, the new technology did contribute to maintaining output growth in a period that witnessed little expansion in the supply of land. This was crucial for maintaining food security for a growing population.

The implications of the Green Revolution were not only limited to agriculture but also had a long-term impact on the trajectory of regional development in India. There was widespread criticism of the technology in the initial period, particularly because of its perceived impact on labor use in agriculture as well as on income distribution. The impact of mechanization on farm operations in a labor-abundant rural economy was the subject of intense debate in the country, but after decades of research on the question, there seems to be increasing consensus on several points. The new technology has been adopted by all kinds of farmers, large and small, and over a period of time has spread to new areas, although the dry-land region has not yet seen much progress in this regard. The technology has increased the income of a large section of the peasantry and the wage laborers but has also accentuated inequalities in income and well-being at both the individual and regional levels. While specific components of the technology had labor-displacing effects, there was an overall increase in the demand for labor in agriculture in the Green Revolution belt and led to labor migration from relatively densely populated and less developed areas to the Green Revolution areas. Agrarian growth in these areas also had a spillover impact on the rural nonagricultural economy, which in turn led to increase in labor demand. Thus, agriculture-led growth through diversification of the rural economy came to be regarded as a major plank of the rural development strategy in India and elsewhere. The built-in bias in favor of relatively better-developed regions, crop selectivity, and regional Green Revolution concentration led to regional imbalances in the Indian economy, although scholars have divergent views on the extent to which the Green Revolution itself can be blamed for rising regional inequality in India. Politically this led to the growth of the rich and middle peasantry articulating demands for higher subsidies to farmers. They became significant voices in the Indian political system.

The ecological impact of the Green Revolution has been substantial. The increase in monocropping has often led to loss of biodiversity, particularly seed diversity. Soil depletion, water pollution, and health hazards as a result of increasing use of agrochemical-based pest and weed controls have emerged as major concerns. An increase in the area under irrigation has led to a rise in the salinity of the land as well as degradation of groundwater in many parts of the areas under intensive agriculture. Partly as a result of this, in recent decades the productivity growth of food grains in India's traditional Green Revolution belt has slowed down. The recent policy emphasis is on a second Green Revolution, which is regionally more dispersed

and ecologically more sustainable. Apart from expanding the traditional Green Revolution package to new crops and new areas, the new strategy aims at diversifying agriculture as well as using biotechnology to solve the crisis of food availability, hunger, and malnutrition.

DEEPAK K. MISHRA

See also Agriculture; Economy; Food Security

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✦ GUJARAT

Located on the western coast of India, Gujarat is one of the fastest-growing states in the Union. According to the 2001 census, the population was 50.671 million. Gujarat is the second most-industrialized state after Maharashtra and one of the most sought-after destinations for industrial investment. Several policy-level changes, political will, a proactive bureaucracy, a relatively well-developed infrastructure, and a large industrial sector have all helped create a vibrant industrial environment. The home state of the father of the nation, Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948), Gujarat has deep roots in its multicultural past and has been a land of traders and merchants. The state was created on May 1, 1960. The capital is Gandhinagar. Major languages spoken are Gujarati, Hindi, Sindhi, Urdu, Marathi, Bhili, Khandesi/Ahirani, Punjabi, Konkani, and English.

Gujarat state is bound by the Arabian Sea on the west; Maharashtra and the Union Territories of Diu, Daman, Dadra, and Nagar Haveli in the south; Pakistan and Rajasthan in the north and northeast; and Madhya Pradesh in the east. The size of Gujarat is 121,803 square miles. The state can be divided into four geocultural regions: mainland Gujarat; Kutch, which is situated on the northwestern border of the state bordering Pakistan and consists of four zones (Vagad, Kanthi, Banni, and Maghpat); Saurashtra (semiarid and hilly); and northern Gujarat (hilly areas with a predominantly tribal population). Gujarat has around 1,000 miles of coastline, which amounts to about one-third of the nation's access to the sea. The total forest area of Gujarat in 2007–2008 was nearly 12,000 square miles, which constitutes almost 10 percent of the total geographical area of the state. The


per capita forest area is .10 acre, compared to the national average of .17 acre. Most of the forests are dry deciduous to scrub.

The forest supports more than 40 species of animals, including the rare Asiatic lion, the wild ass, and the blackbuck. The Banni area of Kutch has an unusual ecology and is considered one of the finest grasslands of Asia. Similarly, Gujarat has vast mangrove wetlands, making the state rich in biodiversity. Major rivers include the Narmada, Sabarmati, Mahi, Mithi, Khari, Bhadar, Shetrunji, Bhogavo, Tapi, Purna, Ambika, Auranga, and Damanganga.

The word "Gujarat" is derived from *Gujaratta*, meaning the land protected or ruled by the Gurjars or inhabited by them. The Gurjars were spread out over a wide area from the Himalayas and the Punjab to the Narmada Valley, but the territorial identity of Gujarat emerged around the sixth century CE. At this time, "Gurjardesha," "Gurjara Ratta," and "Gujarat Mandala" were the terms used for the region around Mt. Abu (southern Rajasthan and parts of north Gujarat). The term "Gujarat" gained currency to denote a larger region that included Lata and Saurashtra (Surath) during the rule of the Chalukya Dynasty (942–1299). The Arab traders called the entire region Gujarat. The state bases its identity on language (Gujarati) and politically from the creation of the separate state of Gujarat in 1960. Districts include Ahmedabad, Amreli, Banskantha, Bharuch, Narmada, Bhavnagar, Gandhinagar, Jamnagar, Junagadh, Porbandar, Kuchchh, Kheda, Anand, Mehsana, Patan, Panchmahal, Dahod, Rajkot, Sabarkantha, Surat, Surendranagar, Valsad, Navsari, Vadodara, Tapi, and Dang.

With diverse social groups of traders, merchants, and nomads arriving and settling at various stages of its long history, Gujarat has emerged as a multicultural and multilayered society. Just as Surat hosted traders from Armenia, Arabia, France, the Netherlands, England, and Turkey, Kutch was one of the first places migrants reached in the subcontinent. Over the course of time, the migration of a number of different peoples resulted in a society with a high level of fluidity in terms of social and religious identities. After the eighth century, it was not uncommon to find members of the same community on both sides of the Kutch-Sindh border, one group being Hindu and the other Muslim. Similarly, there are Rajputs who are sometimes Muslim and at other places Hindu. Parsis and Siddis are two among various communities that came from outside but established themselves in the state. In recent decades, however, social identities have shown a strong tendency toward solidifying along religious as well as caste lines. In 2002, for example, Gujarat witnessed one of the worst communal riots in the history of India. There has also been social exclusion along dietary lines. The dominant tradition is to be vegetarian, with as many as 76 communities claiming to be totally vegetarian. The number of occasional nonvegetarian communities, however, is around 130.

Gujarat has its own term for Hindu castes, which are traditionally divided into clusters of *nyatis* (communities or occupational groups). Some of these clusters are Patanwadia, Patidar, Patel, Kunbi (traditionally peasant communities), Rathodia, Siddi (agrarian laborers), Tai, Suthar (artisans), Vanjha, Vankar (weavers), Wagher, and Kharwa or Ghogholia (fisherfolk/sailors), to name a few. There are 17 Scheduled Castes and 28 Scheduled Tribes in Gujarat. The Muslim groups are either converts from various Hindu communities (such as Rangrej,



Panchmahal district of Gujarat, typical of the semi-arid land of many areas of India. (Dinodia)

Samma, Sepai, Jamat, Sumra, Langha, Miyana, and Ker) or claim a link with communities of Southwest or Central Asia (Saiyed, Shaikh, Moghul, and Pathan). Many among these groups are business communities, such as the Bohras, the Khojas (Ismaili shias), and the Memons (Hanafite Sunnis).

Among the Hindus, the Kolis are the largest community and represent an extraordinary range of groups, including tribes, peasants, craftsmen, laborers, and fishermen. There are two segments: Talapada (locals) and Pardesi (immigrants). In the medieval period the Kolis were petty chieftains. Gujarat has a sizable tribal population of 740,800, which is estimated to constitute 14.76 percent of the total population. The tribal population is concentrated in the eastern hilly tracts of Banaskantha, Sabarkantha, Dahod, Panchmahals, Baroda, Narmada, Bharuch, Surat, Navsari, Bulsar, and Dang districts. There are about 30 major tribal groups, mainly Bhils, Kuknas, Warlis, Naikas, Dublas, Gamits, Dhankas, and Dhodias, with the Bhils being the largest group. Due to several government development projects such as irrigation, some 35,000 tribal families have been displaced since independence in August 1947. Around 494,211 acres of land have been acquired by the government, and this means that more than 100,000 people have been affected by these irrigation projects; 77 percent are tribals.

In terms of language, Gujarat is divided into four zones defined by dialect: North Gujarat, where Charotari is spoken in the districts of Panchmahal, Sabarkanta, Banaskanta, Mahesana, Kheda, Ahmedabad, and Gandhinagar; South Gujarat, dominated by Gujarati speakers of the districts of Valsad, Bharuch, Surat, and Dang, where another specific language

called Dangi is predominantly spoken; Saurashtra, where Kathiawadi is spoken, covering the districts of Junagadh, Jamnagar, Rajkot, Amreli, Surendranagar, and Bhavnagar; and Kutch, where Kutchi is spoken.

With only about 5 percent of the nation's population, Gujarat accounts for about 14 percent of India's industrial output and around 20 percent of its industrial investment. The Planning Commission has projected Gujarat to be one of the fastest-growing states in the Union. However, urbanization and industrialization are highly decentralized. Around half of the people of the state live in concentrated but fairly spread-out population clusters. Before the division of the state into smaller districts, most of the districts had more than 20,000 industrial workers. Now, with the smaller districts, there are around 10,000 industrial workers per district, with concentrations in specific urban centers such as Surat and Ahmedabad. The major industries are in the sectors of oil and gas, synthetic fibers, cotton textiles, chemicals, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, engineering, ceramics, gems and jewelry, and agro-based products.

Since the liberalization of the Indian economy in 1991, Gujarat has responded to global competition by introducing various changes in its industrial policy. The share of chemicals and petro-based sectors has risen, but one of the key sectors, cotton textiles, has faced a dramatic decline. Investment increased in medium- and large-scale sectors vis-à-vis the small-scale sector, which was Gujarat's traditional stronghold. Ten major groups dominate Gujarat's industrial structure, controlling close to 80 percent of the factories, nearly 97 percent of fixed capital investment, 93 percent of gross output, and 87 percent of employment.

Animal husbandry and dairy have helped transform the rural economy in a number of ways. Milk production is largely organized on a cooperative basis and is fairly widespread. Gujarat, in fact, is the largest producer of milk in India and has been the leader since the 1970s. In the agriculture sector, the state is the main producer of tobacco, cotton, and groundnuts in the country and produces another dozen crops as well, but agricultural development has lagged behind. Agricultural development has proved to be unstable and has a zero, if not negative, growth rate. While per capita incomes in the secondary and tertiary sectors have shown a consistent increase in the last two to three decades, agriculture does not match the pace. Unsuitable climatic conditions and lack of water are the major constraints. The state has large wastelands, but almost half of the total area is uncultivated.

Economic development has its own costs. The performance in human development indices (in areas such as health, nutrition, literacy, education, and gender equality) is low. The state has also witnessed severe depletion and degradation of its environmental resources. The predominance of pollution-causing industries and the mismanagement of water resources are two serious threats. Excessive salinity, excessive fluoride, and excessive nitrites all mean a severe shortage of drinking water in a state that has always been short of water.

SADAN JHA

See also Daman and Diu

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✦ GULF STATES, INDIAN LABOR IN

The connections between India and the Gulf states (also known as the Arab states of the Persian Gulf or the Persian Gulf states), which include Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, started more than 4,500 years ago. Archaeological findings show that artifacts from that time were found in Oman, indicating that it had a link with the Indus Valley civilization. In 2010 Indians constituted approximately 15 percent of the total population of Oman. People of Indian extraction residing abroad number approximately 20 million, with approximately 1.4 million persons a year leaving India. The early migrants who formed the basis of this Indian diaspora were mainly manual workers who met the enormous demand for indentured labor that arose in the 19th-century plantations and mines in the other British colonies, with southern Africa, East Africa, Malaya, the Caribbean countries, British Guiana, and Fiji being the main destinations.

In the early and mid-20th century, the Middle East began to be a new destination. Indians began to man the clerical and technical positions of the oil companies in the Persian Gulf region after oil was discovered there during the 1930s. Between 1948 and the 1970s, migration numbers increased from about 1,400 to 40,000. Between 1970 and 1975, however, the number of Indians migrating to the Gulf increased dramatically. The 1970s, in fact, brought radical changes to both India and the Gulf states as oil became a highly lucrative source of income for all the region's states and India and as the world experienced a severe bout of inflation as a result of the Yom Kippur War of 1973 and the sharp increase in the price of oil that followed.

The development of the booming oil sector after 1973 suffered from a lack of local expertise in running oil refineries and ancillary businesses and the unwillingness of enough local workers to do the backbreaking and hot and heavy work often performed in the oil industry and in the construction business that accompanied the oil boom. Accordingly, the Gulf states relied heavily on foreign expertise and, more importantly, on foreign labor, both skilled and especially unskilled or semiskilled labor. As the Gulf states' local workers lacked the skills, however minimal they were, and often the desire to acquire them, many poorly educated Indians were recruited to fill the gaps in the workforce. They eagerly signed on to work not only in the oil industry but also in the booming construction industry. These overseas Indian workers mainly came from southern India from the three states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh. Some 70 percent of the Indian migrants in the Gulf were semiskilled and unskilled workers who often lived in dormitories in poor and sometimes unsanitary conditions and made little or no money for themselves after they paid for their food and living arrangements, paid the agent in India who had initially recruited them and paid for their transportation to the Gulf, and remitted money to their families. Many of the workers could never get out of the debt they owed to their agent for sending them to the Gulf. The rest were office workers, professionals, and sometimes academics who usually fared better, some very well indeed.

The remittances sent home by these workers, however large or small they were on an individual basis, proved to be an enormous boon to their families and to the Indian economy. Remittances constituted .7 percent in terms of the share of gross domestic product in 1991 and 3 percent in 2000, which put India at the top of the list of countries receiving remittances from its migrants abroad, with around $21.7 billion in 2004.

The laborers in the Gulf states, however, face a variety of problems connected with their living conditions and in regard to their work. The migration of married men who left behind responsibility for the management of their household and the caring of parents or relatives to women in the family, especially their wives, created social and psychological problems for the wives of these so-called Gulf widows. On the other hand, because of the language barrier and the cultural differences between Indians and Gulf Arabs, most Indians working in the Gulf find integration into Gulf society an uneasy, even impossible, proposition. The system of sponsorship, or *kafala*, that organizes foreign laborers' life in the Gulf states puts a lot of constraints on migrants in order to protect the closed nature of Arab society. This is often resented by highly skilled and highly educated professionals and academics, although they find their own niche in the societies in which they live. Some of the less-skilled workers, however, find themselves in very poor living conditions and suffer from mistreatment; this especially applies to women working as housemaids.

In the new millennium, especially after the economic recession hit in late 2009, foreign laborers, including Indians, became unwelcome guests by governments of the Gulf states. This was for a number of reasons. First, since health care and social benefits for the foreign workers is funded by the government, the increasing size of the migrant workforce only added

to budgetary pressures felt by Gulf states. Foreign workers have also raised national security concerns, as some of them were involved in political incidents in Gulf countries including coup attempts, political assassinations, and terrorist attacks. Thus, the Gulf states are trying to decrease their reliance on foreign labor by pursuing policies labeled "Emiratization," "Qatarization," and "Saudization" that are aimed at improving the skills of local workers in order to increase the number of indigenous people in the workforce. As part of this policy, for example, in November 2007 the Kuwaiti government declared its intention to reduce the expatriate workforce by 35 percent, although the Kuwaiti government did not provide any details on how it was going to achieve this aim or how it was going to attract local workers to do the dirty and hot jobs they had shunned in the past.

With regard to migrant workers, there is a lack-of-information problem. No comprehensive data are available on women migrants as dependents or workers. In India, systematic all-India data are not easily available except for the state of Kerala, where an exclusive state-level ministry for overseas Keralite affairs, the Non-Resident Keralites' Affairs Department, was created in 1996.

At the Indian government level, some measures have been taken in order to protect Indian labor abroad and to guarantee the flow of their remittances, which is so important to the government of India because it brings in foreign exchange and improves the balance of payments between imports and exports. For example, the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs was created in 2004. The ministry took the initiative to amend the Emigration Act of 1983, which was designed mainly to ensure protection to vulnerable unskilled and semiskilled workers and women going abroad, and introduced a number of measures to protect the rights of Indians working abroad. According to this law, Indian citizens would, among other things, have the right to exercise their vote while they were residents overseas.

At the business level, numerous institutional frameworks have been established in order to organize, protect, and develop the Indian business and professional communities in the Gulf states. In this regard, the Indian Business and Professional Council was formed in 2003 in Dubai, one of the seven emirates of the United Arab Emirates, after the unification of three Indian business organizations, namely the Indian Business Council, the Overseas Indians Economic Forum, and the Business and Professional Club. The Indian Business and Professional Council is the only recognized representative organization of Indian business and professionals in Dubai.

Finally, Indian labor in the Gulf states is a central component of Indian relations with these countries, especially since the Kuwait War of 1990–1991, when Indians largely replaced other foreign workers, even nonnational Arabs, in the Gulf. From less than 258,000 in 1975 the number went up to 3.3 million in 2001. About 91 percent of the Indian migrant population lives in the six oil-rich states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

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See also Diaspora, Indian

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H



✦ HARYANA

Haryana, meaning "heavenly abode" or "green land," is a state in the northwestern part of India that was created on November 1, 1966, to provide a state for Hindi speakers. It was carved out of the state of the Punjab, leaving the rest of the Punjab a predominantly Punjabi-speaking and Sikh-dominated state. The two states share a renowned capital, Chandigarh, a planned city designed by the Swiss-born French modernist architect Le Corbusier, Charles-Édouard Jeanneret (1887–1965), and it is administered as a federal territory. A part of Haryana is given to the National Capital Territory of Delhi, which contains the capital of India, New Delhi. Due to its proximity to Delhi and its agricultural (especially rice) and industrial base, and especially its information technology (IT) industries, Haryana, with a population of just over 20 million people, is one of the wealthiest states in India.

Haryana is a hallowed site in Indian history and mythology. It was the easternmost locale of the Indus Valley civilization (ca. 2700–ca. 1800 BCE) with one site, Rakhigarhi, dated to ca. 3000 BCE. The archaeological site Kurukshetra is the purported site of the Battle of Kurukshetra depicted in the 18-book epic *Mahabharata* (ca. fifth century BCE) when the episode between the god Krishna and the warrior Arjun, one of the five Pandava brothers fighting their Kaurava cousins, was recorded in the *Bhagavadgita,* which comprises 18 chapters of the 6th book of the *Mahabharata*. Panipat, the city located at Karnal, was, according to legend, founded by one set of brothers, the Pandavas, who are the heroes of the *Mahabharata*. The nearby city of Thaneswar was later the capital of King Harsha (ca. 606–647), who conquered much of northern India. After Muhammad Ghori

(1162–1206) won the second Battle of Tarain (near Thanesar) in 1192, northern India was opened up to Muslim conquest and the Delhi Sultanate (1206–1526) was created in northern India. Panipat was also the location of three battles that changed history. The first was on April 21, 1526, and saw the creation of the Mughal Empire (1526–1858) under Babur (1483–1530; Mughal emperor 1526–1530); the second Battle of Panipat saw Babur's grandson, Akbar (1542–1605; Mughal emperor 1556–1605), reestablish Mughal power on November 5, 1556; and the Third Battle of Panipat in January 1761 was a victory for the Afghan invader, Ahmad Shah Abdali (ca. 1722–1773), who was the founder of modern Afghanistan. In short, Haryana holds a mythical place in India's recorded history and in its mythology and religion.

Haryana's wealth is largely a result of the city of Gurgaon, Haryana's sixth-largest city, but the state's industrial and financial center. Located less than 20 miles from Delhi and linked with it by an eight-lane highway and by Delhi Metro, the commuter railroad, with a population of less than 1 million, it has been ranked in one magazine survey as the best city to live and work in India. It is the headquarters for more than a dozen multinational corporations, including IBM, Microsoft, Coca-Cola, and American Express. It is also the location of motorcycle and automobile companies Suzuki and Honda, and the location of a national defense university and the Indo-Israel Training Academy.

Tourists to Haryana visit the battlefield at Panipat and the city of Kurukshetra, where they pass on to nearby Thaneswar to worship the Hindu god Shiva, for he was first worshiped there, and to purify themselves in the Brahma Sarovar, a tank (lake) 1,800 feet long and 1,400 feet wide. By dipping themselves in the water, devotees purify themselves and commemorate the Hindu god Lord Brahma's creation of the universe. With its mythological and historical past and its future based on modern industry and high technology, Haryana holds a special place in the Indian imagination.

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See also Punjab

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✦ HEALTH CARE

Health care has deep roots in India, dating back 3,500 years to the early days in Indian history, when traditional herbal medicine was developed and practiced. Today, the health care system is a modern one, covering the full spectrum of the prevention, treatment, and management of illness. It is accompanied by a wide array of allied health industries and professions. The sector is one of the largest in the country in terms of revenue and employment. However, despite significant improvement in health services in recent years, these services remain inadequate to meet today's health needs, and the country faces a heavy disease and illness burden. There are also broader economic and social issues that impinge on health outcomes as the country undergoes rapid social transformation.

Major developments in health care policy took place in the early 1980s. In 1983 the government endorsed the country's first national program, the National Health Policy, which was updated in 2002. The main aim of the policy was to achieve an acceptable standard of good health among the population, and this would be achieved by the development of comprehensive health services, the creation of infrastructure, and further research and development. Subsequent major policy changes included the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts (1992), which created health, welfare, and poverty alleviation programs; a National Nutrition Policy (1993) designed to alleviate malnutrition; universal health insurance schemes for the poor (2003); the Common Minimum Program (2004) to raise public spending on health; and the National Rural Health Mission (2005) to increase the availability of rural health care. These policies have helped to tackle health issues and are of national importance. However, despite a well-formulated policy framework, critics argue that the policies do not translate into effective service. Major weaknesses include minimal community-level participation and failure to consider variations across states.

Government responsibility for health care provisions is shared by the central, state, and local governments. The central government is responsible for developing and monitoring national standards and regulations, coordinating health planning, and promoting major health programs. State and local governments are responsible for administration and the delivery of services. The majority of funding comes from state and local levels with less than 20 percent coming from the central government. Although government health spending across states is similar, state spending on health differs substantially, with states such as Kerala, the Punjab, and Tamil Nadu spending more than double the amount spent in Madhya Pradesh and Bihar. The unequal distribution of services and infrastructure across states, as well as such state differences as the level of economic development, the governing capacity of the relevant government, and civil unrest, has led to marked state disparities in health outcomes across the country.

Health care in India consists of a government-funded sector ranging from primary to tertiary services and a private sector that focuses mainly on primary care. Although some public services are among the best in the country, the public-private division generally represents two completely different worlds: overburdened public services that offer limited or no access



A child is immunized through a program of the World Health Organization at the Malipur Maternity Home in Delhi, November 2002. In many areas of India the level of health care has improved dramatically. (WHO/P. Virot)

to adequate health care for the average Indian, contrasted to high-quality medical care in the private sector for middle-class Indians and medical tourists.

In addition to the public and private sectors, there is an increasing number of charitable trusts and voluntary organizations dealing with health. Numerous international organizations also make an important contribution to health in India, and they include such entities as the World Health Organization, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the World Bank. They offer technical, financial, and material assistance with health programs in such areas as family planning, HIV/AIDS, malaria control, and polio eradication.

The public sector has built up a vast health infrastructure, including universal health care in which government-funded programs provide treatment at minimal or no cost. Some public hospitals are models of excellence in service delivery. However, the vast majority of the country's public health system has not kept up with economic growth and social development. The health care system today suffers from inefficiency, insufficient resources, poor infrastructure, outdated equipment, a low ratio of trained personnel such as doctors and nurses to patients, and the lack of availability of some medicines and diagnostic tests. Recent statistics put the number of hospital beds at 9 per 10,000 people, and the number of doctors and professional nurses at 7 and 7.85 respectively per 10,000. A large number of posts for medical professionals remain vacant every year. This means that even the best public hospitals are short of staff. Data concerning government spending on health tells a dismal story: the total public expenditure on health is about 1 percent, one of the lowest in the world and higher than only a handful of other countries.

Health care supervision extends from the national level to the village level. At the national level there is the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and its departments; at the state level there are the state health services under the coordination of a director; at the district and subdivisional levels group health care for several districts is brought under unified control; and at the community level health care is offered by Primary Health Centers, which provide basic services in general medicine. At the grassroots level, many health education and promotion projects have been initiated as part of national health programs.

The rural health system is characterized by primary and community health centers, which deal with routine medical care. There is currently a crisis in rural health care, characterized

by the concentration of medical facilities in urban areas, nonexistent services in some villages, a dilapidated infrastructure, poor equipment and medicine supply, unqualified medical practitioners, employee absenteeism, and the reluctance of doctors to work in rural areas. The government has promised to do more for rural India but has yet to deliver on its promise.

There are over 250 Indian medical colleges dealing with modern medicine under the control of the Indian Medical Council, and 400 in the Indian system of traditional medicine and homeopathy. Over the past several decades, the number of medical colleges and the standard of education has increased significantly, and nowadays over 250,000 new doctors graduate annually in the modern medical system. There is a similar number of traditional practitioners and paraprofessionals, although there is limited integration between Western-orientated medical personnel and indigenous medical practitioners.

Despite some cultural differences in people's beliefs about illness and treatment, such as the belief in traditional medicine systems like the ayurvedic and Unani systems, modern health care in India is similar to that of other countries. Health professionals in India are trained in a similar fashion as in the West, and use the same classification systems, drugs, and behavioral methods. Similarly, as in Western countries, most patients are treated in the first instance in primary health centers and general hospitals as inpatients or outpatients, whereas patients who need specialist care are referred to secondary- or tertiary-care hospitals.

The lack of an accessible and efficient public health system has led to remarkable growth in the private sector. Private health care now accounts for the majority (more than 80 percent) of Indian hospitals, hospital beds, and health care financing. Standards of care and quality in this private health care system are significantly higher than those available in the public sector. At the upper end of the market, some hospitals are on a par with those in Western countries, with state-of-the-art facilities, teams of renowned specialists, the latest medical technology and equipment, and the expertise and resources to conduct sophisticated surgeries. In contrast to the poorly financed public sector, private spending on health is more than 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), which places India among the top 20 countries in the world.

A key driver of the private sector is medical tourism, catering to increasing numbers of foreigners from Bangladesh, Europe, the Middle East, the United States, and Pakistan. Major cities that cater to medical tourists are Chennai, Mumbai, and New Delhi. The most popular treatments requested by tourists include alternative medicine, bone-marrow transplants, cosmetic surgery, dentistry, infertility treatments, joint replacements, oncology services, and specialized surgeries such as eye and heart surgery. The key advantages for medical tourists in India include affordability, the immediate availability of treatment, high standards of care, expertise, and easy communication, since Indian doctors speak English. This contrasts to the high costs and long waiting times in countries such as Canada and the United States, as well as Europe; less-advanced technology in the Middle East; and the nonavailability of treatment in poorer countries in Africa and South Asia.

The government actively encourages private stakeholders to fill the gap left by the ailing public health system. Government incentives include low real estate taxes for hospitals, tax

and import duty exemptions, liberal attitudes toward foreign investment, expedited visas for overseas patients, and public-private partnerships. Consequently, there has been substantial investment from large corporate groups, including drug and technology companies, and collaboration with foreign counterparts. In addition, government bodies in India, such as the Ministry of Tourism, have initiated a range of programs to encourage and market medical tourism, including marketing campaigns and an improved airport and transport infrastructure.

However, the private sector is not without its problems. There is growing compliance on quality standards, for example, but the sector is largely unregulated at both the state and the professional level. There are frequent complaints of overcharging, poor standards of care, unqualified or unlicensed practitioners, and unethical behavior. The private sector has grown at the expense of public services, but its high costs are out of reach for the majority of the population. Also, there is uncertainty about the extent to which the private health care industry benefits the economy and the public health system.

India's public health care system faces many challenges. There are limited resources and government funding, which is a major constraint to developing the system. Another pressing problem is the marked inequalities in health care provision, such as the concentration of hospitals and services in urban areas, while the majority of the population lives in rural areas, and there is caste, class, and gender discrimination. Widespread poverty in India means that a significant number of patients either cannot afford to pay for treatment, or sell assets and fall into debt to cover medical expenses. Other problems include the emigration of doctors, the high incidence of health issues that are preventable (due to, among other things, malnutrition, abysmal sanitation, and contaminated water supplies), reports of bribery to obtain advice and treatment, poor disease surveillance and response systems, poor involvement of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the lack of respect for the rights of sick people.

Another big challenge concerns the different health burden and facilities across states. Some states are further along in the health transition, whereas others are still in their early stages, and there are also differences in their health outcomes, funding, levels of use of public and private services, ways of dealing with the private sector, and governance issues.

The unfortunate reality of these challenges is that a large number of people in India are without access to satisfactory health service provisions. The main focus now should be to make health care accessible to everyone, to ensure that services reach the poor and the needy, and to establish high standards of care through professional regulatory bodies.

The challenges facing the health care sector are substantial. An enormous amount of investment will be needed in the coming years to improve standards to meet today's health care demands. The health care industry, particularly the private sector, is growing at a rapid pace, leading to the development and expansion of services. Examples include infrastructure expansion, the development of the pharmaceutical industry and the health insurance market, the relocation of medical equipment manufacturing from overseas, research and development, and clinical trials. All this will lead to more services, choice, and greater availability of sophisticated medical procedures.

The government has faced up to these problems. Improvements include a more proactive approach to health promotion, government funding and training opportunities for mental health personnel, medical innovations, and an increasing presence of NGOs involved in activities related to welfare and human rights. These positive changes are set against a backdrop of concern for improving health care policy and provision, increasing living standards for the country as a whole, and improvement in various health outcomes.

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See also Ayurvedic Medicine; Diet and Health; HIV/AIDS; Medical Tourism; Mental Health Care

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Health Care, Mental. *See* Mental Health Care

✦ HIMACHAL PRADESH

Himachal ("land of snow") Pradesh is a mountainous state in northern India that forms a transition between the plains of the Punjab and the peaks of the Himalaya Mountains. Two main rivers, the Beas and the Ravi, flow through the region, watering the valleys and providing electric power for the region. The capital of the state is Shimla (formerly spelled Simla), the former summer capital of the British Raj. The main language spoken is Hindi, along with a variety of regional dialects. The state has a population of approximately 6 million, 95 percent of whom practice the Hindu faith. Himachal Pradesh is bordered on the north by Jammu and Kashmir, on the west and southwest by the Punjab, on the south by Haryana, on the southeast by Uttar Pradesh, and on the east by China.

The altitude of the state ranges from approximately 1,000 feet to 21,000 feet, making it a favorite destination for trekkers and climbers. The road from the Kullu valley to Manali follows the Beas River, then rises to the 13,000-foot-high Rotang Pass, and continues on the main road to Leh, Ladakh. The area is covered with pine and deodar trees, wheat fields, and fruit orchards. The Kullu valley and most of the Himalayan range is populated by a tribe called Gujjars, goat herders, who also spin and weave shawls, blankets, and clothing appropriate for the cold climate.

Historically, the area was populated during the Vedic period going back to at least 1000 BCE. As tribal chiefs consolidated their territories, small states evolved. The Mauryan

Empire (4th–3rd centuries BCE) absorbed these states, and later princes continued to accept the authority of the Kushan (ca. 48–220 CE), Gupta (ca. 320–ca. 510 CE), and Mughal (1526–1858) rulers. During the latter period, the local rajas of these small kingdoms made agreements to keep their land in exchange for taxes and service in the military. In the 19th century, Ranjit Singh (1780–1829) of the Punjab seized control of many of the kingdoms in the area. When the British controlled the area after the Gurkha Wars of 1814, they entered into treaties with some of the rajas and annexed others. In 1948, a year after Indian independence, 30 princely states united to form Himachal Pradesh, and parcels of the Punjab were added in 1966 and 1977 to become the present official boundaries.

Shimla was settled by the British in the 1820s after they entered into agreements of mutual interest with local rulers. Beginning with a scattering of houses and sanatoria, the area slowly developed into a town as the British escaped the summer heat of the plains. In 1864 the viceroy John Lawrence (1811–1879; viceroy 1864–1869) made Shimla the summer capital of British India. (The winter capital was Calcutta and later Delhi.) The town today is a veritable museum of Victorian architecture lining the main street, the Mall, which is a walking street free of vehicles. Christ Church (1857); Gorton Castle (1904); Rashtrapati Niwas (1888), the former viceroy's home; Gaiety Theatre (1887); and Kipling's "Scandal Corner" all contribute to a British atmosphere. Leaders of the Indian National Congress (INC; founded 1885) and the independence movement, such as Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948), Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958), regularly visited Shimla, and it was the site of the 1945 conference called by the viceroy, Lord Archibald Wavell (1883–1950; viceroy 1943–1947), that tried to reach an agreement between Indian leaders and the British on India's future status and independence.

Dharamsala (Dharamshala), meaning "religious abode," is the headquarters of the Kangra District, Himachal Pradesh. The town gets its name because of an ancient Shiva temple of Bhagsunag nearby. The town has a population of approximately 19,000 and is divided into two separate parts: a lower level at 3,600 feet altitude and McLeod Gang (Upper Dharamsala) at about 6,000 feet. In 1849, after the Second Anglo-Sikh War (1848–1849), the area was annexed and made into a British military garrison called a cantonment. McLeod Gang is named after David McLeod, lieutenant governor of the Punjab at that time. Like Shimla and Dalhousie, Dharamsala became a popular hill station for the British.

The 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso (b. 1935), formed the Tibetan government-in-exile in McLeod Gang after fleeing Tibet in 1959, and several thousand Tibetan exiles have built Buddhist temples, monasteries, and schools along with the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, which houses over 80,000 manuscripts. It has become known as "Little Llasa" because of its large Tibetan population.

The region is known for its centuries-old Hindu temples and miniature paintings. The Lakshmi Narayan group of six stone temples at Chamba date from the 10th century and are dedicated to the deities Shiva and Vishnu. They are of architectural importance because

of their fine condition and because they are excellent examples of the north Indian style of temple construction. They have carved wall sculptures and a tall, sloping carved tower above the main chamber, which houses the image of the deity to whom the temple is dedicated.

Paintings from the region are categorized as *pahari*, meaning "from the mountains," and are divided according to the kingdom from which they came. Basholi, Kulu, and Mankot paintings of the late 17th century are noted for their flat, bright colors; faces in profile; and stark backgrounds. The influence of the Mughal court produced more naturalism into the ateliers, especially in Guler and Kangra. The lush forests, flowing rivers, and snow-covered mountains formed the settings for illustrations of the two epics, the *Mahabharata* and *Ramayana*, and mythologies of the deities. The atelier of Raja Sansar Chand (1775–1823) of Kangra incorporated architecture and portraiture into court paintings using pale, shaded colors. Pahari paintings are highly collectible and the subject of a large number of books on Indian miniature paintings.

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See also Dalai Lama, 14th; Punjab

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✦ HIMALAYA

The Himalaya (often known in English as the Himalayas) run along the Indian subcontinent's northern flank, rising abruptly and majestically from the flat expanses of the Indo-Gangetic Plain. They have been formed over the last 50 million years by the central thrust of the Indian (tectonic) Plate into and underneath the Eurasian Plate, and are the most formidable of the ranges of mountains and hills that ring the subcontinent on all land approaches. The slopes, ridges, and valleys of the Himalaya harbor a vast and unique diversity of ecosystems, flora, fauna, peoples, languages, and cultures. Despite the fact that they lie on the very edge of the subcontinent, and have traditionally remained independent and distinct from the plains, they hold an important position in South Asian history and culture. The arrival in the late 20th century of modern transport and communications has had large ramifications for Himalayan environments and cultures, and fundamentally changed the nature of their relationship with the other regions of South Asia. But despite the push for "development"

and integration of the mountain regions, the challenges posed by the Himalaya's awesome scale and the remoteness of many areas mean that they remain a place apart.

The Himalaya rise in stages: several minor ranges (the Siwaliks, the Lesser Himalaya or *Mahabharat Lek*), inner valleys or *duns*, and a tangle of spurs and foothills (cut by deep river valleys) lie between the northern rim of the plains and the highest ridge, the Great Himalaya or *Himal*. To the east and west, it is difficult to delineate in practice where the Himalaya end and where their various subranges begin. At their western end, the Himalaya merge into a complex mass of ridges and knots that rise to the Karakoram and Pamir before splitting, with one fork running westward into the Hindu Kush and the other back eastward into the Tien Shan; their eastern reaches flare into the hills that cover much of Southeast Asia and southwestern China. Some geographers define the western and eastern boundaries of the "Himalaya proper" as the deep gorges where they are pierced by the Indus and Tsangpo/ Brahmaputra Rivers, roughly 1,500 miles apart. Others, including the regional organization ICIMOD (the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, based in Kathmandu), prefer a definition that acknowledges the interconnected nature of all the ranges at the heart of Asia and recognize a "Greater Himalayan Region," which covers a much larger area, encompassing parts or the entirety of eight countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, China, India, Nepal, and Pakistan), and if taken to its furthest extent, still more countries of Central and Southeast Asia. This region contains all of the 100 highest mountains in the world, including 14 peaks that rise higher than 26,000 feet, and is the source of most of the major rivers of South, Southeast, East, and Central Asia. It is also home to a population estimated at more than 200 million, of whom some 72 million live in India.

The word "Himalaya" is from the Sanskrit *Himālaya*, meaning "abode of snow," and since ancient times the mountains have been of immense spiritual importance to Hinduism, the predominant religion across most of South Asia. Two of the most sacred Hindu sites are Mount Kailash in Tibet, on whose summit Shiva is believed to live with his consort Parvati, and the Gangotri glacier in the Indian state of Uttarakhand, which is considered to be the source of the holy river Ganges. These, and countless other holy places across the Himalaya, have been destinations of pilgrimage for thousands of years, and the mountains' importance to Hindus is illustrated by the beautiful and often quoted verses of the *Skanda Purana*: "In a hundred ages of gods, I could not tell thee of the glories of Himachal. As the dew is dried up by the morning sun, so are the sins of mankind by the sight of Himachal." Significant sites for other religions originating in South Asia (Buddhism, Jainism, and Sikhism) are also spread throughout the mountains.


The Himalaya and their subranges form a natural divide that insulates the subcontinent from the rest of Asia, and their steep ridges and thick snows have prevented many of the invasions that swept across Central Asia from reaching India. Invading groups who succeeded in reaching the subcontinent (for example, the Greeks, the Afghans, and the Mughals) have come down mostly through the passes of the Hindu Kush on the northwestern side. The dense forests of the northeastern hills have proved an even greater barrier to outsiders,

the only decisive invasion into India's northeast in recorded history being the Ahom invasion of Assam in the 13th century. The mountain heights also act to check the icy northern winds that blow down over Central Asia from Siberia. This keeps the subcontinent relatively warm all year round, and all parts of India (except alpine areas) have climates that are considered tropical or subtropical. The role of the Himalaya in the development of northern India's landscape has also been crucial. The Indo-Gangetic plain, all the way from the Punjab to the Bay of Bengal, is formed of alluvial deposits that have been eroded from the youthful soils of the Himalaya over millions of years and carried downhill by their steep rivers.

Large sections of the Republic of India's northern frontier follow the crest of the Himalayan watershed, although in the west it crosses into the trans-Himalaya, and further east it is interrupted by the mountain states of Nepal and Bhutan. The frontier is a legacy of India's rule by the British, who measured and mapped for the first time the mountains dividing the subcontinent from the rest of Asia. The British were well aware of the role the mountains played in the defense of India and spent decades securing a northern border that would make the best use of this natural advantage. In the western Himalaya they sustained an intense rivalry (popularly known as "the Great Game") with Russia for control of the crucial routes between India and Central Asia, eventually leading them to annex large areas of the trans-Himalaya such as Baltistan and Gilgit (now in Pakistan). The northeast frontier (eastward from Bhutan) was fixed at the Himalayan watershed by representatives of British India and Tibet in the Simla Accord in 1914 and is known as the McMahon line. Most sections of the Himalayan border are disputed—both India and Pakistan claim the entirety of the former princely state of Kashmir, which has been divided and militarized by both countries for more than 60 years. China, for its part, does not recognize Indian sovereignty in Aksai Chin (in Ladakh) or Arunachal Pradesh, as it claims it was not consulted when the boundaries were agreed, and that Tibet, as tributary to China, was not sovereign to sign the Simla Accord. The rivalry over Kashmir has sparked several wars between India and Pakistan since 1947, and frontier disputes were a major cause of the war between India and China in 1962.

Five of India's states have the majority of their territory in the Himalaya. These are Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand (formerly Uttaranchal), Sikkim, and Arunachal Pradesh. In addition, the hill districts around Darjeeling in West Bengal, and the hill states of the northeast (Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Meghalaya, and Tripura) are also considered by many to be extensions of the Himalayan foothills. ICIMOD estimates that while some 15 percent of India's total land area falls within the Greater Himalayan Region, this area contains only 6 percent of India's population. These statistics reflect the fact that settlement patterns in the hills are sparser than in plains areas and that there are large tracts of uninhabited land in the mountains.

Although the hill and mountain states are not geographically distant from the plains, the difference in altitude and topography has meant that their histories and cultures are markedly distinct. While Kashmir has remained a discrete political entity for centuries (and continues to command autonomy from many of the powers of India's central government), Himachal



A woman harvests crops in the Himalayan foothills. Many areas of India have an ideal climate for the growing of foodstuffs to feed its vast population. (Corel)

and Uttarakhand have both broken away from larger states since independence, achieving full statehood in 1971 and 2000 respectively. By separating from the plains states of the Punjab and Uttar Pradesh, Himachal and Uttarakhand were effectively reestablishing the autonomy that hill areas had traditionally known before the colonial period. Sikkim is a recent addition to the Indian polity, having been an independent kingdom (albeit under India's protection) until it was annexed in 1975. Arunachal Pradesh, formerly known as the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA), was largely left to its own devices by the British and continued to experience very light government for several decades after independence. It became a full state in 1987; since then the state apparatus has been greatly extended.

Even in a country as large and diverse as India, the biological and cultural diversity found in the Himalaya are unparalleled. The Himalaya are so sheer that the plains at their foot are in many stretches less than 100 miles as the crow flies from the mountain crests, a difference in altitude of some 22,000 or 26,000 feet along many parts of the range. Many mountain rivers flow through valleys that are thousands of feet deep, and climatic conditions can pass from subtropical through temperate to alpine over the distance of barely a few miles, moving up the mountainside. Consequently, the Himalaya contain a large variety of natural environments, influenced both by altitudinal zonation and by the many microclimates that are engendered by the dramatic topography of the foothills. Three of the regions identified as crucial stores of the world's biodiversity (known as "biodiversity hotspots") fall within India, and of these two (the Himalayan and Indo-Burman hotspots) lie in the Himalaya and northeastern hills. Not only are the varying elevations and microclimates of the mountain slopes particularly suited to the development of diverse species of plants and animals, but two of the world's eight biogeographical realms (or ecozones), representing the highest-level division of the plant and animal kingdoms into relatively autonomous regions, meet at the Himalaya: the Palaearctic Realm to the north and the Indo-Malaya Realm to the south. Thus, Himalayan biodiversity comprises elements of both.

The rugged terrain, remoteness, and—until modern times—seclusion of the mountains have also facilitated the development of independent and distinctive cultures throughout

the length of the Himalaya. Traditional means of livelihood included such varied systems as sedentary agriculture (with terracing of steep slopes in many regions), shifting agriculture (also known as swidden), pastoralism, long-distance trading, hunting, and foraging. The inhabitants of many hill areas combined a number of these practices and were typically better nourished and healthier than the peasantry of the plains. Himalayan people living in the lower foothills and valleys tend to be culturally and religiously close to South Asia, often following Hinduism (or Islam), whereas many of those who live at higher altitudes are Buddhist and have close links to Tibetan culture. Many Himalayan groups, however, have absorbed cultural influences from both north and south of the mountains, and a significant number, particularly in the eastern Himalaya, maintain indigenous local traditions that are distinct from those of both India and Tibet. Of the roughly 415 languages known in India, a sizable number are spoken in the Himalaya, the vast majority of which are Indo-Aryan and Tibeto-Burman languages of the Indo-European and Sino-Tibetan families respectively. Many Himalayan languages have for centuries been spoken in relatively small and defined geographical areas. Such languages often carry a large amount of specialized knowledge about the natural environment of the region where they are spoken, and the means by which people can make use of the environment for agriculture, animal husbandry, wild products (for example, medicinal and aromatic plants), hunting, and construction.

Over recent decades, the economy of many parts of the Himalaya has become increasingly integrated with that of the plains by the extensive program of road building that the government implemented throughout the border regions following India's defeat in the Sino-Indian War of 1962. While roads are usually at the top of the "development list" of state planners and villagers alike, they are not without controversy. The Himalayan road system has made it possible to complete journeys in the space of a day that once would have taken weeks, and allowed certain areas to diversify their economies into such new spheres as commercial horticulture and tourism, but it has also in many cases been known to increase disparities of wealth in hill communities. The road network has also had significant effects on the natural environment of India's hill states. The felling of the Himalaya's great forests began in the colonial period, but it has continued apace in independent India, as new roads have opened up formerly inaccessible forest areas to the national economy for the first time. While several of the rivers that hurtle down from the high mountains have already been dammed for hydropower, the government plans many more. The timber and electricity that come from the Himalayan forests and waters are mostly used in the plains; perhaps this is not surprising, given the much higher population living there, but nonetheless it is a cause of resentment in some parts of the Himalaya. The perceived economic and political alienation of the hills from central power has been one factor in the development of separatist movements in several hill states: in the northeastern states of Nagaland and Manipur, various armed militias are fighting for independence from India; the Nepali-speaking community in the Darjeeling hills is engaged in a struggle to secede from the state of West Bengal and create a new hill state called Gorkhaland; and Kashmir, the most obvious victim of the standoff between India and

Pakistan, contains an array of militant groups, some demanding independence and others union with Pakistan.

Hill and mountain cultures now experience much more intimate contact with mainstream (that is, plains) Indian culture than they had traditionally known, following the rapid spread of roads and such mass communications as radio and television. Competency in Hindi (the official language of the republic and the lingua franca of most of northern India) and other plains languages has risen significantly in recent years among the people of the hills, to the extent that younger generations in some areas are ceasing to use their ancestral language and prefer to speak Hindi, Punjabi, and other languages, which are associated with modernity and social advancement. While this trend clearly broadens the horizons of hill people at a national level (the ability to speak Hindi makes it easier to get a coveted government job, or—more likely—leave the hills and search for work in the large cities on the plains), it also brings, in many cases, a cultural disjuncture between the younger generation fast assimilating to the dominant national culture, and the older generation that tends to be more rooted in the ancestral culture. The dismissal of hill and mountain languages as "dialects" and their cultures as "backward" by the discourse of the national mainstream (as well as sections of the international development community) has done damage to the cultural integrity and self-esteem of many highland groups, who have been encouraged to adopt the cultural trappings of the center and abandon the customs of their ancestors. In South Asian and world history, the phenomenon of cultural assimilation is, of course, nothing new; however, the speed of the cultural and linguistic shift currently taking place in many parts of the Himalaya (and mirrored in other culturally diverse regions across the world) is unprecedented. If the trends that are currently underway in the Himalaya continue unchecked, future generations of mountain people stand to be alienated from the cultural world and intimate local knowledge that sustained their grandparents. Such a loss would be incalculable both for them and for humankind.

The challenges posed by distance and topography in the mountains (and the harsh alpine climate of higher elevations) have made it more difficult to extend comprehensive coverage of services such as education, health, and power for people who traditionally live in dispersed or even seminomadic settlements. In India, such interventions have typically been designed for the more densely settled plains and failed to take account of the ecological, economic, and cultural differences of the mountains. While much of the Himalaya's rural population holds more land than their counterparts on the plains (where land tenure continues to be highly inequitable in many areas), the remoteness of many settlements constrains the opportunities for employment outside the agricultural sector. Frustration at the limited opportunities in the mountains and desire to access the modern facilities available in more developed areas, as well as the imperative to increase cash incomes (among other factors), have pushed many people, particularly men, to leave their villages and migrate, temporarily or permanently, to find work in the plains or abroad. In many Himalayan villages, only women, the elderly, and the children are left behind as the men have left for Delhi, Mumbai, Malaysia, or the Gulf States. The greatest challenge for the people of the Himalaya and governments of Himalayan nations

over the next century will be to find ways to bring modernization and development that can continue to support dignified livelihoods in the mountains over the long term and sustain, as far as possible, the magnificence of their environments and the vitality of their rich cultures.

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See also Environment; Water Resources

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✦ *HINDU, THE*

The *Hindu* is one of the most widely respected and influential national English-language newspapers in India today, claiming a circulation of over 1,000,000 copies; according to the Indian Readership Survey 2009 (Round 1) it ranks third among all English-language dailies by readership. Though it is headquartered in Chennai (Madras), it now prints from 12 centers, including Coimbatore, Bangalore, Madurai, Hyderabad, New Delhi, Vizag, Thiruvanathapuram, Kochi, Vijayawada, Mangalore, and Tiruchirapalli—all of which are connected by high-speed data lines for transmission across India.

The publication today is a far cry from its modest beginnings in 1878, when the *Hindu* first appeared as an eight-page weekly paper in demi-quarto size, under the initiative of a group of impecunious but idealistic and patriotic students in Madras, with the express intention of putting across the Indian point of view and allowing a critical debate to emerge, although not necessarily always in opposition to the British. It was conservative in its makeup and restrained in its language, modeled on British national papers like the *Times*, and only began to feature news on its front page, instead of advertisements, in 1958. While gaining a strong regional following in southern India, it became a daily in 1889 and soon developed a national stature on account of the caliber of its editors and journalists and the anti-imperial causes it championed, but also because it strove to maintain its reputation as an unbiased

and politically neutral purveyor of news content that could be relied upon to relay the official point of view without distortion. Unlike several other Indian newspapers that were stridently anti-British, the *Hindu* tempered its patriotism with pragmatism, which paid handsome commercial dividends, and it was one of the few papers that remained profitable throughout the colonial period. It was always in receipt of government advertisements, and its journalists had access to official news and information on a consistent basis. On occasion this meant that the *Hindu* had to adopt a nuanced approach to anticolonial movements. In 1919 it refused a request from Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948) to publish a proscribed book since that would endanger its own survival. Again in the 1930s, the editor Kasturi Srinivasan (1887–1959) strove to maintain the paper's relationship with the provincial governments despite the onset of the mass civil disobedience movement initiated by the Indian National Congress (INC; founded 1885). This is evident even in its leading article on Independence Day, August 15, 1947, when it contended, "That India has at long last achieved her independence by agreement with Great Britain is a fact for which the sagacity and statesmanship of Britain is entitled to the fullest credit."

After independence, the *Hindu* upheld the critical role of the press in creating a new nation and was particularly concerned with the economy and economic policies, an interest the paper maintains to this day. In general, it has held successive Indian governments—central and state—to account on a regular basis, evident, for instance, in its critique of the Congress policy in the lead-up to the second general election in 1957. In 1955 a readership survey by the *Hindu* revealed a preponderance of an educated, professional, and young (under 35) demographic, evenly distributed in terms of communities and religions. While the higher income groups were (and continue to be) well catered to, the *Hindu* maintained that lower income groups were increasingly being represented in its pages. It also claimed an effective readership of 363,000 based on a circulation of 70,000, calculating that on average 5 people read every copy of the paper. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s its coverage mirrored the difficult domestic political and social circumstances, as well as the deteriorating external relations with India's neighbors Pakistan and China, and the birth of the new state of Bangladesh. During the 1990s the paper extended a cautious welcome to the increasing liberalization of the Indian economy, while maintaining the need to achieve balanced growth and to address the needs of the vast numbers of the abjectly poor.

Today, the *Hindu* is thriving and read not only by a vast swath of the intelligentsia and middle classes, but also by larger numbers of the newly literate rural and urban populace. It is, like most newspapers, online as well (http://www.hinduonnet.com). It strives to cater to its variegated readership, a claim reflected in the voluminous nature of its daily supplements. These include on Mondays: Metro Plus, Business Review, and Education Plus; on Tuesdays: Metro Plus, Education, and Book Review; on Wednesdays: Metro Plus and Job Opportunities; on Thursdays: Metro Plus, Science, Engineering, and Technology and Agriculture; on Fridays: Cinema, Arts, Music and Entertainment, and Young World, an exclusive children's supplement; on Saturdays: Metro Plus; and finally on Sundays: a weekly magazine covering, among other topics, art, literature, gardening, travel, food, and an Open Page, and, on the

first Sunday of the month, a Literary Review. The Hindu group has also expanded to encompass a vast publishing empire, which covers a wide range of output including a business daily called the *Hindu Business Line*, a weekly sports magazine titled *The Sportstar*, and *Frontline*, a fortnightly features magazine. It also produces a range of up-to-date annual surveys covering industry, agriculture, the environment, and cricket, as well as occasional special publications on such topics as religion, libraries, music, science, and technology. There is little doubt that, in adapting to the changing expectations and demands of the 21st century, the *Hindu* has managed to succeed commercially well beyond the expectations of its idealistic founders. However, the cache of the name and the quality of the journalism on which its reputation was built lies at the heart of this success and will determine its future.

CHANDRIKA KAUL

See also Newspapers, Indian-Language; Tamil Nadu

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✦ HINDUISM

Hinduism is described as "a way of life" because it is a religion with no founder, no date of origination, and no single institution that can be identified as characterizing the religion. The earliest religious books associated with Hinduism are the four *Vedas:* the *Rigveda*, the *Yajurveda*, the *Samaveda*, and the *Arthavaveda*. With regard to the question of naming the early practices of the people of India, the only term that is associated with religion in the *Vedas* is *dharma*. The Greeks were the first to refer to "India" (from the Sanskrit "Hindva") during Alexander the Great's expeditions toward the East (327–324 BCE). Everything bordering on Persia was referred to by this name: the mountains were Hindukush, the river was Indus, the ocean was the Indian Ocean, and the people were Hindus. Following the Greeks, others also used this terminology: the Chinese pilgrims seeking Buddhist knowledge referred to India as Xandu (from "Sindhu") or Xindu and to Indians as Xindus, which was later changed to Hindu again by the Persian invaders. Although the Greeks were the first to use the term "Hindu," the Persians are credited with popularizing it. The Persian chronicler Alberuni (973–1048 CE) decided to name his chronicle *Al Hind*, a name used for

more than 1,200 years, since the Greek traveler, geographer, and ambassador Megasthenes (ca. 350–290 BCE) called his book on India *Indica*.

Hinduism shows two streams of practices closely intertwined right from the beginning: the popular and the philosophical or metaphysical. Popular practice is represented by the numerous gods, goddesses, and rituals and is derived from the Indus Valley tradition, while the philosophical, metaphysical, and ritual practices originate in the Vedic texts. Although both originated in the same geographical region and during about the same time period, and display some overlap in practice, these two cultures were antagonistic to each other. The earliest depiction of *pasupati* (lord of animals), identified as proto-Shiva, was discovered in the excavations at Indus Valley. Several popular Hindu gods and goddesses from Vedic as well as later practice have also been identified from the Indus Valley seals. The main feature of Indus Valley culture is the continuity of symbols and practices noted in later Hinduism, such as reverence for water, daily ablutions and showers, and regard for and representations of divinity in multiple forms.

The *Vedas* were composed between 3000 and 1500 BCE, when the Vedic people lived in the Indus Valley region, after which they moved toward eastern India to the Ganges River delta. The Ganges River phase denotes the Upanishadic period following the Vedic stage of Hinduism. However, the *Vedas* are considered eternal texts received by the seers (*rishis*) from the highest god and represent the highest truth of Hinduism. The later philosophical systems, as well as popular Hinduism, are extensions of this truth. The *Rigveda* consists of 10,000 verses, whose collection ended around 1500 BCE. This is followed by the composition of *Arthavaveda* and *Yajurveda* and *Samaveda*. These Vedic texts contain four parts: (1) the verses (*Mantra*), (2) ritually-oriented commentaries (*Brahmanas*), (3) ritual and theological speculations (*Aranyakas*), and (4) spiritual experiences of meditative efforts (*Upanishads*).

The text of the *Rigveda* contains the expressions of the energies of creation. It contains words as well as sounds; it is a sound-based text. Its words express more than the written words. Rigvedic verses are addressed to one or more gods, usually goddesses, although sometimes they may address common mundane issues of life. In the *Vedas*, the term *deva*, although roughly translated as "god or goddess," means "shining" or "auspicious." The gods or goddesses are the shining and auspicious powers of life, such as speech, consciousness, life, wind, fire, and water. The numerous gods and goddesses celebrated in the *Vedas* represent all these powerful forces of life, such as Agni (god of fire), Varuna (god of rain), Savitri (the sun god), Indra (god of thunder and lightning), Ushas (goddesses of light), Soma (god of drink), Mitra (god of snares and contracts), and Vac (goddess of speech). But these deities are not the ultimate creators or sustainers of the universe. There is only a single reality beyond this, formless and beyond human understanding, simply called THAT, or THAT ONE.

The *Upanishads* are the next step in the Vedic understanding of the world. At the center of Upanishadic thought are the questions concerning I, the person; the ultimate basis of existence; and the relationship between existence and ultimate reality, based on the realization that the wheel of life is an endless cycle of births and deaths. Therefore, the *Upanishads*



Akshardam Temple in Delhi. The temple complex opened in 2005 and attracts nearly three-quarters of tourists to Delhi. It is devoted to the worship of Swaminarayan, the supreme avatar of the Hindu god Vishnu. (Russ Bowling)

address Atman/Brahma (the soul), a reality beyond these questions. The earliest of these teachings are contained in the *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, Chandogya Upanishad, Aitareya Upanishad, Taittiriya Upanishad, Kena Upanishad, Katha Upanishad, Kaushitaki Upaishad, Prashna Upanishad, Mundaka Upanishad, Mandukya Upanishad, Svetasvatara Upanishad,* and the *Isa Upanishad,* composed between 1200 and 800 BCE. These texts also contain descriptions of various *lokas* (worlds) and divinities. While the philosophical speculations served as the basis for later philosophical systems, the descriptions of divinities and heavens and hells served as the basis for later popular devotional schools.

From this phase, the philosophical and devotional schools take divergent paths, although they influence each other intermittently, unlike the Vedic phase where both systems are intertwined almost inseparably. A number of philosophical and devotional systems are known from 600 BCE, which is considered to be the end of the Vedic phase. However, the six schools of philosophy were well known and influenced later thinking in India. These are: Samkya, Vaisheshika, Mimamsa, Yoga, Nyaya, and Vedanta. This is also the period when the *Mahabharata* (a compendium of Hindu myths and thought), the *Ramayana,* and the early *Puranas,* such as the *Harivamsa,* were composed, preserving a vivid mythological background of Hinduism.

Deriving from the philosophical understandings of the *Vedas* and the *Upanishads,* Yoga and other philosophical systems lay fundamental stress on mental refinement rather than on ritual performance to understand and reach the divine.

Samkhya. Kapila (550 BCE) founded the Samkhya school of philosophy with his composition *Samkhyasutra.* Samkhya proposed dualistic metaphysics with realistic epistemology. Samkhya postulates that the creation arose from matter (*prakriti*); therefore, it is also known as a materialistic school of philosophy. However, spirit is the driving force behind the creation.

Vedanta. Badarayana (400 BCE) wrote the basic text of the Vedanta system, *Vedantasutra,* and is recognized as the founder of the Vedanta system of philosophy. The Vedanta system also gave rise to such later philosophical schools as Advaita of Shankara, Visistadvaita of Ramanuja, and Dvaita of Madhva, which propose minor variations in understanding the relation between Atma and Brahma. According to Vedanta, the world of plurality is an appearance of Brahma-Atma, and its essential nature is *jiva* (life/being).

Mimamsa. Jaimini (ca. third century BCE) is considered to be the founder of Mimamsa based on his text, *Mimamsasutra.* This philosophical system is based on Vedic ritualism. It propounds the existence of an external world of souls, heaven, hell, and gods. Souls, as well as the material elements, are eternal.

Yoga. Patanjali (200 BCE) composed the Yoga Sutras, the basic text of the yoga school of philosophy. The yoga system closely follows the metaphysical understandings of Samkhya; however, it also considers that devotion to god is essential to the attainment of Samadhi, a spiritual state of consciousness.

Nyaya. Gautama (100 CE) composed *Nyayasutras,* the basic text of the Nyaya school, and hence is regarded as the founder of this philosophical system. Like other systems of philosophy, Nyaya proposes that humans suffer in worldly existence due to ignorance (*avidya*) and that they can obtain liberation through the correct knowledge of reality (*tattva-jnana*). Nyaya is based on realism and believes in the reality of the external world, the existence of the plurality of individuals, and a creator god.

Vaisheshika. The Vaisheshika philosophy also contains a realistic epistemology and a pluralistic metaphysics. The basic text of this school, *Vaisheshikasutra,* was composed by Kanada (100–300 CE). According to the Vaisheshika system, everything is composed of atoms from four kinds of elements: earth, water, fire, and air. Like Nyaya, the Vaisheshika system also combines realistic pluralism with theistic understanding.

Composition of the epics (the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana*), the early *Puranas,* and the *Bhagavadgita* are variously dated between 600 BCE and 300 CE, and these texts represent the devotional or popular Hinduism of this period. The *Mahabharata* is an illustration of how a feud between cousins leads to the end of an empire. In addition, the *Mahabharata* also collects the well-known myths of that period. Almost all the myths of gods and goddesses known in India today are found in the *Mahabharata.* The basic text of devotional Hinduism, the *Bhagavadgita,* is also embedded in the *Mahabharata.* The *Harivamsa* contains the life of Krishna, as well as the various avatars of Vishnu. This text also includes the mythology of the goddess Kali and the god Shiva. Later, the *Puranas* expanded on the basic mythology recorded in the *Mahabharata,* the *Ramayana,* and the *Harivamsa.* The *Ramayana* is the story of Rama, his life, exile, struggles, and return, and the foundation of the first empire of India,

which encompassed all of India from the Himalayas to Sri Lanka. The life of Rama illustrates the life and struggle of a young, lone prince, as well as the philosophical, humanistic understanding of Hinduism.

The basic mythology of these texts serves as the basis of devotional schools of Hinduism, centered around the gods Vishnu (Vaisnavism), Shiva (Shaivism), and Kali or Durga (Shaktism). Although these deities are known from the *Vedas*, their extensive mythology is recorded in the epics and the *Puranas*. From this mythology evolves the tripartite principle of life: creation (Brahma—creator god), sustenance (Vishnu—god of balance and spread), and destruction (Shiva and Shakti, represented by Kali).

This phase of Hinduism is marked by ritual as well as meditative practices. Various temple rituals and meditative schools emerge to popularize various practices of Hinduism and encompass temples, gods, goddesses, and ritual.

The earliest Hindu temple is identified in the Indus Valley. Although communal worship and ritual sacrifices (*Yagnas*) are mentioned in the *Vedas*, excavations in the Indus Valley region found numerous images of deities. A temple is identified in one image, while a sacrificial platform (*asvamedha ghat*) is identified in Rangpur.

One of the common features in the Indus Valley and in the Vedic texts is the sacredness of water. Numerous sites in the Indus Valley contain communal baths and water management systems (baths in the houses), while the *Vedas* contain numerous rituals that include ablutions with water, including the daily *savitri* recital in the morning and evening after due cleansing.

The world is seen as a continuously changing and moving entity (*jagam/jagat*), destined finally to be absorbed back into the permanent entity (Brahma). Life on earth is governed by earthly right (*dharma*). It is known as *rta* in the *Vedas*. It is symbolically represented by a wheel, which constantly turns and represents the movement as the basic character of life: one should always stay balanced. The wheel of *dharma* is represented by various stages and sacraments in life. The four stages of life (*asrama*) are *brahmacharya* (childhood/unmarried student), *grihastha* (married householder), *vanaprastha* (renunciant), and *sanyasa* (mendicant), which incorporate the four ideals of life: *dharma* (duty/right), *artha* (material gain), *kama* (desire), and *moksha* (enlightenment/ultimate identity with Brahma). Practicing these ideals throughout the various stages of life provides not only for a comfortable life in this world but also for ultimate release from the cycle of birth and death in other worlds, leading to ultimate unity with Brahma.

Humans are made from five worldly elements, the nonpermanent and changing substances earth, air, water, fire, and ether, while the soul is permanent and unchangeable. Therefore, although the world is changeable and contains changeable living beings of different forms, these forms contain permanent and nonpermanent substances and are in some way linked to one another as well as to the divine.

The *Vedas* propose a vague classification of society into four classes called *Varna*, which can be roughly translated as color, dance style, or alphabet. The modern alphabet is referred

to as *Varnamala* (string of *Varna*). *Varna* is also the name of a dance movement in the dance form *Bharatanatyam*. The Vedic classes are not rigid but changeable according to one's profession, and a family can consist of people practicing different professions, as is seen in the *Rigveda*. This is only a class system and should not be confused with the caste system of later India.

The caste system of India is derived from the *Jati* system, which is based on an exclusive group system of the guilds and on one's birth. From the first century the guilds became very strong professional organizations and regulated not only the economic affairs of the guilds, but also their social, religious, and political aspects. The members of the guilds belonged to a single professional group, and they protected their exclusive rights by restricting guild privileges to the guild's members and children of its members. By gradually laying the foundations for numerous castes, they created exclusive professional groups based on birth. These castes became restrictive in order to protect their own privileges; inter-dining and intermarriage were prohibited later. This practice spread to other religions that entered India later, such as Islam and Christianity. Women in Vedic Hinduism had the most liberal attitude toward castes, although this changes in the Classical Hindu era. Caste restrictions also extend to restrictions on women since a woman gives birth to children whose lives are based on the caste of the father and mother. Women's ultimate happiness is deemed to be the happiness of their husbands. Their goal is to follow their husbands even in death. Although not practiced widely, suttee (voluntary death) on the funeral pyre of the husband is regarded as the highest ideal for women. Medieval Muslim invasions and influences placed more restrictions on women by introducing *purda* (veil) and restricting the movement of women.

In the medieval period early Hindu devotionalism developed in southern India under the Vaishnava and Shaiva saints (Alvars and Nayanars) between 300 and 1200. However, its greatest and most popular mystics came from northern India beginning in 1500, and they had a lasting impact on the Muslim *sufi* sects in India.

Kabir (1440–1518) was raised by Muslim parents and was a weaver. He worshipped and praised god, who is formless and is nameless (*nirguna*), in a concept similar to the Vedic concept of god. He condemned idol worship and supported mindful devotion to a single formless deity.

Chaitanya (1486–1533) centered his faith on Radha and Krishna. He renounced the world at the age of 22 and undertook extensive pilgrimages. He was believed to be an incarnation of Krishna and Radha in one body. He composed and sang several *kirtans* (devotional songs) and popularized the notion of devotion to Krishna in eastern India.

Tulsidas (1532–1623) is one of the well-known medieval mystics. His retelling of the story of the *Ramayana* in Hindi/Hindusthani, or as it was called in those days, the *Ramacaritmanas,* is a widely-read devotional text and provides the basis for *Ramlila* plays performed during the Ramanavami celebrations in northern India. So great was Tulsidas's devotion to Rama that although he composed his text in Varanasi at a pilgrimage center destroyed by the Muslims, he claimed that even the Muslims would be saved by Rama's name.

Sant Tukaram (1608–1649) is credited with the composition of a number of poems written down by his followers after his death. His devotional poems not only praise Vishnu (known as Vithoba or Vithala in Maharashtra, the home state of Tukaram), but also condemn such social practices as caste.

The Arya Samaj was founded by Swami Dayananda Saraswathi (1824–1883) in 1875, with a view to return Hinduism to what he interpreted to be its original teachings. Dayananda renounced his family, against their wishes, at the age of 21; wandered in forests, holy places, and *tirthas* (pilgrimage sites on holy rivers); and practiced complete devotion and meditation for 15 years. He became a disciple of Virajananda (1873–1951), a widely recognized master of Sanskrit grammar. The Arya Samaj was founded with the goal of going "back to the *Vedas*," that is, to return Hinduism to what he interpreted as its roots. Quoting the *Vedas*, he condemned such social practices as caste and gender discrimination; for him the *Vedas* were infallible.

The Brahmo Samaj was founded by Raja Rammohan Roy (1772–1833). Well versed in Arabic, Persian, Sanskrit, English, and Hindi as well as his native tongue, Bengali, Roy was devoted to reforming Hinduism, basing his ideas on the teachings of Vedanta philosophy. The three pillars of the Brahmo Samaj—rationalism, humanism, and social reform—were clearly based on his own ideas. He translated the Vedanta Sutras into Bengali. In that book he said that the reason for his work was to vindicate his own faith, that of his early forefathers, and that of his Hindu friends. The Brahmo Samaj prohibits the worship of images and supports only meditative contemplation. It also condemns sectarian and caste prejudice. Due to its teaching it initiated a widespread social reform movement in India in order to rid Hinduism of medieval dogmatic practices.

Hinduism remains the faith of just over 80 percent of the population of India. It is also practiced by diasporic Indians settled in various countries around the world. Hinduism was introduced into the U.S. popular imagination by Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902) in his speech at the Parliament of the World's Religions in Chicago in 1893. However, Hindu ideas had earlier influenced the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson (1802–1882) and Henry David Thoreau (1817–1862). In addition, a number of the "New Age" schools of the 19th and 20th centuries derived their ideas from Hinduism. The Theosophical Society, founded by the Russian Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (1831–1891) and the American Colonel Henry Steel Olcott (1832–1907) in 1875, was an effort to establish a universal faith derived from a combination of Hinduism with other faiths. Hinduism also spread to British colonies in Africa, including South Africa and Nigeria, as well as to the Caribbean islands, especially Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Fiji, as Hindu indentured workers were hired to work on plantations.

In Southeast Asia, in such countries as Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Borneo, Hinduism spread through overseas trade missions from the 5th century on. A number of these countries still have thriving Hindu religious centers. Large numbers of Hindus migrated to Malaysia and Singapore during the 19th-century colonial British occupation of the straits,

as well as to Sri Lanka. Whether in India or in the diaspora, Hinduism has been characterized by both change and continuity throughout its historical practice; as it has always done, it continues to evolve while at the same time preserving its ancient ideas and practices.

LAVANYA VEMSANI

See also Jainism; Religion; Theosophical Society

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✦ *HINDUSTAN TIMES*

The *Hindustan Times* is one of the major English-language national daily newspapers in India today and is the flagship publication of HT Media Limited. With a circulation of over 1.14 million in 2008, it was certified by the Audit Bureau of Circulation as the third-largest daily newspaper published in English. In terms of readership it scores even higher according to the Indian Readership Survey of 2008, which ranks it as the second most widely read English newspaper, with a readership of 6.6 million, behind only the *Times of India*. It publishes editions from Bhopal, Chandigarh, Delhi, Kolkata, Lucknow, Mumbai, and Patna.

The *Hindustan Times* was started in 1924 as the first major nationalist newspaper published from the capital of British India, New Delhi. At a time when Indian newspapers were self-conscious political platforms against colonial rule, it unsurprisingly reflected the interests of the ideologues and politicians who wielded editorial and proprietorial control. It was established by Sunder Singh Lyallpuri (1878–1969), one of the founders of the Akali, or Gurdwara Reform Movement, which developed between 1920 and 1925 as a vehicle to agitate for the reform of Sikh temples, or *gurdwaras,* in the Punjab in northern India. It was funded by Sikh luminaries, most prominently the maharaja of Nabha, Ripudaman Singh

(1883–1942; maharaja 1911–1923), who had been forced to abdicate by the British a year earlier and now hoped for press support for his reinstatement. Its first editor was a young and gifted Oxford-educated nationalist, K. M. Pannikar (1894–1963). However, the newspaper was not an immediate financial success, and within two years it was bought out by members of the Indian National Congress (INC), spearheaded by Madan Mohan Malaviya (1861–1946) with the support of a management committee comprising other leading congressmen Lajpat Rai (1865–1928) and M. R. Jayakar (1873–1959), and funded by loans and donations—most significantly from the industrial magnate G. D. Birla (1894–1983), who also owned several other publications. The paper's circulation and prestige increased throughout the interwar years and in the years before Indian independence, largely due to efficient financial management and a revamp of the paper's look and style—for example, it introduced news on the front page and came out with a crisper editorial format—but, equally importantly, because of the efforts of a succession of talented editors, including J. N. Sahni (1900–?); Pothan Joseph (1892–1972), who achieved national fame for his column "Over a Cup of Tea"; and Devdas Gandhi (1900–1957), the youngest of the four sons of Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948), as well as contributions from the cream of the Indian intelligentsia. Yet, despite retaining its nationalist credentials (it stopped publication in 1930 as a protest against the repressive colonial laws attacking the Civil Disobedience movement inaugurated by the INC) the paper also began to reflect the financial interests of the Birlas, the owners of one of India's largest business houses, who had become the majority shareholders, and on occasion this could temper the radicalism of the publication's confrontation with the British.

In terms of its journalistic credentials, the *Hindustan Times* has retained a significant measure of its prestige throughout the postindependence years but is locked in a commercial struggle for dominance with its archrival, the *Times of India*, in northern India and the prestigious Delhi market. The newspaper is part of the K. K. Birla group and managed by Shobhana Bhartia (b. 1957), a granddaughter of G. D. Birla who, upon joining the paper in 1986, became the first woman chief executive of a national newspaper. In addition to a radio channel, the group's other significant publications include a business daily in English called *Mint*, *Hindustan* (a daily in Hindi), and two monthlies, *Nandan*, a children's magazine, and *Kadambani*, a literary magazine. In keeping with the general trend of special supplements, the different editions of the newspaper offer a varied diet of entertainment and instruction. For example, the Delhi and Mumbai editions offer supplements on lifestyle, travel, health, automobiles, education, employment, and real estate, as well as a free magazine on Sundays called *Brunch*. The Delhi edition has a special weekend edition on Fridays called *HT City WE*. It is available online at www.hindustantimes.com.

CHANDRIKA KAUL

See also Hindu, The; Newspapers, Indian-Language

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✦ HINDUTVA

The word "Hindutva" is derived from the two terms "Hindu" and "*tattva*," which when translated means "Hindu principles" or "Hinduness." It originated with Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883–1966) in his book *Hindutva: Who Is a Hindu?*, published in 1923. The term served as the ideological underpinning of several right-wing groupings collectively known as the Sangh Parivar: the Hindu Mahasabha, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Jana Sangh, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), the Bajrang Dal, and importantly, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

Before the Partition of the subcontinent in August 1947, Hindutva stood for cultural unity of all its people sharing a common culture, history, philosophy of life, and values, further sharing the common political aspiration of a common, independent state. Since the birth of the BJP, there has been no opposition to the Partition and the subsequent adoption by India of a secular constitution, ensuring equal rights to all minorities, including the Muslims. The RSS had occasion to clarify its position: "the term Hindu in the conviction as well as in the constitution of the RSS is a cultural and civilizational concept and not a political or religious dogma . . . the cultural nationality of India, in the conviction of the RSS, is Hindu and it was inclusive for all who are born and who have adopted Bharat as their motherland, including Muslims, Christians and Parsis" (RSS secretary-general's response to the tribunal constituted under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act of 1967). Although the BJP supported a universal civil code for all, there was no move to adopt it during the years of the BJP-dominated administration (1999–2004). It should be noted that one of BJP's vice presidents and several members of the party were Muslims and Christians.

Significantly, in the post–Babri Masjid demolition period, the Supreme Court (justices J. S. Sharma, N. P. Singh, and K. Venkataswami) ruled on December 11, 1995, on the issue of Hindutva as a cultural and not a political concept: "ordinarily, Hindutva is understood as a way of life or a state of mind and is not to be equated with or understood as religious Hindu fundamentalism. A Hindu may embrace a non-Hindu religion without ceasing to be a Hindu and since the Hindu is disposed to think synthetically and to regard other forms of worship. . . . [H]e tends to believe that the highest divine powers complement each other for the well-being of the world and mankind."

The Supreme Court quoted approvingly from Maulana Wahiduddin Khan's *Indian Muslims: The Need for a Positive Outlook*: "the strategy worked out to resolve the minorities

problem was, although differently worded, that of Hindutva or Indianization. This strategy, briefly stated, aims at developing a uniform culture by obliterating the differences between all of the cultures co-existing in the country. This was felt to be the way to communal harmony and national unity."

The BJP accepted the Supreme Court's ruling. Lal Krishna Advani (b. 1927), former deputy prime minister in the BJP government and regarded as the leader of the right wing in the BJP, noted in his autobiography that he equated Hindutva with "cultural nationalism." He wrote, "an over-whelming majority of our population has been living in India for centuries. Change of religious identity of a section of the population cannot change their national identity . . . since the word 'Indian' is itself of recent vintage, this unifying principle is Hinduness or Hindutva, the name given to a broad-minded, tolerant, pluralistic and inclusive tradition." In March 2010 the BJP's newly elected president, Nitin Gadkari (b. 1957), invoked the Supreme Court ruling and added that Hindutva cannot be a part of politics or the creed of any political party as such; it was valid only as a part of cultural nationalism.

SHEREEN BHALLA

See also Ayodhya; Bharatiya Janata Party; Hinduism; Religion

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✦ HINGLISH

Hinglish is the distinctive use of Hindi and English words in one sentence, resulting in the formation of a hybrid linguistic variety. The use of both languages in this manner has gained popularity, not only in India's urban regions, but also globally. This phenomenon is referred to by some Indian linguists as "chutneyfying English." This hybrid form has developed as a result of globalization, the rise of the Internet as a medium of communication, the growing use of Indian call centers, and the increasing popularity of Hindi cinema (more commonly known as "Bollywood"). It has also been used by novelists, including Salman Rushdie (b. 1947) and Upamanyu Chatterjee (b. 1959). Hinglish is sometimes also known as Indian English, which is the variety of English spoken by Indians and includes the particular use of English words or phrases. Examples of Indian English include the words "pre-pone," to bring forward; "good name," first name, which is a translation of the Hindi term *shubh naam*; "pass out," to graduate; and "time pass," leisure time.

The English language has always borrowed words from other languages. It is claimed that 14.7 new words are added to the English language every day and that the number of people speaking English in some form exceeds 1.5 billion. Hindi is contributing to this growth, and Hindi words that have been adopted into the English language include such words as shampoo, chai, masala, jodhpurs, pukka, pundit, jute, pajama, mantra, dungarees, and veranda. In England it is not uncommon to hear someone say "take a *dekko*" (take a look), or "fancy a *chai*" (have a cup of tea).

Hinglish has also entered into everyday speech in India in such a way that individuals are unaware that they are actually participating in a form of code-mixing. It is estimated that over 350 million Indians speak Hinglish as a second language and that this number will continue to grow. Unlike some countries where English is a second or a foreign language, India has two official languages, Hindi and English, spoken throughout India. There are, however, differences in the way the two languages are used. Whereas English is typically used to signify modernity, a cosmopolitan ethos, or wealth, Hindi is used to show pride in one's country, community, and family.

In the business world it is common to see Hinglish being used by both local and international companies as part of their advertising and marketing campaigns. Words, whether Hindi or English, are carefully selected, and cultural nuances are added in order to create an advertisement that speaks to its audience and makes Hinglish advertising distinctive. Examples include, "Hungry *Kya?*" (Are you hungry?), and "Indian team *ke rang me rang lo*" (Wrap yourself in the colors of the Indian team). As individuals in India, and those vast numbers of Indian ancestry living overseas, use both Hindi and English, the use of Hinglish is increasingly making it difficult to trace the origins of commonly used hybrid phrases.

SHARMINA MAWANI AND ANJOOM MUKADAM

See also Nonresident Indians and Persons of Indian Origin

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✦ HIV/AIDS

As a recent World Bank study observes, "South Asia's most severe [HIV/AIDS] epidemics are in India and Nepal." This brief overview of HIV/AIDS in India covers the extent of the Indian epidemic, what drives the epidemic, and the response.

India's HIV/AIDS outbreak is not a generalized epidemic but has been documented as consisting of three regional epidemics. These are located in the southern states Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu; in the western states Maharashtra and Goa; and in the

northeastern states Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland. One study reports that the HIV prevalence rate in these locations is four to five times higher than in the more populous north of the country. In addition, the epidemic in India includes the additional dimension of cross-border movement of sex workers from Nepal. The disease is mainly caused by female sex workers and their clients, and it is passed on to the clients' non–sex worker partners. The epidemics in the south and west are heterosexual epidemics between sex workers and clients, together with the smaller phenomenon of man-to-man sex networks, while the northeast epidemic was caused by injecting drugs through shared contaminated syringes, then passing the disease on through sexual contact. While evidence suggests so far that the Indian epidemic is largely urban, one exception is rural Karnataka, with an above-average level of rural sex workers, and consequently a higher HIV/AIDS rate.

The most recent data, which are for 2005–2006 and cover the age range 15–49 years and the background characteristics of income and religion, among others, show that 61 percent of women and 84 percent of men have heard of AIDS. The degree of knowledge about AIDS is affected more by background characteristics than by age. Rural people are less likely to know about AIDS than their urban counterparts. Fifty percent of rural women know of AIDS, while 77 percent of rural men know of the disease. Eighty-three percent of urban people are aware of AIDS, which breaks down to 95 percent for urban men and 30 percent for urban women. With regard to educational level, 51 percent of urban men and 30 percent of urban women with no formal education know of AIDS, while 99 percent of men and women with 12 or more years of education (100 percent for men) have knowledge of the disease. Only 53 percent of men and 25 percent of women in the lowest income quintile know about AIDS. Notably, "only 12 percent of women with no education and 33 percent of men with no education have heard of using condoms as a means of preventing HIV/AIDS."

Previous Indian country-level data on HIV/AIDS infections have overestimated the number of those infected as shown by the release in 2006 of India's first population-based survey [of HIV/AIDS], which collected and analyzed blood samples in order to accurately measure the proportion of India's population that has been infected. Whereas prior to 2006 the estimates of total numbers infected with HIV/AIDS (i.e., people living with HIV or PLHIV) was 5.7 million for ages 15–49, the new 2007 estimate is 2.5 (2.45) million, inside a 95 percent confidence interval of 1.75 to 3.15 million. This translates into an HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of .92 percent prior to revision for ages 15–49, and a revised rate of .41 percent. The United Nations (UN) reports an Indian infection rate for 2007 of .3 percent (both sexes aged 15–49). Therefore, while the overall percentage of infections is low compared to sub-Saharan African countries, where rates among the worst-affected countries are above 20 percent, the actual number of infections is large and comparable to many countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The UN is said to have made projections that show India emerging as the main HIV/AIDS country in the next 10 years, an assessment that the National AIDS Control Organisation (NACO) of the Department of AIDS Control of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, the government of India, is said to have "dismissed."



As part of the World Health Organization's AIDS program, a lab technician at Swasthya Kalyan Blood Bank in Jaipur, Rajasthan, conducts testing for the disease or the presence of HIV. (WHO/P. Virot)

The incidence of the disease by gender in India shows a different pattern to that of sub-Saharan Africa. While in the latter, more women than men are infected, in India data on reported HIV/AIDS cases (not estimates) for 2002 show that 75 percent (74.88) of those infected are male. In addition, the data on reported HIV cases show that 85 percent of those cases are individuals aged 15–44 years. The social makeup of sex workers tends to be those from disadvantaged groups, in general terms the poor, who predominantly consist of lower-caste Hindus due to the continuing extreme discrimination practiced against them by higher castes. Sex workers, and hence many HIV/AIDS victims, tend to be quite young. Individual accounts of prostitution, including such supply mechanisms as forced people trafficking, suggest that large numbers of prostitutes are young—under 18 years—and very young—between 12 and 15 years of age. Even younger ages have been reported and include males as well as females. In addition, the average age of marriage in India is among the lowest in the world.

In terms of drivers of the disease, India has most of the classic susceptibilities that lead to serious HIV/AIDS epidemics: these are gender inequality, lack of broad-based economic development that researches marginalized groups, deep and widespread poverty, low-quality government health services, and widespread misunderstanding about HIV/AIDS.

The chief aspects of gender inequality in India that help stimulate HIV/AIDS epidemics are functional illiteracy and low levels of education among women that hamper dissemination and use of information about the disease; social norms of morality and

family "honor"; and the primacy of women's domestic roles that has minimized women's income-earning options, thereby creating disincentives for female education due to low economic returns. These factors increase the probability that women and girls are exposed to HIV by husbands and the probability of their resorting to prostitution due to a family livelihoods emergency. In addition, early marriage (India's average marriage age is very low) and wide age difference at marriage mean less likelihood of women negotiating sex with husbands. Repressive gender norms of the kind found in India have been linked to the existence of large-scale prostitution, with its implications for the spread of HIV. Less well appreciated is that HIV, particularly with the high estimated infection rate among sex workers and the consequent high attrition rate from illness and death, causes an increased demand by brothel operators for sex workers. This will have the added effect of sustaining the existence and increasing the spread of the disease. Also understudied are the factors that lead men to buy sex in India, but which are likely linked to gender inequality. For example, a study for Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh, Vietnam, found that many men saw a dichotomy between sex with wives, which they approached as a duty (procreation), and sex with prostitutes, which they saw as pleasurable or "fun."

Lack of economic growth and its close associate, poverty (41.6 percent in extreme poverty in 2005, according to the World Bank; 27.8 percent for 2004–2005, according to the Indian government), act to promote the epidemic through poor health, which causes an increased probability of contracting HIV; further, the lack of viable income-earning options for women and families creates a ready supply of sex workers. China currently has 160 million formal-sector manufacturing jobs, while India has 6.2 million (both countries have total populations of just over 1 billion); large numbers of unmarried girls and women migrate to the factories in China; in India, the government's continued stalling on repeal of restrictive labor laws in the formal sector stifles employment creation, facilitating sex worker supply. The lack of broad-based employment for women also results in reduced power within the family. This suggests that the lack of agency or "bargaining power" of women within marriage is an important determinant of sexually transmitted diseases, as reported in the case of sub-Saharan Africa.

Indian government studies suggest that the rate of untreated ailments rose by nearly 40 percent in the poorest decile. Moreover, health expenditure is emerging as one of the major reasons for indebtedness today, as rates for those not accessing health care for financial reasons has doubled at the end of the 20th century. A result will be patchy testing for HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases that facilitate HIV transmission during sex.

With regard to attitudes and response to HIV/AIDS, attitudes of the uninfected public toward those with HIV/AIDS are "overwhelmingly negative," contributing to the disincentives for individuals to be tested for HIV/AIDS or to understand the disease. In 2001 the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) reported the results of a study of educated individuals in southern India: 36 percent of respondents to the study said that people infected with HIV/AIDS should kill themselves; a similar percentage believed

that those infected "deserved their fate"; 34 percent said that they would not interact with the infected; and 20 percent stated that "it was a punishment from God," while "almost 90 percent of respondents harboured at least one hostile view, and more than half held three or more such views." In addition, "60 percent believed that only gay men, prostitutes, and drug users can get AIDS," but not men who engage in sex with prostitutes. As of 2001 UNAIDS concluded, with respect to the response in India to HIV/AIDS, that "people living with HIV and AIDS continue to be burdened by poor care and inadequate services, while those with the power to help do little to make the situation better."

RISTO HÄRMÄ

See also Health Care

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✦ HOLIDAYS

As a multicultural and multiethnic society of over 1 billion people, India may have more unofficial days of celebration than any country on earth. There are countless holy days and festivals of various size and scope scattered throughout the calendars of the major religions of Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity, while the smaller groups, such as the Sikhs

and the Jains, also have their their own holidays. In addition, other tribal belief systems have their own equally diverse plethora of celebrations.

Coupled with religious celebrations, the government of India recognizes three national holidays. These holidays are secular in nature and are celebrated by all Indian citizens, regardless of race, creed, or religion. The first is India's Independence Day, held on August 15 each year. It celebrates the birth of the sovereign nation-state of India and its break from the colonial control of the British in 1947. Celebrations are held in New Delhi and across the country and consist of public officials, including the prime minister, raising the flag and giving speeches on the state of the government. It is also celebrated with a large number and variety of festivities of a cultural nature, often featuring music and dance.

The second national holiday is Gandhi Jayanti and is celebrated every year on October 2. On this day Indians mark the birth of Mohandas Mahatma Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948), considered the "father of the country" by most Indians. Celebrations include local and state festivities, prayer services, and other remembrances of Gandhi's sacrifice for freedom from British rule in a unified India and his lifelong commitment to nonviolence.

The final national holiday is Republic Day, held each year on January 26. This day marks the anniversary of the official acceptance of the Constitution of India, marking the beginning of the republican government of the new nation-state. To mark the occasion, celebrations are conducted nationwide, but they are focused primarily on the grandiose military and cultural parade held in New Delhi.

Beyond the official secular holidays celebrated by Indians, there are several religious festivals and traditions that consume the attention of a large percentage of the population each year. Among the most colorful and boisterous is the Hindu festival known as Diwali. Also known as the "festival of lights," Diwali is spread over five days in autumn and is scheduled according to the Hindu calendar.

Although primarily a Hindu holiday, the origins of Diwali predate modern Hinduism. As such, activities are related to the diversity of meanings given to the festival by the various Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist sects who celebrate the holiday. Most celebrations center on the use of light, with candles, oil lamps, and electric lights decorating houses during this time. Sweets and other edibles are prepared, and *pujas* (worship) to various gods and ancestors are carried out.

One loud aspect of Diwali is the widespread use of fireworks and "crackers." These celebratory devices of black powder and paper turn normally quiet villages and cities into raucous places of celebration. One day of Diwali is also afforded the honor of being a public holiday, a day off for government officials, schools, and banks.

Another public holiday celebrated, though lesser known, is the Hindu festival of Dussehra. The religious traditions behind the festival are diverse, but the essence of the celebration is the victory of good (Lord Rama) over evil (Ravana). Large effigies of demons are constructed in the weeks leading up to the holiday and then burned during the festival. It is also a time of harvest in India, which gives further meaning to the event as it relates to the harvests, good fortune, and religious tradition. One of the largest celebrations, though not



Holi, also called the Festival of Color, celebrates the start of spring and is associated with the Hindu god Krishna, an avatar or incarnation of Vishnu. Here, celebrants in Chennai, Tamil Nadu, are sprayed with colored water, March 2010. (Martin Louis/Dreamstime.com)

an official public holiday, is the Hindu festival of Holi. The religious tradition behind the festival centers on a familiar theme, the destruction of evil forces in the world by the Hindu god Vishnu. Celebrated in the spring of each year, Holi is a colorful and energetic festival that includes the ample use of colored water for anointing statues and for play among the celebratory crowds. People often end up drenched from being squirted with the colored water.

Outside of the dominant Hindu festivals, several other public religious-based holidays are celebrated and recognized. These include Good Friday, Christmas, and Id al-Fitr (Eid).

Both Good Friday and Christmas are holidays celebrated by Christians. Good Friday occurs at the end of the week before Easter, which can fall on a Sunday from late March through late April, and though banks and government offices are closed, only the Christian community observes the day with any great seriousness. Christmas is celebrated on the 25th day of December each year, and along with public offices and banks being closed, the 25 million Christians in India celebrate it much the same way as people do in the West. Midnight masses, prayer services, and singing, along with colorful decorations and gift giving, mix with such traditions as decorating houses with oil lamps and lighting mango or banana trees.

Id al-Fitr (Eid) is the most widely celebrated Islamic public holiday in India. Coming at the end of Ramadan each year, Eid is a time of feasting and celebration for Muslims in countries the world over, and India is no exception. The faithful celebrate by attending special prayers at local and national mosques, preparing special foods, and shopping for new clothes. Women and young girls often mark the occasion by specially painting their hands with henna.

In India, the Buddhist tradition is given a single public holiday: Buddha Purnima. Celebrated in April or May of each year, depending upon the Buddhist calendar, the Buddha Purnima, also known as Vesak, is recognized as the day the Buddha was born, attained enlightenment, and entered nirvana. This trinity of coincidences coincides with the triple gem of Buddhism (*sangha*, *dharma*, Buddha—community, duty, Buddha) and adds special meaning for the faithful who attend temple ceremonies, give alms to monks, engage in special religious talks, and make an extra effort to be kind to all living things. During Vesak, India welcomes Buddhist pilgrims from across the world who come to celebrate this auspicious day in one of the many pilgrimage sites found across the country.

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See also Consumer Culture; Hinduism; Islam; Jainism; Religion

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✦ HUMAN RIGHTS

The question of human rights in India is shaped by the extent to which the universal aspirations of human rights (theoretically applicable to all without exception) are reconcilable with the specifically Western origins of its formulation, such as find expression in the United Nations (UN) Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. Traditional India lacks an indigenous discourse of "rights" as such. However, it does not lack a concern with "human dignity," such as the notion of human rights is meant to guarantee and protect. This distinction shapes the two extremes in debate over human rights in India: (1) the extreme that is skeptical of rights-discourse, stating that attempts to protect human dignity must be adapted to approximations in traditional conceptual frameworks; and (2) the extreme that considers such traditional assumptions of human dignity to be inherently inimical to "rights," meaning that such traditions must be abandoned in favor of modern Western rights-based discourse. Constructive contributions to human rights in India have successfully mediated between these two extremes; however, the tension between them often shapes the discussion.

The key concern in this mediation is how to adapt the notion of *dharma*, both in its sense of a natural or underlying order and a normative model of duty. *Dharma*, especially in terms of *svadharma*, one's "own duty," provides a traditional means of articulating a sense

of individual responsibility and dignity, such as is implied in human rights. However, while the applicability of *dharma* as a normative concept is universal, its mode of expression is not. An individual's duties are determined according to caste (*jāti*), subcaste (*jñāti, biādarī*), clan (*gotra*), or stage of life (*āśrama*), presupposing underlying notions of hierarchy and inequality characteristic of traditional worldviews. While the rights-oriented discourse of secular modernity presupposes egalitarianism as a normative ideal, and the ultimate reducibility of public social relations to the universal contract between the citizen and state, a duty-oriented discourse may be more applicable in a traditional setting, in which an individual's (*sva*)*dharma* is embedded within, and determined by, an often overlapping plurality of loyalties, obligations, social relations, and group identifications. The hierarchical nature of traditional conceptions of *dharma* make it more akin to earlier Western notions of "natural rights," wherein rights are determined according to respective inborn (natural) social roles and functions. An individual's *svadharma*, based on specific caste or stage of life, is easier to recognize in the more precise structure of positively framed *claim* rights ("the right to be free *to* . . .") rather than the more abstract and broader structure of negatively framed *freedom* rights ("the right to be free *from* . . .").

At issue is the extent to which duties are reconcilable with rights; whether, and under what circumstances, rights entail correlative duties, or whether duties necessarily entail correlative rights. Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948) stated that "all rights to be deserved and preserved come from duty alone." Gandhi was skeptical of the potential passivity, and negative (mere "freedom *from* . . .") nature of rights, preferring instead the positive agency of duty ("obligation *to* . . ."), suggesting an approach of subsuming modern notions of rights to traditional frameworks. This strategy was also apparent in Gandhi's response to caste and untouchability. As did earlier reformers, such as Raja Rammohan Roy (1772–1833) and Swāmī Vivekānanda (1863–1902), Gandhi responded to modernity's demand for a universalized normative model of human dignity by advocating an idealized fourfold Hindu *varna* (caste) structure characterized by a (theoretically) nonhierarchical interdependence of different *dharmas;* Gandhi was not opposed to the caste system per se. He did, however, oppose the "untouchability" of those outside the caste system. Yet he nonetheless resisted a modern rights discourse in redressing untouchability, advocating instead the incorporation of untouchables as *harijans* (Children of God) into the caste system.

At odds with Gandhi's approach was that of B. R. Ambedkar (1889–1956). Rejecting both the term "untouchable" and *harijan* in favor of *dalit* (oppressed), Ambedkar's approach leaned more toward a rights-based strategy for addressing untouchability. Unlike Gandhi's more traditionally Hindu "integration" model, Ambedkar considered traditional Hindu values inherently inimical to the sort of dignity guaranteed by rights, arguing instead for separate Dalit autonomy. The compromise reached between Gandhi and Ambedkar in the Poona Pact of 1932 guaranteed that an independent India would reserve 15 percent of government and educational places for Dalits, later officially categorized as Scheduled Castes and Tribes (SCT); the secular rights-based approach to addressing untouchability thus won out over a

traditional model. This adoption of a rights model allowed India to become the first nation to constitutionally enshrine "positive discrimination" or "affirmative action." Notable though is that Ambedkar nonetheless struck a balance between traditional notions and modernity; his championing of Dalit rights did not imply a complete rejection of *dharma*. In his embracing of Buddhism and its *dharma* he found a traditional precedent for his own calls for egalitarianism and rejection of the caste system, while in his appeal to the indigenous rights of Dalits, as the original pre-Aryan inhabitants of the subcontinent, he also associated Dalit identity with the *Ad Dharm* (primordial *dharma*). Ambedkar sought to maintain the sense of *dharma* as an underlying "natural" order that guarantees inalienable rights, but without the hierarchical connotations of *dharma* as caste-determined duty.

The Second Backward Classes (Mandal) Commission of 1980, which continued the state's secular approach to addressing caste-based human rights violations, recommended an expansion of the sort of reservations offered to SCTs by also opening up 27 percent of government, public sector, and education places to lower-caste groups, officially termed Other Backward Castes (OBC). With caste and untouchability being religious as well as social distinctions, this reservation-approach also raised issues for the state's involvement in religion. Characteristic of the many complexities of Indian secularism, the approach led to the paradoxical situation in which removing the stigma of untouchability or low-caste status also removed any basis for entitlement to the very government reservations designed to redress this inequality. Ironically, caste, which from a Western point of view represents the system most opposed to the egalitarian assumptions of human rights, has become the basis in postindependence India for protecting separate identity and human dignity. With different social identities often being traditionally legitimized precisely through incorporation into the caste system, appeals for the diversity of indigenous and cultural expression are often understood precisely through the lens of caste groupings and affiliations, often leading to a greater concern with "caste rights" than "human rights." While in theory the universality of human rights and equality is opposed to caste, in reality the promotion of the communal nature of caste rights has been a vehicle for the large-scale practical implementation of human rights in postindependence India.

These tensions have erupted in the wake of the implementation of the Mandal Commission's recommendations in 1990. Higher-caste backlash has led not only to an escalation of caste-based human rights abuse but also to the rise of "caste politics" and communalism. The rise of the Dalit politician Māyāvatī (Mayawati) (b. 1956) and the Bhujan Samaj Party (BSP) in Uttar Pradesh, as well as the success of Lālū Prasād Yādav (b. 1947) and the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) in Bihar, while illustrating the effectiveness of the reservation system, also demonstrates its openness to manipulation. The nationalist agenda of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has been furthered through attacks on the secular rights–based reservation strategy as undermining Hindu identity and Indian unity. The communal violence that has accompanied the politicization of caste in the 1990s and into the new century has been cited as vindication by both extremes of the debate over human rights and illustrates

the complexity of the nature of human rights in India. On the one hand, communal violence and caste politics have been seen as proof that the secular human rights model has failed, and that modern notions of rights have not been carefully enough adapted to traditional assumptions. On the other hand, the counterview has also been presented: that communal violence has stemmed precisely from rights-based models not being promoted enough, and that their implementation is being compromised by the need to pander to traditional assumptions.

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See also Bharatiya Janata Party; Communalism; Dalits; Hindutva

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✦ HYDERABAD

The city of Hyderabad, the largest city in the south of India, with a population in the metropolitan area of over 6 million people, has been the capital of Andhra Pradesh state since its inception in 1956. The city was incorporated as the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation in 2007, absorbing the surrounding districts of Rangareddy, Nalgonda, and Medak, thereby greatly increasing the size of Hyderabad. Some 40 percent of the population is Muslim, and the city has traditionally been the heartland of Muslim culture in the south.

The original city of Hyderabad was founded in 1591 on the northern bank of the Musi River; however, after 1600, it expanded tremendously, absorbing a number of villages. The original city of Hyderabad, once confined to the environs of the southern banks of the Musi, an area now popularly known as the "Old City," was a sleepy fishing and farming community until the fourth Qutb Shah ruler, Mohammed Quli (1580–1611), decided to found a city



View of Hyderabad, capital of the state of Andhra Pradesh and the sixth most populous city of India. It is also a center for India's rapidly-expanding high-tech industry. (Jorisvo/Dreamstime.com)

similar to Isfahan, the great capital of the Safavid Dynasty (1501–1722) in Iran, then in its golden age. A flowing river became necessary to implement his plan, and so the city center was moved south toward the Musi River from Golkonda, the former capital of the Qutb Shahi Nawabs. Although the former location was preferred for its safety, aesthetically the Musi and its environs were more attractive.

There is, however, a popular romantic story behind the foundation of the city that relays how the young crown prince, Muhammad Quli, only 14 years old at the time, fell in love with a beautiful dancer, Bhagmati, who was from Chichlam, a fishing village on the southern banks of the Musi. He would swim across the Musi to meet his paramour, and nothing would stop him, not even heavy rains and floods. After being crowned sultan, he married her and decided to build a city at the site of her village, naming it Bhagyanagar in her honor. It was officially named Hyderabad later.

Architects from Iran were brought to plan the new city, and it resembled Isfahan with its boulevards, covered bridges, palaces, mosques, and bathhouses. Its foundation was celebrated with a prayer service at Charminar (Mosque of the Four Minarets), located at the city's center, at a junction of four roads from the four cardinal directions. Many of its structures were destroyed in Mughal raids under Aurangzeb (1618–1707; emperor 1658–1707), but the market, with the early planned garden Moosarambagh, still survives, as do a number of other buildings, such as Mukaramjahi market, Puranapul bridge, Chowmahalla palace, and the Makkah Masjid. Muhammed Quli is said to have stated: "O God, fill my city with people,

as you have the river with fish." His dynasty ended with the invasion of Aurangzeb in 1687; the new dynasty of Nizam Asaf Jah (nizam 1720–1748) was established in 1720 after Asaf Jah threw off Mughal rule and declared independence.

The Nizams continued to develop the city of Hyderabad. The city of Secunderabad, with a population of over 200,000 people, is the twin city of Hyderabad and is separated from it by a man-made lake. It was founded by the British in 1807 as a military base and added to Hyderabad during Nizami rule when a treaty was concluded with the East India Company, founded in 1600 and dominant in southern India by the end of the 18th century. The East India Company Army was stationed at Secunderabad, in an area still referred to as the Contonment, and the British Resident lived in the Residency, now the Women's College of Osmania University.

The modern city of Hyderabad is an industrial center with notable IT, media, and pharmaceutical companies (including Reddy Labs, Natco Pharma, and Aravinda Pharma). It is also a well-known educational center and home to nine national universities. Telugu and Urdu are the principal languages spoken, although English is widely used in the city's administration and among the educated class.

The Telugu film industry, popularly known as Tollywood, is based in the city and is the second-largest movie industry in India. Such renowned studios as Romoji Film City, Ramanaidu Film City, and Sarathi Film Studios offer world-class facilities. The major tourist attractions include Birla Mandir (Venkateshwara temple), Golkonda fort, Chowmahalla Palace, the Qutbshah tombs, Salarjung Museum, and the Charminar Mosque. The Andhra Pradesh state assembly, located in Nampally, one of the largest suburbs of Hyderabad, houses the largest statue of Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948) in India.

The large number of Muslim residents in the "Old City" of Hyderabad gives rise to communal tensions, and violence between Hindus and Muslims breaks out from time to time. Nonetheless, Hyderabad is considered to be a modern, high-tech, progressive city with a highly educated population poised to be a full partner in India's rapid economic growth in the 21st century.

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See also Telangana

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I



✦ INDIAN AIRLINES

Indian Airlines, which was merged into Air India in 2007, was created on August 1, 1953, through the enactment of the Air Corporations Act, which nationalized and amalgamated some seven domestic airlines into a single company. While Indian Airlines was created to serve domestic and regional routes, the state-owned Air India specialized in international routes. Air India has steadily upgraded its fleet of planes and now includes the Airbus A320. In 2005, as part of corporate rebranding, it adopted the name "Indian" to capitalize on its heritage, and an advertisement depicting a turbaned maharaja became the symbol of the airline.

In 1990 the government liberalized the airlines industry, and Indian Airlines, which previously had a monopoly on the domestic flight routes, faced stiff competition from the likes of East-West Airlines, ModiLuft, Jet Airways, and Air Sahara. Besides destinations in South Asia, Indian Airlines flew to major hubs in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Prior to the merger with Air India in 2007, Indian Airlines was carrying about 7.5 million passengers annually.

In 2010 there was discussion at the national level that the merger with Air India was a mistake, causing millions of dollars in losses. One of the reasons attributed to the losses is that private airlines are allowed to fly major commercial routes. In the enthusiasm for the competition of the free market, Indian Airlines was put to great disadvantage by the allocation of prime commercial routes to private airlines. A parliamentary panel is now advocating route rationalization and route allocation within the airlines industry.

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See also Railroads; Tourism

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✦ *INDIAN EXPRESS*

The *Indian Express* is an English-language daily newspaper with a complicated history. Today, *Indian Express* is a generic term applied to a chain of national newspapers printed from more than 14 centers countrywide that are part of the Indian Express Group, a holding and managing company that covers more than 30 national newspapers and several regional-language dailies, and has subsidiary interests, such as in specialist book publications. *Indian Express* began life, however, as a single daily newspaper in the 1930s and achieved fame and fortune under the guiding hand of the businessman Ramnath Goenka (1904–1991), whose death in 1991 led to a split between a north Indian branch, with headquarters in Mumbai, and a south Indian one based in Chennai. The *New Indian Express*, as the south Indian edition of the newspaper is now called, was ranked seventh in the 2008 Indian Readership survey among the most widely read English-language dailies in India, with a readership of 1.8 million.

The *Indian Express* was founded in 1934 in Madras (Chennai) by a member of the Indian National Congress (INC) party, Varadarajulu Naidu, to support the anti-imperialist cause and specifically to function as a mouthpiece for the prominent Indian nationalist C. Rajagopalachari (1878–1952), who later went on to become the first Indian governor-general in succession to Lord Louis Mountbatten (1900–1979; governor-general 1947–1948). Naidu's chief competitors were the long-established *Madras Mail* and *The Hindu*. Very soon, however, he sold out to S. Sadanand (d. 1953), founder-editor of the *Free Press Journal*. The closure of the *Free Press Journal* in 1935 impacted the fortunes of the *Indian Express*, which passed into the formal ownership of the newspaper baron Goenka, who had earlier helped arrange the funding for Sadanand's buyout. It was a tough beginning for the paper, with a meager circulation of 2,000 and limited advertising revenue. Goenka brought in an efficient financial regime as well as the services of the famed journalist Pothan Joseph (1892–1972) in 1937, whose editorial skill helped establish the fortunes of the *Indian Express*. While it remained pro-Congress and nationalist, no Congress leader could expect uncritical support from the paper. It also developed a reputation, which it has retained today, for crusading journalism and vigorous investigative reporting, as well as a strong antiestablishment stance. These factors helped increase its circulation, especially during World War II, when it rose to 20,000 copies daily.

However, it was Goenka's astute business acumen that propelled the *Indian Express* into becoming one of the most commercially successful newspaper chains in the country, after the *Independence of India* in August 1947. Within a decade of taking over at the *Indian Express,* Goenka introduced the model of the multicenter chain—a pioneering concept among Indian publishers—inspired by the vision of a national newspaper network in English and in regional languages. He began acquiring such titles in major cities as the *National Standard* in Bombay (Mumbai) and the *Indian News Chronicle* in Delhi, and very shortly relaunched them as *Indian Express.* The journalistic reputation acquired under the British now meant that successive Indian governments were held to account by the newspaper. One of the highlights in the newspaper's antiestablishment career was the spirited and critical stance that the *Indian Express* and its journalists in Delhi and elsewhere adopted during the national emergency declared in India in 1975. The newspaper was forced to pay a heavy commercial price; it faced closure for a short period, and its journalists were intimidated. Some were even forced to serve prison sentences.

The Indian Express Group currently owns several imprints, including the *Indian Express* chain of national English-language dailies; the *Sunday Express;* the *Financial Express;* a Marathi daily called *Loksatta;* a weekly titled *Lokprabha;* a Hindi daily called *Jansatta;* several other regional-language newspapers, including a number published in Tamil and Telegu; *Screen,* an entertainment journal; and several online publications. Its subsidiary holdings include a Business Publications Division, established in 1990, which publishes a range of specialist journals in such fields as information technology (IT), health care, pharmaceuticals, and travel and hospitality.

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See also Hindustan Times; Times of India, The

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✦ INDIAN INSTITUTES OF TECHNOLOGY

Since the early 1980s, India has experienced a period of unprecedented economic growth. This has been accompanied by a substantial increase in scientific, technological, and cultural prominence at the global level and numerous significant contributions of its émigré communities in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other nations. Although no single

factor can explain these dramatic changes, India's unique system of institutions of higher education, the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs), have clearly played an important role. This is especially noteworthy because, overall, India's university system is considered to be relatively weak by world standards. Four hundred fully accredited general universities serve a population of more than 1 billion, and only 12 percent of the population pursues a post-secondary degree.

The concept of the IITs dates back to 1946, one year prior to India's gaining independence. At that time, Sir Jogendra Singh (1877–1946) of the Viceroy's Executive Council formed a committee, headed by Nalini Ranjan Sarkar (1882–1953), and thus known as the Sarkar Committee, to consider the creation of "Higher Technical Institutions" in post–World War II India. Following the recommendations of the committee, Sarkar, Sir Ardeshir Dalal (1884–1949), also a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, and others established the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) to further the advancement of technological studies. The CSIR received considerable financial support from the United States—via the Technology Cooperation Mission—in the form of hundreds of postdoctoral fellowships for Indian scientists and engineers to study in the United States. Nevertheless, it was evident to Dalal and his colleagues that such a program could not be sustained; thus, they proposed creating one or more technological institutes in India, broadly modeled on the programs of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).

Following the recommendation of the Sarkar Committee, the first Indian Institute of Technology was opened at the direction of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964) in May 1950 in West Bengal, originally in Kolkata (Calcutta), and in September of that year at its permanent campus near Kharagpur, at the site of Hijli Detention camp (built by the colonial British government in 1930 to house detained members of the Non-Cooperation Movement). In September 1956 Parliament designated IIT Kharagpur as an "Institute of National Importance" under the Indian Institute of Technology (Kharagpur) Act. This designation, which was later extended to the other IITs, has served to maintain a privileged status for the institutes in India's system of higher education.

In the decade following the opening of IIT Kharagpur, four other campuses were founded at Mumbai (Bombay, 1958); Chennai (Madras, 1959); Kanpur (1960), an industrial city of Uttar Pradesh; and Delhi (1961). In 1995 a sixth campus at Guwahati, the capital of Assam, was added, and in 2001 a seventh campus was established by upgrading Roorkee University, Uttarakhand, which was founded in 1847 as the first engineering college in the British Empire, to IIT status.

In October 2003 Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (b. 1924; prime minister 1996, 1998–2004) announced plans to create additional IITs by upgrading additional existing academic institutions. These were to be located throughout the country to correct what was perceived to be a regional imbalance in the distribution of the older institutes. In November 2003 the S. K. Joshi Committee was formed to select the institutions that would become the new IITs. Shortly thereafter, planning began for six new campuses to be located in Orissa,



Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) campus in Delhi. There are 15 IITs all around the country and many of them enjoy a world class reputation for the quality of their research and the international repute of their staff and graduates. (Bryn Pinzgauer)

Gujarat, Bihar, and other states that had not been included in earlier rounds. Soon after taking office in 2004, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (b. 1932; prime minister 2004–) urged the extensive, rapid expansion of the system in the hope of retaining India's best students. By 2009, IITs were officially opened in Bhubaneshwar, Orissa; Gandhinagar, Gujarat; Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh; Indore, Madhya Pradesh; Jodhpur, Rajasthan; Mandi, Himachal Pradesh; Patna, Bihar; and Rupnagar, Punjab.

As established by the Institutes of Technology Act, 1961, and as amended in 1963 and at later dates, each institute is considered a "body corporate" governed by a board, chair, and director. The system of IITs is administered centrally by the IIT Central Council, headed by a president. The Council is de jure independent of the University Grants Commission (UGC), the organization responsible for managing the country's traditional universities. However, the Chair of the UGC is a member of the Council, along with the minister-in-charge of technical education in the Union Government, the chairs and directors of each IIT, the director-general of CSIR, and others. Other independent institutions of higher education in India with a similar structure to that of the IITs include the Institute of Science, the Institutes of Management, the new Institutes of Science Education and Research, and the Institutes of Information Technology (created under the auspices of the IITs).

The principal reasons for the IITs' success include exceptionally high admission standards; a rigorous curriculum that emphasizes frequent, in-depth examinations; a strong component of pedagogical fundamentals, especially in mathematics; and an institutional culture that stresses hard work and competition. Only senior high school graduates who have completed their 12th year and have scored a minimum of 60 percent on the exit examination for higher secondary studies are qualified to take the admissions test. Candidates take a single objective test that fewer that 3 percent pass (a far smaller percentage than that of any undergraduate program in the United States). The test, known as the IIT-JEE (the Joint Entrance Examination), which applies to the undergraduate B. Tech and the masters-level M. Tech programs, is taken by approximately 300,000 students annually. In April 2009, 320,000 students took the exam, competing for 8,000 places in the older and the newer institutes.

The IITs are clearly elite colleges. Yet, as is true of India's other institutions of higher education, the institutes follow the practice of reserving seats for applicants from historically disadvantaged groups. The admissions policy of each IIT, which was established in 1973, stipulates that 15 percent of the students admitted must be from Scheduled Castes, 7.5 percent from Scheduled Tribes, and 27 percent from Other Backward Classes. Candidates for admission under the reservation policy take the IIT-JEE with the rest of the applicants, and their work is evaluated according to the same criteria as the general candidates for graduation. The IITs have an additional procedure for admission that includes a preparatory course in English and physical science. After the first year of study, candidates with high grades in the preparatory end-of-semester exams are admitted to the regular program.

Today, the IITs offer undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in more than 25 engineering, technology, and business fields. As of 2009 approximately 150,000 people (90 percent of them male) had graduated from the older seven IIT campuses. Graduates and faculty members of the IITs are competitively recruited by leading graduate programs in the United States and have succeeded in virtually every field of engineering and business. An active and growing IIT Alumni Association establishes support networks and professional contacts in the United States, India, and throughout the world.

IIT graduates have been and continue to be among the leading innovators and entrepreneurs in the cyber revolution of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Among the pioneers is Preetinder S. Virk (B. Tech., IIT Kharagpur, 1962), a professor of chemical engineering at MIT and prolific researcher in the field of polymer "pathways." Other influential IIT alumni include Bharat Desai (b. 1953), cofounder and CEO of Syntel; Vinod Khosla (b. 1955), cofounder of Sun Microsystems; Rakesh Gangwal (b. 1953), CEO of U.S. Airways Group; and Victor J. Menezes (b. 1949), co-CEO of Citicorp's corporate and investment banking unit. High-tech corporations throughout the world, including McKinsey and Company and SAP, specifically seek out IIT graduates, and nearly one-fourth of the current group of Silicon Valley start-ups were founded by IIT alumni. It is estimated that organizations founded in Silicon Valley and other parts of the United States by IIT graduates are responsible for creating 150,000 jobs and $80 billion in market value.

In recognition of these contributions, two states, Virginia and Maryland, have declared an IIT-Indian-American Heritage Month, and the U.S. House of Representatives drafted House Resolution 227 honoring "the economic innovation attributable to graduates of the Indian Institutes of Technology."

Despite its obvious strengths, the IIT system has encountered challenges in several areas. These include diminishing financial support, dilution of resources because of rapid growth in the number of institutes—the result of what some critics have identified as poor planning—and loss of talent to the "brain drain."

The institutes are not and never were conceived to be self-supporting; they are heavily subsidized. Of the 100,000 rupees required per student for one year's attendance at an IIT, 70,000 are provided by the central government. An additional resource issue is the lack of qualified professors. Even before the opening of the newer six institutes, the schools experienced faculty shortages of approximately 25 percent. A major cause of the shortfall is that IIT faculty members, who are well paid in comparison to faculty members of the traditional universities, can earn two to three times more in the private sector.

According to many observers, the doubling of the number of institutes was ill-conceived and would eventually prove that the nation's limited educational resources had been severely strained. In addition, many administrators and government officials expressed fear that the all-important reputation of the IITs would be tarnished by overly ambitious expansion. These concerns were exacerbated by parallel initiatives to create 5 new Indian Institutes of Science Education and Research, 8 new IITs, 7 new Indian Institutes of Management, and 20 new Indian Institutes of Information Technology.

As of 2009 all of the six new IITs had a full complement of students, but most had no director and several had no faculty members. The institutes opened without permanent facilities, including IIT Punjab, which began classes on the campus of IIT Delhi; and classes started before construction began on any of the campuses. In Rajasthan, the government did not even identify the city in which its new IIT would be located prior to the beginning of the academic year, although in June 2009 Jodhpur was announced as the site. During the first year or so after the founding of the new institutes, the older institutes accommodated the newly admitted students by rotating professors between campuses or by expanding existing course offerings. As a result of these perceived mistakes, several leading educational administrators resigned in protest, including Ashok Mishra, director of the IIT in Mumbai, who stepped down in 2008, and C. N. R. Rau, chairman of the IIT Central Council, in 2009.

The success of the IITs has, ironically, made them significant contributors to India's "brain drain." More than one-third of IIT graduates go abroad to work, the largest proportion of whom go to the United States. Since the 1960s, more than 40,000 graduates have gone to the United States, many as permanent residents. This equals around 500 graduates per year, or about 30 percent of the total graduating classes of the seven older institutes. Considering the substantial amount of scarce public resources invested

in the education of IIT students, the departure of the graduates to the United States and other foreign countries are a matter of serious concern to Indian citizens, businesses, and political leaders.

In the hope of altering the perception of this emigration flow as a liability, the government of India has consistently defined the phenomenon as a "brain gain," emphasizing its potential to enhance India's reputation globally and to benefit the national economy through foreign remittances to families back home. In an effort to formalize these "gains," Parliament has considered levying a repayment tax on nonreturning IIT graduates to defray up to one-third of the cost of their education. As a result of a concerted fund-raising effort, several IIT campuses receive alumni donations of between $500,000 and $2 million per year. Beginning in about 2005, it became evident that the outward flow of IIT graduates had slowed or reversed, in part because of the desire among alumni to participate directly in India's 21st-century technological revolution. For example, one-third of the employees at Bangalore's John F. Welch Technology Center are IIT graduates who have moved back to India from the United States.

The future of the IITs will largely depend on how these challenges of limited finances, rapid expansion, and the brain drain will be met. Regardless of the outcome, however, the pedagogical innovations of the institute system, the quality of its graduates, and the contributions of its alumni—within and outside of India—will undoubtedly have positive and lasting effects on the global political economy.

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See also District Primary Education Program; Education, Development

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✦ *INDIA TODAY*

India Today is probably the foremost weekly newsmagazine currently published in India. It claims a circulation in excess of 1.1 million copies per week and a total readership (for all editions combined) of more than 15 million. The English edition is cited by the 2009 Indian Readership survey as the most widely read among all weekly magazines. *India Today* also appears in Hindi (started in 1985); Tamil, Telegu, and Malayalam (all started in 1990); and, most recently, Bengali (started in 2006).

The first issue of the then-fortnightly newsmagazine appeared in English on December 15, 1975, from the capital, New Delhi. The guiding force behind the venture was media tycoon Aroon Purie (b. 1945), who combined the roles of managing editor and publisher, and his sister Madhu Trehan, who served as the editor. Purie, in 2009, in a remarkable feat of journalistic longevity, retains the post of editor in chief. *India Today* began life in difficult circumstances, as there was a state of emergency declared in India and strict prepublication censorship was in force. A measure of its journalistic intent was provided, however, when its inaugural issue in 1975 focused precisely on the emergency instituted by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984), with headlines reading: "Now You See It, Now You Don't," and "Who's Afraid of the Emergency?" Interestingly, the magazine was initially conceptualized to provide insight into the real India for nonresident Indians and as a means of breaking down the "prejudicial attitudes, stereotyped images and preconceived opinions" that the world was perceived to have of India. In the inaugural issue, Purie also noted how he visualized the magazine as part of "a larger movement which is the growth of the Third World media, projecting a viewpoint with their own terms of reference."

In 1975 *India Today* had a circulation of 5,000, and the editorial content was provided by a group of contributing editors who were experts drawn from across the political, socioeconomic, and cultural spheres. Its first international issue appeared in April 1982, and after 515 issues the fortnightly became a weekly—appearing as such for the first time on June 9, 1997. *India Today* can justly be credited with the status of a pioneer in establishing the format of serious, investigative, political newsmagazines in modern India, which nevertheless appeal to a wider audience. Its glossy format offers illustrated features on lifestyle, the arts, travel, science, and technology, among others, combined with hard-hitting political, social, and economic news and comment, covering not just domestic but also overseas news. In addition, it publishes special city supplements every month that focus on major metropolitan centers. These supplements are titled with the prefix *Simply*, such as *Simply Delhi* or *Simply Bangalore*.

India Today is now part of the India Today Group, a highly successful multimedia conglomerate that grew out of the magazine and, under the guiding direction of Purie, now boasts more than a dozen magazines, including such titles as *Business Today*, *travelPLUS*, *Design Today*, and *Golf Digest India;* a radio channel; a handful of television networks, including TVToday, which owns the Hindi news channel *Aaj Tak;* an English news channel, *Headlines Today;* and a classical music label called *Music Today*. The group's offerings are

available to international subscribers in the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, and other countries, and it has exclusive marketing and distribution rights in India for such international publications as *Time, Fortune,* and the *Harvard Business Review;* it also publishes an Indian edition of *Cosmopolitan*. Purie has been the recipient of numerous awards in recognition of his contribution to media and entrepreneurship, including the *Padma Bhushan,* awarded him by the government of India in 2001.

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See also Hindu, The; Hindustan Times; Newspapers, Indian-Language; Right to Information; *Times of India, The*

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✦ INDO-U.S. NUCLEAR DEAL

The Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, also known as the Indo-U.S. Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, is a landmark bilateral accord on civil nuclear collaboration between India and the United States. The framework for this agreement was laid down in a joint statement issued by Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh (b. 1932; prime minister 2004–) and U.S. president George W. Bush (b. 1946; president 2001–2009) on July 18, 2005, in Washington, D.C. The joint statement, which laid down the broad contours of nuclear cooperation, lifted a three-decade U.S. moratorium on nuclear trade with India. In a clear departure from past U.S. policy, President Bush recognized India as "a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology" and committed America to working toward achieving "full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India." Toward this objective, he would seek agreement from the U.S. Congress to adjust domestic laws and policies that ban the supply of civilian nuclear technology and fuel for power generation to non–Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) states. The United States would also work with friends and allies to adjust restrictive international regimes so that India could benefit from "full nuclear energy cooperation and trade."

On his part, Prime Minister Singh committed India to: designate and separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and programs in a phased manner; place its civilian nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; sign and adhere to IAEA's Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities, which allows more-intrusive IAEA inspections of its civilian facilities; continue its moratorium on nuclear weapons testing; strengthen the security of its nuclear arsenals; and work

toward negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) with the United States that would ban the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. India agreed to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that do not possess them and to support international nonproliferation efforts.

Since July 2005, the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal has passed several complex stages for implementation. India, for instance, submitted a Nuclear Separation Plan to the United States in March 2006, under which it kept 8 of its 22 operating/under-construction power reactors out of the IAEA safeguards. Following this, in December 2006, the U.S. Congress passed the United States–India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, which modified the requirements of Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act to give the Bush Administration the necessary waiver to reach a pact with India. In August 2007 both India and the United States released the 123 Agreement, which defined the terms and conditions for bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation between the two countries.

Similarly, on August 1, 2008, the IAEA approved the safeguards agreement with India under which all nuclear material and equipment transferred as a part of this deal would be subject to safeguards. The United States then approached the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to grant a waiver to India to commence civilian nuclear trade. The NSG, established by the United States and other states to control exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology to non–nuclear weapon states, granted the waiver on September 6, 2008, at its meeting held in Vienna, Austria, thereby allowing India to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries. This waiver made India the only known country with nuclear weapons that is not a party to NPT but is still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with the rest of the world.

The U.S. Congress on October 1, 2008, approved the nuclear agreement, and the president signed the legislation into a law now called the United States–India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act. The agreement was finally signed by the Indian external affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee (b. 1935; minister of external affairs 2006–2009) and his U.S. counterpart, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (b. 1954; secretary of state 2005–2009), on October 10, 2008, paving the way for the operationalizing of the deal.

Both India and the United States expect many benefits from this agreement. India claims that the nuclear agreement implicitly recognizes its de facto nuclear status even without signing the NPT and accepts New Delhi's right to retain and pursue its nuclear program outside the purview of international regulatory agencies. In addition, and most importantly, India achieves access to the international nuclear-energy market, reducing its dependence on fossil fuels that contribute to global warming. At the political level, the deal helps India break nuclear parity with Pakistan and regain strategic equivalence with China. The United States, on the other hand, expects that the deal will bring India, a rising global power and an important U.S. trading partner, closer diplomatically; encourage New Delhi to accept international safeguards on facilities it has not allowed to be inspected; create good job opportunities for

U.S. companies; and assist India in meeting its growing energy needs in an environmentally friendly manner.

Critics in the United States, however, say that the deal fundamentally reverses half a century of U.S. nonproliferation efforts and control of nuclear fuel supply by NSG members, and that it will free India's indigenous fissile material for the production of additional nuclear warheads, leading to a nuclear arms race in Asia.

The Indian case is that it has a clean nonproliferation record because, unlike many of its neighbors, it has maintained strict controls on its nuclear technology and has not shared it with any other country. Similarly, the deal would not materially contribute toward India's strategic capacities in any consequential way. Ashley J. Tellis, in his well-researched report *Atoms for War? U.S. Indian Civilian Nuclear Co-operation and India's Nuclear Arsenal* (2006), has argued that India is currently separating about 24–40 kilograms (kg) of weapons-grade plutonium annually, far less than it has the capability to produce. This suggests that India has so far adopted a relaxed nuclear posture and is in no hurry to build a huge nuclear stockpile.

The deal did not have a smooth sailing in India. At one time, it even threatened the survival of the Manmohan Singh–led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government. Many parliamentarians opposed the deal, arguing that it would limit India's sovereignty and hurt its security. Some Indian nuclear experts protested what they saw as excessive U.S. participation in deciding which of India's nuclear facilities to define as civilian and open to international inspection.

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See also Foreign Policy; Look East Policy; Missile Program; United States, Relations with

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Industry. *See* Economy

Informal Economy. *See* Economy, Informal

Information, Right to. *See* Right to Information

✦ INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

India has a long and colorful history of espionage going all the way back to the classical times, as can be seen in the prescriptions of Kautilya's *Arthashastra* (4th century BCE). However, these have no direct bearing on their modern Indian counterparts, which have their origins in the early 19th century under British rule. After India's independence, and especially since the 1960s, India's intelligence-gathering agencies have grown and multiplied. Modern India has a number of intelligence-gathering agencies, and most are related to military or signal intelligence. Two agencies do the kind of spying usually associated with cloak-and-dagger espionage. The oldest is the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which does all the domestic spying, and the other is the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), which exclusively deals with foreign intelligence gathering.

The domestic intelligence-gathering agencies had their beginnings in the 19th century but evolved slowly. One reason for this was that the Victorians (unlike the previous Indian empires) saw professional domestic spies as something positively "un-British," and associated them with the despotic regimes of the past and present on the continent. The other was the question of finance. The British government in India simply did not have sufficient funds to allocate for the maintenance of large spy networks. Finally, there was also a concern over the Indian public's perception about the existence of such an agency. However, the most important factor was the supreme confidence that the Victorians had about their position in India, which even after the Indian mutiny of 1857–1858 dismissed any internal developments as posing a serious threat to their Indian empire.

However, the realities of administering a far-flung and a diverse empire led to the creation of a rudimentary intelligence-gathering apparatus. This was first precipitated by organized crime, especially the notorious band of murderous highwaymen called *thuggi*, or Thugs. The Thugs ritually strangled and robbed travelers along Indian highways, and it was estimated that 50-odd gangs were involved in killing an annual average of 20,000–30,000 people.

This situation led in 1820 to the establishment of the first internal intelligence-gathering agency called the Thuggi and Dakaiti Department under Captain William Sleeman (1788–1856), who held the post as its first general superintendent. After the *thuggi* menace, the organization, whose purview included the entirety of British and princely India, remained active with a skeleton staff of just 18 officers. The Thuggi and Dakaiti Department was to be the model and precursor to the Central Criminal Intelligence Department, which was later called the Central Intelligence Bureau (IB) in postindependence (1947) India. The IB also has the credentials of being the oldest professional spy agency in the world.

In the days of the British Raj (1857–1947), intelligence was collected through a loose network of informers, village officials, and colonial civil servants, who forwarded information to the government. The IB was created to fulfill the task of maintaining security and to give imperial Britain a firm hold on its Indian territories. During the 20th century, the government of India was also concerned with the activities of Indian nationalists, the communal situation between Hindus and Muslims, the Communist infiltration of local political organizations, or anything else seen as a threat to the stability of the British Raj.

In sensitive and volatile areas, such as the Punjab, a special branch was set up in 1876 to collect information on potential threats and to facilitate a greater cooperation between the local police and the colonial administration. This branch was an adjunct of the Thuggi and Dakaiti Department, and it was to report directly to the government of India. It was a tiny operation with a staff of two police officials and two clerks. Convinced of its value as an additional layer of security, the government asked all provincial administrations to set up their own special branches. Their duties were also widened to keep tabs on foreign and local suspects, rebellious religious sects, and the local vernacular press suspected of printing any seditious or inflammatory articles. A weekly report was sent to the government. In 1902 this wing, along with the Thuggi and Dakaiti Department, was reorganized as the Central Criminal Intelligence Department, which became the primary intelligence-gathering agency in India. All information was passed along by the local police and their informants, who did the actual snooping and spying. Overall, it was an inefficient operation, as most of the local police were poorly educated, and the underpaid police inspectors and subinspectors had no special training for evaluating this type of intelligence work, which they had to do in addition to their regular duties.

In postindependence India, the IB has a central core organization in New Delhi and branch units, called subsidiary units and field offices, in various states. Since the IB was administratively modeled after the Indian police, it also retains a pyramid-like organizational structure. It is headed by the director of IB, and all the various subunits at the state and local level, such as the Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau and the field offices, are headed by a special or additional director, with the security assistant at the lowest level. All the top-level administrators are class-one gazetted officers of the Indian Political Service, that is, their names and positions are listed (gazetted) in an official government journal (a gazette).

The IB is the primary watchdog for all levels of civilian security matters within India. In this capacity, it routinely monitors all Lok Sabha, or lower house, parliamentary proceedings and reports on them to the Cabinet. It also monitors all the various functions of the state assemblies and advises their respective state governments. It presides over matters of national security both great and small, including counterespionage, counterterrorism, and border security. In this capacity, it is believed to regularly open mail, read e-mail messages, monitor Internet traffic, and institute wiretaps without a warrant. It issues licenses to amateur ham-radio operators and oversees the security clearances to all judges and diplomats. It also provides regular threat assessments for ethnically, religiously, or ideologically motivated militancy in politically sensitive areas, such as the current Islamist threat in Kashmir or the ongoing Maoist insurgencies in northeastern India. Due to its small size, most of the information is gathered, as it was in the days of the Raj, by various branches of the Criminal Investigative Department (CID) of the state police, which is administratively placed under the director general of police and each state's chief minister. The state police have vast resources for this type of intelligence gathering through a network of city government employees and service sector employees, right down to their connections at the village level. The connection between

the police and the intelligence bureau is something inherited from the colonial past that has lasted to the present.

Most agents of the IB are police recruits who had been handpicked while they were undergoing training for the Indian police. However, in spite of the IB's large police presence, there has not been sufficient coordination and cooperation with the state police forces in postcolonial India, and this had led to major lapses in fighting homegrown or cross-border terrorism.

If the 19th-century Victorians felt that British rule in India would in no way be undermined by local forces, they were equally aware that a combination of foreign and domestic aggression, aided by local support, would put the British Raj in danger. In the mid-19th century it was the Russian Empire, at the behest of ambitious czars expanding Russian territory closer to the Indian frontier, that was perceived to be the greatest threat.

In 1820 the Russian Empire was steadily expanding eastward, and by the 1870s it had moved 2,000 miles and was, in certain areas of the northwest frontier of India, a mere 20 miles away from India. It was in light of the potential Russian threat that the British government embarked on a campaign to collect vital information in Central Asia to meet any Russian challenge, and this included gathering topographical, political, and military data. The quest for this information, and the way the Raj went about collecting it, is called the "Great Game," a term that was popularized by Rudyard Kipling (1865–1936) in his novel *Kim* (1901). First and foremost in British minds was the gathering of vital information in the frontier and sensitive areas of Central Asia to meet and frustrate any rapid Russian march into Afghanistan. For this, accurate topographical maps of Turkmenistan and northern Afghanistan were needed. Drawing these maps was the responsibility of the cartographical division of the India Survey Department. It was for this gathering of vital topographical data that the earliest clandestine operations were launched by the British Raj outside of India's frontiers.

Due to the strict ban on putting the lives of British officers at risk, the survey department hit on the novel idea of using Indian explorers trained in modern mapmaking techniques. Because of their ethnicity, they were less likely to attract attention or be captured, and their capture would be less politically embarrassing than that of a British officer. This was the idea conceived by Captain Thomas Montgomerie (1830–1878) of the Indian Survey Department. In Kipling's *Kim*, Montgomerie was the model for Colonel Creighton, and the character Horree Chunder Mookerjee, or agent R17, is based on an actual Indian spy named Sarat Chandra Das (1849–1917), an Indian scholar of Tibetan language and culture who made two journeys to Tibet in 1879 and 1881–1882. As in Kipling's novel, these Indian agents were called *pandits* (scholars), and many were handpicked and specially trained. They were sent to Central Asia and Tibet under great secrecy since discovery meant torture and death by public beheading. As such, their very existence and activities were kept under the utmost secrecy, even within the survey department, and they were known only by numbers or cryptograms. They were carefully trained at Dehra Dun (the headquarters of the Indian Survey Department, located in the Himalayan foothills) and provided with specially crafted

equipment made at the survey's workshops. They often traveled in disguise as Buddhist *lamas* (monks), with pace-counters resembling rosary beads that were used to count paces and calculate distances traveled by day or night. They also carried cleverly designed prayer-wheels and trunks with false bottoms, which held other essential survey equipment. They were also trained in the art of disguise so they could maintain a cover that would hold firm for months of traveling under local scrutiny, some of which was very intense, especially in Central Asia. In spite of their operatic outfits, these clandestine operators provided a wealth of very accurate geographical data about areas previously left blank on colonial maps.

Another major development was in the field of military intelligence under Major-General Sir Charles Macgregor (1840–1887), quartermaster general for intelligence for the government of India. Macgregor was well qualified to study the potential threat from Czarist Russia, as he had become the head of the newly formed military intelligence department at Simla in 1881. It was a rudimentary setup with a skeleton staff of three permanent and two temporary officers and a small Indian support staff. The military intelligence department was concerned with the gathering and evaluation of any information about Russian troop concentrations and strength in Central Asia and their potential threat to India. However, there was no counterpart to Kipling's "secret service," an overarching intelligence-gathering body, during this period. Political intelligence was collected by frontier officials who passed it on to the Political Department, which was India's de facto foreign office. The topographical intelligence was done by the survey department, and the military intelligence was collected by Macgregor's agency. There was a great deal of turf rivalry and jealousy between the agencies, an attribute that was to linger in postindependence India.

Until World War I broke out in 1914, the government of India was reluctant to allow any of its intelligence-gathering agencies to set up permanent bases abroad. However, the overseas activity of Indian revolutionaries and their links to enemy powers during the war led to a revision of this policy. The Central Criminal Intelligence Department had set up a small covert operation along the U.S. Pacific coast, which had a significant migrant Sikh community. This spy outfit was to monitor the activities of Sikh militants belonging to the Ghadr Party (founded in 1913), which was being funded and orchestrated against British interests in India by the German Foreign Office. In February 1915 three shiploads of arms were sent to India, along with agitators to stir up mutiny among Sikh regiments stationed in the Punjab: the 130th Baluch Regiment at Rangoon, Burma, and the 5th Light Infantry Regiment at Singapore. However, good intelligence, better luck, and sheer incompetence on the part of the revolutionaries nipped in the bud this most audaciously planned campaign to destabilize India while Britain was tied up in the war-ravaged continent of Europe.

After India's independence in 1947, a policy decision was made to set up a foreign intelligence unit of the IB. Agents were posted to France, Germany, and Pakistan under the cover of the Indian diplomatic corps. It was a rudimentary affair, and soon the setup was expanded to all the neighboring states that could compromise India's security. Initially, it was modeled after the British counterintelligence and security organization MI5, under the direction of the first director of the IB, Sanjeevi Pillai. These early ventures to gather foreign intelligence

turned out to have produced nothing substantial due to ineffectual training of the agents. As a result, in 1966, it was deemed essential to set up a separate external intelligence-gathering unit, especially after India's ill-fated monthlong border war with China in October–November 1962, which was seen as a serious intelligence failure.

Under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984), there was a keener realization of the special role a foreign intelligence unit could play in the creation of India's foreign policy. It was to brief the Cabinet on policies to be adopted in India's relations with foreign countries, as well as to provide information about any hostile acts perpetrated against India's interests by its traditional rivals China and Pakistan. It was also meant to boost India's international image by generating support among the Non-Aligned countries and non–Communist bloc countries.

These goals became a mandate for a new external spy agency called Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). While the IB was in charge of internal security and placed under the Home Ministry, RAW was in charge of external security and was placed directly under the prime minister's office as an independent secretariat. There was also a need for an effective head for RAW, and the choice fell on Rameshwar Nath Kao (1918–2002), a Kashmiri Brahmin and close friend of India's first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964), who was to become India's legendary spy master. Kao was an IB field officer when he was directed by Nehru to help set up a new foreign intelligence unit for the newly independent state of Ghana led by Kwame Nkrumah (1909–1972). Kao's own experience in setting up postcolonial Africa's first intelligence unit became useful when India decided to set up IB's own foreign intelligence bureau. It was under Kao's leadership that Indian intelligence emerged out of its colonial-era police culture into a world-class spy agency. The recruits for RAW were not former police cadets but specialists with a high degree of technical proficiency, as well as civil servants from the Indian diplomatic corps. Kao's handpicked team, nicknamed the "Kao Boys," brought a new spirit and a higher level of professionalism to the fledgling Indian foreign intelligence-gathering apparatus.

The entire external intelligence apparatus is under the director of RAW, and there are three key departments under him that deal with external intelligence gathering. These are:

1. Department One, which is centered in the Office of Special Operations (OSO). This office is concerned with planning, training, and the execution of sensitive covert operations considered vital for India's national security and is one where any chance of exposure would be highly embarrassing to the government. It provides the necessary cover for such operations, as well as the setting up of front organizations or businesses in hostile territory. It also has the task of training future field agents and equipping them with the necessary survival skills.
2. Department Two, which houses the office of the director-general of security. All aerial surveillance satellite and spy plane data, as well as intelligence on border security, come under the purview of this office.

3. Department Three, which contains the office of the additional director of RAW. This office oversees all cipher or code-breaking activities, and it handles electronic listening as well as the management of all field operations.

The field operations are divided into four major geographical zones, which also tell a lot about India's current security concerns. The priority lies with such regional rivals as China and Pakistan, and countries with a large Indian expatriate community. The four zones are: area one—Pakistan; area two—China and Southeast Asia; area three—Africa and the Middle East; and area four—Europe and the rest of the world.

From the office of the additional director there is a large espionage chain of command that ends with the field agents in rival and foreign territories. It is an impressive organization that would match the shadowy world of George Smiley in John Le Carre's spy thrillers. Under the joint director of an area are the station chief, who is also based at RAW headquarters in New Delhi. He supervises various case officers. The case officers are assigned "projects," or the clandestine gathering of key information. Here, information is collected by the principal agent with the aid of a number of field agents who do the actual spying and collecting of information. Both the principal agents and their assistants are all either foreign nationals recruited from the country where the operation takes place, or someone who is close to the intelligence target. The entire operation is overseen by a "resident" who, unlike the station chief, lives in close geographical proximity to the operation. The resident is generally an Indian national who himself does not engage in any sort of espionage but does "cleanup" if the operation goes awry or has any chance of discovery. The resident is often financially well off and is also a well-respected member of the Indian expatriate community, with legitimate business concerns in the area.

From RAW's modest beginnings, with a budget of 20 million rupees in 1969 and a staff of 250 personnel, the budget increased fivefold to 100 million rupees and a staff of 7,000 in 1980. The current budget and the total number of employees remain a state secret. The organization has not been without its controversies. During the Indira Gandhi administration of 1966 to 1977, its powers were increased to undertake domestic surveillance and to spy, harass, and jail Mrs. Gandhi's political opponents. With the fall of her first government in 1977, the subsequent Janata government (the Janata Party was founded on January 18, 1977) stripped RAW of an international surveillance role. The IB was given the task of managing all internal surveillance and counterespionage operations within India.

The establishment of a joint intelligence community and the subsequent National Security Council were created to strengthen the capacity of the government of India to utilize intelligence findings to shape its future policies. For reasons that remain unclear, various elected governments had been reluctant to use these overarching agencies to shape their own foreign policies. Instead, they relied heavily on their own Cabinet security committees. Since the early 1990s, this lack of cooperation and coordination among the various branches of the

Indian intelligence community has led to its inability to prevent a number of major terrorist attacks in India's capital. This was quite clearly demonstrated in the 2008 Mumbai attack, when repeated warnings issued by the IB and RAW, as well as U.S. counterintelligence, were ignored by the administration, and neither the coast guards nor even the local police were notified of a possible seaborne attack on targets in the city.

Since the late 1970s, RAW has been housed in an 11-story office complex in the posh neighborhood of Vasant Vihar, in the heart of New Delhi: locals call it the "spy house." In spite of its modest beginnings and low budget in relation to other well-known global intelligence agencies, both the IB and RAW were highly ranked by U.S.-based foreign intelligence analysts for their effectiveness in gathering intelligence.

RAMAN N. SEYLON

See also Armed Forces; Security, Internal

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Internal Security. *See* Security, Internal

✦ INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, RELATIONS WITH

World War II (1939–1945) saw not only advanced arrangements for financial and economic control at the onset of the war but also comprehensive plans for international monetary cooperation in the postwar years. These plans translated into the birth of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in July 1944, when representatives of 45 countries met in the town of Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to create the new institution. They initiated the process of building a structured organization promoting global economic cooperation, which was deemed necessary to avoid a repetition of the disastrous economic policies that had contributed to the Great Depression. Indian representation at Bretton Woods included both British citizens and Indian nationals since India was still part of the British Empire at the time.

The IMF came into formal existence in December 1945, when the first 29 member countries signed its Articles of Agreement. It began operations on March 1, 1947. The Bretton Woods system required each country to adopt a monetary policy that ensured stable and adjustable exchange rates. Exchange rates were not permanently fixed, as occasional devaluations of individual currencies were allowed to correct fundamental disequilibria in the balance of payments. While India shared the world's interest in postwar currency plans, it had a special concern with regard to the "embarrassing plenitude" of the sterling balances built up by the sacrifice of current consumption during the war. India was keen to secure the establishment of an order that would not only safeguard the value of these balances after the war but also enable it to draw on them in a manner best suited to its postwar requirements for the development of the economy. Governor of the Reserve Bank of India between 1937 and 1943, Sir James Taylor (1891–1943), played a key role in the matter of the repatriation of the sterling debt, while Governor Sir Chintaman Dwarkanath Deshmukh (1896–1982), during his governorship between 1943 and 1949, took a leading part in India's participation in postwar currency plans. He was a member of the Indian delegation to the Bretton Woods Conference and was accompanied by Dr. B. K. Madan (director of research), as secretary of the delegation. The Central Board of the Reserve Bank of India took an active interest in the postwar currency plans, and its views were also formally sought by the government.

Member countries were assigned a quota fixed on the basis of the value of their foreign trade in the three prewar years. No payment was to be made by member countries by way of subscription in gold/foreign exchange toward the quota; the size of the individual quotas was intended to measure the member's responsibility in the management of the Indian Union and set a limit to the maximum credit facility available to each member; that is, the union was to have no capital of its own. Each member was allotted a quota determined on the basis of its holdings of gold and foreign exchange, the magnitude of fluctuations in its balance of international payments, and its national income; quotas were payable in gold, securities, and local currency in stipulated proportions to constitute sources of funds for the exchange operations of the IMF. The right of a member to purchase foreign exchange from the IMF with its local currency was recognized only to the extent of its quota, subject to certain limitations.

In 1945 India's quota was fixed at $400 million, the sixth largest after those of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, and France. These five countries were the five permanent members of the Executive Board of the IMF. As the Soviet Union declined to join the IMF, India moved up to the fifth permanent seat on the Executive Board. The board, which was the main decision-making body, consisted initially of 12 members. IMF membership expanded from 30 members in 1947 to 194 by 2004. Although India's quota has grown from special drawing rights of SDR 400 million in 1947 to SDR 4.158 billion in October 2004, the relative decline deprived it of a permanent seat on the board. India has, however, retained membership on the board through biannual elections. Currently, India's quota is SDR 4158.20 million (1.91 percent of total SDR), and the country has 41,832 votes (1.88 percent of the total number).

India and the IMF have a positive relationship. The IMF has provided financial assistance to India, which has helped in boosting the country's economy. The IMF praised the country for managing to avoid the Asian financial crisis in 1999 and maintaining the average growth rate of its economy. The IMF attributes the country's economic growth to the skillful handling of monetary policies by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and its ability to control inflation. The IMF has conjectured a growth rate of 8 percent with more reforms in economic policies. The relationship between the IMF and India has grown strong over the years and has proved advantageous for both. The country has turned into a creditor to the IMF and has stopped taking loans from it. "With India's long term prospects remaining strong and private sector balance sheets sound, we expect growth to be back at potential in 2010–11 even if advance economies grow below trend," IMF said in its latest paper issued after consultation with Indian authorities.

PARAMITA GUPTA

See also World Bank, Relations with; World Trade Organization, Relations with

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✦ IRRIGATION

The challenge of sustaining irrigation systems and the irrigated lands they serve is a matter of crucial importance as water resources become increasingly scarce, threatening the livelihood of millions of farmers. India's canal irrigation systems, which have so far made an enormous contribution to food security, are now in crisis because of policy gaps, increasing competition for water from sectors other than agriculture, poor management, and declining funding.

The first irrigation commission was formed in 1900. It found that new construction was likely to prove remunerative only in certain northern regions, such as the Punjab, and that even the prospects of famine protection were limited to specific areas. The commission also gave a recommendation to the government that loans should be provided for private agricultural improvements, such as well irrigation. A series of decentralization reforms, introduced in 1919, led to the turnover of irrigation to local governments. From 1912 to 1946, state and federal governments continued to invest in major irrigation works across



A farmer walks near an irrigation canal in Kadamtali about 41 miles east of Gauhati, Assam, the "Gateway" to the Northeast, August 2009. (AP Photo/Anupam Nath)

the country, most notably in the south, where high rates of return on major projects led to a doubling of annual expenditure.

The command area development (CAD) concept was viewed in 1973 as an integrated area-development program. The concept was further emphasized by the National Commission on Agriculture (1976) regarding the need for the integrated development of command areas. Irrigation and agriculture being state subjects, CAD has to be implemented by the state governments.

In 1987 the National Water Management Project (NWMP) was initially implemented in the south in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Tamil Nadu. The NWMP's premise was that substantial benefits could be obtained in existing irrigation schemes through a more reliable, predictable, and equitable water delivery system. As a strategy, NWMP focused on the preparation of an "operational plan" for each scheme to define the principles of water distribution and allocate responsibilities for implementation. The approach of NWMP, then, was to provide a demand-scheduled supply by means of structured and manageable irrigation systems. This approach provided hope for a manageable system, which responded to evolving conditions and made relatively efficient use of highly variable and limited water supplies available to many of the schemes in the southern part of India. The objectives of NWMP, however, could not be achieved due to the existing operational practices. In some cases the objectives of the program were in contrast with existing local approaches.

Today, dams and canals are crippled water distribution systems that can rarely deliver water to more than half their service areas. The canals are leaky and undersized. The problem, however, is fundamentally political, as the government is unable to prevent farmers at the upper reaches of the distributory systems from taking so much canal water that the tail ends run dry.

At the same time as irrigation systems have expanded, their upkeep has become more expensive. Various policy studies have concluded that institutional reforms must address the incentives of water suppliers and users and lead to new arrangements for joint management of irrigation. Reforms should be based on six principles:

1. The irrigation agency must be financially autonomous.
2. Irrigation staff salaries must come from the fees charged for irrigation water.
3. The irrigation agency must be accountable to user groups.
4. Third-party intervention in the form of an Independent Regulatory Commission for Canal Irrigation (IRCCI) may be necessary to prevent a deadlock between the irrigation agency and farmers when it comes to costs and incentives.
5. The primary tasks of the IRCCI should be to ensure transparency in contracts, obtain technical help, and act as a dispute settlement body.
6. The pricing of water should be related to consumption to keep costs low.

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See also Environment; Water Conflict; Water Policy; Water Resources

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✦ ISLAM

After Hinduism, Islam is the second most-practiced religion in India today. Arab settler-traders along the Malabar Coast first introduced the faith to the subcontinent in the 8th century, and the first mosque in India was erected in Kodungallur, Kerala, in 629. The first

wave of Muslim political expansion is represented by the Arab conquest of Sindh (southeast Pakistan) in 712. In the late 10th century Mahmud of Ghazni (971–1030) led a series of raids on northern India, and by the late 12th century Muhamad Ghori (d. 1206) established his dynasty, the Ghorids (1150–1206), as the first Islamic political presence in South Asia. The Ghorids were the first of the Delhi Sultanates (1206–1526), a series of dynasties that ruled from Delhi. The Mughals (1526–1858) were the only Indo-Islamic empire.

The community of Muslims (*ummah*) in India has historically been diverse, with numerous doctrinal, sectarian, class, and ethnic divisions. Additionally, and largely unique to South Asian Islam, is the presence of an unofficial caste system, which is the result of the social influence of the Hindu caste system. Sunnis have historically been the dominant Muslim group in India, although there has also been a sizable Shia minority represented by the people as well as by several ruling dynasties, including the Sultans of Bijapur and Golconda, and the Nawabs of Murshidabad, Awadh, and Lucknow. Ethnically, Indian Muslims comprise one of two dominant groups: they are descendants either of Muslim emigrants from Arabia, Afghanistan, Turkey, Iran, or Africa, or of indigenous converts. While the latter have historically been the largest group, emigrant Muslim groups have been better represented in politics and have had a more profound impact on Indo-Islamic culture, as the origins of nearly all of the Indo-Islamic dynasties are traceable to Central or Western Asia.

Between the 12th and 19th centuries the various Indo-Islamic courts attracted scholars, artists, theologians, scientists, and adventurers from across the Islamic world as well as from within South Asia. Under their Indo-Islamic patrons these thinkers and artists made significant contributions to South Asian culture, infusing it with diverse traits that remain today.

Islamic art and architecture may be broadly divided into the sacred and the secular. The former is represented by sacred structures, such as mosques, tombs, and religious texts, while the latter includes forts, palaces, and paintings of nonreligious subjects. The Mughal emperors were among the most prolific patrons of art and architecture in South Asian history. Their most celebrated commissions include the Taj Mahal, the Jama Masjid of Delhi, Fatehpur Sikhri, the Red Fort at Delhi, and various schools of miniature paintings.

Muslim mystics (*Sufis*) have had a profound social, religious, and political role in South Asia, and Islam spread rapidly across the subcontinent less by forced conversion than through the peaceful persuasion of *Sufis*. The *Sufis'* success is largely attributable to their blending of Islamic theology with elements of the Hindu *bhakti* (devotional) tradition, their ministrations to the poor, their musical and poetic traditions, and their proselytizing in local vernacular languages, thereby creating unique, regional forms of the faith.

The major *Sufi* orders in India include the Chishtiyya, Naqshbandiyyah, Qadiriyyah, and Suhrawaridyyah. The Chishtiyya order has historically been the most popular and enjoyed the patronage of several Mughal emperors, who made frequent pilgrimages to the order's *darghas* (tombs of holy men referred to as *pirs*). There are innumerable *Sufi pirs* in India, some only venerated by a local audience, while others are popular throughout the subcontinent. *Darghas,* such as those of the Chishtiyya sheikhs Salim at Fatehpur Sikhri, Nizamuddin

Auliya in Delhi, and Mu'in al Din in Ajmer, remain active sacred centers today with thousands of devotees making pilgrimages on the *pirs'* death anniversaries (*urs*). *Darghas* such as those of the Chishtiyya *pirs* are sprawling complexes, containing in addition to the *pir's* tomb, graves of several of his followers, a soup kitchen, a mosque, and a theological school (*madrasa*).

Lesser known *pirs* are commonly entombed in smaller *darghas* or simple graves in rural or urban centers throughout India. *Sufism* continues to occupy a vital religious as well as social role in India by bridging religious distinctions. Many notable *pirs* are venerated by both Hindus and Muslims who make pilgrimages to their *darghas* to partake of the *pirs'* blessings and thaumaturgic powers (*barakat*). The *darghas* of certain *pirs* are also associated with assisting litigants in civil suits, and with curing illnesses and infertility.

The Indian constitution guarantees all citizens the right to a fair trial. However, while non-Muslims are tried in secular government courts, the passage of the Muslim Personal Law Application Act in 1937 gave Muslims in India the right to trial in economic, marital, inheritance, endowment (*waqf*), and other civil matters in courts governed by Islamic law (Sharia). The most widely practiced school of Sharia in India is the Hanafi.

The possible complications of having two legal systems in a single nation are illustrated by the Shah Bano divorce case. In 1978 Shah Bano, a 62-year-old Muslim woman with five children from Indore (Madhya Pradesh), was divorced by her husband according to Sharia law. She was subsequently denied alimony and child support by the Sharia courts. After seven years, the Indian Supreme Court ordered Shah Bano's ex-husband to pay her a maintenance allowance. The judgment was met with widespread outcry from north Indian orthodox Muslim groups, who viewed it as an attack on their civil and religious freedom. In 1986 the Congress Party, which had an absolute majority in Parliament at the time, overturned the Supreme Court ruling. The result has been that the case has attracted international attention and remains highly controversial.

After the Lahore Resolution of March 23, 1940, the All-India Muslim League, founded in 1906, began campaigning for a sovereign Muslim state on the grounds that India had fragmented into two nations: one of Hindus and one of Muslims. Many Muslim political groups argued that Muslims had historically been a distinct and separate community, which had become politically marginalized in the post-Mughal era. While proponents of the creation of Pakistan cite this "two-nation theory," Indian nationalists commonly cite the cause of Partition as the British strategy of "divide and rule," in which the British deliberately created political division and fomented communal strife in order to stem a strong, united independence movement.

Partition and the creation of two nations, India and Pakistan, immediately followed independence on August 15, 1947. While the two nations were divided ostensibly along religious lines, there was in fact a significant Hindu and Sikh population in Pakistan, and a large Muslim minority in India. The new international borders were established at the cost of hundreds of thousands of lives, the displacement of nearly 15 million people, social

upheaval on a historically unprecedented scale, and territorial skirmishes, the ramifications of which are still seen today. Neither of the new governments was equipped to deal with the volume of refugees that flooded into their countries to join their new coreligious citizens, and widespread slaughter and riots ensued on both sides of the border. One of the most contentious and enduring results of Partition is the Kashmir conflict. Like the states of Bengal, the Punjab, and Sindh, the Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir were bifurcated by a war between the two new dominions of India and Pakistan. India claimed the significantly larger, more populous, better developed, fertile Valley of Kashmir. However, unlike the other border regions that were ceded to Pakistan, Kashmir had a Muslim majority at independence and today remains the sole Indian state with a Muslim majority. Since 1947 Kashmir's Indo-Pakistan border has been a disputed one. Pakistan has consistently asserted its claim to both larger sections of the region, as well as the entire state, on the basis of the Kashmir's Muslim majority. India and Pakistan fought four border wars over Kashmir (1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999), and India fought with China over the state's northern border in 1962. The situation in Kashmir is further complicated by numerous independent separatist movements, each dedicated to the establishment of a sovereign Kashmir, though often divided in their strategies of how to accomplish this sovereignty. The Indian government has consistently claimed that both Pakistan and the mujahideen have supported the separatists by smuggling arms and soldiers from Pakistan.

Since Partition there have been several additional incidents of large-scale communal strife in India; among the most significant in recent history is the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya and the ensuing riots throughout India. In the early 16th century the Mughal emperor Babur (1483–1530; emperor 1526–1530) demolished a Hindu temple, which allegedly commemorated the birthplace of Rama, an incarnation of the god Vishnu, and erected a mosque on the site. In 1992 an estimated 150,000 Hindu nationalists associated with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), founded in 1925; the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), founded in 1964; the Hindu Munnani, founded in 1980 or 1982 (accounts differ) in Tamil Nadu; and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), founded in 1980, organized the demolition of the mosque and erected a temple dedicated to Rama at the site. While the Hindu nationalists' assert that their reclamation of the site reestablishes one of the most sacred Hindu pilgrimage sites, the mosque's demolition remains highly controversial: it has not been conclusively proven if a temple dedicated to Rama did, in fact, initially occupy the site, and many Muslims view the destruction as a well-organized communal attack. Claims are also widespread that the Indian Supreme Court guaranteed the structure's protection and subsequently provided inadequate protection to enforce its judgment.

Heated reactions to the destruction of the Babri Masjid culminated throughout India in communal riots, which broke out in several cities with sizable Muslim populations, including Mumbai, Delhi, and Hyderabad. The riots were the most devastating in Mumbai, which saw an initial Muslim-instigated attack nearly a week after the mosque's destruction and a counter Hindu-instigated attack a month later. It is estimated that more than 2,000 people

were killed in the post–Babri Masjid riots, although arson and other property damage was also tremendous and increased the amount of destruction and misery.

After the city of Mumbai, the state of Gujarat has been the second Indian area most affected by communal violence in recent history; it is also associated with the destruction of the Babri Masjid. On February 25, 2002, in the town of Godhra, a Muslim mob attacked and burned a train of Hindu pilgrims returning from Ayodhya. Fifty-eight passengers were killed, and devastating communal violence ensued. The worst of the riots occurred between February and March in northern, central, and northeastern areas of the state. Entire Muslim housing communities, as well as individual Muslim-owned businesses and houses, were burned down, people were killed and displaced, and women were sexually assaulted. As in the Mumbai riots a decade earlier, Muslim factions responded by organizing riots and inflicting death and destruction on Hindu communities in the region. The official estimated death toll of the Gujarat riots is 1,040 (790 Muslims and 250 Hindus). As with the destruction of the Babri Masjid, many maintain that not only was police protection inadequate, but also that members of the government and police actively participated in the riots. The investigation is ongoing, and the bitterness and suspicion continues between the communities in the area.

Hindu-Muslim relations in postindependence India have been deeply associated with violence and communalism, particularly in the international media. However, it is vital to stress that this is only one aspect of Islam in India. Not only have Muslim patrons, artists, thinkers, and religious figures contributed to Indian culture in the past, but they also continue to actively contribute to all aspects of Indian culture today. Since independence there have been three Muslim presidents of India: Dr. Zakir Hussain (1897–1969; president 1967–1969), Dr. Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed (1905–1977; president 1974–1977), and Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam (b. 1932; president 2002–2007). Muslims are also well represented in state and national government.

Since the establishment of the Mumbai-based Indian cinema industry, known as Bollywood, in the early 20th century, some of the most popular and influential actors have been Muslim or of mixed Hindu/Muslim parentage. Among them are Dilip Kumar (b. 1922), Nargis (1929–1981), Suraiya (1929–2004), Madhubala (1933–1969), Waheeda Rehman (b. 1936), Saira Banu (b. 1944), Naseeruddin Shah (b. 1950), Shabana Azmi (b. 1950), Shahrukh Khan (b. 1965), Aamir Khan (b. 1965), Salman Khan (b. 1965), Saif Ali Khan (b. 1970), and Katrina Kaif (b. 1984). Muslim Indian musicians such as Allah Rakha Rahman (b. 1966) and Resul Pookutty (b. 1971) have won national and international awards: Pookutty won the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences Award (an Oscar) in 2009 for his score for the film *Slumdog Millionaire,* and Rahman won an Oscar for the music.

Muslim sports figures have gained international fame. Sania Mirza (b. 1986) is the most successful female Indian tennis player ever, and one of the most successful female tennis players in the world, especially in doubles. She won the 2003 ladies' doubles title at Wimbledon in 2003, and she became the mixed doubles champion at the 2009 Australian Open. In cricket, the most popular sport in India, there are many successful Muslim players in India's history,

including the Nawab of Pataudi (1910–1952), who played for both India and England; Syed Mushtaq Ali (1914–2005); and Mohammad Azharuddin (b. 1963). The current national cricket team includes such players such as Zaheer Khan (b. 1978), Yusuf Khan Pathan (b. 1982), and Irfan Pathan (b. 1984).

Muslims have also played active and highly significant roles in the nation's economic growth. Some of India's most successful businesses, including Wipro, Wockhardt, Himalaya Health Care, Hamdard Laboratories, Cipla, and Mirza Tanners, were founded by Muslims. The only two South Asian Muslim billionaires named by *Forbes Magazine*, Azim Premji (b. 1945), chairman of Wipro, and Yusuf Khwaja Hamied, chairman of Cipla, are Indian.

MELIA BELLI

See also Ayodhya; Muslims; Religion; Shah Bano Case

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Ismailis. *See* Nizari Ismailis

✦ ISRAEL, RELATIONS WITH

Despite their common experience of achieving independence from British rule, India and Israel have had a difficult and often strained relationship. During the interwar period, Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948), Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964), and the Indian National Congress (INC; founded in 1885) made statements favoring the Arab position on Palestine and opposing Zionist efforts to establish a state there. In 1921, in *Young India*, Gandhi wrote that "by no canon of ethics or war . . . can Palestine be given to the Jews as a result of the war," and in 1947, in recently discovered correspondence with Albert Einstein, Nehru declared that "Palestine is essentially

an Arab country, and no decision can be made without the consent of all Arabs." Zionist efforts to sway their way of thinking were unsuccessful.

There are several reasons why Indian nationalists were reluctant to support Zionism. Gandhi advocated a secular Indian nationalism and opposed the All-India Muslim League (founded in 1885), led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), for the party's divisive stance on religion, which was used for nationalistic purposes and to mobilize Muslims behind the party. Gandhi believed that Zionism suffered from the same flawed religion-based approach. While the INC struggled against British colonial rule, Zionists, with the support of the Balfour Declaration of 1917, were seen as working with British rule to dominate Palestinian Arabs. Gandhi saw Zionism, therefore, as an extension of British imperialism.

In addition, one cannot overemphasize the fact that India under the British contained the world's largest Muslim population. Gandhi was anxious to accommodate their views, and a rivalry emerged between the INC and the Muslim League over support for the Arab position on Palestine. Gandhi tried to promote Hindu-Muslim unity, in part, by supporting the popular Khalifat movement (1919–1924). This movement, started in India by a disparate group of Muslims led by Maulana Mohammad Ali Jauhar (1878–1831), advocated the principle that Arabia, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Palestine should remain under Muslim control after the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I. In addition, Haji Amin al-Husseini (1895–1974), the mufti of Jerusalem, sent emissaries to India seeking financial and political support. These efforts came to fruition in 1937, when the INC adopted a resolution opposing proposals to partition Palestine.

In 1947 the now-independent India joined the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). While a majority of UNSCOP members proposed partitioning Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, India, along with Iran and Yugoslavia, proposed a federal Palestine with Jewish autonomy. On November 29, 1947, India voted in the General Assembly against the partition of Palestine.

Following the armistice agreements between Israel and the surrounding Arab states, India recognized the state of Israel in September 1950. No diplomatic relations were established, but Israel was permitted to open a consulate in Mumbai in 1953. Efforts at the normalization of ties were hampered by India's concern over the reaction of the Indian Muslim population, and its desire for Arab support in the conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir. India acceded to the request of Arab states and excluded Israel from the first Afro-Asian conference, held at Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955. This set the precedent for the exclusion of Israel from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The Suez Crisis of 1956, in which Israel, Great Britain, and France attacked Egypt, played an important role in firmly placing India in the pro-Arab camp. In its aftermath, Nehru informed the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament, that diplomatic relations with Israel were not possible.

Relations between India and Israel reached their nadir in the 1970s and early 1980s. In 1975 India cosponsored the United Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution equating Zionism with racism. While the Israeli consular mission was restricted to Mumbai and the

state of Maharashtra, India allowed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to open an office in New Delhi, and in 1980 Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984) granted the PLO full diplomatic recognition, and the PLO's office became a full-fledged embassy. In 1982 the Israeli consul was declared persona non grata after giving an interview in which he attributed India's policies regarding Israel to pressure from an Arab-Muslim lobby in India and fears over losing trade contracts with Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Indian moves toward normalizing diplomatic relations with Israel began under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991; prime minister 1984–1989). He met with Israeli prime minister Shimon Peres (b. 1923; prime minister 1977, 1984–1986, 1995–1996) at the UN General Assembly meeting in 1985 and subsequently allowed Israel to return its vice consul to Mumbai. In 1988 India added the state of Kerala to Israel's consular jurisdiction and in 1989 restored its status to a full consul.

Normalization accelerated under the government of Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao (1921–2004; prime minister 1991–1996). Following the Madrid Peace Conference of October 1991, India joined the UN majority in repealing the Zionism-is-racism resolution it had cosponsored 16 years earlier. On January 29, 1992, India finally established full diplomatic relations with Israel, becoming the last major non-Muslim country to do so.

There were several reasons for this change in Indian policy. The end of the Cold War weakened the NAM and the East-West ideological divide. As India liberalized its economic policy, it looked increasingly to the West, and the absence of relations with Israel was seen as an impediment, particularly in the United States. The willingness of Arab states, and in particular the Palestinians, to participate with the Israelis in the Middle East peace process removed a key obstacle to full diplomatic relations. In addition, despite decades of support for the Arab cause, there had been little reciprocation from Arab states on the question of Kashmir and Pakistan.

Since 1992 there has been marked improvement in the relations between India and Israel in all areas. In addition to high-profile diplomatic visits by the Israeli president Ezer Weizman (1924–2005; president 1993–2000) in 1996 and Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon (b. 1928; prime minister 2001–2006) in 2003, there have been numerous bilateral agreements. These agreements have helped to increase trade between the two countries, which grew from $202 million in 1992 to almost $4 billion in 2008 (not including arms sales). The largest sectors of trade are precious stones (primarily diamonds), high-tech equipment, software, biotechnology, machinery, and chemicals. The establishment of direct airline flights has also increased tourism, primarily from Israel to India, with more than 40,000 Israelis visiting India annually. A trip to India after completion of army service has become a rite of passage for many young Israelis. At the same time, however, Israelis in India have also become targets for terrorism, as seen in the Mumbai attacks of 2008, which included the local Jewish center.

In addition to civilian trade, military trade between India and Israel has also expanded significantly. By 2009 Israel had supplanted Russia as India's largest defense and military supplier, with $1 billion in defense contracts. India began by retrofitting its aging Soviet-era

weapons but has since moved to acquiring new military systems and technology developed by Israeli firms, including the purchase of space and satellite expertise.

India and Israel have pursued growing military cooperation, particularly since the election into office of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP; founded in 1980) in 1998, and it continued to grow under Congress-led governments after the election of 2004. Their relationship is less an alliance than a common strategic agenda. Both India and Israel share concerns about the development of Islamic fundamentalism, the spread of terrorism, and Pakistan's nuclear program. Israel has been a consistent supporter of India in its dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. The bilateral Working Group on Counterterrorism was established in 2002, allowing Indians and Israelis to share information and deal with the growing threat of terrorism. Both countries are also believed to have engaged in secret nuclear intelligence cooperation.

JEFFREY C. BLUTINGER

See also Foreign Policy; Missile Program

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J



✦ JAINISM

Jainism is derived from the word *Jina* ("Conqueror"), a term attributed to the founders of Jainism. Although Jainism was founded by Mahavira (599–527 BCE), the 24th *Thirthankara* ("Fordmaker"), it originated at least a few hundred years prior to him. However, due to the paucity of any historical sources, it is difficult to establish its origin precisely. Mahavira was born in Kundagrama (599 BCE) in the Jantrika clan. He left his family at the age of 28 after the death of his parents and became an ascetic and joined the followers of Parshva, the 23rd *Thirthankara*. He achieved liberation (*kevala*) and achieved *Jinahood*. The central teachings of Jainism are based on asceticism and nonviolence.

The five principles of Jainism are as follows:

- *Jiva: Jivas* are the particles of life that exist in everything. In other words, every living being has soul.
- Cycles of life: The *jivas* are born and reborn in endless cycles of life. Jainism assumes that each *jiva* will pass through innumerable births, occupying all of the various kinds of bodies, from humans to gods, insects to plants, or lower.
- Karma: Karmic law governs the cycles of life. Subtle particles of karma pervade the universe and are indistinguishable from one another. When they are attracted to the soul, they take on the characteristics of the acts of the soul. The worst types of karma are those that are attracted by acts of violence and destruction.

- Principles of liberation: Five vows help exit this cycle of life and achieve liberation: *satya* ("truth"), *ahimsa* ("nonviolence"), *asteya* (not stealing), *brahmacharya* (abstaining from sex), and *aparigraha* ("nonattachment").
- *kevala* ("liberation"): Every being can achieve liberation. Fourteen stages are represented on the path of liberation. These stages are achieved by a combination of deep faith, right knowledge, and pure conduct, referred to as the "three jewels" in Jainism. Faith is considered the first jewel since it is the first step to turn an individual away from further bondage and toward liberation.

Jainism proposes an eternal, permanent world, although subject to changes based on time periods. Jainism proposes 12 periods of cyclical time: 6 upward-moving cycles and 6 downward. The continuity of existence is stressed, although all lives and civilizations end at the end of each cycle and are once again created and rediscovered afresh when a new cycle begins.

Jain teachings are preserved in 12 *angas* ("limbs") compiled by Indrabhuti. The most important of these texts are *The Book of Conduct,* containing the rules of life, and *The Book of Critique,* which examines the views opposed to Jainism. There are also 12 Jain subsidiary texts known as *upangas* ("secondary limbs"), which contain instructions for lay followers. In addition to these canonical texts, a number of Jain texts were written later as commentaries and philosophical expositions of Jain scripture. In addition, Jain scholars also produced epic narratives, biographies of the *Jinas,* and devotional poetry.

One major schism occurred in Jainism based on a dispute over practice, and Jainism divided into two sects known as the Digambaras ("sky clad" or "naked") and Svetambaras ("white robe clad"). The schism occurred roughly 200 years after the death of Mahavira. In the third century BCE, a group of 1,200 Jains moved to southern India under the leadership of Bhadrabahu due to a famine in northern India at that time, while another group stayed behind. The group of Jains under the leadership of Bhadrabahu returned to northern India 12 years later and noticed that the north Indian group had strayed from the original practices of Jainism by wearing clothing, and thus called them Svetambara Jains from then onward. The two groups also differ in their agreement over the right of liberation for women. While the Svetambaras sanction that women are eligible to achieve liberation in this life, the Digambaras believe that women can only obtain liberation after being reborn as a man in another life, since their asceticism is incomplete in this life, because they can go naked as male ascetics of the Digambara sect.

Jainism is a minority religion in India and across the world. In India, Jain communities are found mostly in western states including the Punjab, Gujarat, Rajasthan, and Karnataka. The Pakistan side of the Punjab and Sindh used to have significant numbers of Jains but they migrated to India due to communal tensions after the creation of Pakistan in August 1947. East African countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda have significant Jain communities. Western countries such as Britain, Canada, and the United States also contain significant communities that follow Jainism.

LAVANYA VEMSANI

See also Hinduism; Religion

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✦ JAIPUR

Jaipur, which literally means city (*pur*) of victory (*Jai*), is the capital of the desert state of Rajasthan in northwestern India and is situated just over 160 miles from Delhi. It is well served by transport links, including an airport. Rajasthan is the second-largest state by area and ninth largest by population in the union of India, while Jaipur District covers an area of just over 7,200 square miles and, in the 2001 census, had a population of more than 5.2 million. The principal languages spoken are Hindi and Rajasthani. Today, Jaipur is synonymous with tourism as "the Pink City" and gateway to the state's rich historical, architectural, and handicraft heritage. The principal buildings in the city center, however, only came to be painted pink in the 1870s to celebrate the visit of Great Britain's Edward (1841–1910), prince of Wales, later King Edward VII (1901–1910).

Although the history of Rajasthan goes back to prehistoric times, Jaipur derives from the time of its founder, Maharaja Sawai Jai Singh II (1688–1743; maharaja, 1700–1743), the Rajput ruler of the state of Amber, who founded it as his new and modern planned capital city in 1727. Jai Singh was an exceptionally talented monarch with a special interest in sciences and astronomy and is renowned for constructing the Jantar Mantar, which is considered to be the largest stone astronomical observatory in the world. While predominantly followers of the Hindu faith, Rajput princely rulers were tolerant monarchs, which explains how Rajasthan came to be a key center for Jainism in India. In 1818, these rulers, including Jai Singh's descendent Jagat Singh (maharaja 1803–1818), agreed to retain their sovereignty in exchange for collective supervision by representatives of the British East India Company, founded in 1600, under the new name of Rajputana, which in 1958 formally became the state of Rajasthan.

In addition to tourism and its traditional excellence in handicrafts, including jewelry and garments, Jaipur is fast emerging as an industrial center and enjoys high levels of investment and growth. Rajasthan's major industries include textiles, woolens, and sugar, while its rich mineral deposits include zinc, emerald, granite, gypsum, silver, and mica.

CHANDRIKA KAUL

See also Rajasthan

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✦ JAMA MASJID MOSQUE

Jama Masjid or Masjid-i-Jahanuma ("mosque commanding the world view") is a mosque completed in 1656 by the fifth Mughal emperor Shahjahan (1592–1666; emperor, 1628–1658). Located in the old walled city of Delhi, it is the largest mosque in India and a major tourist attraction. Approximately 5,000 laborers, skilled artisans, and craftsmen completed this project over the course of six years. It is just over 500 yards away from the famous royal palace, or Red Fort, and it stands on a rock on top of a hill with three double-storied gateways. The architectural design of the mosque is a testament to Indo-Islamic culture with its four-storied, tapering, 130-foot-high minarets with three drum-shaped bulbous domes striped with black and white marble. The main courtyard is enclosed by pillared corridors with



Jama Masjid Mosque in Old Delhi, completed in 1656, can accommodate over 20,000 worshippers. (Daniel Boiteau/Dreamstime.com)

domed pavilions at the corners where 25,000 worshippers can be accommodated at one time. It contains a sparkling ablution tank in the center. This mosque holds some very old copies of the Quran on deerskin and some relics of the Prophet Muhammad (ca. 570–632). The prayer hall has three arches with marble frames containing an inscription about the details of the construction of the mosque and its costs (1 million rupees in 1656).

One of the remarkable features of this mosque is that the custodians and family in charge of congregational prayers came from the city of Bukhara in Central Asia on the invitation of Shahjahan in 1656, and his descendents still continue to lead the prayers. Abdul Ghafoor Bukhari led the first Friday prayers in this main mosque of the capital city in 1656, and Syed Abdullah Bukhari, who died in 2009, was an enthusiastic supporter of communal harmony and Indian secularism. He single-handedly persuaded thousands of Muslims not to migrate to Pakistan in 1947. He became even more famous for his criticism leveled against the government program of forced sterilization in the late 1970s and the Babri Mosque Movement in the 1990s. However, the rise of right-wing political parties, such as the Bharatiya Janata Party, which was founded in 1980, marginalized Bukhari.

Jama Masjid became the site of terrorist attacks when two crude bombs exploded seven minutes apart on April 14, 2006, on a Friday when Muslim worshippers were celebrating the birth of the Prophet Muhammad. This incident brought Abdullah Bukhari into the limelight again when he appealed to the people to maintain communal harmony at all costs. In this effort, he created the Jama Masjid United Forum in 2007 to promote universal peace. The forum convenes annual conferences on terrorism with the aim of dispelling the idea that Islam is intrinsically linked with terrorism and discusses means by which terrorism can be eradicated. The forum is deeply committed to other projects as well including education, especially for girls, the provision of medical supplies and facilities for the poor, social and academic programs to combat poverty and hunger, and the obtaining of basic rights for the underprivileged.

The Jama Masjid complex, which houses the mausoleum of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958) and Sufi saint Syed Sarmad (d. 1661) and other burial sites, is undergoing major renovations that began in 2009. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi plans to beautify and renovate the 46 acres of land surrounding the mosque by raising the height of the area, creating a Mughal garden, building a shopping complex, redeveloping a bazaar called Meena bazaar (with 650 air-conditioned shops), and instituting new traffic control regulations for the busy and overcrowded area. The project is under consideration by the urban planning authorities and is being supervised by the Archaeological Survey of India, which is responsible for monitoring developmental projects around historical sites. Nonetheless, financial concerns and controversy over redevelopment plans has delayed the project.

FATIMA A. IMAM

See also Islam; Muslims

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✦ JAMIA MILLIA ISLAMIA UNIVERSITY

Jamia Millia Islamia is a central university located in the Muslim-populated Okhla District in the southern part of Delhi. In Arabic and Urdu, *Jamia* means "university," *Millia* means "national," and *Islamia* means "Islamic." Accordingly, Jamia Millia University means National Islamic University. Jamia Millia Islamia was established in 1920 at Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh, at another renowned center of higher education for Muslims, Aligarh Muslim University, founded in 1875 by social reformer and educationist Syed Ahmed Khan (1817–1898) as Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College, which became Aligarh Muslim University in 1920, the same year Jamia Millia was established. Jamia Millia was founded by 18 members of a self-selected group of the Muslim intellectual and religious elite called the Founding Committee. In 1962, the University Grants Commission of India declared Jamia Millia Islamia to be a "deemed university" and it acquired the status of a central university in 1988 by an act of Parliament. There are no colleges affiliated to Jamia Millia Islamia, instead, it is a residential university with over 12,000 students and 700 faculty members. The university is fully accredited by the University Grants Commission and other national bodies.

In the early part of the 20th century, a group of Muslim scholars led by Maulana Mehmood Hasan (1851–1920) responded to the nationalist call to boycott educational institutions supported or run by the British colonial administration. As Aligarh Muslim University, with its modernist education, was perceived to have pro-Western inclinations, a group of more activist Muslim nationalists imbued with the spirit of the Khilafat Movement (1919–1924) and the first Non-Cooperation Movement (1920–1922) led by Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948) and organized by the Indian National Congress, founded in 1885, created the Founding Committee that established the university. Hakim ("Doctor") Ajmal Khan (1863–1928) was elected as the first chancellor of Jamia Millia Islamia on November 22, 1920, and Mohammed Ali Jauhar (1878–1931) was made its first vice-chancellor.

During its formative phase, a number of teachers and students from Jamia Millia Islamia took part in the Non-Cooperation Movement and in spite of the members of the Jamia community being imprisoned by the British, volunteers from Jamia Millia Islamia also took an active part in the Bordoli Satyagraha of 1928, an antitax movement in Gujarat led by Vallabhbhai Patel (1875–1950).

Mustafa Kamal Ataturk of Turkey declared the end of the Khilafat Movement in 1924, and there was a financial crisis looming in Jamia Millia Islamia due to the drying up of donations. It is at this stage that Hakim Ajmal Khan, Abdul Majeed Khwaja (1885–1962), and Dr. Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari (1880–1936) traveled to various parts of India, as well as embarking on trips overseas, to engage in a fund-raising campaign. Their efforts paid dividends and in 1925, the campus of Jamia Millia Islamia was shifted from Aligarh to Karol Bagh in West Delhi.

When Hakim Ajmal Khan passed away in 1928, Jamia Millia Islamia was again plunged into another financial crisis, as Dr. Khan himself had been donating a sizable amount to meet Jamia's financial needs and the development of its infrastructure. However, upon their return from their studies in Europe, a group of young scholars including Dr. Zakir Hussein (1897–1969), Dr. Mohammed Mujeeb (1902–1985), and Dr. Syed Abid Husain (1896–1978) agreed to serve as teachers at Jamia Millia Islamia on a paltry salary of less than 150 rupees per month. A second group of teachers took a similar pledge in 1942. Slowly and surely, Jamia's educational outlets opened up with the establishment of Jamia Press, the Urdu Academy, and finally the Maktaba Jamia being entrusted to Professor Mohammed Mujeeb, Dr. Abid Hussein, and Mr. Hamid Ali Khan. As a result, Jamia Millia Islamia was built, according to poet Sarojini Naidu (1879–1949), "stone by stone, sacrifice by sacrifice."

The foundation for the present campus of Jamia Millia Islamia in the Okhla section of Delhi to the south of the city was laid on March 1, 1935. During the 1930s, a number of scholars from overseas visited Jamia Millia Islamia. These included Admiral Hussein Raouf Bey of Turkey (1933), Dr. Behadjet Wahbi of Egypt (1934), Ms. Halide Edib of Turkey (1936), and Ms. Gerda Philipsborn of Germany (1939)—a friend of Zakir Husain who served the university between 1931 and 1943—who became known as "Aapa Jaan," had a building named after her at the University and is buried there. After India achieved independence in August 1947, Jamia Millia Islamia expanded rapidly with new departments and centers being created on a regular basis.

Jamia Millia Islamia offers various academic and curricular programs through its cluster of units. They include such faculties as the Faculty of Education, the Faculty of Engineering and Technology, the Faculty of Humanities and Languages, the Faculty of Social Sciences, and the Faculty of Architecture and Ekistics. A number of highly reputed centers have been established by Jamia Millia Islamia such as the FTK Center for Information Technology, the Center for Jawaharlal Nehru Studies, the Center for Gandhian Studies, the Center for Dalit and Minorities Studies, the Munshi Premchand Archives, and the Academy of Third World Studies.

Jamia Millia Islamia is one of the premier central universities in India's capital, Delhi, along with Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi University, and Indira Gandhi Open University. With a generous grant from India's University Grants Commission, Jamia's Dr. Zakir Hussein Library has been equipped with state-of-the-art facilities. Jamia Millia Islamia has also entered into a memorandum of understanding and exchange agreements

with a number of universities around the world. Notable alumni of the university include film actor Shahrukh Khan (b. 1965), cricketer Virender Sehwag (b. 1978), and media personality Barkha Dutt (b. 1971).

MOHAMMED BADRUL ALAM

See also Aligarh Muslim University; Islam; Muslims

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✦ JAMMU AND KASHMIR

The Indian Independence Act of 1947 passed by the British Parliament created the dominions of India and Pakistan and practically made the 562 princely states independent. The act simply stated, "The suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States." However, in mid-1947, Lord Louis Mountbatten (1900–1979), in his capacity as viceroy, advised the princes to join either dominion, preferably on the basis of geographical contiguity. Maharaja Hari Singh of the state of Jammu and Kashmir was also advised accordingly. The problem was that his state bordered both India and Pakistan. On July 17, 1947, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), the founder of Pakistan, endorsed the British legal position in regard to the princely states: constitutionally and legally, the Indian states would be independent sovereign states on the termination of British paramountcy and would be free to adopt any course they liked; it was open to them to join the Hindustan Constituent Assembly or the Pakistan Constituent Assembly or decide to remain independent. In the last case, they would enter into an agreement or a relationship with India or Pakistan as they chose.

Of the princely states, Jammu and Kashmir was the largest in area, about 84,258 square miles, with a relatively small population of more than 4 million, of which 78 percent were Muslims, 21 percent were Hindus, and the rest were Buddhists and Sikhs. The state had three distinct units in terms of religious affiliation: the valley of Kashmir is predominantly Muslim, Jammu has a large Hindu population, and Ladakh is predominantly Buddhist. Jammu and Kashmir is strategically extremely important, bordering China and the former Soviet Union, Tibet, and Afghanistan. In the era of Cold War politics, it was

undeniably an extremely strategic location. Besides, whoever controlled Kashmir controlled the headwaters of many rivers flowing into India and Pakistan.

As in most parts of the subcontinent, the rulers and subjects before the Muslim conquest were Hindus. In the sixth century CE, Kashmir came under the Vikramaditya Dynasty of Ujjain in central India, marking Kashmir's golden age. From that time on Kashmir came to be known as a great center for the study of Sanskrit, the classics, music, architecture, and sculpture. Scholarship flourished during the reign of the greatest of Kashmir's kings, Lalitaditya (697–738), a great warrior, certainly not the first, but highly renowned for public works and charity. Kashmir came under Muslim rule in 1339 with Shah Mirza's occupation of Srinagar, the capital. Among its pre-Mughal rulers were Sultan Qutbud-din and Zain-ul-Abidin, who established a tradition of religious tolerance, encouraged Sanskrit learning, funded Hindu and Muslim theological institutions, and sent Hindu students to Benaras (Varanasi) for advanced studies. Zain-ul-Abidin, popularly known as *Budshah* or "Great King," himself was a student of Sanskrit who committed to memory the text of *Yoga Vashista*, reciting it in his old age for the spiritual solace it provided him. For the first two centuries of Muslim rule, Sanskrit was used as the court language and the administration was led by Brahmans (pandits).

Kashmiri pandits served as court advisers and administrators until the middle of the 20th century. The tradition of Muslim/Hindu harmony was the heritage of the Kashmiris until the 1990s, when the seeds of hatred and suspicion were sown and led to the ethnic cleansing of Kashmir's 400,000 Hindu pandits, who were forced to leave the valley as destitutes: a large number still live in refugee camps outside Delhi.

Mughal rule in Kashmir was notable for laying out spacious and world-renowned gardens such as Achibal, Nasim, and Shalimar. Akbar the Great, who ruled India from 1556 until 1605, ordered his able minister, Todar Mal, to introduce his well-known land tenure system, which has continued into recent times. The institution of village officers in Kashmir dates from Mughal times. Unfortunately, during the last days of Mughal rule, tribal peoples from the subcontinent's northwest unleashed a reign of terror marked by anarchy, looting, rape, and plunder, which in 1819 led a Kashmiri nobleman from the valley, Birbal Dar, to invite the Sikh monarch, Ranjit Singh, to occupy Jammu and Kashmir.

After the conquest, Ranjit Singh appointed one of his principal ministers, Gulab Singh, to administer Jammu. Later in the 19th century, the ascendant British sold Kashmir to Gulab Singh, the founder of the Dogra Dynasty, for 7.5 million rupees. In 1889, as part of the "forward" policy to thwart Russian expansion in the region, the British created the Gilgit Agency and placed it under a British political agent beyond the jurisdiction of the rulers of Jammu and Kashmir.

In the early 1930s, a popular movement began in Kashmir under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah. Born and raised in Kashmir, he was educated at Aligarh Muslim University in Uttar Pradesh. In 1932, he founded the Muslim Conference, whose name he changed to the Kashmir National Conference (NC) in 1939 because the progressive and liberal-minded Sheikh wanted the organization to be noncommunal. The NC had large numbers of Hindus

and Sikhs as its members. The organization's aims were political and economic. The NC under Sheikh Abdullah agitated for a government of the people just as the Indian National Congress, founded in 1885, did under Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948) and Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964). The NC joined the All-India States People's Conference (AISPC). Sheikh Abdullah was its vice president before he was thrown in jail by the maharaja; while in prison, he was elected president of the AISPC. The Kashmir movement was thus in line with the movement in the rest of India.

The NC's agitation led, in 1934, to the creation of a Legislative Assembly of 75 members of whom 40 were elected, though the right to vote was limited to only 8 percent of the population, based as it was on literacy and property qualifications. The assembly had no powers; the maharaja's authority was unchallenged. The NC hoped the maharaja would, in course of time, be a constitutional monarchy with limited powers, on the British pattern. The maharaja was personally not too happy with Sheikh Abdullah and his policies. When the Cabinet Mission, headed by Sir Pethick Lawrence, arrived in 1946, the NC managed to let it be known that it favored sending Kashmir's representatives to the Indian Constituent Assembly. The maharaja's narrow-minded and obnoxious prime minister, Ram Chandra Kak (1893–1983; prime minister 1945–1947), disagreed and arrested Sheikh Abdullah. In his absence, his wife, Begum Akbar Jahan Abdullah (1917–2000), gave up living in *purdah* for the first time and led the people in public.

The Indian Independence Act of 1947 stipulated that "an Indian State shall be deemed to have acceded to the Dominion if the Governor-General has signified his acceptance of the Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler thereof." The other alternative was to remain aloof from both India and Pakistan and, if the maharaja felt like it, to sign a standstill agreement with either or both of the dominions.

The maharaja did not want to exercise his options immediately. He would not accede to Pakistan because it would have gone against the wishes of his people as represented by the NC led by "The Lion of Kashmir" Sheikh Abdullah, the principal secular-minded leader. Consequently, the maharaja did not want to risk the political unrest that would have erupted if he went against the NC. On the other hand, accession to India would have put his archenemy, Sheikh Abdullah, in power. The latter's close relationship with the Congress Party and especially with Nehru would have made him too dominant for the maharaja's liking. Therefore, on August 12, 1947, the maharaja proposed a standstill agreement with both India and Pakistan. Both accepted. Pakistan did so on August 15, thereby agreeing to keep communication and supply lines to Kashmir open as before.

However, Pakistan had different plans for Kashmir. On August 31, Major General Henry Scott, who commanded the maharaja's army, complained to his government of tribal raids from Pakistan. On October 13, Norman Cliff of the *London News Chronicle* reported that Pakistan had cut off supplies of gasoline, sugar, salt, and kerosene oil to Kashmir, "although a Standstill Agreement between them has been signed." Two days later, the maharaja complained to the British prime minister, Clement Attlee, about the invasion with the "obvious



An Indian Border Security Force soldier guards a mountain pass in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir as pilgrims trek to the Amarnath cave near Sangam, 85 miles northeast of Srinagar, July 2004. Hundreds of pilgrims annually make the pilgrimage to the remote, 14,500-foot high Himalayan shrine to worship a stalagmite representing Shiva, the Hindu god of destruction. (AP Photo/Rafiq Maqbool)

connivance of the Pakistan Government." By October 22, the invaders had captured several towns; massacred large numbers of civilians, particularly in Baramula; and reached Uri, only 50 miles from Srinagar. Two days later, the maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession to India and appealed for military help. While accepting the accession, Mountbatten wrote to Maharaja Hari Singh on October 27, "It is my Government's wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people."

The international legal status of Kashmir and the Indian government's responsibility to defend it was accepted by the United States, whose representative to the United Nations (UN), Warren Austin, stated on February 4, 1948, "The external sovereignty of Kashmir is no longer under the control of Maharaja. . . . With the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, this foreign sovereignty went over to India and is exercised by India, and that is how India happens to be here as a petitioner."

India took the Kashmir question to the Security Council of the UN on January 1, 1948. Its aim was to get the Pakistani forces out of Kashmir, which had legally acceded to India. An attack on any part of Kashmir, therefore, became an aggression against Indian territory. Invoking Article 35 of the UN Charter, India complained that raiders and other

Pakistani nationals, aided by Pakistani armed personnel, using Pakistani military equipment, transportation, and supplies (including gasoline), were involved in the attacks. India, therefore, requested the Security Council "to prevent Pakistan Government personnel, military and civil, from participating or assisting in the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir state." Failing any action, India reserved the right to protect its borders. A long diplomatic battle then ensued in the UN with Pakistan's rejoinder completely denying any role in the tribal invasion of Kashmir. The Security Council ordered a cease fire effective January 1, 1948, and appointed the Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) to investigate and report. However, before the crucial resolution of August 13, 1948, was passed, the UNCIP reported a complete change in the situation. In a "surprising and contradictory" testimony before the UNCIP on July 7, 1948, the foreign minister of Pakistan, Sir Zafrullah Khan (1893–1985), said that "the Pakistan Army had at the time three brigades of regular troops in Kashmir and that the troops had been sent into the State during the first half of May." A member of the UNCIP, Josef Korbel (1909–1977), described the "flagrant and contradictory admission" by Pakistan's foreign minister as a "bombshell" because it completely vitiated the basis of UNCIP's thinking up to that point of time.

UNCIP's August 13 resolution, therefore, made any further action conditional on Pakistan's complete withdrawal of its regular troops as well as of the invading tribesmen. The August resolution consists of three parts of which Part II contains two subparts. Implementation of each part and subpart was conditional on the implementation of the previous one. Part I-A and I-B proposed that the two countries issue cease-fire orders to their respective forces. Part II-A and II-B deserve to be quoted in extenso.

Part II-A states:

1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from the State.
2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavor to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.
3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.

Part II-B states:

When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in Part II-A2 have withdrawn thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council on having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State

of Jammu and Kashmir, and further that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the *bulk* of their forces from that in *stages* to be agreed upon with the Commission [emphasis added].

And finally, Part III states:

The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the Truce Agreement both governments agree to enter into consultations with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expressions will be assured.

It took the two governments four months to communicate their acceptance of the UNCIP resolution of August 13, 1948. According to the Indian spokesman, V. K. Krishna Menon, the delay was caused by his government seeking and securing certain clarifications. Among these were as follows: (1) responsibility for the security of the state of Jammu and Kashmir rests with the government of India; (2) there shall be no recognition of the so-called Azad Kashmir government; (3) the administration of the evacuated areas in the north shall revert to the government of India who will, if necessary, maintain garrisons for preventing the incursions of tribesmen and for guarding the main trade routes; (4) if a plebiscite is found to be impossible for technical or practical reasons, the commission will consider other methods of determining fair and equitable conditions for ensuring a free expression of the people's will; and (5) plebiscite proposals shall not be binding upon India if Pakistan does not implement Parts I and II of the resolution of August 13, 1948.

Thanks to the persistent efforts of the UNCIP, the two sides ordered a cease-fire effective "one minute before midnight of first January, 1949." That, in effect, implemented Part I of the resolution of August 13, 1948. Part II regarding withdrawal of forces was not then, and has not since, been implemented. Despite attempts made by several UN representatives and plebiscite administrators, notably the Canadian general A. G. L. McNaughton (1887–1966), the Australian judge and diplomat Sir Owen Dixon (1886–1972), U.S. admiral Chester W. Nimitz (1885–1966), and U.S. senator and educator Dr. Frank Graham (1886–1972), between 1949 and 1953, no plebiscite could be held in Kashmir as Pakistan refused to withdraw its troops as required under Part I-A of the UNCIP resolution of August 13, 1948.

From that time to this date, Pakistan has not complied with Part I-A of the August 13, 1948, resolution requiring it to withdraw its troops. Since the plebiscite was conditional on such compliance, it has not been possible for the UN to move any further on the matter. As the years rolled by and Pakistan had still not complied, the Indian government pleaded that it could not be held accountable for its promise to hold the plebiscite. India also stated that in view of the altered strategic situation caused by Pakistan's military pact with the United

States and membership of the U.S.-led alliances such as MEDO, CENTO, and SEATO, the military balance on the subcontinent had changed. The Indian prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, wrote to his Pakistan counterpart on December 21, 1953: "Military aid to Pakistan . . . produces a qualitative change in the existing situation and, therefore, it affects Indo-Pakistan relations, and, more especially, the Kashmir problem." Two India-Pakistan wars later, in the aftermath of Pakistan losing its eastern half and with India holding 94,000 Pakistani armed forces as prisoners of war, Zulfiqar Bhutto (1928–1979; president 1971–1973; prime minister 1973–1977) of Pakistan and Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984) of India met at Simla, Himachal Pradesh. The two signed a pact agreeing to make the line of control (LOC) in the former Jammu and Kashmir state the international border between India and Pakistan. All parties concerned observed the LOC as the effective border until the late 1980s, when several armed groups attempted to alter it by force.

Since 1989, there has been considerable violence in Kashmir, making it one of the most dangerous spots on the planet as it is contested by two nations, India and Pakistan, that possess nuclear weapons. The end of the anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan in the same year as the outbreak of the antigovernment violence in Kashmir was no coincidence. Large numbers of the mujahideens, Arabs of different nationalities, notably Egyptians and Yemenis, moved to Pakistan-held Kashmir and from there infiltrated into Indian Kashmir. Pakistan regarded them as "freedom fighters" who were pursuing a jihadist struggle to unite the two Kashmirs and bring the entire state under Pakistan. The largest number of incidents, 6,043 of them, occurred in 1994. The Indian and U.S. intelligence agencies perceived that the jihadists were mostly trained in Pakistan-held Kashmir and in Pakistan itself, and that they were directly helped militarily and economically by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and pro-Taliban elements in the Pakistani Army. A Rand Corporation study of 2001 titled *Pakistan's Role in the Kashmir Insurgency* noted that the "nature of the conflict has been transformed from what was originally a secular, locally-based struggle (conducted via the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front [JKLF]) to one that is now largely carried out by foreign militants and rationalized in pan-Islamic religious terms."

The JKLF and the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference demand an independent Kashmir, the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed (outlawed by Pakistan and the United States) and numerous other militant outfits want all of Kashmir brought under Pakistan's flag. U.S. intelligence avows that Al Qaeda maintains a very important base in the Pakistan-ruled part of Kashmir, that its goals are pan-Islamic and anti-Western, and that it directly helps the militant struggle so as to foment an open war between India and Pakistan.

In 2002, Osama bin Laden listed U.S. support for India on the question of Kashmir as a reason he was fighting the United States. Different sources, governmental and others, have alleged that potential militants from diverse parts of the world have received elaborate training in Pakistan-held Kashmir before their deployment in Indian Kashmir. The U.S. Council on Foreign Relations has held that parts of Pakistan's military and ISI

"have provided covert but well-documented support to terrorist groups active in Kashmir." The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has published images of militant training camps both in Pakistan and Pakistan-held Kashmir. On more than one occasion, the UN Security Council has urged Pakistan to crack down on terrorist groups operating in Kashmir and killing ordinary people. Pakistan has denied any role in training or assisting any of the militant groups, whom it lauds as freedom fighters. Pakistan avows its support to Kashmiri fighters has been limited to diplomatic channels.

In the two decades since 1989, according to official Indian sources, more than 47,000 people have died and an estimated 3,400 people are missing. The incidents of violence were most intense in the mid-1990s; the largest number of violent incidents was in 1994. Some of the militants involved in Kashmir have claimed responsibility or have been blamed for incidents of anti-Indian violence outside Kashmir. Such incidents included the hijacking of Indian Airlines flight IC-184 to Kandahar in Afghanistan and an attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001. The number of violent incidents has fallen dramatically since India and Pakistan began a peace process in January 2004, when the Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (b. 1924; prime minister 1996, 1998–2004) and Pakistan's president Pervez Musharaff (b. 1943; president 2001–2008) met for discussions. Since the 1980s, both India and Pakistan have stationed a large number of regular troops and paramilitary forces on either side of the LOC. There was only one major conflict between the two rival states as Pakistan made an unsuccessful effort to alter the ground situation in Kargil in 1998. In 2008, for the first time, Pakistan's president, Asif Ali Zardari (b. 1955; president 2008–), stated that the militants in Kashmir were terrorists and that India has never been a threat to Pakistan.

A major tragedy of the two-decade-old militancy in Kashmir has been the suffering of Kashmiri pandits, who were compelled to flee from their homes in the Kashmir Valley in large numbers. They were specifically targeted by militants as they were killed or displaced. In 2006, the U.S. Congress in a special resolution called it "ethnic cleansing" and urged the government of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian government to "take immediate steps to remedy the situation" of the Kashmiri pandits to "ensure the physical, political and economic security of this embattled community." However, as of 2010, the bulk of the refugees, numbering over 400,000, languish in refugee camps around India's capital.

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See also Pakistan, Relations with

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✦ JAPAN, RELATIONS WITH

The foreign policy of India, like that of any other country, is shaped and influenced by geopolitics, geography, history, cultural parameters, and, most important, vital national interests. The changing economic, military, and strategic environment in and around South Asia, Southeast Asia, and East Asia has had its repercussions, with India trying to reach out for new avenues to exercise greater flexibility in its conduct of foreign policy in the Asian region. In this context, India's Look East policy, with special reference to Japan, has profound foreign policy ramifications.

Japan and India are two of the oldest civilizations of the world, with a shared past dating back to the time of Gautama Buddha (ca. 563–483 BCE), the founder of Buddhism. Siddhartha, as he was popularly known, was born in India (present-day Nepal) and spent his entire adult life in India. After his death, Buddhism spread to other parts of Asia: to Tibet, then to China, Korea, and eventually to Japan where an Indian Buddhist monk had set foot as early as the eighth century. Thus, the two countries have cherished long cultural bonds spanning over 13 centuries. Today, Buddhism is one of the two main religions of Japan, the other being Shintoism, and the Buddha's teachings still have a profound influence.

On a parallel track, India's 1913 Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) influenced Japanese philosopher and artist Tenshin Okakura (1862–1913) and a number of his contemporaries, especially during Tagore's three trips to Japan in 1916, 1924, and 1929.

During India's struggle for independence in the opening years of the 20th century, an influential radical faction of the Indian National Congress Party, founded in 1885, led by Netaji Subash Chandra Bose (1897–1945) derived its ideological inspiration from the right-wing nationalists of Japan and sought military cooperation in order to drive the British out of India. The Indian National Army (INA), a guerrilla army that was formed in 1943 under the command of Bose, was trained by Japanese military officers based in the British territory of Singapore, which was then under Japanese occupation. Subsequently, Justice Radha Binod Pal (1886–1967) of India was the only dissenting judge in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo that tried Japanese military leaders for crimes committed during World War II. He gave the judicial opinion that it was wrong for the victorious Allied powers to try a defeated nation in court, and so he gave Japanese wartime leaders the verdict of "not guilty."

After India achieved its long-cherished independence in August 1947, its first prime minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964), looked upon

Japan as a friendly nation that could be counted on to help India rebuild its industrial and agricultural base. Nehru's policy of nonalignment found a receptive audience among the Japanese elite and leftist intellectuals, and he refused to attend the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco in 1945, which led to the founding of the United Nations (UN), as he viewed a possible army of occupation in Japan as a violation of Japanese sovereignty. India under Nehru signed a separate peace treaty with Japan in 1952, which was the first treaty to be signed by a postwar Japanese government. Thus, Japan and India entered into a formal diplomatic relationship in the spirit of mutual respect and goodwill and cooperated with each other in areas of trade and commerce. Japan also received from India valuable raw materials such as iron ore, aluminum, and steel to further modernize and rebuild its own economy in the postwar years. Over the years, Indian textiles and Indian tea have been leading export items from India to Japan. Japan, on its part, is a member nation of the India Aid Consortium, which first met in August 1958 and has assisted India generously, especially since the rise of the Japanese economy in the 1960s, through the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development that was founded in 1948 and re-formed in 1961 into its present organization. Since 1986, Japan has been India's largest donor.

The expanding role of Japan in the global economy has been of considerable interest to India. In turn, India's industrial and technological strength has enhanced its global competitiveness in several vital sectors, and it has posed a challenge to the most advanced industrialized countries. Since 1991, when India liberalized its economy through the introduction of wide-ranging economic reforms, India has joined the developing countries by making strenuous efforts to attract foreign investment and increase trade with other countries, Japan included.

Japan is one of India's largest and oldest trading partners as the Indo-Japanese trade relationship started as early as the 1870s. Since 1991, however, the volume of trade has witnessed an upward spiral. As Japan has shifted its focus toward other Asian countries in South and Southeast Asia, particularly in the countries of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, founded in 1985, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, founded earlier in 1967, trade between the two countries has increased dramatically. Nonetheless, it is believed Indo-Japanese bilateral trade has still not opened up to its fullest potential. Despite India's economic reforms, Indian goods have not been able to penetrate far into the Japanese market. India only has the miniscule share of .7 percent of total Japanese global trade. It ranks 20th among Japan's trading partners and far below the United States, China, the European Union (EU), and East Asian and southwest Asian countries. Japan, however, is the third-largest exporting destination for India, after the United States and the United Kingdom. India, in fact, was the first country to be offered loan assistance when Japan launched its financial assistance program in 1958. Over the years, Japan's soft loan assistance to India has expanded to cover a wide range of areas, from development of its economic infrastructure to reforestation and preservation of its cultural heritage.

The year 2003 was a landmark for the Japan-India development partnership, as India became the largest recipient of yen loan assistance from Japan. Since then, India has been the

top recipient of Japanese soft loan assistance. With the yen loan commitment to India going up by 18.9 percent in 2007 over the previous year's figure, Japanese assistance has scaled new heights. In December 2008, the prime ministers of the two countries decided to launch immediate negotiations for the conclusion of a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement aiming to make rapid strides in expanding trade.

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See also China, Relations with; Foreign Policy; Look East Policy

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✦ JHARKHAND

The state of Jharkhand covers nearly 31,000 square miles and was carved out of 46 percent of south Bihar's territory in northeastern India on November 15, 2000. Most of Jharkhand lies on the Chota Nagpur Plateau. It is a hilly upland, the land of jungle and *jhari* ("forest" or "bush"), and forest covers about 30 percent of Jharkhand. Rivers, lakes, and dams, which generate electricity, are also found in the state, as well as a number of national parks and zoological gardens. The state's greatest attribute, however, is its mineral resources, which include uranium, gold, silver, iron, coal (nearly one-third of Indian production), and copper (one-quarter of India's output). Scheduled tribes, tribals or aboriginals (*adivasis*), account for nearly 30 percent of the population, and scheduled castes (Dalits or untouchables) account for 12 percent of the nearly 30 million people in the state. The main languages spoken are Hindi, Bengali, Oriya, Urdu, English, and numerous tribal languages. There are 32 tribes in Jharkhand who have different subsistence patterns: hunting and gathering, shifting agriculture, artisanal, and settled agriculture. Many in more remote areas of the state still continue their old way of life and remain desperately poor and uneducated. As a result, many have been receptive to the ideas of the Naxalites, the

Maoists who operate along the "Red Corridor" down the east coast from Bengal to Kerala on the west coast. Jharkhand is one of the few states with a considerable Naxalite influence and the "Naxal Belt," which also comprises Jharkhand, reportedly houses some 20,000 insurgents.

Jharkhand is divided into 24 districts for administrative purposes, with the governor, appointed by the president of India, heading the state. Executive authority rests with the elected chief minister and his cabinet. The Legislative Assembly, located at the capital, Ranchi, seats 81 representatives; the two largest political parties are the Bharatiya Janata Party and the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha. Due to the rugged terrain, less than half of the 30,000 or so villages in the state receive electricity and only one-quarter are linked by road. The area's great role in history was to provide the coal and iron ore on which the Mauryans (321–185 BCE) and the Guptas (320–550 CE) based their dynasties. Both were able to use these natural resources to build empires that encompassed most of India. In turn, the Muslim empires (1206–1858) and the British (1857–1947) used the coal and iron ore as important material assets.

The tribal people who had been agitating for a state that would represent their interests since before India received its independence from Great Britain in August 1947 have, until the last few decades, lived lives relatively unchanged over the centuries due to the area's inaccessibility and remoteness. The dominant tribe is the Santhals, who speak an Austro-Asiatic language written it its own Olchiki script. They are followed by the Dravidian Oraon and Munda peoples and the Hos. While the tribes follow animistic practices with a number of rituals, ceremonies, and festivals, especially their worship of sacred places and village or tribal deities and they have developed distinct traditions of tribal artwork from pottery and jewelry to woodwork and tribal weaponry, over 50 percent of the Kharias and 25 percent of the Munda and Ho are Christians, as the area has a considerable number of Christian missions. Proselytization began in 1845 when the German Gossner Evangelical Lutheran Church was established in Ranchi. Anglicans and Roman Catholics followed and they operate a number of educational and medical institutions in Jharkhand, one of which is the Dublin Mission operated by Trinity College of Dublin. Since the 19th century the tribes have also attracted keen attention from anthropologists and latterly from sociologists.

While 80 percent of the state's workers are farmers, there are a number of noted cities built on Jharkhand's mineral resources. The largest is Jamshedpur, which, in 1919, was named after Jamshed Tata (1839–1904), the "father of Indian industry" and the founding member of the multinational Tata Group with interests in some 80 countries run by the Tata family, now one of the richest families in the world. Jamshedpur is also known as Steel City, Tata Nagar, or Tata. With a population of more than 1 million people, it contains such Tata operations as Tata Steel, Tata Motors, and Tata Power. It is part of a 53-square-mile industrial area known as Adityapur Industrial Area, which contains nearly 1,000 industries both large and small. Jamshedpur was laid out as a planned city and it is run and maintained by Tata Steel. As such, it is the only city in India with no municipal government.

Dhanbad is known as the "Coal Capital of India" and is similar in size to Jamshedpur. It has over 100 mines, both underground mines and opencast mines. Tata Steel is also located in Dhanbad and the company, as other entities in the city, has built company towns for its employees and, as in Jamshedpur, the corporate presence is overwhelming. Electric power is also generated in the area and the city is home to the Indian School of Mines, which attracts students from all parts of India.

Bokaro Steel City, with just over half a million people, is about half the size of Jamshedpur and Dhanbad, but it contains the country's largest steel mills. Bokaro District, which takes its name from the river Bokaro, was created in 1991 from two districts of Dhanbad, although the first blast furnace was started nearly 20 years earlier in 1972. Bokaro is just to the southwest of Dhanbad and a continuation of a great swathe of coal and steel production comparable to the great industrial areas of Europe that produced the Industrial Revolution. Accordingly, Jharkhand is a state that contains both aboriginal inhabitants who speak a language known to very few people and live in a world fast disappearing as well as industries on the cutting edge of 21st-century technology that attract workers from all corners of India eager to take part in India's rapidly expanding economy.

ROGER D. LONG

See also Bharatiya Janata Party; Naxalite Movement; Northeastern States

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✦ JODHPUR

Jodhpur is the second-largest city of the state of Rajasthan and is famous for its palaces, forts, and temples. It has served as the capital city of the Rathor clan for more than 500 years. It was founded by Rao Jodha (1416–1489) in 1459, who established his independent principality in the southwestern part of Rajasthan known as Marwar, or land of death. The area is arid, although the eastern part has some agrarian cultivation if the monsoon is a good one.

The Rathors changed the face and fortune of this area forever by constructing a walled city. The old city has an impregnable defense wall about six miles long with eight entrances and a fort (Mehergarh) on a high cliff.

Jodhpur is strategically situated on the trade route from northwestern India to Gujarat, and it became a major trade center producing cotton textiles, handicrafts of wood and camel bone, salt, and gypsum. When the Mughals came to power in the 16th century in northern India, Jodhpur rulers became their trusted allies after initially offering stiff resistance to the founder of the Mughal Dynasty, Babur (1484–1531; emperor, 1526–1530). Jodhpur later became the provincial administrative headquarters of the empire, and the Rathors continued to rule until the end of the 18th century. In 1818, the Rajput states, including Jodhpur, became part of the subsidiary alliance system with the British East India Company, founded in 1600, in order to maintain their quasi-independent status as princely states. After India gained independence in August 1947, the state of Marwar, in 1949, decided, along with 17 other Rajput states, to merge into the present-day state of Rajasthan. The royal family, with its current maharaja, Gaj Singh II (b. 1948), still lives in Jodhpur in a part of one of the five palaces, the Umaid Bhawan Palace, he inherited as a four-year-old



Umaid Bhawan Palace in Jodhpur, Rajasthan. Built between 1929 and 1942, this vast palace is now divided into three parts and contains a museum, the luxury Taj Palace Hotel, and the residence of the Jodhpur royal family. (iStockphoto)

when his father died in a plane crash. One of the largest private residences in the world, the rest of the palace has been converted into a museum and a hotel.

Jodhpur is a major tourist attraction due to its imposing forts including Umaid Bhawan and Mehergarh, its cuisine, its polo, its festivals, and its tie-and-dye cotton textiles. About 30 percent of Jodhpur's income comes from tourism. It is a bustling city of nearly a million people and it has rich academic, social, and cultural institutions. It has a national engineering college, a law school, the Rajasthan Oriental Research Institute, the Arid Forest Research Institute, and a state university. It also has a high court and an airport connected to major destinations throughout India. Training center for the Indian Army, the Indian Air Force, and Border Security Force are also situated in Jodhpur.

In 1989, the National Information Center (NIC), which provides information management and data to the government as well as to the corporate sector, was established in Jodhpur. It has a satellite-based nationwide computer network (VSAT) that connects New Delhi, the national capital, with other state capitals and district headquarters. This is the largest VSAT network of its kind in the world and it has proved effective in providing communication links to areas affected by natural disasters such as cyclones and floods. Around 3,000 workers help the NIC prepare databases for education, health, law, and communications. It has compiled huge amounts of data from elections and the national census and it is involved in the computerization of land records, the treasury, pension plans, and court data, among a long list of its projects. In short, Jodhpur is an ancient capital that has transformed itself into a vital part of the 21st-century communications revolution.

FATIMA A. IMAM

See also Rajasthan

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✦ JUDICIARY SYSTEM

If there is to be constitutional government, then a political system must have a judiciary independent of and acting as a check on the arbitrary exercise of legislative and executive powers. The functions of rule making, rule enforcement, and rule interpretation are separated into the three institutions of the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. For the rule of law to prevail, the judiciary must be seen to be universal, impartial, and impersonal. It

simultaneously acts to protect individual rights and state power. The judiciary is also the final arbiter on what the Constitution itself means. All this is a delicate and challenging task, but not, on the evidence to date, one beyond the capacity of India's learned judges.

If independent India was going to give meaning to the fine sentiments expressed in its Constitution—protect minorities, give practical content to the principles of equality of opportunity and equality under the law, establish that democracy means that all votes have equal value and all officials as well as citizens are answerable in court—then the judiciary, led by the Supreme Court of India, was going to have to provide firm guidance. Despite occasional failures of nerve, by and large it has done so. At times this has meant that the Supreme Court has had to fill a political vacuum (and sometimes an executive or legislative one as well), for instance, to give one example, with respect to curbing pollution in the national capital by enforcing emission control standards on Delhi's transport.

The Supreme Court of India came into being on January 26, 1950, with the adoption of the Constitution. In 1950 there were 8 judges appointed to the court, by 2008 the number had steadily increased to 31. In its role as the supreme guardian of the Constitution, the Supreme Court is vested with original, appellate, and advisory jurisdictions. Moreover, its interpretation is binding in all other courts within the territory of India. In addition, all civil and judicial authorities throughout the territory of India are enjoined to act in aid of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction first as a federal court. Differences of interpretation of the federal-provincial distribution of powers or conflicts between state governments require authoritative resolution by a judicial organ independent of both levels of government. The Supreme Court of India is given exclusive original jurisdiction in a dispute (1) between the central government and any one or more states; (2) between the central government and one or more state governments on one side and one or more state governments on the other side; and (3) between two or more states, if and insofar as the dispute involves any question about a law or fact on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends.

The court also has nonexclusive original jurisdiction as the protector of fundamental rights. Citizens have the right to move the Supreme Court directly for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights enumerated in Part III of the Constitution. The Indian judiciary is unique with respect to the concept and practice of public interest litigation (PIL). Any individual or group of Indians can approach the Supreme Court directly on a matter involving the interest of the public at large. If the question is deemed to be of sufficient public importance, the court may take up the case. Several landmark cases have been decided through this extraordinary jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court has comprehensive appellate jurisdiction in cases involving constitutional issues; civil and criminal cases involving specified threshold values of property or a death sentence; and wide-ranging powers of special appeals.

The Supreme Court has been vested with the power to render advisory opinions on any question of fact or law that may be referred to it by the president of India. This is different

from ordinary adjudication in three senses: there is no litigation between two parties; an advisory opinion is not binding on the government; and it is not executable as a judgment of the court. The provision is an interesting and conscious departure from the American precedent. The U.S. Supreme Court decided early on against such a role, on the argument that it would encroach on the legislative function and thereby negate the separation of powers that underpins the U.S. Constitution. The availability of the provision in India, however, gives a soft option to the Indian government on some politically difficult issues, although it comes with the attendant danger that referral to the Supreme Court can politicize the judiciary instead of resolving an essentially political problem. In a significant decision on October 24, 1994, the Supreme Court ruled that the reference to it of the question of a Hindu temple having existed at a disputed site in Ayodhya was "superfluous, unnecessary and does not require to be answered."

The judiciary exists to interpret laws, expound the Constitution, and ensure that the rule of law prevails. Responsibility for maintaining law and order vests in the executive arm of the government. The cabinet can weigh popular opinion in the balance before deciding on issues of public policy. The judiciary cannot decide on questions of belief, opinion, or political wisdom, nor pronounce on questions of history, archaeology, and mythology. The cabinet should not shift the burden of responsibility to the courts on matters for which the government is too weak, timid, or confused to make firm decisions. The judiciary cannot compensate for inadequacies of government or the failure of the political process.

The independence of judges is safeguarded in the Constitution by several means affecting their appointment, salaries, and dismissal. But because a judiciary is formally independent it does not mean that it is also socially neutral. Judges tend to be predisposed toward stabilizing the social order by upholding the dominant values of society. With few exceptions, India's senior judges have come from the upper strata of society. They are generally held in high public respect. And many of the severest critics of the failings and shortcomings of the judiciary have been members of the legal profession itself.

The framers of the Constitution believed it would be unwise to leave the appointment of the judges to the discretion of the president of India. But the alternative of making judicial appointments subject to legislative concurrence was thought to be too cumbersome and vulnerable to political pressures. Instead, a middle course was adopted. The chief justice of India and 25 justices of the Supreme Court are appointed by the president on the advice of the cabinet and after consultation with other persons. For appointing the chief justice, the president is required to consult such judges of the Supreme Court and high courts as he deems necessary. In the appointment of other judges of the Supreme Court, consultation with the chief justice is mandatory. These provisions clearly tried to apply lessons learned from the American experience of the sometimes unseemly politicization of the nomination and appointment process. Despite this, over the years the appointment of high court and Supreme Court judges, including chief justices, became a focus of political controversy. For over a decade now, however, Supreme Court appointments have been free of major controversy.

Once appointed, Supreme Court justices hold office until the retirement age of 65 as specified by the Constitution. A judge may, of course, vacate office voluntarily. A judge may also be removed from office on grounds of proven misbehavior or incapacity. The process of removal is very rigorous, requiring a majority opinion of the total membership of the two houses of Parliament and a two-thirds majority of those present and voting in each house. This has never happened. The precedent for this system of removal of a judge was from England, where superior court judges are appointed by the Crown but hold office on "good behavior" rather than at "the pleasure of the Crown." To shield judges from political controversy, the Indian Constitution grants them immunity from criticism against decisions and actions made in their official capacity. While philosophical criticisms are permissible, no motives can be imputed to any Supreme Court decision. In recent years some high court and Supreme Court judges have threatened to hold in contempt commentators debating legitimate flaws of the judicial system. The conduct of high court and Supreme Court judges may not be discussed in Parliament unless in the context of an address to remove a judge from office. To keep judges free of temptation, the Constitution further stipulates that retired Supreme Court judges may not practice law in any Indian court. But the scope for patronage has not been eliminated totally: retired judges are eligible for appointment for such specialized tasks as commissions of inquiry and university vice-chancellorships.

During office, the allowances, leave, and pension rights of justices may not be varied by Parliament to their disadvantage. The salaries of the justices are also fixed by the Constitution. But the financial protection of the judges can be overridden by the president of India if a financial emergency is formally in force in the country. The Constitution gives the Supreme Court the right to maintain its own establishment and staff independently of Parliament. The associated expenses are chargeable on the consolidated fund and therefore not subject to parliamentary vote.

Unlike the U.S. model of a dual federal/state court system, India has a unitary system. The structural base remains the same throughout the country, although the designations are not uniform from one state to the next. At the head of each state judiciary sits a high court comprising a chief justice and other justices appointed by the president of India. In 2009, there were 21 high courts in India in the hands of nearly 750 judges. The number of judges on a high court ranges from 3 in Sikkim to almost 100 in Allahabad, the site of the high court of the country's most populous state, Uttar Pradesh. Except in cases where the Supreme Court holds original jurisdiction, high courts exercise full legal powers within their particular state (or group of states).

The district court is the principal civil court of original jurisdiction. It is subordinate to the high court, and every lower-level court is subordinate to the high court and district court. District judges and other subordinate judges in a state are appointed by the governor of the state in consultation with the state high court and public service commission. At the bottom rung of the judicial hierarchy, executive magistrates discharge functions of a criminal court as part of their administrative task of maintaining law and order. While executive magistrates

are common to metropolitan and other areas, the pattern of judicial administration is quite different in the two categories. City civil courts have been set up in metropolitan cities such as Ahmedabad, Bangalore, Chennai, Hyderabad, Kolkata, and Mumbai.

The Constitution seeks to protect the independence of high court judges through provisions broadly comparable to those affecting the appointment, conditions of office (except that the age of retirement is 60, not 65), and removal of Supreme Court judges. Although high courts are placed under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, the latter does not have any direct administrative control over the former. A high court is the apex body of a state's judicial system, but it is not as sharply separated from the federal government as the state supreme courts in the United States. The government of India exercises control over high courts through powers of appointment and removal, as well as the transfer of judges from one area to another. Also under central jurisdiction are the establishment and organization of high courts; the power to constitute a common high court for two or more states, for example, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has jurisdiction over the two neighboring states of the Punjab and Haryana (the jurisdiction of a high court is normally coterminous with the territorial boundaries of its state); to extend the jurisdiction of a high court to a Union Territory (for example the high court of Kolkata covers the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Union Territory along with West Bengal state, and the high court of Mumbai covers the Union Territory of Pondicherry as well as the state of Maharashtra); or to exclude a territory from the jurisdiction of a court. In addition, the Supreme Court can remove almost any case from a high court and take it up directly. The aim of these provisions was to remove the state judiciary from the realm of provincial politics; their effect is to blur the operation of federalism in the judicial sphere.

Every high court has the power of superintendence over all courts and judicial tribunals throughout its territorial jurisdiction, with the exception of military tribunals. Interestingly, this power of superintendence includes a revisional jurisdiction to intervene directly in cases of gross injustice, or nonexercise, or abuse of jurisdiction, even if the case should not fall within the high court's appellate jurisdiction. That is, the power of superintendence is both administrative and judicial. A high court may also transfer a case from subordinate courts to itself if a constitutional interpretation is germane to the disposal of the case. Having decided on the question of law in regard to the correct interpretation of the Constitution, the high court may either dispose of the case itself or return the case to the initial subordinate court. The latter is then bound by the high court's finding on the substantial question of law.

Seven high courts (Chennai, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Kolkata, Mumbai, and Patna) exercise original or first-instance jurisdiction in civil matters. The appellate jurisdiction of a high court in civil cases involves questions of fact as well as law. The power of first appeal directly to the high court pertains to decisions of district judges and those of subordinate judges in cases involving amounts above a threshold pecuniary value. In addition, when a court subordinate to the high court decides an appeal from an inferior court, then its decision in turn is subject to a second appeal to the high court. In the high courts of

Allahabad, Chennai, Kolkata, Mumbai, and Patna, an appeal to a high court bench may be made against a decision of a single judge of the high court itself. The criminal appellate jurisdictions of high courts is similarly complicated.

There is one further power of high courts that is worth noting. The Constitution confers on every high court the power to issue to any person, authority, or government within its territorial jurisdiction directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose. Because this power derives from the Constitution, it cannot be abridged or removed other than by a constitutional amendment. Moreover, while the Supreme Court can issue writs only where fundamental rights have been violated, the high courts can issue them even where ordinary legal rights have been infringed, so long as a writ is a proper legal remedy in such cases.

Overall satisfaction with and respect for the judiciary notwithstanding, some restiveness of the Indian people with their judicial system is based on five factors:

- The slowness and inaccessibility of the judicial process owing to the heavy cost of legal services and the ignorance of the general public about their rights and obligations and their enforceability;
- The antiquated nature of court procedures and management practices;
- Flaws in procedural laws, lack of effective control of court proceedings and availability of multiple remedies at different rungs of the judicial ladder that enable dishonest and recalcitrant suitors to abuse the judicial process;
- The lowered standards of conduct, character, and competence of the legal profession and judges; and
- Hyperactivism of the judiciary by encroaching into the jurisdictions of the legislature and executive.

Probably the most serious shortcoming of the Indian judiciary is its excruciating slowness. In a speech on May 8, 1982, Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer of the Supreme Court remarked that "in India law is on fighting terms with justice." He went on to offer this advice: "Once you start a litigation, please execute a will, naming the person who will continue the case in court." In 2009, there were about 30 million cases pending in the courts of India, up from 20 million in the early 1990s. In the meantime, up to 70 percent of the prison population is accounted for by those still awaiting trial. The Supreme Court accepts some 100,000 cases each year (compared to the 100–150 cases of the 5,000 filed that are accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court), with a high risk of becoming bogged down in judicial trivia. Part of the explanation for the multiplying backlog lies in the politicization of the judiciary at all levels, partly in its corruption at lower levels: justice delayed can mean pockets filled.

Is the Indians' fondness for litigation to be explained by the fact that they use courts not to settle disputes but to further them? Is the lag between judicial theory and practice to be explained by the relationship of judicial norms to the social structure of the judicial system or

by their incongruity with indigenous values? A more charitable interpretation is that the frequency and number of resorts to the courts is testimony to the people's faith in their judicial system compared to other institutions of government.


RAMESH THAKUR

See also Cabinet; Constitution; Parliament; President; Prime Minister

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K



✦ KANPUR

Kanpur, situated on the Grand Trunk Road that links New Delhi to Kolkata, is the largest city in Uttar Pradesh and one of the oldest industrial towns in India. Located on the southern bank of the river Ganges, Kanpur covers an area of more than 1,000 square miles. In 2001 the city had a population of 2.5 million. Renowned because of its textile and woolen mills and its leather industries, Kanpur also produces chemicals, fertilizers, hosiery, scooters, and soap. Hindus and Muslims form the major religious communities, followed by Sikhs, Christians, and Parsis who live in well-defined areas. Nonetheless, the city remains cosmopolitan.

Kanpur's climate is characterized by hot and dry summers except during the southwestern monsoon season. The period from March to mid-June is the summer season. This is followed by the southwestern monsoon season, which lasts until the end of September. October and the first half of November form the postmonsoon or transition period. The cool season begins around the middle of November.

According to legend, the king of the state of Saehendi visited in 1750 to bathe in the Ganges and founded the city. He named it Kanhapur, which became Kanpur, and then the name was anglicized to Cawnpore by the British, who assumed control of the area in 1810. Two years later Cawnpore became a major Indian Army base and played a major and infamous role in the Mutiny of 1857, when the ruler of Kanpur massacred British women and children on the banks of the Ganges at Massacre Ghat.

The Government Harness and Saddlery Factory was set up in 1860 to manufacture leather products for the British Army. The factory still exists as the Ordinance Equipment Factory and now manufactures goods for the Indian Army. In 1862 the Elgin Mill was the

first textile mill established in the city and marked the development of the textile industry, the first of many industries leading to Kanpur becoming the "Manchester of the East."

After World War I, indigenous industries began with the foundation of a number of textile mills. In 1928 the first rerolling mill of India was established, bringing the steel industry to the city. Flour milling and tea plantations followed, as did the production of scooters, plastics, pharmaceuticals, detergents, pan masala, jewelry, fertilizers, chemicals, soap, and hosiery in addition to food processing and tea packaging. However, industrial concerns and the adjoining agricultural lands contribute to very serious air, water, and land pollution, and this is exacerbated by the densely packed population and heavy traffic congestion. The result is that the city, the most polluted in the state, is among the 65 most-dangerous cities in India. The situation worsens in winter, when the smoke forms smog and damages plant and crop growth. The quality of the water, which comes from the heavily polluted river Ganges, is also exceedingly low.

Kanpur is run by the Kanpur Municipal Corporation. First created in 1861, the corporation is headed by a commissioner appointed by the state government. In addition to its industrial prominence, Kanpur is also an important academic center. Christ Church College, the oldest educational institution in the city, was started as a high school and became a degree-awarding college in 1919. The city also hosts the Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur University, Chandra Shekhar Azad University of Agriculture and Technology, GSVM Medical College, and technical institutions such as the National Sugar Institute, the Forest Research Institute, the Central Textile Institute, and the Leather Institute. The Reserve Bank of India, the District Court of Kanpur, and the Institute of Chartered Accountants round out the list of some of Kanpur's renowned institutions.

The sites of interest in the city include the Kanpur Memorial Church built in 1875; the J. K. Temple, a Radha Krishna temple; the Sanganlal Temple, with its exquisite glass and enamel decorative furnishings; Kamala Tower, Kanpur's business center; the Allen Forest and Zoo; the Kamla Retreat, surrounded by a beautiful garden containing a lighted swimming pool; Phool Bagh, used for public meetings; Nana Rao Park, situated in the heart of the city and full of statues of national heroes and leaders, the most prominent being the Dalit leader Dr. Ambedkar and where Dalits hold an annual festival; Dwarka Dhish Temple, which attracts Krishna devotees; Brijendra Swaroop Park, where football, cricket, and hockey are played; Moti Jheel, a favorite picnic spot and walking area; and Green Park, where international cricket matches are played.

VANDANA ASTHANA

See also Uttar Pradesh

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✦ KARNATAKA

Karnataka is one of the 29 states of the Indian Union. With a population in the 2001 census of nearly 53 million people, the city is spread over some 74,000 square miles, making it in area the seventh-largest state in the Union. Karnataka is located in the southwestern part of the Indian subcontinent and is bordered by Maharashtra in the north, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu in the east and southeast, Kerala in the south, and the Arabian Sea on the west. The official language is Kannada, which is spoken by the great majority of the population (nearly 70 percent), but other Dravidian languages such as Telugu and Tamil are also spoken. Other native languages are Tulu, Kodava Takk, and Konkani. The Muslim population, 10 percent of Karnataka, speaks Urdu.

Until 1973, Karnataka was still known as Mysore. According to Hindu mythology, the country's ancient name derived from Mahishasura, a demon who was defeated by the goddess Durga. Present-day Karnataka is the result of the territorial reorganization undertaken by the Indian government in 1956 when new districts were attached to the Mysore State on the basis of the shared language principle. Therefore, Kannada-speaking districts that were previously part of other bordering states were put under the administrative and territorial jurisdiction of the Mysore State. The integration of new territories, namely Coorg, the southern districts of Bombay State, and the western districts of Hyderabad State, resulted in a significant enlargement of the Mysore State's territory.

Karnataka is divided for administrative purposes into 29 districts: Belgaum, Bellary, Bangalore Rural, Bangalore Urban, Bagalkote, Bidar, Bijapur, Chamrajnagar, Chikkaballapur, Chikkamagaluru, Chitradurga, Dakshina Kannada, Uttara Kannada, Dharwad, Gadag, Davanagere, Gulbarga, Hassan, Haveri, Kodagu, Kolar, Koppal, Mysore, Mandya, Raichur, Ramanagara, Shimoga, Tumkur, and Udupi. They are grouped into 4 divisions centered on Bangalore, Mysore, Belgaum, and Gulbarga. From a geographical point of view, the state presents a high variety of climates, soils, and landscapes. The northern part of the country is characterized by an arid region known as Bayaluseeme, which is part of the Deccan Plateau. The coastal belt comprising the districts of Udupi, Uttara Kannada, and Dakshina Kannada presents a tropical monsoon climate. The central part of the country is a hilly region covered by forests. The main urban centers, accommodating around one-third of the population of the state, are Bangalore with more than 4 million people, making it India's fourth-largest city; Mysore; Mangalore; Belgaum; and Gulbarga.

The administrative and political organization of Karnataka is similar to that of other Indian states, with a parliamentary governmental system based on two houses: the Legislative



Street market in Mysore, Karnataka. Agriculture is still the most important industry in Karnataka despite significant growth in other sectors of the economy. (Jeremy Richards/Dreamstime.com)

Assembly and the Legislative Council. The head of the government is a chief minister who, together with a Council of Ministers, discharges the main functions linked to the executive power. The Indian president appoints a governor for a five-year term who is officially the head of the state, but his function is more formal than real.

In the last few decades Karnataka's economy has been one of the most successful within the Indian Union. The state capital, Bangalore, is renowned for its software and information technology industry, with more than 60 companies in 2001. This has earned the city an international reputation, and it is commonly known as the Silicon Valley of India. But Karnataka is not only synonymous with high-tech industry; other industrial enterprises have also been developed. Karnataka is the leading silk producer within the Indian Union. Its raw silk production accounted for 70–75 percent of the total amount of raw silk produced in the country. The silk industry is an agro industry that currently employs large swaths of the rural population in the main silk-producing districts: Tumkur, Mysore, Mandya, and Bangalore. Other industrial activities developed in the state are biotechnology industries and manufacturing industries of different kinds such as oil refineries and electrical and aeronautic industries. The financial sector is another crucial activity. In fact, some of the leading banks in India, such as Canara Bank, the State Bank of Mysore, and Corporation Bank, were originally established in Karnataka. The success of these banks can be explained by taking into account the state's long-standing tradition in the field of money lending and private banks.

Despite the development of industry, agriculture is still of primary importance. Karnataka produces a wide range of agricultural and horticultural products including rice, millets, groundnuts, sugarcane, red chilies, turmeric, peanuts, and cotton. Coffee and tea are also extensively grown on the slopes of the western Ghats.

The culture of the state reflects its history and its multiethnic composition. Particularly renowned is the local classical music style known as Carnatic music, which stemmed from the Hindu tradition and spread all over southern India. Due to the presence of Muslims, however, the northern Hindustani musical tradition is also well represented. Alongside music, dance is another hallmark of Karnataka's culture, and a great variety of dance styles can be seen at religious and social events. Many communities have their own dances performed in a traditional way. The very well-known Bharatanatyam, the Indian national dance originally from Tamil Nadu, is also performed in Karnataka with some local variations that distinguish the Mysore style of this dance. There is also a strong tradition of theater. The Bayalata, which literally means "open air theater," is the term used to refer to the traditional form derived from religious rituals and is closely linked to religious festivals and ceremonies. The state also has a renowned literary tradition. Some of the most internationally known Indian writers such as Shashi Deshpande (b. 1938), Kamala Markandaya (1924–2004), and Aravind Adiga (b. 1974) are from Karnataka.

ANTONELLA VIOLA

See also Bangalore

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Kashmir. *See* Jammu and Kashmir

✦ KAYASTHAS

Kayasthas are the traditional literate scribe castes in India and have a strong presence, with 800,000 people engaged in professions including engineering, medicine, law, and business. Kayasthas take great pride in the achievements of their members such as

Dr. Rajendra Prasad (1884–1963), the first president of independent India (1950–1962); Lal Bahadur Shastri (1904–1966), the second prime minister of India (1964–1966); Munshi Prem Chand (1880–1936), a writer of modern Hindi and Urdu literature; Shatrughan Sinha (b. 1946), an actor-politician who was one of the five top Bollywood movie stars in the 1970s and 1980s and in the mid-1980s joined the Bharatiya Janata Party, founded in 1980, and became a Cabinet member holding the portfolios of health and shipping; Amitabh Bachchan (b. 1942), the movie star who became one of the most prominent figures in the history of Indian cinema and also became head of the Bachchan Clan; and Sonu Nigam (b. 1973), the singer who has recorded a number of albums and whose songs have been featured in numerous movies.

There are many theories about the origins of the Kayasthas. The Brahmanical religious texts refer to them as a caste responsible for writing secular documents and maintaining records from the seventh century CE onward. In the beginning, the scribes were recruited from different castes such as the Kshastriya (ruling class), Vaishyas (professionals), and Brahmans (priests), but gradually these scribes developed into well-knit subcaste communities in northern and western India. Kayasthas have been mentioned as mixed caste, combining Brahman-Sudra (lower caste) and sometimes Kshastriya as well, and occupied the highest administrative offices in many early medieval Indian kingdoms, serving as ministers and competing with the Brahmans for these positions. In this way Kayasthas challenged the monopolization of Brahmans as writers, administrators, record keepers, and accountants. The princes, temple officials, and merchants had to employ large numbers of clerks to maintain records of land grants, village revenue records, and land transfers from the fifth century CE onward as the centralized rule of the Gupta Dynasty (ca. 320–ca. 510) declined in northern and western India. These scribes rose to dominance to meet the needs of changing economic and administrative requirements.

The Kayastha community slowly cut off its social ties with the parent castes as they started conforming to rules of class endogamy (marriage within the group) and family exogamy (marriage outside of the group) to form the new community. Kayasthas may have sought mythological origins for the community in order to fit themselves into the fourfold caste system. Kayasthas (according to their official website) trace their ancestry from Chitragupta, who was created out of Brahma's (the creator) souls as a record keeper of human beings. The 12 subcastes of the Kayasthas—Mathurs, Saxenas, Nigams, Bhatnagars, Karnas, Asthanas, Surdhwajas, Gours, Srivastavas, Ambasthas, Kulshreshthas, and Valmikis—are progeny of Chitragupta from his two wives, Irawati and Nandini. Since medieval times, the Kayasthas have demonstrated their academic and administrative skills and have excelled in occupying important administrative positions during the Mughal Dynasty (1526–1858) and the British colonial period (1858–1947).

The Kayasthas community has never been politically and socially united in the past. The Kayastha Mahasabha (Assembly), which was established in 1887, still acts as an umbrella organization in the country and organizes biannual conferences that focus on community

issues. However, the reservation policy of the Indian government, especially the precedents set in the Mandal Commission (1990) for job reservations for Scheduled Castes and backward castes, has spurred the Kayasthas into political action to create a consensus and to increase cohesion within the community. According to Kayastha community leaders, there has been a growing demand for unity to counter the gains made by other castes that align themselves with different political parties for economic and political advantage. Kayasthas feel isolated, as they are apparently losing opportunities and power to the Scheduled Castes due to the reservation policy. Now Kayasthas are demanding 33 percent reservations in government jobs for their own community by mobilizing Kayasthas through different regional organizations in the United Provinces, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Bengal, and Orissa. Some regional party leaders, such as Mulayam Singh Yadav (b. 1939) of the Samajwadi Party (Socialist Party), have taken note of the political advantage to be gained from the support of a unified Kayastha community and have championed their demands for job reservations. For their part the Kayastha community leaders are becoming more active in politics. In the 2009 general election they facilitated the election of Kayastha members to the lower house of Parliament, the Lok Sabha, and celebrated their victory in an impressive ceremony in New Delhi.

FATIMA A. IMAM

See also Yadav, Mulayam Singh

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✦ KERALA

Recognized worldwide for its good social development indicators and economic model, Kerala is the southernmost state in India and shares borders with the states of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. A region of India with heavy monsoon rains, Kerala is renowned for its backwaters; its ayurveda; its agricultural products such as coconuts, rice, cardamom, cashew, pepper, tea, and coffee; and its rubber. Historically linked to the spice trade and the times of King Solomon (r. ca. 971–931 BCE), Augustus (r. 27 BCE–14 CE), and Vasco da Gama (ca. 1460–1524), Kerala was established in 1956 with the reorganization of the three Malayalam-speaking majority regions of Travancore, Cochin, and Malabar. Trivandrum/



Verkala, Kerala. Kerala's spectacular beaches are one of the state's greatest tourist attractions. (Rafal Cichawa/Dreamstime.com)

Thiruvananthapuram is the state capital, and the state is divided into 14 districts containing a population of more than 34 million. In 1957 Kerala became the first state in the world (with the exception of the Italian principality of San Marino) to form a democratically elected Communist government. At one time the worst forms of untouchability in a rigid caste system that practiced distance pollution were found in Kerala, whereas now its caste practices are the most liberal in India. In 1970 Kerala was the first state in India to abolish landlordism. Kerala has a 91 percent literacy rate and the highest circulation of newspapers in India. It is the least corrupt state in India and has a low incidence of malnutrition as well as a highly developed health care system, which is acclaimed by the World Health Organization. Kerala has the highest life expectancy rates in India. Although the religion in the state is predominantly Hindu, with Jain, Muslim, Buddhist, and Jewish minorities, 25 percent of the population are Christians, whose ancestors were believed to have been converted in 42 CE by the Apostle Saint Thomas. Despite having the highest human development index in India and low urban-rural disparities, Kerala has the highest rate of educated unemployed due to low industrial development. Consequently, there is large-scale migration of skilled labor, with Keralites found in key administrative and educational positions both in India and abroad.

SHEEBA HÄRMÄ

See also Health Care; Poverty and Wealth

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✦ KHAN, AAMIR

Aamir Khan (b. 1965) is a Muslim actor, producer, director, and scriptwriter in the Hindi film industry who is based in Mumbai in the state of Maharashtra. He was born and raised in Mumbai by his father Tahir Hussain, who was also a film producer, and his mother, Zeenat Hussain. Khan's family members have produced many commercially successful movies, and Khan appeared as a child artist in *Yaadon Ki Baraat* (1973), a film produced and directed by his uncle, Nasir Hussain (1931–2002). Khan studied at the Bombay Scottish High School and debuted as a leading man in *Qayamat se Qayamat Tak* (1988), a film directed by his cousin, Mansoor Khan. The film, a Romeo and Juliet–type romantic drama, was a big commercial success that earned Khan several awards and made him a teenage heartthrob in the late 1980s. He has created a niche for himself in the Hindi film industry in Mumbai (also referred to as Bollywood) as a serious performer known for his perfectionism in his roles. For Kehta Mehta's *The Rising: Ballad of Mangal Pandey* (2005), for example, Khan devoted four years in preparation for his role as Mangal Pandey (the first martyr of the Revolt of 1857) and did not work for any other film until the release of *The Rising*.

Khan's name became synonymous with success after blockbusters such as *Dil* (1992); *Jo Jeeta Wahi Sikander* (1992); *Hum Hai Rahi Pyar Ke*, for which he cowrote the script with Mahesh Bhatt in 1993; *Rangeela* (1995); and *Raja Hindustani* (1996). Khan played the leading roles in all of these films and received nominations for numerous film awards. He followed his father's footsteps by opening a production house in 2001—Aamir Khan Productions—and producing *Lagaan: Once upon a Time* in 2001. *Lagaan* was nominated for an award in several categories such as best movie, best director, best actor, best music, and best cinematography. Khan played the illiterate poor farmer, Bhuvan, in a drought-stricken part of western India under British rule. The film was nominated as the Best Foreign Language Film for the 74th Academy Awards, or Oscars, and was only the third Indian movie to earn that honor after *Mother India* (1957) and *Salaam Bombay* (1988). Khan also received many honors for his contributions to Hindi cinema including the Padma Shree (2003), which is the fourth-highest civilian award given by the Indian government. His first directorial debut was *Taare Zameen Par* (2007), and it was received

favorably by the film industry. Critics felt that the story of an eight-year-old dyslexic child and his art teacher (played by Khan) who helps him to overcome his physical and mental challenges was captured brilliantly. In Khan's movie *Ghajini* (2008), a remake of a Tamil movie, Khan played the role of Sanjay Singhania, a victim suffering from amnesia who avenges the death of his love interest. *Ghajini* became the highest-grossing Hindi movie in India.

Khan is very selective about which roles he will play and, unusually for Indian actors, only works for one movie at a time. He is usually reclusive and avoids the media and award functions except to promote his own movies. He is equally discerning about his endorsements of brand name products or appearing in advertisements and is only associated with Coca-Cola, Titan, Toyota, Tata Sky DTH, and Samsung Mobile, an unusually small number of product lines for leading Indian actors. He also champions the cause of Narmada Bachao Andolan, a nongovernment organization that supports the rehabilitation of people affected by the building of Narmada Dam in Gujarat, and he is also involved in attempts to help the victims of the gas explosion at Bhopal (1984) to receive justice. Recently the *Times of India* has appointed him its ambassador to promote the Teach India initiative, a United Nations Volunteers (UNV) program designed to recruit teachers. In that capacity, on July 18, 2009, he shared the stage with U.S. secretary of state Hilary Rodham Clinton (b. 1947) at St. Xavier's College in Mumbai in an interactive session on educational reforms.

Khan has two children, Junaid and Aira, with his first wife Reena Dutta, a Hindu with whom he eloped and married secretly in April 1986 and divorced in 2002. He now lives in Mumbai with his second wife Kiran Rao, a film director whom he married in December 2005. He appeared in the leading role in the film she directed, *Dhobhi Ghat* (2009), playing the role of a painter in a small studio.

FATIMA A. IMAM


See also Bollywood; Film Industry

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✦ KHAN, ALI AKBAR

Ali Akbar Khan (1922–2009), often referred to as Khansahib or Ustad, was a virtuoso of the north Indian long-necked plucked lute called the sarod. Together with his brother-in-law Ravi Shankar (b. 1920), Ali Akbar Khan shared responsibility for the Western



World-renowned Bengali sarod master Ali Akbar Khan performs in concert, about 1970. (Michael Ochs Archive/Getty Images)

popularity of Hindustani music, the traditional classical music of northern India. Known as a teacher as well as a performer, Khan's main contribution was his establishment of the Ali Akbar College of Music in San Rafael, California, which also had a branch in Basel, Switzerland. From his base in California, Khan taught generations of aspiring Westerners the intricacies of Hindustani music and generated an active and creative Indian music scene in the United States.

The violinist Yehudi Menuhin (1916–1999) first invited Khan to the United States in 1955 and was instrumental in arranging for him to record the first LP album of Indian classical music in the United States, *Music of India: Morning and Evening Ragas*. Khan was also the first to play the sarod on American television. Shortly afterward he settled in the United States, establishing his college of music first in the San Francisco area. He lived in the United States for the last 50 years of his life and toured for most of that time before moving his school to San Rafael. Khan also made hundreds of recordings, but his most famous were *Master Musician of India*, an LP version (1965) of *Raga Chandranandan*, which was an original composition, and *Shree Rag* (1969). He sometimes performed with Ravi Shankar, most famously during their duet performance at the Concert for Bangladesh in 1971 organized by former Beatle George Harrison (1943–2001).

Khan was born in what is now Bangladesh and began rigorous training on the sarod with his father, Baba Allauddin Khan (1862–1972), of the Maihar Gharana (an apostolic

tradition). After his concert debut at the age of 13, Ali Akbar Khan began performing in public and occasionally with Ravi Shankar, another of his father's students. Khan became the music director of All India Radio (AIR) in Lucknow in his early 20s while simultaneously serving as court musician for the maharaja of Jodhpur, thus bridging the gap between older courtly patronage and the modern marketing of music. After India became independent from the British in 1947, and following the death of the maharaja, Khan moved to Mumbai, where he began to compose scores for Indian films. His film credits include Satyajit Ray's *Devi* (1960), Merchant-Ivory's *The Householder* (1963), and some of the music for Bernardo Bertolucci's *Little Buddha* (1993).

Khan was awarded India's second-highest recognition, the Padma Vibhushan award, in 1989. In the United States he received a MacArthur Fellowship in 1991 and many other honors. In 1997 he received the National Endowment for the Arts prestigious National Heritage Fellowship, the highest honor in the United States in the traditional arts. Five of Khan's recordings have been nominated for Grammy Awards.

Khan was married three times and had 11 children. His eldest son, Ustad Aashish Khan (b. 1939), is also a well-known sarod virtuoso.

J. ANDREW GREIG

See also Music, Devotional; Shankar, Ravi

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✦ KHAN, VILAYAT

Vilayat Khan (1928–2004) was one of India's best-known sitar maestros as well as one of its more controversial and innovative ones. He revolutionized sitar playing even while playing guardian of its rich traditions. Khan traced his musical pedigree back many generations. His father, Inayat (Enayat) Khan (1882–1927), was a leading sitar and surbahar (bass sitar) player, as were his grandfather, Imdad Khan (1848–1920), and their progenitors. Vilayat Khan, along with his younger brother Imrat Khan (b. 1935), were among the first of the musicians from traditional musical families and their feudal patronage to succeed in the modern Indian musical market. Vilayat Khan recorded his first 78-RPM disc at the age of 8. Throughout his long professional life, he adapted his music to fit the changing needs of the emerging media such as radio, long-playing records, cassettes, and eventually CDs and television. He gave concerts throughout the world and was 75 years old at the time of his last concert only months before his death. Khan lived most of his life in Kolkata, India's cultural capital, and moved to the United States in his last years.

Khan was born in the part of British India that is now part of Bangladesh, but his family roots were in Etawah, a village outside of Agra, where his grandfather lived. Therefore, Khan's tradition is called the Etawah *gharana* or sometimes the Imdadkhani *gharana*. The term *gharana* means "lineage." After losing his father at a young age, Khan continued his training on the sitar and in voice with relatives on both his father's and mother's sides of the family. The result was a sitar-playing style deeply rooted in the family's sitar traditions but heavily influenced by vocal styles. Khan began calling it *gayaki ang* ("vocal style"), to contrast it with the instrumental style of other sitar players. Khan often sang during his performances to demonstrate how his sitar playing was an extension of the voice. The vocal style is carried on by his brother, Imrat, as well as by Khan's sons Hidayat (b. 1975) and Shujaat (b. 1960) and his nephews Rais (b. 1939), Nishat (b. mid-1960s), Irshad, Wajahat, Shafaat (1944–2005), and Shahid Parvez (b. 1955).

Khan made some modifications to the sitar so that it could better handle the demands of the *gayaki ang*, working closely with prominent Kolkata instrument makers to produce a sitar sound that has a more sustained and a clearer and more resonant tone with less buzz than that of, for example, Ravi Shankar (b. 1920). Khan's style and technique contrast with that of Shankar, and together they defined sitar playing in the 20th century. Khan maintained that he was preserving the integrity of the traditional Hindustani repertoire, especially the songs of the Muslim courts of the 18th and 19th centuries. Nonetheless, he was a creative musician and composed several new ragas and light classical songs using the pen name Nath Piya.

Khan was often a controversial figure, best known for keeping his distance from the cultural establishment of India. For instance, he refused to accept India's fourth-, third-, and second-highest civilian honors—the Padma Shri, Padma Bhushan, and Padma Vibhushan awards, respectively—on the grounds that the selection committees were incompetent to judge his music. He also refused the Sangeet Natak Akademi Award, boycotted All India Radio (AIR) for a time, and withdrew his permission for EMI India to distribute his LP recordings. He did accept the special decorations of "Bharat Sitar Samrat" (India Sitar Emperor) by the Artistes Association of India and "Aftab-e-Sitar" (Sun of the Sitar), awarded by the president of India.

Khan was married twice and was survived by his two daughters, Zila (a Sufi singer) and Yaman; two sons, Shujaat and Hidayat, both sitar players; his younger brother Imrat, maestro of sitar and surbahar; and many nephews who are all Hindustani musicians.

J. ANDREW GREIG

See also Khan, Ali Akbar; Music, Devotional; Shankar, Ravi

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✦ KOLKATA

The city in West Bengal traditionally known as Calcutta renamed itself Kolkata in 2001, rejecting the Anglicized version of the name conferred on it during the British colonial era (1858–1947). The present capital of the Indian state of West Bengal, Kolkata had been the capital of British India until 1911, when the colonial seat of power was moved to Delhi. Today Kolkata is a vibrant and densely populated city with a total population of nearly 5 million.

The beginning of Kolkata is usually traced to the English merchant of the East India Company (founded in 1600), Job Charnock (ca. 1630–1693), who landed there in 1690. The village Kolikata, with its strategic location on the river, was viewed as occupying a vantage point in terms of both trade and defense. A deed of lease was drawn up and signed in 1698 between the Indian landlord Lakshmikanta Roy Choudhury and Job Charnock's son-in-law Charles Eyre (d. 1729) for a cluster of three villages: Kalikata, Gobindapur, and Sutanuti. These three villages were the imperial *jagir* ("territory") of the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (1618–1707; r. 1658–1707), and Choudhury and Eyre together developed the city of Kolkata.

Although the history of the city is generally dated from Charnock's visit, historical evidence shows Kalikata as emerging over a longer period. The area of southwestern Bengal had been a region populated from ancient times, and the poet Bipradas Piplai's *Manasa Vijaya* (1495) and Abul Fazl's *Ain-i-Akbari* (1596) allude to a place called Kalikatah. However, the legend of Charnock as the founder of the city is more popularly accepted, possibly because the growth of the city is so closely linked with the growth and enterprise of the British East India Company and later the British government in India. With permission to trade from the Mughal emperor, the English built their settlements in Kolkata, or Calcutta as it was called then. The French had set up base at Chandannagar, also in Bengal, and there was constant conflict over trade interests between these two European powers. The tension became heightened with the outbreak of the Seven Years' War (French and Indian War) in 1756, and the British began strengthening their fortifications in Kolkata. Their unauthorized fortifications at Fort William in the city angered the nawab (governor or viceroy), Siraj-ud-daulah (1733–1757; nawab 1756–1757), who ordered them dismantled. The British refused. Siraj laid siege to Kolkata and defeated the British. The next year, however, Robert Clive (1725–1774; governor of Bengal during 1758–1760 and 1765–1767) led British troops to a decisive victory against the nawab at the Battle of Palashi (Plassey) on June 23. This marked the beginning of the British domination of India. In the treaty that followed, the right to the property of the area of Kolkata was vested with the company, and in 1772 the city became the capital of British India. By the mid-19th century, thousands of Europeans and Indians from outside Bengal had immigrated to the burgeoning city. The East India Company flourished, and Kolkata became the center for the company's trade in opium, which was sold there and shipped to China.

There was at this time a distinct division within the city: the Black Town, where the Indians lived, and the White Town, where the Europeans lived. Between the two was the

Grey Town, the living quarters of the Anglo-Indians (the children of mixed descent), the Greeks, the Armenians, the Baghdadi Jews, the Portuguese, and the Chinese. Over the two centuries that have passed since then, the social organization of space within the city has altered considerably following large-scale migration away from the city after India's independence from colonial rule in August 1947. Yet remnants of the Grey Town remain, as a number of old families have stayed behind and made Kolkata their home. The once-intense presence of these communities in the city is marked by the beautiful structures of the Maghen David, the largest synagogue in the Eastern Hemisphere; the Neveh Shalom; the Kalighat Greek Orthodox Church; the Chinese temple for Quan Ti; the Parsi Fire Temple; the Armenian College; and the Jewish Girls School. Other Jain, Buddhist, Christian, Muslim, and Hindu temples, cathedrals, churches, mosques, *maths* (monasteries) present in Kolkata are evidence of the rich religious and cultural diversity that is a part of the city. The most famous among these are the Kali Temple, from which the city of Kalikata is supposed to have gotten its name; the Nakhoda Masjid; the Pareshnath Jain Temple; St. Paul's Cathedral; and the Belur Math.

As the first seat of colonial power in India, Kolkata underwent rapid industrialization and change. The first railway line in India was established in 1854 between Kolkata and Hooghly. Western education was introduced to create an indigenous group, the babu class, who would act as interpreters and clerks at the many administrative and trade offices that



Cycles and cars on the Chitpur Road in Kolkata, West Bengal, one of the world's busiest, largest, and most vibrant cities. (Samrat/Dreamstime.com)

were established in Kolkata. The Bengali middle class began to emerge at this time, and with the expansion of education Kolkata witnessed the development of modern thinking that came to be known as the Bengal Renaissance. The orthodox social concepts and conventions were challenged during this period to usher in an age of liberal idealism. The Bengal Renaissance included social reformers such as Ram Mohan Roy (1774–1833), Ishwarchandra Vidyasagar (1820–1891), Henry Louis Vivian Derozio (1809–1831) and his Young Bengal group, and Syed Amir Ali (1849–1928); religious reformers such as Sri Ramakrishna (1836–1886), Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902), Keshub Chunder Sen (1838–1884), Reverend Krishna Mohan Banerjee (1813–1885), and Debendranath Tagore (1817–1905); writers including Michael Madhusudan Dutta (1824–1873), Mir Musharraf Hussain (1848–1912), Bankim Chandra Chatterjee (1838–1894), Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941), and Sarat Chandra Chatterjee (1876–1938); and many others who gave leadership to a social, literary, and intellectual movement that made Kolkata famous as the intellectual capital of India. The period saw developments in science through the work of scientists such as Jagadish Chandra Bose (1858–1937), whose research on radio waves was pioneering work; Prafulla Chandra Ray (1861–1944); Satyendra Nath Bose (1894–1974); and Meghnad Saha (1893–1956). The nationalist movement that gathered momentum over the latter part of the 19th century owed much to Bengal Renaissance leaders.

Kolkata witnessed numerous processions of protest in 1905 when the government partitioned the province of Bengal. Allegedly made to facilitate administration of the province, the real intent behind the move was seen as causing a rift between Bengal's Hindus and Muslims. Besides the anger and outrage that this partition triggered, causing the government to revoke it six years later in 1911, the event also sparked the Swadeshi (self-sufficiency) movement in Kolkata that aimed to empower the indigenous worker and weaken British industries by boycotting British goods. This principle of self-sufficiency and independence lay at the center of Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi's (1869–1948) call for Swaraj (self-rule). Organizations such as the Jugantar ("New Age") and Anushilan Samiti ("Self-Culture Association") led by revolutionaries such as Aurobindo Ghosh (1872–1950), Barin Ghosh (1880–1959), Jatindranath Mukherjee (1879–1915), Prafulla Chaki (1888–1908), and Bipin Chandra Pal (1858–1932) emerged in Kolkata and its suburbs. They aimed to wrest independence from the British colonizers. Another of the Bengali freedom fighters was Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945), who became a national hero; was one of the leaders of the Indian National Congress (INC), founded in 1885; and formed the Indian National Army in 1942.

In 1947 the declaration of India's independence came with the announcement of the partition of Bengal. The Muslim-dominated East Bengal was to be part of Pakistan. This division of the province between Hindu- and Muslim-dominated areas led to terrible riots that killed thousands in the Great Calcutta Killing that began on August 16, 1946. Since independence in August 1947, Kolkata has been the capital of the state and has been governed by a Communist government for more than 30 years. Variously called the culture

capital and the intellectual capital of India, Kolkata has also been accused of economic stagnation brought on by an aggressive trade union movement encouraged by the Communist government. A radical Marxist-Maoist movement known as the Naxalite movement unleashed a great deal of violence and terror on the streets of Kolkata in the 1960s and 1970s. Since the 1990s, the city has been trying to achieve economic recovery. Information technology has helped revive the city's economy. Culture and the arts have retained their position of prominence in the life of Kolkata. The Kallol movement of the poets, the Third Theatre of Badal Sarkar (b. 1925), and the cinema of Satyajit Ray (1921–1992) are only a few examples of the city's contributions to Indian culture. Three Nobel laureates are from this city: Rabindranath Tagore, Amartya Sen (b. 1933), and Mother Teresa (1910–1997).

SIPRA MUKHERJEE

See also Naxalite Movement; West Bengal

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✦ LADAKH

The region Ladakh comprises almost one-third of the state Jammu and Kashmir and is the highest region in India, with steep, narrow valleys between the Himalayan and Karakoram mountains. The altitude ranges from 9,800 feet at Leh, the capital, to 11,300 feet at Zoji-la Pass, peaking to 23,000 feet at Nun-Kun. Ladakh is divided into two districts, Kargil and Leh, the inhabitants of the former being mostly Shia Muslims and of the latter mostly Vajrayana Buddhists. The district is one of the most sparsely populated parts of India, with a population of approximately 260,000 people. Ladakh is governed by the Autonomous Hill Development Council (AHDC) Act of 1995. Both Leh and Kargil districts are governed by councils who work with villages for social services such as health and education, land use, and taxation. Due to its location between Pakistan and China, Ladakh is a major military outpost for the Indian Army.

The Ladakhi language is based on the Tibetan language family but is different enough to constitute a separate language, although it is written in the Tibetan script. The word *Ladakh* means "land of high passes," and it is also called "moonland" because of its lack of rainfall, its meager vegetation, and its mountainous landscape. Ladakh is bordered by Pakistan-occupied Kashmir on the west, China on the north and east, and Lahul and Spiti of the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh on the southeast. The largest ethnic group is Buddhist, approximately



View of Leh, capital of India's most northern region, Ladakh, a center of Tibetan Buddhism. (Belayamedvedica/Dreamstime.com)

81 percent of the population, followed by 15 percent of the population, which is Muslim, and 4 percent Hindu. Because of Ladakh's high altitude, agriculture is possible for only a few months of the year, between May and September. The main crops are barley, wheat, and some vegetables such as cauliflower, potatoes, and peas. The livestock raised include yaks, cows, sheep, and goats. The water supply comes from the run-off of melting snow and glaciers that is are funneled into canals for drinking and for irrigation. Land is held by small farmers who bring their crops to small local markets or to the main market at Leh.

Ladakh is the repository of many historic Tibetan-style monasteries that are filled with murals, sculptures, metal images, and *tangkas* (painted scrolls) all relating to the life of the Buddha and attendant deities. Ladakh has about 5,000 lamas (monks) who live at these monasteries. Two of the oldest monasteries are Lamayuru and Alchi. Laramyuru, situated in an isolated mountain site about 75 miles west of Leh was started in the 11th century CE. Formerly holding 400 lamas, the site houses only about 50 now. It is famous for its 2-story-high 11-headed, 1,000-armed Lord of the Western Paradise. Alchi Monastery, founded in 1000 CE, is famous for its 1,000-year-old wall paintings in brilliant shades of red and blue. Located about 40 miles west of Leh, it is distinct in that it is not situated on a hill or mountain; instead, it was built on a level with the village. Thiksey, on the outskirts of Leh, is on a hill overlooking the city and the Indus River and was founded in 1430. It is renowned for its ancient collection of Buddhist texts and small bronze sculptures. Hemis, founded in 1630, is the biggest and wealthiest monastery and it is noted for its large yearly festival that is now becoming a tourist attraction.

Ladakh's history reflects four competing influences: Indian, Tibetan, Kashmiri, and British. During the Mauryan Dynasty (322–ca. 185 BCE), in the 3rd century BCE, an emissary from Emperor Ashoka (ca. 273–232) brought Buddhism to Ladakh. The region was later part of the Kushan Empire (ca. 48–220 CE) and linked the major commercial trade routes between China, Central Asia, and India. Contact with Tibet came during the 7th century during the reign of Songstan Gampo (ca. 605–649), founder of the Tibetan Empire. Tibetans migrated to Ladakh, intermarrying with the local Buddhist Mon and Dard populations. The kings of Ladakh, the Lha Chen Dynasty, descended from a branch of the Tibetan kings after 842 CE with the breakup of the Tibetan Empire, and greater Tibetanization occurred after this time.

In Kashmir, the first Muslim king, Rinchana, (1320–1323) was a Ladakhi Buddhist prince who converted to Islam. From that period, Islam spread especially in the western part of Ladakh. The Namghal Dynasty was established in 1533 by Choyang Namgyal, who was also a descendant of the former kings of Tibet, so that Ladakh had close ties to both Kashmir and Tibet. In 1685, the king of Ladakh, Deldan Namgyal (1642–1694), received aid from Kashmir, then part of the Mughal Empire, in order to defeat an invading Tibetan and Mongol army, and this led to greater Kashmiri influence. Kashmir became part of the Sikh Empire under Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1780–1839; maharaja 1801–1839), who appointed a Dogra, Gulab Singh (1792–1857), as the governor of Jammu. When Gulab Singh refused to support the Sikhs during the Anglo-Sikh War of 1846, he was rewarded by the British and became the maharaja of the combined state of Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh. After Indian Independence in 1947, Gulab Singh's great-grandson, Maharaja Hari Singh (1895–1961), the Hindu ruler of the combined region, signed articles of accession to become part of India, and this included Ladakh. This accession to India was disputed by newly created Pakistan, and tribesmen from the North-West Frontier province crossed the border and invaded Kashmir and Ladakh. Pakistan felt that the entire state should be part of Pakistan because over 90 percent of the state's population was Muslim. Ladakh pushed back the invaders but Kashmir was divided along a Line of Control. It has been the site of numerous border disputes and several wars and skirmishes, one of which, the Kargil War of 1999 between India and Pakistan in the western part of Ladakh, threatened the important Srinagar (Kashmir) to Leh highway. The Indian Army eventually pushed back Pakistan's troops to its previous position behind the Line of Control.

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See also Dalai Lama, 14th

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✦ LAKSHWADEEP

Lakshwadeep (a hundred thousand islands), also known as the Lacadive Islands, is at 11 square miles, the smallest and least populated Union Territory with just over 60,000 inhabitants. Located some 200 miles from the southwest coast of India there are nearly 40 islands and islets. The capital, situated on one of the four main islands, is Kavaratti. Over 80 percent of the population speaks Malayalam; others speak Jeseri and Mahl. The main industry revolves around coconuts and coconut-fiber products, although a growing number of tourists come from India to enjoy the spectacular beaches, water sports, and the marine life and clear water. The administrator governs the islands. Lakshwadeep sends one member to the lower house of Parliament, the Lok Sabha, in New Delhi.

ROGER D. LONG

See also Constitution; Territories

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✦ LAND TENURE

The system of land tenure not only affects the prospects of agrarian transformation but also has implications for the well-being of rural households in general. The Indian land tenure system that has evolved over centuries is marked by a great deal of diversity and regional variation. The system of land tenure in India during the British period (1757–1947) underwent major changes. There were basically three different types of land tenure systems in colonial India: the *zamindari* system, the *mahalwari* system, and the *ryotwari* system. In the *zamindari* system it was the responsibility of the landlords, called *zamindar,* to collect land revenue from

the peasants and to submit their share of the revenue to the government; in the *mahalwari* system it was the village headman who was to collect and deposit the revenue on behalf of the whole village; and under the *ryotwari* system the individual farmer was responsible for the payment of revenue directly to the government.

The *zamindari* system was created by the East India Company in 1793, when the "permanent settlement" was introduced by Lord Cornwallis. Under this system, *zamindars* were declared full proprietors of large areas of land and were entrusted with the task of collecting rent from the farmers. Thus a class of intermediaries was created between the state and the farmers. At the time of independence, this system was prevalent in West Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh. The *zamindari* system often led to exploitation of the peasantry in a variety of ways, including forced labor and compulsory "gifts."

Soon after independence, steps were taken to abolish the *zamindari* system. Although *zamindari* abolition was one of the relatively satisfactory measures undertaken under the land reforms program, the exemption given to land under "personal cultivation" was used as a pretext for retaining large chunks of land by the *zamindars*. The other components of India's land reform program included imposition of ceilings on land ownership and transfer of surplus land to the landless; tenancy reforms to provide security of tenure and regulate rent; and consolidation of land holdings. By and large, land reforms were only a partial success, except in a few states, such as West Bengal and Kerala. But in many parts of the country, owing to the political and social power of the landlords, poor land records, the informal nature of the tenancy contracts, and ineffective administrative agencies at the grassroots level, land reforms were poorly implemented.

Although tenancy has declined in India, it continues to be a feature of both advanced and backward agriculture. The phenomenon of "reverse tenancy" under which relatively large farmers lease land from small and marginal farmers is being found in areas of advanced agriculture such as the Punjab and Haryana. With the gradual move toward the liberalization of agricultural trade and marketing, corporate involvement in agriculture has been on the rise. On the one hand, there has been a demand for the relaxation and the withdrawal of the restriction on land-leasing, so that there is more flexibility in the land-lease market. On the other hand, serious reservations have been raised against such moves that tend to displace farmers from land, their main source of livelihood.

DEEPAK K. MISHRA

See also Economy; Food Security; Poverty and Wealth; Water Conflict

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✦ LANGUAGES AND SCRIPTS

India is an area of great linguistic diversity and is called a "nation of nations," with each "nation" possessing its own language and dialects. There are 22 official languages and 47 important languages, as well as tribal languages and dialects; altogether, according to one estimate, there are cumulative totals of 179 languages and 544 dialects. Within this variety there are four major language groups. These are Indo-Aryan, Dravidian, Austro-Asiatic, and Tibeto-Burman. Among these it is the Indo-Aryan language group that is spoken by the majority of Indians. In spite of this bewildering diversity, the entire region could be considered as a single linguistic area, since regardless of the languages' affiliations to any of the four major groups, they share a number of cultural, religious, and social features due to shared geographical proximity and historical past.

Most north Indian languages seem to have derived from a single language called Arya, which was introduced to India by groups of nomadic migrants who arrived through the Himalayan passes more than 3,000 years ago. Over time, the Aryan language successively spread over large parts of northern and central India, and it also evolved to become today's various north Indian languages. These modern languages are also in many ways different from the ancient spoken Arya and its immediate successor, Sanskrit. Sanskrit first evolved into Prakrit (natural speech). Further refinement of Prakrit as a literary language occurred around the 10th century, and it was soon after this we find the development of modern regional languages such as Bengali, Hindi, Punjabi, and Gujarati.

The Dravidian family of languages is mainly concentrated in southern India. In terms of numbers of speakers, Dravidian languages are the fourth or fifth largest of the world's language families. And in India every fifth person speaks a Dravidian language. The Dravidian language family has four subgroups: South Dravidian, consisting of Badaga, Irula, Kannada, Kodagu, Kota, Malayalam, Tamil, Toda, and Tulu; South-Central Dravidian, including Gondi, Konda, Kui, Kuvi, Manda, Pengo, and Telugu; Central Dravidian, containing Gadaba, Kolami, Naiki, and Parji; and North Dravidian, consisting of Brahui, Kurux, and Malto.

The vast majority of the Dravidian speakers are concentrated in southern and central India from the Vindhya Mountains (a cultural and linguistic divider) to Cape Comorin and are located mainly in the states of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Kerala.

The Munda language family is currently spoken in eastern India. Munda and its related sister languages, such as Khasi of Assam, are branches of the Austro-Asiatic family of languages. This family includes various languages of Southeast Asia, such as Mon-Khmer of present-day Cambodia and Nicobarese in the Nicobar Islands. This linguistic evidence in the form of loan words found in Vedic and later in Indo-Aryan texts also suggest the possibility of an early Austro-Asiatic language that may well have been spoken in the Punjab and the Ganges-Yamuna Doab. But so far, no direct, concrete evidence for its widespread use in the distant prehistoric past has appeared.


The northern rim of South Asia bordering the foothills and the mountain chains of the high Himalayas is inhabited by Tibeto-Burman speakers. The early history of this area is

unknown and the earliest widely accepted reference to the people of this area is the mountain people called Kirata, who are mentioned in Vedic texts. The language of Kathmandu Valley in Nepal was Nawari until the mid-18th century, when it was replaced by Nepali; Nawari belongs to the Tibeto-Burman language group, as do the present-day dominant languages in Ladakh and Bhutan, along with the dialect of the Sherpa people.

Apart from the four families mentioned, there are a few languages in India that show no identifiable relationship with any language inside or outside the Indian subcontinent. These include Burushaski, a language in Kashmir; Nahali, a language in central India; and Vedda, a language of the earliest hunter gatherers of Sri Lanka. These languages are spoken to a limited extent today but some of them may have been of great importance in prehistoric times.

Loan words in old Indo-Aryan and early Dravidian hints of the existence of pre-Aryan and pre-Dravidian languages. The modern locations of some of these languages were not necessarily their prehistoric homeland.

The earliest epigraphical record of a decidedly Indian script that could be deciphered is the rock and pillar edicts of the Mauryan emperor Ashoka (272–231 BCE). They were mostly written in two of the earliest Indian scripts—Brahmi and the other Kharosthi—but the language used in these inscriptions is the Magadhi-Prakrit dialect of Ashoka's capital Pataliputra in Magada (Bihar). Some 200 scripts, both ancient and modern, from the Indian subcontinent as well as Tibet and Southeast Asia claim their descent from Brahmi, a term used for writing in general (the art of Brahma).



Example of the Deva-Nagari script, the dominant script in India today. There are 22 scheduled languages in India, with nearly 400 additional identifiable languages. (Honorata Kawecka)

By the beginning of the first millennium, Brahmi writing had already branched off into two distinct script families, the northern and the southern. Each of these families had a number of separate scripts and, although they had a common origin, their shape had visibly changed. The currently dominant script, Deva-Nagari (script for the city of gods), has 48 letters: 13 are vowels, and the remaining 35 are consonants. They can represent every sound in Sanskrit. Along with Sanskrit, other modern languages from northern India are also written in Deva-Nagari such as Hindi and Nepali, the official languages of India and Nepal, as well as the widely used language of western India, Marathi. Deva-Nagari, like other Brahmi-based scripts, is written from left to right. It became the parent of other Indic scripts such as Gurmukhi, which has been used by the Sikhs since the 1500s to write their sacred texts in the Punjabi language. Gurumukhi is closely connected with the emergence of Sikhism and was a modified form of an earlier Indic script called Landa that was used for writing Punjabi, Landa, and Sindhi. It was chosen for writing Punjabi by the early Sikh gurus. In modern Pakistan, keeping with its Islamic heritage, Punjabi is written in the Perso-Arabic script. Another important script that derived from Nagari was the proto-Bengali script. It led to the development of modern Bengali script (another widely used script in eastern India), along with scripts used for writing Santhali (an Austric tribal language), Assamese, and Manipuri, which is closely related to the Gujarati script used in western India. Other daughters of Gupta script are the Pali script, Tibetan, and Sarada, and it is one of the sources for the Tamil script, the oldest Dravidian language in southern India.

The Pali script, along with Grantha (of the late 5th-century Pallava Dynasty), was to be the parent script for many south and southeast Asian languages including old Thai, Burmese, Kavi (old Javanese), and Sinhalese. Sarada, another daughter of Pali (and which gave rise to the Takri script used for the Dogri language in Jammu), was used for writing the Kashmiri language (which could also be written in Deva-Nagari). But Kashmir, being predominately an Islamic region, adopted the Persio-Arabic script as its national script.

The south Indian scripts of the Dravidian-speaking people are a smaller family than the northern group. Here, the most important one that derived from the Brahmi script was Kadamba. This gave rise to old Kanarese, the parent script of both modern Kanarese and Kannada, both of which emerged around 1500 CE. Another important southern script was Grantha (which means "book" in Sanskrit), which originated 800 years ago. It became the parent of Malayalam script and was commonly used for writing the Sanskrit language in southern India. It also was to influence the development of Tamil script around 750 CE and the Tamil script called Tamil-eluthu, which derives from the northern group. All Indic scripts are adaptations to the language's sound system. In Pakistan, the official language, Urdu, though similar to Hindi in speech, uses the Persio-Arabic script. The Persio-Arabic script, unlike Deva-Nagari, is inadequate for expressing the complex grammar of the new Indo-Aryan speech, and this makes reading Urdu somewhat difficult. Since the early days of the first Islamic sultanates of the mid-11th century to the mid-19th

century, the Persian language and the Persio-Arabic script remained the official literary medium in all north Indian–based kingdoms and empires, including the early British colonial state. After 1830, the English language, and the Latin script, became the dominant means of both the spoken and the written language.

Today, largely due to foreign travel and globalization, English has again become the lingua franca of the educated professional classes of India. The rise of the English language and the use of the Latin script also has to do with the failure of Hindi and its Deva-Nagari script to become the single pan-Indian elite language. The English spoken by most Indians, earlier derogatorily referred to as "chi-chi" and now sometimes called "Hinglish," has achieved the status of a language in itself with a growing and widely admired corpus of literature and its own Nobel Prize–winning authors.

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See also Hinglish; Media and Telecommunications; Newspapers, Indian-Language

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✦ LITERATURE

The literature of India is composed in various languages, each of which has its own distinct tradition. However, owing to a pan-Indian Sanskrit tradition, Arabic-Persian influences, the colonial experience, a common set of mythologies, and above all, close interaction between these linguistic and literary traditions, significant resemblances are found among these regional cultures and traditions, which together form the canon of Indian literature.

The English word "literature" has derived from the Latin root *litera*, meaning "a letter," thus invoking a connection with something written. This connection, however, does not hold true in the context of India. The hymns of the *Rigveda* (ca. 1500 BCE), generally regarded as the earliest extant text of India, were composed orally. Hence, it is also known as a part of the *shruti*, or oral tradition. Much later, around the first century of the Common Era, Bharata composed the earliest extant dramaturgy of India, *Natyasastra*. Bharata used the word *kavya*, which literally meant "poetry," to denote any literary creation: written, oral, or visual. According to Bharata, there are two types of poetry: *kavya drisyakavya* (visual poetry) and *shravya kavya*

(oral poetry). While drama forms a part of visual poetry, long narrative poems are part of oral poetry. Thus orality has been considered to be an indispensable part of Indian literature, and contemporary Indian literature also acknowledges the impact of oral traditions.

Aspects of literature composed in various regions of India vary due to cultural and linguistic differences and several sociopolitical reasons. This regional literature has developed in its own way through interaction with other Indian and non-Indian literature and cultures, forming its own unique literary history. Broadly speaking, Indian literature can be divided into three major periods: literature of the ancient period, covering from around 1500 BCE up to approximately 700 CE; literature of the medieval period, spanning from around 700 to around 1800 CE; and literature of the modern period, beginning roughly around 1800 and running to the present.

The 19th century marked a major turning point in the trajectory of Indian literature, as English education was formally introduced during this period by the British colonizers. The existing court languages of India—mainly Sanskrit and Persian—were gradually replaced by English, and the exposure to Western culture through English and interactions among various regional traditions have shaped modern Indian literature. The period is characterized by several movements, countermovements, schools, and styles, which are often overlapping at both the national as well as regional levels. A number of authors have contributed in more than one field of literature and sometimes in multiple languages as well. Modern Indian literature can be divided into two broad sections: prose on the one hand, and poetry and drama on the other.

Prose. Storytelling has been a part of the Indian tradition as far as it has been recorded. However, the novel as a genre only began to flourish in India from the late 19th century when early novelists were influenced by British novels. However, the rich Sanskrit and folk traditions of India have also greatly influenced Indian novels, resulting in a genre very much different from British novels.

Bankim Chandra Chatterjee (1838–1894) was a particularly famous early novelist of India who was influenced by English literature. He wrote novels in English as well as in Bengali. The short story also began to emerge as a very popular and powerful literary genre at the end of the 19th century thanks to a large number of magazines, journals, and periodicals that regularly published short stories. It was mainly Rabindranath Thakur (1861–1941), generally known as Rabindranath Tagore, who popularized this genre in India. As a result of their oeuvres and their influences, Chatterjee and Tagore were said to be the founders of modern Indian literature.

As a result of colonial politics, the sociopolitical situation of India changed rapidly during this period and this was reflected in the literature of the time. Social issues became a common theme in various forms of regional literature. The rise of a new class of people, the "babus," and a critique of the treatment of women became crucial themes. Chatterjee's *Vishavriksha* (*The Poison Tree*) of 1873 was a seminal text that depicted the dilemma of women in the newly emerging nuclear families.

From the 19th century a number of female authors came to the forefront. Rassundari Devi's (ca. 1809–?) *Amar Jiban* (*My Life*) of 1876 is the first autobiography by an Indian woman. Pandita Ramabai (1858–1922), Rokeya Sakhawat Hossain (1880–1932), Krupabai Satthianadhan (1862–1894), and Tarabai Shindhe (ca. 1850–1910) are some of the most important authors of the early modern period to criticize gender discrimination and caste hierarchy. Rokeya Hossain's short story "Sultana's Dream" is one of the earliest stories of science fiction in India; she describes a "ladyland" much more advanced in science and technology than the mundane patriarchal society of the time.

During the first half of the 20th century the Indian nationalist movement had a profound impact on Indian prose as well as verse, and the nationalist movement, in turn, was influenced by the literature of the day. There was, in short, a symbiotic relationship between the two. Bakim Chandra Chatterjee's Bengali novel *Anandamath* (*Abbey of Bliss*), published in 1882, was one of those novels that had a lingering impact on the Indian nationalist movement, as the song "Bande Mataram" ("Hail to Thee Mother") was first sung at the 1896 session of the Indian National Congress (founded in 1885) and became very popular. Many people were upset that it did not become the national anthem in 1950 and there are calls by the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (founded in 1980) that it should be adopted as the national anthem. In addition, Indian literature was also influenced by the international Marxist-Socialist movement. *Umrao Jan Ada*, an Urdu novel by Mirza Mohammad Hadi Ruswa (1857–1931), has been called the first realist novel of India. It was published in 1899 and narrated the life of a courtesan in Lucknow to the backdrop of the 1857 rebellion. In 1929 Bibhutibhushan Bandopadhyay (1894–1950) published his famous novel *Pather Panchali* (*Song of the Road*) in Bengali, drawing on a particular form of Bengali folk song called *panchali*. The novel is one of the numerous instances of the confluence of the written and the oral traditions in the Indian context. In 1936 Munshi Premchand (1880–1936) published *Godaan* (*The Gift of a Cow*) in Hindi, in a novel that depicted the miserable conditions of Indian peasants living under British rule. In the same year, the Progressive Writers' Association was set up in India, which marked the progressive trend in Indian literature. Sarat Chandra Chattopadhyay (1876–1938), a Bengali novelist and a contemporary of Premchand, was also famous for his depiction of rural Bengal.

Raja Rao, who lived between 1908 and 2006, wrote *Kanthapura*, which was one of the earliest English novels in India. Published in 1938, the novel deals with Gandhian philosophy, that is, the ideas of Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948), and its impact on the Indian nationalist movement. Since then, a number of novels, short stories, and poems by Indian authors have been published in English. Nirad C. Chaudhuri (1897–1999), Mulk Raj Anand (1905–2004), and R. K. Narayan (1906–2001) are particularly famous for their English fiction and their essays.

The partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 followed by communal riots in various parts of India created a long-lasting impact on Indian literature, so much so that even after more than 60 years of independence, partition has remained an important theme in contemporary



R. K. Narayan in 1999. Narayan depicted life in India with grace and humor, offering witty, perceptive descriptions of Indian life. His novels and short stories, many of them highly autobiographical, have brought the characters of his imaginary town of Malgudi to an appreciative international audience. (THE HINDU/AFP/Getty Images)

Indian literature. The violence and trauma of the partition period intimately associated with the independence of the country has become a recurring motif in Indian novels, short stories, and poems. *Train to Pakistan* by Khushwant Singh (b. 1915) and *Midnight's Children* by Salman Rushdie (b. 1947) are two of the most famous novels dealing with this traumatic event. While Singh focuses on the violence immediately following independence, Rushdie traces the journey of these twin countries after independence.

Postindependence literature is remarkable also for its humanistic and progressive trends. Social problems, especially those of caste and gender hierarchy, come up as recurring themes. Vyankatesh Madgulkar (1927–2001) published the novella *Bangarvadi* in 1955 about a poor village. Shripad Narayan Pendse (1913–2007) published *Garambica Bapu* (*Wild Bapu of Garambi*) in 1952. Thakazhi Sivasankara Pillai (1912–1999) published *Chemmeen* (*Prawns*) in 1956. Shrilal Shukla (b. 1925) published *Raag Darbari* in 1968. Mahasweta Devi (b. 1926) published *Aranyer Adhikar* (*The Occupation of the Forest*) in 1977. U. R. Ananthamurthy (b. 1932) published *Samskara,* which can be translated as "culture" or "ritual" or "death rites," in 1966. Anita Desai (b. 1935) published *In Custody* in 1984. Amitav Ghosh (b. 1956) published *The Shadow Lines* in 1988. Upamanyu Chatterjee (b. 1959) published *English August: An Indian Story* in 1988. Arundhati Roy (b. 1961) published *The God of Small Things* in 1997, which won the Booker Prize the same year. These are among the most famous contemporary novels dealing with varying aspects of the sociopolitical struggles in India and of the plight of rural or urban India.

The rise of a number of promising women authors and the foregrounding of feminist issues are other distinct features of this period. The Urdu author Ismat Chughtai (1911–1991) is particularly famous for her short story "Lihaaf" ("The Quilt"), which was published in 1941. With its implicit reference to lesbianism, the story appeared as a severe critique of Indian society. Mahasweta Devi (b. 1926), a famous activist-author, penned numerous novels, short stories, and essays in Bengali highlighting the exploitations of the

"lower" caste people. Nabaneeta Dev Sen (b. 1938), C. S. Laxmi (b. 1944) (who also writes under the pen name Ambai), Urmila Pawar (b. 1945), Vaidehi (b. 1945) (whose real name is Janaki Srinivasa Murthy), Mrinal Pande (b. 1946), and B. M. Zuhara (b. 1952) are some of the eminent women authors on the contemporary Indian literary scene. Many of them champion the cause of women in their work.

Dalit literature is one of the most prominent aspects of contemporary Indian writing. The word *dalit* means "oppressed." The term refers to groups of people from various parts of the country who have traditionally been regarded as "untouchables." A number of Dalit authors have created a major impact on the content as well as the form of Indian literature. Dalit authors such as Baby Kamble (b. 1929), Urmila Pawar (b. 1945), Bama Faustina (b. 1958), and others have introduced a new literary genre in the Indian canon, the *testimonio* (testimony). Although Kamble and Pawar write in Marathi, Bama's autobiography *Karukku* (1992) is regarded as the first Tamil Dalit text.

There is also a large group of authors of Indian origin who live outside India and who have achieved international acclaim. Among such authors are Bharati Mukherjee (b. 1940), Rohinton Mistry (b. 1952), Jhumpa Lahiri (b. 1967), and Kiran Desai (b. 1971).

Poetry and Drama. Like prose, early modern poetry and drama were also influenced by classical European and English poetry. Madhusudan Dutta (1824–1873) was a famous Bengali poet who introduced free verse poems in Bengali literature. Rabindranath Tagore was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1913 for a collection of 103 poems called *Gitanjali* (*Song Offerings*), which were published in the same year. In 1922 he published *Lipika*, a book that was considered by many to be the first work of prose poems in India.

The impact of the nationalist movement is evident in Tagore's patriotic poems and songs. In fact, his writings also influenced the trajectory of the Indian nationalist movement to a large extent. The Tamil poet Subramania Bharati (1882–1921) and the Bengali poets Dwijendralal Roy (1863–1913) and Kaji Najrul Islam (1899–1976) are also known for their patriotic poems and songs. Narmadashankar Dave (1833–1886) (popularly known as Narmad), Kerala Varma (1845–1914), Kumaran Asan (1873–1922), and Mohammad Iqbal (1877–1938) are among the most distinguished poets of this period who have successfully blended Western influences with ancient Indian traditions in their poems.

Romanticism began to flourish in Indian poetry from the early 20th century. Suryakant Tripathi (1896–1961) (also known as Nirala), Mahadevi Varma (1907–1987), Harivanshrai Bachchan (1907–2003), Balamani Amma (1909–2004), Sachidananda H. Vatsyaya (1911–1987) (also known by his pen name Agyeya), and the internationally renowned Faiz Ahmed Faiz (1911–1984) are some of the remarkable poets of this period who emphasized personal experience and lyricism in their works. The poems of this period are characterized by their stress on individuality, nature, emotion, childhood, and nostalgia. These poems, to a large extent, resemble English Romantic poetry.

However, attempts to develop a new poetry became evident from the 1930s on. From this period a number of poets began to move away from traditional meters and styles and

to create a new and different kind of verse. Such attempts produced varying results among various regional traditions. In Bengali literature this period was known as *Kallol yug* ("era of the literary magazine *Kallol*"), when poets such as Buddhadev Basu (1908–1974), Jibonanando Das (1899–1954), and others strove to break free from the empty lyricism of popular Bengali poems. In Hindi literature this was the period of *pragativad* (progressivism) followed by *prayogvad* (experimentalism). While Bengali poets were influenced more by Western poets, such as T. S. Eliot (1888–1965), Baudelaire (1821–1867), and others, some poets writing in Hindi sought inspiration from Japanese haiku. In fact, Indians' exposure to non-Indian cultures through English played a major role behind such movements.

Gradually, the style and form of poetry changed. Everyday language has become a part of poetic diction, and prose poems have become popular. The rising sociopolitical consciousness, especially issues like gender, class, and caste discrimination, is well manifested in the poems of Subhas Mukhopadhyay (1919–2003), Shankha Ghosh (b. 1932), Raghuvir Sahay (1929–1990), Arun Kolkatkar (1932–2004), Dilip Chitre (b. 1938), Kamala Das (1934–2009), Namdeo Dhasal (b. 1949), and others. Dhasal is one of the most prominent Dalit poets of contemporary India and also an activist who has voiced his protest against the marginalization of Dalits in his poems and novels. *The Golden Gate*, a novel in verse by Vikram Seth (b. 1952), marks a breakthrough in the structure of Indian novels. In 2007, Dogri author Gian Singh Pagoch received the Sahitya Akademi (India's National Academy of Letters) Award for his epic *Mahatma Vidur*.

Toru Dutt (1856–1877) is one of the first Indian authors to write novels as well as poems in English. She is followed by a number of other poets, including Sarojini Naidu (1879–1949), Nissim Ezekiel (1924–2004), Jayanta Mahapatra (b. 1928), and Arvind Krishna Mehrotra (b. 1947). During the second half of the 20th century a number of bilingual poets appeared, such as A. K. Ramanujan (1929–1993), Kamala Das, Arun Kolatkar (1932–2004), and Dilip Chitre, who write in their mother tongue as well as in English.

The 20th-century sociopolitical scene marked the rise of a number of women poets. Swarnakumari Devi (1855–1932) was one of the earliest women writers of India who wrote poems and novels, and she also edited a magazine called *Bharati*. Amrita Pritam (1919–2005) was the first Indian woman who won the Sahitya Akademi Award (in 1956) for her poem *Sunehure*. Mahadevi Varma (1907–1987), Balamani Amma (1909–2004), Nabaneeta Dev Sen (b. 1938), Hira Bansode (b. 1939), Padma Sachdev (b. 1940), and Sujata Bhatt (b. 1956) are some of the other women who have had a significant impact on Indian poetry.

The forms of traditional Indian drama also began to change from the mid-19th century. Early modern playwrights, such as Madhusudan Dutta (1824–1873), Bharatendu Haris-hchandra (1850–1885), Girish Chandra Ghosh (1844–1912), D. L. Roy (1863–1913), and others, offered pictures of colonial India in their plays. Harishchandra, considered to be the father of modern Hindi literature, is particularly well known for his political satire *Andher Nagari* (*The Dark City*). While Dutta is famous for his farces criticizing the newly educated Bengali "babus," Roy and Ghosh are renowned for their historical and social

plays. Roy's *Shahjahan* (1910) and *Chandragupta* (1911) and Ghosh's *Chitanya Lila* (1884), *Siraj-Ud-Daula* (1905), and other plays became extremely popular. The use of ancient myths and historical characters to satirize contemporary society is quite prominent in works by contemporary authors, poets, and playwrights alike. Ghosh also translated Shakespeare's *Macbeth* into Bengali. Tagore was remarkable in his attempt at blending ancient Indian dramatic traditions and folk traditions in modern plays, and they eventually shaped the course of modern Indian plays. His plays such as *Dakghor* (*Post Office*), *Raktakorobi* (*Red Oleanders*), and *Raja* (*The King*) are radically different from those of his predecessors. In fact, folk theaters like *yatra, nautanki,* and *yakshagana* have had a significant impact on modern Indian plays.

In 1942 a group of playwrights and actors formed the Indian People's Theatre Association (IPTA) in order to make people aware of the prevailing sociopolitical situation. In 1944 the IPTA produced *Nabanna,* a pathbreaking play written by Bijon Bhattacharya (1917–1978) with World War II and the Bengal Famine of 1943 as backdrops. The IPTA, however, stopped functioning after 1947, and various theater groups emerged in its place. Bahurupee was one of the most famous groups; it staged its own productions as well as plays written by other playwrights.

Besides group theater, there were also several individual playwrights who achieved great success. Bhisham Sahni (1915–2003), Habib Tanvir (1923–2009), Mohan Rakesh (1925–1972), Chandrashekhar Kambar (b. 1937), Mahesh Elkunchwar (b. 1939), and Ratan Thiyam (b. 1948) are among the notable playwrights of modern India. Badal Sirkar (b. 1925) wrote *Evam Indrajit*—a complex play dealing with the existential struggle and identity crisis of modern human beings—first staged in 1967, this play marked a major turning point in Indian drama. In 1975 Tanvir's *Charandas Chor* (*Charandas, the Thief*), a successful blend of folk tradition and modern theater, marked a radical change in the form of Indian plays. Utpal Dutt (1929–1993) penned *Tiner Taloar* (The Tin Sword), a play based on *Pygmallion* (1913) by George Bernard Shaw (1856–1950) and it also became very famous. A critique of the sociopolitical situation of India is apparent in contemporary plays. Vijay Tendulkar (1928–2008) produced *Shantata! Court Chalu Aahe* (*Silence! The Court Is in Session*) and *Ghashiram Kotwal* (*Ghashiram, the Constable*), and Girish Karnad (b. 1938) wrote *Tughlak* (1964). These are some of the most popular plays that satirize the prevailing sociopolitical situation. Karnad's *Hayavadana* is another important play that brings into focus the identity crisis of modern Indians. In fact, sociopolitical turmoil along with issues of gender and caste discrimination have become the concern of a number of contemporary playwrights and have been manifested in *Kaeji Rath* by Sajood Sailani (b. 1936), in *Curfew* by Lakshman Srimal (b. 1944), and in various other plays. Mahesh Dattani (b. 1958) penned *Seven Circles Round the Fire,* an outstanding play that depicts an affair between a hermaphrodite and an upper-class man. His *On a Muggy Night in Mumbai* is another pathbreaking play that deals with homosexual love.

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See also Media and Telecommunications; Theater

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✦ LOOK EAST POLICY

India's Look East policy is a multifaceted approach geared toward developing and strengthening economic and strategic ties with the nations of Southeast Asia. Partly seen as India's larger regional strategy to boost its position as a regional power, the policy has received significant attention within and outside the country. Southeast Asia has witnessed remarkable economic growth in the recent past and India's relatively better economic performance in the postliberalization period has fueled hope for mutually beneficial trade relations among the growing economies of the region. On the part of India, this multifaceted strategy aims to establish strategic links with individual countries, evolve closer political and economic ties with the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and to showcase India's potential as a partner in regional trade and investment relations. Observers feel that India's Look East policy, at least partly, is a response to the increasing economic, political, and strategic connections between China and ASEAN. Domestically it is also seen as part of a strategy to develop India's relatively backward northeastern region.

The Look East policy is seen in the context of increasing economic partnership between ASEAN and the People's Republic of China. China was accepted by ASEAN as a dialogue partner in 1996 and since then China has been actively involved in strengthening its economic

partnership with these nations. In 2001, China unilaterally offered to open its market in some key sectors to the ASEAN countries and in 2002 a Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation was signed. This strategy is also seen as an important step toward integrating the backward southwestern part of China with the ASEAN economies. India's engagement with the ASEAN countries has to be seen in the context of this regional configuration of economic cooperation in Asia.

As part of the strategy, India has actively attempted to strengthen its relations with ASEAN, and at least partly it has become successful in doing so. India became a sectoral dialogue partner with ASEAN in 1992, a full dialogue partner in 1995, a member of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, and a summit partner (on par with China, Japan, and Korea) in 2002. In 2002, the first India-ASEAN business summit was held in Delhi. In August 2009, India signed a free-trade agreement (FTA) for goods with ASEAN, which resulted in tariff liberalization in a large number of products traded between the 10-member ASEAN nations and India. Negotiations are going on to reach an agreement on trade in services and investment. This is considered to be a very significant development in the context of India's longstanding suspicion toward regional multilateralism.

Initial speculations suggest that India's plantations (tea, coffee, rubber, and spices), marine products, and textile and garment industries are going to face tough competition from the ASEAN countries on account of this FTA in goods. Certain segments of India's manufacturing industries, however, feel that the agreement will open up new opportunities.

The other important dimension of this policy is the greater "sensitivity towards a large number of smaller countries of Southeast Asia" and the discernable change in India's attitude toward Myanmar's military junta. There has been a reversal of the earlier policy of reservations toward the military government and India is among the few countries that have provided aid to the military regime in Myanmar. India is currently building a highway and railroad north of the new capital, Mandalaya.

Domestically, this policy of closer economic and political ties with its eastern neighbors is seen as a significant part of the new development policy for the economically backward states of northeastern India. These states, though rich in oil and mineral resources, have remained weakly integrated with the Indian economy and have been falling behind the national economic growth rate after the liberalization period. The northeastern region (NER) of India has 98 percent of its boundary with neighboring countries and is connected with the rest of India through a narrow corridor at Siliguri. The region has also witnessed secessionist and militant movements of diverse kinds for a long time. In response to the region's backwardness, the government of India has initiated a number of infrastructure and other projects in the past few years. India's Look East policy is expected to provide new growth impetus for this land-locked region. The North Eastern Region Vision 2020, a document produced by the Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region, states: "the immediate priority is to build the required infrastructure right up to the border areas, establishing connectivity and communication links to the cross-border points through which

trade and economic exchanges with the countries neighboring the North Eastern Region are proposed to be promoted under the Look East Policy." However, as of now, critics feel that India's Look East policy is more centrally anchored with regional security policy rather than with a regionally rooted development strategy. The future success of the strategy depends on the extent to which India's involvement with the ASEAN countries, and other neighboring countries, is linked to the regional bottlenecks in terms of poor connectivity and weak market linkages in the northeastern region. In an address to the "Look East" Summit in Kolkata (2010), Arunachal Governor J. J. Singh outlined the imperatives of developing the region. The challenge, he noted, is not only to open up new vistas of economic cooperation but also to manage the borders effectively, "especially with regard to cross border migration, terrorism, drugs and arms supply and other forms of non-conventional security threats for ensuring the rights and traditions of local ethnic groups comprehensively in the context of global forces of change."

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See also Foreign Policy; Myanmar, Relations with; Singapore, Relations with; Southeast Asia, Relations with; Vietnam, Relations with

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✦ LUCKNOW

Lucknow, the capital of Uttar Pradesh, is situated on the bank of the river Gomti and has an estimated population of 5 million people. Lucknow is famous for its fine cuisine and gracious living, music, Urdu and Hindi literature, and fine architecture. Although Lucknow was able to maintain a semblance of communal harmony between the Hindus and Muslims during the traumatic days of the partition period, postindependence politics based on religious and caste issues has besmirched its rich and tolerant history. Voting trends in Uttar Pradesh, the largest state in India, are monitored very closely by all political parties, as it is the key to winning a majority at the center. In addition to its status as the political epicenter of India, the city has highly reputed academic, medical, and research institutions, as well as

old established and respected high schools, and boasts its own high court, a medical college, two universities, a central drug research institute, and tutoring schools for students aspiring to do well in competitive exams. Lucknow's educational, commercial, and legal infrastructure has facilitated its growth in the information technology sector, in banking, in retail, and in construction. All major national companies are present in Lucknow. Lucknow is one of the few cities in northern India that has been selected for the Smart City project, which uses information technology for economic development.

The present city was built within the environs of the ruins of Lakshmanpur, a land, according to legend, gifted by Lord Rama, hero of the epic *Ramayana*, to his younger brother Lakshman. This city rose to prominence when the Nawabs of Awadh, the descendents of a Persian noble family of Nishapur, Khurasan, decided to shift their capital from Faizabad-Ayodhya to Lucknow in 1775. The Nawabs (an honorary title given to them by the Mughal emperors) of Awadh were encouraged by the English East India Company, founded in 1600, to reassert their separate identity as Shia Muslims in the last decades of the 18th century. Saadat Khan (ca. 1680–1839; nawab 1724–1739), whose former name was Muhammad Amin, was the founder of the dynasty. He never rose up in open revolt against the Mughal emperor but simply took advantage of the emperor's weak position and set himself up as an independent king. He ensured the family's prosperity when he designated his nephew, who was married to his only daughter, to be his successor.



Street market in the old section of Lucknow, the bustling capital of Uttar Pradesh. Lucknow was renowned as a cosmopolitan city with a strong cultural and artistic tradition supported by a refined aristocratic class in the 18th and 19th centuries. (Dinodia/StockphotoPro)

The Nawabs of Awadh contributed to making Lucknow a vibrant city both culturally and economically through their encouragement of artisanal production, music, architectural projects, and handicrafts. Most notably, the rulers of Awadh took the annual Shia commemoration of Imam Hussain's martyrdom (Imam Hussain was the Prophet Mohammad's grandson) at the Battle of Karbala in 680, also known as the Remembrance of Muharram, and made it highly ritualistic and elaborate. Although the Nawabs of Awadh built specific edifices like *Bara Imambara* (a house to remember Imam Husain) to observe Muharram, the first month of the Islamic calendar, they also publicly involved other religious communities as well. The handicrafts of Lucknow are highly renowned, especially the *Chikankari*, an intricate embroidery involving 38 types of stitches (*morri, katao,* and *bakhia*) produced on textiles. The artisans, mostly women, create designs of *Chikankari* on cotton, muslin, chiffon, and silk for sale locally and internationally. Lucknow eateries still thrive on 19th-century traditional Nawabi cuisine, where food is produced on a slow fire (*dum* style). Great attention is paid to the flavors, the ingredients, and the way the food is served.

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See also Uttar Pradesh

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M



✦ MADHYA PRADESH

Madhya Pradesh is a state in the central part of India whose history goes back millennia. Evidence abounds that Madhya Pradesh has been populated since the Neolithic period. It was at this time that the earliest waves of humans arrived in the region and continued what appeared to be a seminomadic lifestyle. Gradually the various tribes began to settle, developing agriculture and building cities. Arts, science, and government flourished in the region centuries before the arrival of the Aryans and the Vedic religion, two forces that would later dominate India.

The first powerful kingdom of the area was known as the Avanti and held considerable sway over a vast swath of central India. Later during the Vedic Age (ca. 2000–650 BCE), Madhya Pradesh continued to prosper and benefited from the cultural enrichment and technological progress that characterized this era. This included organization of society along a class system (*varnas*), rules of marriage, and creation of an organized religion based on the Vedas, the Upanishads, and the Puranas.

Later Madhya Pradesh would become a part of the Mauryan Empire (323–185 BCE), India's first unified kingdom, and embraced Buddhism, the religion of its rulers. The state had the distinct honor of being chosen by the Mauryan emperor Ashoka the Great (304–232 BCE) as the location for the first Buddhist stupa in human history, the great Stupa of Sanchi. This historic monument still stands today and is a popular attraction for Buddhist pilgrims and tourists alike, attracting visitors from all over the world.

In the first millennium of the Common Era, Madhya Pradesh would see the rise and fall of a number of kingdoms. The region became a battlefield for many competing political forces

both from within India proper and from the invasions of Turks, Huns, Mongols, and Muslim armies who sought to conquer and control the rich territory.

Throughout the Middle Ages, each successive wave of invasion and fighting ushered in a rebirth and development of new cultural and architectural characteristics for Madhya Pradesh's cities and a destruction of much of what came before. Among the few remaining structures from this period are the impressive temples of Khajuraho, built by the Hindu kings of the Chandela Dynasty (10th–13th century CE). These striking temples depicting human sexuality miraculously survived the onslaught of Muslim invasions and Islamic rule for more than 1,000 years. Like Sanchi, they too attract tourists who come from far and wide to see these remarkable temples and their incredible carvings.

Madhya Pradesh came under Mughal control in the 16th century and remained under Muslim rule until the 18th century, when control of the region was once again contested by an outside force. This time it was the British, whose imperial ambitions led them to colonize the coastlines of India first and then expand into the heartland. By 1861 the British were in complete control of Madhya Pradesh, and it became part of British India. After Indian independence from Britain in August 1947, modern Madhya Pradesh was created out of the former princely states and colonial holdings of British India.

At the time of its modern political organization in 1956, Madhya Pradesh was the largest of India's 29 states. However, its size was reduced in November 2000 when the new state of Chhattisgarh was carved out of southeastern Madhya Pradesh. Nonetheless, Madhya Pradesh is home to more than 60 million people and is nearly 200,000 square miles in size.

Given its geographical location at the center of India, Madhya Pradesh has always been a vitally important part of India's government and political well-being. As part of India's federal system, Madhya Pradesh contributes representatives to India's Parliament and has its own state-level government, consisting of a 230-seat Legislative Assembly. Although there are many political parties active in Madhya Pradesh, the state is dominated by two major parties, the Indian National Congress (INC), founded in 1885, and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), founded in 1980. In 2010 the BJP held the reins of government after winning landslide elections in 2003 and 2008.

Madhya Pradesh ranks 7th in economic output among India's 29 states and ranks 10th in per capita gross domestic product. Since 1999, the state has had a steady growth rate of approximately 3.5 percent. The growth rate would have been more, but the separation of Chhattisgarh from Madhya Pradesh in 2000 cut an estimated 30 percent from the overall economic output. Much of the productivity of Madhya Pradesh is in the agricultural sector, particularly forest products, which are valuable for their variety and are used in ayurvedic (traditional medicine) practices throughout India and the world. Madhya Pradesh also produces sugar, soybeans, oil seeds, and a variety of grains for domestic consumption. Even with this agricultural output, however, Madhya Pradesh has a large number of poor and hungry people. Recent studies have equated the hunger in Madhya Pradesh with that in Ethiopia and Chad.

In industry, Madhya Pradesh once hosted Union Carbide, one of the oldest and most influential petrochemical corporations in the world. The joint U.S.-Indian venture was located in the city of Bhopal and became headline news in 1984 when on December 3 an estimated 42 tons of toxic methyl isocyanate gas were accidentally released into the atmosphere. In what would become the worst industrial disaster ever recorded, up to 10,000 people died within 72 hours of the gas leak, and 25,000 have died from diseases related to gas exposure since that time. As a result, few major international companies call Madhya Pradesh home, having only one S&P 500 (Standard & Poor index of the top 500 companies of large-cap American stocks) located within the state.

The population within Madhya Pradesh is diverse. India's tribal communities, some of whose earliest inhabitants lived outside of the *varna* system for much of India's history, continue to thrive and make up a large percentage of the state's overall population. These communities have kept many of their customs and traditions alive, in large part due to their relative isolation from the political turmoil that shaped India's landscape over the centuries. Along with tribal groups, a large segment of Madhya Pradesh is populated by followers of the Hindu faith, the ancestors of whom migrated to the area in successive waves over the centuries. Supplementing these two groups are small numbers of Jains, Sikhs, Christians, and Muslims.

In matters of customs and culture, most of the population follows Hindu traditions and ceremonies of marriage, birth, and death. Even the tribal groups have adopted much of the Hindu tradition as part of their local customs. Clothing varies among the groups as well, yet there are clear clothing choices that dominate the cultural scene in Madhya Pradesh. These include the *lungi* (*dhoti* or sarong worn around the waist), various forms of head coverings (*safa* or turban), the *kurta* (a loose shirt falling below the waist and worn by both men and women), the *salwar* (loose pajama-like trousers), and *saris* (a garment of unstitched cloth of four to nine yards worn by women). Clothes are often brightly colored and are chosen for their ability to protect the wearer from Madhya Pradesh's hot summers and moderately cool winters.

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See also Bharatiya Janata Party; Bhopal Gas Disaster

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Madras. *See* Tamil Nadu

✦ MAHARASHTRA

Maharashtra (meaning "great nation") is a state located on the west coast of India on the Arabian Sea. With a 2001 population of 96.9 million people, it is India's second most populous state. Maharashtra is the third-largest state in terms of land area, covering an area of approximately 191,000 square miles. Dubbed India's "economic powerhouse," it has the highest gross domestic product of any state in the country and makes the largest contribution to national industrial output. Maharashtra became a state on May 1, 1960—celebrated annually as Maharashtra Day—when the former state of Bombay was divided into the ethnolinguistic states of Maharashtra, where most of the people speak Marathi; and Gujarat, where most of the people speak Gujarati. The newly formed state of Maharashtra also included Marathi-speaking parts of Madhya Pradesh and the princely state of Hyderabad that had been reassigned to the state of Bombay in 1956. Maharashtra's political capital is Mumbai, and its official language is Marathi.

With the Arabian Sea to the west, Maharashtra borders the states of Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh on the north, Chhattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh on the east, and Goa and Karnataka on the south. Maharashtra is made up of 35 districts divided into 5 geographic regions: Konkan, Marathwada (or Aurangabad division), Khandesh (or Nashik division), Desh (or Pune division), and Vidarbha (made up of the Nagpur and Amravati divisions). The Sahyadri (or Western Ghat) mountain range runs north to south parallel to the coast. East of the Sahyadris is the Deccan Plateau. The state's three major rivers are the Godavri, Krishna, and Tapi. Although a majority of Maharashtra's population is rural, it is India's second most urban state, with 42 percent living in urban areas in 2001.

Once a part of Ashoka's Mauryan Empire (304–232 BCE), parts of modern-day Maharashtra came under the rule of the Satavahana Dynasty around 230 BCE. Based in Paithan in the Marathwada region, the Satavahana Dynasty was the first Maharashtra-based empire to emerge, ruling over parts of the region for roughly 400 years. The rock caves at Ajanta and Ellora are among the lasting cultural legacies of this empire and are rightly celebrated as some of the most remarkable edifices in the world. Around 400 CE the Satavahanas were succeeded by the Vakatakas and then the Chalukyas. Power struggles ensued among these empires as well as the Hoyasala and Yadava kingdoms well into the 12th century. Between the 11th and 13th centuries, the Yadava Kingdom nurtured Maratha arts and culture from its capital in Devagiri (near present-day Aurangabad). It was during the Yadava Empire in 1290 that the saint and poet Dnyeneshwar (1275–1296) wrote the beloved Marathi poem *Dnyaneshwari,* which was a commentary on the sacred Hindu scripture, the *Bhagavad Gita*. During this period Sanskrit

literature also flourished in the region. In the late 13th century the region sustained attacks from the sultans of Delhi, and the Yadava Kingdom fell in 1317.

Between the 14th and 17th centuries, the area was under the control of the Delhi Sultinate. In 1327 the Muslim emperor Muhammed bin Tughlaq (ca. 1300–1351) moved his capital from Delhi to Devagiri, changing the city's name to Daulatabad. For the next 400 years a succession of Muslim emperors ruled over the Deccan, including the Tughlaqs (1321–1398), the Bhamani Dynasty (1347–1482), and a series of smaller shahdoms. Throughout this period, Muslim rule was continually challenged by the region's Hindu Maratha chiefs. However, the Marathas did not pose a serious threat to Maharashtra's Mughal rulers, as civil wars prevented them from uniting against the more unified opposition. In the mid-17th century, however, the Maratha chief Shivaji Bhonsale, or Chhattrapati Shivaji Maharaj (1630–1680; r. 1674–1680), successfully united these forces and led a successful insurrection against Mughal rule in the region. Shivaji signed a truce with Bijapur's emperor Adil Shah in 1660, after which Shivaji's kingdom was firmly established and he built a civil administration in the region. Until his death in 1680, however, Shivaji's army engaged in bitter battles with Aurangzeb (1618–1707), the Mughal governor of the Deccan (1636–1644, 1652–1658) and Mughal emperor (1658–1707), as well as British and Portuguese forces. Maratha hold was further fortified in the early 18th century when Shivaji's grandson adopted the formal designation *peshwa* ("prime minister"). Maratha Peshwas ruled over the region, although not without considerable struggle, for roughly 200 years.

During this time the Europeans had arrived and were establishing a foothold in western India. While the Portuguese maintained a strong presence in the area, most British trading activities were concentrated in the northeastern city of Calcutta on the bank of the river Hooghly. Trade between England and western India meanwhile was conducted primarily from the Gujarati city of Surat. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the East India Company struggled with the Marathas for control of Maharashtra. After defeating the Marathas in the Third Anglo-Maratha War in 1818, the company established its regional dominance and created the Bombay Presidency, encompassing much of present-day Maharashtra and Gujarat. Meanwhile, the territories of Goa, Daman, and Diu were still under Portuguese control, and areas to the east were overseen by the nizam of Hyderabad. In the 1820s the company relocated its administrative and commercial activities from Surat to Bombay, and many Gujarati merchants and traders soon followed. After the Mutiny of 1857, the British Crown consolidated its India holdings, and the East India Company relinquished control of the Bombay Presidency. Until India gained independence in August 1947, the British colonial administration governed the Bombay Presidency from its regional headquarters in the fort area of southern Bombay.

After independence, the organization of India's provinces, states, and administrative regions was an irrational jumble, reflecting part colonial legacy and part political compromise. The idea had earlier been proposed to reorganize the states along linguistic lines, although India's new leadership, including Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister

1947–1964), opposed the idea on the grounds that such a reorganization would weaken national unity. After a leader in the movement to create a Telugu-speaking state fasted to death in 1952, however, the prime minister acquiesced and created the Telugu-speaking state of Andhra Pradesh, paving the way for complete state reorganization. In 1956 the Indian States Reorganization Committee recommended the creation of 14 ethnolinguistic states. Under the States Reorganization Act of 1956, the Marathi-speaking regions of Vidarbha and Marathwada became part of Bombay state, but Bombay state remained a bilingual Marathi and Gujarati state. Opposing this decision, a group of Marathi activists formed the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti in February 1956 to fight for the creation of a Marathi-speaking state. Bombay state's Gujarati population generally opposed the state's division, fearing the loss of the city of Bombay that had been built largely with Gujarati capital, although with Maratha labor.

For the next four years, Bombay politics were dominated by debates over state reorganization. Although the movement was initially dominated by members of the Indian National Congress (INC), founded in 1885 and also known as the Congress Party, Maharashtrian Socialists, Communists, and other leftist groups were brought into the movement to show broad support for a Marathi state. The movement meanwhile turned violent in early 1960 when Chief Minister Morarji Desai (1896–1995; chief minister of Bombay 1952–1960; prime minister 1977–1979) ordered the police to fire on a crowd of Samyukta Maharashtra protestors, killing 105 people. As a result, Desai was forced to step down from his post. The public outrage over this event helped fuel the movement for the creation of a Marathi-speaking state, and the state of Maharashtra was created on May 1, 1960, with the city of Bombay as its administrative and legislative capital.

Since its formation, Maharashtra generally speaking has been an INC stronghold. With the exception of the 1978 election in which the Janata Party took the largest share of seats in the Maharashtra Legislative Assembly, the INC (in its various incarnations and splinter parties) held on to power. Maharashtra politics have generally been dominated by members of rural Maratha castes who have held power in village councils and control over the state's agricultural cooperatives. Consequently, politics in the state have tended to be dominated by the INC and are predominantly rural and decidedly anti-Brahmin. This political landscape began to change in the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, culminating in 1995 with the INC defeat and the formation of a coalition government by the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), founded in 1980, and the Shiv Sena Party, founded in 1966.

While support for the Mumbai-based Shiv Sena Party had been growing steadily since its formation in 1966, the party made its first strong standing in statewide elections in 1990 when it ran in cooperation with the Hindu nationalist BJP. Although the party was still unable to take a majority of seats in 1990, a scandal in Maharashtra's INC, paired with the Shiv Sena's strategic use of violence, sealed the coalition's electoral success. The BJP and Shiv Sena won enough seats to put together a majority and form the government in 1995. In addition to several high-profile scandals, the ruling INC government had suffered waning public support after its seemingly inept response to the 1993 earthquake in Marathwada. The coalition's political capture was short-lived, however, and an INC-led coalition returned to power in 1999.

In Maharashtra's October 2009 elections a coalition of the INC and the Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) formed in May 1999 after three INC members were expelled from the party for rejecting the idea that a foreigner, the Italian-born Sonia Gandhi (b. 1946) and widow of former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991; prime minister 1984–1989), could lead the INC after the coalition won a decisive victory across the state. Of the 288 seats in the state's Legislative Assembly, 144 seats were secured by either INC or NCP candidates. The BJP and Shiv Sena meanwhile won 46 and 45 seats, respectively.

LIZA WEINSTEIN

See also Bharatiya Janata Party; Mumbai; Shiv Sena; Thackeray, Balasaheb Keshav

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✦ MALDIVES

Maldives is a small island nation located in the Indian Ocean, with Male as its capital. India and Sri Lanka, with which Maldives has close historical, cultural, and economic ties, are its neighbors. The total land area of Maldives is fewer than 186 square miles. The estimated population in 2009 was 396,334. The official language is Dhivehi.

Maldives is an Islamic nation whose people were converted to Sunni Islam in the mid-12th century. The nation was long ruled by a hereditary sultanate. Maldives became a British protectorate in 1887 and secured independence on July 26, 1965. After the abolition of the hereditary sultanate in 1968, Maldives, through a referendum, became a republic. The nation has a highly centralized presidential form of government. Under a major political reform agenda, political parties were unanimously given legal recognition by the People's Majlis in 2005. Maumoon Abdul Gayoom (b. 1937), the longest-ruling head of government in Asia, ruled the island state for 30 years (1978–2008). In November 1988 Sri Lankan Tamil mercenaries attempted to overthrow Gayoom in a coup, but it was immediately foiled with India's military assistance. In the first multiparty presidential elections held in October 2008, Gayoom was defeated by his political rival, Mohamed Nasheed (b. 1967), who was sworn in

as president of Maldives on November 11, 2008. The Maldivian economy is primarily based on fisheries, although the natural beauty of Maldives has been attracting a large number of tourists, mainly from Europe and South Asia, who richly contribute to the state's revenue. Maldives has the highest per capita income in South Asia.

B. M. JAIN

See also South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

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✦ MANDAL COMMISSION

The Mandal Commission, named after Bindheshwari Prasad Mandal (1918–1982) from Bihar, who was a member of the lower house of Parliament, the Lok Sabha, was established in 1979 by the Indian government under Prime Minister Morarji Desai (1896–1995; prime minister 1977–1979) of the Janata Party to identify socially or educationally backward communities and to recommend reservations (or minimum quotas) for them in government service and in public universities. The first report of this commission was submitted in late 1980 and then was recirculated to pass a law during the National Front government led by Prime Minister Vishwanath Pratap Singh (1931–2008; prime minister 1989–1990) in 1990. The Mandal Commission identified almost 52 percent of the Indian population who did not have access to educational institutions and government employment. The commission recommended 27 percent job quotas for members of the lower castes, known as Other Backward Classes (OBC), in all central government offices including the judiciary, the police, banks, railways, and the private sector. The report suggested that state governments follow the same criteria. The commission also proposed that the same quota should be applied in OBC's admissions and promotions and that a separate central ministry should monitor the progress made in the implementation of the quota system.

When Singh announced on August 7, 1990, that his government would implement the changes specified by the Mandal Commission, widespread protests broke out across the country. Students belonging to the upper castes played a leading role in the protests, and many of them committed self-immolation in protest over the government's repressive response. The fragile coalition central government could not withstand the onslaught

on the reservations policy and fell from power less than a year after being sworn in. The most important dimension of the Mandal Commission's report was its recommendation to start investigations into the conditions of OBCs among the Sikh, Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim communities. This issue of reservations for other backward classes, those who are not recognized in the Indian Constitution as protected citizens such as Scheduled Castes (untouchables), also known as Dalits, and Scheduled Tribes, also known as Adivasis, receded into the background during the communal fervor that ripped the country apart in the early 1990s and brought a coalition of right-wing Hindu parties, most notably the Bharatiya Janata Party, founded in 1980, to power. Since then the central and state governments have partially applied the Mandal Commission recommendations, but the southern Indian states have been more open and liberal in increasing job and educational quotas for the OBCs.

The issue of reservations in jobs and educational institutions came to the fore again with the formation of the National Commission for Minorities in 1992, which was charged with monitoring and evaluating the progress of the reservations policy. The commission identifies specific needs of socially backward classes that can be met through job quotas and reservations in schools, colleges, professional institutions, and universities. The recommendations and initiatives of the commission are routinely challenged by upper-caste Indian communities, leading to injunctions of judicial rulings. For instance, in 2008 the Supreme Court upheld the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government's plan to provide a 27 percent quota to OBCs in central educational institutions excluding the "creamy layer" (the affluent sections of OBCs). The Court also validated the 93rd Amendment of the Constitution (2005), which gives power to the central government to increase the OBC quota in institutions of higher learning. OBC communities have since received greater opportunities through the recommendations submitted by the Mishra Commission (2007), which proposed 15 percent reservations for Dalits, Muslims, and Christians in educational institutions and jobs and their inclusion into the OBC category.

The UPA government, reelected in 2009 and led by Manmohan Singh (b. 1932; prime minister 2004–), reiterated its government's commitment to providing equal opportunity to every Indian citizen irrespective of caste, class, or religion in national economic activities, education, and employment.

FATIMA A. IMAM

See also Constitution

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Manipur. *See* Northeastern States

Maoists. *See* Naxalite Movement

✦ MARWARIS

Commercial activity in India has historically been dominated by certain merchant banking communities such as the Marwaris, Khatris, and Khojas in the north Indian hinterland; Gujarati *banias,* Lohanas, Bhatias, Parsis, and Muslim traders in Western India; the Sindhis (especially from the *bhaiband* class) in the northwestern parts of undivided India; and the Chettiars and Komatis in southern India. One community that has been able to maintain its economic prowess in the subcontinent since at least the 15th century and from which prominent business figures continue to emerge even in the 21st century is that of the Marwaris.

The word "Marwari" is derived from Marwar, the erstwhile state of Jodhpur, but it is used to refer to anyone whose homeland is Rajasthan. Comprising a heterogeneous mix of caste groups within the *bania* (trader) caste, a number of *jatis* (subcastes), and persons of both Hindu and Jain persuasion, the term has been widely used to refer to immigrant traders from Rajasthan, especially in regions where they have settled. The immigrant traders themselves identified with the title from the late 19th century, as it helped them conceal their internal differences and present themselves as a unified community.

Rajasthani traders have a long history of migration for trade purposes. From at least the early 15th century, they are known to have traded all over the north Indian hinterland, especially in up-country markets, and often migrated in search of economic opportunities or to regions where they were offered special trading privileges by rulers. Their traditional interests included trading along caravan routes, money lending, acting as treasurers to ruling dynasties, and financing warring princes. From the 17th century Rajasthani traders moved to eastern India, especially Bengal. The coming of European traders and the establishment of British ascendancy over the subcontinent furthered this migration. Taking advantage of the rise of new commercial centers, the expansion of commercial agriculture, the new safety of travel established by the British, and the commercial opportunities of the Pax Brittanica, they arrived in large numbers in Bombay and Calcutta from the mid-19th century and later moved to Madras, various places in central India, and Assam.

The immigrant traders soon became indispensable in the new economic order as brokers, middlemen, and subcontractors, and by the last decades of the 19th century they gained control over the main segments of the bazaar economy. Given their long tradition of trading and their strong links with the hinterland of northern India, these traders were also involved in financing peasant cultivators and were able to ensure the seasonal flows of goods that the Europeans required. Widespread networks and complex financial arrangements interlocked

Marwaris together at several levels and generated credit flows, enabling these indigenous merchants to deliver goods at all levels of the economy. Financing of the massive movement of goods and crops occurred under their auspices, as did agricultural and craft production, which was dependent on them advancing loans to peasants and artisans. Through credit networks and the use of sophisticated financial instruments (*hundi*), the traders could control the indigenous money market and ensure the flow of goods and credit across the subcontinent. Thus, the Marwaris came to occupy a position of advantage within the colonial economy. Among the commodities in which they dealt were Manchester piece goods, of which they became the principal distributors; grain; oilseeds; raw cotton; jute; and other unprocessed goods. As brokers, the Marwaris became *banias* or guarantee brokers to important European houses and helped in bringing in new orders and in financing and guaranteeing bills. In addition to trading, the Marwaris developed considerable interests in speculative markets and engaged in futures trading in opium, spices, hessian (a coarse woven cloth), and jute.

Community networks played a critical role in helping Marwari newcomers settle. Typically they were housed in a *bassa* (community lodging) and worked as apprentices to well-settled traders before launching out on their own. This experience initiated the newcomers into the ways of city life, introduced them to the codes of mercantile morality that held the immigrants together, and inducted them into community networks. By the mid-19th century, the immigrant traders had also set up community institutions to regulate internal affairs, determine current rates of interest, settle disputes, and represent the community at diverse forums.

From this advantageous position, the Marwaris were able to expand into industry in the post–World War I era. The war presented enormous opportunities in both trading and speculation for bazaar traders, as European shipping was tied up with war needs. These profits, the dominance by Marwaris over hinterland trade, and their familiarity with different layers in the jute sector from procurement of raw materials to baling, speculation, and their control over jute shares enabled the Marwaris of eastern India to break into the European monopoly of the jute industry. Thus, in 1919 three Marwari firms—Birla Jute Manufacturing Company, Halwasia Jute Mills, and Hukumchand Jute Mills, Ltd.—entered the jute-production business. While the majority of the community remained traders and moneylenders, the larger business groups were able to enter into cotton and sugar in the 1920s, followed by cement, paper, coal, light engineering, iron and steel, and pharmaceuticals in the 1930s and 1940s. The interwar years thus witnessed their entry into technologically advanced areas and their emergence as industrialists in places far removed from Calcutta and Bombay. New groups emerged in almost every decade from the ranks of the Marwari bazaar traders, while their bazaar links and interests remained strong. The 1940s also saw older Marwari business groups enter areas, such as tea, from which European businesses were anxious to withdraw in the lead-up to independence and foray into new areas such as staple fiber, aluminum, fertilizers, and rayon pulp. By the 1950s the community was growing toward being the most prominent on the Indian industrial scene, second only to the Parsees.

A number of factors and historical circumstances were responsible for the widespread success of Marwari traders. Their corporate organization, their shared code of business ethics, their strong kin and locality networks, and a flexible nexus between family and firm gave them advantages in commercial pursuits. They also maintained a highly versatile trading and financial portfolio that enabled them to shift their priorities when faced with challenges and take advantage of new opportunities.

Apart from commercial prowess, the Marwari community also played an important part in public life. Marwari traders were especially close to the Hindu nationalist politician and educationist Madan Mohan Malaviya (1861–1946) and enthusiastically supported several causes of Hindu resurgence that Malaviya championed such as cow protection, vegetarianism, and the propagation of Sanskrit and Hindi. A deeply religious community, the Marwaris also grew close to Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1969–1948) from the late 1920s. A *bania* himself, Gandhi appeared as one of their own, and they were especially attracted to his religious persona. Their association with him grew to be both political and religious. Alongside smaller traders, prominent members of the community such as Jamnalal Bajaj (1884–1942), Ghanshyamdas Birla (1894–1983), and Hanuman Prasad Poddar (1892–1971) took an active interest in national politics.

In postindependence India, the large Marwari business houses consolidated their economic power under the new industrial policy of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964). This policy, which appeared to restrict industrial growth, advantaged large groups that grew their share of capital, fixed assets, and capital stock. In 1964 the Monopolies Inquiry Committee found that 10 of the 37 largest industrial houses belonged to the Marwaris. In the last 60 years the community has continued to dominate the industrial sphere, although many new players have emerged, and even in the late 1980s four Marwari houses accounted for a third of the total assets of the top 10 business houses in India. Half of the nation's private industrial assets were controlled by the community as late as 1997.

Yet there are challenges that the community faces. The Marwaris are widely stereotyped as miserly, untrustworthy, greedy, and clannish and are treated as outsiders even in regions where they have resided for several generations. Strong anti-Marwari sentiments have erupted at times of economic distress, and Marwari traders have been blamed for hoarding, adulterating, and creating artificial scarcity of essential commodities since the famous Deccan Agriculturist Riots of 1875, when peasants in rural Maharashtra blamed Marwari moneylenders for their economic distress. There have been other instances, such as the Bengal famine of 1943, when the Marwaris were accused of hoarding and causing false shortages. In more recent years, anti-Marwari agitations have been witnessed in Orissa in the 1980s and in Assam in the 1960s and again in the 1990s. Negative perceptions also affect large Marwari business houses, which are perceived to be run on kin ties, to be family dominated, to be unprofessional, to favor community and caste members, and to value profits and pace of growth rather than quality.

The recent liberalization of the Indian economy (post-1991) and the increased competition that it has heralded have led to the decline of some Marwari groups, but many have remained in the limelight. Prominent Marwaris have also continued to emerge on the industrial scene, the latest being Lakshmi Mittal (b. 1950), whose acquisition of Arcelor S.A. in 2006 made him the largest steel maker in the world. Yet it remains to be seen how Marwari businesses will respond to the challenges and opportunities that liberalization is bringing to India and how the community will fare in 21st-century India.

MEDHA KUDAISYA

See also Economy; Kolkata; Rajasthan

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Masjid-i-Jahanuma. *See* Jama Masjid Mosque

✦ MAURITIUS, RELATIONS WITH

India and Mauritius have a shared historical past spanning several centuries. Migration from India to Mauritius has taken place since the 15th century, with Indians primarily going to Mauritius as indentured laborers. Over time a sizable percentage of the indigenous population of Mauritius has undergone a process of assimilation and acculturation with India's diverse cultural heritage.

The visit of Indian nationalist leader Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948) in 1901 and his decision to send Manilal Doctor (1881–1956), a London-educated lawyer and politician, to Mauritius to garner support for India's struggle for freedom strongly influenced the people of Mauritius, who themselves were striving for independence. In 1968 when the island finally achieved independence, March 12—the starting date of Gandhi's historic Dandi Salt March in 1930—was selected as the date of independence and the national day of Mauritius.

Since the independence of Mauritius, India has taken a proactive part in promoting human resources and the economic development of the country. India has provided the necessary expertise for sectors of the economy targeted for rapid economic development such as in the Export Processing Zones and in tourism. India has assisted Mauritius with the

implementation of the Four-Year Plan by sending technical experts and workers. In addition, India also provided heavy machinery and equipment that were used for infrastructural development in construction and surface transportation. The Four-Year Plan was followed by the 1978 Agreement on Economic, Technical and Scientific and Cultural Cooperation and the establishment of a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement between India and Mauritius. The diplomatic relationship between Mauritius and India is a warm one, and the bilateral relationship between the two countries is expected to grow significantly in the foreseeable future.

MOHAMMED BADRUL ALAM

See also Diaspora, Indian

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✦ MEDIA AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

The media and telecommunications sectors in India today are thriving, exhibiting varying degrees of public-private partnership and providing a wider range of choice and content to larger numbers of people in both rural and urban areas than ever before. The major watershed event occurred in 1991 when the Indian economy was deregulated and opened up to foreign competition and investment. The result is that the telecommunications sector is the third-largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI). The 1990s and 2000s have been dominated by developments in television—especially through cable and satellite television—as well as the boom in the Internet, particularly since 1995 with the availability of commercial Internet. There has also been a major increase in the regional-language newspaper industry, and this is linked to increasing literacy, technological improvements, rising disposable incomes, the emergence of a rural middle class, the rapidly expanding urban middle class, a widening public-political sphere, and greater participation in public affairs at the local level.

Indian print journalism presents an unrivaled example of success with rising newspaper circulation, thus bucking the global trend toward falling advertising revenue. Since the 1980s the dominance of English-language newspapers in terms of circulation and readership numbers has been replaced by Indian-language newspapers, spearheaded by those in Hindi, although English national dailies and magazines still command a disproportionately higher



Busy newsroom at New Delhi Television (NDTV), one of India's private news channels, April 2003. (AP Photo/Gautam Singh)

degree of prestige and political influence. According to a March 2007 survey conducted by the Office of the Registrar of Newspapers for India (RNI), the total number of registered newspapers and periodicals in 2007 was 65,032, which included 7,131 dailies and 22,116 weeklies. These include publications in more than 124 languages and dialects, with Hindi having the largest number of registered newspapers and periodicals at 24,927, followed a distant second by those in English at 9,064. There have been dramatic improvements in the reach and penetration of the press as well. The National Readership survey of 2005 claimed a total readership of 200 million, which is almost 1 in 5 readers or about 20 percent of the Indian population, with almost 50 percent of those based in rural India. As reported by the RNI in 2008, the largest daily newspaper in the country by readership is the Hindi-language *Dainik Jagran,* at 55.7 million, and among the most widely read English dailies are, in descending order, the *Times of India,* the *Hindustan Times,* and the *Hindu.*

However, the success of the Indian press is firmly rooted in its imperial past. When India gained independence in 1947, the country had a bustling and thriving journalistic community and a press conducted in both English and vernacular languages. From the early 19th century when the first Indian printer and publisher set up business in Calcutta (Kolkata) in 1807, the Indian press grew into a prominent vehicle for the articulation of Indian nationalist anti-imperial sentiment and provided a rare forum for political participation under British rule after the British Crown takeover in 1858. The first telegraph line was opened between Calcutta and Diamond Harbour to the south of Calcutta in 1851, and from the late 1850s

until independence the main news agency operating within India was the British-owned company Reuters, which was founded in 1851. Reuters in India monopolized foreign news services and through its affiliates also dominated domestic news. Following independence, the company lost its monopoly and soon ceased to operate completely in India. Today the main news agency is the nonprofit Press Trust of India (PTI), which came into operation in 1949 and now boasts more than 500 newspapers and all major television and radio channels and includes foreign media organizations, such as the BBC, on its books. Although smaller than the PTI, the other major news agency is the United News of India (UNI), which began functioning in 1961. There is also an Internet-based news and photo exchange arrangement among nonaligned countries, including India, called the Non-Aligned Movement News Network (NNN).

Radio broadcasting was introduced into India by the British between World War I and World War II, with All India Radio (AIR) broadcasting from 1936. At independence in 1947, however, India only had 6 radio stations and 18 transmitters covering 11 percent of the population and 2.5 percent of the land area of India. By the end of 2007, this number had increased to include 231 radio stations and 373 transmitters covering 99.14 percent of the population and 91 percent of India. While news can only be broadcast on the government-controlled AIR channels, nonnews sectors have been privatized and are open completely to FDI, with more than 100 private channels and cable networks in operation in 2009.

Television services began in India as part of the AIR network under government control, beginning in the capital of New Delhi in 1965, Bombay (Mumbai) in 1972, and Calcutta (Kolkata), and Madras (Chennai) in 1975. Delhi Doordarshan (DD), as the premier television organization, came into existence on September 15, 1976. Color television made its appearance in 1982, with the main impetus for its introduction provided by the Asian Games hosted by India in Delhi that year. In 1997 a new Broadcasting Corporation of India, the Prasar Bharati, came into existence subsuming DD and AIR, and five years later a 24-hour news channel was introduced on Indian television. Today there are more than 64 television centers in operation throughout the country functioning on a three-tier system with national, regional, and local broadcasting. From slow beginnings, the broadcast media has been opened to limited FDI, and today the consumer is spoiled by the choices available from cable and satellite broadcasters, with dozens of indigenous channels as well as a substantial number of foreign channels, including the BBC, Channel 5, MTV, Star, CNN, PBS, CBS, ITV, Sky, History, and National Geographic.

The first telephone services were introduced by the British only six years after the invention of the telephone in Calcutta during 1881–1882, with the first automatic exchanges being opened in Simla during 1913–1914. However, for a long time even after independence, the coverage and quality of telephone service remained very poor. In the last few decades major strides have been made to improve coverage and the range of options available to the consumer. In 2000 the Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd (BSNL), a new undertaking by the new public sector to cover all forms of telephone service, came into operation. There has also

been a major impetus to increase the private sector share of telephone operations, which in March 2008 stood at 73.5 percent at a time when the network of telephone connections in the country was around 300.49 million. The rural areas, which have traditionally been poorly assisted by this service, have also seen heavy investment with the introduction in 2007 of broadband service, although optimal coverage will require a great deal more work in terms of infrastructure and services. By 2010 there were around 545 million mobile phone subscribers in India, placing the country second in the world for mobile phone use, behind only China and ahead of the United States.

CHANDRIKA KAUL

See also All India Radio; Doordarshan; *Hindu, The; Hindustan Times; Indian Express; India Today;* Newspapers, Indian-Language; Radio; Television; *Times of India, The*

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✦ MEDICAL TOURISM

India is a popular destination for international travelers seeking private health care. Medical tourism in fact is experiencing high annual growth rates, and government bodies in India, such as the Ministry of Tourism, have initiated a range of programs to encourage and market medical tourism, including marketing campaigns, improved airport and transportation services, and tax incentives.

The most popular treatments requested by tourists include alternative medicine treatment, bone marrow transplants, cosmetic surgery, dentistry, infertility treatments, joint replacements, oncology services, and specialized surgeries such as eye and heart surgery. Major cities that cater to medical tourists are Chennai, Mumbai, and New Delhi.

India offers several key advantages for medical tourists, including affordability, the immediate availability of treatment, high standards of care, medical expertise, the availability of the latest medical technology, easy communication with doctors and nurses in English, and India's popularity as a favorite tourist destination. Package deals for patients often include prearrangements, flights, transfers, hotel and hospital stays, postoperative care, and even a vacation. This contrasts with the high costs and long waiting times in countries such as Canada and the United States and in Europe, the lack of up-to-date technology in the Middle

East, and the nonavailability of treatment in some poorer countries in Africa and the other countries of the subcontinent.

Although health care delivery is largely unregulated in India, medical services for tourists report a growing compliance with international quality standards. A number of private Indian hospitals have been inspected by the Joint Commission International in the United States, the Trent International Accreditation Scheme in the United Kingdom, and other global accreditation organizations as well. India has also set up its own accreditation boards; one is the National Accreditation Board for Hospitals and Healthcare Providers, which is under the supervision of the Quality Council of India. These organizations inspect and accredit health care facilities and hospitals worldwide that use internationally recognized procedures and standards.

There are some problems associated with medical care in India. As Western countries have leading medical services and high quality standards, undergoing treatment overseas is sometimes viewed as inferior and risky. There is some variation in quality and accreditation in Indian hospitals, and many do not meet international standards. Postoperative complications can occur for patients who undertake vacation activities or travel back to their home country shortly after surgery, and these might be more difficult to solve after patients leave the hospital. Another problem is the resolution of complaints or any litigation that reaches the courts. In addition, the industry faces tough competition from health facilities in countries in the region such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. Some people also believe that there are ethical issues for India to resolve with regard to medical tourists: tourists occupy the time of doctors and nurses and take up bed space and facilities in an already overburdened health care system; tourists create further inequalities, as medical tourism facilities are far superior to those that cater to the average Indian; tourists create fears that higher salaries and career opportunities in private health care lure professionals from the public sector and the rural areas; tourists create uncertainty over the extent to which the large profits generated from private health care benefit public health and public health systems; and tourists raise the issue of the illegal purchase of organs and tissues for transplantation.

GARETH DAVEY

See also Ayurvedic Medicine; Diet and Health; Health Care; HIV/AIDS; Mental Health Care

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Medicine, Ayurvedic. *See* Ayurvedic Medicine

✦ MEGHALAYA

Meghalaya, meaning the "Abode of Clouds," is a state, or federal unit, of the Indian Union located in the northeastern region of the country. Comprising plateaus and hills, this picturesque state boasts of having the wettest site on the planet. Shillong, often called the "Scotland of the East," is the capital. Meghalaya was a part of the larger state of Assam before it attained full statehood in 1972 in the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act.

Meghalaya is bounded by Assam on the north and Bangladesh on the south and lies on a latitude range of 20°1′N and 26°5′N and a longitude range of 85°49′E and 92°53′E. The total geographical area of Meghalaya is about 14,000 square miles, and the state falls under 3 autonomous district councils—Khasi, Garo, and Jaintia—in accordance with the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. These 3 autonomous councils are further divided into 7 administrative districts, 2 subdivisions, 6 special administrative units, and 30 community development blocks. The headquarters of the 7 districts are as follows: East Khasi Hills District, headquartered in Shillong; Ri Bhoi District, headquartered in Nongpoh; West Khasi Hills District, headquartered in Nongstoin; East Garo Hills District, headquartered in William Nagar; West Garo Hills District, headquartered in Tura; South Garo Hills District, headquartered in Baghmara; and Jaintia Hills District, headquartered in Jowai.

Geologically very rich, the whole state of Meghalaya is a plateau with a wide variety of natural vegetation ranging from tropical mixed forests of the Garo Hills to deciduous pine forests in the Khasi-Jaintia Hills. Sal, pine, firs, bamboo, wild bananas, and grasslands are important varieties of flora in the plateau.

The Khasis of Meghalaya belong to the Mon-Khmer subfamily of the Austric stock of people. The nearest groups who speak similar languages are the Mundas of the Chottanagpur Plateau, the Mons of Lower Burma, and the Khmer of Cambodia and Thailand. These groups started settling down in their present habitat at different periods of time and commonly trace their original settlement to the meeting point of the Brahmaputra Valley before it was dominated by the Bodo-Kacheri plains people. The Garo peoples share ancestral ties with the greater Bodo-Kacheri peoples. However, the inhabitants of the frontier regions display significant cultural influences from the people of Bangladesh and Assam.

The Khasis have their own origin myth. They believe that many centuries ago a particular hill, U Lum Sohpet Bneng ("The Navel of Heaven"), originally connected heaven and earth. On the side of heaven there were seven huts where men lived. Due to man's sins, heaven was separated from earth, so man was left to himself. By this folktale, the Khasis claim to be of divine origin. Christianity is the dominant religion today, but it has several traits of animism and pagan worship instilled in it.

The total population of Meghalaya is nearly 2.5 million, with an average density of around 65 persons per square mile. Three principal groups of people reside here: The Garos live in the East and West Garo Hills, and the Khasis and Pnars dominate the Khasi and Jaintia



Khasi women at a market in the Indian state of Meghalaya, November 2010. The Khasis are a matrilineal society where property is inherited by the youngest daughter. In Khasi culture, the woman looks after the home, the father finds the means to support the family, and the maternal uncle settles all family matters. (Samrat/Dreamstime.com)

Hills. They primarily follow a matrilineal system. English is the official language of the state, but the principal spoken languages are Khasi, Pnar, and Garo.

Before the British incursion into the region in the 19th century, Meghalaya was comprised of independent Khasi, Garo, and Jaintia kingdoms. In 1835 the British incorporated Meghalaya into Assam, although the region enjoyed a semi-independent status for a short while by virtue of a treaty relationship with the British Crown. The topography and climate of Meghalaya made it a much-favored location for Europeans. Administrators and missionaries alike built headquarters or bases for their operations in Meghalaya. After the transfer of power in August 1947, the state, then known as United Khasi and Jaintia Hills, became part of the larger state of Assam, with Shillong as the capital.

With the reorganization of states in India under the 1971 North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act, Meghalaya attained full-fledged statehood on January 21, 1972, with a Legislative Assembly elected every five years. The Legislative Assembly has 60 members, and Meghalaya has 2 representatives in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament, one each from Shillong in Khasi Hills and Tura in Garo Hills. Meghalaya also has 1 representative in the Rajya Sabha, the upper house of Parliament. The ceremonial head of the state is the governor, who is appointed by the government of India. However, real executive powers

are held by the chief minister, who is elected through a majority vote of the Legislative Assembly.

Meghalaya has a traditional governance system based on clan hierarchy. In the customary Khasi system of governing, each clan has its own council known as the Durbar Kur, which is presided over by the clan headman. The Durbar Kur manages the internal affairs of the clan and even today coexists with modern forms of governance. Every village also has a local assembly known as the Durbar Shnong ("Village Council"), which is presided over by the village headman. These councils play an important administrative role in rural areas in regard to aspects of community land, sanitation, education, health, and the resolution of disputes.

Matters relating to more than one village are dealt with by another council, the Raid Durbar, that is comprised of members of adjacent Khasi villages. The Raid Durbar is presided over by an elected headman known as *basan*, *lyngdoh*, or *sirdar*. Above the Raid Durbar there is a final political authority called the Syiemship. The Syiemship is the congregation of several raids and is headed by an elected chief known as the *syiem* ("king"). At various levels the Raid Durbar coexists, both formally and informally, with constitutional forms of government and is of immense importance in Khasi society. With some minor exceptions, the traditional governance systems of the Jaintias and the Garos are similar to that of the Khasis.

Meghalaya does not have large industries, but the smaller-scale industries comprise sericulture, flour mills, preservation, and engineering units concentrated either in the urban centers or located along the Shillong-Guwahati National Highway in an area called Byrnihat. Important medium-scale industries are confined to cement manufacture, plywood, chemical factories, and oil mills. Animal husbandry and dairy farming are important livelihood sources. Meghalaya has about 540,000 cattle, 29,000 buffaloes, 180,000 goats, 2.07 million pigs, and 1.419 million birds in the poultry business.

Meghalaya is rich in mineral resources, particularly in coal, limestone, and uranium. During 1983–1984 the Department of Atomic Energy discovered two high-quality uranium ore deposits of 9.22 million tons at Killung and Rangam. After initial explorations in 1987, the Uranium Corporation of India (UCIL), a government of India undertaking, extracted about 630 tons of uranium from a open cast mine, 6.2 square miles in size, near Domiasiat. However, strong local opposition forced the UCIL to wind up operations in the early 1990s. The UCIL is now proposing an open cast mining project worth 8,140 million rupees. The proposed mining and processing project—the Kylleng-Pyndengsohing Uranium Project in Mawthabah—will require 867 acres from 6 villages and will impact 72 other villages that fall within a 12-mile radius of the project area. There is strong opposition to the project from environmental organizations and local communities. They allege that public opinion was not incorporated into decision making on the project, which involves large-scale environmental degradation and the exposure of the local population to nuclear radiation.

Meghalaya, unlike most other states of India, follows a matrilineal system whereby lineage and inheritance are traced through the female line. In this system the youngest daughter

inherits all the property and acts as the caretaker of her parents. However, the men, usually the mother's brother, have considerable influence in property-related decision making. But the matrilineal system also means that women sometimes take on a huge amount of responsibility both within the household and in the public sphere.

SUSHMITA KASHYAP

See also Northeastern States

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✦ MENTAL HEALTH CARE

Mental health care in India is directed by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare as part of the general health service. The National Mental Health Plan, set up in 1982, serves as the nation's mental health policy. The plan aims to ensure the availability and development of mental health services and training for mental health care practitioners. A number of health-related acts have been approved by the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Parliament of India, including the Mental Health Act (1987) that regulates the treatment, care, and rights of the mentally ill and created a central government authority to regulate the provision of mental health services.

Patients are treated in primary health centers and general hospitals as inpatients or outpatients. Most mental hospitals are supervised by local, state, or central governments. There has also been a growth in private psychiatric services as well as in charitable trusts, voluntary groups, and other nongovernment organizations. Health professionals are trained in modern medicine and use the same illness classification systems, drugs, and behavioral methods as in the West. However, traditional medical practitioners constitute an important part of health care provision in India. The two medical systems practiced by these practitioners are ayurveda, "the science of life," that would be considered an alternative medical system as, among other things, it prescribes herbs, massage, and yoga; and Unani or Yunani (meaning "Greek Medicine"), which is based on the Greek concepts of the four humors: phlegm, blood, yellow bile, and black bile. Traditional medical systems are more popular in the rural areas, where such systems are readily available and comparatively inexpensive.

The family plays an important role in the care of the mentally ill in India, which is responsible for decisions about seeking help and the treatment process. However, family

and community reactions to the mentally ill are often negative and can sometimes result in neglect, rejection, and stigma.

Although there has been a significant improvement in health care provision since independence, a pressing need exists for better mental health resources. Problems include the limited number of mental health facilities and professionals, the concentration of services in urban areas, minimal government funding, and the inability of patients to pay for treatment. The overwhelming majority of the people of India live in rural areas and do not have satisfactory health service facilities, services, or access to health care practitioners. There is also no central organization for mental health services and no nationwide data on the prevalence and incidence of mental illnesses. Consequently, the majority of mentally ill people in India go without adequate diagnosis, treatment, and aftercare. Another major issue is the rights of mentally ill people.

Despite these challenges, mental health services in India have improved a great deal in a short period of time. The government and other agencies are active in mental health promotion, and there have been improvements in the quality of care. Some of these improvements include an increase in government funding, the training of mental health personnel, innovations in the private sector, the integration of Indian and Western approaches, and an increase in nongovernmental organizations related to aftercare programs and human rights.

GARETH DAVEY

See also Ayurvedic Medicine; Diet and Health; Health Care; HIV/AIDS

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✦ MIDDLE CLASS

The term "middle class" in relation to India is predominantly used with respect to the subcontinent's drastic shift from a planned economy to an open market economy in the early 1990s and with a gross domestic product of 6.5 percent. Abroad, attention is generally focused on the new market segments of millions of new customers with surplus money to spend on a plethora of consumer durables and automobiles as well as the growth of the service sectors, ranging from information technologies to business product outsourcing (e.g., call centers). India has capitalized on its large educated English-speaking population to become a major exporter of information technology services and software workers, who constitute key segments of the middle class. Moreover, the middle class has gained international attention due to the presence of some 26 million overseas Indians, many of whom have been referred

to as "cultural ambassadors" by several Indian politicians. Overseas Indians contribute to India's growth by sending substantial remittances to family members and by investing in real estate or other growing industries in the country. The Indian middle class is also frequently compared to its Chinese equivalent in order to define similarities and differences in terms of economic, political, and social changes.

It is important to note that the middle class as a social category did not suddenly emerge in 1991 when India opened up its economy. The Indian middle class is as old as any Western country's middle class and is directly related to the spread of high capitalism, the development of bourgeois society, industrialization, the advent of the East India Company (1600–1858), and British colonial rule (1858–1947). Employment in the colonial administration and work in towns and trading centers were especially fertile ground for the development of middle-class culture and infrastructure. An important subgroup of the established Indian middle class was the *bhadralok*, members of the educated and cultivated status group of the so-called respectable people in Bengal. Sometimes you can find them depicted in indigenous popular culture and satirical magazines around 1900, such as when a pot-bellied man would be made fun of for his attempts to mimic the British colonial lifestyle. While such iconography must be understood as persiflage, it nevertheless underlines a well-established view that Indian modernity is copied from the West because Indians cannot develop their own modernity. Such a problematic Orientalist view of a singular Western modernity has been challenged by Indian and non-Indian scholars who have argued for alternative, multiple, or multicentered modernities.

Based on the large colonial administration, postindependence India continued to elaborate a middle class predominantly on the grounds of its huge government administration. The middle classes of the open market economy mark a shift from the administrative sector to the private service sector. Accompanied by reservation politics introduced in the late 1980s that facilitated access to higher education and to positions in the government administration for underprivileged castes and classes, the new middle classes are said to be less defined by birth, such as caste, than by merit and ambition. The idea of the American Dream has nurtured that of the Indian Dream and encouraged the emergence of a confident Indian who sees himself or herself at the same level as anyone from a Western country. This possibility has shaped the notion of world-class Indianness. However, despite the fact that by law caste must not be considered in terms of a person's individual career and other forms of discrimination, in practice caste membership continues to govern social concepts of the middle class, such as marriage (endogamy).

The definition of today's middle class in surveys varies greatly in terms of income, underlining the relevance of recognizing the existence of different middle classes according to income but also to aspiration. There is no single category that allows us to define the term "middle class" in India. One approach is to look at occupation patterns, education, and income. The new middle classes are a highly heterogeneous group and are made up of people in professional, administrative, managerial, clerical, and other white-collar occupations. Survey categories defining the middle classes are (in ascending order) "aspirers," "seekers," "strivers,"

and the "near rich." Images-KSA Technopak, Gurgaon, a global management consulting firm, in its survey of urban consumers titled "Consumer Outlook 2005," published in *India Retail Report 2005*, differentiated the new middle classes into 32 million "technologies babies" (8–19 years of age), 16 million "impatient aspirers" (20–25 years of age), 41 million "balance seekers" (25–50 years of age), and 9 million "arrived veterans" (51–60 years of age). According to a survey by the management consulting firm McKinsey's Global Institute, in 2007 the middle class encompassed 50 million people and is projected to grow tenfold in the next 20 years. Other statistics speak of more than 100 million and even 300 million middle-class people, based on today's predictions. India is thus one of the largest consumer markets worldwide, with an overwhelming dominance of consumption taking place in the urban regions (62 percent). In 2004 the National Council for Applied Economic Research (NCAER) published a report titled "The Great Indian Middle Class" and estimated that in 2010 almost 4 million households will belong to the "near rich" to "super rich" categories, with an annual income of 1 million to more than 10 million rupees (e.g., around $24,000 to $240,000). The McKinsey Global Institute has predicted that by 2025, more than 291 million Indians will move up the economic ladder and cross the poverty line. This seems to be a very optimistic prognosis and part of what Ruchira Ganguly-Scrase and Timothy J. Scrase have called the great myth of economic liberalization. Underlying India's image of globalization's "El Dorado" is the increasing withdrawal of the state's financial and social safety nets and the transformation of Indian society into a risk society, that is, a society increasingly challenged by human-made problems as a result of modernization. The aspiration to move up is paired with the fear of falling or being left behind. Thus, other concepts aspired to seem to be at risk and are simultaneously mythologized; that is, being seen as part of the community, both local and global, and fully participating in it are considered important. In this context education, and in particular English and higher education, become increasingly important for the middle class and the upwardly mobile.

The fear of falling by the aspiring and even the affluent middle classes in India who hang between high and low is a fear that many people share. The option to choose among a wide variety of material goods, lifestyle designs, and relationships is not only attractive but is also threatening and in fact highly risky, with responsibilities taken and borne by individuals. The constant pressure to perform suitable conspicuous acts of consumption and be up to date with the latest lifestyle trends is also a way of ensuring that you do not fall down and behind. In this context, the production and circulation of moral narratives of risk and rise are crucial in order to negotiate and legitimize what is socially acceptable and what is not. For members of the thriving middle class, often stigmatized as parvenus by the established elites, lifestyle experts and the media have become a safety net and an educational platform for getting the best and fastest access to crucial know-how. But access is restricted, and conditions and rules are constantly shifting due to a host of different forces.

In tandem with the glamor and fascination of this economic miracle came the critique that the fruits of economic growth were enjoyed by the affluent classes, ignoring the fact that more

than 50 percent of households in India are in the "deprived" category. The NCAER report on the middle classes of 2004 defines the "deprived" (for 2001–2002) as annually earning below 90,000 rupees and consisting of about 135 million households. The inflation rate of 10.7 percent for consumer goods has shown how everyday life of the "simple" middle class and poor is affected. In 2005, 27.5 percent of the Indian population lived below the poverty line, with 25.7 percent in urban areas and 28.3 percent in rural areas. The per capita income per month defining the poverty line in Delhi was 613 rupees ($14). Reuters reports that 77 percent of Indians, about 836 million people, "live on less than half a dollar a day in one of the world's hottest economies," referring to the report of the state-run National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector (NCEUS). The survey states that a majority of the people from the informal sector in fact live on less than 20 rupees (45 cents) per day.

Challenging purely quantitative approaches toward defining a social group such as the middle classes in India, the term "middle-classness" was introduced to highlight the importance of membership to a particular group and its relevance for developing "suitable" strategies to establish membership in the middle class. The desire to belong to the middle class is not necessarily restricted to a person's income. Instead, the practices and status symbols linked to the term



A young middle class family visiting the Jama Masjid mosque in Delhi, February 2008. The middle classes have become a very important group in India's booming consumer market. (Paul Prescott/ Dreamstime.com)

"middle class" are constantly being negotiated by those who might already belong and those who do not belong to this group but aspire to do so. Middle-classness must be visualized and performed in order to be recognized and experienced. Conspicuous consumption—the conscious display of affluence—is part and parcel of a person's right to belong to the middle class or the elite. In this light many new spaces and practices have emerged, mainly in urban sites, as stages for these practices and new social groups related to the opening of the market economy. These range from large shopping malls to golf courses to gated communities and special economic zones. An increasingly visible middle class youth culture occupies spaces such as cafes, bars, nightclubs, and restaurants. Along with this a new infrastructure of experts has emerged, such as wedding planners; interior designers; beauty, wellness, and fitness consultants; spiritual lifestyle masters; and therapists. The mass media, ranging from magazines to television programs and blogs, celebrate, criticize, and shape their dominant consumers, the middle class. India's gigantic film industry, in particular Bombay cinema (Bollywood), spins off narratives of confident cosmopolitan and yet patriotic middle-classness and elite lifestyles.

New professional groups and new leisure sites and practices are the most obvious markers of India Shining—a political slogan referring to the overall feeling of economic optimism after plentiful rains in 2003 and the success of the *Indian IT boom*. The slogan was popularized by the then-ruling *Bharatiya Janata Party* (BJP) for the 2004 *Indian general elections*. Several of the sites, spaces, and events at which this Indian Dream becomes visible and almost tangible have resulted from the process of economic liberalization started in 1991. Global capitalism, especially in the new millennium, has produced a large and heterogeneous middle class that is distinctly different from the old middle class. The dramatic speed at which India opened up to the world market and enjoyed rapid economic growth has also contributed to the production of new lifestyles that allow members of the new middle classes to both adapt to this change in terms of mobility and flexibility and learn to perform and display the newly gained wealth and confidence. One of the most obvious testing grounds and stages of new lifestyles are the city, the media, and religious practices (e.g., pilgrimage and marriage). They are the arenas where new identities are contested, where desires, pleasures, and anxieties are given a face, a narrative, and direction, by a host of lifestyle experts, the media, and social events.

The new enthusiasm about belonging to the world class has various origins. Until the early 1990s, India seemed to be on the receiving end of modernity, positioned at the margins of the developed world and predominantly defined as a backward country. This image was propagated by both the Indian political and economic elites and Western countries and can be traced back to the expansionist and Eurocentric politics of imperialism and colonialism. The imperial metropolis was conceived as being center stage, while the colonies were placed at its periphery. Flows of knowledge, power, and goods were perceived as monodirectional, moving from a center to its margins. Only if the margins became like the center, the argument went, could these nations become modern. This asymmetrical relationship in the perception of Indians and non-Indians, however, has changed since the beginning of the millennium:

India, along with China, is about to join the league of First World countries and alliances, and the state as well as nongovernmental organizations and individual players herald the view that an age of Indian confidence and strength has begun.

In the age of open market economies, class has become the key focus and platform of cultural production and consumption—particularly the affluent segment of the new middle classes, or the new rich—underlining the fact that these groups share a consensus about their new roles, social positions, and lifestyles. They have a common capacity for dis-cretionary spending and new forms of consumption and public display, which are derived largely from international middle-class fashion. However, this heterogeneous, dynamic, and predominantly metropolitan segment of Indian society has yet to come to terms with the idea of its own identity in the national and global economy and the public culture.

The Indian middle class must actually be coined in the plural: "middle classes." The middle class in India is highly heterogeneous and dynamic, a complexity that depends on a variety of factors that determine a person's and a group's context including region, religion, caste, and education. All of this makes it difficult to talk of "the" middle class in India. While the Indian middle class's growth is predictable, its manifold facets and practices keep changing in unexpected directions.

CHRISTIANE BROSIUS

See also Economy

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✦ MIDDLE EAST, RELATIONS WITH

India has historically had close relations with the countries of the Middle East. Travelers, traders, and rulers from Persia and Arabia have enhanced the cultural richness of the Indian subcontinent. After independence from the British in August 1947, India continued to have good relations with the Middle East, particularly with Egypt and Iran. In the Arab-Israeli conflict, India pursued a pro-Arab policy. This was both in order to counteract Pakistani influence in the region and to secure access to Middle East petroleum resources. India concentrated on developing a close relationship with Egypt on the strength of the ties between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964) with Egyptian president Gamel Abdul Nasser (1918–1970; president 1954–1970).

In the late 1960s and in the 1970s, India successfully improved bilateral relations by developing mutually beneficial economic exchanges with a number of Islamic countries, particularly Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the other Persian Gulf states that had formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981. The strength of India's economic ties also enabled the country to build strong relationships with Iran and Iraq. Indian–Middle Eastern relations were further strengthened by New Delhi's anti-Israeli stance in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 and by Indian support for the fourfold oil price rise in 1973 by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

The Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, both of which occurred in 1979, changed the balance of power in the Middle East and complicated India's relations with these countries. The significance of Egypt as a leader of the Arab world also declined during this period, and Saudi Arabia and the other oil-rich Gulf monarchies now gained prominence in Middle Eastern political affairs. In the 1980s, India performed a delicate diplomatic balancing act. New Delhi took a position of neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), maintained warm ties with Baghdad, and built workable political and economic relations with the new Islamic government in Tehran. India's support for the Palestinian cause continued during this period. India also continued its diplomatic relations with Lebanon in spite of the ensuing civil war there. During the escalation of violence in Beirut the Indian embassy was temporarily closed, but apart from this brief closure, India maintained its diplomatic representation in Beirut throughout the civil war.

The 1990s also saw a change in India's policy. The Indian government stepped back from its staunch anti-Israeli stance and support for the Palestinian cause. In 1992 India recognized the State of Israel and established diplomatic relations. This was also in line with India's attempts to get closer to the United States, which was the only remaining superpower after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. India's new opening to Israel brought important technical, intelligence, and military benefits and more influence in Washington. Following in this direction, New Delhi voted for the United Nations (UN) resolution authorizing the use of force to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait and rejected Iraq's linkage of the Kuwaiti and Palestinian problems.

India continues to have good relations with the Middle East in the post-9/11 environment. In 2003 India preserved its neutrality over the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq to topple the government led by President Saddam Hussein (1937–2006; president 1979–2003). There was talk of contributing Indian troops to the military action, but due to anti-U.S. protests within India, the decision to send troops was cancelled. India normalized its ties with the new democratically elected government of Iraq in 2005, seeking to restart trade and cooperation. Indian businesses applied for contracts for reconstruction projects to the Iraqi government, and simultaneously activities of Iraqi businesses in India have also been growing rapidly. Iraq is also one of the major suppliers of crude oil to India. In a significant departure from its previous position, in 2005 due to its pro-U.S. foreign policy, India voted against Iran in the UN on the question of Iran's nuclear program. This was in contradiction to the older pro-Iranian Indian stance and significantly harmed Indo-Iranian relations.

India is very reliant upon Middle Eastern oil and gas and must maintain cordial relations with most of the major suppliers, including Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia as well as Iraq. Similarly, India is also a major consumer for these states. The GCC as a collective entity has tremendous significance for India. India's historical ties with GCC states, coupled with increasing imports of oil and gas, growing trade and investment opportunities, and the presence of 3.5 million Indian workers in the region, are of vital interest to India. India's economic linkages with the GCC increased steadily during 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, especially due to growth in oil imports. India has also provided soldiers to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) since 1998 and has about 850 soldiers currently deployed in the eastern sector of the 13-mile buffer zone north of the Israeli border. The Indian government continues to build on its close economic, cultural, and political ties with the Middle East by adapting to the changing realities of the international environment.

A pattern of interdependence is emerging between India and the GCC due to their strategic positions and central roles in the current energy security discourse. Development-induced growth in India during the 1990s resulted in higher energy consumption, increasing oil demand, and a growing reliance on oil. The process of deregulation of the petroleum industry in India was completed in 2002 with a significant lifting of curbs by the Indian government on foreign direct investment in the petroleum sector. On the supply side there has been a declining Western market share of Gulf oil and declining oil revenues for the Gulf states. However, due to vast reserves and low cost production capabilities, this will stabilize, and they will regain their position as a key oil supplier. Even though India has taken significant measures to diversify the sources of oil and gas, the current trends of consumption clearly indicate that the dependence on the Gulf is likely to remain.

From a strategic point of view, India and the GCC share the desire for political stability and security in the region. Their common political and security concerns translate into efforts for peace, security, and stability in the Gulf region and South Asia and create further opportunities for GCC-India cooperation in the future. The areas for cooperation are also

widening beyond investments, trade and commerce, and sharing and development of human resources to include security.

STUTI BHATNAGAR

See also Foreign Policy; Gulf States, Indian Labor in

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✦ MISSILE PROGRAM

Among all the developing countries that have weapon of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, India alone has achieved a unique degree of success. Outside the group of the five legally accepted nuclear weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, India possesses the most sophisticated ballistic and cruise missile programs in the world. They have developed to the extent that New Delhi can now design, build, and test any type of missile and deploy short- and medium-range nuclear-tipped ballistic and cruise missiles in an operational mode against Pakistan and China. India views its nuclear and missile programs as the key to maintaining strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region, safeguarding against potential nuclear threats from Pakistan and China, and attaining Great Power status.

Indians are not completely new to the world of rocketry and missilery. The use of such technology by India dates back to the 18th century during the reign of Hyder Ali (1722–1782; r. 1761–1782) of Mysore (Karnataka) and his son Tipu Sultan (1750–1799; r. 1782–1799), the "Tiger of Mysore." Fighting the British East India Company, Tipu Sultan's army used a variety of rockets in a supporting role in the battles at Sirangapatam in the 1790s. This was the world's first use of rockets for fighting modern wars. The rockets were reverse-engineered by British rocket metallurgy pioneer William Congreve (1772–1828) and later became known as Congreve Rockets.

Efforts to design and build missiles span nearly four decades. India embarked on a number of plans to develop missiles in the early 1970s that would strengthen the country's defenses. Prominent among them was Project Indigo, which led to an Indo-Swiss joint agreement to design and manufacture an intermediate-range missile; Project Valiant, which involved

the development of a long-range ballistic missile; and Project Devil, which was aimed at reverse-engineering the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM). While Project Indigo never came to fruition, Project Valiant and Project Devil were developed but with limited success. They were ended in 1974 and 1980, respectively.

A comprehensive missile-development program known as the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP) was begun in 1983 under the leadership of the aeronautical engineer and later president of India (2002–2007) Dr. Abdul Kalam (b. 1931). He had previously been the project director of the Satellite Launch Vehicle-3 program at the Indian Space Research Organization. The IGMDP was undertaken by the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) in partnership with other Indian government laboratories and research centers. With an initial budget of $133 million, the program envisaged simultaneously taking up the design and development of five missiles that would provide the nation with a comprehensive missile-based defense umbrella within 10 years. The five missiles included the short-range Trishul (Trident) SAM, the Akash (Sky) SAM, the smokeless high-energy Nag (Snake) antitank guided missile, the Prithvi (Earth) surface-to-surface missile, and the Agni (Fire) intermediate-range missile. Of these, only Prithvi and Agni are ballistic missiles with the capability of delivering nuclear warheads.



Indian Air Force (IAF) personnel march past a short-range Prithvi ballistic missile at the IAF Day Parade in New Delhi. India successfully test-fired two nuclear-capable Prithvi-II surface-to-surface missiles at Chandipur, Orissa, October 2009. (AP Photo/Mustafa Quraishi)

Prithvi, which was first test-fired in 1988, has three versions. Prithvi-I, or the army version, has a range of 93 miles and a payload capacity of 2,204 pounds. The Indian Army has raised two missile groups, the 333rd and 334th, both based in Secunderabad (Andhra Pradesh), to handle all logistical and operational details related to Prithvi-I. Prithvi-II, the air force version, has a range of 155 miles with a warhead weight of 1,100–1,543 pounds. The Indian Air Force has raised two missile squadrons based in Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh). Prithvi-III, also called Dhanush (Bow), has two variants of 155- and 217-mile ranges and a warhead weight of 1,100 pounds.

This missile, which in 2010 was under development, is a surface- and ship-launched ballistic missile whose purpose is to provide the Indian Navy with the third leg of the triad (land, air, and sea) delivery system for nuclear systems.

The intermediate-range Agni has four versions: Agni-I, Agni-II, Agni-III, and Agni-IV. Agni-I, which was first test-fired in 2002, has a 434-mile range and a 2,204-pound payload capacity and would probably replace short-range and liquid-fueled Prithvis for nuclear-targeting missions against Pakistan. Agni-II, which was flight-tested in 1999, has a 2,204 pound payload and a range of 1,200 miles, which it can cover in 11 minutes. The Indian Army has raised two missile groups, the 444th and the 555th, to induct and manage Agni-I and Agni-II variants. Agni-III is a two-stage solid fuel missile that can carry a 1.5 ton nuclear warhead 1,800-plus miles. With this missile, India has achieved credibility in its nuclear deterrent posture vis-à-vis China, something that India has been striving to achieve for a long time. The Agni-IV, with a range 3,100 miles, is now under development.

The Shaurya (Valor) is another short-range SAM developed by the DRDO outside the IGMDP for use by the Indian Army. Capable of hypersonic speeds, the Shaurya has a range of 372 miles and a payload capacity of a one-ton conventional or nuclear warhead. The missile was first tested in November 2008.

Realizing the importance of cruise missiles for their edge in accuracy and precision over ballistic missiles, India has introduced the BrahMos, supersonic cruise missile, the product of an Indian-Russian joint venture, into its armed forces. The missile is named after two great rivers, the Brahmaputra in India and the Moskva in Russia. BrahMos has a range of 173–186 miles and payload of 440–661 pound. The missile can be launched from submarines, ships, aircraft, or silos. It is believed that the technologies acquired and developed under the program will most likely help India develop nuclear-capable long-range cruise missiles in the medium and long term.

In July 2007 Indian defense scientists announced the proposed development of a subsonic cruise missile called Nirbhay (Fearless) with a range of 621 miles that can be deployed on multiple platforms. With its terrain-hugging capability, the missile would be able to avoid being detected by ground radar.

In February 2008 India carried out a successful test of the K-15 (Sagarika or Oceanic) submarine-launched ballistic missile, which can deliver a 1,102-pound nuclear payload to distances of between 466 and 621 miles. The Sagarika program is believed to be driven by India's long-term goals of achieving a secure sea-based second-strike nuclear capability.

In January 2008 the government announced the formal end of the IGMDP program since most of the missiles developed under the program had been introduced into service. According to Dr. S. Pralhada, director of the DRDO, new missile and weapons systems will be developed in new five-year programs and will include both private industry as well as foreign partners in order to lower costs.

Despite its emergence as a world-class missile power, India is not a member of the 34-member Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which was established in 1987 to

restrict the proliferation of WMD-capable ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles and their associated technology to nonmissile states. India rejects the MTCR on the grounds that it is a victim of such technology-denial regimes that are insensitive to India's national security needs and, the Indian government believes, interfere with the peaceful uses of space technology. Although India is not a member of the MTCR, the Indian government has been informally observing MTCR guidelines and has refrained from selling its missiles or missile-related technologies to other states. While stringent export controls by technology-denial regimes have slowed down many Indian projects (especially the development of an independent space launch capability and the building of a missile deterrent capability against China) and increased its costs, these have also made the Indian missile program largely an indigenous one with almost all of the equipment developed by Indian scientists.

Unlike the 1970s and 1980s when political symbolism and scientific expertise steered India's missile program, it is now guided by a clear strategic vision and a determination to bring about time-bound technological outcomes. Clearly the missile program has not only become central to India's minimal nuclear-deterrent posture, but more significantly it has emerged as the symbol of an independent, self-reliant, vibrant, and strategically autonomous Indian state.

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See also Space Program

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✦ MIZORAM

Mizoram is the 23rd state of the Indian Union and is located in the northeastern region of India. The state boasts the highest literacy rate in the country. Mizoram literally means "Land of the Highlanders" in Mizo, a language of the Kuki-Chin branch of the Tibeto-Burman group of languages. Mizoram was called the Lushai Hills District by the British; after the transfer of power in August 1947, it was renamed Mizo Hills District in 1954. The present name was given in 1972 when it was made a Union Territory. On February 20, 1987, Mizoram became a part of the Indian federal structure when it was made into a state, with Aizawl as its capital. While Mizoram is home to a number of ethnic groups, the Mizo people hold the

majority position in terms of population, education, and jobs. Mizoram is infamous for its periodic famine that occurs during the bamboo flowering season and has also been in the news for the migration of some Mizos to Israel.

Mizoram is at located at a latitude of 21°58′ and 24°35′N and a longitude 92°15′ and 93°29′E. It occupies an important strategic position, having a long international border of almost 450 miles, and is flanked by Bangladesh on the west and Myanmar on the east and south. On the Indian side, Mizoram shares borders with Manipur, Assam, and Tripura to the north and has the most diverse topography in northeastern India with a varied range of flora and fauna. As many as 21 major hill ranges of different heights run through the length and breadth of the state, with the highest peak, Phawngpui ("Blue Mountain"), towering almost 6,800 feet above sea level. Phawngpui is famous for its orchids and rhododendrons.

There are various wildlife sanctuaries and national parks in Mizoram, including the Ngengpui Wildlife Sanctuary, the Khawnglung Wildlife Sanctuary, Phawngpui National Park, the Thorangtlang Wildlife Sanctuary, and the Lengteng Wildlife Sanctuary. The summers are pleasant, and winters are cool. During winter the temperature varies from approximately 51 to 69 degrees, and in summer temperatures are between 68 and 84 degrees. The entire area is under the regular influence of monsoons, with heavy rains from May to September. The average rainfall is 100 inches per annum.

The origin of the Mizos is shrouded in mystery. In Mizo oral tradition, they were said to have emerged from the netherworld through an opening in a huge rock. The generally accepted theory is that the Mizos and other subtribes were part of a great Mongoloid wave of migration from China, with people first settling in Myanmar and later moving to Mizoram. It is possible that the Mizos came from Shinlung or Chhinlungsan located on the banks of the river Yalung in China. In Myanmar they first settled in Shan State and then moved on to the Kabaw Valley, then Khampat, and later in the middle of the 16th century to the Chin Hills. Mizo folk songs talk about kinship ties with the Burmese. Other theories suggest that the Mizos lived in Shan State for about 300 years before they moved across the river Tiau to India in the middle of the 16th century. Legends narrate that the early Mizos were cave dwellers.

Even today, no dependable inscriptions on the prehistoric and protohistoric periods of the Lushai people are available. Therefore, oral traditions, folklore, and accounts by foreign travelers are very valuable chronicles. We do know, however, that the modern era began in 1890 with annexation by the British.

According to the 2001 census, the population of Mizoram was 888,573. Most of these people are in tribes linked linguistically or ethnically. These ethnic groups are collectively known as the Lushais or are otherwise called Mizos, both of which are umbrella terms. The Mizos are divided into many subtribes, the largest of which is the Lushais, comprising almost two-thirds of the state's population. Other Mizo tribes include the Hmar, Mara, Paite, Lai, Ralte, and Lakher. Kuki and Chin peoples are also related to the Mizos. Notable among them are the Bru and Riang tribes from Tripura and the Chakma of Arakanese origin. There are

also ethnic groups from other parts of India as a result of migration through government jobs and trade, but their numbers are minimal. The sex ratio at 938 females to 1,000 males is slightly higher than the national average of 933 females to 1,000 males.

In addition to the Mizos, the Lakhers are an important tribe living in the hills of the India-Myanmar border. In appearance some of them are typically Naga and some are typically Kuki, while others appear to belong to neither of these groups. Superficially the Lakhers appear to definitely be a Kuki tribe, but their language and material culture associate them with the Lushais and Chins. Their terms of relationship are more Kuki than Naga, and their weapons, including their ceremonial *daas*, are Kuki. The Lakhers are matrilineal. These matrilineal traditions suggest at first sight Mon-Khmer associations, but except perhaps for the locality in which the Lakhers are found, they might equally well be Bodo. In short, the Lakhers may be classed insofar as their material culture and language are concerned with the Kuki tribes who had migrated in prehistoric times down the valley of the Chindwin to their present habitat.

In 2001 the state became the second most-literate Indian state, with an overall literacy of 88.49 percent. Today, with a 97 percent literacy rate, Mizoram has replaced Kerala as India's most literate state. The Mizos had no literature of their own until 1894, when the Roman script was introduced by Christian missionaries.

Mizoram was previously animistic, but Christianity spread rapidly with the arrival of Christian missionaries. Now the majority population is Christian, and most are members of the Presbyterian Church. The other three major churches are Mizoram Baptist, Roman Catholic, and the Salvation Army. There is also a Jewish sect, called the Bnei Menashe, that considers itself one of the lost tribes of Israel. Several hundred Chins, Kukis, and Mizos have formally converted to Orthodox Judaism but see themselves not as converts but instead as ethnically Jewish. The Jewish population of the Bnei Menashe currently is estimated to be 9,000. The landscape is dotted with many churches and temples.

Mizoram is a part of the federal system of the Indian Union and has a Legislative Assembly of 40 members. The chief minister, appointed by the central government, is the chief political officer. Political awakening among the Mizos started during the British administration with the creation of the first political party, the Mizo Common People's Union, on April 9, 1946. It was later renamed the Mizo Union. During the transfer of power, the Mizo Union demanded the inclusion of all the Mizo-inhabited areas adjacent to Lushai Hills. However, a new party called United Mizo Freedom (UMFO) demanded that Lushai Hills should join Burma and not India. As a result, a certain amount of autonomy was granted by the government and enshrined in the Indian Constitution. When the Lushai Hills Autonomous District Council came into being in 1952, chieftainships among the Mizos were legally abolished. The arrangements for autonomy, however, were vague and did not meet the aspirations of the Mizos, and they soon started to demand a separate hill state.

The Young Mizo Association (YMA) is the oldest and largest social organization in Mizoram. It is an association in which every Mizo adult is entitled to be a member by paying

a prescribed membership fee. Since its inception in 1935, the YMA has been an important voice in the region. Although the organization has become politicized, the essential aims of the YMA are the development of Mizoram and honoring Christian values.

In 1959 Mizoram was devastated by a great famine known as the Mautam Famine. The famine was caused by excessive flowering of a certain bamboo called *mautam*, which attracts rodents that feed on the bamboo flowers and proliferate in great numbers. Once the bamboo flowers are all devoured, the rats ravage paddy and other crops, sometimes destroying huge tracts overnight. The 1959 occurrence led to plague and famine, and people kept themselves alive by eating roots and leaves gathered in the jungle. Others moved to faraway places, while a considerable number of people died of starvation. One result of the famine was that in September 1960 the Mizo National Famine Front (MNFF) started under the leadership of Pu Laldenga (d. 1990), a bank clerk in Aizawl, and the party gained a great deal of support because of its famine relief work.

The MNFF dropped the word "Famine" and a new political organization, the Mizo National Front (MNF), was born on October 22, 1961, under Laldenga's leadership. The aim of the party was to push for the sovereign independence of Mizoram through armed rebellion. As a result the MNF was outlawed in 1967, but disturbances in the region continued. Laldenga met with prime minister Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991; prime minister 1984–1989), and the MNF was disbanded following the Mizoram Accord of June 30, 1986, whereby the MNF renounced violence. The MNF laid down arms, and Laldenga was appointed the first chief minister of the new full-fledged State of Mizoram. He held the chief ministership from 1986 until 1988.

Mizo society is clan-based and follows customary law. Under this system, village elders and appointed chiefs discuss all matters concerning local governance and adjudicate disputes. Customary law is patriarchal and holds more sway than the Indian legal system. Before a money economy was introduced, most of the punishment was in terms of fines paid in kind, such as giving a *mithun* (bison), a pig, or a fowl.

Mizos also have a *zawlbuk* (bachelor's house) system in which young men become socialized. The dormitory is usually situated at the heart of the village. After work the men gather in the *zawlbuk* and engage in storytelling, wrestling, and crafts work or socialize. Most important meetings are also held in the hall of the dormitory. Boys stay with their parents until puberty and after that attain full membership in the *zawlbuk*. This system is no longer strictly followed, although in most Lushai and Pawi villages the institution still exists. The Lakher tribe, however, being matrilineal, do not have the *zawlbuk* system.

Four factors can account for the near abolition of the system. The village chiefs had sole authority over the *zawlbuk*, and prior to 1947 during the British colonial period the powers of the chief shrank considerably. In postcolonial India chieftanship was legally abolished, thus undermining the legitimacy of the *zawlbuk* system. Also, the adoption of Christian values slowly changed indigenous practices and customs. The extinction of the *zawlbuk* system was almost inevitable when formal educational institutions were introduced among the Mizos.

Mizo society is largely patrilineal in nature. The eldest son inherits the father's property, as women do not have inheritance rights under customary law. In the absence of sons, the property goes to the nearest male kin. If a man dies leaving behind a widow and minor children, the widow takes care of the property until the children come of age. In case the widow remarries anyone except the brother of the deceased, the property and care of the children become the responsibility of the brother or uncle of the deceased.

When somebody dies, the villagers are informed by various means including a gunshot fired from the house of the deceased. Mizos believe in the afterlife and ancestor worship. During the funeral ceremony for a deceased person, friends and relatives gather in the house and celebrate with the beating of drums and by feasting with locally prepared rice beer and meat. In case of an unnatural death, no such feasting is done.

Mizo marriages are generally preceded by long courtships during which the suitor, with the parents' permission, can sleep in the girl's house. The girl's family does not give any dowry. Instead the bridegroom's family has to offer a bride-price that is negotiated among the elders of the two families over rice beer. On the wedding day both sides slaughter a certain number of pigs and exchange gifts such as axes, cotton thread, or traditional jewelry before the bride enters the groom's house. A person can divorce at will, but certain customary procedures must be followed. The main issues concern the refund or payment of the unpaid bride-price, depending on who has filed for divorce. However, with the conversion of most tribes to Christianity, many of these customs are not strictly followed. Older people still follow customary traditions, but young people tend to be more relaxed about them.

Mizos are a fun-loving people and like to celebrate with dances, feasts, and songs. The most popular Mizo dance is the bamboo dance, which is also seen in many Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines. Other popular dances are the Khal Lam, Sawlakin, and Tlanglam. The traditional musical instruments are drums and flutes. The women are natural weavers, and almost every woman can weave intricate and colorful patterns. The *puan*, a striped loin cloth worn by both men and women, is the traditional garment of the Mizos. These garments are of varied shades and designs and are usually produced on looms.

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See also Northeastern States

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Modern Art. *See* Art, Modern

✦ MONETARY POLICY

The evolution of monetary policy can be traced back to the developmental objectives of creating an institutional framework for industrial growth, the creation of rural credit for agricultural development and expansion, and the establishment of balanced regional growth as laid down in the various Five-Year Plans. The First Five-Year Plan, originally presented to the Lok Sabha, the lower house of the Indian Parliament, by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964) on December 8, 1951, stated that central banking in a planned economy could not be confined to the regulation of the overall supply of credit or the regulation of the flow of bank credit. Central banking would instead have to take a direct and active role, first in creating or helping to create the machinery needed for financing developmental activities and second in ensuring that finance flows in the directions intended.

The two major objectives of monetary policy in India are to maintain price stability and to ensure the adequate availability of credit to sustain overall growth. The emphasis on these objectives has varied depending on the circumstances of the day. Price stability as the predominant objective of monetary policy emerged as high public investments and consequent high fiscal deficits led to inflationary pressures in the early stages of planned development.

In the 1960s, bank credit—aggregate as well as sectoral—was the intermediate target of monetary policy. The targeting of credit was meshed with the aim of central banking to push development projects. This targeting of credit was the instrument through which the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) influenced monetary policy and was the means by which the RBI could achieve the ultimate objectives of monetary policy. However, even while targeting credit, the RBI also took monetary aggregates into account. In this context, a number of studies found that the demand for money in India was relatively stable. Consequently, the RBI, on the recommendations of the Chakravarty Committee, which was set up to examine the workings of monetary policy and reported in 1985, accepted a monetary targeting framework to target broad money (M3) in line with the expected rate of growth of the gross domestic product and an acceptable level of inflation. M3 means the different types of money available including notes and coins, traveler's checks of nonbank issuers, demand deposits, savings deposits, and various deposits of cash and money market accounts. Accordingly, the RBI sets an indicative broad money expansion target in its Annual Policy Statement, which is announced every year in April. A multiple indicator approach, besides a broad money target, was also adopted by the RBI in April 1998. These indicators include movement in interest rates, trade, capital flows, the exchange rate, and the availability of credit to other sectors of

the economy. The multiple indicator approach serves as a comprehensive guide for monetary policymaking, given that the uncertain environment in which monetary authorities operate makes a single model or a limited set of indicators an insufficient guide for the conduct of monetary policy.

With monetary policy reforms, a shift took place from simply relying on traditional instruments of monetary policy, that is, open market operations and changes in the bank rate for short-term interest rates as an important instrument of monetary policy. The RBI is now able to influence short-term interest rates by adjusting the liquidity in the system through the Liquidity Adjustment Facility.

The RBI also reactivated the bank rate in April 1997 as a reference rate, which served as the signaling device for monetary policy. The interest rates on different types of accommodation from the RBI are also linked to the bank rate. Any change in the bank rate also affects the prime lending rates of commercial banks. The use of the cash reserve ratio as an instrument of monetary control has been reduced. The cash reserve ratio was lowered from the peak rate of 15 percent in 1981 to 5 percent in 2004, rising again to 9 percent on August 30, 2008.

The changes in how monetary policy operates have also had an impact on the RBI's balance sheet in terms of size and composition and sources of income and expenditure. In this context the RBI has more clearly articulated the process of how it formulates monetary policy, how it has been more consultative, and how it has reformed the way it formulates monetary policy.

The conduct of monetary policy is governed by a number of factors. The objective of price stability comes to the fore in the wake of high and volatile prices for food, fuel, and metals. On the other hand, the global economic crisis that began in late 2008 required stability in the financial sector and increasing demand in the market. Another challenge in the formulation of monetary policy is to maintain linkages between different segments of the financial market, including money, government securities, and the foreign exchange market.

The Annual Policy Statement for 2009–2010 highlighted several immediate challenges faced by the Indian economy that needed to be addressed through monetary policy. These were supporting the drivers of aggregate demand to enable the economy to return to its high growth rate, restoring credit flow to all the productive sectors of the economy, unwinding fiscal stimulus over time in an orderly manner in order to return to a path of credible fiscal consolidation, financial stability in the face of a severe global economic crisis, withdrawal of the large liquidity in an orderly manner to avoid possible risks of upward inflationary pressures and asset price bubbles, and addressing the key challenge of ensuring an interest rate environment that supports revival of investment demand.

RASHMI UMESH ARORA

See also Asian Development Bank; Central Banking, Development Aspects; Economy; Financial Institutions, Development; International Monetary Fund, Relations with; Reserve

Bank of India; Stock Exchange Markets; World Bank, Relations with; World Economic Forum; World Trade Organization, Relations with

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
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✦ MONEY AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKETS

The money market is the part of the monetary system engaged in the lending and borrowing of short-term funds. The Indian money market witnessed exponential growth after the globalization initiative in 1991 and is integral for financial institutions that employ short-term instruments for meeting financial requirements of various sectors such as agriculture, finance, and manufacturing. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), established on April 1, 1935, has played a major role in regulating and controlling the money market, which has exhibited outstanding performance over the past 20 years.

Money market instruments take care of borrowers' short-term needs and render liquidity to lenders. For India's monetary policy, call/notice money and repo transactions are most critical. Call/notice money consists of overnight money and money at short notice (i.e., up to 14 days). The Indian financial sector in the 1970s and 1980s was governed by a heavily regulated system of nationalized banking, directed credit, and automatic monetization of government deficits. Rate ceilings were frequent in those days of volatile call money rates, and the market remained narrow and undeveloped. Extensive attempts were made to increase the number of money market participants following recommendations made by the Chakravarty Committee in 1985 and the Vaghul Committee in 1987. Currently India has two major types of entities participating in the call/notice market: (1) market makers that lend and borrow and (2) lenders only. Banks (commercial and cooperative) and primary dealers act as market makers. Their total number is 112, and they are allowed to lend as well as to borrow. All-India financial institutions, mutual funds, and insurance companies are permitted to operate as lenders only, and there are 53 of them. The average daily turnover in this market is about $120 billion. The various types of money market instruments are treasury bills, repurchase agreements, commercial papers, certificates of deposit, and banker's acceptance.

The RBI intervenes when necessary in order to eliminate disparities in the market. Whenever there is a liquidity crunch, the RBI opts to either reduce the cash reserve ratio (CRR) or infuse more money into the financial system. In a recent initiative to overcome the liquidity crunch in the money market, the RBI infused more than $750 billion along with reductions in the CRR.



Note: Not corrected for double counting
Source: RBI Building

Figure 3 Foreign exchange trading activity

The foreign exchange market in India took off in 1978 when the government began to allow banks to trade foreign exchange with one another. Today more than 70 percent of the trading in foreign exchange continues to take place in the interbank market. The market consists of more than 90 authorized dealers, mostly banks, that conduct currency trades among themselves, emerging with neutral positions at the end of the trading day.

Trading is regulated by the Foreign Exchange Dealers Association of India (FEDAI), a self-regulatory association of dealers incorporated under Section 25 of the Companies Act of 1956. The FEDAI's major activities include framing rules that govern the conduct of interbank foreign exchange business among banks vis-à-vis the public and acting as a liaison with the RBI for reforms and development of the foreign exchange market. Since 2001, clearing and settlement functions in the foreign exchange market are largely carried out by the Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL). The CCIL handles transactions of approximately $3.5 billion per day, accounting for about 80 percent of the total transactions.

The process of liberalization has significantly boosted the foreign exchange market in the country by allowing both banks and corporations greater flexibility in holding and trading foreign currencies. The Sodhani Committee, set up in 1994, recommended greater freedom to participating banks, allowing them to fix their own trading limits, set interest rates on foreign currency (FCNR) deposits, and use derivative products. The foreign exchange market has more than tripled in the last few years, recording a compounded annual growth rate exceeding 25 percent. This includes swaps, forwards, and forward cancellations. Figure 3

shows the growth of foreign exchange trading in India between 1999 and 2006. The interbank foreign exchange trading volume has continued to account for the dominant share (more than 77 percent) of total trading during this period.

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See also Asian Development Bank; Central Banking, Development Aspects; Economy; Financial Institutions, Development; International Monetary Fund, Relations with; Monetary Policy; Reserve Bank of India; Stock Exchange Markets; World Bank, Relations with; World Economic Forum; World Trade Organization, Relations with

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✦ MUMBAI

The city of Mumbai, located on India's west coast and formerly known as Bombay, is India's largest city and the political capital of the State of Maharashtra. Dubbed *urbs prima in Indus* (India's foremost city), Mumbai is regarded as the country's financial, commercial, and entertainment capital. Home to India's largest (and Asia's oldest) stock exchange and the Indian headquarters of many domestic and multinational corporations as well as Bollywood, the massive Hindi-language film and television industry, Mumbai contributes more than any other city to India's gross domestic product and income tax coffers. Yet despite its economic might, Mumbai is also marked by severe socioeconomic and health disparities, with a majority of its population living in slums and squatter settlements and lacking access to adequate sanitation facilities and potable water.

The city of Mumbai was originally a string of seven small islands separating the Arabian Sea from a protected harbor. During the 18th and 19th centuries the seven islands merged into one continuous island through both naturally rising water levels and engineered landfills. Until the arrival of Europeans in the 16th century, the area was reportedly referred to as Mumbai by its earliest inhabitants, members of the Marathi-speaking Koli fishing community. The name was given for Mumbadevi, a goddess important to the Kolis. During Portuguese (1534–1661) and then British (1661–1947) possession, the area was called Bombay, a version of the Portuguese phrase for "good bay." This etymology has been disputed by some historians, however, and other explanations for the city's name can be found. Under

British rule, Bombay was both a city and the capital of a vast presidency comprising Gujarat, western Maharashtra, and parts of Karnataka and Sindh in Pakistan. Aden was also governed from Bombay. As a result of the Government of India Act of 1935, Sindh became a separate province of British India, and Bombay became much smaller and a province. The city of Bombay, however, continued to be the financial, educational, entertainment, and political hub of western India. In November 1995 the city's name was officially changed to Mumbai when a coalition headed by the conservative Shiv Sena Party, founded in 1966, came to power at the state level. The renaming signaled a reassertion of the city's Marathi origins and a rejection of its European and non-Maharashtrian past. However, many residents continue to call the city Bombay as well as use its Hindi and Gujarati pronunciations, Bombai and Mambai.

According to Census of India, 11.9 million people were living in Greater Mumbai in 2001. Comprising an area of nearly 300 square miles, Greater Mumbai is one of the world's most densely populated cities, with a density of approximately 54,000 persons per square mile. In 2007 the United Nations (UN) estimated the population of the Mumbai urban agglomeration at 18.98 million people. According to these numbers, Mumbai is the fourth-largest urban agglomeration in the world. With an annual average growth rate estimated at 2.32 percent, Mumbai is predicted to become the world's second-largest city by 2020.

In 2001 the gender ratio in Greater Mumbai was 811 females per 1000 males. This compares to a nationwide ratio of 933 females per 1,000 males. Although Mumbai's gender ratio has gradually improved over the past century, it is still significantly lower than the national average. The percentage of Mumbai's population living in slums in 2001 was estimated at 52.5 percent, or 6.25 million people. This is regarded as a conservative estimate, as some estimates have placed the city's slum population as high as 8 million people, or 60 percent of the city's overall population.

Mumbai has long been regarded as India's most cosmopolitan city, with all of the country's major religious, linguistic, and ethnic communities represented. In 2001, 67.4 percent of Mumbai's population was Hindu, with 18.6 percent Muslim, 5.2 percent Buddhist, and the remaining 9 percent comprised of the city's visible minority Christian, Sikh, Parsi, and Jewish communities. Roughly half of Mumbai's population is Maharashtrian. The remaining half is made up of Gujaratis, Sindhis, Parsis, southern Indians, and northern Indians from Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and the Punjab. About 5 percent of the population is comprised of members of the Scheduled (formerly Untouchable) Castes, with the largest numbers representing the Bhambi, Mahar, and Mang castes. Less than 1 percent is made up of members of Scheduled Tribes.

For as long as recorded history, the islands of Mumbai were inhabited by members of the Son Koli caste. In the mid-14th century the islands came under Muslim rule when a military outpost was established on one of the islands. For the next 150 years a series of Muslim and Hindu rulers, based largely in Gujarat, struggled for control of the region. Yet the area was not viewed as commercially or militarily important when the Portuguese landed on the sparsely populated islands in the early 16th century and established administrative control in October 1535.



Cityscape of Mumbai, Maharashtra, one of the world's biggest and most dynamic cities, and home of the world's largest film industry, Bollywood. (iStockphoto)

During their 136-year rule the Portuguese gave the islands and bay the name Bombay, but they remained uninterested in developing the area as a commercial or military outpost. In fact, it was their missionaries who left the most indelible mark on the city by converting a large segment of the population to Catholicism. Decendents of these early converts, referred to as East Indian Christians, remain visible in Mumbai today and still carry Portuguese surnames. In 1661 the islands of Bombay were included in the dowry of Catherine de Braganza (1638–1705), the sister of Portugal's king, upon her marriage to King Charles II (1630–1685; r. 1665–1685) of England the following year. In 1668 the British Crown leased the seven islands—then called Bombay, Colaba, Old Woman's Island, Mahim, Mazagaon, Parel, and Worli—to the English East India Company (founded on December 31, 1600) at the rate of 10 pounds per year. The East India Company retained administrative control of Bombay until 1858, when the British government consolidated its holdings of British India and established a new colonial administration in the city of Bombay.

The city's roots as a commercial center date to the early 1800s, when local entrepreneurs began shipping Bihari and Malwa opium from Bombay to China. These activities posed a direct challenge to the East India Company's opium monopoly based in Calcutta and helped establish Bombay as a center for native investment and entrepreneurship. By the 1820s, Bombay's native business community included members of such diverse groups as Gujaratis, Parsis, Marwaris, *banias,* Iranian Jews, Dawoodi Bohras, and Konkani Muslims. This diversity and cosmopolitan character are often cited, even today, as Mumbai's most significant commercial advantage.

In the mid-1800s, capital from the opium trade was invested in several industrial enterprises, most notably in textile manufacturing. In 1854 a Parsi merchant, Cowasjee Nanabhoy Davar (1815–1873), built India's first mechanized cotton textile mill in Bombay, the Bombay Spinning and Weaving Company. By the end of the 1850s, dozens of other cotton textile mills had been established in the city. Activity in the mills increased sharply in the 1860s, when the American Civil War (1861–1865) cut off North American exports of cotton to England. Lancaster and Manchester, the center of the cotton industry in England, turned to Bombay and the city's new textile mills to provide them with the required short staple cotton and processed cotton textiles. By the end of the 19th century, there were 83 textile mills in the city employing approximately 10 percent of the population.

Bombay further bolstered its position as India's commercial capital throughout the 20th century as textile profits were invested in capital intensive industries, including light engineering, pharmaceuticals, petrochemicals, and fertilizers. The city remained important as a shipping port and emerged as the center of India's oil industry. Hindi-language cinema grew more popular in the period immediately following independence, and a thriving film and television industry developed in the city. Referred to both informally and increasingly formally as Bollywood, Bombay's film industry grew steadily during the late 20th century to become one of the world's largest, measured by profit and productivity.

The textile industry fell into decline in the 1960s and 1970s due to aging facilities and increased competition from China and Southeast Asia. An infamous 18-month strike and mass layoffs in the early 1980s further weakened the industry. By the early 1990s, Mumbai's industrial workforce was one-fifth the size it had been in the late 1970s. Workers were gradually replaced by power looms, and those who remained employed were shifted from the formal sector to the unorganized, largely informal sector.

The city's economy underwent dramatic restructuring in the 1980s and 1990s. Manufacturing employment fell significantly, driven by steep losses in the textile sector. Meanwhile, the largest employment gains were in the communications sector as well as in the finance, insurance, and real estate industries. Foreign investment helped fuel Mumbai's economy in the period following India's economic liberalization in 1991, and international financial groups began trading on Bombay's Stock Exchange. Despite challenges from high-growth technology centers in southern India, Mumbai remains an engine of the Indian economy. In addition to the Bombay Stock Exchange and the Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai remains home to an active shipping port, the Indian headquarters of most private financial institutions, and a booming real estate industry.

Despite the presence of these powerful institutions, a significant proportion of Mumbai's economy remains in the unorganized or informal sector. With large segments of retail, domestic service, and small-scale manufacturing operating outside of the formal sector, most of the city's workers lack access to adequate wages and benefits and safe working conditions.

Mumbai has also played a major role in India's political history, playing host to the first session of the Indian National Congress (INC), also known as the Congress Party, in December 1885

and other significant events in India's struggle for independence. After independence, Mumbai remained an INC stronghold, and the city's political elite have long had strong ties to New Delhi.

In the late 1950s the city sat at the center of the Samyukta Maharashtra movement, founded in 1956 by Keshavrao Jedhe (1886–1959) in the struggle over the creation of linguistic states. As plans were being drafted to divide Bombay state into Marathi- and Gujarati-speaking states, debates raged over where the city of Bombay would go. Marathi members of the Samyukta Maharashtra movement argued that Bombay was an integral part of the state of Maharashtra, while the city's Gujarati business communities claimed the city as their own. Meanwhile, a third group argued that Bombay did not belong to a single linguistic group and proposed the designation of Bombay as a Union Territory like the national capital, New Delhi. On May 1, 1960, the Samyukta Maharashtra movement was successful, and Mumbai was designated the capital of Maharashtra.

Despite strong INC support throughout the 1960s, Mumbai has also been home to regional political movements that have directly challenged the party's dominance. The Shiv Sena, a right-wing political party formed in Mumbai in 1966 by Balasaheb Thackeray (b. 1926), emerged as a formidable political movement in the 1970s and 1980s by mobilizing ethnic pride and anti-Muslim sentiments among the city's middle and working classes. The violent underpinnings of the Shiv Sena's message and tactics fell into sharp relief in the early 1990s when the city erupted in religious riots and the party's leadership fanned the flames of conflict. The two largest political parties in Mumbai remain the INC and the Shiv Sena, although the Bharatiya Janata Party (founded in 1980), the Republican Party of India that came out of the Scheduled Castes Federation founded by the Scheduled Caste leader Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (1891–1956) in 1942, the Nationalist Congress Party (founded in 1999), and the Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (founded in 2006 as an offshoot of the Shiv Sena by Raj Thackeray [b. 1968]) also have a political presence in the city.

LIZA WEINSTEIN

See also Bharatiya Janata Party; Maharashtra; Thackeray, Balasaheb Keshav; Shiv Sena

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✦ MUSIC, DEVOTIONAL

Bhajans (the devotional music of Bhakti sects), Qawwails (Sufi devotional music), and Shab Kirtan (the devotional music of the Sikhs) are central to three major religious traditions of South Asia. Devotional music in India is not only found in devotional settings but is also a potentially lucrative music market in South Asia. Devotional music is predominantly vocal, often sung in groups, and is almost always accompanied by drums, idiophones, or handclapping.

For the most part, devotional music represents one of the major folk traditions of the subcontinent. As such, it is sung by nonprofessionals in religious gatherings. Starting with the availability of cheap cassettes, the mass marketing of devotional music has drawn highly skilled and talented professional musicians and musical groups into the commercial genre. The oldest form of devotional music is the chanting and singing of the Hindu holy books the Vedas, especially the *Samaveda,* which is typically sung by a group of devotees. Both Qawwali and Bhajan forms date as far back as the 1300s. Qawwalis emerged in the Sufi traditions of South Asian Sufism, some with roots in Central Asia. Bhajans, or their ancestors, have been part of Bhakti movements and sects since about the same period. Shabad Kirtan grew out of the emphasis on musical worship by the founders of Sikhism in the 16th century. All three forms are informed but not ruled by the classical Hindustani and Karnatik raga systems.

Nothing can be more deeply rooted in the Hindu Bhakti tradition than Bhajans. Bhajans are songs of love for God or of self-surrender. Virtually all Bhakti sects have their own sets of Bhajans and ways of singing them. References found in Bhajans to attributes or anecdotes of gods or goddesses typically mime human relationships. While Sanskrit is prominent, Bhajans are found in virtually any of South Asia's vernacular languages. Famous medieval composers of Bhajans are Tulsidas (1532–1623), Mirabai (ca. 1498–ca. 1547), any of various composers known as Surdas, and many others. Their Bhajans have become part of the tradition of classical music to be regularly included in vocal concerts as light but solo vocal performances. Professional Bhajan singers are able to become quite popular singing the same repertoire. Bhajans are also found in medieval syncretic devotional sects such as those of Kabir (1440–1518) and Guru Nanak (1469–1539), where they form the basis for the Sikhs' Shabad Kirtan. Another form of the Bhajan is the Hindu Kirtan wherein songs usually directed toward the Hindu gods Krishna, Ram, or Vishnu are accompanied by drumming and group dancing approaching the ecstatic.

Qawwali is a form of Sufi devotional music particularly popular in South Asian areas with a historically strong Muslim presence such as in the Punjab in both Pakistan and India, in the Gangetic Valley, and to a lesser degree in Bangladesh and Kashmir, which have their own strong folk traditions. Originally performed mainly at Sufi shrines or gatherings, Qawwali has gained mainstream popularity thanks to the rise of the mass media in South Asia.

Qawwali originated with the Sufi saints of Central Asia, as is the case for South Asian Sufism. Amir Khusrau Dehlavi (1253–1325), who wrote in both Persian and medieval Hindi,

is strongly associated with the origins of Qawwali in South Asia, and Qawwali singing is especially important to Chishti Sufis. However, the performance of Qawwali is South Asian and is characterized by one or two strong leaders accompanied by a male chorus singing in unison and by vigorous drumming. Themes are largely invocations and praise directed to Allah, the prophet Muhammad, Imam Ali, or Sufi saints and are often interspersed with poetry sung in Urdu, Punjabi, and, infrequently, Multani, Persian, or older forms of Hindi, and even Bengali in Bangladesh.

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See also Hinduism; Islam; Khan, Ali Akbar; Khan, Vilayat; Religion; Shankar, Ravi; Sikhism

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✦ MUSLIMS

India is home to one of the largest Muslim communities in the world. Muslims comprise 13.4 percent of India's 1.1 billion population and are the largest minority community in the nation. With a history of more than a millennium on the subcontinent, Muslims in India have coexisted in one of the most diverse and pluralistic societies in the world. They are the majority community in Kashmir and Lakshadweep. In addition, they live in large numbers in Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, and Bihar. Despite being a minority, members of the Muslim community have made major contributions in different walks of life and often excel in several of them. However, Muslims continue to struggle with poverty, low literacy rates, and the lack of access to educational institutions, especially in higher education, and they are underrepresented in government offices at all levels.

The present community of Muslims in India is the result of a long historical process. The first Muslims in India were the Arab traders who appeared on the western coast as early as the 7th century, and many of them intermarried with local women and started families. In the northern parts of the Indian subcontinent, Muslim settlement started with the arrival of Turks, Afghanis, Persians, and Central Asians in the 10th and 11th centuries, although the first invasion of India by land occurred by the Arab commander Muhammad bin Qasim (ca. 695–715) in 711 CE. Members of these groups ruled India intermittently from the period of the Delhi Sultanate (1206–1526) through the Mughal Empire (1526–1858). They

also spread out to other parts of the subcontinent including southern India, where several independent political states and social entities emerged. Over time the number of Muslims in India increased as their communities prospered and as members of the local population converted to Islam. The reasons for conversion included political aspiration, social uplift as people sought to escape the caste system if they were untouchables or from the lower castes, and being attracted to the egalitarianism promised by Islam that does not recognize caste or class. Sufis also played an important role in the spread of Islam since they were very accommodating of cultural practices and customs found in indigenous traditions. In addition, Indians recognized Sufism because it had an affinity with the Hindu tradition of devotion known as Bhakti. The Muslims in India today thus come from different ethnicities, sects, caste backgrounds, linguistic groups, and an interesting mixture of variations on all these factors.

According to the census of 2001, the number of Muslims in India is 138 million. At 13.4 percent of the Indian population, they are next only to the Hindus, who constitute 80.5 percent of the population. The sex ratio among Muslims is 936 females per 1,000 males, which is just above the national average of 933 females to 1,000 males. Their literacy rate is 59.1 percent, compared to the national average of 64.8 percent. Similarly, the literacy rate among Muslim women is 50.1 percent, certainly below that of their male counterparts as well as the overall female literacy rate in India, which is 53.7 percent. Other data also affirm Muslims as trailing in the national figures on the education and economic development index, among other categories. The total fertility rate (TFR), however—that is, the average number of children a woman would bear during her lifetime—is .7 percent higher among Muslim women than the national figure. But this rate varies among Muslims in different socioeconomic levels. As is reflected in statistics found worldwide, educated and financially stable families have lower fertility rates than the poor and the uneducated. The fertility rate also fluctuates from region to region. For instance, the fertility rate among Muslims is lower in southern states than in the states in northern and central India.

Contrary to popular belief, the worldwide Muslim community is not monolithic, and neither is the Muslim community in India. Although Sunnis make up the majority of India's Muslims, Shias have been politically and economically influential. The existence of divisions and factions within each of the two sects further defies the notion of one single and strictly coherent community. Although Islam does not recognize or acknowledge the validity of a class or caste system, Muslims in India identify themselves as *ashrafs,* or those with Arab or foreign ancestry; *ajlafs,* or middle-caste Hindu converts; and *arzals,* or converts from the untouchable castes. Another grouping is also that of the upper-caste Hindu converts. This stratification is further reflected in social categories such as Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes. Historically, a good number of low-caste Hindus converted to Islam but remained impoverished and browbeaten, with most of them continuing their traditional occupations and their low occupational status. Similarly, Muslim converts carried their regional culture and often their traditions into their new religion. Muslim society in India is therefore distinguished by social, sectarian, economic, and regional variations.

Muslim interactions with other communities in India are generally cordial in everyday life but are not free on occasion from conflicts and violent clashes. Muslims have contributed to the rich culture of India in food, dress, architecture, music, art, and languages, and it is noteworthy that the Indian culture we know today is a result of the coming together of multiple cultures. However, the prevalence of a common culture has not prevented conflicts from taking place. Communal riots between Hindus and Muslims occurred on numerous occasions before and after India attained independence in 1947. Although different riots need to be understood in their own local and situational contexts, the organized movement Hindutva (Hinduness, or Hindu nationalism) and its counterpart Muslim extremist ideologies have provided a combustible fuel to such incidents. A notorious series of bloody riots took place in Gujarat in 2002 in which more than 2,000 Muslims lost their lives, and a number of Hindus were also murdered in retaliation. Earlier, Hindu-Muslim riots broke out across India in December 1992 following the demolition of Babri Mosque at Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh by Hindu activists who claimed that the site was the birthplace of the Hindu god Lord Rama. Such incidents take place every few years and lead to ghettoization in many areas, as Muslims feel safer living within the confines of their own community. But the limited nature and duration of such vicious incidents owes a great deal to the secular foundations of India and its enduring commitment to secularism.

As a community, Muslims have played a key role in the politics of the nation. Many Muslims fought for India's independence and also laid down their lives in the cause of freedom.



Thousands of devout Muslims congregate at the Jama Masjid Mosque in Old Delhi for prayers on the first day of the Eid celebration marking the end of Ramadan. (AP/Wide World Photos)

At the time of the Partition of British India into the sovereign states of India and Pakistan, a number of Muslims chose to live in India, both defying the call for a separate Islamic homeland for Muslims (Pakistan) and choosing to remain in an India led by a secular-minded Hindu prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964). The result is that Muslims continued to make a major contribution to national political life in postcolonial India. Muslims have served in parliamentary, ministerial, gubernatorial, cabinet, and other high positions within federal, state, and local governments. Even the highest office in the nation, the presidency of India, has been held by Muslims on three different occasions: Zakir Hussain (1897–1969; president 1967–1969), Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad (1905–1977; president 1974–1977), and A. P. J. Abdul Kalam (b. 1931; president 2002–2007). Muslims have also served as vice president, including the vice president serving in 2009, Mohammad Hamid Ansari (b. 1934; vice president 2007–). Despite significant Muslim representation at the top, there have been demands from some Muslim organizations to enhance their political representation in Parliament and in political parties by calling for quotas based on proportional representation.

Education is another field where Muslims have the dual distinction of being both ahead in some areas but generally behind their Hindu confreres. Muslims are among the most highly educated people in India but as a community are ranked among the most marginalized when it comes to overall higher education levels and rate of literacy. In postcolonial India the leadership and vision of renowned Muslim scholars Maulana Abul Kalam Azad (1888–1958) and Saiyid Nurul Hasan (1921–1993) in the field of education is unparalleled. The Muslim community has also produced innumerable professors, engineers, medical professionals, corporate executives, teachers, scientists, technologists, artists, and actors, among a long list of professions where Muslims have made major contributions. Under constitutional provisions, schools and institutions of higher learning are operated by Muslims. Such institutions of national eminence include Aligarh Muslim University in Uttar Pradesh and Jamia Millia Islamia in Delhi. They have produced some of the greatest Muslim intellectuals and leaders in the nation. A majority of Muslims, however, go to madrasas or Islamic seminaries. Darul Ulum, founded in 1866 and located in Deoband, Uttar Pradesh, and Nadwatul Ulama, founded in 1894 and located in Lucknow, are among the most renowned madrasas in India. In general, madrasas operate with a very low budget and are always short of funds. In addition, they are located in substandard educational facilities. Nonetheless it is largely to their credit that the larger Muslim community is found to be literate and educated, since the madrasas offer education and accommodation either free of cost or for a token amount. The downside of this picture is the low overall literacy rate of Muslims.

Muslim representation in both the private and public sectors is also way below the average proportion for their population. Although jobs in the private sector have occupied the center stage of employment in India since the country's deregulation of the economy in 1991, government jobs are still sought after for the financial security and status they bring. Muslims hold only 4 percent of government jobs, and the percentage of Muslims holding jobs in the private sector

is also very low. This percentage gets even lower when it comes to the higher echelons of the civil service. Under the current reservation system for deprived socioreligious groups in India, some Muslim communities qualify for government positions, and this has helped enhance Muslim representation. The demand for increasing the number of reservations for Muslims in government positions has been raised, as has the demand for increased numbers of Muslims in the army, the police, and other agencies. Studying the social, economic, and educational status of Muslims in India, the Sachar Committee, chaired by Justice Rajindar Sachar, chief justice of the high court at Delhi, presented its 403-page report in 2006 and recommended an incentive-based diversity index and a program of affirmative action in the private sector.

The contribution of Muslims can be noted in different fields. In literature, their contribution is more than acknowledged. Muslim writers from India have composed some of the most noted writings in Arabic and Persian, but their contribution to the literature of several Indian languages is also highly noteworthy. Beginning with poets such as Mirza Ghalib (1797–1869) and prose writers such as Muhammad Husain Azad (1830–1910), the body of Urdu literature has mostly been shaped and contributed by Muslim litterateurs. Some of the notable modern writers include Kaifi Azmi (1919–2002), Qurratulain Hyder (1926–2007), Ismat Chughtai (1911–1991), Rahi Masoom Raza (1927–1992), and Bashir Badr (b. 1945). Muslim writers have equally enriched the literature of the Assamese, Bengali, Bhojpuri, English, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Kashmiri, Malyalam, Marathi, Punjabi, Tamil, and Telugu languages. Nazrul Islam (1899–1976) in Bengali, Waris Shah (1722–1798) in Punjabi, Abdur Rahman (b. 1937) in Tamil, K. T. Muhammad (1927–2008) in Malayalam, Habba Khatoon (16th century) in Kashmiri, and Malik Muhammad Jaisi (1477–1542), who wrote in the Avadhi dialect of Hindi, are only a few examples.

Muslims have made a significant contribution in the field of Indian art and cinema. Muslim actors, actresses, directors, producers, screenwriters, lyricists, composers, singers, and technicians have carved a niche for themselves in Bombay cinema ever since the beginnings of the industry. Actor Dilip Kumar (aka Yusuf Khan; b. 1922), singer Mohammad Rafi (1924–1980), actress Madhubala (aka Mumtaz Begam Jehan Dehlavi; 1933–1969), screenwriter Jan Nisar Akhtar (1914–1976), and director Kamal Amrohi (1918–1993) have been the doyens of Indian cinema. Even today, actors such as Aamir Khan (b. 1965), Shahrukh Khan (b. 1965), and Salman Khan (b. 1965) are some of the most popular and successful stars in the industry. Similarly, M. F. Husain (b. 1915) currently is the most recognized Indian painter and has been called the "Picasso of India," while Ebrahim Alkazi (b. 1925) and Habib Tanvir (1923–2009) established themselves as the leading theater personalities of India. In the field of Indian classical music, Muslims such as the vocalist Bade Ghulam Ali Khan (1902–1968), the *shehnai* player Bismillah Khan (1916–2006), the *tabla* players Alla Rakha (1919–2000) and Zakir Hussain (b. 1951), and the *sarod* player Amjad Ali Khan (b. 1946) have dominated its Hindustani school.

Muslims in India today also face challenges as they live a life of promise. Poverty, low literacy, and lack of access to quality educational facilities and good teachers are major issues

facing the community. Another serious challenge that Muslims face is the rise of religious fundamentalism. Historically part of a pluralistic culture, India's Muslims have not been free from violence, but recent incidents of terrorism have threatened their liberal and secular credentials. The promise of life in India comprises the economic growth that India has enjoyed since the 1990s and benefits all communities, including Muslims. This economic expansion of India has improved their economic well-being. With further growth and expansion of the Indian economy, the status of Muslims is expected to improve, and so will the statistics that show their relative backwardness. Similarly, widespread and greater access to educational opportunities will further improve their social, economic, and political life.

M. RAISUR RAHMAN

See also Ayodhya; Communalism; Jama Masjid Mosque; Nizari Ismailis; Religion

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✦ MYANMAR, RELATIONS WITH

The relationship between the Republic of India and the Union of Myanmar (prior to 1989 known as Burma) is predicated on historical ties, including the shared cultural and religious heritage of these neighbors. The Indian origin of many Burmese words is indicative of the almost constant traffic between these two cultures. Their shared tradition of Buddhism, wide-ranging commercial and political links, and the enduring legacies of British colonialism ensure that the two countries have a great deal in common. Indian support for the independence of Burma in 1948 continues to provide a measure of mutual goodwill and admiration.

The shared history of British colonial rule becomes even more potent when considered alongside large-scale Indian migration to colonial Burma. Many of these migrants were employed in the military, the bureaucracy, and the administration. Before World War II (1939–1945), Indians were the dominant group in some of Burma's major centers, including the city of Rangoon, and their influential role led to anti-Indian attacks. After independence,

further political hardships in Burma motivated many to leave the country. While most of the descendants of these migrants returned to India or moved to other parts of the world, some have remained in Burma, where they constitute a small but commercially successful segment of the urban population. The descendants of these Indians still constitute about 2 percent of the population.

At the governmental level, there have been repeated episodes of tension punctuated by mutual accusations of harboring armed rebels. Such accusations have largely centered on rebel groups with bases along the Indo-Burmese frontier and include the United Liberation Front of Asom in India and the Kachin Independence Army in Myanmar. Both rebel groups are accused of seeking a safe haven in the neighboring country and of using their international links to consolidate their operational successes with improved training and logistics. Their reputed links to the regional narcotics trade have often been used to justify attacks on them.

Since 1988 the State Law and Order Restoration Council/State Peace and Development Council has governed Myanmar, and ties between the two countries have improved. This improvement has emerged during a period when the Myanmar military established its control of the Indo-Myanmar frontier through its cease-fire agreement with the Kachin Independence Army.

The two governments have increased cooperation along their 909-mile frontier, and there are now formal trading points between the two countries. At the same time, India is attempting to fence the entire length of the border to stop illegal crossings. Seeking economic solutions to political conflict in northeastern India means that ambition for even greater links and the upgrading of an often decrepit infrastructure are priorities for both countries. The World War II–era Stilwell Road between northeastern India and southwestern China that snakes its way across the mountains of northern Myanmar may one day become a key component of infrastructure linking Asia's two most populous countries. Such a conduit of economic and cultural resources would see Myanmar playing an even greater role in the future security and prosperity of northeastern India.

Recent efforts to increase trade and diplomatic ties have led to a partial thawing in official relations. From India's perspective the rationale for friendlier relations is that Indian foreign policy analysts identify China's strategic designs on the Indian Ocean as a potential threat. Chinese access to the Indian Ocean is best facilitated through Myanmar, and the dangers that this suggests have come to preoccupy some Indian strategic planners.

Disrupting opportunities for even closer ties was the lingering issue of the treatment of Myanmar prodemocracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi (b. 1945) and her incarceration under house arrest, although she was released from captivity in November 2010. Some Indian commentators considered their country's failure to more fully advocate on her behalf a betrayal of Indian democratic principles. Others are far more circumspect and remain focused on the threat that a stronger Chinese influence in Myanmar presents. They equivocate on Myanmar's democracy and are prepared to overlook the government's human rights abuses if that will help secure India's strategic future. Nonetheless, there has been public concern about arms sales to the Myanmar government, particularly in the period immediately after the 2007

crackdown on protests by Buddhist priests. There are indications that the Indian government is continuing to consider its options with respect to further engagement with Myanmar.

High-level official visits have become more frequent between the two countries, and these formal links have been consolidated by participation in multilateral forums including the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) and the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation. Both organizations include South Asian and Southeast Asian members and are based on the logic of history, geography, and economics. It is ultimately those ties that will lead to further links between India and Myanmar. Both countries hope to capitalize on what remain largely underdeveloped efforts to cooperate and collaborate on issues of shared concern.

NICHOLAS FARRELLY

See also China, Relations with; Look East Policy; Southeast Asia, Relations with

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Haacke, Jürgen. *Myanmar's Foreign Policy: Domestic Influences and International Implications.* New York: Routledge, 2006.**Figure 3 Foreign exchange trading activity**

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


✦ NAGALAND

Nagaland is situated in the extreme northeastern corner of India and is considered by many to be one of the most interesting of India's 29 states. It is bordered by Arunachal Pradesh to the north, Assam to the west, and Manipur to the south. Nagaland, so named for its tribal inhabitants, the Naga people, is roughly 10,000 square miles in size and has a climate that is dominated by the five-month-long monsoon season beginning in May and ending in September of each year.

The abundance of rain and the tropical latitude ensure that Nagaland is rich in flora and fauna. Bamboo, oak, magnolia, and pine trees are abundant. Nagaland's wildlife is also diverse, including large mammals, such as elephants, wild buffaloes, and bears. Nagaland is also home to a rich variety of small primates, including pigtailed macaques, the slow loris, and hoolock gibbons. One may also find big cats in Nagaland, including the leopard and tiger, though in recent decades both have become endangered species.

Nagaland, though populated for thousands of years, was only organized as a political state in the Republic of India on December 1, 1963, 16 years after Indian independence in 1947. The majority of the Naga people embraced the union with India on specified terms, which included a high level of autonomy from the central government in New Delhi to run their own economic and political affairs. Today, Nagaland is governed by a legislative assembly of 60 representatives elected by popular vote. It is dominated by four political parties, with the Nagaland People's Front currently in power. Stability of the state remains a priority, with Nagaland having suffered low-level nationalist insurgencies since its union with India.



Nagas shout slogans and march in a rally demanding integration of all Naga-inhabited areas in Senapati, about 50 miles south of Kohima, capital of the northeastern Indian state of Nagaland, May 13, 2006. (AP Photo/K. Sharatchandra)

Economically, Nagaland's standard of living ranks in the middle of India's 29 states. Agriculture remains the most important economic activity, with up to 90 percent of the population engaged in some aspect of the sector. Harvests of rice, millet, sugarcane, and forest products account for much of the agricultural output, but new attention is being paid to silk production as a way to boost the standard of living for the state's residents. Due to the political violence that erupted in the 1970s and the 1980s, the tourist sector was hurt as potential visitors avoided the area in large numbers. The insurgency between ethnonationalists seeking complete independence from India and government forces ended with a cease-fire brokered in the mid-1990s. Since that time Nagaland has promoted itself as both a safe and tourist-friendly destination.

Tourism is an increasingly important aspect of Nagaland's economy. It helps that, although the state is geographically isolated compared to much of India, Nagaland is easily reached by automobile, train, or jet aircraft. To capitalize on this fact, Nagaland's state government and many private companies have been pushing for more visitors, even opening websites dedicated to Nagaland tourism. These sites feature videos and other materials highlighting the state's colorful tribes, festivals, and unique culture. In many ways, Nagaland is showcasing itself as a place for ecotourism and anthropological tourism, a destination where one can learn about tribal diversity and enjoy some of India's best-preserved tropical forests at the same time.

The vast majority of Nagaland's population identify themselves with one of the region's 14 major tribes and speak languages of the Tibeto-Burman language family. These languages provide important clues to the origins of the people. For example, linguists have

traced common cultural and ethnic links shared by the Nagas to groups living in Bhutan, Nepal, Assam, and Burma, as well as to smaller tribes found in northern Thailand and southwestern China. Research has further shown that the indigenous languages of the Naga tribes had no written script; instead, the area borrowed first from Sanskrit and later from the Latin alphabet introduced by Christian missionaries.

It is estimated today that up to 90 percent of the Naga people claim Christianity as their main religion. Surprisingly, Nagaland resisted absorbing both the Hindu and Buddhist beliefs of India, with only traces of their influence found in the region. Instead, the tribes came to embrace Christianity in the 19th and 20th centuries; the Christianity that developed, however, was a blend of Christian and indigenous beliefs. Like many of the world's premodern populations, the people of Nagaland had earlier religious beliefs and practices based upon animism, the worship of nature; these often included such practices as headhunting.

Although the practice of headhunting has long been abandoned, many Nagas hold firm to animist beliefs, recognizing and worshiping spirits in nature, such as divinities that live in the forests, rocks, and rivers of the region. Another aspect of animism still found in Nagaland is the shaman or medicine man. Shamans were common fixtures in villages of the past and can still be found today, overseeing various village rites and festivals celebrated throughout the year.

The national costume and clothing of Nagaland is also different from most of the rest of India. The Nagas eschew the more common dress, including the ever-present *salwar* or *lungi* and even the *sari*. Instead, one will find Nagas attired in handloomed sarongs and shawls, brightly colored and decorated according to tribal customs.

STEVEN B. SHIRLEY

See also Northeastern States

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✦ NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS

The National Alliance of People's Movements (NAPM), which originated in 1992, is a nationwide coalition of a diverse range of individuals, groups, and movements that works toward the fulfillment of a democratic, autonomous, and egalitarian state. While rapidly growing urban India and the consumer market benefit industrial and business elites and the swelling ranks of

the middle class, the majority of people continue to live in rural areas and comprise a diverse population of marginal farmers, Adivasis (tribals), and marginalized castes. The NAPM wages a struggle against the hegemonic and exploitative policies associated with the "New Economic Policy" of privatization, liberalization, and partnership in global capitalism. The policy, it argues, irretrievably damages the environment and demeans the sacrifice of the toiling masses; in addition, it alienates, uproots, and displaces the people living on the margins in both urban and rural areas.

The NAPM advocates fundamental change and a people-oriented sustainable development model. It opposes the uncontrolled powers of global and domestic capital, and the policies and conditions imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO), which have all diminished the role of the state in the vital areas of health and education, as well as in the economy as a whole. The NAPM supports legal protection for the people's right of access to forests, common land, and water, and aims to revitalize the rural economy, including measures to improve the lives of forest dwellers, rural artisans, and those engaged in rural industries. It opposes the current industrial policy, which, it believes, abandons social responsibility and devalues human labor. It supports legislation regarding the minimum wage, safety regulation, health care, working hours, and environmental protection.

The NAPM also focuses on microwatershed development and river basins as a unit of planning and opposes big dams and the development of other infrastructure projects, such as the creation of special economic zones. These encroach upon the resources and livelihood of marginal farmers and Adivasis. The creation of nuclear and mining projects and the exploitation of minerals and natural wealth also cause enormous damage to the lives of the downtrodden and to the environment. The organization opposes communalism and values the protection of plural cultures; condemns organized violence, both private and state; advocates gender equity; and demands extensive electoral reform. It has championed the Right to Information, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, the Right to Food, and the rights of hawkers and slum dwellers. The NAPM has opposed both extremist and state violence in the Adivasi areas and the abuse of state machinery through such legislation as the Armed Forces Special Powers Act.

YOGESH SNEHI

See also Asian Development Bank; Central Banking, Development Aspects; Economy; Financial Institutions, Development; International Monetary Fund, Relations with; Monetary Policy; National Rural Employment Guarantee Act; Reserve Bank of India; Stock Exchange Markets; World Bank, Relations with; World Economic Forum; World Trade Organization, Relations with

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✦ NATIONAL RURAL EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE ACT

The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) of 2005, also known as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005, is a law that guarantees at least 100 days of work a year at statutory minimum wages to every household whose adult members volunteer to do unskilled manual work. Whenever adult members register themselves, in writing or orally, with the local Gram Panchayat, they are issued a Job Card, which is valid for at least five years, and as a matter of right are entitled to work within 15 days of the application. (A Gram Panchayat is a local government at the village or small-town level; it can be set up with a minimum population of 300.)

Initially, the NREGA was established in 200 districts of India on February 2, 2006, and then extended to an additional 130 districts in 2007–2008. (On April 1, 2007, 113 districts were established, and 17 districts in Uttar Pradesh were established on May 15, 2007.) The remaining districts were established on April 1, 2008, which extended the NREGA to the entire country.

A guarantee of employment is important social security legislation. For the more than 60 percent of the rural population that is dependent on agriculture, the NREGA provides a minimum subsistence entitlement and is especially effective during an economic slowdown or recession.

The NREGA ensures twin benefits for rural development. While it guarantees work, it also helps in building and strengthening the rural infrastructure through the construction of roads, the repairing of water channels for water conservation and flood control, the recovering of waste land, and afforestation. It also provides a viable alternative against hunger. Significantly, if a registered member is not provided employment within the stipulated time, he or she is entitled to an unemployment allowance.

Rural development has been an intrinsic part of various government schemes, but most of them failed in achieving their objectives primarily because of bureaucratic hassles and a policy that never made people aware of such schemes. The NREGA goes beyond the limited purview of these schemes. It is an act of the Parliament and provides legal entitlements to laborers for work at minimum wages fixed by the central and state government. This also strengthens the bargaining power of unorganized workers.

Along with providing the guarantee of a job, the NREGA has also restructured power relationships in rural India. More women and people from the margins of caste and class, Dalits (formerly called untouchables), small and marginal farmers, and the landless have benefited from the economic and social entitlements of the act. The Right to Information Act also provides an additional tool for ensuring accountability and transparency in the functioning of the NREGA.

There are, however, some major shortcomings that affect the implementation of the NREGA. Among the major challenges are the inordinate delays in the payment of wages, poor worksite facilities like crèches, and corruption through the siphoning of large funds by the faking of old assets. These have been reported in states such as Uttar Pradesh and

Madhya Pradesh. The augmentation of schemes for rural development also remains a major challenge, owing to a shift in the work cycle of laborers during the harvest season.

Some of these challenges have been addressed through the opening of individual or joint bank accounts for laborers and enabling payment through proposed ATM-like machines, the use of information technology (IT) for monitoring completed work, and the institution of social audits of NREGA funds.

YOGESH SNEHI

See also Central Banking, Development Aspects; Economy; Financial Institutions, Development

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National Volunteers Organization. *See* Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh

✦ NAXALITE MOVEMENT

The Naxalite, or Naxalbari, movement was centered on the struggle for land and labor rights for the tribal people of the Naxalbari region in West Bengal and was led by radicals from the Communist Party of India (Marxist), or CPI(M), against the local landlords and the Darjeeling tea estate owners. This rebellion (or insurgency) lasted barely 52 days, from the last week of May to mid-July 1967. This peasant rebellion took its name from the Naxalbari region, where 60-odd villages cover an area of about 300 square miles in the Darjeeling district. This area is the slender neck of eastern India, squeezed in between former East Pakistan (Bangladesh) below and the foothills of the Himalayas, China, Bhutan, and Nepal above. It was also an area ideal for many insurrection movements, as it provided mountain hideouts, natural forest cover, and possible foreign sanctuaries.

The people of this part of West Bengal are tribal, mainly Santals, with a population of 1,200,000 by the 1961 census. They were employed by the landlords, or *jotedars,* under the *adhiar* land tenure system on a contractual basis. Under the *adhiar* system, the landlord provided capital in the form of seeds, plows, and bullocks needed for crop cultivation. In exchange, the landlord got a share of the harvested crops. Labor relations in the region were

highly exploitative, and disputes over the shares of the produce and eviction of the peasant laborers were common occurrences. There was also unrest in the famous Darjeeling tea estates, where tribal peasants had been cultivating rice on surplus estate lands. They feared eminent eviction by the estate owners.

The general election of 1967 was a major event in Indian political history. The fourth general election for independent India, it saw a number of major electoral defeats for the ruling Congress Party in statewide elections. It was a humiliating setback for the Congress Party, which had fought for India's independence and delivered India from British rule just 20 years earlier. In Bengal, the election also brought an end to the 20-year continuous rule by the Congress Party. A political coalition called United Front government came to power under Ajoy Mukherjee with an alliance of 14 parties, including the pro-Russian Communist Party of India (CPI) and the pro-Chinese CPI(M), which were bitter rivals.

Maverick Communist activists had been working in this state since the mid-1950s, organizing the tribal peoples for protests on a wide range of issues. The most important of these was to stop the arbitrary eviction of the tribal workers from the lands they had previously cleared and cultivated. The tribal people, for their part, depended on Communist activists to help them deal with the exploitative relations with wealthy *jotedars,* who were often absentee landlords, and moneylenders, who kept the cultivators in near serflike status. The leading Communist activists were Kanu Sanyal, an upper-caste Brahmin with a charismatic personality from a nearby town. Kanu Sanyal was a dedicated Communist Party worker who had learned the tribal language and lived among the peasants, organizing meetings, leading protests, and handling court cases on their behalf. His close associate was Jangul Santal, a Santal tribal activist who was also an active member of the CPI(M). Their chief was a radical Communist ideologue named Charu Mazumdar, a small, well-read, 59-year-old upper caste Marxist visionary with a heart condition. Mazumdar was dedicated to the ideas of China's chairman Mao-Tse-Tung. He wanted to set up a Marxist revolutionary base to stage peasant uprisings all across the Indian countryside and eventually win political power, imitating Mao's own example in the Chinese countryside. Mazumdar played a major role in building up cells in this area, but unlike Kanu Sanyal, he was not a charismatic person and preferred to act behind the scenes.

The CPI being part of the winning United Front coalition government led to rumors and fearmongering. The CPI had convinced the landlords that their small and medium-sized lands would be confiscated by the new government and turned over to its tribal cultivators. In response, and as a precautionary proactive measure, there was a spate of evictions of tribal sharecroppers. There were also attacks, carried out by thugs hired by landlords, on sharecroppers who had previously challenged and won their right to remain on the lands they had cultivated. The trigger for the Naxalite rebellion was one such attack on a tribal man who had been awarded land by the court under the existing tenancy legislation. This time, the tribal people chose to retaliate by attacking the landlords and seizing their lands with the support of the local Communist activists from CPI(M).

On May 25, 1967, the tribal activists drove the local landlords away from their lands and hoisted red flags in their fields. The local police and the administration were also forced to flee the area of conflict, and this area was declared a "liberated zone." Tribal militia, armed with their traditional bows and arrows and occasional firearms, began to mobilize and to defend the area against any future police actions. Committees were formed in every village, setting up a parallel administration and taking over courts and schools. Raids were undertaken on the homes of rich landlords to confiscate their rice stocks and cancel or burn all tenant-related documents or deeds alleged to have been used to oppress and cheat the peasants.

Roving armed bands began to collect taxes and administer vigilante justice. Death sentences were passed on the more oppressive landlords. The state minister, on June 12, 1967, declared that a "reign of terror" had descended on Darjeeling district, and the CPI(M) sent a top-level delegation to defuse the crisis. However, the local Communist chapter would not yield. The CPI(M) Politburo, by the end of June, came up against its own activists during the Naxalbari rebellion. It expelled Charu Mazumdar, Kanu Sanyal, Jangul Santal, and their follow rebels from the party ranks for advocating what is called an "adventurous line of action." All this happened under the glare of national and international publicity. The peasant rebels from Naxalbari won the sympathy and admiration of the radical leftist students at the Calcutta Presidency College, who organized public meetings and demonstrations and set up a support group called "Naxalbari Peasants Struggle Aid." This support group was later, in 1969, to become the nucleus of the separate Marxist Party, the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), or CPI(ML).

As rebel activities continued unabated, Radio Peking (Beijing) broadcast the Chinese government's own support and sympathy for the Naxalbari rebels on June 28 by describing the Naxalbari incident as the "front paw of a revolutionary armed struggle by the Indian people under the guidance of Chairmen Mao-Tse-Tung." It called the United Front government the tool of the reactionaries engaged in deceiving the people of West Bengal. This was the first evidence that China was also paying close attention to events unfolding in West Bengal and its disenchantment with its Indian political disciple, the CPI(M). This public denouncement by Radio Peking was something of a shock for the CPI(M) hierarchy, which had considered itself a loyal adherent of the Pro-Chinese Communist Party. At the same time, the message had a tremendous impact on the morale of the Naxalbari-based party rebels, who saw it as a vindication of their independent action. The government of India interpreted the Chinese radio broadcast as blatant interference in its internal affairs and an act of Chinese subversion to undermine its own authority and legitimacy in this volatile area. The state and the local police forces were ordered to locate and arrest the agitators and crush the rebellion.

The rebellion lasted only 52 days, and its end came on July 12, 1967, when a major police action was launched to round up the rebels and to arrest its leaders. The casualty rate was surprisingly low, as only one person died during the final police action. The total casualties for

the entire rebellion were 18 tribal women and children, who were killed while allegedly being used as human shields (according to the police version) in an earlier shootout. In the final push, the rebels offered no resistance, and the key leaders Kanu Sanyal, Charu Mazumdar, and Jangul Santal were all arrested and jailed. They were later released in March 1969, when another Marxist-led coalition state government come to power.

This movement came at a critical period of Indian history, five years after its humiliating military defeat in a brief but bruising border skirmish with the Chinese. At this time, the government of India was very sensitive to any public statements from Beijing that could be interpreted as interference in India's domestic and international affairs. It was in no mood to allow any form of Chinese patronage to any group within its territory. It also came at a time when China itself faced internal power struggles within the Communist Party in the form of the so-called "cultural revolution" and was eager to support other radical Communist-led insurgencies in its neighborhood. It also occurred at a period of Indian economic stagnation, with a declining per capita income, and the nation on the verge of a large-scale famine in Bihar. There were also food shortages in other provinces, with millions of India's citizens kept alive by emergency food aid from the United States.

Finally, there were the college-educated students whose future looked bleak at a time of massive unemployment, and they had a lot of free time and were ready to engage in radical political activities. It was also the late 1960s and the high point of leftist student protests and riots, which was part of the global youth cultural scene. In West Bengal, the better-organized radical Marxist parties with a lot of prestige attracted the more socially conscious students. They also offered ready solutions to the present predicaments through mass revolution, the overthrow of an exploitive system, and the establishment of a just order based on Chairman Mao's Chinese Communist model. The slogan of the day among the Calcutta Presidency College student activists was "Mao-Tse-Tung Zindabad," or "Long live Chairman Mao-Tse-Tung."

The only major casualty of the Naxalbari rebellion seems to have been the provincial coalition government under Ajoy Mukherjee, which was dismissed by the central government of India in November 1967. In spite of its brief life span, and the relatively small loss of life, the Naxalbari peasant revolt had a far-reaching impact as a model for politically motivated tribal-peasant rebellions throughout India. Even today, such radical Naxalbari-style insurgencies, now called "Maoist" by the popular press, are considered the biggest internal threat to the security of India. Since 2009 the government of India has labeled all Maoist groups as terrorists and issued greater power to its police, the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) paramilitary force, and the armed forces to deal with them accordingly.

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See also Land Tenure; Northeastern States; West Bengal

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✦ NEW DELHI

New Delhi (also known as Delhi) is one of the nine districts of Delhi in the National Capital Territory of Delhi, the capital of the Republic of India, and the capital of the government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi. Located on the banks of the Yamuna River, in northwestern India on the Indo-Gangetic Plain, it has a population of more than 18 million people, spread out over more than 160 square miles, and is expanding rapidly, with about 250,000 people migrating to the city every year. Its population density of more than 75,000 people per square mile makes it one of the largest cities in the world. Numerous languages are spoken in Delhi, although the predominant languages are Hindi, Punjabi, Urdu, and English. Along with Mumbai and Kolkata it is one of the three greatest cities of India and is renowned for its social and intellectual dynamism. The business, political, and media center for India, Delhi rivals the great conurbations of the world, and more than 20 million people pass through its Indira Gandhi International Airport every year.

The city has a humid subtropical climate, with an average high of 102 degrees Fahrenheit in May and an average low of 45 degrees in January. Most of its average 28 inches of rainfall comes during the monsoon rains of July and August, when city streets are often flooded, people wade up to their knees in water, and traffic comes to a standstill. At other times people bake in the dry summer heat, made worse by a blanket of dust and pollution hovering over the city, which is caused by the acutely congested traffic and factories and workshops, and worsened by the numerous dung fires that people light to cook their meals, especially in the evenings. Airplanes are sometimes grounded in winter for hours when the smoke mixes with

fog, reducing visibility. New Delhi is thus one of the most populous, most crowded, most polluted, and fastest-growing cities in the world.

King George V (1865–1936; king of the United Kingdom and emperor of India, 1910–1936), announced on December 12, 1911, that the capital of British India would be moved from Calcutta to Delhi in a new city to be built adjacent to the old city. New Delhi was designed by British architects Edwin Lutyens (1869–1944) and Herbert Baker (1862–1946) and inaugurated on February 13, 1931. Delhi, however, because of its strategic location, had been the center of habitation for millennia. It is located on the site of an early capital mentioned in the *Mahabharata*, of circa 1000 BCE; was Islamicized around the 12th century; and was made the great city of the Mughals after Babur (1483–1531; Mughal emperor 1526–1531) captured the city in 1526. It has been the capital of at least half a dozen dynasties or empires.

Delhi is, therefore, a city containing numerous sights both ancient and modern. Nothing remains of its ancient Aryan past, but the most significant of Delhi's top tourist sites are the Qutub Minar, a minaret almost 238 feet high built by Muslim ruler Qutub-ud-din Aibak, the first sultan of Delhi (1206–1210) between 1193 and 1368; the tomb of the first Mughal emperor, Humayun (1508–1556; Mughal emperor 1530–1540, 1555–1556); the Red Fort (*Lal Qila*), completed by Mughal emperor Shah Jahan (1592–1666; Mughal emperor 1628–1658) in 1648; and Jama Masjid Mosque, the largest mosque in India,



Aerial view of Connaught Place, a thriving and bustling business and commercial center as well as an entertainment district filled with restaurants, bars, and shops; it is considered to be the center of New Delhi. (Sipra Das/The India Today Group/Getty Images)

completed in 1656. Its pre-Muslim history is represented by the 22-foot-high iron pillar of Chandragupta II, emperor (ca. 380–415) during the Gupta Empire (319–547). Sites from the British period include Rashtrapati Bhavan, the official residence of the president; Parliament House, containing both the upper (Rajya Sabha) and the lower (Lok Sabha) houses of Parliament; the Secretariat Building, housing government ministries; and India Gate, commemorating the lives of servicemen from World War I. Numerous temples are also found in Delhi, from the modernist Bahai Lotus Temple to the Hindu Akshardham Temple and Lakshminarayan Temple to the Sikh Gurdwara Bangla Sahib; numerous churches and cathedrals are found there as well.

Delhi is one of the great educational centers of the world, with a large number of world-class universities, including Delhi University, Jamia Millia Islamia, and Jawaharlal Nehru University. It houses the remarkable National Museum and the Nehru Memorial Museum, which is not only a museum on the life of Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964), the second member of the Nehru dynasty, which has given India three prime ministers so far, but is also a vast treasure trove for scholars working on India's modern history.

New Delhi is a vibrant city that pulsates with energy from early morning to late at night. Its innumerable cafes and tea shops are the center of life for many Indians, especially the young, students, and the unemployed and the underemployed, who all gather in Connaught Place. The city contains some of the finest hotels and restaurants in the world and houses bazaars selling almost every imaginable product. It is a book lover's paradise. Buses, rickshaws, and taxis zoom around the city, helping to create the frenetic pace and atmosphere that characterizes the city. It is modernizing at a fast pace, almost as quickly as the new rapidly expanding metro, both underground and aboveground, speeds people to their destinations around the city and into the far suburbs. New Delhi is not just a remarkable city but also an incredible experience.

ROGER D. LONG

See also Jama Masjid Mosque

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✦ NEWSPAPERS, INDIAN-LANGUAGE

India's newspaper market is highly complex and diverse. In 2008 newspapers were published in English and 22 other principal languages written in 14 different scripts. There has been a tremendous growth of Indian-language newspapers since independence in 1947, and especially since the late 1970s. Spearheaded by Hindi-language newspapers, this growth is largely driven by the increase in the level of literacy, improvements in consumer purchasing power, growing political awareness, the spread of computer technology and offset presses, and the use of marketing strategies by newspapers to reach out to the readers. It was in 1979 that Hindi dailies for the first time overtook English dailies in terms of circulation (3 million to 2.97 million, according to the Registrar of Newspapers India), and this gap kept widening during the 1980s and 1990s. According to the circulation figures for 2007, Hindi dailies lead with 8.48 million copies, while English dailies trail a distant second with 3.15 million copies.

Another way of understanding the growth of Indian-language newspapers is through the readership figures. In India, the culture of sharing a newspaper is prevalent, particularly among the readers of Indian-language newspapers. This is evident when looking at the difference between circulation and readership figures. The National Readership Survey for 2006 reported that vernacular newspapers have grown from 191 million readers to 203.6 million (of these, 81.6 million were readers of Hindi newspapers), while English newspapers have stagnated at around 21 million readers.

It must be noted that the dramatic rise of Hindi newspapers has taken place in the context of the growing ascendancy of electronic media. Many analysts believe that the advent of privately operated cable and satellite television channels will spell the death knell of newspapers. However, newspapers have adapted to technological innovations and repositioned themselves to continue as a vital medium of communication. By localizing their content and issuing regional-, district-, and local-level editions, Hindi newspapers have been able to create new constituencies of readership and, in the process, retain their share of advertising revenue in the face of growing competition from the electronic media. Through focusing on local news and stories of local interest, Hindi newspapers have brought news closer to the readers.

From the independence of India in August 1947 until the mid-1980s, politicians and bureaucrats hardly bothered with or even took notice of the news published in Hindi newspapers. English-language newspapers were considered the national newspapers, even though they had a low circulation. Now, politicians and bureaucrats cannot afford to ignore news published in Hindi and other regional-language newspapers.

Dainik Jagran was established by a revolutionary Indian freedom fighter, Puran Chandra Gupta (b. 1940). The first edition of the newspaper was brought out from Jhansi, Uttar Pradesh, in 1942, but in 1947 it was issued at Kanpur, also in Uttar Pradesh. Since its inception, *Dainik Jagran* has expanded steadily. According to the National Readership survey of 2006, it is the most widely read daily newspaper of India, with 21.24 million readers. It is the first Indian newspaper to have crossed the readership mark of 20 million copies a day.

Since its establishment in 1942 until 1989, *Dainik Jagran* was mostly only available in Uttar Pradesh. The only edition outside the state during this period was an edition published from Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, which was launched in 1956. However, being based in Uttar Pradesh itself was a major advantage, as that state has the distinction of being the "Hindi heartland" and occupies an important place in the pan-Indian political landscape. After the Bhopal edition came out, the next expansion took place nearly two decades later, with the launch of an edition from Gorakhpur, Uttar Pradesh, in 1975. This was followed by the launch of local editions coming out from different cities in the state, including Lucknow (1979), the capital city of Uttar Pradesh. By the end of the 1980s *Dainik Jagran* was able to establish for itself a dominant presence in Uttar Pradesh. Thereafter, it started expanding outside the state.

Dainik Jagran launched its edition from New Delhi, the capital of India, in 1990, and launched its Jalandhar, Punjab, edition in 1999. *Dainik Jagran* now has a media presence across 12 states: Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Delhi (a Union Territory), Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Uttaranchal. Currently, *Dainik Jagran* publishes 37 editions and prints more than 200 subeditions, with each subedition carefully customized for the readership of its geographic area.

Much of the success of *Dainik Jagran* can be attributed to its ability to localize the content of each edition and to use the colloquial language of the area. As a result, the difference in the presentation style of a particular item of news in two different editions is easily noticeable. This is one of the important features of Hindi newspapers that cannot be found in the case of English newspapers. In the political arena, *Dainik Jagran* has also been notorious for supporting a right-wing Hindutva (Hinduness) ideology. During the Babri Masjid controversy in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which eventually led to the destruction of the mosque on December 6, 1992, *Dainik Jagran* reported the events in a highly sensational manner and stoked the passions of Hindu extremists. As a result, in its December 1991 Ayodhya Judgment, the Press Council of India criticized the Hindi Press in general, and *Dainik Jagran* in particular, for "offending the canons of journalistic ethics."

The chief editor of the newspaper, Narendra Mohan (1934–2002), was elected to the Rajya Sabha, the upper house of the Indian Parliament, and represented the extremist right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), founded in 1980. Similarly, during the Kargil war between India and Pakistan in 1998, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (b. 1924), leader of the BJP, gave an exclusive interview to *Dainik Jagran*, which was printed widely in the English press, once again indicating the central role of the newspaper.

Giving its support to a right-wing political ideology greatly helped *Dainik Jagran* to expand, as a wave of support for Hindutva swept the northern Indian heartland. Thus, *Dainik Jagran* rode the rising wave of Hindutva sentiment in the late 1980s and early 1990s through its sensationalist and populist reporting style. However, it would be an oversimplification to attribute the entire success of *Dainik Jagran* merely to its support of Hindutva ideology. As noted above, the newspaper has 37 editions and more than 200 subeditions, which shows its strong appeal to a local audience. It also employs marketing strategies to create a new constituency of readers. The result is that *Dainik Jagran* became an important newspaper catering to a large number of Hindi-speakers in disparate parts of India.

Dainik Bhaskar was first published in 1958 by industrialist Dwarka Prasad Agarwal (b. 1933) as a family business from Bhopal, the capital of the state of Madhya Pradesh. For nearly 40 years the distributorship of the daily newspaper was confined to Madhya Pradesh, but in 1995 it expanded outside the state. In 2009 it is the second most-widely read newspaper in India after *Dainik Jagran,* with an estimated 20.95 million readers. It is the leading newspaper in the states of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Chandigarh (a Union Territory), and Haryana.

In 1992 *Dainik Bhaskar* became the leading newspaper in Madhya Pradesh. In the wake of the communal riots that broke out in Bhopal following the demolition of the Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992, *Dainik Bhaskar* appealed for communal harmony. Unlike a number of other Hindi newspapers, *Dainik Bhaskar* adopted a liberal and secular approach during the controversy and as a result was able to establish a following among the Muslim population, which is nearly 40 percent of the total population of Bhopal.

In an attempt to expand its base outside of Madhya Pradesh, *Dainik Bhaskar* embarked on an aggressive research and marketing campaign in the mid-1990s. Thus, in October 1995 newspaper executives identified Rajasthan as a potential market, a decision that was viewed as a high-risk venture since one company, Bennett, Coleman and Company, had just shut down the Jaipur edition of *Navbharat Times,* a Hindi newspaper. Moreover, *Rajasthan Patrika* was dominating the newspaper market in Rajasthan, and other Hindi newspapers such as *Rashthradoot* and *Nav Jyoti* had a strong presence in the state. Yet in spite of this market situation, the Agarwal family decided to launch its Rajasthan edition from Jaipur on December 19, 1996. Over the next 14 months a massive survey was conducted in 175,000 households in Jaipur, almost 50 percent of the total population, and 100 percent of the total readership. The survey aimed to understand people's preferences, their reading habits, and their expectations for a newspaper.

These multipronged marketing strategies helped *Dainik Bhaskar* make an entry into the newspaper market in Rajasthan and to surpass *Rajasthan Patrika* as the leading newspaper in the state, a position it had held since 1956. The success fascinated the Bhaskar Group, as it was their first venture outside the state of Madhya Pradesh. This was the first time in the history of the Hindi print media that a publisher employed marketing strategies to develop a new market and sell newspapers like any other consumer good. The success in Jaipur prompted the group to expand to other regions, and *Dainik Bhaskar* now prints 32 separate editions and more than 200 subeditions spread across nine states.

Dainik Bhaskar is also the first Hindi newspaper to start a newspaper for women. In order to provide exclusive coverage of issues of special interest to women, *Women Bhaskar* was launched in December 2007 from Indore, Madhya Pradesh. It is the first daily newspaper designed exclusively for women, and it is distributed along with the main edition of *Dainik Bhaskar.* Its success in Indore prompted the Bhaskar group to start a women's newspaper in Bhopal and in other cities across India.

Another important step in the process of publishing for the local market was the beginning of *Upcountry City Bhaskar,* a four-page weekly pullout that covers lifestyle and other local happenings in the countryside. The publication is targeted at a young readership, including women. As of 2010 this concept had not been tried by any other Hindi newspaper, as "upcountry" is usually considered less desirable for consumer-oriented lifestyles.

Like *Dainik Jagran,* its close competitor, *Dainik Bhaskar* focuses on local news and items of local interest. Of the 20 pages carried in each of its 32 separate editions, only 4 to 5 pages are common to all. Each edition is customized according to its locale and infused with colloquial language and local idioms. While explaining the sources of their publishing model, Girish Agarwal, managing director of the Bhaskar group, remarked to *Business India,* "We have borrowed aggressiveness from the Times group, networking from *Eenadu,* and content from the *Hindu.*" However, the two publishing models that *Dainik Bhaskar* follows are *USA Today* and the *Times of India.*

It is evident that the Bhaskar group is open to learning from and adopting different approaches used by successful newspapers in different countries. Such an approach of investing time, energy, and money in learning the secrets of successful newspapers and adopting their strategies has helped *Dainik Bhaskar* become a great success story in the Indian media market.

Punjab Kesari, a daily newspaper, was started at Jalandhar in 1965, with an initial print order of 1,500 copies. By 1977 the circulation had risen to nearly 72,000 copies per day. During the Emergency of 1975–1977, when the government of Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984) imposed heavy censorship over the press, *Punjab Kesari* started encompassing its front page in a color magazine. *Punjab Kesari* thus has the distinction of being the first newspaper in India to use color on its front page. In 1983 *Punjab Kesari* launched an edition from Delhi, and by 1986 it had become the largest-selling Hindi daily in India.

Lala Jagat Narain (1889–1981), the founder of *Punjab Kesari,* was gunned down in September 1981 during the Khalistan insurgency that shook the Punjab during the 1980s. The reason for his murder was the perceived insult that he and his newspaper perpetuated on the sentiments of Sikhs by speaking out against a separate Khalistan. Insurgents also targeted *Punjab Kesari*'s agents and hawkers, and 53 of them were murdered. The newspaper established a "martyr's fund" and raised 42 million rupees from readers as compensation to be paid to the bereaved families. The large amount of money raised was a demonstration of the strong support commanded for the newspaper by its readers.

Punjab Kesari remained a dominant Hindi daily in the 1980s and in the first half of the 1990s. Instead of employing a marketing survey, *Punjab Kesari* utilized its connection with agents and hawkers to understand the preferences and demands of its readers. The result was that it kept changing the type of news it covered and the editorial content of the paper. It was the first Hindi daily newspaper, for example, to focus on offering a strong dose of local news.

However, critics and rivals among the Hindi dailies regard *Punjab Kesari* as the symbol of a declining standard of journalism. *Punjab Kesari* buys stories from the *National Enquirer*—a notorious tabloid widely sold in supermarkets and other outlets in the United States. Though this helped in assuring its initial success, it could not sustain its growth for long. As a result, it has now lost its dominant position in the Hindi newspaper market. The growth story of *Punjab Kesari* also illustrates India's highly competitive newspaper market and the need for a newspaper to adapt to the changing tastes of its readers in order to survive and flourish.

Anandabazar Patrika is an influential Bengali daily published from Kolkata. It was started in 1922 as an evening daily. For many years it has remained the largest-circulated single-edition regional-language daily of India. It has a daily circulation of more than 1 million copies. The readership figure of the newspaper stands at 7.29 million, according to the National Readership Survey of 2006. Despite being the largest-circulated daily, it did not receive significant advertisement until the 1980s. This was because of the perception prevalent among advertisers and advertising agencies that only readers of English newspapers have purchasing power. However, *Anandabazar Patrika* was able to convince the advertisers about the potential purchasing power of regional-language newspaper readers. Today, the rate of advertisement in the paper is highest among all regional-language newspapers.

Like other successful regional-language newspapers, *Anandabazar Patrika* uses simple and colloquial language. However, unlike other regional-language newspapers, which began to publish multiple editions to increase their readership, *Anandabazar Patrika* confined itself to Kolkata and Mumbai. Instead of launching its editions from small towns and rural areas, which would have made it a mass newspaper, *Anandabazar Patrika* is still based in metropolitan cities and mostly read by the highest strata of the society. This strategy of the paper is partly driven by the hope of attracting the biggest advertisers and charging the highest advertising rates.

Dina Thanthi, or *Daily Thanthi*, was founded in 1942 from Madurai, a provincial town in southern Tamil Nadu. It is the most-read Tamil newspaper of India, with 10.38 million readers, according to the National Readership Survey of 2006. The founder of the daily, S. P. Adithanar, was a lawyer trained in Britain. While in Britain, he was inspired by the English tabloid, the *Daily Mirror*, for its ability to reach a mass audience. It was his desire to publish a newspaper in the Tamil language that could reach ordinary people. It is believed that *Daily Thanthi* pioneered the technique of publishing from a number of centers. In the 1940s, Adithanar started editions from Madras, Salem, and Tiruchchirappalli. However, the Salem edition soon failed, while the Tiruchchirappalli edition was paused and restarted in 1954. The publisher used the public bus services to distribute the newspaper throughout the southern Tamil region.

In the past, readers in the far-flung areas away from the publication centers got their newspaper at least a day late. But Adithanar could provide a fresh newspaper to readers every morning in Tamil towns, which proprietors elsewhere in India could not do until 40 years later. It also used photographs extensively at a time when other newspapers found it difficult to do so because of limited technology and resources. *Daily Thanthi*'s most notable feature is its emphasis on local news, particularly crimes. The use of colloquial language that resonates with the local society is another important reason for its success.

Daily Thanthi today has 14 editions. It also publishes editions from the neighboring states of Karnataka and Pondicherry to cater to the needs of the Tamil-speaking population in these states.

Eenadu was started in 1974 from Visakhapatnam. It is now the largest-read Telugu daily of India. According to the National Readership Survey of 2006, it has a readership base of 13.8 million, which made it the number three daily of India. *Eenadu* is owned by Ramoji Rao (b. 1936), who is a businessman and media baron. Ramoji Rao and his newspaper played an important role in the creation and success of the Telugu Desam Party, a regional political party in the state of Andhra Pradesh, which challenged the dominance of the Congress Party, a national political party.

Eenadu is believed to have pioneered the strategy of localization that has led to the tremendous growth of Indian-language newspapers since the 1980s. By 1989 *Eenadu* started publishing district editions for small towns in rural Andhra Pradesh. It began to publish an 8-page color tabloid with content tailored for the particular district where it was distributed, which went along with the 12 pages printed on the broadsheet. In order to get local news, *Eenadu* built a network of correspondents in the countryside. If their news was published, they received small sums of money. Telephones were used to send news of immediate importance to the head office. Otherwise, news was sent through the bus services. By localizing the paper, *Eenadu* was able to generate local bases of advertising, which became a major source of revenue. These methods of local news gathering and the creation of local advertising were subsequently followed by other regional-language and Hindi newspapers.

Today *Eenadu* uses such modern technology as the Internet to get news from remote areas. It has continuously invested huge capital to modernize the technology and the processes of news gathering. The success of *Eenadu* also shows the changing nature of Telugu journalism and the importance of associating and highlighting the local society.

Malayala Manorama was started as a four-page weekly newspaper in 1890 from Kottayam, a small town in the princely state of Travancore. It became a daily in 1928. It was also the first joint-stock publishing company of India, founded by Kandathil Varghese Mappillai (1857–1904) in 1888. *Malayala Manorama* was closed in September 1938 when the Travancore government became outraged at political opposition expressed in its columns and banned the newspaper. The editor of the paper, K. C. Mammen Mappillai (1873–1953), Kandathil Varghese Mappillai's nephew who had become editor upon the death of his uncle in 1904, by which time the newspaper was issued biweekly, was jailed

and his property was confiscated. The newspaper was closed down after it printed reports of police and military atrocities. Mappillai's jailing showed the influence of the press and its power to mobilize the masses. The newspaper did not resume publication for nine years but finally did so on November 29, 1947, and it soon flourished.

The second edition of the paper was issued in Kozhikode in 1966, and since the early 1970s *Malayala Manorama* has become the leading newspaper in Kerala. Today it is the largest-read Malayalam daily, with 8.4 million readers, and is published from eight centers in Kerala. In 2002 it launched Manorama Online.

TABEREZ AHMED NEYAZI

See also Hindu, The; Hindustan Times; Indian Express; India Today; Media and Telecommunications; *Times of India, The*

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✦ NIZARI ISMAILIS

The Nizari Ismailis (generally known as the Ismailis) are a minority Shia Muslim community that resides in 25 different countries around the world, including India. The Ismailis are an ethnically, culturally, and linguistically diverse community united by their allegiance to their imam (spiritual leader) Prince Karim Aga Khan IV (b. 1936; Aga Khan 1957–), who is their 49th hereditary imam and a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad through Ali (598–661; caliph 656–661), who was the first imam and the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law, and through Ali's wife, Fatima (ca. 605–632), the daughter of the Prophet.



Ismaili Muslims hold Indian national flags and Ismaili religious flags as they wait to welcome their spiritual leader, Aga Khan IV in Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, May 2008. (AP Photo/ Mahesh Kumar)

Although they are officially known as the Shia Imami Ismaili Muslims, in India they are often referred to as Khojas or Aga Khanis. The term *khoja* is derived from the Persian *khwaja,* meaning "lord, master, or honorable person." Prior to their conversion the Nizari Ismailis of the Indian subcontinent were members of the Hindu Lohana caste and were addressed by the Hindu title of *thakur* (master). The term *khoja,* therefore, was a replacement for *thakur.* The Indian Ismailis are not concentrated in one part of India; rather, they reside in various states throughout India. The majority of Indian Ismailis are of Gujarati ancestry and migrated to other Indian states in the late 19th century due to deteriorating conditions in Gujarat.

Islam consists of two principal sects, the Shia and the Sunni, which both bear witness that there is only one God and that Muhammad is the final Messenger of God. A schism in the Islamic community occurred upon the death of the Prophet. The community was in need of a leader, but as Muhammad was the seal of the prophets, another prophet could not succeed him. A group of prominent Muslims took the matter into their own hands and chose Abu Bakr (ca. 573–634; caliph 632–634), a close companion of the Prophet and one of the earliest converts to Islam, to be the successor of the Messenger of God. The institution of the caliphate in Islam was thus established. In the meantime, a small group of Muslims (later known as the Shia) held that shortly before his death the Prophet had designated his cousin and son-in-law, Ali, as his successor and the imam.

The caliph, in Sunni understanding, was primarily a political leader who commanded armies, protected Islam, and governed following the Quran and the examples of the Prophet. He was not a religious leader and did not have supreme authority to interpret revelation. The doctrine of Imama in the Shia tradition states that the institution of Imamate is bestowed on the descendants of Ali and Fatima, the Prophet's daughter, through *nass,* or divine designation. The role of the imam is to guide his followers in temporal and spiritual matters, to preserve the message of the Quran, and to ensure it is interpreted according to the changing times.

The death of the fifth imam, Jafar al-Sadiq (702–765), resulted in the first major split among the Shia. A small minority, the Ismailis, accepted his elder son, Ismail (ca. 721–755), as his successor. The majority, the Ithna'ashariyya (Twelvers), accepted his younger son, Musa al-Kazim (745–799), as the next imam. The Ithna'ashariyya are the largest Shia group and are so called because of their conviction that their 12th imam went into concealment in the ninth century and that his reappearance is still being awaited. While the majority of sources relate that Ismail died before his father, the Ismailis denied this notion and claimed that the announcement of Ismail's death was a strategy to protect Ismail from the Abbasids, the third dynasty in Islam, which ruled 749–1258. Soon after the recognition of Musa al-Kazim as imam by the majority, the Ismaili imams went into hiding to avoid Abbasid persecution and initiated the *dawr al-satr,* or period of concealment. During this period the Ismaili *dawa* (missionary) movement flourished in Iraq, Persia, eastern Arabia, and Sindh. In 883 the *dawa* movement was initiated in the Indian subcontinent.

The *dawr al-satr* ended with the establishment of the Fatimid caliphate in North Africa in 909, and in 973 the caliphate's headquarters moved to Cairo. During the Fatimid caliphate (909–1171) there was a further split among the Ismailis after the death of the 18th imam, al-Mustansir I, in 1094. This resulted in the formation of those that accepted his elder son, Nizar (1045–1097, imam 1095–1097), as the succeeding imam, known as the Nizari Ismailis, and those who accepted his younger son, Mustali (imam 1094–1101), known as the Mustalian Ismailis. The Fatimid caliphate continued under the leadership of the Mustali Ismaili imams. In India the Mustalian Ismailis, popularly known as Bohras, are primarily found in Gujarat and Mumbai. The term *bohra* is derived from the Gujarati *vohorvu,* meaning "to trade." It is held, therefore, that either the Bohras were originally a trading community or that they were converted to Mustalian Ismailism from the Hindu Vohra caste. The Mustalian Ismailis believe that their final imam is in occultation, and they are waiting for his emergence. For the second time in their history, in about 1095, the Nizari Ismaili imams were forced to conceal their identity, this time in Persia for nearly 70 years. It was not until 1162 that the 23rd imam, Hasan II (imam 1162–1166), openly manifested himself as the imam and resumed his position as head of state and community. Hasan II and his successors ruled at the fortress of Alamut in the Persian Alburz Mountains until the Mongols invaded in 1256. In the late Alamut period the Nizari Ismaili leadership made extensive efforts to introduce the *dawa* activities into the Indian subcontinent.

For at least two centuries after the fall of Alamut, the Nizari imams lived covertly in predominantly Sunni Persia and were inaccessible to their followers. The Nizari Ismailis who survived the Mongol invasion escaped to Nizari Ismaili communities in Afghanistan, Central Asia, and Sindh, where they were guided by local *dais* (missionaries), *pirs* (preacher-saints), or *shaykhs,* who claimed access to the Nizari imams in Persia. In order to escape persecution, the Nizari Ismailis adopted the practice of *taqiyya,* or dissimulation and secrecy, often disguising themselves as Sufis (Muslim mystics), Twelver Shias, Sunnis, or Hindus, as it befitted the environment around them.

After the fall of Alamut, Sufi teachings, terminology, and ideas permeated into Persian Nizari Ismailism. At the same time, the Sufis began to use Nizari Ismaili doctrines. Due to this fusion, the Persian Nizari Ismailis began to adopt external Sufi ways of life. The Nizari Ismaili imams, still living covertly, presented themselves to outsiders as Sufi masters or *pirs,* and their followers adopted the title of *murids,* or disciples. The imams also adopted Sufi names. This practice was initiated by the 32nd imam, Mustansir Billah II (1029–1094; imam 1036–1094), who took on the name of Shah Qalandar. The Persian Nizari Ismailis concealed themselves under the guise of Sufism, and although they did not formally affiliate with any one Sufi *tariqa,* or order, by this time they appeared as any other Sufi *tariqa.*

During the 13th century mysticism flourished from Anatolia and Egypt to Delhi, and Persian literature thrived in India as much as in Persia. At the same time, the fervor of Sufism reached the Indian subcontinent, which saw the expansion of various Sufi schools. Alongside the rise of Sufism, the Indian subcontinent was in the midst of another transformation, the rise of the Bhakti tradition, particularly in northern India. Tradition asserts that the Ismaili imams sent *pirs* from Persia to the Indian subcontinent in the first half of the 13th century to initiate the *dawa.*

The *pirs* composed *ginans* (devotional songs) in local languages, including Gujarati, Kacchi, Sindhi, Siraiki (or Multani), Punjabi, Hindi, and Urdu, with terminology borrowed from Sanskrit, Arabic, and Persian. In addition to using vernacular languages, the *pirs* also appropriated widespread doctrines. Similar to medieval Indian devotional poetry, the *ginans* were transmitted orally. The earliest-known manuscript, dated to the 16th century, indicates that it may have been around this time that the *ginans* were first translated from an oral into a written tradition. Today the *ginans* are an integral part of the congregational worship of the Ismailis of South Asian ancestry in India, as well as in other parts of the world.

According to Ismaili tradition, the earliest *pir* to be sent to India by the imams was Satgur Nur. He is said to have lived sometime between the late 11th and early 12th centuries and was mainly active in Patan, Gujarat. He is well known for having converted the king of Gujarat, Siddharaja Jayasinha, along with all the residents of Patan, which was renamed Pirna Patan (the *pir*'s city). Satgur Nur's tomb is located in Nawsari, near Surat. The second major *pir* in India was Shams, who was primarily active in Uch and Multan. His dates are variously given as the early 12th century to the 14th century. Shams portrayed himself to be a Hindu *yogi* or wandering *dervish* in order to blend into his environment. Shams's mausoleum can be found

in Multan. The next major *pir*, Sadr al-Din, was the great-grandson of Shams, and the largest number of *ginans* are attributed to him. He lived during the latter part of the 14th and early 15th century. Although his headquarters was in Uch, his work reached Sindh, the Punjab, Kutch, and Kathiawad. Sadr al-Din bestowed the title of Khoja on the Ismailis in India. He is also credited with the establishment of the first *jamaatkhana* (place of worship) in Kotdi, Sindh. Today, there are approximately 337 *jamaatkhanas* in India. In addition, Sadr al-Din is said to be the creator of the Khojki script, which was used exclusively by the Ismailis until the late 1960s to record religious literature, perhaps in order to deter hostility from those who were adverse to Ismaili practices and doctrine; it is no longer a living script. The death of Sadr al-Din took place anywhere between the late 14th and early 15th century. His shrine is located near Uch. Sadr al-Din was succeeded by his son Hasan al-Kabir al-Din, who maintained Uch as his center. Born in Uch in the 15th century, he was the first *pir* to be born in India. Hasan al-Kabir al-Din died in the latter part of the 15th century. His tomb lies outside Uch and is known locally as Hasan Darya.

The 46th Ismaili imam, Hasan Ali Shah (1804–1881), who received the honorific title of Aga Khan ("lord"), was the first of the Nizari Ismaili imams to migrate from Persia to the Indian subcontinent in 1842. In time he set up residences in Mumbai, Pune, and Bangalore. His son and successor, Aqa Ali Shah (1830–1885), Aga Khan II, in his brief Imamate of four years (1881–1885) and in his capacity as president of the Muhammadan National Association, promoted a system of quality education and social welfare for the benefit of all Indian Muslims. He was also appointed to the Bombay Legislative Council. Aga Khan II's son, Sultan Muhammad Shah al-Husayni (1877–1957), Aga Khan III, succeeded him in 1885 and continued to put reforms into place for the betterment of the Nizari Ismailis. He frequently traveled to Europe, where he befriended British royalty and other government officials. He was also an active participant in Indian politics and was part of the movement that eventually led to independence from British colonial rule. He was also entirely committed to the modernization of the Ismaili community and ensured that high-quality schools and hospitals were established for the benefit of all, regardless of ethnicity, gender, or religion. Aga Khan III was succeeded by his grandson, Prince Karim Aga Khan IV (b. 1936; Aga Khan 1957–), who is the present imam of the Ismailis. In an effort to continue the modernization policies, and to ensure improving socioeconomic and educational conditions, as well as access to primary health care, he founded the Aga Khan Foundation in 1967. As the foundation's work expanded into the three main areas of economic development, social development, and culture, the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) was established. AKDN is a system of numerous development agencies that operate mainly in Asia and Africa. In July 2007 Aga Khan IV celebrated his Golden Jubilee, marking 50 years of being the imam of the Ismaili community.

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See also Islam; Religion

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✦ NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

The nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) sector in India represents a vibrant civil society. While the evolution of this sector has been a slow process, it now plays an important role in development and public policy making. The inability of the state to meet the needs of the people has led either to the cooption of voluntary groups, which have been delegated power to perform certain functions, or to the rise of groups that have assumed an advocacy or activist role to change public policy. This grassroots connection and social networking with the community in the social services sector has made NGOs an important yet subordinate ally in the public policy process, and they have been slowly acknowledged as an important agency of social polity.

The World Bank and other agencies estimate that about 2 million NGOs are working in India, and 34,000 of them are classified on the basis of geography and activity: 53 percent are rural based, 47 percent are urban based, 49.6 percent are unregistered, 80 percent are corporate and people financed, 1.3 percent are government financed, and 7 percent are funded by global capital. Most NGOs are small operations; volunteers or a few part-time employees run about three-fourths of them. Since these organizations lack money to support themselves, the government allocates funds. Many funds also come from foreign groups and foundations. This money is regulated by the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) of 1976 under the Ministry of Home Affairs. NGOs must be registered as trusts or societies, or as private, limited, nonprofit companies under Section 25 of the Indian Companies Act, 1956. Section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act gives them tax exemption.

The rise of the NGO sector began with the establishment of the traditional voluntary service sector before independence in the form of Hindu charitable organizations and Christian

missionaries. The former service-oriented organizations worked for the welfare of Hindu communities, and the latter provided educational opportunities and health care to the marginalized poor and tribes, who were also encouraged to convert to Christianity. These voluntary organizations performed a great role in the social and political transformation of the country. In postindependence India, many Gandhians established voluntary agencies to work closely with governmental programs on social and economical issues. The Gandhian values of *khadi* (homespun cloth) and propagation of *swadeshi* (self-rule) were facilitated by these organizations. They not only helped people fight for freedom but also spread the message of Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948) among the rural poor in order to usher in a new era of self-sufficiency and self-reliance in the villages. These agencies worked with the communities in village and rural-development programs, cooperative agencies, and small handicraft industries. In addition, they organized cooperatives for market products and worked for adult education and the eradication of illiteracy.

By the 1960s it became clear that government programs could not solve the problems of the poor. To tackle major issues of social justice, inequality, caste, and class, NGO groups emerged and started to support and advocate the cause of the underprivileged. This evolved into NGOs going into the rural areas. As a result, NGOs became a familiar sight in the countryside.

In the beginning, funds were scarce as no institutional money was available, and the NGOs relied upon volunteerism. Soon the role of NGOs and their importance in rural development was recognized, and the central government felt the need to financially support these organizations in both urban and rural areas. This did not happen, however, until the 1980s. It was under the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1980–1985) that the government identified new areas in which NGOs could be involved, and they included renewable energy, environmental protection and sustainable development, family welfare, health and nutrition, education, water management, social welfare programs and tribal development, and disaster management. This was just the beginning. In the following Five-Year Plans, the government engaged the NGOs more actively, and these groups were expected to show how village and indigenous resources could be used and how human resources, rural skills, and local knowledge could be used in development.

Because of their interaction with local people, NGOs can be very effective in bringing change, and a network of NGOs has been created. These organizations also work as a go-between, negotiating between the state and the people. By the early 1980s the term NGO became popular, encouraging a new NGO era. Although NGOs were traditionally voluntary, their professional dimension was a later development. Many NGO groups have taken an alternative "social action" approach by politicizing the issue of poverty, directly challenging many of the social programs established by the government. NGOs in the areas of the environment, health, education, peace, human rights, consumer rights, and women's rights have shown how effective they can be in ushering in social and political change.

NGOs can be divided into the following three sectors: (i) operational NGOs, whose primary purpose is the design and implementation of development-related projects; (ii) advocacy

NGOs, whose primary purpose is to defend or promote a specific cause and who seek to influence policies and practices; and (iii) NGOs that engage in both operational and advocacy activities.

Operational NGOs are those that work in the area of development and empowerment projects, such as providing water and sanitation, building taps or pumps in rural villages, and training workers for skills that make them self-reliant and raise them out of poverty. Examples range from the Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA) to Sulabh International. SEWA has worked in the area of women's empowerment and has helped women become self-reliant. Sulabh International spearheaded a movement to build latrines in rural and urban communities where open fecal matter created health and sanitation problems.

Since the 1980s, many NGO groups across the country have moved in the direction of functioning as operational NGOs with the help of donor agencies, government funds, and microcredit organizations that have politicized the issue of poverty. Another critical area where operational NGOs have worked is in the prevention of HIV/AIDS and disaster management. India suffers from floods and droughts every year, and many NGOs are pressed into service during their aftermath. The NGO sector, in fact, has always been in the forefront of providing recovery, relief, and rehabilitation after natural calamities and disasters. One example was the NGOs' enormous response in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. These actions of the NGO sector have compelled the government to seek assistance from NGO groups in developing, coordinating, and implementing new health and disaster management policies.

Another area where operational NGOs have assumed importance is in conservation and maintaining good water quality and biodiversity. Under the pressures of rapid industrialization, a rapid increase in population, and anthropogenic activities, biodiversity, human life, and ecological resolve are threatened. Both surface and groundwater resources are deteriorating and polluted with chemicals and other hazardous agents. Supplying clean drinking water, in fact, is one of the greatest challenges in the world today. There are grave threats to biodiversity, and animal species are dying and becoming extinct each day. The Center for Science and Environment, Eco Friends, Tarun Bharat Sangh, and World Wild Life Fund for Nature are NGOs that operate in these areas. They are trying to bring about awareness and induce people to take up measures for the protection of nature and the environment. Saving turtles, crocodiles, tigers, deer, lions, salmon, tree ferns, and many other species of plants and animals form their agenda.

Advocacy and activist NGOs are those that lobby for a cause and defend certain rights of the people that are being violated by government policies. They do not function in project management and development but mainly work toward raising awareness of an issue through protests, public rallies, and the media. Many of the recent NGO protests have been related to large dam and development projects where the government has left many people displaced without an adequate rehabilitation policy. There have also been movements for the protection of land and forests, like the Bhoodan Movement and Chipko Andolan. More recently, with

the rise of neoliberalism and globalization, large corporations have moved in to control the water supply. Several organizations, like the Plachimada in Kerala, the Research Foundation for Science Technology and Ecology, and the Paani Morcha in Delhi, have taken up the cause against the backdoor privatization of water. One of the most successful social movements was the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) movement, which fought for the rights of tribal people displaced by the large Sardar Sarovar Dam being built across the Narmada River near Navagam, Gujerat. Strong interventions by the NBA and other NGOs have forced the government to take up these issues more seriously and draft a rehabilitation policy. The NGO interventions in these issues has remained very strong, and, in some cases, they have forced a change in government policy and planning.

NGOs have also done pioneering work in the area of women's rights. In a largely traditional society like India's, women have been subject to discrimination, torture, dowry deaths, and multiple forms and contexts of domination. The women's movement began in the 1970s and has since made great strides in the protection of women's rights, with special reference to discrimination at work and at home and to unequal wages and domestic labor. The most important success of this movement was a 33 percent reservation for women in the Panchayats—the local-level bodies for village administration. This demand was further taken to Parliament, and in March 2010 the Rajya Sabha passed a bill for a 33 percent reservation for women in Parliament and in state legislatures. It still, however, awaits passage in the lower house, the Lok Sabha.

NGOs have their own strengths and weaknesses. Some of the major strengths have been their direct networking with local people. Given their work in the hinterland, they possess a much better sense of the issues on the ground than do the politicians hundreds of miles away; their strong field-based experiences can be incorporated into government policies. They are participatory in their approach and engage with the community and the state, forming a link between the two. The government's enactment of the right to information has opened new opportunities for NGOs in government planning and operations. The NGO Parivartan used this right of information to expose the World Bank's intervention in the tendering process for a water-distribution plant.

Most NGOs lack the visibility and importance that should be accorded to organizations of this nature. They are not central to the policy-making process and are generally successful mainly in small-scale interventions. In spite of their contributions, NGOs are limited in their financial and institutional capacity. In some cases an NGO may have between 2 and 5 employees; estimates are that about 5 percent have between 6 and 10 employees, and only about 8.5 percent (1 in every 12) NGOs employ more than 10 people. While funds are a constant source of concern, the accountability of these funds is also a serious issue. Some NGO workers have started regarding their advocacy as a livelihood rather than a social commitment. In many cases, the search for funds induces them to work for funding agencies. Many NGOs are searching for financial stability lest they perish in the absence of funds. In spite of their low levels of sustainability, there is an

upsurge in the number of NGOs, and the sector has assumed a strong base. Their role as agents of social change has become exceedingly important. The NGO culture has changed from volunteerism into professionalism, but it still represents a vibrant civil society and citizens' democracy in action.

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See also Asian Development Bank; Central Banking, Development Aspects; Economy; Environment; Feminism; Financial Institutions, Development; World Bank, Relations with

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✦ NONRESIDENT INDIANS AND PERSONS OF INDIAN ORIGIN

Nonresident Indian (NRI), or *Pravasi Bharatiya*, is the term used for an individual who was born in India and has Indian citizenship but who lives abroad. The term can be used for an Indian citizen who has taken up employment or is studying overseas but who aims to return to India. Every year, on January 7–9, the government recognizes the contributions made by NRIs at an event known as *Pravasi Bharatiya Divas* (Nonresident Indian Day). The dates are significant, as January 9, 1915, is the date that Mahatma Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948) returned to India from South Africa. The event was established in 2003. It is sponsored by the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA) and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), and NRIs who have made a significant contribution in their field or profession are recognized. Since 2006 there has been a branch of the *Pravasi Bharatiya Divas* in Europe.

The term NRI is often replaced by Person of Indian Origin (PIO) as people become citizens in their newly adopted countries. There are several other terms in addition to PIO, including expatriate Indian, overseas Indian, member of the Indian diaspora, and *pardesi*. In order to obtain PIO status one must apply for a PIO card, show evidence of a link to India, and pay a fee. The term PIO is an official status given by the government to those foreign nationals (with the exception of those living in Bangladesh and Pakistan) who have held an Indian passport, can trace their ancestry to India up to their great-grandparents, or are the spouse of a citizen of India or PIO. The benefits of having a PIO card include visa-free entry into India during the period of validity of the PIO card, exemption from registering with the authorities if the stay in India is less than six months, and the right to acquire, hold, transfer,

and dispose of immovable properties in India, except for agricultural or plantation property. PIO cardholders are not, however, allowed to vote in Indian elections.

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See also Diaspora, Indian; Diaspora in the United Kingdom; Diaspora in the United States

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✦ NORTHEASTERN STATES

Spread over an area of 158,500 square miles, the northeastern states (NES) of India, commonly referred to as northeastern India, comprise the seven states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura. Tenuously linked with the Indian mainland by a narrow stretch of land 13 miles in width, the region remained, as a result of British colonial policy, relatively isolated, physically and culturally, until 1950, a trend that allowed an internal homogeneity of sorts to develop.

The region is a combination of lowlands on the one hand, and of plateaus, hills, and mountains on the other, in a 3:7 ratio. Elevation varies from 96 to 426 feet in the former, and from 2,622 to 9,840 feet in most parts of the latter. Topography varies sharply along the northern reaches of Arunachal Pradesh, where elevation ranges from 13,000 to 26,082 feet. In the remaining parts of the region, topographic variation, and also elevation, is much lower. In the Meghalaya-Karbi plateau, the elevation ranges from 3,937 to 5,577 feet in general, barring the Shillong peak that reaches 6,433 feet; similar differences in relative relief along the eastern hills are far lower than the northern parts of Arunachal.

The climate is a blend of cold, humid monsoon in areas above the 6,500-foot contour line; wet subtropical in southern stretches of Arunachal, western Nagaland, Mizoram, and Manipur; and humid mesothermal monsoonal in the valley and plateau areas. Rainfall, copious throughout the region, is torrential in stretches like the Cherrapunji-Mawsynram-Pnursula belt of southern Meghalaya bordering Bangladesh; and in Cherrapunji more than 354 inches annually is a routine occurrence. In the rest of the region, average annual precipitation ranges from 39 inches to more than 157 inches, with about 60 percent being concentrated during the monsoon season of June to October.

Against such a backdrop, luxuriant tropical vegetation ranging from alpine, subtropical pine, and montane to tropical wet evergreen, semi-evergreen, and moist deciduous thrives, making the territory a global biodiversity hotspot. Forests are central to the region in terms of its economy and timber trade, tourism, and wildlife resorts, and shifting cultivation in the hill areas is closely interwoven with the region's forest wealth. The NES accounts for more than a quarter of India's area under forest, while covering only 7.7 percent of the country's total geographical area.

For the region as a whole, the forest cover stood at 54 percent of the total area in 1993 and increased to 66 percent in 2005, although doubts have been expressed over official data. Official reports state that forest cover varies between 80.9 percent (of the total geographical area) in Arunachal Pradesh, to 35 percent in Assam, with the other states placed between 76 percent in Manipur to 88.6 percent in Mizoram.

However, only 6.8 percent of forests in the region belong to the very dense category, and many protected areas are largely bereft of forest cover. Forest areas under state control are of three types: National Parks (NP), Wildlife Sanctuaries (WLS), and Reserved Forests (RF), in order of declining levels of protective enforcement and increasing levels of encroachment, settlement, and illegal logging. During 1993, 33.7 percent of the forest area was under RF, 14 percent was under NPs and WLSs, and the lion's share of 59.7 percent was under the "unclassified" category, the latter being almost entirely under community control in the hill areas, where autonomous councils administer the forest areas. In such community-owned areas, tribal communities decide matters such as the area to be brought under cultivation or the quantity of bamboo to be extracted for sale at paper mills; in some instances communities revere certain forests as sacred groves (SGs) that are often quite well preserved. Among the numerous community-protected SGs, the Mawphlang grove north of Shillong has been particularly well preserved for several generations.

Several Protected Areas (PAs), such as NPs, WLSs, and RFs, dot the landscape. With the opening up of the region with the coming of the British in the early 19th century and the years following the Treaty of Yandaboo in 1826, the forest wealth declined gradually and consistently. PAs today remain the last bastion for many of the region's rich flora and fauna species. The NPs in particular attract many domestic and international tourists, with the Kaziranga and Manas NPs being well-known tourist destinations. The former is a World Heritage Site and is rated as a conservation success story. It boasts of several species, such as the great one-horned rhinoceros, Indian tiger, wild Asiatic water buffalo, and swamp deer.

The population composition of the NES is marked by a bewildering ethnic diversity unparalleled elsewhere in India and perhaps by few corners of the world. Although at first glance seven states based on linguistic differences seem to portray a fair degree of ethnic homogeneity, the truth is that within individual states marked ethnic diversities flourish. Thus, in Nagaland more than 20 major tribes each speak different dialects, whereas in excess of 200 tribes exist in Arunachal Pradesh. In certain pockets of Assam bordering the other states, tribes such as the Hmars, the Kukis, the Paites, the Zemi Nagas, and the Dimasas exist side by side. The inaccessibility of the area, prompted by a difficult terrain, hindered communication, and spatial interaction and intermingling in the recent past have allowed diverse cultural groups to flourish.

However such ethnic diversities have not always meant peaceful coexistence, and interethnic rivals fighting over few economic resources have often been the region's bane, with the result that ethnic conflict has claimed many lives. Conflict-induced displacement in different corners of the NES at different points of time has been a frequent occurrence. In Assam's

Kokrajhar District, it is estimated that in excess of 250,000 persons were displaced as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) following conflicts between the Boros and the Santhals from 1996 to 1998. While the Boros are a plains tribe that inhabits large areas of Assam on the north bank of the Brahmaputra River, the Santhals were imported from the Chota Nagpur Plateau areas (present-day Jharkhand) during the 19th century to work the tea plantations of Assam.

In recent decades conflicts have not infrequently occurred between indigenous tribes, the Assamese, and cross-border international immigrants. The porous international border has allowed large numbers of undocumented illegal migrants to enter the NES, and Assam in particular. The Supreme Court in a 2005 judgment termed the waves of illegal migration flows as demographic aggression. However, since there are a slew of contentious issues at stake, very little has been achieved to resolve the issue.

The NES has a population density of 93 persons per square mile, less than half the 194 persons per square mile density in India as a whole. There are, however, sharp contrasts in density within the seven states. Assam and Tripura have densities above 186 persons per square mile, compared to 8 and 24 persons per square mile in Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram respectively. The states of Manipur, Meghalaya, and Nagaland possess a density of around 60. The population densities of the NES reflect the nature of the terrain and the availability of valley land.

In terms of size, the states in descending order are Arunachal Pradesh (52,035 square miles), Assam (48,739 square miles), Meghalaya (13,936 square miles), Manipur (13,873 square miles), Mizoram (13,720 square miles), Nagaland (10,301 square miles), and Tripura (6,515 square miles). In terms of population size, the states in descending order are Assam, Tripura, Meghalaya, Manipur, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh, and Mizoram.

Although it has a low-density tract in comparison to the Indian average, the NES does not lag behind the country's aggregate in terms of the rate of population growth. On the contrary, the NES recorded a decadal population growth rate of 21.86 percent to that of 21.54 percent recorded by India as a whole. All the states, barring Assam and Tripura, grew faster than the average Indian growth rate during 1991–2001. Nagaland, with a growth rate of 64.46 percent, recorded the highest growth rate among all the states during the past decade.

In spite of this rapid growth during 1991–2001, northeastern India remains more rural than any other part of India. The proportion of urban population at 18.08 percent is considerably lower then the 27.82 percent norm in 2001. Interestingly, the relatively larger demographic states of Assam and Tripura had lower urban populations of 12.9 and 17 percent respectively than did their demographically smaller neighboring states.

In terms of sex ratio (the number of females per 1,000 males), the NES with 937 females was very similar to the national average of 933 females. Within the NES, Manipur, Meghalaya, and Tripura had relatively better sex ratios, with 978, 972, and 948 respectively. Among these, Meghalaya follows a matrilineal system, and the status of women in society is very high. This is often remarked upon when female literacy rates are considered.

Agriculture is the economic mainstay of the NES. Generally, subsistence agriculture prevails, although there are marked differences between lowland and highland areas. In the lowland areas wet rice (paddy) cultivation is the norm, and most areas are dependent on the monsoon rains rather than on irrigation. Productivity is not high, although yield levels have improved in recent years. The spread of modern agricultural techniques has been slow, with the mechanization of farms being the exception rather than the rule. However, changes such as cultivation of more than a single paddy crop, the use of high-yielding varieties of seeds, and the use of fertilizers have crept in. Agricultural operations, however, are often disrupted by several waves of floods that burst the banks of the large rivers, the Brahmaputra and the Barak. Although floods damage crops, and crop losses mount to millions of rupees annually, the silt carried and deposited by the annual floodwaters serves to enhance the soil fertility of the alluvial plains. The Brahmaputra flows through the midline of the length of the valley, and its floodwaters extend as broad swaths on its north and south banks. Although much of the valley land is annually replenished by silt, bank erosion caused by the river is an adverse spin off concomitant to flooding.

Agricultural operations in the lowlands thrive year after year with minimal technological input. The floodwaters, coupled with abundant rainfall, ensure that in spite of limited irrigation, satisfactory crop yields are maintained. The main crops, in addition to rice, are jute, tea, rubber, cotton, oilseeds, sugarcane, and potatoes. Fruits include oranges, bananas, grapes, pineapples, passion fruit, areca nuts, coconuts, guavas, mangos, jackfruit, and citrus fruits. In certain localities a wide array of medicinal plants and rare orchids are found.

In the highland areas, shifting cultivation (locally known as *jhum*) is practiced. A diverse range of crops are cultivated in the *jhum* areas. Sometimes 30–40 different crops are cultivated in the same *jhum* plot. Apart from serving to meet the subsistence requirements of the families dependent on *jhum*, growing a multiple mix of crops helps protect these farmers and their families from crop failure and crop-specific pest attacks. As with shifting cultivation in the uplands of Southeast Asia, *jhum* involves a shifting of plots rather than a rotation of crops. This is known as the *jhum* cycle and varies between 2 and 5 years across different areas in the region. In general, there has been a sharp reduction in the *jhum* cycle, and this has rendered the *jhum* system less sustainable, since a longer cycle and longer fallow periods allow for natural regeneration of soil fertility. Compared to the 10- to 20-year cycles in the past, current short cycles, on account of growing population and increased demands on land, have led to a reduction in the viability of the practice and an increase in its deleterious environmental effects. It has been alleged that *jhum* increases loss and aggravates flooding in downstream areas.

Jhum is not merely a method of cultivation in the upland areas of northeastern India. *Jhumming* has several rituals and traditions attached to it. Many of these traditions have been passed down the generations. Symbolic rituals include the sacrifice of chickens to aid in plot selection and in the prediction of the quality of the harvest, and the offering of prayers to appease spirits and ward off evil. Harvest operations, which are carried out using human power, are often a community affair marked by much gaiety and camaraderie. Partaking of rice beer and community feasting often mark such occasions and are a part and parcel of the

jhum economy. While the use of draft animals, either a pair of cows or buffaloes, to plow the land is the norm in lowland agriculture, in contrast, minimal tools and a primitive dibbling stick and seeds sown using the broadcast method are standard practice. However, there are exceptions, and in certain areas, Nagaland in particular, an intricate system of terraced hillslopes is used to cultivate paddies in the absence of level land. Elsewhere in the Aratani plateau, near Ziro in Arunachal Pradesh, a unique indigenous system of irrigation developed over several generations transfers water from one rice field to another.

Beyond subsistence agriculture is the tea plantation economy in Assam. Initiated by the British, the Assam tea plantations continue to be a profitable venture. One of the effects has been the mushrooming of small tea growers in Assam as well as in the other nearby states. Small growers make use of the factories in larger tea gardens to process their tea leaves, since economies of scale inhibit them from making investments in factories and the machinery involved. To handle the tea output the Gauhati Tea Auction Center (GTAC) was set up in 1970 at Guwahati. Currently the GTAC is the largest auction center in the world in terms of the amount of crush, tear, and curl tea (black tea) handled. The method of processing black tea is also known as cut, twist, and curl.

The NES exhibit lower levels of development compared to the rest of India. The NES's contribution to the country's total industrial output is less than 2 percent. In terms of agriculture, only nominal amounts of surplus are generated, and the bulk of production remains confined to meeting subsistence requirements. To counter this, planning attempts have sought to boost less-developed areas like northeastern India. Special considerations have been given to the region in three ways: through the transfer of resources under planning assistance, through transfer of revenue resources, and by way of financial-institution investments in central public-sector undertakings (CPSU).

Under various Five-Year Plans, through the allocation of funds, a balanced regional development was attempted. From the Fourth Plan (1974–1978) onward, concerted efforts to boost the less-developed NES were made. For the developed states, 30 percent of plan assistance was provided in the form of grants and 70 percent in the form of loans, whereas for the NES the breakdown was 90 percent as grants and 10 percent as loans. Preferential treatment has been given in allocating funds to certain states in the NES, termed Special Category States (SCS), and these states were given better allocation of funds vis-à-vis the average. However, considering the low base level of development, such preferential treatment did not translate to improved levels of development and the amelioration of regional disparities. The Shukla Committee Report observed that in the infrastructure sector alone a staggering investment to the tune of 180 billion rupees (1 U.S. dollar = 50 rupees) was needed to bring the NES to par with the rest of India.

Apart from resource transfer under the Five-Year Plans, the transfer of revenue resources by the Finance Commissions (FCs) also sought to lessen inequalities between states. However, in this respect as well, the avowed policy was not always followed while disbursing funds. The first few FCs, from the first FC (1957–1962) until the ninth FC (1990–1995), did not fund the

NES favorably. The tenth FC (1995–2000) was distinctly favorable toward the NES in terms of the sharing of income tax revenues. In this context, the more money a state receives relative to its population numbers, the more the federal contribution is considered progressive. In terms of the sharing of union excise duties, the FC devolutions were progressive for the NES. From the eighth FC onward, economic backwardness became an important factor in allocating funds to states, and the NES, as a poor region by national standards, benefited accordingly.

A third dimension to funding development has been the role of financial institutions, the direction of flow of foreign direct investments (FDIs), and the distribution of assets of CPSUs. In this respect as well the NES did not benefit in a substantial manner, and tangible results did not accrue. Generally, low levels of infrastructure development have been a constricting factor.

Thus, in spite of efforts to reduce regional disparities and boost levels of development, the NES have lagged behind the development ladder. This has meant limited employment opportunities for the growing population, and stunted development has indirectly led to insurgency, militancy, and extortionist tendencies. There have been several demands for the creation of new states and even demands for secession from the Indian Union. While peace has ultimately prevailed in states like Mizoram and Nagaland, small (and not so small) pockets of dissent remain in Manipur, Nagaland, and Assam. In Manipur, in particular, there are numerous small groups of dissidents that have frequently tested state and union government resolve. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) is a much contested act. It has been in operation in Manipur for the past eight years, and it gives the armed forces draconian powers; several instances of human rights violations have been alleged.

The NES has potential wealth from water stemming from the mighty rivers that crisscross it, particularly in Arunachal Pradesh and to a lesser extent in the other NES states. It is estimated that 40 percent of the country's total hydro potential lies with the NES. However, of this less than 2 percent has thus far been harnessed. It remains the case that the NES is India's powerhouse of tomorrow. In terms of existing power sources, oil and natural gas are one of its assets, and the region boasts of refineries at Digboi, Bongaigaon, Gauhati, and Numaligarh, of which the former is more than a century old. The NES has an estimated 500 billion cubic feet of natural gas reserves, and they are largely in Assam, Tripura, and Nagaland. They are capable of generating 3,000 megawatts for 30 years.

Other areas in which the NES has excellent resources are in coal, uranium, ethnic handicrafts, horticulture, fruit processing, agro-based industries, and ecotourism. In all, the land holds a great deal of potential, and its wealth is slowly unfolding as India increasingly pays attention to this far-flung region.

ANUP SAIKIA

See also Arunachal Pradesh; Assam; Economy; Meghalaya; Mizoram; Nagaland; National Rural Employment Guarantee Act

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O



Offshoring *See* Outsourcing and Offshoring

✦ ORIENTALISM

Orientalism is the name given to a particular kind of approach to the Orient (including India, where the argument has been particularly well received and has many adherents) and to things Oriental as put forward by Edward Said (1935–2003) in his book *Orientalism* (1978). Said argued that the domination of the Orient by the West had been sustained by a literature developed especially since the 18th century that represented the Orient in a particular way. This literature, he wrote, represented the East repeatedly as an exotic, subhuman "Other." Over the course of two centuries of reiteration and self-reference, this created a body of work that came to be accepted as one of systematic knowledge about the Orient.

Said believed that this literature was not an innocent misrepresentation of the Orient but intead was a cultural apparatus that operated "as representations usually do, for a purpose, according to a tendency, in a specific historical, intellectual, and even economic setting." Through analyses of literature on the Orient, he argued that this knowledge was produced in situations of unequal power and was mostly a prejudice serving political ends. Said enumerated four currents in 18th-century thought—expansion, historical confrontation, sympathy, and classification—upon which the intellectual and institutional structures of Orientalism were based. As evidenced in travelogues, novels, scholarly texts, and letters, he believed that the West constructed a discourse about the Orient that explained the East's differences in

terms that were in accordance with Western standards and therefore judgmental. This made it possible to comprehend and consequently reject practices that were essentially different as belonging to an earlier rung of civilization that the West had already climbed. If one believed in this framing of the Orient, it was then acceptable and even desirable that the lands of the East should be subjugated and ruled by the so-called superior West.

SIPRA MUKHERJEE

See also Asiatic Society of Bengal; Asiatic Society of Mumbai; Postcolonial Studies

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✦ ORISSA

Among states in the Indian Union, Orissa—Odhisha after March, 2011—ranks 12th in population and 10th in area. It is a maritime state with a coastline of 249 miles along the Bay of Bengal. Orissa covers an area of 60,199 square miles and has a population of 367 million. The state is surrounded by West Bengal, Bihar, and Jharkhand on the north; Andhra Pradesh on the south; the Bay of Bengal on the east; and Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh on the west. Orissa, as a separate state from Bengal, received its exclusive identity as a province of the Oriya-speaking people in 1936 when India was still under British rule. Present-day Orissa consists of 30 districts, 58 subdivisions, 171 *tehsils,* and 314 development blocks.

Orissa has the distinct record of having had an independent dynasty of rulers from the 7th century until the 14th century, after which the province was ruled by the Mughals (1526–1858), the Marathas (1720–1819), and the British (1858–1947). The state is divided into four natural regions: the hilly areas on the north and northwest, the Eastern Ghats, the central and western plateaus, and the coastal plains. The hilly regions on the north and northwest and the central and plateau areas constitute the mineral belt of the state. These areas are regarded as parts of the Vindhya ranges of the Gondwana variety and cover major portions of the districts of Mayurbhanja, Keonjhar, Sundargarh, Bargarh, Angul, Sambalpur, Kalahandi, and Bolangir. The hilly terrain of the coastal regions are not continuous ranges but instead are a series of steep rugged ridges separated by precipitous valleys. About three-quarters of the area of Orissa has extensive mountainous regions.

The inhabitants of Orissa are mostly Oriyas, and their mother tongue is Oriya. The state is predominantly a traditional Hindu society, and the political, social, and economic bases of power are provided by the caste Hindus with Lord Jagannath, a form of the Hindu god Vishnu, as the symbol of Oriyan identity.

The dominant castes in contemporary Oriyan society are the Brahmins, Karans, and Khandayats. According to F. C. Bailey, an eminent historian, the Karans of Orissa in general and those of the city of Cuttack, one of the oldest cities in Orissa and its cultural and commercial capital, in particular are clever political operators and occupy almost all of the important political and administrative positions in the state. It is possible to argue that the legitimation of Karan power was derived from the Karans' status of being successors of the famous Gajapati kings of the Suryavamsa Dynasty who ruled over Kalinga (Orissa) and parts of Andhra Prasesh and West Bengal from 1435 until 1541.

Orissa also has a sizable tribal population, which is approximately 22 percent of the total population of the state. The tribes have their own languages depending on whether they are from the Bhuiyan, Savar, Gond, or Kondh tribes. The tribal economy is a subsistence economy and is based mainly on hunting, gathering, and fishing or a combination of hunting and gathering with shifting cultivation. The lifestyle among the tribes is not an easy one, and their problems are compounded due to land alienation, the perennial issue of indebtedness, antiquated agricultural practices, seasonal migration patterns, and the fact that the tribal members are largely uneducated. However, tribal peoples in some areas also benefit from their association with the Durga Puja, an important Hindu festival. The small village of Rameswapur in Orissa claims to hold the oldest Durga Puja on record. In spite of their marginal status and their migratory patterns, the tribes have fully taken part in the electoral process of the state. Sometimes they have been manipulated by different political parties,



Fishermen remove fish from their nets on a sandy beach in Orissa. India has many spectacular beaches and a huge fishing industry. (Jeremy Richards/Dreamstime.com)

while at other times they have been represented by their political mouthpiece, the Jharkhand Party, which has pockets of influence and has even decided the political fortunes of parties in power. The demands by a vociferous section of the tribal leaders for increased autonomy have added new political dimensions to regional rivalry in the state. These developments sit well with the demands for rural representation and a voice in the politics in state institutions and simultaneously in the mass political mobilization marked by an increasingly effective tribal organization.

Orissa has had a history of successfully managing the integration of princely states into its fold. Politically, Orissa originally consisted of only six districts but has included 26 Gadjats or Indian native states as well. Due to the efforts of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (1875–1950), home minister, deputy prime minister, minister of information and broadcasting, and, most importantly with regard to the princely states, minister of the states from 1947 until his death; and Dr. Harekrushna Mahatab (1899–1987), chief minister of Orissa during 1946–1950 and 1956–1961, the princely states finally agreed to sign the Instruments of Accession on December, 14, 1947, whereby they became part of India rather than semi-independent states and merged into Orissa's administrative structure on January, 1, 1948. On January 26, 1950, the day when India became a republic, the territorial map of Orissa was redrawn to include 13 districts. The government of J. B. Patnaik (b. 1927), which was in power for most of the 1980s and 1990s (Patnaik was chief minister during 1980–1989 and 1995–1999), had also taken some steps to create additional centers of administrative zones to benefit the people residing in the western and southern parts of Orissa. His son, Naveen Patnaik (b. 1946), the founder of the Biju Janata Dal party, was sworn in as the chief minister of Orissa after the elections of 2000 and won reelection in both 2004 and 2009. His victory is largely due to his image as an incorruptible politician and because he has attracted various companies to invest in Orissa's mineral belt.

In spite of development in industrialization, urbanization, communications, and education, Orissa still lags behind most of the other states of the Indian Union. There have been vociferous demands for the federal government to allocate more funds to the state as a special case, as a majority of Orissa's population lives below the poverty line. As Orissa moves toward modernization, conflicts arise with those propounding more traditional values. This clash of the traditional with the modern reflects the dynamism of Orissa's body politic. In March 2011, the 113th Amendment to the Indian Constitution changed the name to Odisha.

MOHAMMED BADRUL ALAM

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✦ OUTSOURCING AND OFFSHORING

Outsourcing involves contracting part of a business's activities to another domestic or international firm, while offshoring involves shifting a business activity to another country while keeping it within the same company. In both cases the primary intentions are the same: to save on costs, to complement other objectives such as increasing market share, and ultimately to increase profits through the ability to offer lower prices to consumers. Dealing with the business process and the supply chain complexity is the other key aim of outsourcing. In industry jargon, outsourcing (and offshoring) consists of business process outsourcing (BPO) and covers information technology (IT) software development and the IT services element, while another form of BPO—covering human resources (HR), finance, insurance, health, and after-sales call-center customer service—is referred to as information technology enabled services (ITES).

While outsourcing is currently famous through IT and other services, both of which India is known for as the most renowned destination, outsourcing began in earnest in the 1980s in the United States (in manufacturing) as the tool for realizing lean businesses, concentrating on a single or small set of products, as an alternative to the old conglomerate business model. The lean concept evolved further to use outsourcing to remove core processes from businesses to be subcontracted. Companies could then pick and choose among subcontractors to get ever-lower costs. While this reduced traditional costs and risk, it gave rise to a new set of costs and risks.

Outsourcing in India consists of IT (i.e., software and programming); traditional IT outsourcing, such as the remote management of whole systems and the beginnings of research and development; business back-office and front-office tasks and services (e.g., business administration and call centers); and manufacturing (e.g., clothing). Of these, IT and business back-office and front-office tasks and services are, at present, the most significant for India, all of which grew exponentially after 1995 compared to manufacturing, which has grown very slowly. As sectoral percentages of national income (gross domestic product [GDP]) for 1999–2000, all manufacturing constitutes 14.7 percent, with 11 percent of total employment, with finance, insurance, and real estate services and business services (including IT) being 13 and 1.2 percent, respectively. In 2005 the estimated contribution of IT offshoring and outsourcing to the Indian GDP for 2007–2008 was 7 percent, with an estimated workforce of approximately 1.5 million for that period and 2.23 million in 2009 (total employment in IT and BPO-ITES was said to be 4 million in 2008). The United States represents 60 percent of Indian IT and BPO-ITES activity. Total



Hewlett-Packard employees work at the company's business process outsourcing call center in Bangalore, Karnataka, August 2007. India's high-tech outsourcing industry is one of the largest in the world. (AP Photo/Aijaz Rahi)

services exports (which includes IT) increased in value from $5 billion to $60 billion from 1990 to 2006. Over the same period textile exports (which include clothing) increased from about $2 billion to about $8 billion. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has also been similarly muted. The IT and BPO-ITES industries are concentrated in the city of Bangalore in Karnataka but are also located in Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, and the more familiar cities of Mumbai (Bombay), Delhi, and Kolkotta (Calcutta). As of 2009, 7 Indian IT and BPO-ITES companies are in the top 15 global firms: HCL (India), Oracle, Xerox, Infosys (India), Accenture, IBM Global, Ciber (India), Cap Gemini, Genpact (India), Hewlett Packard-EDS, CSC, Cognizant (India), Intelligroup, Igate (India), and Patni (India).

The well-known success of Indian IT and business back-office and front-office tasks and services outsourcing resulted from low costs and low wages paid to workers and from the high quality of an elite segment of university graduates, specifically from the seven Indian institutes of technology and the six Indian institutes of management. This also resulted from English as India's second language; a history of sending highly skilled labor to the United States, resulting in cross-cultural and business knowledge familiarity; minimal reliance on India's physical infrastructure; the post-1991 Indian liberalization of the economy; and a strategic labor supply shortage in the United States of identically skilled IT labor. The acute IT shortage of engineers in the late 1990s that resulted from the Y2K software year "00" digit

problem gave the final push that established Indian IT outsourcing internationally, which has resulted in the terms "Bangalored" or "Bangalore it."

By 2009, constraints on the further expansion of the sector had become a concern, as indicated by articles such as "The Coming Death of Indian Outsourcing." The Indian cost advantage of one to six (which at present is one to three) is in part a result of increasing salaries and a limited labor supply. Salary growth is around 15 percent per year, and if this growth continues, the cost ratio will be one-to-one by 2015. Only a fraction of India's large number of university graduates are suited to international work, hence the labor supply problem, and large numbers continue to emigrate.

Manufacturing's poor performance, particularly in the labor-intensive subsectors involved in outsourcing apparel (clothing), is in considerable measure due to the legacy of industrial restrictions referred to as the licence Raj as well as ongoing excessive labor regulations (to fire workers in companies with more than 100 workers, the state government's permission must be obtained). The industrial licensing and restrictions system operates as follows. Certain products—socks, for example—as of 2005 are permitted for manufacture only by small firms. India's clothing industry is therefore contrasted with those in China, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, where companies often employ thousands of workers under a single roof, while such companies in India remain small, frequently consisting of shops with fewer than 50 tailors. While clothing is a leading Indian outsourced export, the small export size, when compared to Bangladesh's much smaller workforce, indicates the effect of India's policy-induced economic constraints. The result is low productivity, low quality, and excessive pressure to reduce costs given a company's need to remain small. This leads to byzantine supply chains through subcontracting of subcontracting in order to meet deadlines that initial subcontractors cannot meet. The end result is the regular use of heavily exploited adult labor and incentives to use child labor in unregistered companies. A minimum estimate places child labor numbers at around 10 million. Western outsourcing firms find it very difficult to monitor this atomistic subcontractor supply chain structure, leading to consumer boycott risks due to repeated exposure of exploitative working conditions by journalists. Improved prospects for clothing sector outsourcing rests with the Indian government, dramatically speeding up the de-reserving of restricted goods that only began in 1997. As of 2005 some 600 goods were still restricted to production by small businesses. By January 2007 this was down to 239.

RISTO HÄRMÄ

See also Economy; Globalization; Indian Institutes of Technology; Special Economic Zones

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P



✦ PAKISTAN, RELATIONS WITH

India-Pakistan relations suffer from one of the longest ongoing conflicts in the world. The two nations have been involved in financial, military, and diplomatic disputes since India became independent and Pakistan was created in August 1947. The two countries have fought three major wars (1947–1948, 1965, and 1971) and one small-scale conflict (1999) and have frequently exchanged cross-border shots and barrages along the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir. Violent clashes have led to a whole host of differences, and mistrust between the two rivals has grown. For one reason or another, the gulf separating the two states continues to grow.

Understanding the events of the recent past helps us to understand the contemporary relations between India and Pakistan and possible future impacts as well. Throughout the 1990s, both countries were engaged in a series of dialogues to resolve outstanding disputes, in particular the long-lasting conflict over Kashmir. However, the talks ended in stalemate in 1998 when India demonstrated its nuclear capability and became a nuclear power. Soon after that in May 1998, due to enormous political pressure in Pakistan, the Pakistan Muslim League administration of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (b. 1949; prime minister 1990–1993, 1997–1999) conducted five consecutive nuclear tests in Baluchistan Province. As a result of this nuclear arms race, according to one estimate India had 60–70 nuclear warheads, and Pakistan possesses roughly 60 nuclear warheads. Concerns were thus heightened between May and July 1999 when India and Pakistan engaged in another small-scale conflict in Kashmir, the Kargil Conflict. Realizing the danger and the horrendous consequences of a nuclear exchange between the two countries, New Delhi and Islamabad exchanged details of their

nuclear facilities in January 2009 as per the Agreement on the Prohibition of Attacks against Nuclear Installations and Facilities, which both countries signed in Islamabad.

The conflict has affected the potential for bilateral trade between India and Pakistan as well as trade conducted under the auspices of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), founded in 1985, of which both India and Pakistan are members. The South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) created by SAARC is designed to enhance intraregional trade on the subcontinent. In 2007 bilateral trade was only $1.7 billion, which is much below the target of $10 billion set by SAARC. The volume of illegal trade between India and Pakistan is estimated to be $1.5 billion. Bilateral trade is only likely to reach its full potential once Pakistan gives India most favored nation (MFN) status, but this has not happened, and the MFN issue continues to be a major bone of contention between New Delhi and Islamabad.

The peace process has been an intermittent one, and in the recent past the only worthwhile development was in the form of the Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue. The dialogue was initiated in 2004 to explore solutions to a wide range of issues, such as the Kashmir dispute, the Sir Creek issue, the Wullar Barrage Project/Tulbul Navigation Project, terrorism and drug trafficking, economic and commercial cooperation, and promotion of friendly exchanges in various other fields. The process of the dialogue also suffered from a yearlong pause in 2007; it was restarted in May 2008 with a ministerial-level review of the fourth round of the dialogue. Even with tension in bilateral relations over the issue of a terrorist attack on the Indian embassy in Kabul on July 7, 2008, both countries moved on with the fifth round of the dialogue the same month. However, the dialogue made little progress because the controversial issue of cross-border terrorism was at the center stage of negotiations and could not be resolved.

The Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue has often been criticized for not producing results. However, a number of confidence-building measures have been agreed:

- In October 2005 an agreement was reached whereby both countries would inform the other with at least three days' notice before testing ballistic missiles within 25 miles of the international boundary and the LOC.
- The Memorandum of Understanding of June 2004 required measures to reduce the risk of accidental unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, and a nuclear hotline was set up to connect the foreign secretaries of both countries.
- To avoid the arrest of innocent fishermen who have strayed into each country's territorial waters, there is a hotline being created for better communications between the naval agencies of both countries.
- An important feature of the Composite Dialogue is the expansion of transportation linkages between India and Pakistan. The New Delhi–Lahore bus services was established in 1999, but by 2010 there were four other available bus routes: Srinagar-Muzaffarabad, Pooch-Rawalakot, Amritsar-Nankana Sahib, and Amritsar-Lahore.

> The bus service between New Delhi and Lahore now runs three times a week, indicating the number of passengers desiring to travel between the two cities. In addition, there are two available train links: the Samjhota Express (between Amritsar and Lahore) and the Thar Express (between Munabao and Khokhrapar). There are now 12 flights connecting New Delhi and Mumbai in India with Lahore and Karachi in Pakistan. In 2008, both countries reached an agreement to expand the air routes and connect Chennai with Islamabad.

Nonetheless, the menace of terrorism has greatly constrained the peace process, and on several occasions the countries were on the verge of war due to cross-border terrorism. For example, relations were at their lowest level after an attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, by the Muslim terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Good), founded in 1990, and Jaish-e-Mohammed (Army of Mohammed or Army of the Prophet), founded in 2000, and a series of bomb blasts in Mumbai in July 2006 and later in November 2008. Both countries have understood the need to cooperate in fighting terrorists on both sides of the border, and for that purpose they are discussing the viability of a Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism (JATM) between India and Pakistan. In addition, the member states of SAARC, including India and Pakistan, have launched the SAARC Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk (STOMD) in Colombo, Sri Lanka, as a result of the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, which was signed in Katmandu, Nepal, in 1987. There are also talks going on at SAARC to launch a regional police organization similar to the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), first established in 1923.

ZAHID SHAHAB AHMED

See also Foreign Policy; South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

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✦ *PANCHAYAT* SYSTEM AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Implementing and designing poverty alleviation policies with the people's participation forms a key feature of the *panchayat* system of decentralized governance in India. Article 40 of the Indian Constitution directs the government to establish *panchayats* ("councils of five") to serve as institutions of local self-government, of which the elected village council (*gram panchayat*) is the basic unit. A *gram panchayat* includes between 1 and 5 revenue villages and a minimum of 20 wards (*chaupals*), and once elected *panchayat* members have a tenure of 5 years. A key element is the Gram Sabhas (the assembly), which is the formal vehicle for people's participation and where the annual report of activities is presented. The Gram Sabhas is open to everyone aged 18 and above. Districts in India are subdivided into *taluqs* or *tehsils*—areas that contain around 200–600 villages—where economic development and social welfare government departments have offices. Within the local governance infrastructure, a block is a large subunit of a district, and in some states blocks are of equal size with *taluqs* or *tehsils*. The district council (*zilla parishad*) is at the top level of the local governance system, and its jurisdiction includes all village and block councils within a district; membership includes the block council chairs.

In 1989 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991; prime minister 1984–1989) tried to enhance the role of *panchayats* in local government and economic development by introducing the Jawahar Employment Plan (Jawahar Rozgar Yojana), which provided funding directly to village councils to create jobs for the unemployed through public works projects. His government proposed the Sixty-Fourth Amendment Bill to make it mandatory for all states to establish a three-tiered (village, block, and district) system of *panchayats* in which representatives would be directly elected for five-year terms. *Panchayats* were to be given expanded authority and funding for local development efforts. Despite the popular appeal of transferring power to *panchayats*, the Sixty-Fourth Amendment Bill was rejected by Parliament, and in 1992 it was the 73rd and 74th amendments to the Indian Constitution that led to the constitutional status of *panchayats* as the third level of governance. Above this basic framework, most states in India have added other features to their *panchayat* legislation and have developed state-specific methods of local governance. These programs are undertaken not only by state governments but also by nongovernmental organizations, women's groups, self-help groups, and other political and grassroots activist organizations. Although the 73rd Amendment states that one-third of *panchayat* seats should be reserved for women, with a similar number for people from Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (depressed classes or untouchable or underprivileged classes), actual representation of these groups at the

panchayat level and participation of women and poor households in Gram Sabha meetings is minimal, as social norms continue to dominate. Kerala is the only state in India with a fully functional and structured local government network, where measures for local governance accountability are recognized as a vital factor in effective public sector performance.

SHEEBA HÄRMÄ

See also Cabinet; Constitution; Parliament; President; Prime Minister

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✦ PARLIAMENT

The progressive democratization of politics in Britain took the form of an increasing assertion of control by an elected Parliament over the executive. The chief means by which Parliament usurped the monarch's power of rule over subjects was responsible government. In the same tradition, both the prime minister and the cabinet are subject to control by the Indian Parliament in the regional and central legislatures created by the British during the period of British government control of India (1858–1947). This system has endured in its essential form since India became independent in 1947.

The powers of the Indian Parliament can be divided into legislative, financial, procedural, governmental, constitution-amending, and constitutive powers. Parliament enacts the law of the land, at least in theory. In reality, the legislative agenda is controlled by the government and is rubber-stamped by Parliament with the help of tightly maintained party discipline. If it chooses to act with the government, as is almost always the case, Parliament is all-powerful; if it chooses to act independently of the government, Parliament creates political instability and unpredictability in the affairs of the state. By choosing to act against the executive, Parliament indicates that the government has lost its confidence, and this brings the business of government to a standstill until fresh elections can be held.

The financial powers of Parliament are those empowering it to raise and spend money, including discussion and approval of the annual budget, which is usually introduced in mid-February. Only Parliament has the authority to levy taxes and spend money from the resulting consolidated fund. The procedural powers are those that permit Parliament to make rules for the conduct of its own business. Parliament formally controls the reins of government in that the cabinet is required to have the confidence of the Lok Sabha (the House of the People



Sansad Bhavan, Indian Parliament, New Delhi. Containing the Lower House, the Lok Sabha, the Upper House or Council of States, the Rajya Sabha, and a library, the circular parliament building opened in 1927; it is now a potent symbol of the world's largest democracy. (Shutterstock)

or the lower house of Parliament) and is collectively responsible to Parliament. Parliament is the main body for amending the Indian Constitution. Under its constitutive powers, Parliament can legislate to create or admit new states into the union of India, create a high court for a Union Territory and extend the jurisdiction of a high court to or restrict it from a Union Territory, and create or abolish the upper house for a state with the consent of its lower house.

The Parliament of India is bicameral. Its members are elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage. In the 15th general election in 2009, the number of eligible voters was a staggering 714 million, of whom some 420 million voted. The distribution of seats among the states is roughly in proportion to their population size. Of the 543 elective seats in the 15th Lok Sabha (2009–2014), 413 members of Parliament were in the general category, 81 were from Scheduled Castes (formerly known as untouchables), and 49 were from Scheduled Tribes. Any citizen of India who is at least 25 years old may seek election to the Lok Sabha from a constituency in which he or she has resided for a minimum period of 180 days. In a reserved constituency, only members of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes may run for office, but all adults within the constituency may vote. The two nominated seats are filled by the president with representatives of the Anglo-Indian community.

The system of voting is the single-member constituency, first past the post system. Each constituency is represented by only one member of Parliament in the Lok Sabha. Of those contesting from any constituency, the candidate with the highest number of votes is

declared elected even if the total is well short of a majority. A proportional representation system would be more representative in a mathematically defined version of democracy. However, under Indian conditions (size, diversity, and complexity) this would almost certainly produce chaos.

The conduct of elections is entrusted by the Constitution to an election commission. The chief election commissioner is an independent official appointed by the president under conditions of service resembling those of senior judges. The tasks of the election commission include designing voting forms suitable for Indian conditions, determining the best dates for holding elections, and deciding whether the elections should be held simultaneously on consecutive days or at staggered intervals. The 15th general election was organized in five phases of voting spread over four weeks during April–May 2009.

By and large, the members of Parliament are chosen fairly. While individual seats may have been determined by musclemen or bribes, no general election in India has produced an overall result that was not a fair reflection of voter preferences. With growing consciousness of regional identity, a number of parties have risen to power in states and have formed coalition governments in New Delhi. The last time that a party was elected with an absolute majority in its own right in the Lok Sabha was in 1984.

Required to convene at least twice a year, the Lok Sabha normally meets annually in three sessions. The term of the Lok Sabha is for five years, although in an emergency this may be extended one year at a time but indefinitely. While Parliament may be dissolved and fresh elections held because a government has lost the confidence of the members of the Lok Sabha, the more common occurrence is for a prime minister to time a call for fresh elections with the goal of maximizing personal or party political gains.

The process of legislation involves three stages corresponding to the familiar three readings of bills in the British Parliament: the introduction and consideration of a bill followed by its enactment into law. The first reading consists of the bill being introduced along with an explanation of its aims and purposes. After the second reading a bill may be referred to a select committee, circulated for public response, or taken up for immediate consideration. The most substantial consideration of bills takes place in committee.

Ordinary bills can be introduced in either house, the Lok Sabha or the Rajya Sabha (the Council of States or the upper house of Parliament), and must be passed by both houses before they can be sent to the president. Ordinary bills become law once they have been signed by the president. Money bills can be introduced only in the Lok Sabha ("no taxation without representation"). While they may be taken up for discussion in the Rajya Sabha, the upper house cannot refuse assent to money bills, nor can it frustrate the passage of a money bill by the simple expedient of procrastination. The bill is deemed to have passed if not returned by the Rajya Sabha within 14 days.

The Lok Sabha is fundamentally akin to legislative assemblies in other parliamentary democracies, but the actual daily activity of India's Parliament can be quite different, reflecting its own unique sociopolitical environment.

The Rajya Sabha has 250 members, of whom 238 represent the states and Union Territories; the remaining 12 are nominated by the president acting on the advice of cabinet. Nominated members are chosen on the basis of their special knowledge or skills in the arts and sciences, in order to rectify a serious underrepresentation in Parliament of any particular group, or in an exercise of political patronage to reward party workers or major financial supporters. The distribution of Rajya Sabha seats among states is roughly in proportion to their population strengths, albeit with some effort at equalization.

Rajya Sabha members are elected for six-year terms, with a biennial turnover of one-third of the house. Unlike the Lok Sabha, the upper house is not subject to dissolution. The quorum of the Rajya Sabha is set at one-tenth (i.e., 25 members) of the total membership, with decisions being made by a majority of members actually present and voting. The presiding officer of the Rajya Sabha is the vice president of India.

The opposition in a parliamentary democracy is expected to play the role of an alternative government, complete with a shadow prime minister and cabinet-in-waiting. Because of the large number of political parties in India, the status of the leader of the opposition can be conferred only on the leader of a party that has at least 50 seats in the Lok Sabha. The main purpose of the opposition is to critique government actions and policies. By its existence and voice in Parliament, the opposition expresses the diversity of opinions in a country as large and varied as India. Party discipline ensures that the opposition loses when the votes on any motion are tallied. But statements in Parliament are heard in the country at large and are often listened to within the ranks of the ruling party. This is particularly relevant in a country such as India where the major parties are not sharply distinguished by ideological cleavages. Opposition arguments can resonate within the ruling party and can shape public policy by this indirect means. In turn, this has made the opposition parties in India more influential than would be suggested just by their numbers. In other words, although the debate in Parliament is ostensibly between the government and the opposition, in fact it can serve to structure the internal debate within the ruling party. This has been a distinctive feature of Indian politics.

RAMESH THAKUR

See also Cabinet; Constitution; *Panchayat* System and Local Government; Parliament; Prime Minister

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✦ PARSIS

Parsis are the Indian followers of the Zoroastrian religion who had migrated to the western part of India during the eighth century CE. Today they are a well-settled minority community of approximately 70,000 members who preserve their religious and cultural identity. The Indian Parsis form the majority of and maintain close affiliations with the rest of the Zoroastrian community worldwide. Zoroastrianism, the oldest of the world's monotheistic religions, has influenced Judaism, Christianity, and Islam with its teachings of belief in a single cosmic deity, the struggle between good and evil, and the final day of judgment. Zoroastrianism originated in Iran after the settlement of the Aryans in the region. This led to the development of the traditions of both the Aryans and the indigenous Iranians. The traditional accounts of the Parsis relate that for more than 100 years before the defeat of Sassanian kings at the hands of Arabs in the seventh century, and before landing at the coastal town of Sanjan, Gujarat, Zoroastrians had wandered over various parts of India. The Hindu king Jadi Rana gave them refuge on the condition that the Zoroastrians would peacefully assimilate to the customs, dress, and language of the area. However, Parsis have maintained a strict observance of their faith by discouraging proselytizing. Nonetheless, as a community the Parsis are on the verge of extinction due to falling birthrates and the exclusion of children born to non-Parsi parents. By 2020 the population is expected to fall to 25,000.



Members of the Parsi community interact at a fire temple on the Parsi New Year Navroz in Ahmadabad, Gujarat, August 2009. Parsis, also known as Zoroastrians, are followers of the Persian prophet Zarathustra and first migrated to western India in the eighth century. (AP Photo/AjitSolanki)

The sacred fire, the central icon of the Zoroastrian faith, is regarded as a glowing image of the energy and reverential worth of God, known to the Parsis as Ahura Mazda. Most sacred fires are lit only for the duration of the religious worship. There are, however, many fire temples (*agiaries* or *atesh kadeh*) where the fire is kept burning at all times. Other objects, such as flowers and food, are displayed as symbols of divine creation. Mumbai has 41 fire temples, 4 Parsi cathedrals (*atesh bahrams*), and the Tower of Silence, where the funerary rituals are performed for the community. Since Parsis revere nature and do not want to defile the earth, the sky, or the water, they follow the system known as sky burials. The dead are placed inside a four-walled structure with an open top that exposes the corpses to the natural elements, including the vultures and the carrion crows that devour them.

The other important religious practice of the Parsis is the *navjote*, or initiation ceremony, during which boys and girls between the ages of seven and nine wear a *sudrah* (cotton shirt) and a *kusti* (a cord of 72 threads) around the waist. Like the initiation ceremonies, Parsi marriages are joyous occasions and are celebrated with the consumption of lots of food and drink. The nuptial benediction is offered in Zend, or Middle Persian of southwestern Iran during the Sassanian period, and in the Indian classical language Sanskrit. Parsis are encouraged to lead family lives, and celibacy is proscribed. Hereditary priests perform rites and ceremonies for the community, while the Parsi Panchayat (community government) regulates issues concerning the family and property. In spite of the Parsis having an exclusive cultural identity—the most noticeable acculturative practice is the adoption of the Gujarati language in preference to Persian—the Parsis have successfully immersed themselves into the social and political world of India, particularly in the city of Mumbai, and have played an important role in the legal system and most especially in business, where many Parsis have become exceedingly successful and wealthy. This transformation has been a remarkable one, as the Parsis were first of all a rural-based community but gradually rose to prominence in urban areas through their business acumen and the community's stress on educational achievement. This rise to prominence occurred especially during the colonial period, when they embraced the educational opportunities, including at the higher educational level, offered by the British, most notably at Elphinstone College, Mumbai, which was founded in 1857. The first Indian to be elected to the British House of Commons, in 1892, was a Parsi, Dadabhai Naoroji (1825–1917), who in 1850 was also the first Indian to be appointed a professor at Elphinstone College, his alma mater. The business houses of Tatas, Wadias, and Godrej, among other renowned Parsis corporations, carry forward the business tradition of the Parsis in contemporary India.

FATIMA A. IMAM

See also Mumbai; Religion

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✦ PATNA

Patna, the capital of the state of Bihar, is located on the southern bank of the river Ganges. The city has a long history and derives its name from the word *patan* ("port"). Patna was an important center for inland river trade throughout the course of history. The city was known as Patliputra, Palibothra (as the Greeks called it), Kusumpur, Pushpapura, and Azimabad at different times in history. It was the seat of government for a long period as different empires and dynasties such as Magadha (5th century BCE), Nanda (5th–4th centuries BCE), Maurya (321–185 BCE), Sunga (185–73 BCE), Gupta (320–550 CE), and Pala (750–1174) made it their capital. In the British colonial period (1858–1947), Patna was an important center for the opium and indigo trades for European merchants.

Patna is the largest city of Bihar, has a total area of nearly 68 square miles, and is under the authority of the Patna Municipal Corporation. The city has been divided into 72 municipal wards with a total population of 1.366 million (2001 census). The Patna Municipal Corporation was established on August 15, 1952, in accordance with the Patna Municipal Corporation Act of 1951. The corporation consists of electoral representatives (known as ward councilors) from its 72 wards. These councilors further elect a mayor and an Empowered Standing Committee. Seventy-two wards are joined together in four circles, each administered by an executive officer appointed by the state government. The administration of the corporation is under the direct control of the municipal commissioner.

The city acts as the most significant business as well as the administrative hub of the entire region and receives a floating population of around 200,000 every day. With little industry, the city primarily functions as the service center for administration, health facilities, and education. The few industries include steel casting, cotton mills, warehousing, electronics, and leather and shoes. Altogether, around 250 small-scale industries are listed in and around the city. Around 250,000 people living below the poverty live in the area.

The development of the city has so far been haphazard. A master plan, however, known as the Jawarharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission City Development Plan (2006–2012), was prepared by the Patna Regional Development Authority (a body of the state government of Bihar) to carry out a planned and evenly distributed development of the city. The plan intends to cover the urbanized portion of the Patna Regional Development Authority region of some 145 square miles by including areas of the Patna Municipal Corporation along with its satellite towns Danapur Nagarpalika, Phulwari Sharif Nagarpalika, Danapur Cantonment Area, and Khagaul Nagarpalika.

The plan aims to cover all the major aspects of urban life including water supply, drainage, and sanitation as well as the housing needs of an expanding city. The plan takes into account the seven famous monuments of the city—Agam Kuan, Durakhi Devi Temple, Choiti Patandevei, Begu Hajjam's Mosque, Kamaldah Jain Temple, Gol Ghar, and Har Mandir Takht—at a cost of just over 1 billion rupees.

SADAN JHA

See also Bihar

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✦ PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy in modern India tends to take one of three often overlapping forms: engagement with issues internal to Western philosophy; a reconsideration of traditional Indian thought, especially that of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism, in global contexts through the adaptation of Western philosophical terminology and frameworks; and a reconsideration of Western philosophical concepts in light of traditional Indian thought. This complexity stems from the fact that a separate sphere of philosophy, self-consciously distinguished from religion, is foreign to traditional Indian thought.

The question of whether Indian thought can be considered philosophical was first raised by the German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831). For Hegel, Indian thought cannot be considered philosophical since it remains entangled with religious speculation. Unlike Western philosophy, Indian thought is incapable of pure theory or knowledge for its own sake and is enslaved to religious practice. For Hegel, the concern with the supposed abstract oneness of meditative states discourages the critical self-reflection and independent thought characteristic of Western philosophy and secular modernity. Hegel's disavowal of Indian thought as philosophy accords with his assumption of the uniquely European nature of philosophy and overall vindication of the Enlightenment project. Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), by contrast, considers Indian thought as properly philosophical. Focusing on

early Buddhism and the *Upanishads*, Schopenhauer finds in Indian thought support for his critique of the Enlightenment's claims to detached objectivity and knowledge as pure theory.

These same concerns shape the inquiry of Indians themselves who take up the issue from the mid-19th century under British colonial rule. The question of what philosophy is, whether it is found outside the West and whether there is an Indian form of it, become inseparable from larger reconsiderations of India's intellectual heritage and the engagement of Indian traditions with modernity as part of the development of a distinctly Indian cultural identity. Consequently, Indian philosophy comes to be considered mostly in terms of religions of Indian origin, namely Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism. A concern becomes whether any indigenous concept corresponds to the Western term "philosophy." The most notable candidates found are the Sanskrit *anvīkiki* ("methodological investigation") and *darśana* ("seeing"). Other Sanskrit equivalents invoked are *tattvajñāna* and *tattvavidyā* ("knowledge of reality"). However, while terms for "philosophy" are sought in Sanskrit, philosophizing itself mostly occurs in English. The term "philosophy," in its earliest appropriation in modern India, is thus associated with and made to ensure continuity between a primordial traditional past and a de-localized present anticipating a global future.

Traditionally, *darśana* does not denote philosophy separable from religious practice but rather denotes the view of a particular school, such as in the six schools (*ad-darśana*) of Hinduism. But in the latter half of the 19th century *darśana* became the main equivalent to the term "philosophy," propagated most influentially by the neo-Vedāntin reformer Swāmī Vivekānanda (1863–1902). The understanding of *darśana* as "philosophy" is invoked as an Indian equivalent on a world stage to refer to a universal phenomenon, placing India on equal terms with the West. Yet the visual connotations of *darśana* as "seeing" also come to enable the promotion of a distinctly Indian form of philosophizing. Vivekānanda equates philosophy in India with "clear *seeing*." His neo-Vedāntin successor Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888–1975) refers to it as a "*vision* of truth." The experiential nature of Indian thought is emphasized and is contrasted favorably against Western thought. Thus, the dichotomy employed by Hegel between pure theory/knowledge for its own sake (as found in the West) and speculation subordinated to religious practice and spiritual experience (as found in India) is internalized in formative Indian appropriations of *darśana* as "philosophy." However, the values of the dichotomy are reversed: Western philosophy's concern for knowledge for its own sake and the eschewing of subjectivity are seen as leaving Western philosophy spiritually bereft, as it lacks a lived experiential component. Radhakrishnan's *Indian Philosophy* (1923) exemplifies this, as does Basant Kumar Mallik's (1879–1958) *The Individual and the Group* (1939) and *The Real and the Negative* (1940). This tendency is illustrated by the choice of the poet Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) as the first president of the Indian Philosophical Congress in 1925. The contributions to the first survey of philosophy in modern India, *Contemporary Indian Philosophy* (1936), coedited by Radhakrishnan, also consistently emphasize the distinctly spiritual and experiential nature of Indian philosophizing.

Professional philosophy first occurred at Calcutta University under Bajendranath Seal (1864–1938), the first, in 1899, to refer to comparative philosophy. His colleague Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya (1875–1949) began philosophy proper in India, overcoming the rational-spiritual/theory-practice dichotomy. Bhattacharya's analysis moved beyond mere reconsideration of Indian thought in Western terms, constituting philosophical development in its own right. Responding to the positivist reduction of philosophy to the methods of the natural sciences and the promotion of empirical psychology in the work of Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), Bhattacharya in *The Subject as Freedom* (1930) reworked Immanuel Kant's (1724–1804) transcendental model to develop what Bhattacharya terms "transcendental psychology" as a means of restoring the primacy of intentionality. Bhattacharya seeks to reinstate the place of subjectivity without falling back onto the metaphysical existence of the soul, instead positing the knowing subject as the very knowability of the object. He thus anticipates the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) (whose *Ideas* Bhattacharya encountered in English in 1931). Bhattacharya builds on this to develop an account of subjectivity's alienation from the known object as a mode of freedom as the lived ground to which the will responds. In his posthumous *Studies in Philosophy* (1956), Bhattacharya applies the *rasa* ("taste" or "essence") theory from classical Indian aesthetics to the problem of the sacred in postmetaphysical modernity. Bhattacharya continues the discussion of the nature of philosophy itself, as does his son Kali Das Bhattacharya (1911–1984) in his *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy* (1953). Kali Das Bhattacharya is also notable for his *Philosophy, Logic and Language* (1965) and *The Indian Concept of Man* (1982).

Indian phenomenology as foreshadowed by Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya is furthered by Jarava Lal Mehta (1912–1988) and Jitendra Nath Mohanty (b. 1928). Mehta's *The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger* (1967) highlights the significance of thought of Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) as a culmination of both the phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions of Western philosophy. Mehta's positioning outside of the West, unencumbered by post-Enlightenment Western philosophy's historical unease with religion, allows him to be one of the earliest to identify the religious implications of Heidegger's analysis of language and being for a postmetaphysical reenvisaging of negative theology. This enables an often overlooked continuity to be drawn from Heidegger's earlier focus on radical ontology to his later aesthetic turn. Mehta's *Transcendental Phenomenology* (1989) represents the culmination of his analysis of Heidegger, the phenomenological tradition and its influences on the Deconstructionist movement. Mohanty traces a similar trajectory; however, he takes Husserl's treatment of intentionality as his starting point in *The Concept of Intentionality* (1971), *Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning* (1976), and *Phenomenology* (1997). Both Mehta and Mohanty utilize the insights of phenomenology, especially its emphasis on the historical and cultural embeddedness of subjectivity, to self-critically reflect upon their own position as Indian thinkers working within Western philosophy. They thus develop sophisticated methodologies for undertaking philosophical dialogue across cultures. Mehta, in his *India and the West* (1985)

and posthumous *Philosophy and Religion* (1990), utilizes Heidegger's insights into the ontological (i.e.,"being") itself as a hermeneutic encounter to revisit the place of self-reflection as tradition-bound philosophizing in India. Ironically, Heidegger's concern with the uniquely European origins of philosophy, especially his reconsideration of Plato's conception of *theoria* and the transformative nature of self-knowledge, allows Mehta to reconsider classical Indian thought itself unencumbered by the religion-philosophy/theory-practice dichotomy. Similarly, Mohanty in his *Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought* (1992), *The Self and Its Other* (2000), and *Explorations in Philosophy* (2001) reappraises the assumptions of theory and practice, authority and knowledge, as a basis for rethinking the place of philosophizing in traditional India and modernity.

Representing different extremes of modern Indian philosophy are Bimal Krishna Matilal (1935–1991), Daya Krishna (1924–2007), and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (b. 1942). Matilal brings his training in both the Sanskritic tradition of logic (*tarka*) and mathematical logic under W. V. O. Quine (1908–2000) to bear on reconsiderations of Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain logic in light of modern analytical developments. In *Epistemology, Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis* (1971), *Language, Logic and Reality* (1985), and *Perception* (1986), Matilal pioneers a comparative framework within which to approach analytic philosophy, utilizing this to later engage in issues of ethics and personhood. Krishna, one of the most independent and original of modern Indian thinkers, questions the very assumption of the religious orientation of much classical Indian thought, instead emphasizing its purely theoretical nature in his *Indian Philosophy: A Counter Perspective* (1991). This allows Krishna to trace continuities between traditional and modern philosophizing. Spivak comes to prominence following her translation of Jacques Derrida's (1930–2004) *Of Grammatology* (1976). Spivak combines philosophical, literary, and sociopolitical analysis, critiquing the Enlightenment ideal of the autonomy of reason detached from political and ideological concerns. In "Can the Subaltern Speak?" (1988) and *A Critique of Postcolonial Reason* (1999), she argues that the claim of detached objectivity legitimizes colonial interests by masking the agenda of the colonizer and marginalizing the subjectivity of the colonized. Spivak criticizes Matilal's attempt to promote Indian thought in terms of the analytic tradition as contributing to this marginalization due to its internalization of Enlightenment paradigms of rationality. Krishna, in turn, is scathing toward the sort of postmodern critique espoused by Spivak.

With the notable exception of Spivak, most modern Indian thinkers have utilized Western philosophy to reconsider traditional Indian thought. Those working within the analytic tradition, such as Matilal and Krishna, have tended to emphasize the commonalities between traditional Indian thought and Western philosophy, while differences have tended to be highlighted by thinkers such as Mehta and Mohanty who work within continental traditions, such as phenomenology, that have tended to be more open to considering philosophy as occurring within the greater totality of unique lifeworlds. Beyond its independent developments, the significance of modern Indian philosophy lies in the ways that the hermeneutic encounter between Indian traditions and modernity have been utilized

not only to reconsider the nature of philosophy itself but also to pioneer methodologies for undertaking philosophy in global, comparative, cross-cultural, and postcolonial settings.

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See also Religion

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Pondicherry. *See* Puducherry

✦ POPULATION

Every sixth person in the world is an Indian. India's population, as per the 2001 population census, was 1.028 billion, consisting of 531.3 million males and 495.7 million females. The population in 2010 was estimated to be 1.173 billion according to the 2010 CIA *World Factbook,* while the provisional figure from the 2011 census is 1.21 billion. India accounts for 2.4 percent of the world's land area but supports 17.5 percent of the world population. It is one of the most densely populated countries in the world. India's population growth trajectory has been keenly studied for both academic reasons and policy purposes. Although there has been a marginal decline in the growth rate of the population from 2.14 percent during 1981–1991 to 1.93 percent during 1991–2001 and an estimated 1.376 percent in 2010, the growth rate continues to be high in comparison to many countries in Europe and North America. India is the second most-populous country in the world, behind only to China.

India's population density has increased steadily from 77 persons per .6 square mile to 324 persons per square kilometer in 2001. The difference in population density in different areas of the country is substantial, ranging from 9,340 in Delhi and 903 in West Bengal, the most thickly populated state among the major states, to 13 in Arunachal Pradesh. The high rate of population growth has its advantages as well as its disadvantages for social and economic development. On the one hand, a large population base ensures the supply of a large and growing labor force and also provides a large market for goods and services. On the other hand,

in an agrarian country with a low rate of savings and low capital formation, a large population acts as a drag on resources, and the generation of capital for investment poses serious problems.

Historically, India has been a country with a relatively large population. This is primarily because of its soil, climate, and natural resources and its early development of agriculture that could support such large populations. The first census was conducted in 1872, but it was only from 1881 that the census was conducted every 10 years. Data from 1901 onward are considered to be more reliable than the earlier censuses. The pattern of population growth saw high fluctuations. Periods of high growth were followed by decreases, especially during 1871–1881, 1891–1901, and 1911–1921. This was largely due to huge famines in the 1870s and 1890s and the influenza epidemic of 1918 in which, according to one estimate, more than 15 million persons died. Nonetheless, India's population reached approximately 251 million in 1921. After that the population increased rapidly. The year 1921, also known as the year of the Great Divide, marks the difference in the patterns of growth. The rapid population growth during 1921–1951 occurred because of the decline in mortality rates and a large population whereby families were little affected by family planning programs and needed family members, especially sons, to supplement family income and to care for elders in old age. The decade 1951–1961 saw an explosive population growth whereby 78 million persons were added to the population. During 1961–1971 about 109 million persons were added, while the next decade, 1971–1981, saw an addition of 135 million persons. Furthermore, during 1981–1991 there was a net addition of 160 million persons, and the last decade of the century, 1991–2001, saw an increase of 184 million persons.

While high mortality rates caused by infectious and parasitic diseases, epidemics, and famines controlled population growth in the past, the rapid decline in mortality rates since 1921 and especially after 1947 led to a high growth rate that reached almost 2 percent during 1951–1961. In the subsequent decades the growth rate hovered around 2.2 percent per annum. The relative stability of the birthrate remained a major concern. It was only during 1991–2001 that the fall in the birthrate was faster than the death rate and that population growth was less than 2 percent. The significant point regarding the experience of the decade was that India had entered a phase of demographic transition characterized by declining fertility in some states. The increase in population has primarily occurred due to a significant reduction in the death rate. Demographic projections suggest that India will overtake China and become the most populous country of the world by the middle of this century.

Between Indian independence in 1947 and 1970, there was a significant decline in India's mortality rate. This decline was caused by a combination of factors, including reduction in the impact of several major communicable diseases and the prevention of famines. The mortality rate continued to decline steadily from 1970. Both the crude death rate (CDR) and the infant mortality rates (IMR) almost halved. While the CDR declined from 16 to less than 8 per 1,000, the IMR declined from 134 infant deaths to about 57 infant deaths per 1,000 live births in 2006. However, a rural-urban disparity continues to be a cause of concern. Life expectancy at birth in India has gone up from 32 years for 1950–1951 to 63 for 1999–2000.

India's total fertility rate (TFR), which measures the number of births per woman, has declined from around 6 in 1961 to just above 3 in 2010. Fertility has declined across the country but at different rates in rural and urban areas. There are marked contrasts in the fertility levels across the country. While Kerala and Tamil Nadu in southern India have already achieved replacement-level fertility rates, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar continue to have fertility rates considerably higher. In general, fertility rates are appreciably lower in the southern states. An analysis of the determinants of fertility reduction in India suggests that it has been achieved overwhelmingly through the increased use of modern contraceptive methods (mainly female sterilization). In particular, Kerala's remarkable achievement has often been linked to its better performance in social sector development. It is often pointed out that while Kerala and Tamil Nadu have been successful in radically reducing their fertility rates, many northern states such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan all have very high fertility rates. These latter four states also have much lower levels of educational achievement, especially in female education, and general health care. It is these four states that are going to contribute an estimated 55 percent of total population growth in the quarter century between 2001 and 2026. The lower fertility levels and earlier fertility declines in the southern states has been attributed to the region's weaker patriarchal kinship structures and more equitable gender relations. These regional contrasts point out important aspects of the social and economic contexts that determine the extent and pace of fertility reduction in India. Although there appears to be a trend toward a broad convergence in levels of fertility between states, the interstate variations in fertility will likely continue for some time.

The urban population has increased from just 10.8 percent in 1901 to 27.8 percent in 2001. However, the growth of the urban population has declined since 1981. The slowing down of urban growth is largely due to a decline in the rate of the natural increase and a limited increase in the population of new towns. The process of urbanization in India is based on the larger cities. The share of Class I cities—that is, the number of metropolitan cities having a population of 1 million or more—increased from 12 in 1981 to 35 in 2001.

According to the 2001 census, 29.9 percent of the population were migrants. As per National Sample Survey (NSS) estimates, the percentage of migrants increased from 24.7 percent in 1993 to 26.6 percent for 1999–2000. Of the total migrants in 2001, 55 percent were rural-to-rural migrants, whereas 16 percent were migrants from rural to urban areas. While males migrate mostly for economic reasons (such as employment, business, and education), much of female migration in India is associational in nature; females mostly migrate when they get married. The majority of migrants in India migrate just short distances. This mobility usually goes from backward to relatively economically advanced states and cities. Recently, however, it has been observed that although regional imbalances have increased, the population has become relatively immobile. This is due to the growth of regional identity and regional pride and to city development plans that are hostile to the poor and to migrants.

India has a young age structure, with nearly 35 percent of the population below 15 years of age. Since 1971, however, and largely because of a decline in birthrates, there has been a

significant decline in the proportion of children below the age of 15. At the same time, the proportion of the population aged 60 and above has increased steadily. In 2001 the share of the elderly population was 7.45 percent. The dependency ratio, defined as the ratio of nonworkers to workers, is high, which is why the contribution of children under 15 years of age is high.

Sex ratio, defined as the number of females per 1,000 males, is an important indicator of gender equality. The sex ratio in India has always been unfavorable to females, although there are regional variations. India's sex ratio declined from 972 in 1901 to 926 in 1991. In 2001 there was a marginal improvement as the sex ratio moved up to 933. Still, this is one of the lowest ratios in the world. Moreover, there are stark regional differences in the sex ratio; by and large, the southern states have a better record than the northern and northwestern states. Kerala has a sex ratio of 1058, which is comparatively high by global standards. There is a great deal of evidence to indicate that there has been a relative neglect in the health and well-being of women, particularly of infants and children, that has resulted in a lower survival rate for females in comparison to males. The relative disadvantage of females is also reflected in the low and declining child sex ratio (CSR). The CSR in India has come down from 945 in 1991 to 927 in 2001. The regional contrasts are again very significant, with the northwestern states of Punjab, Haryana, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and Himachal Pradesh having a lower CSR than many southern states.

The work participation rate refers to the proportion of total workers to the total population expressed as a percentage. In general, the total work participation rate in India shows a rising trend since 1971. The trend is more pronounced in rural areas than in urban areas, where it has remained almost constant at 30 percent. In the case of females there has been an increase in the rate in both rural and urban areas. In the case of males, a slight decline in the rate is noticed for 1981–1991.

A majority of Indians are still dependent on agriculture for their livelihood, although there has been a decline in the share of agricultural workers from nearly 74 percent for 1972–1973 to nearly 57 percent for 2004–2005. Employment has undergone some significant changes in recent decades. Since the liberalization of the Indian economy in the 1990s the economy has performed well, but growth in employment has slowed down considerably. The 1990s have been described as a period of jobless growth, although there has been some recovery on the employment front since 1999–2000.

The literacy rate of the population in the age group seven years and above has risen to 65.4 percent in 2001 from 52.2 percent in 1991 and 43.6 percent in 1981. Despite a series of interventions by the government and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), nearly one-third of Indians are still illiterate. In the rural areas literacy was 59 percent in 2001, while among rural females it was only 47 percent. The disadvantaged social groups also have relatively lower literacy rates. Illiteracy is disproportionately concentrated in seven states: Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Bihar. These states account for more than half of the illiterate people in the country. Programs such

as Sarva Siksha Abhiyan—midday meal schemes—have been launched to achieve universal elementary education in India. Notwithstanding its phenomenal growth, higher education is still not accessible to the majority of people.

India's large population has been seen as a burden and as a Malthusian constraint on economic growth. Recently, however, emphasis has been placed on the benefits of such a large and young population in a globalizing and aging world. In 2004 the working population (15–64 years old) was 672 million, that is, nearly 62 percent of the total population. Even with the anticipated decline in fertility, it is estimated that India will have a substantially large population of young people. It is expected that by the year 2020 the average age of an Indian will be 29, compared to 37 for China and the United States, 45 for Western Europe, and 48 for Japan. This is expected to benefit the economy in many ways. First of all, a higher working-age population will mean the availability of a larger number of producers or workers, and a decline in the nation's saving rate is likely to increase the savings rate of the economy. Critics, however, point out that the large pool of young people could be productively employed only when India's significant deficits in education and health care are resolved. In the absence of policies enhancing the human capital base of the economy, the benefits of such demographic advantages will be seriously limited.

Population policies are policy measures designed to bring about desirable changes in the growth, composition, and quality of the population. Although the term "population policy" is often narrowly defined to mean family planning programs, or programs concerning



A teacher working with USAID conducts a family planning meeting for women in the densely populated and impoverished area of Sangam Vihar, New Delhi, August 1999. (AP Photo/John McConnico)

the reduction in the growth rate of the population, population policies in the wider sense encompass a gamut of issues concerning the number and the characteristics of the population.

There has always been a debate regarding the desirability of family planning programs. For the first decade and a half after India's independence in 1947, family planning programs were adopted on a modest scale, but the emphasis on family planning increased after the publication of the 1961 census data, which showed a growth rate that was greater than anticipated. The full-fledged Department of Family Planning was created in 1966, and an approach was adopted under which male and female family planning workers were recruited to provide alternative methods of contraception. During 1966–1969 the family planning program was made target-oriented, and more funds were provided. Achievement, however, fell far short of expectations.

The New National Population Policy of 1976 marked a departure from the earlier policies. Earlier policies were based on the understanding that while the government should continue to pursue family planning policies, population growth would be effectively controlled by the process of economic development and improvements in literacy. But the policy of 1976 clearly declared that to wait for education and economic development to bring about a decline in the fertility rate was not a practical solution, as the increase in population made economic development slow and more difficult to achieve. As a result, it was felt that a direct assault on population growth had to be made. The policy was a more proactive one, and some direct measures such as increasing the legal minimum age of marriage to 21 for males and 18 for girls were adopted. During the Emergency (1975–1977), however, compulsory sterilization and coercive family planning discredited the family planning program.

In the period after the Emergency there was again a revision in government policy toward family welfare. While targets were routinely revised and fresh goals were agreed upon, the use of coercive methods was not envisaged in the subsequent policy pronouncements. Relatively modest targets were fixed, and the structure of incentives for adoption and disincentives for nonadoption were devised.

National Population Policy 2000 (NPP 2000) has put emphasis on voluntary and informed choice, the consent of citizens while availing themselves of reproductive health care services, and the continuation of the target-free approach in administering family planning services. The policy signifies a shift from the earlier demographically driven target-oriented population policies to recognizing the centrality of human development, gender equity, and adolescent reproductive health and rights, among other factors. NPP 2000 aims at achieving net replacement levels (the TFR) by 2010 and is based on a broader set of interventions and recognizes the need to simultaneously address issues of child survival, maternal health, and contraception while increasing outreach and coverage of a comprehensive package of reproductive and child health services. In terms of agencies, there has been a more inclusive approach toward involving civil society groups, NGOs, and the corporate sector along with government agencies.

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See also Economy

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✦ POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES

Postcolonial studies is an interdisciplinary field of academic specialization. Practitioners include literary and art critics as well as cultural historians and political scientists who focus on the analysis of issues related to the identity and expressions of populations who were the victims of modern European colonization. Some of the most influential representatives of postcolonial studies are from India.

Overseas European colonies were consolidated over several centuries until, by the time of World War I, the Europeans had settled in or were dominating more than three quarters of the globe. Following World War II, however, the bankruptcy of Britain and other nations with empires and the opposition to imperial rule organized by national liberation movements, which had been gathering momentum since the beginning of the 20th century, led to the fairly rapid disintegration of the European colonial empires and to the establishment of a myriad of politically autonomous nation-states. India gained its independence from the British at the stroke of midnight on August 14, 1947, ushering in a period of identity search and redefinition affecting a whole generation of intellectuals. Indian writer Salman Rushdie (b. 1947) encapsulated this phenomenon in his award-winning novel *Midnight's Children* (1981), which is still considered a particularly representative example of postcolonial literature. Through the narrative technique of magical realism, Rushdie presents the protagonist's life story as an allegory of Indian history before and especially after independence. The role of memory, through which people filter their experience of reality and establish their own idiosyncratic truth, is greatly emphasized in the novel, pointing to one of the basic themes of postcolonial studies: national identity is built on a scaffolding of collective memories, which reflect the way people are socially perceived and represented. The colonial encounter catalyzes

a superiority/inferiority distinction between the colonizer and the colonized that becomes inexorably embedded in self-perception. Having been defined as qualitatively "other" by the colonial powers, those who were colonized cannot simply erase that identity by gaining political independence, particularly when the West maintains its indirect dominance on postcolonial societies (often ironically self-identified as "the Rest") through economic power and the prestige of its institutions.

The predicament of the continuing intellectual hegemony of the West is exactly what practitioners of postcolonial studies wish to address. Not surprisingly, this issue has especially attracted the attention of scholars who, while often born and raised in what are now postcolonial societies, have ended up living and working in Western academic settings. Thus, as argued by the Pakistani-Welsh theorist Sara Suleri (b. 1951), postcolonial theorists remain entangled in the colonial encounter since they choose to address, albeit critically, a mainly Western audience.

The issue of audience is a crucial one not only in postcolonial studies but also in the broader field of postcolonial literature in general, correlating as it does with the fact that the languages used by most postcolonial writers are the ones imposed by the colonizers. Being educated in postcolonial settings usually means acquiring these languages—English in particular—as a sort of lingua franca that provides the means for surmounting regional and ethnic particularism and for addressing a global audience. Consequently, postcolonial literature seems to be the result of a process adumbrated in the title of a foundational work of analysis: *The Empire Writes Back* (1989). But this "writing back" from the global periphery to its center reproduces just the client-patron relationship that should have ended with decolonization. One of the most influential postcolonial theorists, the Indian-born U.S.-based academic Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (b. 1942), has characterized this process as one of "epistemic violence": the imposition of Western ways of knowing causing postcolonial subjects to be forever "caught in translation," that is, unable to express themselves without reference to alien categories.

The pervasive intellectual dominance of the West on "the Rest"—absorbed through linguistic and educational channels and molding the social identity of the postcolonial subjects—becomes particularly problematic when it is seen as being behind the very process of emancipation through which colonized societies successfully fought for and acquired political autonomy. The Indian political scientist Partha Chatterjee (b. 1947) highlights quite forcefully how the model of the nation-state adopted at independence by postcolonial societies such as India was clearly derived from the Western ideology of modernity and liberal democracy. This ideology, however, was linked to definitions of subjectivity and community that differ very profoundly from those catalyzed by Indian history. As a result, not only is the adoption of the institutional mechanisms of the democratic capitalistic state bound to clash with indigenous social structures, but even the Marxist critique of those mechanisms cannot be usefully adopted. The postcolonial experience highlights the local specificity of Western ideologies that were assumed to have universal application. Thus, one of the objectives

of postcolonial studies is to provincialize Europe, as Indian historian Dipesh Chakrabarty indicates in the title of his influential work *Provincializing Europe* (2000).

In the view of perhaps the most influential representative of postcolonial studies, the Palestinian American literary critic Edward Said (1935–2003), it is the universalist assumptions of Western civilization that inevitably led to representing cultural differences in terms of superiority/inferiority, in the process justifying the West's imperial ambitions. In the analysis presented in his book *Orientalism* (1978), Said argues that even the most scholarly Western treatments of the languages, history, and cultural expressions of the Orient—Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East—were implicitly biased by the colonial encounter. As a result, the whole history of the Orient was rewritten from a Western point of view and then was used as the framework for remaking the colonial subjects in the image of their Western colonizers.

By highlighting the affiliation of knowledge with power, Said proposed discourse analysis as a useful tool for understanding the pervasive influence of ideology on all forms of expression, including scholarly research. This became the basis of much of the theoretical and methodological approach of postcolonial studies, leading on the one hand to a certain technical impenetrability of its texts and on the other hand to an overlap with related forms of cultural analysis, such as in India those emerging from the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), the Centre of Contemporary Studies (CCS), and the Subaltern Studies Collective. The main difference between the type of cultural studies produced in India and those produced by scholars of Indian origin operating in the West, however, has to do with the themes they address. While issues of nationhood, communal conflict, and globalization attract the attention of indigenously based scholars, issues of identity, individual rights, and cultural hybridity are addressed most often in the work of émigré scholars, or diasporic intellectuals as they are often called.

One of the most influential representatives of the latter group is the Indian-born, British-educated, and U.S.-based academic Homi K. Bhabha (b. 1949), who is also notorious for the opacity of his prose. Combining postmodern discourse analysis with Lacanian psychoanalysis, Bhabha argues that the only constructive strategy for addressing both the basic incommensurability of different cultures and the continuing hegemony of the West is hybridity. According to Bhabha, cultural assumptions are deconstructed by having the observed become the observer and by confusing categorizations of authenticity and "otherness" through mimicry, a set of ironically deceptive practices frustrating homogenizing efforts.

Two arguments put forth by the strongest critics of the textual turn in postcolonial studies are that the hybridity strategy may well be a successful approach for the personal adjustment of diasporic intellectuals themselves and that the celebration of social fragmentation and individual expression of multiple types of cultural diversity may fit particularly well in the context of globalized consumer capitalism. Among these critics, the Indo-Pakistani literary theorist Aijaz Ahmad (b. 1947), a fellow of the CCS, has possibly produced the most cogent critique of the heavy cost exacted by shifting the analysis of the postcolonial condition from the

political-economic realm to the literary-cultural realm. As he concludes in his aptly titled work *In Theory* (1992), a reevaluation of the material conditions of postcolonial life, in the context of a historical reassessment of the revolutionary struggles leading to political independence, may uniquely reinvigorate the transformational potential of postcolonial studies, translating theory into practice. Or, as indicated by Sumit Sarkar (b. 1939), another Indian scholar calling for the need to reconfigure the political relevance rather than merely the academic relevance of postcolonial studies, what is needed is implementation of the Gramscian motto "Pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will" by shifting from discourse to circumstance.

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See also Asiatic Society of Bengal; Asiatic Society of Mumbai; Orientalism

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✦ POVERTY AND WEALTH

Official data on poverty and wealth in India show a significant decline in poverty and an increase in wealth since 1980 compared to the preceding period. Using official Indian government estimates, the total population below the poverty line declined between 1983 and 1993–1994 by 8.5 percent, going from 44.5 to 36 percent, and between 1993–1994 and 2004–2005 by 8.2 percent, going from 36 to 27.8 percent. For the most recent data year, 2004–2005, using 2005 United Nations (UN) population data, this translated into 314.3 million out of a total population of 1.13 billion. This is down from 344.8 million in 1985,

using UN 1985 population data and Indian 1983 poverty data. By comparison, the Indian middle class is frequently quoted as being 300 million people; in between this and the official poverty measure there are another 400 million people. However, given the high levels of malnutrition among children and women, it is at best uncertain that official Indian poverty data are a reliable measure of actual living standards or reductions in deprivation. The World Bank's most recent estimates of poverty for India, published in 2009, using the $1.25 a day poverty line—popularly referred to as the dollar-a-day measure of extreme poverty defined as inability to meet basic needs—puts the percentage of people in poverty at 41.6. The World Bank's 2009 $2 dollar-a-day poverty line measure of moderate poverty, where basic needs may just be met, records 75.6 percent living in poverty. The World Bank used an improved survey technique in 2008, so data published in the World Bank's report before this date are not strictly comparable with those from 2008 because the new technique more accurately shows what people consume, resulting in evidence that previous estimates underestimated the percentage in poverty.



Stark contrasts between the haves and have nots in India are omnipresent: between the few who can afford to buy expensive consumer products and the overwhelming majority of the population, which has to work very hard and long hours to eke out a living, like this rickshaw driver, October 2009. (Alain Lacroix/Dreamstime.com)

Poverty lines such as these, whether the Indian government's or the World Bank's, classify individuals as poor using a monetary measure of food items with a margin for basic nonfood items. This measure leaves out significant proportions of the actual resources required for effective maintenance of health and education when compared with the idea of basic needs. Health and education are core indicators of human well-being, both of which can be low (inadequate) even if incomes are relatively high (above the poverty line), as existing research shows. What is required is a real, rather than monetary, measure of wealth in order to accurately measure poverty and deprivation. The term "real" here refers to the actual endowment of education that individuals hold and, alternatively, the skills or jobs that they perform, not the value of their salaries. Other indicators of the real level and distribution of wealth are the distributions of employment between sectors of the economy and health of the population.

This is an important point in the Indian context given that the percentage of children suffering from malnutrition is greater than the percentage of officially measured total poor (children plus adults). The World Bank report *India's Undernourished Children* showed that child malnutrition is significantly worse in India than in sub-Saharan Africa; the number of children underweight at birth in sub-Saharan Africa is half India's number. In 2009, Forbes India reported a figure cited by Save the Children that 6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) is lost through child mortality. Two million Indian children die before their fifth birthday, 25 percent of the world total of 8 million reported by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) in 2009. In 2008 UNICEF cited recent World Health Organization (WHO) data showing that more than 30 percent of Indian children under age 5 are stunted, with wasting measured as acute malnutrition affecting more than 15 percent of children under 5. Fifty percent of children under age 5 are underweight. Forty-six percent of children under age 3 have a body weight that is below the healthy range (i.e., are malnourished), representing almost 33 percent of malnourished children in all developing countries. To put this into perspective, 42 percent of the total Indian population is below age 18. Based on these measures, WHO places India well within the sub-Saharan human development level. Medicins sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders [MSF]) remarked that this represented a major humanitarian emergency in a booming economy. Clearly deprivation is still more widespread when measured by other indicators of human well-being, such as the number of women suffering from malnutrition measured as anemia. In 2008 the MSF reported that 83 percent of Indian women are anemic. As a real indicator, education—the primary education-level skills imparted by government schools—was recently measured by a national survey by the Indian nongovernmental organization Pratham. The results showed that literacy and mathematics skills were significantly deficient. This was in the context of the last 10 years of significant investment in the government primary school sector under the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA), the Education for All initiative.

Wealth is also conventionally valued in monetary terms by company share price and revenue and through other asset prices or the total value of national output. On these measures, wealth has clearly increased dramatically for India, with national output measured as real GDP per worker having doubled between the early 1980s and 2000. Yet wealth on these measures does not as yet adequately take into account depreciation of capital stock outside the typical business measurement context. Missing from depreciation measures are such things as human capital and natural resources, given what economists have long described as the inherent market failure to encompass the complete costs of production and consumption. For example, the World Bank, WHO, and Harvard University have developed the disability-adjusted life year (DALY), a measure of life years lost to premature death and years lived in ill health. From this is calculated the disease burden on countries, which shows the health gap with the healthiest countries. Human capital is affected by malnutrition, disease, and injuries, of which India suffers in excess, well above developed country standards. If wealth requires investment, the following is indicative: Forbes India reported in 2009 that

Indian government spending on health amounts to .9 percent of GDP, in contrast to, for example, Sierra Leone's 7.8 percent. In addition, parts of the capital stock such as agricultural land and transport infrastructure must be taken into consideration in wealth assessments. Recent research has shown that India's natural resources, such as water and agricultural land, have been significantly affected by overuse, causing depletion, particularly in the case of water, and contamination of both water and land caused by overuse of fertilizer and by external sources of pollution. While India's transport system is comprehensive, unlike many countries with similar levels of human development, particularly the railroad network, its rolling stock and freight handling systems are in need of complete redesign, not simply upgrading. Intermodal traffic is limited. India's rolling stock is of equivalent design and capacity to that of the United States in the 1950s. In addition, electricity supply is insufficient, with regular power outages. All of these physical infrastructure elements taken together have been widely quoted as being likely to prevent India's high GDP growth rate from continuing.

Wealthier countries with less income inequality and low absolute poverty tend to have significantly lower employment in agriculture and significant higher employment in manufacturing and services. Indian agricultural employment, which can be defined, as the Indian census does, as "farm worker" (farmers plus their workers), amounted to 67.1 percent of the total Indian workforce in 1991. By the census of 2001, this rate had fallen to 58.5 percent, although the absolute numbers had increased from 210 to 233 during that period. This must be distinguished from the total rural workforce, which includes nonfarm activity. The total rural workforce fell very little, from 79.1 percent in 1990–1991 to 77.2 by 1999–2000. This gives an indication of the geographic distribution of poverty and wealth, given that in 2004–2005 the unorganized sector of agricultural laborers had average years of schooling of 2.4 and 1.0 for males and females, respectively. Recent evidence has shown that since the reforms of 1991, high-value and skilled economic activity has been located in advanced regions and major urban areas. These economic activities, not mass manufacturing and construction employment, have accounted for India's high growth rate. Overall, the evolution of sectoral employment is shown in table 7. China in comparison saw change in employment by sector from 1986 to 2007 as follows: agriculture shrank from 61 to 41 percent; industry, which includes manufacturing, grew from 22 to 27 percent; and services grew from 17 to 32 percent of total employment.

Measured in conventional terms as real GDP, agriculture as a percentage of GDP changed from 46 percent in 1970–1971 to 32 percent in 1990–1991 and to 21 percent in

Table 7 Sectoral Distribution of Employment of the Indian Economy

	1972–1973	1977–1978	1983	1987–1988	1993–1994	1999–2000
Agriculture	74.0	72.3	68.4	65.5	60.4	56.7
Industry	11.4	12.3	13.7	15.5	15.8	17.6
Services	14.6	15.4	17.5	18.4	23.8	25.7

Source: National Sample Survey Organisation, Government of India, 2001.

2004–2005. Industry increased from 22 percent of GDP in 1970–1971 to 27 percent in 1990–1991, where it has remained since. Manufacturing, with its potential to create mass employment in better-paid jobs, increased from 13 percent in 1970–1971 to 17 percent in 1990–1991, where it too has remained. Services, however, have increased from 32 percent of GDP in 1970–1971 to 41 percent in 1990–1991 and to 52 percent in 2004–2005 and has been responsible for all of the reduction in agriculture as a share of GDP. However, the type of services that have expanded have been overwhelmingly in low and unskilled work (in the informal sector). Notably, business services, which includes the much-publicized information technology (IT) and business process outsourcing (BPO) subsectors, constitute only 1.2 percent of the total Indian labor force and 13 percent of GDP (1999–2000). In 2005 the estimated contribution of IT offshoring and outsourcing to GDP was 7 percent, with an estimated workforce of approximately 1.5 million, for 2007–2008 and was 2.23 million for 2009 (total employment in IT and BPO-ITES was said to be 4 million in 2008). India had the highest average growth rate in the export of services during the 1990s, of which IT and BPO were the key components, at 17.5 percent, followed by China at 15.8 percent, while the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries with the highest rates for the same period were Canada and the United States at 7.3 and 6.1 percent, respectively. The United States represents 60 percent of Indian IT and BPO-ITES activity. The better-paid formal sector, which includes services, industry, and manufacturing, consisted of 7.5 million workers (out of a total of 313 million workers) in 1991 and 8.7 million workers in 1998 and fell to 8.4 million workers in 2003. In comparison, in 2002 India had 6.2 million formal sector manufacturing jobs, while at about the same time China had 160 million such jobs. In contrast, India's industrial investment during the current high GDP growth phase since 1980 has been in capital intensive as well as in highly skilled areas. Some famous results have been Tata's Nano, the world's smallest gasoline car launched in 2008; the world's biggest steel company, Lakshmi Mittal's ArcelorMittal, measured by quantity of steel produced in 2008; and a best-selling electric car, the G-Wiz, made by the REVA Electric Car Company in Bangalore, Karnataka. Other successes include solar panels. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) compiles data on value added in manufacturing measured on an index starting from the value 100. The World Bank's World Development Indicators 2007 report reprinted the index, which showed that for East Asia and the Pacific, the index reached nearly 450, an increase of nearly 450 percent from 1990 to 2005. On the same index, South Asia, of which India is the largest country, increased by only 250 percent over the same period. Even the construction sector shares of employment and GDP are not significant at 4.4 and 5.9 percent, respectively, for 1999–2000. Overall, as measured by the World Bank, India was the 12th largest economy in the world in 2007, when its total monetary output value is measured as gross national income; China was the 4th largest.

In starker terms, Forbes India in 2008 determined that India now ranks 8th in the world for the number of billionaires, measured in U.S. dollars, and is ranked 2nd in the world for a country's combined billionaires' monetary wealth, behind the United States. The UN's 2009

human development index ranks India 134th of 182 countries measured, while India ranked 128th of 177 countries measured in 2007. The *Indian Economic Review* noted that for the top 5 percent of the population the comparison is with Europe, the United States, Japan, and Australia, while for the bottom 40 percent it is with sub-Saharan Africa.

RISTO HÄRMÄ

See also Agriculture; Economy; Outsourcing and Offshoring

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✦ PRESIDENT

In a parliamentary democracy, the offices of heads of state and the government are separate but not equal. In hereditary monarchies, the head of state is the king or queen; in republics, the head of state is an elected or appointed president. Formally, the president of India stands at the apex of the country's political system. The executive power of government is vested in the president, who is both the formal head of state and the symbol of the nation. He or she is not answerable to any court for actions taken in the course of performing official duties but is subject to impeachment by Parliament for violating the Indian Constitution. In

reality, the office of president confers status bereft of power. The president has authority and dignity but no power to rule. Instead, he or she performs an essentially ceremonial role. The actual functions of government are carried out by the president only with the aid and advice of the prime minister and the cabinet.

The president is elected to office for five-year terms and may be reelected. Any Indian citizen who is at least 35 years old and is qualified for election to the Lok Sabha (the lower house of Parliament) is eligible to seek the presidency. The president is not elected by the people. Instead, in order to avoid creating a parallel center of authority in a parliamentary system of government, he or she is chosen by an electoral college consisting of the two houses of Parliament at the center and the state legislative assemblies. The method of election helps to keep in check presidential ambitions: chosen by legislators, presidents may not challenge those who have been directly elected by the people. The twin principles of uniformity among states and parity between the center and the states are meant to ensure the election of a truly national candidate. The lack of popular participation eliminates the tumult normally associated with elections in India but does serve to underline the dignity of the office.

The vice president is elected for a five-year term by the two houses of Parliament in a joint session. Responsibilities include presiding over the sessions of the Rajya Sabha (the upper house of Parliament), deputizing for the president as necessary, and succeeding the president if the office should fall vacant for any reason until new elections can be held. There is no expectation that the vice president would normally become the next president.

The choice of president and vice president requires political judgment and balance, especially over a period of time. The offices must be rotated between the major regions and components of the Indian population (especially Hindu and Muslim but also other minority groups such as the Sikhs). On July 25, 2007, Pratibha Devisingh Patil (b. 1934) was sworn in as the first woman president of India. The professional background of India's presidents has mostly been political. Patil is no exception, having served in the Maharashtra State Legislative Assembly during 1961–1985 and in the Rajya Sabha during 1985–1990 before being elected to the Lok Sabha in 1991.

The powers of India's president are normally just ornamental, comprising appointive, dismissive, legislative, and symbolic functions. The president appoints the prime minister and also, on the advice of the prime minister, the cabinet; the justices of the Supreme Court and state high courts; the attorney general and the comptroller and auditor general of India; members of special commissions and other high public officials; and the governors of states. The choice of prime minister is not a discretionary prerogative to be exercised by the president but instead is usually dictated by the party commanding a majority in the Lok Sabha. In most cases the power to appoint is matched by the power to dismiss. The prime minister formally holds office at the pleasure of the president; in reality, the prime minister retains office as long as he or she can demonstrate support of the majority in the Lok Sabha.

The president calls Parliament into session, nominates 12 members of the Rajya Sabha, has the right to address both houses of Parliament, and has the power to dissolve the lower

house. A bill that has been passed by Parliament must be presented to the president for formal assent in order for it to become law. The president may withhold assent and return a bill—unless it is a money bill—for clarification, reconsideration, or possible amendment by Parliament. However, such a presidential veto can be overridden if both houses of Parliament simply pass the bill again. Some types of bills, such as those seeking to alter state boundaries, can be introduced in Parliament only on the president's recommendation.

Another legislative power given to the president is in the form of ordinances. When Parliament is not in session but immediate action is deemed necessary, the president is empowered by the Constitution to issue ordinances on the advice of the government. Although ordinances have the same force and effect as an act of Parliament, they must be laid before Parliament for formal enactment within six weeks of Parliament reconvening.

Thus, the president of India neither reigns nor rules over the country but instead represents and symbolizes the nation. The president is the commander in chief of the armed services, receives ambassadors from other countries, represents India on state visits abroad, presides on great state occasions, and has the power to grant pardons. However, in almost all cases presidential powers are exercised only on the advice of the prime minister and the cabinet.

Sometimes the election of the president can itself become the arena for a power struggle between rival political factions. When president Dr. Zakir Hussain (1897–1969) died in office in 1969, Vice President V. V. Giri (1894–1980) took over as acting president until the election of a new president, which was required to be held within six months. The official Congress Party candidate was N. Sanjiva Reddy (1913–1996), a politician from within the party. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1917–1964; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984), however, who was locked in a struggle for power within the ruling party, let it be known that her preferred candidate was Giri. His election marked her triumph in Parliament over the Congress Party stalwarts who dominated the party organization.

Table 8 Presidents of India, 1950–2012

Name	In Office
Rajendra Prasad	1950–1962
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan	1962–1967
Zakir Hussain	1967–1969
Varahagiri Venkata Giri	1969–1974
Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed	1974–1977
Neelam Sanjiva Reddy	1977–1982
Giani Zail Singh	1982–1987
R. Venkataraman	1987–1992
Shankar Dayal Sharma	1992–1997
Kocheril Raman Narayanan	1997–2002
Abdul J. Kalam	2002–2007
Pratibha Devisingh Patil	2007–2012

The discretionary latitude available to a president depends less on the office or the incumbent and more on the state of party politics in Parliament or in the cabinet. If a prime minister commands the loyalty of his or her cabinet and the confidence of Parliament and if the government in power is stable, there is little scope for independent presidential initiatives, although they can murmur dissent to unpopular bills and, by withholding assent temporarily, hope that public opinion sways the government to change course. If the government is a coalition of different parties based in different ideologies, interests, states, or regions, then the president can play a mediating and influential role in relations between the states and the central government.

RAMESH THAKUR

See also Cabinet; Constitution; *Panchayat* System and Local Government; Parliament; Prime Minister

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✦ PRIME MINISTER

The prime minister of India, like the counterpart in Westminster who provides the model for parliamentary systems of government, is the linchpin of the Indian system of government. In Britain the convention is firmly established that the prime minister must be a member of the lower house of Parliament. By contrast, Manmohan Singh, prime minister since 2004, is a member of India's upper house of Parliament.

The Indian Constitution defines the duties of the prime minister of India but not the powers of the office. Constitutional lawyers and political scientists have sought to identify the sources, agencies, and instruments of the prime minister's power and authority. Eight sources of prime ministerial power can be listed: headship of the Council of Ministers, party leadership, control of parliamentary activities, control of intelligence agencies, control of the bureaucracy, emergency powers, control of foreign policy, and personal charisma.

The prime minister is given almost total freedom in the appointment of members of Parliament to ministerial posts. In making the selections, the party leader nevertheless must ensure adequate representation first to regional and sectarian interests in the country, second to the various factions within the ruling party, and third to the balance of parliamentary seats held by coalition allies. Sometimes public opinion can force certain changes. After the terrorist attacks in Mumbai on November 26, 2008, for example, the home minister had to be dropped from the cabinet. As India has had to learn to live with coalition governments in New Delhi for the last two decades, prime ministers have had to manage fractious allies with large egos. Still, in general a prime minister can exercise considerable influence on parliamentary colleagues and therefore on the destiny of the country through the prerogative of constituting, reconstituting, and reshuffling the ministry and chairing the cabinet meetings.

The prime minister is the head of government by virtue of being the leader of the majority party in Parliament. A party is elected to office on the basis of a policy platform spelled out in an election manifesto. The party leader is exceptionally well placed to influence and shape the translation of the party manifesto into government policy. The extreme example of prime ministerial control of parliamentary activities was probably the period of emergency rule by Indira Gandhi during 1975–1977, when Parliament was in effect converted into a personal rubber stamp. All constitutional fetters were removed from the de facto exercise of power by the prime minister, and opposition benches were to be found chiefly in the country's jails. That one aberration aside, performance in parliamentary debates is itself a crucial test of a political leader's skills.

The peculiarities of Indian politics give unusually large scope for prime ministerial control of political life through domination of party processes. Thus, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was the final arbiter of the choice of Congress Party candidates for elections from all constituencies through the length and breadth of the country, and the party organization became an instrument for the prime minister of India to control and dominate state politics as well. Unusually in the period since 2004, the party president, Sonia Gandhi, although a member of Parliament, has not held any cabinet post but has been the most powerful court of last appeal for deciding on both party and government policy. During the 2009 election campaign, the opposition parties proclaimed dismissively that while Singh presides, Sonia Gandhi decides.

Heads of government can also be partial to abusing their control of intelligence services for personal and party political purposes: the practice of sexing up intelligence has an old lineage. Intelligence agencies traditionally come under prime ministerial oversight, not the least because heads of government would mistrust potential rivals in charge of such key operations. The size and complexity of India, combined with a colonial past, saw the emergence of several intelligence agencies. Some of the more important contemporary ones are the Intelligence Bureau, including the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW); the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI); the Criminal Investigation Department (Special Branch); and the Directorate of

Revenue Intelligence. Several prime ministers have been alleged to have used the intelligence agencies to keep abreast of moves and countermoves by potential challengers and to harass political opponents.

In addition to using intelligence agencies for maintaining a watching brief over opponents and potential rivals, the prime minister can exercise political control through the regular channels of bureaucracy (including the police). This is especially so in India, where the centralization of the elite administrative and police services facilitates vertical control of their activities. The scope for career and postcareer rewards (such as plum ambassadorships and state governorships) for officials was greatly expanded by consolidating centralization of political authority and of the economy. A bureaucratic command economy was created with government officials in charge of, for example, banks that had been nationalized. The opportunities for rewarding loyal officials through patronage appointments were thereby greatly multiplied.

The greatest opportunity for a prime minister of India to exercise total power within the Constitution comes during the declaration of a national emergency. It is not an exaggeration to say that the 1975–1977 experience was a period of prime ministerial dictatorship by Indira Gandhi.

The period of emergency rule was an aberration even by Indian standards. Increasingly in the modern world, heads of governments of all countries have begun to play the most visible role in determining their countries' foreign policies. India is no exception to the rule. The controversial India-U.S. civil nuclear cooperation deal, for example, bore the personal stamp of Manmohan Singh.

An international role in turn enhances the domestic status and stature of the prime minister. All major international conferences, such as the annual Commonwealth heads of governments and the G20 summit meetings in 2008 and 2009, are attended by the prime minister

Table 9 Prime Ministers of India, 1947–2010

Name	Party	In Office
Jawaharlal Nehru	Congress	1947–1964
Lal Bahadur Shastri	Congress	1964–1966
Indira Gandhi	Congress	1966–1977
Morarji Desai	Janata	1977–1979
Charan Singh	Janata	1979–1980
Indira Gandhi	Congress	1980–1984
Rajiv Gandhi	Congress	1984–1989
Vishwanath Pratap Singh	National Front	1989–1990
Chandra Shekhar	Samajvadi Janata	1990–1991
P. V. Narasimha Rao	Congress	1991–1996
H. D. Deve Gowda	United Front	1996–1997
Inder Kumar Gujral	United Front	1997–1998
Atal Bihari Vajpayee	Bharatiya Janata	1998–2004
Manmohan Singh	Congress	2004–

personally. Visits abroad to other countries and to such forums as the United Nations (UN) are treated as major political events where the prime minister is on show.

The final source of prime ministerial authority is the individual attributes and charisma of the person occupying the office. Singh is not the most charismatic leader but is exceptionally well credentialed, with an Oxbridge doctorate in economics.

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See also Cabinet; Constitution; *Panchayat* System and Local Government; Parliament; President

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✦ PUDUCHERRY

Puducherry, prior to 2006 known as Pondicherry, is a legacy of French colonies and trading posts and consists of four territories: Puducherry (175 square miles), on the coast 100 miles south of Chennai; Karaikal (99 square miles), 100 miles farther south; Yanam (18 square miles), strung along the Godavari delta in Andhra Pradesh; and Mahe (a mere 5.5 square miles) on the western coast and surrounded by Kerala. The total population of the territory is just over 1 million. Puducherry is a major tourist site, known especially for its four beaches, and hosts the renowned Sri Aurobindo Ashram. The lieutenant governor administers the territory, which sends one member to New Delhi to the the Lok Sabha (the lower house of Parliament) and one member to the Rajya Sabha (the upper house of Parliament).

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See also Territories

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✦ PUNJAB

The Punjab (Panjab), or the land of the "five rivers," is a region straddling the border between Pakistan and India. The five rivers are the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Ravi, the Sutlej, and the Beas. The Punjab has a long history and rich cultural heritage, and the main religions practiced are Hinduism, Islam, and Sikhism. Prior to the independence of India in August 1947, the province played a significant role in the freedom struggle. Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs lived together relatively harmoniously in the spirit of Punjabiyat, a common regional identity that cut across religious and linguistic lines. However, British divide et impera policies and other developments in identity politics soon began to change the situation, and each community began to assert itself politically in a new way.

Sikhs and Sikh politics have dominated the province. In 1872 Gursikhs, known as the Singh Sahibs, founded the Singh Sabha Movement in reaction to what it believed were wayward practices and beliefs within the Panth ("path" or "way"). The movement sought to reform Sikh practices through the publication of books, pamphlets, and newspapers and even by founding schools. The Singh Sabha was one of the foremost movements toward the assertion of Sikh identity. The Singh Sabha was viewed with suspicion by Hindus and Muslims, who created similar revivalist or fundamentalist movements.

Following in the footsteps of the Singh Sabha Movement, the Shiromani Akali Dal, a leading Sikh political party founded in December 1920, supported the Gurdwara Reform Movement, or the Akali Leher as it is sometimes called, to remove the *gurdwaras* (Sikh temples) from the arbitrary control of *mahants* (priests) and to bring them under popular control. The establishment of the Central Sikh League in 1919 paved the way for the Gurdwara Reform Movement. The Punjab government acceded to their demands and passed the Gurdwara Act on July 6, 1925, which transferred control of all historic Sikh *gurdwaras* from priests to a representative body of the Sikhs. The Gurdwara Reform Movement and the Gurdwara Act had profound consequences for Sikh consciousness and political action. The Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) managed the *gurdwaras,* and the Akali Dal became the political arm of the Sikhs.

India's independence from British rule in August 1947 came at a huge price: the partition of the subcontinent and the Punjab and the creation of a new state for the Muslims, Pakistan. The Punjab, with its diverse population and history of coexistence, was the hardest hit, and the mass migration and murderous communal violence that preceded and followed the partition period deeply impacted the territorial and demographic structure of the state.

The migration of the Muslims left the Sikhs concentrated in a more compact geographical area and at the same time created a minority of Hindus. According to the census of 2001, the state of Punjab had a population of just over 24 million, 92 percent of whom claim Punjabi, a western Hindi dialect, as their mother tongue. More than 60 percent of the population is Sikh, with most of the remaining people being Hindu. The Punjab is one of the most highly urbanized states in India, with just over a third of the population living in towns or cities. Chandigarh is the capital. Ludhiana, with about 1.5 million people, is the largest city, with the next-largest city being the Sikh holy city of Amritsar, with about 1 million people. The province is divided into 17 districts.

One of the major issues that soon emerged after independence was the language dispute over Punjabi. The dispute spurred the Akali Dal's first major protest movement in independent India. In the censuses in the 1950s and 1960s, the Hindus of the Punjab recorded their mother tongue as Hindi instead of Punjabi, and this became a political struggle as Hindus took up the cause of Hindi and Sikhs advocated the use of Punjabi. In response, the Sikh community in the Punjab, under the leadership of the Shiromani Akali Dal, demanded a Punjabi-speaking state in which Punjabi would be the official language. The support given to both sides from Hindi and Punjabi newspapers and various religious organizations exacerbated tensions. As a result, Hindus and Sikhs became increasingly antagonistic toward each other, and the Sikhs began to be viewed as a separate community, or a minority, rather than as a people belonging to a particular province. The Punjab also witnessed an agricultural and development boom due to the success of the Green Revolution and the introduction of newly improved hybrid varieties of seeds. The new wealth in the state made both sides more assertive.

The issue was seemingly resolved in 1966 when the Punjab Reorganization Act was passed and the State of Haryana was carved out of the eastern province of Punjab to create a Hindi-speaking state; the western province retained a mostly Punjabi-speaking majority. The creation of Haryana, however, did not resolve the language issue, as a sizable Hindi-speaking population still existed within the boundaries of the Punjab, and conflict soon restarted on the status of the two languages. In a compromise measure, the Punjab Language Act of December 1967 made Punjabi the official language of the state and Hindi as the medium of communication with the Indian government owing the status of Hindi as the national language of the country. Tensions between the Sikh and Hindu populations continued, however, as both asserted their own religiously based identities.

In October 1973 the Akali Dal formulated the Anandpur Sahib Resolution. The resolution demonstrated the shift among Akalis as the party attempted to appeal to Sikh nationalists. The core political demand of the resolution was to preserve and keep alive the concept of a distinct and independent identity for the Panth and to create an environment in which the national sentiments and the aspirations of the Sikh Panth would find full expression. During this phase, proponents of an independent Sikh state—Khalistan—first given wide publicity by Jagjit Singh Chauhan (1929–2007) in 1971, came to the fore, and



A Sikh activist wears a t-shirt depicting Sikh leader Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale after prayers at Sri Akal Takht at the Golden Temple, Amritsar, June 6, 2010. "Ghallughara Diwas" is the anniversary of the deadly 1984 Indian Army "Operation BLUESTAR" attack on the Golden Temple complex to arrest Bhindranwale and his militant followers who had initiated a movement for a separate Sikh state. (Narinder Nanu/AFP/Getty Images)

the Republic of Khalistan was actually proclaimed by Chauhan in 1980. Khalistan had its own flag and its own currency, the Khalistan dollar.

This began one of the most troubled and violent phases in the state's history. Faced with declining provincial authority under the centralizing federal government of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984), the Akalis mobilized the Sikh peasantry in a major campaign for Punjab's autonomy. The Khalistan movement, led in India by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale (1947–1984) while Chauhan remained in exile in London, was also at its peak and most murderous stage, as the Hindu population in the state began to be targeted and incidents of violence began to increase with devastating effect. In this highly volatile environment, in June 1984 the government launched Operation BLUESTAR on the Golden Temple in Amritsar. The operation was designed to capture Bhindranwale and his armed followers who had fortified the temple and to remove all the weapons that the separatists had stored in the sacred building.

Militarily successful, Operation BLUESTAR was a political disaster because the Indian Army's assault, which met very stiff resistance, badly damaged the holy shrine. This was considered the worst form of desecration of a beloved symbol of Sikhism and alienated the Sikh community both at home and abroad. The damage to the holy shrine led to the growth of

extremism. On October 31, 1984, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by two of her Sikh bodyguards, Satwant Singh (1962–1989) and Beant Singh (d. 1984). Hindus retaliated by murdering Sikhs while the authorities merely looked on. Two years later the chief of Indian Army staff, A. S. Vaidya (1926–1986), who supervised the attack on the Golden Temple, was also assassinated. Gandhi's and Vaidya's assassins have all been declared martyrs by various Sikh groups. Beant Singh's widow and his father were elected by Sikhs to the Lokh Sabha, the lower house of Parliament. The 1980s and 1990s were filled with violence and vigorous state action when, it has been claimed, more than 10,000 Sikhs were killed. Postmilitancy politics in Punjab continue to be tense, although the secessionist movement has all but ended. Culturally and economically the Punjab continues to be a vibrant region that contributes significantly to the economy.

STUTI BHATNAGAR

See also Amritsar; Chandigarh; Sikhism

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
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R



✦ RADIO

Since its beginnings in the 1920s, India radio has achieved its much-desired expansion. The Prasar Bharati Broadcasting Corporation (PBBC) is the public service broadcaster of India's television network (Doordashan) and the radio network AIR (All Indian Radio). Today 99 percent of India's 1 billion people have access to PBBC broadcasts. But the PBBC has been criticized for dull programming, unimaginatively conceived by bureaucrats and presented in a stiff and stilted manner, which has not endeared it to the listening public. Furthermore, the government is unwilling to give up control of the airwaves, whether it is by allowing the private sector to broadcast news, allowing foreign investment in radio broadcasting, or handing over the power and control of the medium to small rural communities to run their own community radio programming. Moreover, despite the information revolution and the onslaught of transnational media companies via satellite television, the government has still not formulated a coherent communications policy.

One of the future developments could be satellite radio. However, despite its wide reach, particularly when compared with FM radio, satellite radio lacks the ability to provide localized content, which FM radio can deliver. The high cost of receiving sets for satellite radio is also a major concern in India and is likely to play an important role in the popularity of satellite radio with the masses. Cable radio (provided by cable operators) and Internet radio are gaining in popularity. Today there are growing numbers of online radio stations.

In the 1950s, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) was starting up its own commercial shortwave radio broadcasts to India. Film songs expelled from the Indian airwaves found a berth on

Radio Ceylon, and soon Hindi film music on that channel became prime-time listening for Indians. The highlight of the week was the hit parade, called *Bianca Geetmala*. It was broadcast on Wednesdays and was sponsored by the multinational Ciba company to promote its brand of toothpaste. Ameen Sayani, the younger brother of Hamid Sayani, another well-known broadcaster, hosted English-language programs for Radio Ceylon and seduced his listeners with his mellifluous voice, humor, and charm. The program ended with the dramatic announcement, amid a fanfare of trumpets, of the new top single of the hit parade. "In many northern and central Indian cities," write Eric Barnouw and S. Krishnawamy, "that moment found clusters of people huddled around tea shops and other places with radios." Many remember those moments fondly. Sathya Saran, editor of the women's magazine *Femina*, even kept diaries of the weekly winning songs: "I remember as a schoolgirl sitting glued to the radio with a large diary on my lap, writing down the name of songs, and their listings on the countdown show, as if it were completely necessary to my well being."

A survey of listener preferences revealed that out of 10 households with licensed radio sets, 9 were tuned to Radio Ceylon and the 10th set was broken. B. V. Keskar, realizing that he could not beat the popularity of Radio Ceylon with his personal preferences, agreed to allow film music back on AIR. Vividh Bharati, a new service that offered almost nonstop film music broadcasts via two powerful short-wave transmitters from Bombay and Madras, was created in 1957. In 1967 the service turned commercial and began accepting advertisements and sponsorship. Today there are 36 Vividh Bharati and other commercial stations on AIR. (Also in 1967, television, hitherto under the auspices of AIR, was deemed an important enough medium to be placed under separate management.)

In the succeeding years, as the cost of transistor radios began to fall, ownership increased exponentially. Transistor radios were also offered as free gifts to men who volunteered for a vasectomy (in keeping with the government's drive to promote family planning) during the 1970s. As the number of transmitters increased, so did the number of listeners. During the infamous years of the Emergency (1975–1977) declared by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the government blatantly used the radio to promote its agenda. There was a clampdown on all dissenting voices, and V. C. Shukla, the minister for information and broadcasting, instructed station directors that AIR was not "a forum run by the government to debate on the conflicting ideologies but to make people 'understand' government policies." AIR was soon dubbed "All Indi(r)a Radio" by the listening public.

Following the defeat of Prime Minister Gandhi and the removal of the Indian National Congress (INC) government after more than three decades of continuous power, proposals granting autonomy to the broadcast media were circulated. However, all of them were shelved when Gandhi returned triumphant after the 1980 election. Against a background of growing violence in the Punjab, Kashmir, and the northeastern regions in the 1980s, she planned to deploy radio for the purpose of national integration and communal harmony. Any hopes for autonomy of the broadcasting services were firmly quashed. In 1984 radio licenses were abolished, and from that point forward the funding for radio came from the public purse.

Since then the issue of autonomy has been raised several times but invariably shelved, either because of a change in government or due to a lack of bureaucratic will. In 1997 the Prasar Bharati, a government-funded body, was set up to oversee the broadcast media and ensure the autonomy of their services. Nevertheless, successive governments have continued to meddle in the composition of its board, half of whose members are appointed by the government. Today AIR remains a centralized bureaucracy disseminating via its expanded network of 210 broadcasting centers what it believes the listening public ought to hear rather than showing any real interest in what they might actually wish to hear. But with the growing competition from television, particularly cable and satellite television, the government has been under tremendous pressure to liberalize the airwaves. If private television channels—even foreign private channels—have been allowed to broadcast to the Indian public, some have argued, why have no Indian private radio channels been granted the same privileges?

In a case brought before it in 1995, the Supreme Court of India delivered a historic judgment by ruling that the airwaves did not constitute the government's exclusive private property. The Court deemed that the airwaves belonged to the people, and although the airwaves could be used for the promotion of the government's political agenda, they also had to be used for promoting the public good. The Court ordered the government to privatize at least a part of the airwaves. With great reluctance, the government agreed to the sale of some FM frequencies to private entrepreneurs in 2000, but several caveats accompanied the government's agreement to privatize the airwaves. Most importantly, no private FM channels would be allowed to disseminate news, and no foreign direct investment would be allowed in radio broadcasting. A total of 107 frequencies were placed on the market for use in 40 cities. Despite the considerable fanfare accompanying this event, only 22 private FM radio stations currently operate in 14 cities. Of these, Sun TV owns 4 stations that provide programs in the southern regional languages.

One of the main reasons for the small number of FM channels has been the high cost of the licenses. This was not imposed by the government but stemmed directly from the folly of the private entrepreneurs. Buoyed by the dot-com boom, they entered into a bidding frenzy. When the bubble burst, they discovered that they had entered into a contractual agreement with the government for an annual increase of 15 percent, regardless of earnings. Since advertising revenues in radio are small compared with those in television and print media, some private FM channels such as Win FM quietly folded. Those that survive are mostly affiliated with media companies.

To recoup the costs of investment and license fees, many of the private FM channels have gravitated toward the most lucrative popular Hindi film and pop music sector. Because they target the same young, urban, and educated middle classes to procure advertising revenue, most channels have ended up providing almost identical fare, delivered in the same breezy Hinglish (Hindi-English) patter. That these privatized FM channels are indistinguishable was made apparent by DRS, a marketing company survey in which listeners to the top three private FM channels—Mirchi, Red, and City Radio—were unable to distinguish among them. According

to Anish Trivedi, formerly of Radio Mid-Day, "Unfortunately the radio industry in India doesn't have a choice any more. The fee structure forces it to attract as large an audience as it can get. While there is nothing wrong with this, I feel it limits the scope of the station, in terms of its programming. . . . My problem is having to assume that all listeners are idiots."

The tight control exercised by the state on the production and dissemination of content, on the one hand, and the homogenized fare that is palmed off as entertainment by the privatized channels, on the other, has resulted in a hegemony in which the state and the market have control over broadcasting. In such a situation, the listening public, both urban and rural, has no say whatsoever in the matter.

News and music are generally the main fare offered on Indian radio channels. The myriad channels of AIR are divided into five main sections that focus on rural areas (primary channels), cities (FM), the commercial service (nationwide), the nighttime channel (nationwide), and external broadcasts.

The main commercial section of AIR is centered on the 36 Vividh Bharati and other commercial stations on AIR. Vividh Bharati, which began in 1957, almost exclusively offers popular film music to the entire nation. The programming mix that is broadcast on primary channels in the regional languages includes news; film and nonfilm music; talks; discussions; interviews; programs on health, nutrition, hygiene, farming, and agriculture; special programs for women and children; sports programs; radio plays; and serials.

A mix of news and music—in Hindi, English, and regional languages—is the main fare of the 9 FM channels that serve the nine major cities (Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Bangalore, Panaji, Lucknow, Cuttack, and Jallandhar). They also feature chat shows, help lines, interactive phone-in programs, traffic news, and weather. The 4 FM II channels in Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata, and Chennai are largely news-based. Plans for FM radio include 40 FM channels that are to be accorded to the education sector in conjunction with the Indira Gandhi National Open University for Gyan Vani (education) channels.

A nationwide nighttime program featuring news, music, and sports is broadcast in Hindi, English, and Urdu. The target audience is mostly the Indian male night-shift workers. AIR also features external broadcasts aimed at the neighboring countries and the Indian diaspora in the developed world. The broadcasts are produced in 27 languages (17 foreign and 10 Indian). The content of the programs is largely news, current affairs, reviews of the Indian press, music, and other subjects of cultural interest.

The most important function of AIR is the dissemination of news. AIR provides a total of 364 news bulletins daily. Around half of these emanate from Delhi and are in Hindi. These are then relayed across the country and are translated into regional languages and dialects. In addition, 45 regional news units located around the country produce 187 regional news bulletins. In total, news is disseminated in 64 regional languages and dialects.

Critics complain about the dull presentation of the news and that the language used on AIR is chaste and ornate. The style is stultified and rigid instead of friendly, and as Sayani Saran points out, its broadcasters make "a pronouncement" of everything. Furthermore, its

news coverage is always deferential to the government and avoids all sensitive or controversial issues. Since political power rests in New Delhi and most news bulletins are composed in the capital before being translated into the regional languages and dialects, the news presentation also tends to be very Delhi-centric. (A similar pattern of control is visible in radio drama. In AIR's drama contests, regional plays must all be first translated into Hindi and then retranslated into the different regional languages for dissemination.) Consequently, the common perception is that news bulletins pay scant attention to local needs and that local news is lower in priority than is national news on local radio stations.

The government waged a similar crusade against foreign news media on television. Unable to stop the news broadcasts of transnational media companies such as BBC and CNN, the government decided to impose its will on foreign companies seeking to disseminate news in Hindi. The government thus pursued Rupert Murdoch's STAR TV news channel with remarkable vigor. Having seen profitability in India rise, STAR News, the news channel of STAR TV, had decided to switch to news services in Hindi. In order to adhere to the government's new guidelines on uplinking, STAR News sought Indian investors for the required 74 percent equity among Indian investors. This led to accusations from rival companies that STAR TV had allowed a plethora of Indian individuals to have a stake in the company but with no real control and that Murdoch would be the dominant influence behind the scenes, as was allegedly the case in the company's FM Radio City operations. Each night until the dispute was resolved, STAR News, produced in India, had to obtain the Indian government's permission to broadcast for the next seven days via its regional base in Hong Kong. The ritual continued until STAR News found Ananda Bazar Patrika, a Kolkata-based publisher, to acquire the 74 percent stake, and the company won a 10-year license to broadcast its news programs directly from its base in Mumbai.

ASHA KASBEKAR RICHARDS

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✦ RAILROADS

The greatest development in the mid-19th century under British rule, one that would have far-reaching consequences of welding India as a nation, took place in the realm of communications. First and foremost among these developments was the building of railways all across India, and it was this development that played a large role in the making of modern India in terms of economic and social development (including the perceptions of the people) and the forging of different geographical and linguistic areas into one unit. Along with the railways, there was the expansion and modernization of road transport such as the Grand Trunk Highway and the introduction of the telegraph (the Victorian Internet). Without these three communication systems, India could not have escaped its premodern economic pattern that was present until the early 19th century, with no access to an expanding internal and international market and no chance of stimulating the early industrial boom or expanding its agricultural products and cash crops, such as jute and cotton.

Indian railways have one of the grandest pieces of architecture of the late Victorian era. The best known among them was the Victoria Terminus, also known as the Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST), built between 1878–1887 and opened during the diamond jubilee of Queen Victoria. The terminus, designed by the famous architect F. W. Stevens and built in the Gothic-Saracenic style, features ornamental arches, ornate stained glass windows, and an imposing central dome. Other stations in the Gothic-Saracenic style that are also palatial in appearance include the Southern Railway Headquarters in Chennai (Madras), the Western Railway Headquarters at Churchgate in Mumbai (Bombay), the Central Station at Egmore in Chennai (Madras), and the Bengal-Nagpur Railway Headquarters at Kolkata (Calcutta), all of which are the finest examples of British Raj's public buildings. They could also be seen as architectural expressions of the colonial presence that exuded confidence and a sense of purpose. This was how the colonial administration wanted the Indian public to perceive its presence and role: as being one with a progressive mission and with all the trappings of power and grandeur. The railways were built for an empire that was meant to endure for a very long time. However, this imposing facade began to buckle in the early decades of the



Mumbai's Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (formerly Victoria Terminus), was opened in 1887 and is the city's main railroad station. With its Victorian neo-Gothic architecture, it is one of the most photographed buildings in all of India. Known as the "CST," the station teems with tens of thousands of commuters pouring through its doorways during the morning and evening rush hours. It has been designated by UNESCO as an outstanding World Heritage site. (Shutterstock)

20th century. Paradoxically, the very institutions and services that were meant to prop up the longevity of the British Raj also undermined its legitimacy. Here the railways played no small role in creating an India-wide nationalist movement.

After independence, India inherited a significant portion of the colonial railway network. New railway links had to be added to address the vital loss of key links due to partition. The priorities had also changed. The British-India government had favored the railways at the expense of large road networks, while the government of independent India focused on building the road networks at the expense of expanding or modernizing its railway system. This led to a greater volume of goods transported by roads.

The first priority after independence was to fill all the gaps in the colonial railway network, which was not designed to meet the requirements of a modern industrial society. The second priority was the standardization of the distance between tracks, or gauges (the unigauge project), and was not undertaken until the late 1990s. In 1853 the broad gauge of 5 feet 6 inches was adapted for India because it was steadier and could have dual civilian and military use. The broad gauge was used to link all the major cities. However, due to greater consideration

of the economy, a new gauge of 3 feet ⅜ inch (meter gauge) was adapted for secondary and feeder links because it was cheaper mile per mile and could also be laid at a much faster rate. A smaller, narrower gauge was adapted for hill stations and many of the princely states. By the time of independence, India had a mixed bag of 9,942 miles of broad gauge, 9,321 miles of meter gauge, and 1,864 miles of narrow gauge of various sizes. After independence, due to a shift in priorities and the lack of funds needed for conversion, a three-gauge system was in use until 1995, when the decision was made that a single unigauge system should be adapted for all existing railway lines. At the current rate of progress, it would take another two decades for full conversion to a single broad gauge. By the year 2000, the broad gauge, which included further additions since independence, had 44,383 miles of track and hauled 90 percent of the nation's freight and 85 percent of its passenger transport.

Electrification of suburban routes was considered as far back as 1914, but no active steps were taken until 1922, when the first experimental train between Bombay and Kurla covered a distance of 9.5 miles; it was opened to the public three years later. Electricity was seen as the most efficient energy and was ideal for hauling heavy traffic. Electrification also had other advantages, such as reducing noise and air pollution and causing fewer disturbances to wildlife. So far less than a third of the railway system has been electrified, and the goal of electrification of the entire system is proceeding at a steady pace. The Mumbai suburban electric trains currently operate for 20 hours daily. At peak hours there is one train every two minutes, and trains often carry three times the permitted load.

Another means of tackling urban traffic problems is the building of underground railways, especially in large cities such as Calcutta, with its congested narrow roads and gridlock traffic jams. A decision was made as early as 1972 to create Calcutta Metro for speedier passenger service, and after many delays the service finally opened in 1995 with state-of-the-art technology. India-specific problems, such as heavy monsoon flooding, had to be addressed before India could have its own world-class underground metro system. Similar plans are being drawn up for New Delhi.

One of the priorities of the postindependence Indian government was total self-reliance, and for this purpose a state-of-the-art locomotive manufacturing unit was built at the Chittaranjan Locomotive Works and came into production in 1950. Chittaranjan Locomotive Works produced steam locomotives until 1972 and since then exclusively manufactures electric and diesel trains. A number of other manufacturing centers, both private and public, were constructed to build engine coaches and electrical parts for what still is Asia's largest rail network. Today the railways remains India's largest employer, as it was in the days of the British Raj. Currently, ambitious plans are being made to introduce monorails in major urban centers and to connect India's major cities by superfast trains.

RAMAN N. SEYLON

See also Economy; Indian Airlines

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✦ RAJASTHAN

India's largest state, noted for its enduring cultural traditions. Rajasthan is located in the northwestern part of India, bordered on the west by Pakistan and elsewhere by five neighboring Indian states, and is bisected by the rugged Aravalli Range, which stretches from the southwest to the northeastern corner of the state. West of this range the land is relatively flat, dry, and infertile, much of it dominated by the Thar Desert. In the eastern parts of the state the land is hilly and more fertile. Average rainfall also varies. The western deserts accumulate about 4 inches annually, while southeastern Rajasthan averages 26 inches, most of which falls during the summer monsoon season.

Rajasthan has been popularly linked to the Rajputs, a warrior caste that ruled much of the region beginning around the 7th century CE. With the advent of the Mughal Empire in the 16th century, many of the Rajput kingdoms aligned themselves with the Mughal court and were greatly influenced by the Mughals both economically and culturally. This led to an era of tremendous wealth and patronage of the arts, resulting in distinctive Rajput styles of art and architecture. Indeed, one popular term for the region as a whole, and the name by which it was known under British rule, was Rajputana ("the land of the Rajputs"). At the time of Indian independence in 1947, the region still included 19 princely states as well as areas that had been under direct British rule. Most of these joined in 1949 to form the state of Rajasthan ("the place of kings"), a term dating from the late 18th century and popularized by the writings of the British chronicler James Tod (1782–1835). With the incorporation of Ajmer and several smaller territories in 1956, Rajasthan assumed its present shape, with Jaipur as the capital. The state is divided into 33 districts and has a single-chamber Legislative Assembly with 200 seats.

Rajasthan encompasses an area of 132,140 square miles. The population according to the 2001 census was 56.5 million. The urban population, comprising 23.4 percent of the total, resides in 222 cities and towns, while 76.6 percent of the population lives in more than 41,000 villages. Almost 90 percent of the population identifies itself as Hindu, while 8.5 percent are Muslim. There are, in addition, small but influential communities of Jains and Sikhs. Approximately 12 percent of the population is from tribal communities, predominantly Bhils and Meenas. The

most commonly spoken languages are Hindi, which has long been the official state language, and various dialects of Rajasthani, which was recently recognized as an official state language but has yet to be recognized as an official language at the national level. Rajasthani was generally considered to be a dialect of Hindi, although that perception has been changing in recent years, and many linguists recognize it today as a distinct language or cluster of related regional dialects.

With the martial heritage of the Rajputs, the colorful appearance of village and tribal peoples, living folk traditions, and magnificent ancient Jain temples at places such as Mount Abu and Osian, Rajasthan is known as one of the most culturally traditional states in India and is thereby one of the country's most popular tourist destinations. Since the elimination of privy purses for princes in 1971, many local erstwhile rulers have converted their forts into tourist attractions and their palaces into heritage hotels. In recent decades, Rajputs have played a prominent role in all sectors of the burgeoning tourist industry. The state government, private foundations, and private enterprises have placed a high priority on preserving, encouraging, and showcasing the traditional performing arts, music, and dance of Rajasthan. These are often on display at forts, museums, festivals, and tourist-oriented specially equipped, maintained, and idealized "villages."

Similarly, there have been efforts to encourage the production of the handicrafts for which Rajasthan is noted, such as miniature paintings, pottery, camel leather shoes, embroidery, and jewelry. Although jewelry is produced throughout the state, Jaipur is today an important global center



Jaipur city, Rajasthan. View from Ishwar Lat minaret near Tripolia gate. "The Pink City," founded in 1727, was India's first planned city. With its palaces, especially the Hawa Mahal, or "Palace of the Winds," Jaipur is one of India's most popular tourist destinations. (Alexander Zotov/Dreamstime.com)

for the production and trade of jewelry, gems, and semiprecious stones. Rajasthan is perhaps best known for the colorfulness of its woolen and cotton textiles, especially block-print and tie-dye cotton fabrics. Cotton prints from towns such as Sanganer and Bagru in the Jaipur District are well known, yet each region of Rajasthan produces its own distinctive patterns and styles.

Other major industries include cement production and the quarrying of marble and sandstone. The latter are not particularly new, as many palaces were constructed of local sandstone, and the marble used in the construction of the Taj Mahal came from the quarry at Makrana. Agricultural production focuses on grains such as wheat and millet, oil seeds, cotton, and sugarcane. Rajasthan is India's largest producer of opium for the pharmaceutical industry.

Rajasthan is known for its historic forts, palaces, and temples, yet it is also home to a number of colorful festivals that have become internationally known, especially the Pushkar Festival, the Marwar Festival in Jodhpur, the Camel Festival in Bikaner, and the Desert Festival in Jaisalmer. Some of these were originally annual fairs for trading livestock but have developed into major showcases for traditional arts, crafts, music, and dance.

Finally, Rajasthan features many distinctive religious shrines and related pilgrimages and fairs. Some important pilgrimages celebrate deified heroes such as Ramdevra, Tejaji, and Gogaji or premodern saints such as Dadu, Jambhoji, and Karni Mata. Thousands of pilgrims are attracted to major Jain shrines at Shri Mahavirji, Nakoda, and Rishabdeo. The most popular Muslim shrine in India is the *dargah* (tomb-shrine) of Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti at Ajmer, where the annual pilgrimage (*urs*) attracts hundreds of thousands of devotees.

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See also Jaipur

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✦ RAMAKRISHNA MISSION

The Ramakrishna Mission, or Vedanta Movement, is a worldwide Hindu spiritual and philanthropic movement named after the Indian saint Ramakrishna Paramahamsa (1836–1886), who preached a simple message of love and tolerance. The Ramakrishna

Mission is headquartered on 40 acres of land just outside of Kolkata at Belur on the west bank of the river Hooghly. Begun by a few Hindu monks, the mission was created in 1897 by Paramahamsa's disciples, foremost among whom was Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902), born Narendranath Dutta in Kolkata, who became a renowned figure in religious circles after he spoke about Hinduism at the Parliament of the World's Religions in Chicago in 1893. The Ramakrishna Mission and the Ramakrishna Math (monastery) form the core of the movement. The math serves as the center for the monastic activities of the order, providing space for the pursuit of spiritual discipline, and also serves as a center for secular activities. The latter include such philanthropic work as education, medicine, and helping people in distress. Together the organizations concretize the motto of the Ramakrishna movement: *Atmano mokshartham jagad hitaya cha* ("For one's own salvation and for the welfare of the world"). It was Vivekananda, with his emphasis on social work, who transformed the Hindu discourse on asceticism, devotion, and worship into the ethos of service to the nation. The Ramakrishna Mission preaches respect for all religions, advocates service to humanity as the highest form of worship, and has successfully blended together the monastic ideal of renunciation with that of altruistic service to society. Today the mission is one of the most successful of all religious orders, with 171 branches and thousands of disciples spread throughout the world.

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See also Hinduism; Kolkata; Religion

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✦ RASHTRIYA SWAYAMSEVAK SANGH

Boasting 4.5 million members in 2009, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), or National Volunteers Organization, is a right-wing Hindu nationalist group that emerged in 1925 from the landscape of Hindu-Muslim riots, low-caste protest movements, and the national movement for independence. Keshava Baliram Hedgewar (1889–1940) of Maharashtra founded the group with five or six others at Nagpur and served as the first leader of the RSS, which became the core of the Sangh Parivar, or family of organizations dedicated to a nationalist project in postindependence India. Through its doctrine of "the whole world is one family," the RSS claims to renew Indian values and culture. This includes rejecting the caste system and working toward an egalitarian society, a position that RSS has backed by its

large numbers of Dalit (untouchable) members. However, the party has maintained a hard-line stance on immigration, particularly the immigration of Bengali and Pakistani Muslims.

Contrary to the National Congress Party, founded in 1885 as the Indian National Congress, which advocated a nonviolent inclusive Indian nation whose focus was uniting against the British, the RSS favored the idea of a unified Hindu nation and was not opposed to militancy or the use of violence. According to its mission statement, the RSS believes that the word "Hindu" is an inclusive category that embodies certain life values, principles, and a holistic perception of the world. However, by propagating a Hindu majoritarian viewpoint, the party's rhetoric has strong anti-Muslim overtones.

The basis of RSS ideology originated from a pamphlet issued in 1923 titled *Hindutva—Who Is a Hindu?* that was written by V. D. Savarkar (1883–1966). K. B. Hedgewar drew out Savarkar's assertion that the term "Hindu" was a racial designation and further expanded the concept of ethnic nationality as developed by Madhav Sadashiv Golwalkar (1906–1973) in his *We, Our Nationhood Defined* (1939). In this treatise Golwalkar criticized India as falling behind socially and rejected the concept of territorial nationalism that the Congress Party supported, that is, a universalistic belief that all peoples and cultures inside India's borders were part of the Indian nation. Instead, he proposed a European model and used Nazi Germany as an example of why homogeneity was an unlikely possibility in a nation with varying ethnic groups. This also drew upon Savarkar's proposition that a common race and a shared civilization and culture make a nation, not mere geographic boundaries.

The RSS has had a contentious history and was banned by the Indian government in 1948, 1975, and 1992 for its involvement in the January 1948 assassination of Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948), the Emergency in India declared by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984) between 1975 and 1977, and the Babri Mosque incident of 1992 when Hindus demolished a mosque believed to be the site of a Hindu temple. In all three instances the organization legally petitioned to have the ban lifted, won the legal battle, and had the organization reinstated.

While there is a branch of the RSS for women, the Rashtra Sevika Samiti, the main organization is for men only and places a strong emphasis on militant masculinity. One of the reasons that the RSS is accused of indoctrinating young men to be potentially violent and reactionary is the emphasis on physical exercise and strength, which are propagated through the *shakhas,* or local branches. The military-like structure of these schools begins with physical fitness routines that include yoga, games, and strength training. The singing of a *prarthana,* or hymn, to the motherland is also performed daily, and the schools also impart lessons emphasizing the RSS's doctrines. The ritual environment of the *shakhas,* infused with anti-Muslim messages and an ultranationalist stance, define the organization as a martial right-wing organization in the Indian political landscape.

Despite a controversial record, the RSS has a policy of *seva,* or public service, that followers study at camps similar to *shakhas.* The RSS has been notably active in relief efforts during times of natural disasters, earthquakes, cyclones, and regional floods. In 2001 the RSS

was reported to have provided more than 30,000 volunteers to aid in searching for victims and removing rubble after the earthquake that devastated parts of Gujarat. The RSS is also credited with speaking out against anti-Sikh violence in the wake of Indira Gandhi's assassination in 1984. Nonetheless, many scholars and journalists remain critical of RSS tactics in the political arena, which are often labeled as extremist or militant.

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See also Sangh Parivar; Vishwa Hindu Parishad

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✦ REGIONALISM AND REGIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTHERN ASIA

The new regionalism theory has been compared with old regionalism, which emerged in the early 20th century. The new regionalism theory is defined as a more comprehensive and multidimensional process that covers trade and economic integration, the environment, social policy, and security and democracy. In the new regionalism theory there is no mention of any direct way to deal with the issue of conflict resolution, although there is a mention of security as a common issue. Nevertheless, one missing aspect from the South Asian Association for Region Cooperation (SAARC) mechanism is proposed in the new regionalism theory: the growth of civil society striving for regional solutions to local and national problems. The significance of civil society is that not only economic networks but also sociocultural networks develop more quickly than formal political cooperation at the regional level. Therefore, unlike the top-down approach adopted by most of the regional cooperation systems based on the traditional paradigm, the new regionalism theory is mainly initiated through a bottom-up process, especially by the civil society actors. The process headed by nonstate actors is often referred to as regionalization.

The SAARC Charter (1985) declares that the member states of SAARC are "desirous of peace, stability, amity and progress in the region through strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter and Non-Alignment, particularly respect for the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, national independence, nonuse of force and noninterference

in the internal affairs of other States and peaceful settlement of all disputes." The charter was signed in Dhaka, Bangladesh, by the heads of states of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.

Since its establishment, SAARC has initiated some important programs for regional economic integration and social cohesion, with the intent to establish equitable development at the regional level. With the overall aim of economic integration, the SAARC Chambers of Commerce and Industry was set up in 1992 to promote regional cooperation in the areas of trade and economic relations. However, a notable move toward furthering economic interdependence was the setting up of the South Asian Preferential Free Trade Agreement (SAPTA) in 1995. Historically South Asia has been a free-trade zone, as until 1947 the three major member states of SAARC—Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan—had been part of British India, which was a common market with an integrated monetary and communication system.

Ratified and entered into force in mid-2006, the South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) builds on the provisions given in SAPTA, therefore extending its scope to include trade facilitation elements and preferred trade liberalization processes from a positive to a negative list approach. One of the key elements of SAFTA is the compensation given for revenue losses for smaller regional economies (Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Maldives) in the event of tariff reductions. SAFTA required the developing countries in South Asia—that is, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—to bring their duties down to 20 percent in the first phase of the two-year period ending in 2007. In the final five-year phase ending in 2012, the 20 percent duty will be reduced to zero in a series of annual cuts. However, the least developing country group in South Asia—consisting of Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Maldives—gets an additional three years to reach zero duty: they have until 2015. Economic integration in South Asia is the prime objective of SAFTA via eliminating all sorts of barriers in trade, promoting free and fair movement of products, promoting fair competition and a free trade environment in regard to existing economic conditions, and establishing an institutional framework to promote and expand regional cooperation.

Apart from its goal of economic integration, a significant focus of SAARC is social cohesion among member countries so as to promote a vibrant South Asian identity. Some of the initiatives taken toward this end include:

1. SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (1987).
2. SAARC Convention on Prevention and Combating Trafficking in Women and Children for Prostitution (2002).
3. SAARC Social Charter (2004).
4. Association of SAARC Speakers and Parliamentarians (1992).
5. SAARCLAW, an association for persons from the legal communities of the SAARC countries (1992).
6. SAARC Scheme for Promotion of Organized Tourism. The scheme was initiated with the overall objective of people-to-people contact in the region and more specifically as a step to facilitate the development of intraregional tourism.

7. SAARC Chairs, Fellowships and Scholarships Scheme. This initiative intends to provide cross-fertilization of ideas through greater interaction among students, scholars, and academics.
8. SAARC Youth Volunteers Program (SYVOP). The main objective of the SYVOP is to harness the idealism of youths for regional cooperation programs by enabling them to work in other countries in the field of agriculture and forestry.

Furthering SAARC objectives, the 14th SAARC Summit held in New Delhi in April 2007 took some significant steps. Member states agreed to increase the SAARC Development Fund, establish the South Asian University, create a SAARC Food Bank, and set up the SAARC Arbitration Council. At the same time, Afghanistan was formally invited to become a member.

The total of informal trade in the South Asian region is about $1.5 billion, which is 72 percent of formal trade for which estimates are available. Interestingly, of the $525 million of India's informal trade with Pakistan, almost half is traded officially first to Dubai and then to Pakistan via Iran and Afghanistan. The reason for this lies in the strained political relations between India and Pakistan. South Asian states seem unprepared for full-scale economic integration due to their fear of being swamped vis-à-vis the Indian economy because of its hegemonic behavior or losing their sovereignty to some extent.

Over the past two decades, SAARC has provided a forum for informal bilateral discussions especially when there has been an absence of formal interaction between the heads of states. For example, the 1991 SAARC Summit was an opportunity for the meeting between the Nepalese prime minister and the Bhutanese king to discuss the issue of refugees, and the May 1997 SAARC Summit enabled the Indian and Pakistani prime ministers to meet and discuss important bilateral issues. Indian and Pakistani officials also met on the sidelines of SAARC summits in Colombo and Katmandu to continue their debates on contemporary bilateral issues. This all was done outside the SAARC agenda.

However, SAARC is not always used as well as it could be. Three of the biggest economies within SAARC—India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—account for 89 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) and 87 percent of the population of the region, yet each nation tackles problems on an individual basis rather than collectively because of political tensions among them. As a result, economic interdependence in the region is very low. Intraregional trade in SAARC is only 3–4 percent. Economic integration is usually seen as a first step toward the ideal of regionalism in any region, and SAARC has come under criticism for its failure to boost economic integration more than has been achieved.

The hope that SAARC would provide incremental benefits to South Asia had not been realized. Peaceful relations and the effective implementation of the SAARC Charter (1985) have been hindered by interstate conflicts between member states. For example, India and Pakistan have been battling through SAARC due to different priorities. As for India, conflict resolution comes after economic cooperation; with the case of Pakistan it is otherwise. The



Indian spectators applaud soldiers of the Indian Border Security Force during the ceremonial opening of the Indo-Pakistan border, October 25, 2009. (Dreamstime.com)

temptation to put either one—conflict resolution and normalization of bilateral issues—ahead of other issues has resulted in the lack of movement on both fronts.

When talking of interstate conflicts in South Asia, India is seen as the state at the center of the disputes. This has strengthened Pakistan's friendship with other smaller states, giving hope that a common stand could help to dilute Indian hegemony through SAARC. However, India and Pakistan are stuck over the Kashmir dispute.

For all the disappointments surrounding SAARC, it is evident that SAARC over the past two decades has been involved in the unprecedented rise in the interaction and networking among various institutions, agencies, and civil society organizations in South Asia. This unofficial cooperation has centered around various issues, especially the promotion of human rights, conflict resolution, health, business, and the performing arts. It has also been stated that through unofficial contacts SAARC was going to be the driving force behind the official SAARC process and that this constituted some sort of new regionalism. One drawback to the effectiveness of the organization is that SAARC has no provision for civil society groups to participate in SAARC summits.

Civil society organizations have been continuously making efforts to improve relations and to develop agendas for upcoming meetings. It was estimated that in 1998–1999 alone there were over 38 Track II channels working in South Asia. This shows the influence of civil society actors. It is often said that regionalization initiated by civil society in South Asia is creating regional peace constituencies.

There have been social movements from civil society organizations forging people-to-people forums in South Asia. This has also enabled civil society voices to be heard at the regional level. One such initiative is called South Asia Partnership International (SAP-I), with its member organizations in Bangladesh, Canada, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. For more than 20 years SAP-I has been promoting regionalism through civil society initiatives. Since 2001 this network has been organizing the People's Summit, which is designed to promote the people's agenda, as SAARC does not have the mechanism to enable civil society groups to interact with them. In addition, there are numerous think tanks in the region studying regionalism vis-à-vis SAARC and formulating recommendations to enhance its activities. For example, the South Asian Centre for Policy Studies (SACEPS) is based in Nepal; the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) based in Colombo, Sri Lanka; and the Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI) is based in Islamabad, Pakistan. SACEPS has been active in debating the role of SAARC and in introducing measures to enhance regionalism. What needs to be done, however, is for civil society groups to have a formal relationship with SAARC.

Greater contact among the SAARC countries has the potential to develop into a launching pad for free trade, larger intraregional investments, and economic integration. Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (b. 1924; prime minister 1996, 1998–2004) even said that open borders and a single currency for South Asia were not unrealistic if the states of the region improved relations and eradicated mutual suspicion. SAARC has taken a gradual approach toward achieving this objective. The problem today is not regional cooperation but rather how to handle intraregional conflicts and to maintain good and just peaceful relations. This is done through conflict resolution or management mechanisms in most regional cooperation structures. With this in mind, a call was made by Pakistan in 2005, articulated by Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri (b. 1941; foreign minister 2002–2007) and President Pervez Musharraf (b. 1943; president 2001–2008) to set up a conflict resolution mechanism within SAARC.

In the past, SAARC has adapted to changing needs and circumstances at the regional level and has expanded its mandate beyond the original spirit of its charter. SAARC has formulated special conventions on problems such as terrorism, drugs, and human trafficking and in this regard set up the SAARC Terrorism Offences Monitoring Desk (STOMD) and the SAARC Drug Offences Monitoring Desk (SDOMD), both based in Sri Lanka. SAARC has also provided opportunities for the leaders of India and Pakistan to continue discussions even at times of high tension.

South Asian nations are aware of the need to pursue the goal of regionalism under the umbrella of SAARC in order to overcome widespread poverty, promote conflict resolution, benefit from extended regional cooperation and economies of scale, and become more competitive and achieve higher growth rates.

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See also Afghanistan, Relations with; Pakistan, Relations with; South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation; Sri Lanka, Relations with

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✦ RELIGION

In India there is no precise equivalent term for the word "religion" and it meanings, although it is certainly possible that a Westerner would identify and recognize as religious certain behavior and practices in India. Religion in India just might be conceived differently, or it might be designated by a completely different term. Actually, both of these points are true within the Indian cultural context. Traditionally, religion (if the term is applied recognizing its cross-cultural limitations) is intertwined with Indian culture, and it is thus difficult to really separate religion from Indian culture.

The closest approximation of the term "religion" in India is the notion of *dharma*, a very elusive term itself to precisely define. The term "dharma" originates from the Sanskrit root *dhar* ("to hold or uphold," "to maintain," "to support," "to be firm," or "to be durable"). In classical Indian texts, dharma can be viewed from two perspectives: physical and individual moral worlds. Both perspectives refer to a revealed and eternal dharma. The term "dharma" when applied to the universe signifies the cosmic laws that govern and maintain it, which are laws guarded by the gods. In addition to the physical realm, dharma also includes the moral world of humans. Within a moral context, dharma represents a set of personal and social obligations and duties that are dependent on a person's station in life and his or her social standing. These obligations associated with personal and moral dharma basically govern how a person should act. In this sense dharma embodies social custom. In short, dharma includes cosmic laws, social custom, legal requirements, and religious rules. The exact opposite of dharma is adharma (nondharma), which disrupts the cosmic harmony, disturbs the social fabric of society, and fragments an individual.

Beyond its meaning as the right way to behave and to maintain harmony in the cosmos, dharma can arguably be best grasped as a total way of life. And this way of life possesses legal, social, and religious rules that need to be followed by an individual. These rules include, for

instance, dietary rules about what foods are allowed or forbidden, rules about with whom an individual can eat a meal, and hygienic rules related to proper bathing, brushing teeth, and grooming. As the social regulations of Indian life, dharma includes the social system and instructions about how the different groups are expected to interact with each other and outsiders, the judicial system and its violations and punishments, and rites of passage from before birth to death. These various rites (birth, initiation, marriage, and death being the most important) shape, refine, and perfect an individual into an adult member of society. This is both an outer and an inner process that is necessarily visible and invisible.

The source of dharma suggests most vehemently and lucidly its association with what the West refers to as religion. There are four sources of dharma, of which the most significant is the divinely revealed Vedas, which for ancient Hindus implies that all dharmas are grounded in revelation. This suggests that dharmas have a transcendent character and thus cannot be easily altered. Tradition is the second source of dharma and rests on the memory of the community. Memory is inferior and subordinate to revelation because it is not directly heard as with revelation, although that which is remembered is based on revelation. Good custom and human conscience are the final two sources of dharma. Good custom, or the way that righteous people live, is equated with a religious life and the acquiring of insight. These sources of dharma establish the traditional goals of life: artha (the attainment of economic well-being), kāma (desire, pleasure, or love), dharma (ritual, religion, ethics, social rules, civil and criminal laws), and moksha (liberation, release, redemption). All of these are considered legitimate goals to pursue. Two of these four goals of life are religiously oriented, which emphasizes the heavily religious connotations of dharma and makes it a close equivalent of what is ordinarily regarded as religion in the West.

If the term "dharma" represents the closest equivalent to religion in India, the characteristics of Hinduism set it apart from the major monotheistic faiths: Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Jainism. Hinduism is polytheistic with strands of monotheism running through it by way of the various sectarian traditions. There is no single identifiable founder of Hinduism, as is the case with Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. Hinduism does not possess a single unified religious organization such as a church. No single text or body of texts (although numerous texts are considered sacred), no single doctrine, and no one symbol are considered authoritative for all Hindus. Hinduism lacks a binding religious authority because there is no founder, no universal organization, and no authoritative scripture (although there are several contenders). Instead of a single sacred center, Hinduism embraces many of them to which people make pilgrimages. There are also many religious leaders, many texts, and many doctrines and symbols. It is difficult to get a cogent grasp of this multitude of religious phenomena. To make matters more confusing, there is no sharp distinction between divine and human beings in Hinduism, which makes it possible to pass from one status to the other. A couple of ways to differentiate between a deity and a human is to gaze at their eyes and feet. If a being does not blink or does not touch the ground with its feet, it is highly probable that the being is divine. In addition to a multitude of gods and goddesses, Hinduism is constituted by many sectarian movements usually centered on a

single divine figure, many schools of thought, a multitude of temples and other sacred locations, and different beliefs and practices. In summary, these various features of Hinduism make it difficult to claim that it represents an orthodoxy, but as the dharma of the Indian people, Hinduism can be grasped as an orthopraxis, or the correct way to act within a religious belief system. Therefore, a Hindu possesses considerable freedom of belief, but an individual is more circumscribed with respect to correct behavior.

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See also Hinduism

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✦ RELIGIOUS POLLUTION

Within the context of the Hindu religious tradition, pollution is an important concept. Pollution is equated with dirt, which is matter out of place according to the insightful work of the anthropologist Mary Douglas (1921–2007) in her seminal work *Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo* (1966). To become polluted means to be defiled, sullied, or dirty, which involves being in a wrong condition with respect to others, social norms, and cultural mores. It is possible to become polluted by improper personal actions, coming into contact with a defiled person, or having contact with an unclean substance, such as some form of bodily waste product (blood, spittle, semen, mucus, hair, nails, feces, or urine). As Douglas makes clear, dirt is misplaced matter that offends against order, which is symbolized by purity. Dirt is never a unique isolated event because it always presupposes an ordered symbolic social system and a systematic ordering and classification of matter, whose boundaries are culturally determined. Moreover, pollution is a type of danger that can result in disorder and can be committed intentionally or inadvertently. It is always incumbent upon the polluted person to remove this incorrect and dangerous condition by means of purification, such by using water or ingesting products of a cow.

Within Hindu religious tradition, there are three major forms of pollution: menstruation, death, and birth. During their menstrual period, women are isolated and live an ascetic lifestyle for five days. Pollution caused by death transmits defilement by genealogical linkage, and the closer the deceased is to survivors, the greater is the pollution for them.

The final major form of pollution is birth, which is culturally called happy pollution because the arrival of a newborn is a joyous event. Obviously, birth pollution is transmitted through kinship lines, although it typically involves a smaller group of kinsfolk than death pollution. The mother, for instance, is considered polluted for three months after giving birth, while her husband is polluted for a period of 11 days.

In addition to these major types of pollution, there are lesser types such as bodily emissions, contact with leather, sexual relations, shaving, cutting of hair, and paring of nails. Saliva generated by eating is another source of pollution. Within the context of classical Hinduism, the polluting nature of saliva due to eating involves restrictions on the transfer of food between different social groups. These food restrictions are related to the types of food. As a general rule, there are no restrictions on raw food, whereas cooked food involves numerous restrictions. Imperfect food (*kaccā*) is, for instance, boiled rice or possibly wheat flour cakes cooked without fat. This type of food is considered imperfect because it is cooked with water, which makes it vulnerable to impurity. Perfect food (*pakkā*) gains its status because it uses cow products in the cooking process that sanctify the food cooked with it.

A more unusual type of defilement is respect pollution, which is an intentional type of pollution. Intentional pollution is performed to demonstrate deference and respect to someone of higher status such as a guru or other type of holy person, which enables a person to express her or his inferior status. Since the human body is hierarchically ordered in Hinduism, with the head being the highest part and the feet being the lowest part, when a person touches the feet of



A Hindu devotee prostrates himself before a *mahant*, a religious leader, on the banks of the sacred river Ganges in Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh, July 2004. (AP photo/Rajesh Kumar Singh)

a superior person, the person doing the touching accepts the pollution of the exalted individual. This is also true of washing the feet of a holy person or embracing the feet of one's parents.

Within the context of Indian villages, ideas about pollution are directly related to the hierarchy of supernatural beings because the high gods, who are usually identified with Sanskrit deities such as Vishnu and Shiva, maintain the highest state of purity, whereas local village spirits are innately impure and malevolent. If the Sanskrit deities are polluted, they could become angry and inflict punishment against the offending person. The local supernatural figures are not consistently protected from impurity and often accept blood and flesh sacrifices, whereas these types of sacrificial offerings are considered polluting for the higher gods, who only accept vegetarian offerings. If village deities are maintained in a field of purity, they are useful to people because they can grant the requests of petitioners, whereas impurity can elicit their malevolent aspects.

Based on internal evidence from Indian classical texts and observations of village life, it can be affirmed that pollution flows, directly or through a conductor, from one being, substance, or fluid to another person. In contrast to pollution, purity cannot flow from person to person, although it can be lost by contact with a defiled person, substance, or fluid. Purity is thus an impermanent and relative condition that can be easily lost but never transferred. Purity exists, for instance, like an island within an ocean of pollution, which suggests that purity is artificially created and maintained. The maintenance of purity and the control of pollution represent a never-ending process.

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See also Hinduism; Religion

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✦ RESERVE BANK OF INDIA

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) dates back to 1773, when efforts were first initiated to establish a central bank in the country. This involved establishing a general bank in Bengal and Bihar. The efforts were not successful, however, as the bank failed soon after.

Later in 1914 the Chamberlain Commission recommended the amalgamation of three presidency banks into one central bank to be called the Imperial Bank of India, and the Imperial Bank Act was passed in 1920. The Imperial Bank, however, performed commercial banking functions as well as central banking functions. These functions included acting as the banker to the government and as a bankers' bank, while the functions of issue of currency notes and management of foreign exchange were the responsibility of central government.

On the recommendations of Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, the decision was made to establish a central bank that performs exclusively central banking functions and does not perform commercial banking functions. The bill was initially introduced in the Legislative Assembly in January 1927 but was subsequently dropped due to differences in views regarding ownership, constitution, and composition of its Board of Directors. Meanwhile, two major reports influenced the decision on establishing the bank. These were the "Report of the Indian Central Banking Enquiry Committee" in 1931 and the "White Paper on Indian Constitutional Reforms" in 1933, which strongly recommended the establishment of the RBI. The bill was introduced again in 1933 and finally passed in 1934, and the Reserve Bank of India Act came into force on January 1, 1935. The Reserve Bank of India Act of 1934 provides the statutory basis of the functioning of the RBI, which commenced operations on April 1, 1935. The RBI was formed as the shareholders' institution in 1935. This, however, subsequently changed when the RBI was nationalized on January 1, 1949, according to the terms of the Reserve Bank of India (Transfer to Public Ownership) Act of 1948.

As in other organizations, the RBI is governed by a Central Board of Directors whose main function is general supervision and direction of RBI affairs. Board members are appointed by the government of India for the period of four years. The board is comprised of official and nonofficial directors. Besides the Central Board of Directors, there are also local boards for four regions (east, west, north and south). Each local board is comprised of five members. As in the case of the Central Board of Directors, members of the local boards are also appointed by the central government for a period of four years. The major functions of local boards are "to advise the Central Board on local matters and to represent territorial and economic interests of local cooperative and indigenous banks" and also "to perform such other functions as delegated by the Central Board from time to time."

The evolution of RBI during 1935–2008 can be examined for three periods: 1935–1950, a prenationalization phase termed a foundation phase when the RBI operated as a private bank; 1951–1990, or the developmental phase; and 1991 onward, or postliberalization phase.

According to the RBI, the objective of its establishment was to "regulate the issue of bank notes and keep the reserves with a view to securing monetary stability in India and generally to operate the currency and credit system of the country to its advantage." The major functions as laid down in the statute were issuing currency, acting as the banker to the government, and acting

as a banker to other banks. These functions were earlier being carried out by the Controller of Currency and the Imperial Bank of India. During World War II and the postwar years, the major functions related to provision of war finance, repatriation of sterling debt, and exchange control operations. The major event during this phase was separation of Burma (Myanmar) from the Indian Union in 1937. The RBI, however, continued to act as the central bank for Burma until the Japanese occupation of Burma until April 1947. The RBI ceased to function as the central bank for Pakistan as of July 1, 1948. The developmental and other promotional roles had still not gained importance during the foundation phase.

The second phase (1951–1990) was the developmental phase, when emphasis was on institution building, financial sector development, and providing access to finance to various groups of people, regions, occupations, and sectors through rapid expansion of the bank branching network and credit. The RBI was also instrumental in institutional development and helped set up institutions such as the Deposit Insurance and Credit Guarantee Corporation of India, the Unit Trust of India, the Industrial Development Bank of India, the National Bank of Agriculture and Rural Development, and the Discount and Finance House of India to build the financial infrastructure of the country.

The economic reforms were launched in India in 1991, and with this the RBI's focus has shifted back to core central banking functions such as monetary policy, bank supervision and regulation, overseeing the payments system, and developing the financial markets. The other aspects that gained attention during this period are transparency, communications, and dissemination of information. The RBI's other thrust areas are financial inclusion and strengthening of credit delivery mechanisms for agriculture and small- and micro-sized enterprises, especially in the rural areas. The RBI is now an active participant in several important international institutions that seek to promote effective regulatory structures and financial and systemic stability. The RBI is a member of the Committee on Global Financial System, Markets Committee, and International Liaison Group under the aegis of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and is also gradually becoming an active member of the Financial Stability Forum and the BCBS. The RBI is also a shareholder in the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).

RASHMI UMESH ARORA

See also Central Banking, Development Aspects; Financial Institutions, Development; Monetary Policy

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✦ RIGHT TO INFORMATION

A new chapter was added to the constitutional and people's history of India with the enactment of the Right to Information (RTI) Act on June 15, 2005. This freedom of information act provides for accountability and transparency in decision making and public spending in various sectors of the Indian government. The necessity for this piece of legislation was inspired by the need to enlarge the democratic space in Indian polity.

Before the enactment of the RTI in India, Tamil Nadu, Goa, and Madhya Pradesh had enacted their own RTI Act in 1997, followed by Rajasthan in 2000 and Delhi in 2001. The enactment of this legislation owes its inspiration to the collective consciousness of various grassroots organizations as they represent the aspirations of Indian people and their demand to develop a new political culture. Prominent among these organizations is Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) in Rajasthan that started the campaign for a minimum wage in rural India and exposed rampant corruption in schemes meant for rural development.

The RTI Act has given the people access to information that was earlier inaccessible and was supposedly confidential. This legislation enables any applicant to question and seek information about public issues such as the repair of roads, the absence of teachers in government schools, insufficient medicines in hospitals, the policy and procedures followed in making decisions, the functioning of the public distribution system, and the utilization of funds for various schemes of rural and urban development. To make the role of public authorities meaningful, the act lays emphasis on *suo moto* disclosures (disclosures made on the initiative of the government official, that is, voluntarily by the government official) on the schemes initiated by any department that spends public money.

The RTI Act instructs every government, a state government entity such as a utility company, and other departments or those that fall into the public domain to appoint a public information officer (PIO) who will be responsible for providing information sought by the public at large subject to the payment of a nominal fee specified in the Fee Rules. Significantly, this act stipulates a time frame of 30 days within which every PIO must provide the information sought by an applicant. The time frame cannot exceed 40 days in any single case. If a PIO fails to provide such information within this period, it is her or his obligation to give the applicant the reasons. The PIO can also be fined in case of willful nondisclosure, and applicants have been given the right to appeal the appellate authority against PIOs. The Central Information Commission (CIC) of the central government and the State Information Commission (SIC) in the respective states regulate the working of the RTI Act in their respective jurisdictions.

The pace of implementation of the RTI Act, however, continues to be abysmal. Apart from website portals, nothing significant has been done to publicize the act. The state governments plan to digitalize information and create a paper-free office for the CIC, something that may indeed be beneficial in the long run but excludes millions of people who are incapable of using information technology. Bureaucratic reluctance to make their decisions and work public is the single largest threat to the effective working of the RTI Act. In fact, the civil service bureaucracy at all levels has been trying to block public access to certain file notes that identify individuals, groups of individuals,

organizations, appointments, and matters relating to inquiries and departmental proceedings. This raises questions about what the effect of the act would be after file notes are exempted. Any information that might have the potential of creating trouble for corrupt bureaucrats may be classified as file noting and be exempt from public disclosure. Furthermore, if the officials concerned are not named, on whom will the responsibility for actions and decisions be laid?

Although Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (b. 1932; prime minister 2004–) has categorically said that file notings relating to development plans, schemes, programs, and projects should be in the ambit of the RTI Act, there is immense pressure on the government and the CIC to exempt these from the act. The chief information commissioner has been imposing penalties and pressuring government departments to disclose file notings. This has not been viewed positively by officials who cherish their autonomy and their authority free from inspection; they even dislike public knowledge of their work. This dichotomy between the fundamental rights of every citizen to have access to information and the subsequent pressures from the very government that enacted the RTI Act to deny access can have serious implications for the working of the act in the coming years.

Ever since the inception of the RTI Act, it has been civil rights groups that have been focusing on the act's implementation. The most significant initiative in this direction is the organization of *jan sunwais* (public hearings). Parivartan, an RTI group based in Delhi has been, for instance, filing applications to seek information on issues of urban governance and the development of neglected slums and minor localities in the city. This group has been exposing rampant corruption through the diversion of funds meant for public welfare programs; the counterfeiting of papers dealing with work done, which in many cases remains nonexistent; and the checking of public utilities, especially access to water, public toilets, roads, and schools. Parivartan then organizes people to collectively question public servants or politicians through *jan sunwais*. These initiatives lead to the raising of public awareness and to the mobilization of people on issues of common interest and also foster social and communal solidarity.

While RTI groups credit the central government for the enactment of the RTI Act, they continue to pressure the government for effective implementation of the act. One of the most important demands of these groups is to inculcate the spirit of the RTI Act in the appointment of PIOs. This underlines the necessity to include, as the act states, "persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in law, science and technology, social service, management, journalism, mass media or administration and governance." The end result, however, is that central and state commissions are completely bureaucratized and have been reduced to another tool for providing postretirement benefits for civil servants. The government has attempted structural adjustments in the wake of public pressure, but its attitude has largely been to avoid the enlargement of public debate on the RTI Act.

YOGESH SNEHI

See also Constitution

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✦ ROY, ARUNDHATI

Indian writer, social activist, and in 1998 one of *People* magazine's "50 Most Beautiful People in the World," Arundhati Roy was born in Shillong in 1961 and is the first Indian writer to win the British literary award known as the Booker Prize, which was awarded to her in 1997 for her first novel, *The God of Small Things.* In 1989 she wrote the screenplay for *In Which Annie Gives It Those Ones,* which was based on her experience as an architecture student, but she came to the public's attention in 1994 with her critique, titled "The Great Indian Rape



Arundhati Roy holds a copy of her novel *The God of Small Things* shortly after being awarded the prestigious Booker Prize, October 14, 1997. (AP Photo/Stefan Rousseau)

Trick," of Shekar Kapur's film *Bandit Queen*, based on the life of the outlaw Phoolan Devi (1963–2001). Roy, after winning the Booker Prize, has written and spoken on political issues and against globalization, India's nuclear activities, religious fundamentalism, and the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 1998 she criticized India's nuclear weapons testing program at Pokran, Rajasthan, in "The End of Imagination," published in a collection of essays titled *The Cost of Living* in 1999. The same year she wrote "The Greater Common Good," arguing against the Narmada Dam project of some 30 large dams on the Narmada River. Her related protests with social activist Medha Patkar (b. 1954) led to Roy being briefly imprisoned. In 2002 the Lannan Foundation (founded in 1960) in Los Angeles awarded her the Prize for Cultural Freedom along with $350,000 in prize money, which she distributed among 50 people's movements, publications, educational institutions, and theater groups in India. In April 2003 South End Press released *War Talk*, which includes "Come September," a critique on the effects of the U.S.-led War on Terror, intervention in Chile, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and the war in Iraq. In 2005 she took an active role in the World Tribunal on Iraq. The Sydney Peace Prize, awarded by the Sydney Peace Foundation in Sydney, Australia, was awarded to Roy in 2004 for her social campaign and advocacy of nonviolence. In 2006, however, in protest of the massacre of protestors by Indian police and of the Indo-U.S. stand on economic policies, she declined to accept the Sahitya Akademi Award (national award from India's Academy of Letters) for her collection of essays titled *The Algebra of Infinite Justice*. In July 2009 Roy published a major work titled *Field Notes on Democracy: Listening to Grasshoppers*, a probing collection of essays on India's democracy and government.

SHEEBA HÄRMÄ

See also Environment; Human Rights; Globalization; Water Resources

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✦ RUSSIA, RELATIONS WITH

Czar Peter the Great (1682–1725) was the first Russian czar to pay serious attention to India. Hostile powers in Central Asia, however, thwarted his attempts to create an overland trade route to India through Central Asia. Not until the beginning of the 19th century did

Russia again direct efforts toward India. The Russian relationship with Great Britain largely determined Russian relations with India until Indian independence in 1947. During the reign of Czar Paul I (r. 1796–1801), the Russian Empire allied with France in an attempt to threaten British territory in India. Paul abandoned Russia's earlier alliance with Great Britain when the two nations united in opposition to the French Revolution and in 1801 dispatched a group of Cossacks to conquer India. Paul died before the mission was completed, and the attack was cancelled. Nevertheless, strained relations with Great Britain continued through the 19th century as the Russian Empire expanded its territorial possessions in Central Asia. Great Britain and Russia vied for control of Central Asia in a struggle known as the Great Game. The struggle involved economic and political competition between the Russian and the British empires throughout Central Asia, including British possessions in the future nations of India and Pakistan.

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, in which revolutionary Russian leaders encouraged colonies to rise up against European colonizers, heightened tensions between the revolutionary Soviet government and Great Britain. But until the end of World War II, the Soviet Union lacked the political will and the resources to make good on its revolutionary rhetoric.

India's independence from Britain in August 1947 coincided with the beginning of the Cold War involving political, economic, and diplomatic competition on a global scale between the capitalist United States and the Socialist Soviet Union. Both powers attempted to expand their influence in newly decolonized European possessions. The United States and the Soviet Union offered two different approaches to modernization, one based on free enterprise and the other on state control of the economy. India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964), attempted to maintain a position of nonalignment between the two powers. A number of factors, however, pushed Nehru into a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. By the 1950s, especially following the Chinese Revolution in 1949, Indian leaders identified much more with the Soviet model of state control and economic planning than with the American capitalist system. Nehru was impressed by the modernization of the Soviet economy without dependence on European and American capital. He borrowed the concept of state-directed industry from the Soviet Union: the idea of a comprehensive economic plan for all sectors of the economy. Nehru also believed that science and technology could lift India from its status as a former colony into a fully developed nation able to defend its interests on the world stage, much as the Bolshevik Revolution seemed to have transformed Russia.

Increasing support of India's rival Pakistan by the United States in the mid-1950s pushed Nehru closer to the Soviet Union. He traveled to the Soviet Union in June 1955, and the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971; premier 1958–1964) visited India later the same year. "Shout for us across the Himalayas whenever you need us," Khrushchev remarked in a gesture of friendship. India and the Soviet Union also shared a growing distrust of Communist China, leading to growing collaboration between the Soviet and Indian militaries in the 1960s and 1970s.

From the early 1960s the Soviets actively promoted their system and culture in India. The policy was part of a broader Soviet attempt to promote revolution in newly independent developing countries. Yuri Gagarin (1934–1968), after his famous flight as the world's first cosmonaut on April 12, 1961, visited India to help solidify the relationship and the collaboration in various fields between the two countries. He met Nehru as well as dozens of members of the cultural, scientific, and technical elite. Later, in April 1984, the Soviet Union launched the first Indian, Indian Air Force squadron leader Rakesh Sharma (b. 1949), into space aboard the Soviet spacecraft *Soyuz*.

The August 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, signed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984) and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev (1906–1982; secretary-general 1964–1982), expanded political, economic, and cultural contacts between the two countries. Following India's wars with Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, the Soviets increased the delivery of weapons and advisers to India. By the 1970s, the Soviet Union became a primary supplier of weaponry and training for the Indian military, just as Pakistan depended heavily on U.S. weaponry and training.

The Soviets also expanded their participation in the Indian nuclear industry, especially after India exploded its first nuclear device on May 18, 1974, at Pokhran in Rajasthan. In response to the test, the United States withdrew its earlier support for India's civilian nuclear industry, and Moscow stepped in to fill the vacuum created by the exit of American nuclear industry advisers. By the early 1980s, Moscow committed Russia to helping India build civilian nuclear reactors, a collaborative effort that continued through the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century.

Contacts between the two nations, however, were not limited to military, scientific, and technical exchanges. During the 1960s, thousands of middle-class Indians went to the Soviet Union to study. The Soviet Union reciprocated by sending thousands of technical advisers and engineers to India. Various aspects of Indian culture such as music and food enjoyed great popularity in Soviet society during the 1960s and 1970s. Thousands of Indians educated in Russia returned to teach Russian language and culture in Indian universities, some of which, such as the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, developed renowned centers for the study of Russian history and politics.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 accelerated a growing liberalization of the Indian economy and a move away from a state-controlled model of economic development. The implosion of the Russian economy in the 1990s reduced Indian dependence on Soviet science and technology as well as Soviet weaponry, whose effectiveness had also been called into question by the disastrous Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989). In the 1990s and the first part of the 21st century, ambitious young Indians chose the business and graduate schools of the United States rather than the study of engineering or physics in educational centers in Russia.

In the 21st century, relations between Russia and India have been based more on pragmatic economic interests rather than ideological programs. India and Russia share a common

fear of Muslim-oriented terrorist groups and have a joint working group on combating international terrorism. When Russia began redeveloping its military and energy sectors in the 21st century, it aggressively marketed weaponry and nuclear power to India. Russia is, in fact, the chief supplier of arms to India. In 2004 India purchased the Russian aircraft carrier *Admiral Gorshkov* and renamed it *INS Vikramaditya*. The carrier was free, but India agreed to pay more than $2 billion for it to be refitted in Russia and to be equipped with Russian armaments. Delays pushed up the cost, and India agreed to pay an additional $1.2 billion with the expectation that the carrier would be commissioned in the Indian Navy in 2012.

India also purchased the BrahMos, a supersonic cruise missile that can be launched from land, air, or sea and even from submarines. It may cost India some $13 billion. In addition, India signed a joint venture deal with Russia to produce the Sukhoi PAK FA jet fighter and purchase 200 of the aircraft when they are produced. The first prototype flew in 2010. The second jointly developed aircraft to be part of the Indian military forces is the Sukhoi Su-30MKI, a multirole combat aircraft. India plans to have 280 in service by 2015 at an estimated cost of more than $10 billion. To transport its troops and equipment, India is in a third joint venture with Russia to produce the UAC/HAL II-214 military transport aircraft. Both countries will invest $300 million to make the aircraft, which is expected to be in service by 2016. Six other weapons systems from submarines to bombers will be bought or leased by India from Russia, making the Indo-Russian relationship an exceedingly important military one with enormous financial implications.

A July 2008 Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement seemed to give the United States an advantage in reentering the potentially lucrative Indian civilian nuclear industry but also opened the door to more Russian participation in India's nuclear sector. Retooling its space industry, Russia has also expanded efforts to service India's military and economic ambitions in space.

India's bilateral trade with Russia is modest. During 2006–2007 bilateral trade was only about $3 billion, with India's exports to Russia accounting for a third of the total. Nonetheless, the two countries set up a number of commissions and groups to further their economic relationship, such as the six Joint Working Groups under the auspices of the India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural Cooperation to study how the two countries could develop their partnership in such areas as trade, finance, energy, mining, science and technology, information technology, culture, and tourism. Energy would be one lucrative area for cooperation. The commission held its 16th session in New Delhi in November 2010. The goal was to increase bilateral trade to $20 billion by 2015, a figure difficult to meet due to the continuing recession that began in 2008 but a goal indicative of the close relationship between the two countries and the optimism shared by both nations that their close historical and contemporary ties would continue unabated. It was to maintain the good relationship that Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited India in December 2010.

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See also Armed Forces; Foreign Policy

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✦ SANGH PARIVAR

The Sangh Parivar, literally "family of organizations," refers to the group of Hindu nationalist organizations in India. While the Sangh Parivar includes approximately 20 different political groups, the triumvirate BJP-VHP-RSS contains by far the largest and strongest organizations of the group. The BJP is the Bharatiya Janata Party, the VHP is the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, and the RSS is the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh.

The collection of political parties emerged in 1925 at the early stages of the movement for independence amid the backdrop of Hindu-Muslim riots. Keshav Baliram Hedgewar (1889–1940) founded the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and served as its first leader. It became the core organization of the Sangh Parivar and was dedicated to a right-wing Hindu nationalist project. The Sangh Parivar, as it was officially termed, eventually came to include at least 12 major nationalist parties, including the VHP and the BJP. The group of organizations encompassed a wide range of interests, with the overarching goals of Hindu unity and national pride.

Founded in 1965 as an issue-oriented organization rather than a political one, the VHP worked for low-caste and tribal people's rights, and also promoted the ban on cow slaughter. The group emerged from a religious retreat led by Swami Chinmayananda (1916–1993) in 1962 and provided the RSS with legitimacy and connections to large religious groups, as well as manpower drawn from the *sadhus* (holy men) and workers connected with the VHP. Though some people speculated that the RSS was behind the religious organization to begin with, the VHP for years remained comparatively apolitical.

The Sangh Parivar was thrust into the political forefront in the 1980s, with the BJP as its most effective political party. Capitalizing on the need to rally around a strong Hindu party,

and around an issue that could galvanize Hindus, the Sangh Parivar seized on the issue of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh. Proposing to replace the Mughal mosque with a temple commemorating the Hindu god Rama's birthplace appealed to the residual resentment toward Muslims, not only for their role in Partition but for a whole host of transgressions against the Hindus historically. The destruction of temples and forcible conversions to Islam during the Mughal era (1525–1858) seemed to justify Hindu hatred, and with the BJP and VHP fanning the flames with virulent anti-Muslim speeches, more than 100,000 Hindu nationalist "volunteers" tore down the mosque in a matter of hours on December 6, 1992. Subsequent communal riots that broke out across India forced the Sangh Parivar to retreat on the building of the temple. However, even today, the proposition of building a Rama temple in Ayodhya is still part of the party platform.

The late 1990s marked an expansion of the Sangh Parivar into advocating a number of social movements, educational institutions, and the development of civil society. Though it encompasses a wide range of parties, ranging from the extreme militancy of the Bajrang Dal, the militant youth wing of the VHP, and the RSS and the BJP, the Sangh Parivar continues to represent more than 40 million Indians who are committed to making India what they consider to be the ideal Hindu nation.

JULI GITTINGER

See also Ayodhya; Bharatiya Janata Party; Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh; Vishwa Hindu Parishad

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✦ SATHYA SAI BABA MOVEMENT

The Sathya Sai Baba movement is approximately 65 years old and has a single identifiable charismatic leader: Shri (honorific) Sathya Sai Baba (1926–2011), known to his devotees as *Bhagawan* (god), *Swami* (lord), or *Baba* (father). The Sathya Sai Baba movement is classified as

a new religious movement by some scholars, as it transcends traditional religious boundaries; as a neo-Hindu revitalization or renewal movement by others; and as a globally successful sectarian Indic movement that draws from religious strains of the subcontinent.

Sathya Sai Baba's personal prefix, *Sathya* (truth), refers both to his given name of Sathyanarayana as well as to the quality his devotees belies him to have embodied. His birth in a rural, dominant-caste peasant family on November 23, 1926, in the remote village of Puttaparthi in Anantapur District in the Rayalseema (boundaries of kings) region of the south Indian state of Andhra Pradesh was, according to apostolic texts, accompanied by divine signs heralding the birth of a great soul. Detailed stories of his compassion, intelligence, musical skill, magical materializations of food and sweets, and healing abilities were all seen as signs of his omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence. After suffering a series of seizures at the age of 13, Sathya Sai Baba claimed that he was a reincarnation of Shirdi Sai Baba, a Muslim saint/seer (*faqir*) who died in 1918, which has led to some confusion among devotees of both sects. Later more reincarnations were attributed to him, including the great gods of Hinduism, Rama and Krishna; Siva and his consort, Shakti; Jesus Christ; and a future avatar called Prema Sai. So Sathya Sai Baba was thought by some to be a charismatic guru (teacher) and by others to be a reincarnated Muslim seer, a saint, or a *purna avatar* (full incarnation) of god, whose philosophy spanned various religious and sectarian traditions.

In his discourses, which number in the tens of thousands, Sathya Sai Baba divided his life into four 16-year phases: during the first phase he engaged in mischief and playful pranks (*balalilas*); during the second he performed miracles (*mahimas*); for the third he dedicated himself to general teaching (*upadesh*), while still performing miracles; and in the last segment (which would have begun around 1984) he dedicated his life to teaching select devotees his spiritual discipline (*sadhana*).

Sathya Sai Baba lived in the remote village of Puttaparthi in Anantapur District of southwestern rural Andhra Pradesh, one of the driest regions of India, about 110 miles from the city of Bangalore, on his 100-acre ashram, Prasanthi Nilayam. After his death on April 24, 2011, he was interred three days later under the podium where he met his disciples and preached.

Devotees had to travel to the ashram to have *darshan* (sacred viewing) of and be close to him. A primary aspect of Sathya Sai Baba's teachings was the spiritual benefit of *darshan* for his students. During *darshan* Sai Baba might interact with people, accept letters, materialize and distribute *vibhuti* (sacred ash), or call groups or individuals for interviews. *Darshan* was the center of all life in the ashram and took place twice a day, beginning with the singing of *bhajans* (sacred hymns), some composed by Sathya Sai Baba himself.

The Sathya Sai Baba movement—which, according to self-reporting, has between 6,000 and 8,000 centers and 50 million devotees all over the globe—is rapidly growing in the West and in East Asia. In 2001 sources within the movement provided a figure of 3,050 centers in approximately 167 countries all over the world. A likely figure of devotional strength suggested by the newsmagazine *India Today* is 20 million in 137 countries.

The Sathya Sai Baba movement is known to be the largest faith-based foreign-exchange earner for India, earning approximately 881.8 million rupees (approximately $5 million) or the year 2002–2003, and its net worth for the same year was approximately $6 billion. The Sai Baba international following is not confined to the Indian, primarily Hindu, diaspora, though those members form a significant part of the devotional base, but has expanded to include the middle classes of many different countries, religions, and cultures. Religious studies scholar Richard Weiss aptly called him "a prophet of the jet-set more than he is a guru of peasants." The devotees—professional, technocratic, "Westernized," or what sociologist Smriti Srinivas called an "urban following"—are characterized by their mobility, their affluence, and their focus on creating a healthy union between body, spirit, and mind.

The logo of the Sathya Sai organization (the Sarva Dharma image) consists of a five-petaled lotus flower displaying on its petals the symbols from five "world" religions (Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, Zoroastrianism, and Buddhism), and at its center is the lamp of knowledge. The symbol of the ecumenism of the Sai faith is found on all official communiqués of the Sathya Sai Baba movement and in iconic form in every Sai center in the world. In 1995 another emblem, also with five petals was added; on them are written the Sai faith's five central values: truth, nonviolence, love, peace, and right conduct, and the two symbols are used interchangeably. Doctrinally, the Sai faith is ecumenical, drawing ideas from all major world religions.



Guru Sathya Sai Baba greets followers after the inauguration of the Sathya Sai Baba International Centre, established to promote the appreciation of "world heritage," March 1999. Sathya Sai Baba, who claims millions of followers around the world, rarely travels and visited Delhi after a 17-year absence. There are an estimated 1,200 Sathya Sai Baba centers in 130 countries. (Tekee Tanwar/AFP/Getty Images)

Sathya Sai Baba's followers have created an international institutional edifice, which is managed by the Shri Sathya Sai Central Trust (SSCT) and is active through various branches of the International Sai Organization (ISO), also known as the International Sathya Sai Baba Organization. Organizationally the devotees are divided into three wings by the transnational Sathya Sai Seva Organization (SSSO)—the service wing, the education wing, and the devotion wing—based on their interest and aptitude, and they are assigned to various zones based on their country of origin. Each zone may consist of various nations—for example,

zone one consists of the United States and Canada—and regions with local chapters. There are nine zones encompassing all the 137 countries where the movement has a presence.

The ISO is involved in service to humanity—distributing aid to the poor (especially those in war-torn or natural disaster zones, such as communities hit by the tsunami in 2004); providing potable water to communities in need; establishing educational institutions; and supporting medical facilities, homeless shelters, food banks, clothing drives, festival dinners, hospital visits, free clinics, and other participatory social services. The Sathya Sai Baba charitable work is understood by most to be the least controversial and most laudable aspect of the worldwide mission. Devotees spend considerable time doing *seva* (charitable work) as part of their mission to heal the world of contemporary problems. Internationally, Sathya Sai Baba devotees gather daily or weekly on Sundays (and/or Thursdays) for group devotional singing (*bhajans*), prayer, spiritual meditation, service to the community (*seva*), and participation in "Education in Human Values" (SSEHV), also known as Sai Sunday School.

The ISO straddles many new media; it issues translations of Sathya Sai Baba's many discourses both in cassette form and in books and journals; it creates and distributes a subscription newsletter called *Santhana Sarathi* (translated as "the way of the Charioteer," an analogy to the divine charioteer Krishna of the Hindu epic the *Mahabharata*); it runs a television broadcast station, Sai Cast, and a radio station, *Radio Sai*; it maintains several Internet sites, including *Heart 2 Heart* and virtual journals; and issues material keepsakes such as photographs and medallions, which are prized by devotees.

Sathya Sai Baba attracted his fair share of controversy and critics, both for his materializations and for cases of healing. The death of four youths in the Sai ashram in 1993 brought in its wake allegations of "sexual healing," popularly understood to be sexual misconduct with minor boys, against the Sai organization and Sathya Sai Baba himself. Sathya Sai Baba's magical materializations, which were filmed and aired in a BBC documentary *The Secret Swami* in 2004, have been seen by critics as nothing more than skillful prestidigitation, which angered devotees worldwide. A central theme of the BBC documentary was former devotee Alaya Rahm's sexual-abuse allegations against Sathya Sai Baba. Another documentary, *Seduced by Sai Baba*, produced by Denmark's national television and radio broadcast company, Denmark Radio, carried interviews containing allegations of abuse. Allegations of corruption, fiscal mismanagement, conspiracy, abuse, and even murder were leveled at Sathya Sai Baba and emphasized by a significant, though small, global anti-Sai movement, comprised primarily of disaffected "former devotees," as they call themselves. Indian and non-Indian news journals, including *India Today*, *The Week*, and *The Telegraph*, published critical pieces about Sathya Sai Baba, but despite his critics' claims of malfeasance, Sai Baba was never accused (much less convicted) of wrongdoing in an Indian court of law.

TULASI SRINIVAS

See also Hinduism; Religion

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✦ SCHEDULED TRIBES

The term Scheduled Tribe refers to specific indigenous peoples of India who inhabit Scheduled Areas. Subject to legislation by Parliament, under Article 342 of the Constitution of India, the president has the power to declare any territory a Scheduled Area.

India is a country with a very large concentration of tribal people. Essentially, tribes are forest-based people whose lives are conditioned by the natural environment. They live off the land and are therefore concentrated in remote villages, forests, and hilly regions of the country. The essential characteristics of the tribal communities are primitive traits, geographical isolation, a distinct culture, an underprivileged condition, and isolation from the mainstream community. These are the criteria for determining whether an area is a Scheduled Area.

The Fifth Schedule of the constitution deals with the administration and control of Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes in states other than Assam and Meghalaya. Some of the essential features of this administration are directives to the states by the union, submission of reports to the president by governors of states with Scheduled Areas, regulations by the governor with the approval of the president to prohibit or restrict the transfer of land by/or among members of the Scheduled Tribes, and regulation of the allotment of land and moneylending. The goal of these provisions is to protect tribals and prevent their exploitation by other social groups. The tribal areas in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram are appended to the Sixth Schedule in the constitution. These tribal areas are administered by autonomous district councils and regional councils with legislative and judicial functions.

The Ministry of Tribal Affairs, a branch of the government of India, looks after the affairs of the tribal communities. An offshoot of the branch of the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, this new ministry was constituted in October 1999 to administer the policies, planning, and coordination for the development of Scheduled Tribes. The constitution also provides safeguards in the form of reserved positions for Scheduled Tribes in government services. The aim is to increase their representation in the services and to improve their social and financial position.

The tribal situation in the country is not homogeneous. In states such as Mizoram, more than 90 percent of the total population fall under the tribal category. In other states, such as Kerala, tribal members comprise less than 2 percent of the total population. The stages of development in different tribal groups also vary, from shifting cultivation and food gathering, to primitive forms of agriculture.

Tribals generally live in rural areas and constitute the labor class in the country. According to the Planning Commission estimate on poverty for the fiscal year 1993–1994, more than 90 percent of tribals live below the poverty line. The destruction and depletion of forests and their resources due to socioeconomic pressures continues to pose a serious threat to tribal alienation from their land and their livelihood.

A detailed review of tribal problems during the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1974–1979) provided a framework for the socioeconomic development of Scheduled Tribes and the prevention of their exploitation by other groups in society. A tribal subplan (TSP) strategy was devised. Amendments to the Fifth Schedule empowered the president to increase the size and number of Scheduled Areas in any state. In pursuance of this policy, the president has from time to time issued orders reassigning Scheduled Areas in some states. Accordingly, in Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, and Rajasthan, TSP areas have been made conterminous with Scheduled Areas. Under TSP, 194 Integrated Tribal Development Projects (ITDPs) were undertaken in areas where the Scheduled Tribe population was more than 50 percent of the total population. Further developments under TSP include the adoption of the Modified Area Development Approach (MADA) to cover smaller areas of tribal concentration (areas with a minimum 10,000 people of which 50 percent are Scheduled Tribes) during the Sixth Five-Year Plan; and identification of tribal clusters (areas with approximately 5,000 people of which 50 percent are Scheduled Tribes) during the Seventh Five-Year Plan. In the TSP states so far, 259 MADAs and 82 clusters have been identified. Spread over 17 states and 1 Union Territory, about 75 tribes have been identified as Primitive Tribal Groups (PTGs). They are characterized by inaccessible habitats, low rates of population growth, little or no literacy, and little movement beyond the hunter-gatherer stage.

The ministry of tribal affairs has implemented various programs for the welfare and development of the Scheduled Tribes. Among others, the programs include grants in aid; the construction of schools and hostels for tribal youth; establishment of village grain banks; guidance to tribal students in building careers and in finding employment; and financial aid to promote research and training for tribal development.

Approximately 15 percent of the geographical area of the country is covered by prominent tribal areas. Article 342 of the constitution identified 533 tribes in the different states and Union Territories, with the state of Orissa having 62 tribal groups, the largest number in any state. Some of the major tribes are Boro in Assam, Bhil in Maharashtra, Gujjar in Himachal Pradesh, Bhil in Gujarat, Buxa in Uttar Pradesh, Bhil in Rajasthan, Banjara in Bihar, Garo in Meghalaya, Chakma in Tripura, Birhor in Orissa, Kammara in Tamil Nadu, Birhor in West Bengal, Lusai in Mizoram, Dafla in Arunachal Pradesh, Dhodi in Goa, Naga in Nagaland, Lepcha in Sikkim, Garra in Jammu and Kashmir, Jarawa in Andaman and the Nicobar Islands, and Dhodi in Daman and Diu. Some tribes can be found in more than one area of the country. Census data indicate an increase in the population of Scheduled Tribes since 1951. In 2001 the Scheduled Tribe population stood at 84.3 million, which was 8.19 percent of the total population of the country.

YOSAY WANGDI

See also Northeastern States

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Scripts. *See* Languages and Scripts

✦ SECULARISM

Secularism is a Western concept that originated with the Latin term *saeculum* (world, century, age) and implies that the outside world is different from the religious world with respect to beliefs and modes of behavior. Secularism reduces and replaces religion with other convictions. Some cultural observers have anticipated and predicted that secularism will replace religion in the not-too-distant future and that religion will wither away, die, and completely disappear. The fulfillment of this prognostication has not occurred, although religious adherence has declined in locations such as Europe. Religion, in fact, has proven to be more resilient than expected and to offer something valuable to ordinary people looking for guidance and meaning in life, something that they cannot find in secularism. The struggle between religion and secularism is being played out in India, which witnessed the rise of right-wing conservative and religiously affiliated Hindu political parties in recent decades under the Sangh Parivar, only to have a resurgence of

the Congress Party, founded in 1885, win recent elections with its message, in part, of the advantages of secularism.

Secularism operates both privately and publicly by altering how people understand themselves and construct a worldview, and it also affects how they behave in public. Secularism is a complex process that includes the following: rationalization, industrialization, social differentiation, individualism, societalization, diversity, relativism, pluralism, modernization, technology, and egalitarianism. These various aspects of secularism do not affect cultures in the same way or to the same extent, and how the culture responds to any of these aspects is also unpredictable. It is important to acknowledge that the extent of the changes ushered in by secularism depends on the local context. There is no universal form of secularism that affects all societies in the same way.

The various elements of secularism operate to undermine religion. Rationalization, for instance, disrupts a person's faith by calling it into question. Industrialization creates a wedge between family life and economic life outside the home. Industrialization also demands specialization of economic roles that can result in the fragmentation of home life. Social differentiation grows in concert with the development of industrialization and specialization, as socioeconomic classes become more divided. Dividing workers into blue collar and white collar is symptomatic of differentiating workers. As socioeconomic developments call for a higher educational level to meet the challenges offered by new types of jobs, the educated adopt more independent modes of thinking that make them less willing to blindly accept religious beliefs and follow religious leaders. Individualism is also a factor that undermines blind adherence to religious messages by creating more autonomy for the person and stressing the importance of the individual over the community. Individualism also tends to make religion into something private. By finding oneself in a pluralistic context, the presumed uniqueness of one's religion is undermined, making one's allegiance to a religion voluntary and encouraging a person to choose among competing religions.

Societalization refers to the organization of life by the nation-state, which replaces the customary role of religion. In the case of India, the traditional caste system and its accompanying social privileges are not recognized by the constitution. This is a good example of the nation-state becoming a force that legitimates the social world instead of religion. Moreover, the diversity of religious cultures suggests relativism, which calls for tolerance to ensure social harmony. Throughout its history, relativism has not been a major problem in India, which has demonstrated considerable tolerance with regard to belief, although the culture has been less tolerant with regard to behavior. A modern exception to this trend is the tension between Hindu groups and Muslims.

The disruption of communal bonds, traditional employment patterns, and social status are caused by modernization and technology. Their promise of a better life is so appealing that they reduce the need for a person to turn to religion for answers to the problems of life. In such a scenario, there is no need to depend on religion because contingency is reduced

and certainty heightened by relying on modern technology. The plethora of religious teachers (gurus) in India is indicative that this has not occurred on a large scale in India.

Although secularism became significant in modern times in the West, the term secularism was not used in India until the late 1940s, when elements of it were introduced into the Indian constitution. In contemporary India, there are five identifiable groups debating the pros and cons of secularism in India. The liberal position insists that religion and politics belong in different realms. In fact, the secularism of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964) was based on a conviction that religion represents an erroneous worldview that will yield to a more rational understanding of the world as scientific thought and economic growth advance. Liberals indicate that the rise of conservative, right-wing political parties, such as the Vishwa Hindu Parisad (VHP), founded in 1964, and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), founded in 1980, are symptomatic of responses to a cultural crisis created by secularism. The Indian sociologists T. N. Madan (b. 1933) and Ashis Nandy (b. 1937) argue for a different perspective on the topic because secularism was never indigenous to India, and it is therefore inappropriate to apply the notion to India. A third position is represented by nationalists who argue that the recognition of minorities represents a pseudosecularism. In contrast to the nationalists, Rajeev Bhargawa wants to incorporate values shared by many religions into the public life of India, a sort of secular religion embraced by all. Finally, by means of her genealogical approach, Shabnum Tejani finds that Indian secularism represents a formulation of nationalism that involves synthesizing liberal discourses with individual definitions of the democratic majority as broadly Hindu. The establishment of secularism in India occurred during the course of constituent assembly debates, which emerged around the issue of political safeguards for minorities between 1946 and 1950. Thus, secularism was invoked as an agreement against reservations for religious minorities. Moreover, it was widely accepted that for India to become a secular state there was a need to ensure freedom of religion. The advent of independence had a significant impact on the debate about secularism, serving as an embodiment of the values of unity and tolerance that marked a break with past political history.

CARL OLSON

See also Ayodhya; Bharatiya Janata Party; Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh; Sangh Parivar; Vishwa Hindu Parishad

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✦ SECURITY, INTERNAL

Internal security refers to the maintenance of security within the entire country. India has been facing major challenges to its internal security as traditional security threats, such as the danger of conventional and nuclear war, have been overshadowed by the dangers of domestic armed insurgencies and terrorist activities. India's internal security situation cannot be understood without taking into account its physical parameters. It is the seventh-largest country in the world; it has land boundaries of nearly 10,000 miles; it contains more than 600 island territories, has a coastline of more than 4,500 miles, and includes an Exclusive Economic Zone of more than 1,500,000 square miles. Finally, it has land frontiers and maritime boundaries with Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, Nepal, Bhutan, and Myanmar.

With a complex physical and sociocultural milieu, India's internal security concerns have been greatly influenced by the forces operating from both within and outside the country. Internal factors include its history, geography, colonial legacy, burgeoning population, sharp social and economic disparities, and complex sociocultural and ethnoreligious traditions that interplay freely in a secular democracy. Similarly, the continuing tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, the geopolitics of the South Asian region (such as the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 and the subsequent political turmoil in Afghanistan and Pakistan), the strategic objectives of the neighboring countries, and the increasing influence of radical Islamic ideas are some of the major external factors that have contributed to internal instability.

India faces multiple internal security threats. Militancy in Kashmir, left-wing extremism, and insurgency in the northeastern states are some of the gravest threats. According to the New Delhi–based South Asia Terrorism Portal, at least 231 of the country's 608 districts are currently affected, at differing intensities, by various insurgent and terrorist movements. In addition, wide areas of the country appear to have "fallen off the map" of good governance and are acutely susceptible to violent political mobilization, lawlessness, and organized criminal activity. In 2008 alone, more than 1,000 civilians were killed in terrorist attacks, Naxalite violence, and militant activities in the northeastern states and in Jammu and Kashmir.

Militancy in the form of kidnapping and murders began to manifest itself in Kashmir in 1989. Since then, the character of militancy in the state has undergone a radical transformation. Initially it was waged by local Kashmiri militants with official Pakistani political, diplomatic, and military support, as Islamabad considered Kashmir the "unfinished agenda of partition." Toward the mid-1990s, however, militancy in the state was hijacked by Pakistan since the idea of merging Kashmir with that country did not find much favor among the local Kashmiri militants. After the tit-for-tat nuclear tests of 1998, Pakistan's confidence that it could raise the threshold of conflict without the risk of military retaliation increased with the direct involvement of its army to change the status quo in Kashmir. The result was the Kargil incident of 1999. While the Kargil debacle caused political turmoil in Pakistan and resulted in a military takeover, India experienced a substantial rise in violence and killings in Jammu and Kashmir and other parts of the country by Pakistan-based terrorist organizations. These



An Indian soldier takes cover as the luxurious Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai burns during the gun battle between the Indian military and Muslim terrorists inside the hotel, November 29, 2008. (AP Photo/David Guttenfelder)

included the 2000 attack on the Red Fort, the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, the 2006 Mumbai subway attack, and the 2008 Mumbai assault. Of these, the Parliament attack of 2002 and the Mumbai attack of 2008 triggered an intense military confrontation between the two nuclear rivals, as India accused Pakistan of complicity in these attacks.

Although political violence is under control in Kashmir, Pakistan-based terrorist groups, such as Jaish-e-Mohammad (the Army of Mohammad) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (the Army of the Pure), have spread their terror activities to the hinterland. The Mumbai attack in 2008 clearly established that these terror groups are resorting to spectacular acts of mass murder in urban centers, with the goal of intimidating and terrorizing the public. In addition, these groups are increasingly targeting national assets, and they have established links with other fundamentalist and terrorist organizations in different parts of the country.

Left-wing extremism, also known as Naxalism or Maoism, originated in India in 1968 and constitutes what Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (b. 1932; prime minister 2004–) has described as the "single biggest internal security challenge" confronting the country. While the number of Maoist-affected states in the country is currently pegged at 14, the movement has demonstrated the intent and the potential to spread across the length and breadth of the country. The People's War Group (PWG), the Maoist Communist Center (MCC), Party Unity, and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) are some of the most dreaded Naxalite groups.

Greatly influenced by Bengali revolutionary Charu Mazumdar (1918–1972) and his theory of "class struggle" and "class violence," the Naxalites operate in forest and tribal areas because they offer ideal conditions to carry out guerrilla warfare. They indulge in such terrorist acts as attempts to annihilate the so-called "class enemy," mass killings, attacks on public installations, and the conduct of summary trials. Their method of operation revolves around stealth, speed, and surprise, and so they target unprepared and sleepy police stations in order to seize arms and ammunition.

Though their "ideology" and "methodology" are imported, the basic causes of Naxalism are indigenous. There is a widespread perception that "land reforms" and efforts at the redressing of genuine grievances of the tribal population have only been superficial and that the "exploiters" continue to "exploit" the poor and the landless agriculturists. Since the issues raised by the Naxalites are people-centric and have a certain legitimacy in the eyes of the common people, the group as been very difficult to control.

The northeastern region consists of seven states with 10 percent of India's land mass. Linked to India by a narrow 43-mile stretch between Bangladesh and Bhutan; sharing an uninterrupted border of nearly 2,300 miles with China, Burma, Bangladesh, and Bhutan; and composed of ethnic groups that also reside in the neighboring countries, the whole area has been in a state of turmoil since the early years of independence. Ethnic heterogeneity, linguistic diversity, a change in the demographic profile of the region due to illegal migration from Bangladesh, historical and geopolitical development, and the lack of economic growth and infrastructure development are some of the major factors that have contributed to insurgency in the Northeast. Moreover, for geopolitical reasons, the neighboring countries bordering these states also encourage secessionist activities by way of providing arms, ammunition, and shelter to the insurgents.

Prominent terrorist and insurgent groups active in the northeastern region include the United Liberation Front of Assam, National Democratic Front of Bodoland, National Socialist Council of Nagaland, National Liberation Front of Tripura, All Tripura Tiger Force, and People's Liberation Army. In addition, these groups are divided into numerous factions, with different demands and principles. They claim to be the "watchdog of the people" and carry out numerous violent acts.

To manage its internal security, the Ministry of Home Affairs, the equivalent of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, is the ministry responsible for the overall internal security of the country. It acts through a number of police, military, and intelligence organizations. These include special security forces to guard airports and other high-profile targets, and 12 paramilitary forces, such as the Central Reserve Police Force, the Assam Rifles, the Border Security Force, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, the Special Frontier Force, the Sashastra Seema Bal, the Central Industrial Security Force, and the National Security Guard. The army usually participates in internal security duties as a last resort. Several intelligence agencies monitor terrorist activities. The Intelligence Bureau (IB), a division of the Ministry of Home Affairs, collects intelligence inside India, and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) is the

external intelligence agency. A joint intelligence committee analyzes intelligence data from IB and RAW, as well as from a handful of military intelligence agencies, which usually provide tactical information gathered while carrying out counterterrorist activities.

India has responded to the problem of internal security through both political and military means. It has tried to reach a political solution by giving greater constitutional autonomy and undertaking developmental activities. The military option has been used to wear the rebels down and bring them to the negotiating table. While this approach has been successful in some cases, like the Punjab (1983–1991) and Mizoram (1966–1986), it has not succeeded in many other situations. There are two major reasons: the first is structural and the second is political. The "Union and State Lists" enshrined in the Indian constitution and the issue of a state's sphere of jurisdiction under its federal structure inhibit coordination among the various arms of the central and state governments. In fact, there is insufficient cooperation between the center and the states, and among states themselves. At the political level, the main obstacle is a lack of consensus among the major political parties on vital issues of national concern. After the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2008, the central government announced a number of measures to strengthen internal security, including the establishment of a National Investigative Agency and a tough antiterrorism law.

UPENDRA CHOUDHURY

See also Intelligence Services; Jammu and Kashmir; Naxalite Movement; Northeastern States

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Security, Regional. *See* Regionalism and Regional Security in Southern Asia

Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA). *See* Women's Reform Movements

✦ SHAH BANO CASE

Contemporary debates between political parties in India largely revolve around the definition of secularism as it exists in the Indian landscape. Deemed a watershed event, the Shah Bano case brought the debate of religious law versus civil law into sharp relief, making secularism a central issue in elections in the 1990s and in the new millennium.

Shah Bano was a 62-year-old Muslim woman and mother of five who was divorced by her husband. Unable to support herself, she appealed through the court system in 1978 for a modest financial settlement from her ex-husband, even though under Muslim Personal Law she was not entitled at that time to any support from him. Seven years later her case was considered by the Supreme Court, which ruled that because Indian women had been able to seek financial recourse through the civil courts since the Hindu Succession Act of 1956, being Muslim did not preclude her from being a citizen of the state and therefore deriving all the benefits of citizenship. Therefore, she was also entitled to this recourse. This was seen by the Muslim community as impinging upon Muslim Personal Law, which, among other things, deals with legal matters concerning marriage, divorce, and inheritance.

Then, in 1986, the Congress Party–dominated Parliament passed the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, whose most controversial provision was that it gave a Muslim woman the right to maintenance for the period of *iddat* (three lunar cycles) after the divorce, in addition to the repayment of *mahr* (dower or brideprice). This was controversial on many levels. From the liberal camp, it was seen as unjust to Muslim women that they were denied the extended maintenance other women in India received. Others felt it was unfair to Hindu men, who were forced to pay alimony for longer than three months. Above all, it was seen as an instance of the government invading religious domains, particularly by the Sangh Parivar, a right-wing group of Hindu organizations founded in 1965. Sangh Parivar argued that the Muslim Women Act went against the secular nature of the state, and thus encouraged further division of the Hindu and Muslim communities.

During the course of this event, the Congress Party of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991; prime minister 1984–1989) was criticized from all sides of the political spectrum by eventually allowing Muslim Personal Law to prevail and reversing the initial court decision, which had become one of the greatest points of contention among the right-wing Hindu community. The Shah Bano case became reconstituted as a cause that had a devastating effect on communal relations. Even today the Sangh Parivar considers the case emblematic of the dire effects of "pseudosecularism." The accusation that certain parties are complicit in nonsecular practices, thus living by a double-standard, was an indictment directed at the Congress Party for its evident lack of evenhandedness with all communities involved in the Shah Bano case.

JULI GITTINGER

See also Islam; Muslims

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✦ SHANKAR, RAVI

Ravi Shankar (b. 1920) is the world's best-known Indian musician. Shankar, sometimes known simply as Ravi, has performed Hindustani music, north India's classical music, all over the world on the sitar, a long-necked, multistringed lute. He greatly expanded the visibility of the sitar and Hindustani music by collaborations with prominent Western musicians, such as the violinist Yehudi Menuhin (1916–1999), Beatles member George Harrison (1943–2001), and the American composer Philip Glass (b. 1937). His influence has also been acknowledged by many other musicians. For instance, jazz saxophonist John Coltrane (1926–1967) was a fan of Shankar's. In addition to his many decades of performing in the most prestigious concert halls and venues of the world, Shankar has an extensive discography of about 120 recordings, 2 of which have won Grammy awards. Shankar also cowrote the Oscar-nominated score for the film *Gandhi* (1982), and he composed the highly acclaimed music for the three films of the Apu Trilogy (1955–1959) directed by Satyajit Ray (1921–1992). He has written two autobiographies in English.



World renowned sitarist Ravi Shankar is seen playing his sitar in an iconic 1967 photograph. (AP Photo)

Shankar has long been an innovator within the traditional repertoire of north Indian classical music. He changed the sound of the sitar and introduced flashier playing techniques that sometimes drew criticism from more conservative musicians. His creative approach, however, opened the music up to more experimental fusions, as demonstrated on his 1987 album *Tana Mana*. During the 1960s, largely due to his association with the Beatles and his performances at the Monterey Pop Festival (1967) and the

Concert for Bangladesh (1971), his sound, in the minds of many people, became synonymous with psychedelia. While enjoying the large crowds and the adulation, Shankar insisted that the arduous technical and spiritual discipline needed to perform his music excluded the use of drugs.

Born into a family of Bengali Brahmin intellectuals in Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh, Shankar won his artistic spurs in Paris during the 1930s in the dance troupe of his elder brother, Uday (1900–1977). Allauddin Khan (1862–1972), a sarod player and multi-instrumentalist composer who became one of the most renowned Indian music teachers of the 20th century, and the father of renowned sarod player Ali Akbar Khan (1922–2009), joined Uday's troupe for a year, during which time Shankar became his disciple. In 1938 Shankar gave up his career as a dancer and began a period of intense study of the sitar and Hindustani music with Allauddin Khan, and later married his daughter, Annapurna Devi (b. 1927). By the 1950s, Shankar was an established artist in India performing regularly in concerts and on the radio. In 1956 he toured the United States and made his seminal recording: *Three Ragas*. His international career soon took off, and he eventually became regarded as an elder statesman of world music.

Shankar has received many honors, including the Music Council UNESCO award (1975), the Magsaysay Award from Manila (1992), the French Legion of Honor (2000), and an honorary knighthood from Queen Elizabeth II (2001). The government of India has recognized his contributions to Indian culture by bestowing its most prestigious awards: the Padma Vibhushan (1981) and the Bharat Ratna (1999). In 1986 he was nominated to the Rajya Sabha, India's upper legislative chamber. Shankar lives in California and New Delhi with his wife Sukanya (b. 1954) and their daughter, the sitarist Anoushka Shankar (b. 1981). He is also the father of the singer Norah Jones (b. 1979).

J. ANDREW GREIG

See also Khan, Ali Akbar; Khan, Vilayat; Music, Devotional

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✦ SHIV SENA

The Shiv Sena (Shivaji's Army) political party is a right-wing regional political party based in the state of Maharashtra. It was formed in Bombay (Mumbai) in 1966 by journalist and cartoonist Balasaheb "Bal" Thackeray (b. 1923). Named for the 17th-century Maratha warrior Shivaji Bhosle, or Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj (1630–1680), Shiv Sena was created as a single-issue movement to challenge the perceived dominance of south Indians in Mumbai's professional occupations. Since the late 1960s, however, its platform has expanded, but the

party has retained a focus on Marathi ethnic chauvinism and Hindu nationalism. In 2010 Shiv Sena held a majority of the seats in the Mumbai Municipal Corporation, the city government of Mumbai and some of its suburbs. It held power at the state level as part of a coalition government between 1995 and 1999. At the national level it is part of the center-right coalition, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which was founded in 1998 and formed the government of India between 1998 and 2004 led by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee (b. 1924).

Bal Thackeray founded the party during an acute recession in the late 1960s, building support by whipping up anti–south Indian (primarily anti-Tamil) sentiments and drawing upon images of strength associated with Maharashtra's warrior history. The party initially spread its message of Maratha pride on the editorial pages of Thackeray's weekly political journal *Marmik* and, later, in the party-sponsored daily newspaper *Saamna*. It also built support through neighborhood-level committees, or *shakas*—a structure borrowed from the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Despite the party's use of local *shakas*, Shiv Sena has maintained a highly centralized structure, tightly controlled by Thackeray himself.

The party's popularity has ebbed and flowed over its 40-year history. Its support first surged in the early 1970s when it captured a majority of the seats in the Mumbai Municipal Corporation. By the close of the 1970s, however, it was losing support in Mumbai, and despite its efforts to become a statewide party, it held no seats in the Maharashtra Assembly. In the 1980s the party benefited from two political shifts. First, a lengthy strike in Mumbai's textile mills, followed by widespread mill closings, challenged the power of Mumbai's labor unions. The Shiv Sena seized this opportunity to build support among the disgruntled Maratha working class. Secondly, the Shiv Sena adopted the increasingly popular discourse of Hindu nationalism, or Hindutva ("Hinduness"), a word coined in 1923 by Hindu nationalist Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883–1966). By reframing its message in terms of Hindutva, Shiv Sena could build support in areas outside of Mumbai, where southern Indians were not perceived as a threat. By the end of the 1980s, Shiv Sena had emerged as a formidable political force in Maharashtra. In the 1990 Maharashtra Assembly elections, the party won 18 percent of the seats. In the next election, in 1995, Shiv Sena took a quarter of the seats and formed a coalition government with the right-wing Hindu nationalist party Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which had been founded in 1980.

In office for just five years, the government built a lasting legacy by officially changing Bombay's name to Mumbai (and overseeing numerous other name changes throughout the state) and facilitating significant investments in housing and infrastructure in Mumbai. Although the coalition lost power in the 1999 elections, Shiv Sena has remained a formidable opposition party. A leadership struggle in the party beginning in the mid-2000s, however, has threatened the party's stability. Soon after Bal Thackeray selected his son, Udhav Thackeray (b. 1960), as his successor in 2003, his nephew and political disciple, Raj Shrikant Thackeray (b. 1968), formed a new political party, the Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (Maharashtra Reformation Army) and took many of the party's supporters with him. With the movement's base divided, Shiv Sena appeared weaker than it had in many years.

LIZA WEINSTEIN

See also Maharashtra; Mumbai

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✦ SIKHISM

Sikhism is the youngest of the world's monotheistic religions. It originated in the Punjab (the region of the five rivers) in northwestern India in the 15th century. Founded by Guru Nanak (1469–1539), Sikhism today has more than 25 million adherents worldwide. About 90 percent of the world's Sikhs live in India and are largely concentrated in the Punjab.

The adherents of Sikhism are called Sikhs. The word *Sikh* is derived from the Pali *sikkha* and the Sanskrit *sisya*, which both mean "disciple." Sikhs believe in one God, the same God for all people of all religions. They adhere to the teachings of ten gurus (teachers), which started with Guru Nanak, born in 1469, and ended with the 10th and last guru, Gobind Singh (1675–1708). The gurus espoused peace, social harmony, and equality of all peoples regardless of caste, with the 10th guru introducing a more militant philosophy in the face of persecution during the Mughal rule of India in the 16th century.

Since his sons were assassinated, Guru Gobind Singh, the 10th and last guru, proclaimed that the line of personal gurus ended with him. Thereafter, the supreme loyalty of the Sikhs was transferred from the personal guru to the holy book, the *Guru Granth Sahib*, and the *Khālsa*, the core group of committed followers from the larger Sikh community that Gobind Singh initiated in 1699.

The Sikh place of worship is called a *gurdwara* (temple), which literally means the "gateway to the guru." People of all faiths are welcome to the *gurdwara*. Sikhism emphasizes *panth* (community) and community service. So every *gurdwara* has a *langar* (a common kitchen), where Sikhs are expected to contribute in preparing a vegetarian meal to be shared by



Sikh pilgrims at the Full Moon Festival, Amritsar, Punjab, May 2010. (Atilla Jandi/Dreamstime.com)

everyone in the spirit of community and equality. While Sikhs do not mandate pilgrimage to holy sites because they believe that God is everywhere, Harmandir Sahib (Golden Temple) in Amritsar in the Punjab is considered as Sikhism's central and most sacred shrine. The *Adi Granth* (the original holy book) is housed at the Golden Temple.

Guru Nanak, the first guru, was born and raised a Hindu. At that time, Punjabis were either Muslims or Hindus. Hinduism and Islam grew side by side for more than 900 years before Sikhism emerged in the Punjab in the 15th century. Sikhism is often viewed as an offshoot of Hinduism, strongly influenced by the Hindu Sants, a meditative and devotional group in the Hindu *bhakti* (devotion) movement. It was also influenced by Islam, particularly by Sufi mysticism. It shuns the idolatry and polytheism of Hinduism and rejects the Hindu caste system and the authority of the Brahmins. Instead, it advocates equality for all men, regardless of caste, race, or gender. Like Islam, Sikhism focuses on one God, who is the truth and omniscient, omnipresent reality. God is formless and reveals himself through creation. It is one's duty to meditate on this creation. Through meditation, a person could be one with the creator. Through meditation and devotion, a person could attain *mokshsa,* the state of unity with the divine that ends the cycle of reincarnation or transmigration.

While Sikhism in its early history advocated tolerance of Hindus and Muslims, Sikhism evolved into a militant religion. It began to identify God with power. Due to continuing persecution during the reign of the Muslim Mughals, who invaded India from Afghanistan in the 16th century, Sikhs realized that they were called to be both soldiers and saints. Starting in

1526, northern India was ruled by the Mughal Dynasty. While there were friendly relations between the Mughals and the Sikhs at the beginning, the Mughals became suspicious of Sikhism due to its growing number of followers, and Sikhs suffered persecution at the hands of Mughal emperors. Emperor Jahangir executed Guru Arjan Dev (5th guru) for presumably corrupting Islamic teachings. For refusing to convert to Islam, Tegh Bahadur (9th guru) was beheaded during the reign of Emperor Aurangzeb. During the era of Hargobind (6th guru) and after Arjan's death, Sikhism slowly acquired militancy, and Amritsar was fortified. But it was during the time of Gobind Singh that Sikhism shifted from Guru Nanak's focus on inner peace and meditation to martial discipline and the arming of followers to defend the faith.

Gobind Singh changed the face of Sikhism when he created the *Khālsa* (community of the pure) from the broader Sikh *panth*. He introduced the rite of *pahul* (initiation by the sword) during the inauguration of this new brotherhood of soldier-saints. He introduced the "Five Ks," which identify many Sikhs to this day: a Sikh was not to cut his *kesh* (the hair of his head or beard), he was to wear a *kangha* (comb), a *kara* (steel bracelet), and *kachh* (short pants); and, he was to carry a *kirpān* (a double-edged sword). Henceforth, Gobind Singh was known as *Singh* (lion). He required male Sikhs to likewise assume the surname "Singh." Women could also be members of the Khālsa. They were given a single-edged sword and vested with the title *Kaur* (princess). The evolution of Sikhism from a meditative to militant religion has been the subject of theological and scholarly interest then and now.

When the Mughal Empire declined, a Sikh kingdom under the rule of Maharaja Ranjit Singh (1799–1839) arose and flourished in the Punjab, with Lahore as the capital and borders reaching as far as China and the Kyber Pass in present-day Afghanistan. With the death of Ranjit Singh, the Sikh kingdom of the Punjab fell into disarray. Then, after the defeat of the Sikhs in the Anglo-Sikh Wars of 1846 and 1848, the Punjab was annexed by Britain in 1849.

When Britain granted independence to India in 1947, and with the partition of the Indian subcontinent into India and Pakistan, what was then known as British Punjab was likewise partitioned. East Punjab became part of India, with West Punjab allocated to Pakistan. More than 2 million Sikhs were forced to emigrate to the East Punjab, leaving their ancestral homes and sacred sites behind in West Punjab. Both the Sikhs and Hindus became embroiled in the bloody war against the Muslims in Pakistan, which resulted in over a million deaths.

When the Hindus and Muslims acquired their own homelands at the end of British rule, Sikhs clamored for a separate Sikh state to be called Khalistan. While the Sikh demand for a separate nation was denied, the Indian central government gave them autonomy within the state of the Punjab. As a religion, Sikhism is difficult to dissociate from politics. In fact, the Akali Dal (Akali Religious Party), formed in 1920 and active to this day despite incessant factionalism, argues that religion and politics are integrated and inseparable in Sikhism. The Akalis claim to represent both the religious and political interests of the Sikhs.

Tragic milestones in the contemporary history of Sikhism occurred in 1984, when Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi ordered the Indian Army to storm the Golden Temple at Amritsar in June. Known as Operation BLUESTAR, this military assault was intended to

force a Sikh extremist group holed up in the temple complex to surrender. This group was headed by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, a religious instructor and politician, who fought for Sikh rights and variably espoused Sikh autonomy or secession, as the case may be, using both terrorism and parliamentary means. Operation BLUESTAR killed not only Bhindranwale and his followers but also innocent faithful visiting the shrine. Sikhs condemned this desecration of their holy temple and the loss of many lives. A few months later, in October 1984, Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards in retaliation for the Amritsar assault. The assassination was followed by the Anti-Sikh Riots of 1984, which generated more Sikh casualties and outrage against the central government of India.

While the Sikhs lived for centuries as a religious majority in the land of the Punjab, they have always been a religious minority in the Indian subcontinent, a land dominated by Hinduism and Islam. Today, while Sikhs comprise only 2 percent of India's total population, they manage to preserve their own distinct identity and culture. Many *gurdwaras* have programs for children to learn Punjabi and the Gurmukhi script for writing the Punjabi language. However, there has been a growing resistance among Sikh youth to following old customs and traditions, particularly the wearing of turbans. In 2004 the election of Manmohan Singh as India's 14th and current prime minister was a welcome development in the Sikh community since he is the first Sikh to hold this office.

Sikhs who emigrated to other countries also live as religious minorities in their new homelands. In the 20th century, Sikh communities began to grow in North America and Europe. Today, the largest Sikh community outside of India can be found in Great Britain. Modest Sikh populations can also be found in Canada and in the United States. Per the U.S. Census Report in 2006, there are presently 500,000 Sikhs in the United States, most of whom live in California, Washington, New York, and New Mexico. After the 9/11 Al Qaeda attack on the World Trade Center in New York in 2001, there was a surge of hate crimes toward Sikhs in the United States, since many confused the turban-wearing Indian Sikhs with Muslims. Smaller Sikh communities can also be found in East Africa, Singapore, Malaysia, Iran, Fiji, Australia, and Hong Kong, among others.

All Sikhs celebrate the birthdays of Guru Nanak and Guru Gobind Singh and the anniversary of the martyrdom of Guru Arjan. They also commemorate the anniversary of the *Khālsa* every year during the Vaisakhi, a Punjabi harvest festival held at the beginning of the solar year.

GLORIA G. GONZALES

See also Amritsar; Punjab

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Sikkim. *See* Himalaya

✦ SINGAPORE, RELATIONS WITH

Of all the 10 countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), founded in 1967, with which India has developed a relationship since the beginning of its Look East policy in 1993, Singapore stands at the top. Singapore was one of the first to actively respond in the early 1990s to India's new policies to liberalize and globalize its economy. And in the post–Cold War and post–Soviet Union (1991) atmosphere, it became far easier for Singapore to endorse India's standing as a rising regional power. The strategic and military ties between the two countries were strengthened when Singapore threw its weight in ASEAN to support India's membership of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, although that has not, in 2010, yet been accomplished. In 2003 a bilateral agreement provided for expansion of cooperation between the two nations in joint military training and the development of weapons and systems technology. Cooperation was most notable in the maritime field, with the navies of the two states holding joint exercises in the MILAN (the Hindi term *milan* means "meeting" and is a biennial gathering of regional navies hosted by the Indian Navy) and SIMBEX (Singapore India Maritime Bilateral Exercise) programs near India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands. New agreements were also signed to promote the exchange of intelligence in fighting terrorism.

The economic statistics of bilateral trade and investment show very impressive growth, with the promise of strong growth in the future as well. Thus, there has been a dramatic growth in bilateral trade and a substantial investment on Singapore's part in India's infrastructure. As of 2006, the tiny island republic was India's eighth-largest source of investment at US$3 billion, an amount expected to rise to $5 billion in 2010 and from there to double in 2015. Singapore-India cumulative foreign direct investment for the period April 2000 to July 2009 was US$8.57 billion. Singapore has notably invested in upgrading India's ports and airports and in developing information technology (IT) parks and special economic zones. Additionally, there has been close collaboration in aerospace and space programs, and in aviation, energy, and biotechnology.

Among the special acts of collaboration is the creation of the Ascendas Information Technology Park in Bangalore in 2005. The Government Investment Corporation (GIC) of Singapore registered itself in India as a financial institutional investor and committed itself heavily in housing finance development corporations. In 2006 Singapore was India's ninth largest trading partner, accounting for 3.8 percent of India's total trade. Trade jumped from US$2.2 billion in 2001 to a little short of $10 billion five years later. In the five years

from 2004 to 2009, India's imports from Singapore increased by 26.88 percent, while its exports doubled at 100.8 percent. More than 50 percent of Singapore's exports to India are re-exports.

The tourist traffic has also grown at an impressive rate. India is Singapore's fourth most popular tourist destination. Indian authorities reported the issue of more than 650,000 visas to visitors from Singapore in 2006. And conversely, Singapore (along with Penang and Pattaya) vie as the most popular family holiday destinations for middle- and higher-level executives and businessmen in India's major cities.

Economic relations have kept pace with the growing political and strategic relationship. India's Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and the Singapore Business Federation have collaborated to promote a better economic relationship, resulting in the governments of the two countries signing the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) in 2005. CECA eliminated trade and tariff barriers, made possible better access to banks and financial institutions, and provided for increased bilateral cooperation in education, science and technology, intellectual property rights, and commercial aviation. Singapore relaxed its conditions for visas to Indian professionals, especially in IT, medicine, engineering, and finance, enabling workers in these fields to migrate to the island nation and work there. In 2010 Singapore issued a license to India's Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI) Bank as a full-fledged bank with authority to open multiple branches. That made ICICI the second Indian bank (after the State Bank of India) to hold that status in Singapore.

DAMODAR R. SARDESAI

See also Southeast Asia, Relations with

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✦ SINGH, KHUSHWANT

A prominent Indian journalist and novelist, Khushwant Singh was born on February 2, 1915, in Hadali, Punjab, which now lies in Pakistan. He is a significant postcolonial writer in the English language and is known for his clear-cut secularism, wit, and deep passion for poetry. He was educated at Government College, Lahore; St. Stephen's College, Delhi; and King's College, London, before reading for the bar at the Inner Temple, also in London.

After qualifying in law, Singh returned to India and set up a legal practice in Lahore. However, he struggled in his practice for several years before the partition of India in August 1947.

Partition forced him to abandon his practice, and with his family he moved and settled in New Delhi. Shortly afterward, he was offered a job in the diplomatic service in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), which took him first to London and later to Canada. He also served in Paris with the United Nations (UN) Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. However, he found life in the bureaucracy to his disliking and left the MEA. In 1951 he joined All India Radio as a journalist.

Since then he has written for almost all the major national and international newspapers in India and abroad, published many books, and made numerous TV and radio appearances at home and abroad. He was the founder-editor of *Yojana* (1951–1953), editor of the *Illustrated Weekly of India* (1979–1980), chief editor of *New Delhi* (1979–1980), and editor of the *Hindustan Times* (1980–1983). His Saturday column "With Malice Towards One and All" in the *Hindustan Times* is by far one of the most popular columns of the day. As a writer and a journalist, he is known for his candor and brutally honest style of writing, which despite often landing him in controversy has not deterred or changed his style of expression.

Singh's many books—the U.S. Library of Congress lists 99 works by and about him—enjoy a worldwide readership. His *A History of the Sikhs* is a classic two-volume book on Sikh history and is used as a reference work by many scholars. His novel *Train to Pakistan* was made into a film and won him international acclaim and the Grove Press Award in 1954. Other well-known novels include *Delhi* and *The Company of Women*. He has also written the biography *Maharaja Ranjit Singh* and the historical work *Fall of Sikh Kingdom*. Singh's translation of *Japji*—the hymns of Guru Nanak (the founder of the Sikh faith)—and commentary on the *Bhagavadgita*, titled *From Mind to Supermind*, are a testament to his secular mindset. Another book, *Declaring Love in Four Languages*, written jointly with Sharda Kaushki, presents a selection of the finest poems in English, Hindi, Urdu, and Punjabi. He has also translated renowned Punjabi poet Amrita Pritam's poem *Pinjar* (Skeleton) into English.

Singh was a member of the Rajya Sabha (upper house of the Indian Parliament) from 1980 to 1986. Among other honors, he was awarded the Padma Bhushan in 1974 by the president of India. He returned the decoration in 1984, however, in protest against the Union Government's siege of the Golden Temple in Amritsar, popularly known as Operation Bluestar. Undeterred, the Indian government awarded Singh an even more prestigious honor, the Padma Vibhushan, in the year 2007. In 1999 he was honored with "Order of Khalsa" (*Nishaan-e-Khalsa*), the highest decoration bestowed by the Sikh community.

STUTI BHATNAGAR

See also Amritsar; Literature; Sikhism

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✦ SINGH, MANMOHAN

Manmohan Singh (b. 1932) became prime minister of India in 2004. He is the first Sikh to hold that office. Equally important, he is seen as the architect of India's economic reforms in the 1990s, which liberalized the Indian economy and opened it to foreign investment, thereby making it a partner in the global economy. He has been awarded national and international awards, including the Padma Vidbushan (1987) and the Euro Money and Asia Money Award for Finance Minister of the Year (1993).

Singh was brought up in Amritsar, Punjab, after his family moved from the place of his ancestors, Gah (Pakistan), in 1947. That year India was divided into the sovereign states of India and Pakistan. After completing his undergraduate degree from the University of the Punjab, Chandigarh, in 1952, and then his master's degree in 1954, he went to St. John's College, at the University of Cambridge. There he earned a degree in 1957 and ended as a Wrenbury Scholar, before transferring to Nuffield College, at the University of Oxford, where he received his PhD in 1962. His doctoral thesis, a critique of Indian trade policies, was entitled "India's Export Performance, 1951–1960, Export Prospects and Policy Implications."



Manmohan Singh is the prime minister of India and the country's first Sikh prime minister. (Shutterstock)

Upon his return to India, Singh taught at his alma mater, the University of the Punjab, between 1957 and 1965. Between 1966 and 1969 he worked at the United Nations (UN) Conference on Trade and Development, and in the following decade he worked at the Ministry of Foreign Trade and then for the cabinet minister for foreign trade. He also taught at the University of Delhi. In 1971 to 1972 he became the economic adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Trade, moving up to be the chief economic adviser to the Ministry of Finance (1972–1976). Between November 1976 and April 1980 he served as secretary of the Ministry of Finance, serving on such commissions as

the Atomic Energy Commission and the Space Commission. In April 1980 he became the secretary of the Planning Commission, and he held that position until September 1982, when he was appointed governor of the Reserve Bank of India. He served as governor for three years before moving on, in 1985, for a two-year stint as deputy chairman of the Planning Commission of India. Between August 1987 and November 1990 he served as secretary-general and commissioner of the South Committee in Geneva, Switzerland. During these decades he acquired a wealth of knowledge by serving on a number of other councils, commissions, and associations.

During the 1990s Singh was ushered into the political limelight when he was chosen to be India's finance minister, and he was elected to the upper house of Parliament, the Rajya Sabha. He won election in October 1991 from Assam on the Congress Party ticket. In the Rajya Sabha he became the Leader of the Opposition and was reelected in 1995, 2001, and 2007. He served as the adviser to the prime minister on economic affairs between December 1990 and March 1991, before being appointed minister of finance, a position he held from June 1991 to May 1996. He then took on the portfolio of the minister of external affairs, holding it between November 2005 and October 2006. He returned for a short term as minister of finance between November 2008 and January 2009. As the finance minister, Singh gave a compelling speech about how India would recover from the near-collapse of its economy. Using the words of the renowned French intellectual and writer Victor Hugo (1802–1885), he stated that no power on earth could stop an idea whose time has come.

After the Congress Party–led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) won the general elections of 2004 Singh was, in a surprise move, chosen as the prime minister. First sworn in on May 22, 2004, he is only the second prime minister in India's history to be reelected after a full five-year term; the other was India's first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964). Singh distinguished himself as prime minister through his economic reforms, which changed the path that the Indian economy had been following for more than four decades. He introduced an ambitious economic recovery program, which led Indian commercial and IT sectors to achieve record growth and expansion. He simplified the Indian tax system and removed government regulations and bureaucratic controls to create a business and investment climate favorable to Indian businesses and entrepreneurs, as well as to global multinational corporations. At the same time, he is a strong advocate of the mixed economic model, in which the public sector remains a strong presence in dealing with infrastructure and agriculture.

Singh is the only Indian prime minister who has not won a general election from a seat in the lower house of Parliament, the Lok Sabha. Although he is intellectual, thoughtful, unassuming, and gentle-looking, albeit with a strong voice, his critics consider him to be a weak and indecisive leader, but he enjoys strong support from India's educated and middle classes, and he has emerged as a consensus builder among often assertive, unruly, and divergent allies in the UPA. Presiding over such a coalition, Singh continued his economic reforms to encourage growth in the industrial as well as the agrarian sectors. He has worked

consistently to make the Indian government's bureaucracy more accountable for its actions. In a gesture toward engendering communal harmony between Hindus and Sikhs, Singh offered a public apology in Parliament on August 12, 2005, for the Indian government's role in the anti-Sikh riots of 1984, which was well received by the Sikh community. These riots had broken out after the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984) by her Sikh bodyguards.

Singh has adopted a pragmatic and friendly approach toward India's neighbors. When alleged Pakistani citizens attacked the financial capital, Mumbai, on November 26, 2008, however, relations with Pakistan became strained once again, but India has been praised for its restraint. Singh's government has also worked to ease tensions between India and China; one sign of normalization in relations was the opening in 2006 of the Nathula pass, which goes from the state of Sikkim to Tibet, after 40 years. Although, his government has reversed policies in dealing with India's former ally Iran. Amid loud criticism from the Opposition, Singh signaled the end of cooperation over Iran's nuclear program.

After his economic reforms, the most noteworthy accomplishment of Singh's government has been the highly contentious U.S.-India nuclear deal, signed in New Delhi by Singh and U.S. president George W. Bush (b. 1946; president 2001–2009) on March 2, 2006. The U.S.-India nuclear agreement allows India access to U.S. nuclear facilities and nuclear technology. As part of the deal, the United States agreed to help India develop civilian nuclear technology, and India is permitted to take part in international nuclear research activities. As a result of the violent opposition to the deal, Singh's government faced a no-confidence motion in Parliament on July 22, 2008, and only survived through abstentions and political deals with regional parties to win by 19 votes (275 votes to 256). In doing so, however, Singh lost the support of leftist parties from his coalition.

Nonetheless, the Indian people gave a decisive verdict in favor of the Congress-led coalition parties in March 2009 by reelecting Singh in the general elections. He commenced his second term in May 2009 with a team of his own choice, which was assembled to tackle the internal security threats, the recession that began in December 2007, and continuing problems with infrastructure. The first initiative of the new UPA government was to implement the lessons learned from the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks regarding lack of preparedness by security forces. Antiterror hubs have been set up in New Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, and Bangalore and are manned by specially trained army commandos. The second initiative has been to upgrade and enhance the efficiency of the government: an ambitious project toward the goal of e-governance is the Unique Identification project (UID), which will provide a unique ID for each resident of the country. In addition, a high-level panel of experts has been appointed, with members such as Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen (b. 1933) and business tycoon L. N. Mittal (b. 1950), to advise the government on how to enhance private-public partnerships to stimulate economic growth. Singh's concern to improve the nation's communications and transportation system was demonstrated when he announced that his government would invest heavily in building

hundreds of miles of freeways. In his Independence Day speech on August 15, 2009, Singh reiterated his government's seven priorities of agriculture, water, education, health care, employment, urban renewal, and infrastructure to continue the trajectory of growth and development of the previous five years. Internationally, Singh's expertise on economic planning and recovery was demonstrated in the G-20 Summit in September 2009, when his policy prescriptions were included in the group's communiqué. Indian diplomatic circles were highly appreciative and enthusiastic about his invitation from U.S. president Barack Obama (b. 1961; president 2009–) to be the first state guest in the White House during the Thanksgiving Day holidays on November 24, 2009.

FATIMA A. IMAM

See also Economy; Prime Minister

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✦ *SLUMDOG MILLIONAIRE* (MOVIE)

The movie *Slumdog Millionaire*, directed by British filmmaker and producer Danny Boyle (b. 1956) with Loveleen Tandan, an Indian film director and casting director, was an international success in 2008. The film won eight Oscars, including Best Film and Best Director. Indian attitudes toward the film, however, were ambivalent, ranging from outright rejection by the cultural chauvinists to acceptance among film fans. There were celebrations in Mumbai when the Oscar announcements were made on February 22, 2008. Related to this ambivalence is an ongoing debate about how the film should be classified—whether it is an Indian film, or a film about India made by a sympathetic foreigner, or a film inspired by the success of contemporary Bollywood. In any case, there is no doubt that Boyle warmed to his subject as production progressed, and the result is a film that captures many of the dilemmas of India's rapidly modernizing society: the corruption, communalism, and brutality on the part of the police, and the changing attitudes of the young toward social conventions that have glued India together for centuries.

The film is based on the 2005 novel *Q&A* by Vikas Swarup, the Indian diplomat and novelist. It was his first novel and has since been renamed *Slumdog Millionaire* to cash in on the film's success. It was transformed into a script by Simon Beaufoy (b. 1966), the British

screenwriter. Funding for the production was obtained from a variety of sources, including Celador Films and Film4 Production (United Kingdom) and Warner International Pictures (United States). The film was shot in England and on location in India. It was well received on release, but its later box office and critical successes were achieved in incremental stages. In the year after winning the Oscar, the film grossed $377 million. Reviews of the film in the West emphasized its debt to Bollywood, while in India there was some disquiet over the title. *Slumdog,* it is alleged, is not a word commonly used in the *bustees* (slums) of Mumbai, and its use was viewed as derogatory. However, it is now reported that the word has been incorporated into *Hinglish,* the lingua franca of contemporary urban India.

The narrative trajectory of the film is complex. It tells the life story of Jamal Malik, a young Muslim who is a *chai wallah* (tea bearer) at a call center in Mumbai. His success on the game show *Kaun Banega Crorepati* (KBC; Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?), originally presented on Indian television by renowned Indian film actors Amitabh Bachchan (b. 1942) in 2000 and 2001 and then Shah Rukh Khan (b. 1965) for one year after a four-year hiatus, is greeted with suspicion, and he is arrested and beaten by the police. Jamal tells his story to an essentially sympathetic police inspector, revealing that each answer he provides on the show relates to an episode in his life, such as getting Amitabh Bachchan's autograph as a child and the death of his mother in the communal riots of 1993. (These episodes are shown in flashback in the film.) After their mother's death Jamal and his brother, Salim, are recruited into a begging gang, from which they escape to become, by accident, tourist guides at the Taj Mahal in Agra. On their return to Mumbai, Salim throws in his lot with a local gangster, while Jamal embarks on a search for Latika, a young girl whom the brothers had befriended in their begging days. Jamal finds that Latika has grown into a beauty but is the mistress of a local gangster. Jamal convinces the inspector that he is genuine, and he is released to complete his quest on KBC. It then becomes apparent that Jamal has undertaken this task in order to win Latika away from the gangster. She escapes with the assistance of Salim and Jamal, whom she meets on a railroad station platform, and they are reunited. The film concludes with a Bollywood song-and-dance routine as the credits role.

Slumdog Millionaire was hugely successful with audiences in the West but was controversial in India, where concerns remained about its overreliance on English to cater to the global audience, its representations of Hindus (who kill the boy's mother), the fate of the young actors who were plucked from the slums to portray the characters in their youth, and its perceived lack of cultural authenticity.

BRIAN SHOESMITH

See also Bachchan, Harivansh Amitabh; Bollywood; Film Industry

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✦ SOAP OPERAS

The genre of soap opera has its origins in the daytime serials that were broadcast on radio and sponsored by giant soap manufacturers, such as Proctor and Gamble, in the United States during the 1930s. Because the stories were targeted toward women doing their household work during the day, the soap opera characteristically features women-centric stories and chiefly (though not only) addresses a female audience.

In India, soap operas are a relatively new phenomenon, and most people refer to them as "serials." They are produced in a variety of Indian languages, including Hindi, Bengali, Marathi, and Tamil. The most popular and well-known serials are in Hindi. Indian prime-time soaps came into their own with the efflorescence of private television channels in the 1990s, such as the Star network, Zee TV, and Sony.

Soaps in India share common features with global soaps in their generic conventions; however, there are differences as well. Key features of Indian soaps can be outlined as follows:

1. Open-ended narratives told in serial/episodic form that resist narrative closure;
2. Multiple characters, plots, and subplots;
3. Use of time at a dual level—one that parallels actual time and implies that soap characters' lives go on whether we watch or not; and two, one in which the narrative takes a generational leap to introduce new characters and new story lines;
4. Emphasis on dialog and attempt at resolution;
5. Mixing of melodrama, myth, realism, and forms of entertainment;
6. The use of hook, recap, and precap;
7. Male characters whose actions move the narrative forward;
8. Women as the central protagonists;
9. The family home as the main setting for the show.

Of the points above, genre mixing and the use of hook, recap, and precap are distinctively India's. With regard to genre, Indian soaps draw on a variety of sources, both from India and the West, but retain a distinctively Indian flavor. Soaps in India represent a continuation of the culture's pre-cinematic dramatic forms and stories, transformed by the capitalist economy of scale and the power of the mass media. Where they differ from their Western counterparts is in the dramatic traditions from which they emerge. For most Indians, dramatic conventions are drawn from the two great epics, the *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata*, as well as from other folk legends, folk stories, and regional performances from the different states of India. The *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata* are stories of large joint families, their relationships and intrigues, and their family values and traditions. Indian soaps have also been influenced by the expensive and stylish production values of such U.S. prime-time soaps as *Dynasty*, *Dallas*, or *Grey's Anatomy*, as well as daytime dramas such as *The Bold and the Beautiful*, *General Hospital*, and *All My Children*. In addition, Indian soaps show the influence of successful mainstream Bollywood films.



Scene still from the Indian soap opera *Mahabharata*, 1989. Soap operas are immensely popular. (Hemant Pithwa/The India Today Group/Getty Images)

Another Indian soap convention is the use of hook, recap, and precap. The beginning of every episode starts with a recap of the previous day's events, bringing the viewer up to date, and then a voice-over invites the audience to "*aaiye, ab dekhtey hain aagey*" ("come, let us watch further"). This is the hook or enticement. Indian soaps use another ploy that is peculiarly Indian in order to lure their viewers to watch the next episode. This is what is termed a "precap." The term "precap" is a uniquely Indian term, literally the opposite of "recap." The precap is a preview of the next day's episode.

Precap is similar to the incorrect, though extremely handy, "prepone," the opposite of "postpone." Instead of using the term "bring forward," many people simply say "prepone" to contrast with "postpone." It is common parlance in India and has come to connote what is referred to as "Indian-English." Terms such as this are perfectly understood and accepted in India.

Indian soap opera production and consumption differ in many ways from that of the West. First, production houses in India are mostly family-run businesses. Examples include Ekta Kapoor's Balaji Telefilms, which gave India its first prime-time soaps, including *Kyunki Saas Bhi Kabhi Bahu Thi* (Because the Mother-in-Law Was Also Once a Daughter-in-Law, which aired on Star Plus) and *Kahaani Ghar Ghar Kii* (The Story of Every Home, which aired on Star Plus). Sunjoy Waddhwa's production house Sphere Origins first challenged Balaji Telefilms' supremacy with *Saat Phere . . . Saloni Ka Safar* (Seven Rounds of the Sacred Fire [during Marriage] . . . Saloni's Journey, which aired on Zee TV) and *Balika Vadhu* (Child

Bride, which aired on Colors). A third example is Rajan Shahi's production house, with soaps such as *Sapna Babul Ka . . . Bidaai* (The Dream of Every Father . . . His Daughter's Departure from her Natal Home to Her In-Laws' Home, aired on Star Plus) and *Yeh Rishta Kya Kehlata Hai* (What Is This Relationship Called, which aired on Star Plus).

A second distinction is the belief that Indians have in astrology, numerology, and *vaastu* (similar to feng shui), when it comes to success in their professional and personal lives. For instance, the soaps produced by Balaji Telefilms are often referred to as the "K soaps" because all their titles start with the letter K. It is said that Ekta Kapoor was advised by her astrologers to use this letter of the alphabet for success. Similarly, producer Sunjoy Waddhwa and his wife, Comall, spell their names in this unusual way (rather than the more usual "Sanjay" and "Komal") because they have been advised to do so by astrologers. Third is a belief in the strength of prayers and the visibility of statues and deities in all the offices of production houses. All the offices have statues of Hindu deities with offerings of fresh flowers and burning incense sticks. Fourth are the incredibly long working hours that production houses and studios keep, working through days and nights, weekends, and even national holidays.

Fifth is the manner in which television soaps are aired in India. Overseas, particularly in the United States, there are season breaks for prime-time soap operas. In India, there are no season breaks. People watch the same soaps Monday through Friday throughout the year. Soap characters, in turn, become like *dal-chawal* (lentils and rice, often a staple diet in India). Sixth is a constant allusion to family. Employees of production houses, as well as the soap stars themselves, refer to being all members of the same family. When a beloved character on a soap opera dies, many people cannot bear to stay on the set to watch that particular episode of shooting. Star TV has instituted the Star Parivaar (family) Awards for the best soap operas.

Until the 1990s, when India opened its doors to economic liberalization, the country had only one state-run television channel, Doordarshan. The most popular soaps on Doordarshan were *Hum Log* (We People, 1984) and *Buniyaad* (Foundation, 1986). These two were modeled along the lines of what are termed Sabido's method of education-entertainment. Simply put, the Sabido method produces radio and television dramas that impart social messages and values.

Hum Log and *Buniyaad* were important soaps in Indian television history because they were launched on the eve of economic reform in India; for the first time Indians had a shared sense of participating in the lives of the characters they saw on screen. Audiences created an imagined community of shared concerns, and issues stemming from the lives of the characters depicted in the soaps became questions that were debated both in the public and private spheres. The shows also made stars like Alok Nath household names. Nath played the role of Haveliram in *Buniyaad*, and after that he played the benevolent patriarch in many Bollywood films and other soaps. He is currently the loving and understanding father on the top-rated soap *Sapna Babul Ka . . . Bidaai*. Similarly, actress Kiran Juneja, who played the role of Veerawali in *Buniyaad*, married award-winning Bollywood director Ramesh Sippy and has acted in several Bollywood films and soaps.

In 2000 soap opera production and viewing changed dramatically with the launch of India's first prime-time soap, *Kyunki Saas Bhi Kabhi Bahu Thi*. The success of *Kyunki*, with its story of the Virani family, was followed by *Kahaani Ghar Ghar Kii*, the story of the Aggarwal family.

With *Kyunki* and *Kahaani*, Ekta Kapoor set a new trend of soap narratives based on urban, rich, joint families. Kapoor also raised the bar for production values; introduced catchy title songs and an opening montage; brought in aspirational lifestyles that also espoused *parivaar aur parampara* (family and tradition); used expensive and stylized sets; and created an upmarket look, reminiscent of popular Bollywood films of the 1990s. The costumes and jewelry featured on the shows set fashion trends, and people also copied the decor of the homes depicted in the soaps. Nothing like this had been seen before on Indian television.

The central women characters—Tulsi in *Kyunki* and Parvati in *Kahaani*—became the ideal wives and *bahus* (daughters-in-law); they also became household names, not only in India but also overseas in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe, Australia, the Middle East, and the Far East. Smriti Irani, who played the role of Tulsi, and Sakshi Tanwar, who essayed the role of Parvati, are better known by their screen names. Such was their popularity that matrimonial advertisements in Indian newspapers marketed products by urging prospective brides to be like Tulsi and Parvati. The men also had their share of the fan following. When Tulsi's husband, Mihir Virani, "died," such was the public uproar to bring him back that the computers at Star TV and Balaji Telefilms crashed owing to the spate of emails from fans. So, Mihir Virani "returned from the dead," but with a new face—this time, the role was played by Ronit Bose Roy, a very popular actor of the small screen, who has been termed the "Amitabh Bachchan of television" in India. Ronit Bose Roy also played the role of the suave and handsome Mr. Rishabh Bajaj on Balaji Telefilm's *Kasautii Zindagii Kay* (The Trials of Life, aired on Star Plus), and he currently plays the rich landlord, Dharamraj Mahiyavanshi, in yet another Balaji Telefilms production *Bandini* (Imprisoned, aired on NDTV Imagine).

Kyunki and *Kahaani* also gave rise to the ubiquitous use of the term *saas-bahu*. In actuality, these were not merely *saas-bahu* sagas, but such was the success of *Kyunki*, which uses both words in its title, that the term stuck, and Bollywood films as well as reality shows and talent shows now use *saas-bahu* in their titles.

Kyunki and *Kahaani*, with their joint family sagas, went off the air after an eight-year run. Smriti Irani started her own production house, Ugraya Entertainment, and produces other shows, none of which have come close to *Kyunki*'s success. Irani's association with *Kyunki* led to the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), one of the political parties in India, to offer her a ticket in their elections. After *Kahaani* wound up, Tanwar has not acted in any other soap. She has, however, appeared in a recent Bollywood film *Coffee House* (2009, directed by Gurbir Singh Grewal), which did not do very well at the box office, and she is awaiting release of her second film, *Saloon*. Tanwar also works as the creative head for a friend's television production on Doordarshan.

The first two soaps to challenge the supremacy of *Kyunki* and *Kahaani* were issue based—they were stories that dealt with the problems that dark-skinned girls face in India,

where a premium is put on fair skin, particularly in the marriage market. *Saat Phere* made a heroine of the brave Saloni; and *Bidaai* recounts the story of two cousins, the fair-skinned and beautiful Sadhana, who loves her dark-skinned cousin Ragini. Sadhana, played by Sara Khan, a former beauty-contest winner, and Ragini played by Parul Chauhan, are currently very popular actresses. *Bidaai*'s success has led to their participation in other shows, including dance talent shows and reality shows. Such is their popularity that they frequently go overseas to London and the United States. Their trips are financed by members of the Indian diaspora, who invite them to participate in such festive events as Diwali (the festival of lights).

Currently, the soaps with the highest ratings are those dealing with social concerns and issues in India. Soap narratives have moved away from the big city of Mumbai to smaller towns and villages. This demand for a different, new kind of content and setting is being driven by the inescapable fact of viewership increasing in the smaller towns of India. The producers of soaps, and advertising sponsors in turn, have to account for this increasing audience base.

The television channel Colors (a Viacom company), in particular, has made a name for itself with such soaps. They led with *Balika Vadhu* (Child Bride), which deals with the issue of child marriages, followed by *Uttaran* (Hand-Me-Down), which tells the story of a poor girl whose mother works in the house of a rich girl. *Na Aana Is Des Laado* (Don't Come to This Country, Darling Daughter) deals with female feticide, and most recently *Bairi Piya* (Vengeful Lover) is set against the backdrop of the very real stories of poor farmers' suicides in India. Avika Gor, who plays the child bride Anandi in *Balika Vadhu*, has won accolades for her acting, and the older women who are authority figures—such as Dadisa, the grandmother in *Balika Vadhu*, essayed by award-winning theater actress Surekha Sikri, and Ammaji in *Na Aana Is Des Laado*, played by actress Meghna Malik—are winning kudos for their acting prowess.

The cultural product that is prime-time soaps in India—particularly from the year 2000 onward—has borrowed from several sources and brought its own conventions and traditions of performance to bear on the form, giving it a distinctly Indian identity. The story of prime-time soaps in India, which are the flagship programs of television channels, is a fascinating one. It is as compelling as the narratives in the soaps that continue to bring audiences back day after day, and keep them engaged for years on end. This genre has retained its top position in viewership ratings. Prime-time soaps have made the small screen a big medium in reaching out to people.

The centrality of women in soap stories has been maintained from the 1980s until now, and production values remain high. Currently, a decade into the 21st century, however, we are seeing a move away from telefiction toward telereality. Whether this trend will continue, as the K soaps earlier did, remains to be seen in this fast-moving and dynamic field.

We need to remember that the story of prime-time soap operas in India has only just begun. But in the few short years of its existence, it has already opened up a large space

in which they are discussed and debated, critiqued and celebrated. Soap stories rebuff easy answers, require ongoing reexamination and reinterpretation, and demand constant heightened interaction from both producers and audiences.

SHOMA MUNSHI

See also Television

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✦ SOMANATHA TEMPLE

The southern Gujarat coast, where the Temple of Somanatha is located, is an ancient auspicious place for Hindu pilgrimage due to its location at the confluence of three rivers, including the mythical Sarasvati. The story relating to Somanatha is mentioned in the sacred *puranas* and in the Hindu epic the *Mahabharata.* In earlier times, this area was called *Prabhas* or *Prabhasa-Pattna* (*Prabhasa* means "brilliance"), but there was no mention of the famous Shiva temple in any of the early accounts. Most modern historians believe that the large stone temple was constructed sometime during the 10th century by the Chaulukya (also known as Solankis) kings, who were the overlords for this stretch of the Gujarati coast. The early temple was a modest wooden structure featuring pillars reinforced with lead. It may have been renovated and fortified by the Chaulukya ruler named Mularaja (940–995 CE) in the 10th century. Apart from being a major center of pilgrimage and worship, it was also a storehouse of wealth, holding solid gold icons, jewelry, and coins that came as pilgrim donations or from temple investments in the overland and Indian ocean trades.

The Gujarati coast is also the location of a major port, known as Somanatha-Veraval, which was one of the three major ports in Gujarat and mainly involved with the horse trade. The Brahmins of Somanatha Temple, just like Brahmin communities in other parts of northern India, were very active participants in this lucrative trade, for which medieval India had an insatiable appetite. The care and breeding of horses had always been a problem in India due to lack of suitable fodder and difficult climatic conditions; therefore, imported high-spirited military horses had a short duration in active service. This caused a constant demand for new replacements, and all good-quality war horses had to be imported from Arabia, Persia, or

Central Asia at a very high cost. It was estimated that 10,000 horses were shipped annually to this coast of India, and that each horse fetched 220 gold dinars. Apart from cavalry, horses were also needed for temple rituals and as status symbols for the rich.

The Somanatha-Veraval port is linked with two major ancient trade routes: One was the Indian Ocean sea trade, which stretched from the South China Sea to the East African and Arabian coasts. The other was its overland caravan counterpart. The Arabian and Persian horses were imported through the oceanic route, while the Central Asian horses from Tajikistan and Korasan, passing through the caravansaries at Ghazni, Afghanistan, with its prosperous expatriate Indian merchant settlements, reached western India through the overland route. The temple earnings from this profitable horse trade were reinvested for further purchases, making Somanatha one of the wealthiest temples in India.

The other sources of income for Somanatha Temple, just like other major Hindu temples, were donations and taxes paid by the pilgrims. Such large amounts of wealth coming into this temple town naturally attracted predatory attacks from local *rajahs* and foreign raiders. Earlier, rival Hindu *rajahs* raided pilgrims and looted their donations, and the coastal shipping was targeted by sea pirates, who also had links with local rulers. It is within this context that we should view the most famous raid on Somanatha Temple by Mahmud of Ghazni, the Muslim Turkish ruler of Ghazni, Afghanistan. It was much more than a raid, according to the nationalist historian K. M. Munshi; for Hindus across India, it was an "unforgettable national disaster." This conventional view has been contested in the recent writings of the historian Romila Thapar, who offers us, in the best "Rashomon" fashion, multiple and often conflicting interpretations of the raid, including the various causes, the real objectives, and its mixed legacy. The summaries of three of these contending versions are given below, beginning with the conventional one.

The Arab medieval historian, Zakari'ya Al Kazwini, better known as Al Kazwini, in his work *Asaru-I Bilad wa Akhbaru-l Ibad*, or "The Monuments of Countries and Memoirs of Men" (composed around 1270 CE), offers us the colorful conventional account of Mahmud's raid on Somanatha. According to Al Kazwini's version, there in the middle of the wondrous temple of Somanatha was a levitating figure of Shiva linga (the representation of the Hindu god Shiva), which stayed afloat by a clever use of the magnetic lodestone, and it naturally amazed all those who witnessed it, whether they were Hindus or Muslims. When Mahmud decided to wage war against the Hindus, he made a great effort to capture and destroy this temple in the hope that the Hindus would become Muslims. Mahmud arrived there in the middle of 1026, and the Indians made a desperate resistance to protect their temple; some 50,000 of the defenders were slain. Mahmud looked upon the floating Shiva linga with wonder and gave orders to loot the temple. Mahmud then destroyed the Shiva linga with his own hands. The value of the gold found within the temple is said to have exceeded 20,000 gold dinars (6.5 tons of gold). For this deed, Mahmud was honored by the caliph of Islam, in Baghdad.

There are a number of Muslim versions of this conventional account, but curiously there is no Hindu version to corroborate the wondrous floating Shiva linga. However, there is one

obscure Hindu reference about Mahmud's raid on Somanatha in the Hindu calendar (Shaka) year 1025–1025 CE, but that reference was also found in a Muslim source. This may well be an indication that the story of the raid was embellished with fictive narratives to make it seem highly symbolic—the triumph of Islam over the unbelievers.

The second version, and an equally plausible one, is the one that associates the image of the Shiva linga at Somanatha with the image of the pre-Islamic Arabian goddess Manat.

According to this version by Farrukhi Sistani (10th–11th centuries CE), the court poet of Mahmud of Ghazni, who claimed to have accompanied Mahmud during his Indian raids, the Somanatha in earlier times used to attract pre-Islamic "pagan" Arab pilgrims. They equated the term Somanatha to Su-Manat (the place of Manat), a major pre-Islamic goddess of the shrine at Kabah in the holy city of Mecca. During this early period she was identified as one of the three daughters of Allah (along with Al-Lat and Al Uzza). Later, these Arabian goddesses were abolished by the Prophet Muhammad. The image of the goddess Manat also was represented by a big block of black stone similar to the image of the Shiva linga. Hence, this Muslim Turkish attack on the Somanatha Temple and the destruction of the linga were not only seen as breaking the Hindu "unbeliever's" temple idol but also as destroying the image of a "false" Arabian goddess, whose obliteration was ordered by the prophet himself. It is in this context that the destruction of the famous Shiva linga could be seen as a doubly pious iconoclastic deed. It was for this that Mahmud was honored by the caliph of Islam and thereby gained political legitimacy.

Here it should also be noted that Mahmud's own fanaticism was not exclusively reserved for the non-Muslim Hindus, as he also waged war against Sultan Daud, the Muslim ruler of Multan in the Punjab, who was an Ismaili Shiite. It was stated in the chronicles of Farrukhi Sistani that some 50,000 Shiite heretics also perished along with 50,000 Hindu unbelievers.

The third version is a modern interpretation that gives an economic twist to this famous iconoclastic raid. According to this version, the raid was not only meant to acquire booty, but also to cripple the Arab monopolistic hold on the lucrative horse trade from the port of Somanatha-Veraval in Gujarat. The destruction of the port city would greatly benefit the rival influential horse merchants based in the town of Ghazni, as the slack in oceanic horse imports would be quickly taken up by the overland supply route passing through Ghazni. There is some evidence to support this version, as Mahmud's raid was zealously resisted not only by the Hindus but also by the local resident Arabs. One Sanskrit inscription tells of Vohara (Bohra) Farid, the son of Vohara Mahmud, who joined in the defense of Somanatha for the local ruler Brahmadeva. He was killed during the raid, and the inscription was commissioned as a memorial to him.

Until quite recently, most historians saw Mahmud's raid on Somanatha Temple as the beginning of the 1,000-year-old Hindu-Muslim divide, which was to shape all future relations between Hinduism and Islam. Thapar, however, maintains that this view is a relatively recent interpretation, or rather the interpolation by colonial historians, based on questionable sources. The earliest authoritative voice to favor this view was that of Alexander

Dow (1735–1779), the East India Company official and author of the three-volume *History of Hindustan,* which is about the 17th-century Indian Muslim historian Muhammad Quasion Firishta (1560–1620). Firishta's work was a highly embellished version of earlier sources, written more in the spirit of the Arabian Nights tales than as a sober objective historical chronicle. This imagined past became highly politicized and gained national prominence during the first Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842), which was a punitive expedition to avenge an earlier humiliating defeat, when almost all of the British Indian Army was ambushed and massacred by local Afghan tribal groups as they made their way back to India. As a fitting vengeance for the massacre, the governor-general Lord Ellenborough ordered the uprooting of the supposed gates of Somanatha, which according to tradition fitted the tomb of Mahmud of Ghazni. This was to make amends for 800 years of "Hindu trauma," and serve as a lasting symbol of the British reconquest of Afghanistan. This act raised a storm of protest within the British Parliament at Westminster. Ellenborough was accused of appeasing the Hindus at the expense of Muslim sentiments and pandering to the monstrous "Linga-ism." On closer examination, this Afghan war trophy proved to be a disappointment, as its workmanship was Egyptian and entirely Islamic in style, not of Hindu craftsmanship. It was said to have been later stored away in an Agra fort, only to be eaten by white ants.

The legacy of the raid on Somanatha Temple was brought to the Indian public's attention during the early 20th century, not by local folk memory or medieval ballads, but in the pages of historical fiction writer Bankin Chandra Chatterji's novel *Jaya Somanatha.* It was published in 1927, when the Indian nationalist movement was in full swing. This fictive work and its emotive historical counterparts were to influence a whole generation of Hindu nationalists, including an amateur historian and a politician from Gujarat named K. M. Munchi, who later became the minister for food and civil services in the first postindependence cabinet under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Munchi, the author of *Somanatha: The Shrine Eternal,* led a powerful Hindu nationalist lobby to restore the temple of Somanatha as one of the first tasks of the newly elected government of independent India. Munchi ignored the opposition from India's professional archaeologists and historians, who accused him of "vandalizing" a known archaeological site for political gain. For Munchi and his Hindu nationalist lobby, the act of removing the old temple ruins and replacing them with a modern structure was to eliminate the very symbols of Hindu's inability to challenge centuries of Islamic iconoclasm and to free Hindus from an inherent "occupation mentality." It was also meant to legitimize the power and the politics of the emerging Hindu nationalism inside postindependence India's political arena. A new stone temple was built in 1951, using the finest architectural style from Gujarat. But this spending of public money to settle a medieval religious grievance, in what is a secular multicultural India, did not have overwhelming support from the governing Congress Party hierarchy, including from Nehru. Nehru was against the Indian government's sponsorship of building a sectarian Hindu shrine and was appalled at the extravagant cost of its consecration ritual at a time when India had more pressing needs, including the ever-present threat

of food shortage and famine. It is debatable if this rebuilding of the Shiva temple at the coast of southern Gujarat in 1951, or the destruction of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya in 1989 by Hindu nationalists, has, in any way, restored the self-confidence or self-worth of the majority of Indians. Such retributory actions, based on unreliable and contentious historical accounts, only led to further alienation among the minority Indian Muslims and sullied the reputation of a supposedly secular and multicultural India.

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See also Ayodhya; Hinduism

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✦ SOUTH ASIAN ASSOCIATION FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION


The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was created on December 8, 1985, after a series of extensive dialogues and brainstorming sessions between the representatives of the following seven SAARC member states: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The SAARC Secretariat was established in Kathmandu, Nepal. At the 14th SAARC Summit, held in New Delhi in April 2007, Afghanistan was admitted as the eighth SAARC member state. The Secretariat is headed by the secretary-general, who is appointed from the SAARC member states in alphabetical order for a period of three years. Dr. Sheel Kant Sharma of India became the ninth secretary-general of the SAARC on March 1, 2008, for a term of three years. Dr. Sharma is the second secretary-general from India; previously Kant Koshore Bhargava served in the same post from October 1989 to December 1991. The secretary-general is assisted by eight directors from member states. The director from India, Mr. Vinay Mohan Kwatra, serves as a director to the office of the secretary-general of SAARC.

There is a great interest in the SAARC from the outside, mainly due to the fact that the region is an emerging economy and also a huge market—more than a billion people—for foreign investment. In 2010 China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United States, Iran, Mauritius, Australia, Myanmar, and the European Union attained the status of SAARC observers.

The SAARC aims at economic cooperation and social development in the region. But under the overarching theme of cooperation in socioeconomic development, the SAARC promoted multilateral cooperation in such areas of mutual concern as agriculture and rural development, energy security, the environment, human resource development, people-to-people contact, poverty alleviation, science and technology, tourism development, and the expansion of transport linkages in South Asia. To reach out to the people of South Asia, the SAARC has established the following SAARC regional centers: SAARC Agricultural Information Center, Dhaka; SAARC Meteorological Research Center, Dhaka; SAARC Tuberculosis Center, Kathmandu; SAARC Documentation Center, New Delhi; SAARC Human Resources Development Center, Islamabad; SAARC Coastal Zone Management Center, Maldives; SAARC Information Center, Kathmandu; SAARC Energy Center, Islamabad; SAARC Disaster Management Center, New Delhi; SAARC Cultural Center, Matara (Sri Lanka); and SAARC Forestry Center in Thimphu (Bhutan).

Annual SAARC summits are considered as the highest authority; the 15th SAARC Summit was held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in 2009, and the 16th SAARC Summit was held in Bhutan in April 2010. SAARC summits are supposed to happen annually, but in 25 years there were only 15 summits due to bilateral tensions and economic difficulties of the member states.

The intraregional trade in SAARC was nominal; therefore, the heads of the states signed the SAARC Preferential Trading Agreement (SAPTA) on December 7, 1995. As a commitment



Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh, center, and Bhutanese prime minister Lyonpo Khandu Wangchuk, right, congratulate Afghan president Hamid Karzai on his country's induction into the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) during the inaugural session of the 14th SAARC Summit in New Delhi, April 2007. (AP Photo/Manish Swarup)

to SAPTA, the SAARC identified 226 items for trade on tariff concessions. India agreed to extend tariff concessions of up to 50 percent on more than 100 items. However, SAPTA wasn't enough to expand the intra-SAARC trade; therefore, at the 9th SAARC Summit in Male (May 1997), the South Asian leaders made a transition from SAPTA to SAFTA (South Asia Free Trade Area). India wholeheartedly accepted this development because it was linked to New Delhi's proposal on the SAARC Economic Community. SAFTA was signed on January 6, 2004, at the 12th SAARC held in Islamabad, and the agreement was actualized on January 1, 2006. To achieve the ideal of a South Asian Economic Union, the SAARC tries to facilitate intraregional trade; for instance, SAARCFINANCE connects the governors of central banks in South Asia. In addition, the SAARC has managed to reach the following crucial agreements: SAARC Limited Multilateral Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation and Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (2005); SAARC Agreement on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters (2005); Agreement for Establishment of SAARC Arbitration Council (2005); and the Agreement on the Establishment of South Asian Standards Organization (SARSO) in 2008. The SAARC's economic agenda under the umbrella of SAFTA continues to cruise at a moderate pace, due not only to political differences between India and Pakistan but also to diverse standards vis-à-vis free trade in the region.

The 21st-century SAARC is looking outward for greater cooperation with individual states, regional blocs, and international development agencies. The SAARC is open to learning lessons from other regional organizations and therefore has forged cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Commission. The SAARC has memoranda of understanding to promote collaboration with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and Pacific (UNESCAP), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Deutche Geselschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and International Standards Organization (ISO), just to name a few.

Besides working relationships with governmental, intergovernmental, and development agencies, the SAARC has forged collaborations with the private sector through SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry (SCCI), SAARC-LAW, South Asian Federation of Accountants (SAFA), South Asia Foundation (SAF), and Foundation of SAARC Writers and Literature (FOSWAL).

Decades after its establishment, the SAARC has moved out of the framework-consensus building stage into the implementation phase. Leaders at the SAARC felt the timely need of implementing projects to benefit the people of South Asia because mere agreements are of no use to prove the value of the organization. In this regard, the initiatives of the SAARC Food Bank and South Asian University in New Delhi, and the SAARC Development Fund

(SDF), which will have its secretariat in Thimphu, are worth mentioning. The SDF has been launched with an initial fund of $300 million, out of which $100 million are donated by India. The SDF has three windows (social, economic, and infrastructure) and has already implemented projects in India and Pakistan through collaborations with local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), namely the Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) in India and the SUNGI Foundation of Pakistan.

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See also Bangladesh, Relations with; Foreign Policy; Maldives; Pakistan, Relations with; Sri Lanka, Relations with

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✦ SOUTHEAST ASIA, RELATIONS WITH

Until the end of the Cold War in 1991, India's relationship with the countries of Southeast Asia, despite their geographic proximity, was only of marginal importance. Particular countries or events in the region concerned India mostly if they had international significance, disturbed global peace, or were part of a general problem, such as colonialism and the struggle to overthrow it. A new concern was evident around the end of colonial rule in India, which occurred in August 1947. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964) first called for an Asian Relations Conference to be held in March–April 1947 in New Delhi. He later called for conferences to be held on Indonesia in 1949; on India's efforts to hammer out the Geneva Agreements on Indochina in 1954; and on Indian readiness to accept the chairmanship of the three-member International Control Commissions (International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam) for Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in 1954. India also believed in the new Asian and African awakening, as demonstrated by its leadership of the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955.

India's policy toward Southeast Asia after the rise of Communist China in 1949 was based on keeping friendly relations with China. This was evident in India's treaties with China in 1954, and subsequently with several individual states, including some in Southeast Asia. The treaties were based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence, or Panch Sheel. India strongly opposed the U.S.-led policies of containment toward Communism and its policies of

building alliances against the Communist bloc in the Cold War era. The United States offered the states of the region membership in the Southeast Treaty Organization (SEATO), whose expressly stated goal was to stem the tide of Communism south of the 17th Parallel. The organization, born in Manila, the Philippines, in August 1954 could enlist only two Southeast Asian states—Thailand and the Philippines—but not Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia, or Laos, which proclaimed their neutrality. Under the leadership of the trio of Nehru, Gamel Abdul Nasser (1918–1970) of Egypt, and Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) of Yugoslavia, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) created a third bloc, obviating the need for a majority of Southeast Asian nations to join the U.S.-led military alliances against the Soviet-Chinese bloc. Divided Vietnam did not officially join either "bloc," but North Vietnam's Hanoi shared India's fears that pro-West alliances would signal the return of colonialism to the region.

As India-China relations soured following India's grant of asylum to the Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso (b. 1935), and his nearly 35,000 followers fleeing Tibet in 1959, and the subsequent Chinese attack against India in the short but consequential India-China War in 1962, China reverted to its historical claim that Southeast Asia was in its sphere of influence. The Soviet diplomatic and military equipment given to India in the Sino-Indian conflict reflected the growing Sino-Soviet rift, which also showed the differing Soviet and Chinese positions in the ensuing Vietnam conflict against the United States. The promulgation of the Lin Biao (1907–1971) doctrine (1965) supporting "wars of liberation" provided the backdrop for Chinese support of the Vietnam conflict against the U.S.-backed Saigon regime in South Vietnam. North Vietnam's preference for the distant Soviet Union rather than for China, its traditional and geographically close neighbor, antagonized the latter, bringing a convergence of interests between India and Vietnam. This became even more pronounced in the Cambodia situation, where both Vietnam and India supported the Heng Samrin (b. 1934) regime (1979–1993), which was opposed by Beijing (and Washington). The new alignment of powers continued as China attacked Vietnam in February 1979, with China's paramount leader, Deng Hsiao Ping (1904–1997), publicly stating that China would teach Vietnam a "lesson" as it had done to India in 1962. It was no wonder that such "convergence" of interests between India and Vietnam against China would bring about a "strategic partnership" between New Delhi and Hanoi. In the late 1980s India played an important role in the international efforts in Paris to bring peace to a much-troubled Cambodia. India offered the benefit of its valuable experience in international peacekeeping, as it sent 1,700 civilian, military, and police personnel to Cambodia, to help both the United Nations (UN) Advanced Missions and the UN Transitional Authority in that country.

India remained aloof from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), from the time of its creation in 1967, when there were only six pro-Western members, until the end of the Cold War in 1991. In the intervening period, for the most part, India regarded ASEAN as an instrument of U.S. policies in the region. India's economically restrictive "Socialist" policies had also inhibited the creation of good economic relations with the fast-growing economies of most of the ASEAN members, notably Malaysia, Singapore,

Indonesia, and Thailand. In 1975, in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and the much reduced U.S. presence in the region, India took a much more active interest in the area for its own sake and not just in the interests of global peace. The states of the region were concerned about the growing role Beijing would assume to fill the superpower vacuum created by the U.S. withdrawal, and there was growing interest among several ASEAN members for India to have a greater role in the region as a counterbalance to China. ASEAN was keen to assert its own independent standing and not just serve as a "lackey" of the United States. It also projected itself as an inclusive organization for the whole region, as it proceeded to admit both nonaligned as well as Communist states. Even Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, originally the reason for ASEAN's existence, were admitted; so was Myanmar, which had long remained neutral between the Communist and anti-Communist camps in Southeast Asia. Also, ASEAN had widened its economic relations to include the markets of China and Vietnam. For the first time, India took steps toward improving its relations with ASEAN, which, as noted, it had previously scorned for its dependence on the West, particularly the United States. In January 1992 ASEAN approved India as a "sector dialog partner" in the fields of trade, information technology, labor development, and tourism. Three years later, in 1995, India was made a "full dialog partner" of ASEAN. The following year, India advanced to become a full member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). More significantly, in 2002, India and ASEAN began holding annual India-ASEAN Summit Meetings.

Almost simultaneously with the promulgation of India's economic liberalization policies came the 1991 pronouncement of Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao (1921–2004; prime minister 1991–1996) that India would develop a Look East policy. This had crucial strategic and economic consequences. From that time India determinedly plowed a path of integration, particularly economic, with the rising Southeast Asian economic powerhouse. Significantly, Rao first talked about the new policy while visiting Singapore, which would become the prime state for the dramatic improvement in bilateral trade and would make substantial financial investments in India.

India's Look East policy was applied to each of the countries of Southeast Asia, and the results were dramatic in the field of trade. In 1993–1994 the India-ASEAN trade was a mere US$2.5 billion, the balance of trade being largely in favor of the ASEAN nations. In the new millennium, the increases in bilateral trade were such as to make Indo-ASEAN trade the fourth largest for India after the European Union, the United States, and China. In the decade since 2000, the Indo-ASEAN trade's compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) was 27 percent, the total trade volume in fiscal 2009 being US$48 billion and expected to grow at an even higher CAGR in the new decade. Such a growth rate was helped tremendously by the signing in October 2009 in Thailand of the India-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Signed by the economic ministers of 11 countries, it covers a population of 1.7 billion people whose gross domestic product (GDP) then totaled US$2.3 trillion. The FTA, which took six years to negotiate, opened up possibilities for the economic integration of the South

and Southeast Asian region. It will lift import tariffs on more than 80 percent of the region's products between 2013 and 2016. The customs duty on "sensitive goods," such as black tea and coffee, pepper, and rubber, will be reduced by 5 percent and eliminated by 2019, giving adequate time for borrowers in both regions to adjust. However, the FTA lists 489 items in agriculture, textiles, and chemicals that are exempted from tariff reduction.

India and ASEAN in 2010 negotiated an Agreement on Trade in Services and Investments. In the words of the co-chairperson of the ASEAN-India Trade Negotiating Committee, ASEAN would thereafter "seek a fast-track approach" with India for a "single" follow-up accord on liberalizing the two-way flow of services and investments. Accordingly, four meetings were scheduled in the first half of 2010 on a "request-offer basis" for negotiations, with the targeted date of August 2010 for the "final deal," which occurred in late October 2010. India has requested specific deals on employment in the ASEAN countries for English-speaking personnel in teaching, medicine and nursing, accounting, architecture, information technology, tourism, finance management, and banking.

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See also Foreign Policy; Singapore, Relations with; Vietnam, Relations with

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✦ SPACE PROGRAM

The Indian Space Program began with the establishment of the Indian National Committee for Space Research in August 1962 under the chairmanship of Dr. Vikram Sarabhai (1919–1971) "to look after all aspects of space research in India." Thereafter, the Space Commission and the Department of Space were established in June 1972, marking the formal beginning of the Indian space program. Since then India has grown into one of the "Big Three" Asian space powers, along with China and Japan.

The Space Commission is the nodal agency for coordinating research and development activities in space science and technology. The executive wing of the commission is the Department of Space, which operates through the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) that was set up in 1969 and is one of the leading space research organizations in the world. The corporate headquarters of ISRO is located in Bangalore, Karnataka, but activities related to

satellites, launch vehicles, and applications are carried out at numerous centers throughout the country. The Vikram Sarabhai Space Center (VSSC) at Trivandrum, Kerala, the largest ISRO center, is responsible for launch vehicles. The principal rocket and satellite testing and launching station is Satish Dhawan Space Center at Sriharikota Island in Andhra Pradesh. The ISRO Satellite Center in Bangalore has the primary responsibility for the design, development, assembly, and testing of satellites. The Space Application Center at Ahmedabad, Gujarat, is responsible for the development of sensors and payloads. The National Remote Sensing Agency at Secunderabad, north of the city of Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, utilizes modern remote sensing techniques for planning and management of the country's natural resources and provides operational support for various users. Other institutes working in this area include the Physical Research Laboratory (PRL) at Ahmedabad, which conducts basic research in space sciences. The Master Control Facility at Hassan in Karnataka is a tracking station for launching satellites.

India began its space program with the aim of attaining self-reliance in satellites for various uses and in the launch vehicles that would put them in specified orbits. Research in these two streams began in the early 1970s. India launched its first experimental geostationary communication satellite, the Ariane Passenger Payload Experiment (APPLE), in 1981 through the French Space Organization. This indigenously built satellite helped scientists to gain experience in the design, development, and operation of the geostationary satellites to provide telecommunication and weather monitoring services. The success of the APPLE project led to the establishment of the Indian National Satellite System (INSAT) in 1983. INSAT consists of 21 satellites, of which 11 are in service, and it is the largest domestic communication system in the Asia-Pacific region.

Unlike the communication satellites, work on the remote sensing satellites began a little earlier. While *Aryabhata*, the first Indian remote sensing satellite, was launched in 1975, *Bhaskar-1* and *Bhaskar-2*, the other remote sensing satellites, were launched in 1979 and 1981 respectively. Designed and built in India, these satellites were launched by the Soviet Union from Baikanor, Kazakhstan, and led to the establishment of the Indian Remote Sensing Satellites (IRS) system in March 1988. With 10 satellites in operation, it is the largest constellation of remote sensing satellites for civilian use in operation today in the world.

Besides satellites, India has achieved remarkable success in the field of launch vehicles technology. In the 1960s and the 1970s, the country successfully developed a sounding rockets program, and by the 1980s research had yielded the Satellite Launch Vehicle-3 project, which was intended to carry an 88-pound payload to a height of nearly 320 miles. Its first experimental flight in 1979 and it third test in 1981, however, ended in failure. The fourth test in 1983 marked the completion of the project and also the experimental phase of the space program.

The second launch vehicle was the Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV), capable of putting 330-pound class payloads into a 250-mile low-earth orbit. Two successful launches of this vehicle were conducted in 1992 and 1994, when SROSS (Stretched Rohini Satellite



The Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV-C6) sits on a launch pad at the Satish Dhawan Space Center of the Indian Space Research Organization at Sriharikota, Andhra Pradesh, May 2005. India's heaviest remote sensing satellite to date, CARTO-SAT-1, was launched by the PSLV-C6 later that month. (AP Photo/M. Lakshman)

Series, meant for atmospheric research and other scientific investigations) were placed in the intended orbits. India further applied its energies, resulting in the creation in 1994 of the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), which launched IRS satellites weighing 2,204–2,645 pounds into 500–560 polar sun-synchronous orbit. Up to September 2009, 15 of 16 total PSLV launches had been successful. However, India's most significant achievement in the launch vehicle area is the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) technology that enabled it to launch its INSAT-II–type satellites (4,409–5,511 pounds) into geostationary orbit. There have been five launches of the GSLV; the last was on September 2, 2007, and successfully put the INSAT-4CR satellite in geostationary orbit, placing India among the five top space-faring nations of the world. Currently, the country is developing its top-end advance launch vehicle called GSLV Mark-III, which is conceived and designed to make India fully self-reliant in launching the INSAT-4 class, heavier communication satellites of 9,920–11,023 pounds with an indigenously developed cryogenic upper stage. The first test is expected in 2011.

India's first mission beyond earth's orbit is Chandrayaan-1, a lunar spacecraft that successfully entered the lunar orbit on November 8, 2008. Although the Chandrayaan's mission was abruptly cut short on August 29, 2009, against its design life of two years, it, along with NASA's Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter, played a major role in discovering water molecules in the moon's soil and rocks. India plans to follow up Chandrayaan-1 with Chandrayaan-2 and unmanned missions to Mars and a near-earth spacecraft in the near future.

Space has become the mainstay of the national infrastructure, providing critical services to the country's overall development. For instance, the INSAT system is extensively utilized for telecommunications, meteorological observations, radio and television broadcasting, satellite-aided search and rescue operations, and navigation and mobile satellite communication purposes. Similarly, remote-sensing satellites have already become the mainstay of the natural

resource management system. Moreover, technology developed under the space program has been used in the nation's Integrated Guided Missile Development Program so as to meet the security needs of the country. India's first satellite launch vehicle, the SLV-3, for instance, played a major role in the development of the Agni series of missiles. The PSLV and GLSV combined together also offer India an intercontinental ballistic missile capability and make the country self-reliant in launching heavy IRS- and INSAT-type military satellites.

India's progress in space technology has attracted worldwide attention and demand, with leasing agreements for marketing IRS data and for the supply of space hardware and services. For example, under an agreement with the U.S. company EOSAT, data from India's IRS satellites are received and distributed worldwide. Several other contracts for the supply of space hardware and services to international customers have also been undertaken by ISRO in the recent past, with a huge earning of 10 billion rupees in 2008–2009 alone. India also believes in cooperating in space with agencies all over the world. A high-level United Nations (UN) team selected India for setting up a UN Center for Space Science and Technology Education. It was created at Dehradun, Uttaranchal, in 1995.

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See also Missile Program

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✦ SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES

Special economic zones (SEZ) are especially demarcated territories within a nation-state that are established primarily to encourage the formation of capital through the production of goods and services. The practice of setting up such specialized zones can be traced back to 1965, when Asia's first export processing zone (EPZ) was set up at Kandla, in the state of Gujarat. Seven more EPZs came into existence by the late 1990s. Under the new scheme, however, all the existing EPZs were converted into SEZs. In April 2000 the government of India announced its first SEZ policy to supposedly overcome the limitations of bureaucratic controls, infrastructure, and fiscal regime, and to stimulate economic growth through foreign investment in the country. Later, in 2005, the government enacted the Special Economic Zones Act, which was supplemented by the SEZ Rules, which came into effect on February 10, 2006.

The SEZ Act was enacted with the primary objective of the "generation of additional economic activity, promotion of exports of goods and services, promotion of investment from domestic and foreign sources, creation of employment opportunities and the development of infrastructure facilities." This act envisaged a single-window SEZ approval mechanism through a 19-member interministerial board of approval, which would process all proposals for establishing such zones. To attract large-scale investment in this sector, the government offered impressive incentives and facilities that included major tax exemptions from export income and profits, central and state sales tax, service tax, customs and excise duties, and duty-free imports. It envisioned that the economic activity generated from SEZs would give multiplier thrust to the economy and surpass the regulatory compromises and fiscal losses, which were estimated by the Finance Ministry to be 1,600 billion rupees by 2010.

By the end of June 2009, the government of India gave approval to 1,201 government SEZs and 600 state/private SEZs set up before 2006, and notified 500 zones under the SEZ Act, totaling a whopping 2,301 zones within four years of enactment of the SEZ Act. Besides this, the government claims that a total area of 768 square miles required for the proposed SEZs would not be more than .066 percent of the total land area and not more than .122 percent of the total agricultural land in India. The policy of land acquisitions has, however, come under severe criticism from all segments of civil society and has opened up a Pandora's box of limitations associated with the SEZ Act. The establishment of an SEZ requires substantial procurement of land by promoters, and the state had been using the colonial Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to enforce acquisitions of fertile land from marginalized communities. Significantly, the Act of 1894 is applicable only for acquiring land for "public purposes," but in the context of SEZs it has been used for providing benefit to private players. Often, primarily agricultural or forest land was allegedly acquired through coercion and state violence. In addition, allegations that the landowners were compensated with payment below the market price and left to fend for themselves, without any source of income and employment, became louder.

In the wake of violent protests by farmers, landless workers, fish workers, and artisans across India—from Barnala (Punjab), Jhajjar (Haryana), Kakinada (Andhra Pradesh), Nandagudi and Mangalore (Karnataka), Singur and Nandigram (West Bengal), Jagatsinghpur (Orissa), Raigad (Maharashtra), and Goa—the government suspended all land acquisitions for new SEZs in February 2007 until a new rehabilitation policy for the displaced is announced. Subsequently, the government introduced the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 2007, and the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2007, and announced the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007, to address the grave problems resulting from land acquisitions for establishing SEZs. Due to a ban on compulsory acquisitions, small and mid-sized SEZ developers started buying land directly from owners. But the developers of large SEZs faced difficulties in acquiring contiguous land. Later, in August 2009, the government issued guidelines to allow states to acquire land for SEZs if the land owners have withdrawn or not filed objections against acquisition.

The issue of the viability of SEZs has generated intense debates in the social and political spheres. The primary reasons for opposition to SEZs emerge out of displacements and the consequent forced migrations of marginalized sections, with the connivance of the state machinery. This was witnessed in the Communist Party–ruled state of West Bengal. Critics have described these developments as "internal colonialism," "primitive globalization," "governance by corporations," and "unmitigated disaster," and they have pronounced SEZs as neoliberal enclosures in India. Votaries of the SEZ project only the positive potential of these zones for employment generation, poverty reduction, and human development. But there are some important areas of concern as well.

Section 49 of the SEZ Act empowers the central and state governments to modify or withdraw the application of any law (except labor laws) in these zones. Significantly, the act instructs the state governments to declare SEZs as "public utility services" and invests the governance of SEZs to the development commissioner (DC). The application of the former clause nullifies the bargaining power of employees and laborers working in SEZs. Further, only special courts with the key role of the DC can try and settle any civil dispute within an SEZ or any trial of a "notified offense." Significantly SEZs are neither clearly defined by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, nor are they subject to dispute-settlement proceedings, except in matters of export subsidies and import substitution.

Central laws have not addressed issues like urban management in the wake of rapid urbanization induced through SEZs, environment impact assessment, or protection of tribals. Some civil society organizations have conducted public audits of SEZs in Maharashtra and questioned the SEZ policy of Indian government. In many cases, like in the state of Goa, people have forced the government to scrap the SEZ policy altogether. In another case, 1,500 farmers of Avasari Khurd village in the Pune District of Maharashtra have joined hands to use their barren land to form their own SEZ. Contradictory findings in relation to the employment of women, plight of contract labor (owing to exemption from the Contract Labor [Regulation and Abolition] Act, 1970), cost-benefit analysis of SEZs, claims and counter claims of employment generation, land acquisitions, and issues of rehabilitation and resettlement present a rather complex picture of the state of SEZs in India and will play a crucial role in the social and economic formation of India in the 21st century.

YOGESH SNEHI

See also Economy; Globalization; Outsourcing and Offshoring

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✦ SRI LANKA, RELATIONS WITH

Relations with Sri Lanka have been guided largely by India's concerns about its security and Sri Lanka's fears of its powerful neighbor. A shared Tamil ethnic composition with Sri Lanka has been a tricky issue threatening India's internal as well as external security. The geographical proximity and the comparatively uneven size of India and Sri Lanka have served mostly as negative factors. Although Sri Lanka, after independence, began its relations with India with some trepidation, by the mid-1950s the two nations had come to share regional concerns. In the 1970s, Sri Lanka's prime minister Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike struck close ties with Indian prime minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi. However, from 1977, the divisive policies instituted by Sri Lankan president Junius Richard Jayawardene and his successor, Ranasinghe Premadasa, created a severe strain in bilateral relations. While the post–Cold War era brought both countries relatively close, the prolonged ethnic war on the island between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), a Tamil militant organization that was defeated militarily only in May 2009, left India in a difficult predicament.

Sri Lanka, an island only 270 miles from north to south and 141 miles east to west, is separated from India by the narrow 22-mile Palk Strait of the Gulf of Mannar. Of its 21 million people, about 18 percent are Tamils, some of whom have lived in the north and east of the island for many centuries, while others were brought from southern India in the late 19th and early 20th centuries by the British to work the coffee and tea plantations in the central highlands. The first bilateral issue of consequence, one that became sticky for some 40 years, was the issue of citizenship for these Tamil plantation workers. At independence, Sri Lanka refused to recognize them as citizens. Over the years more than 500,000 Tamils were repatriated to India, while the rest managed to get citizenship rights by 2003.

A second, more vexatious, issue between India and Sri Lanka has involved Tamils living in the north and east, and also in the south among the Sinhalese. From the time of the

1958 anti-Tamil riots through the major pogrom of 1983, waves of Tamil refugees to India increased dramatically. Disaffected Tamil youth by this time had formed the LTTE and other militant groups, which began receiving weapons and training from India's Research and Intelligence Wing (RAW) to fight the majority Buddhist Sinhala government for security in their Sri Lankan Tamil homelands of the north and east. Although India, especially under Indira Gandhi, supported the cause of Sri Lankan Tamils, neither Gandhi nor her successors promoted the concept of an autonomous independent Tamil state, as this had the potential to undermine India's own constitutional framework. President Jayawardene's knowledge of India's support for Tamil militancy and his deliberate pro-Western tilt in foreign policy, while India was aligned with the Soviet Union in a 15-year Friendship Treaty, did little to contribute to mutual trust.

In May 1987, when the LTTE gained control of the north of the island, Jayawardene imposed an economic blockade on the Jaffna peninsula, causing thousands of its Tamil civilians to starve. Obliging Tamil Nadu's demand to help the Jaffna Tamils, Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi airdropped food and supplies on Jaffna. To prevent a further unauthorized intervention, Jayawardene agreed in July 1987 to the Indo-Lanka Accord, a bilateral agreement aimed at disarming the LTTE and other militant groups, sending the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to protect Tamils in the north and east, devolving substantial powers to a newly created northeast province, and forbidding Sri Lanka to allow outside powers to use its ports for military or broadcasting facilities. But when the LTTE refused to lay down its arms, the IPKF was forced to fight the LTTE. This turned into a genuine fiasco, as the LTTE began to receive clandestine support from Prime Minister Premadasa. After he was elected president in 1988, Premadasa asked the beleaguered IPKF to leave the island. In May 1991 the LTTE scored revenge by assassinating Rajiv Gandhi. Ironically, two years later, Premadasa met the same fate at LTTE's hands. By this time, the Indian government had not only banned the LTTE from its soil but had also adopted caution in dealing with Sri Lanka.

The next decade witnessed improving bilateral relations, with agreements forged in trade and defense. India pledged its commitment to Sri Lanka's unitary sovereignty and territorial integrity. In late 1999 and early 2000, when the LTTE gained an upper hand militarily in the north and east, President Chandrika Kumaratunga made a plea to the Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee for military assistance. Weighing its past debacle, as well as the sentiments of its Tamil populations, India turned down the plea but agreed to assist in the evacuation of trapped army cadres in the north, provided that a cease-fire could be attained between the army and the LTTE. In consultation with India, Norway brokered a cease-fire in 2002 between Kumaratunga and the LTTE. Because of the LTTE's consistent demand for independent statehood, the sporadic talks that followed over the next four years did not bear fruit. As a result, both sides quietly mobilized their militaries. To prevent Sri Lanka from constantly turning to China and Pakistan, India provided military training and assistance and stepped up its naval patrol to curb LTTE smuggling.

After Mahinda Rajapakse won the Sri Lankan presidency in November 2005, in part the result of an LTTE Tamil boycott, violence began to escalate and then turned into a full-scale war. As a result of secession within LTTE forces, the government was able to secure the Eastern Province. The government began its attack on the LTTE in earnest in early 2007. In preparation for this offensive, China provided aid on a large scale, for which it was given access to Sri Lanka's ports and the seabed off the island's northwest coast to explore for oil. Pakistan also played a very significant role in providing arms and expertise. To counter Chinese and Pakistani influence, the Indian government covertly supported Rajapakse's mission but encouraged him overtly to arrange a cease-fire in order to appease its own Tamil populations. As the military pushed north, eventually confining the LTTE and hundreds of thousands of civilians to a small strip of land, people in Tamil Nadu demanded that the Indian government stop the government offensive. While continuing its plea for a cease-fire, India sent humanitarian aid and doctors to attend to wounded and starving Tamil civilians.

Since Rajapakse decided not to allow nongovernment aid workers access to the Wanni region in the north, where thousands of civilians were trapped during the army's last offensive against the LTTE, the United Nations (UN), backed by the European Union, the United States, and India, called for a cease-fire to save civilian lives. Bolstered by support from China and Russia, Rajapakse continued the offensive, disregarding the gravity of attendant civilian casualties. Undeterred, Sri Lanka's military pushed its offensive to the maximum, destroyed the conventional LTTE force along with its leaders, and declared victory in May 2009.

A few days later, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) convened a special session to weigh the possibility of a formal probe into Sri Lanka's and the LTTE's war crimes and into Sri Lanka's treatment of war refugees. The United States, France, and Britain also pressured the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to delay implementation of a $1.9 billion loan. India felt that this Western strategy was detrimental to the cause of the approximately 300,000 Tamil refugees in need of immediate rehabilitation. Sensitive to outside interference in its own internal issues, such as the problems in Kashmir and Assam, India joined China, Russia, Pakistan, and other countries in successfully blocking the UNHRC resolution. To counter Chinese influence, big business concerns in India are pushing its Congress Party–led government to play a more assertive role throughout South Asia. Only time will tell how this strategy translates into Indo–Sri Lankan relations.

SREE PADMA

See also South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

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
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✦ STOCK EXCHANGE MARKETS

Bombay Stock Exchange Limited is the oldest stock exchange in India as well as in Asia. It was established as "The Native Share and Stock Brokers Association" in 1875. The Bombay Stock Exchange, popularly known as the BSE, is the first stock exchange in the country to obtain permanent recognition in 1956 from the government of India under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956. The BSE has played a vital role in the development of the Indian capital market, with a presence in 417 cities and towns. The BSE provides an efficient and transparent platform for trading in equity, debt instruments, and derivatives. The BSE's Online Trading System (BOLT) is a proprietary system of the exchange. It is BS 7799-2-2002 certified, which establishes it as an internationally recognized security framework providing best practices for information, personnel, network, and physical security. The regulatory authority for the Indian stock market is the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), which is entitled to protect the investors' interests and to regulate and develop the securities market. The main index of the BSE is called the BSE SENSEX (or simply SENSEX). It is composed of 30 financially sound company stocks, which are reviewed and modified from time to time.



A man checks his mobile phone as he walks past the Bombay Stock Exchange, Dalal Street, Mumbai, Maharashtra, February 2006. India's stock exchanges have become increasingly important in global financial markets. (AP Photo/Rajesh Nirgude)

Given its large geographic area and the prevalence of the typical floor-based trading system until 1994, a total of 22 stock exchanges were created to cater to the needs of investors in every part of India. Three basic models were adopted: associations of individuals, limited liability companies (without profit sharing), and

companies limited by guarantees. Regardless of the form of organization, all were recognized by the tax authorities as nonprofit entities, or entities in which their members had no claim to operating surpluses. Although the surpluses generated were not explicitly distributed, exchanges provided various services to their members invariably below cost, with the subsidy element varying from exchange to exchange.

Exchanges enjoyed subsidies in many forms. The respective state governments allotted land for constructing the buildings for exchange operations and brokers' offices on nominal terms. Until recently, the government of India had adopted the concept of regional stock exchanges (RSEs), defining the operating area of each exchange. A public company was required to list its stock on the RSE nearest its registered office.

A listed company had to pay listing fees, both initial and annual, and such fees were linked to the size of its issued capital. For most RSEs, listing fees were the main source of income. Each exchange enjoyed monopoly rights in securities trading in the city of its location. Investors had no mechanism to protect themselves from collusive behavior by the stock brokers. This monopoly also led to the creation of fragmented markets that were shallow, inefficient, and cost ineffective. Brokers generally dealt with investors through a multilayered chain of intermediaries, increasing the cost of transaction.

Since exchanges prohibited corporate membership, all brokerage entities were either proprietary or partnership concerns. Although the liability of a brokerage firm was unlimited, this did not mean much to investors, as almost all the brokerage firms were poorly capitalized. Brokerage firms distributed most of the profits at the end of each accounting year, transferring them to their family members. Thus, in the event of a firm's insolvency, investors were the main losers.

The capital market reforms process was launched in 1992 in response to the infamous Harshad Mehta Scam, which shook the banking system and the capital markets. Some prominent stockbrokers fraudulently diverted huge sums of money from banks (government-owned and private banks, as well as prominent foreign banks) and manipulated 270 million shares, causing the BSE to shed 570 points in a day. The diversion of bank funds to personal accounts artificially inflated the prices of their favorite stocks. This brought into the forefront severe deficiencies in the existing trading and settlement system. The apparent boom in equity markets caused by such fraudulent practices attracted thousands of gullible investors who hoped to make quick gains. The bubble burst after some investigative journalists exposed the scam. When the banks demanded funds back from the brokers, it triggered a market collapse. The banks lost an estimated $2 billion, and the crisis was a major embarrassment for the Indian government, which had just launched a series of reforms in the securities markets.


The government promptly imposed reform measures in the securities markets, the highlight of which was the birth of the National Stock Exchange (NSE). The new exchange operated in accord with globally accepted best practices, both in trading and settlement systems. The NSE is India's largest securities exchange in terms of daily trade numbers. It offers automated electronic trading of a variety of securities, including equity, corporate debt, central- and state-government securities, commercial paper, CDs, and exchange traded funds. The exchange has more than 1,000 listed members and is owned

by more than 20 different financial and insurance institutions. The NSE specializes in three market segments: wholesale debt, capital market (automated screen-based trading system), and derivatives, including futures and options that form the largest segment of the exchange. Within six years of its inception, the NSE's impact on the Indian capital markets was so overwhelming that the rest of the exchanges, except for the BSE, became virtually defunct. As a survival strategy, 10 regional exchanges set up subsidiary companies that became members of NSE and BSE. The systems and procedures introduced by the NSE have been accepted by the SEBI and were made applicable to the other exchanges. The new trading system has encouraged price competition resulting in lower bid-ask spreads. As a result, transaction costs are estimated to have declined by a factor of 8 to 10 after the NSE came to dominate the Indian market.

PARAMITA GUPTA

See also Economy; Financial Institutions, Development; Money and Foreign Exchange Markets; World Trade Organization, Relations with

Figure 4 India market value of publicly traded shares



Year	Market Value of Publicly Traded Shares	Rank	Percent Change	Date of Information
2008	818,900,000,000	16		2006
2009	1,819,000,000,000	8	122.13%	December 31, 2007
2010	1,819,000,000,000	8	0.00%	December 31, 2007

Source: "India Market Value of Publicly Traded Shares," Indexmundi, http://www.indexmundi.com/india/market_value_of_publicly_traded_shares.html.

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✦ SUBRAMANIAM, LAKSHMINARAYANA

Lakshminarayana Subramaniam (b. 1947) is one of India's leading south Indian violinists, a composer and conductor, and an outstandingly versatile musician. His opus fuses several Indian and Western musical styles without compromise. Famous for his virtuosic performances in the Karnatic tradition and his convincing performances of Hindustani music, Subramaniam, often known simply as "Mani," has also distinguished himself as a violinist, composer, and conductor in the Western classical tradition, and as a jazz performer.

Subramaniam has never abandoned his deep roots in Indian music. In his long career, he has performed and recorded extensively as both a soloist and accompanist for many of the stars in both the Karnatic and Hindustani musical systems. He has played with such highly regarded south Indian vocalists as Chembai Vaidyanatha Bhagavatar, K. V. Narayanaswamy, S. Srinivasa Iyer, M. Balamuralikrishna, and M. D. Ramanathan, as well as the percussionist Palghat Mani Iyer. His knowledge of the Hindustani system of north India is such that he has performed and recorded with musicians of the caliber of Ali Akbar Khan, Rais Khan, V. G. Jog, and Jasraj and Zakir Hussain.

His prodigious discography of more than 200 recordings and numerous concerts around the world include collaborations with, inter alia, such violin virtuosos such as Yehudi Menuhin, Ruggiero Ricci, Jean-Luc Ponty, and Stéphane Grappelli (their recording together is called *Conversations*). During his forays into jazz, he has performed with such jazz legends as Herbie Hancock, Joe Sample, Stanley Clarke, Maynard Ferguson, Ravi Coltrane, Al Jarreau, and Larry Coryell. His film scores include three films by Mira Nair—*Salaam Bombay* (1988), *Mississippi Masala* (1991), and *Kama Sutra: A Tale of Love* (1996), and he provided contributing music for Bernardo Bertolucci's *Little Buddha* (1993). Subramaniam's orchestral compositions have been performed by some of the world's leading orchestras, including the New York Philharmonic Orchestra with Zubin Mehta (*Fantasy on Vedic Chants*), the Swiss Romande Orchestra (*Turbulence*), the Kirov Ballet (*Shanti Priya*), the Oslo Philharmonic Orchestra (*Concerto for Two Violins*), and the Berlin Opera (*Global Symphony*), the live concert of which was broadcast simultaneously to 28 nations to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the United Nations (UN) in 1995.

Trained by his father, V. Lakshminarayana Iyer, Subramaniam began his career at age six, playing with two of his brothers, L. Shankar and L. Vaidyanathan. When the trio broke up

all of them launched solo careers. A medical degree from Madras Medical College entitles Subramaniam to the honorific "Dr." in his name. He subsequently finished a master's degree in music from the California Institute of the Arts. Among his honors, Subramaniam was awarded both the Padma Shri (1988) and Padma Bhushan (2001) awards from the government of India.

Subramaniam is currently married to Kavita Krishnamurthi, a vocalist. Formerly, he was married to the late Vijayashree (Viji) Subramaniam, who was also a vocalist. He is the father of violinists Seetaa Subramaniam and Ambi Subramaniam, with whom he performs.

J. ANDREW GREIG

See also Khan, Ali Akbar; Khan, Vilayat; Music, Devotional; Shankar, Ravi

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✦ SURAT

The city of Surat in the state of Gujarat is widely known for diamond polishing and synthetic textiles and is one of the most prominent and rapidly growing cities in India. According to the 2001 Census of India, Surat is the nation's 10th-largest city. It is a city with a glorious past that once dominated both the indigenous and the Indian Ocean trading networks. Geographically located midway between Mumbai and Ahmedabad, the rise and fall of Surat has also been closely linked with these two cities. In 1994 Surat was revisited by a deadly plague, which the city responded to with a clean-up campaign. It has since been declared the second-cleanest city in the country, after Chandigarh, by INTACH (Indian National Trust for Arts and Culture, Bangalore).

The city is popularly believed to have been founded by Malik Gopi or Gopinath, a Brahmin trader-administrator in the early decades of the 16th century. Early Portuguese writers like Duarte Barbosa (d. 1521) mention the port of Surat, but in this period it was clearly overshadowed by its twin, Rander, located on the opposite bank of the Tapi River. Rander was also known by its community of Navayat Muslims, or Malik Momins, who were Shi'as and traced the origin of their group to followers of the Abbasid caliphs living at Kufa around 750 CE. These were famous in the western part of the Indian Ocean as pilots and navigators. Rander ultimately declined, which paved the way for the rise of Surat. By 1540 it emerged as a major center of transshipment and as a staging point between Sumatra and merchants from both Southeast and West Asia.

Surat, during the Mughal period (1526–1858), turned into the emporium of India, exporting cloth and gold. Its major industries were textiles and shipbuilding. The city was

famous for *kinkhab* cloth and the weaving of coarse saris, silk cloth, and *kinkhab dupattas* (a long scarf), and production of these items was a major industry. In 1795 there were 15,777 looms, one-third of them operated by Muslims and the rest by Khatris and Kanbis (now known as Patidars). Large ships and boats were also built there, and in 1650 extensive repairs to the English ship *Falcon* (500 tons) were carried out. The shipbuilding yard at Surat was maintained until 1785. Surat's prosperity grew under the Mughals throughout the 17th century. It was also an important pilgrimage center for Indian Muslims as the port of embarkation for the *hajj* (pilgrimage to Mecca). For this reason, Surat was also known as "Babul Macca," the Gateway to Mecca. The city had various *caravansarais* (inns), as well as mosques to cater to both the trading communities and the pilgrims.

For almost 150 years, Surat was truly a multicultural and cosmopolitan city. The first Europeans to confront Surat were Portuguese. After Vasco da Gama (ca. 1460–1524) voyaged around the Cape of Good Hope to Calicut on May 20, 1498, the Portuguese with their naval might rapidly occupied strategic locations in the Indian Ocean. By 1559 they entrenched themselves in Daman, south of Surat. They started controlling the Indian Ocean by sweeping the Arabs from the Arabian sea lanes and imposing their own passport system (*cartez*) on Indian shippers for safe conduct. The arrival of the Dutch and the English, however, spelled the end of Portuguese domination throughout Asia. The Portuguese were routed in 1612 by the English, and in 1640 the Dutch wrested Malacca (in Malaysia) from their control. From 1612 the English had a continuous station in Surat; the Dutch had arrived earlier, in 1602, and founded the United Dutch East India Company. By 1615 the Dutch also had a regular establishment in Surat. The French made an appearance in the city as well, especially French Capuchin missionaries. By the first half of the 18th century, however, Surat began declining with the emergence of the English as the sole power in Indian Ocean trade. This also coincided with the declining authority of the Mughal Empire after the death of Mughal emperor Aurangzeb in 1707 and the concentration of commercial activities in Bombay (Mumbai), which had been acquired by the English.

The reemergence of Surat began in the early 20th century. Surat's prosperity was primarily based on *jari* embroidery (the application of gold and silver thread over fine textiles); handloom weaving, which was later upgraded to power-loom weaving; and diamond polishing. However, unlike the traditional sectors elsewhere in India, the early years of the 20th century in Surat witnessed a revival of traditional industry. In 1909 a survey estimated that there were around 500 dealers and 8,000–10,000 workers in the *jari* industry. Surat's industry continued after independence, and a major expansion occurred in the 1980s when the export market grew rapidly. The industry may be divided into three major segments: *akharedars* (self-employed artisans), traders/manufacturers, and workers or wage earners. The *akharedars* mainly use family labor, and they earn commission based on the volume of work. Traders/manufacturers primarily work as family units and either own small units in which they manufacture goods or outsource work on a contract basis. A large number of workers who do not have choice and control over either the market

or the manufacturing process make up the third group. This workforce mainly consists of women. Initially Muslims controlled this industry, but since 1930 it has been almost exclusively controlled by the Rana caste or the Gola caste of Hindus.

Surat is now one of the largest centers in the world for the production of nylon and polyester synthetic fabrics. From the 1950s onward the central as well as the state governments extended a number of fiscal incentives for the growth of small industries. On the recommendation of the Textile Inquiry Committee (1954), a program to encourage the conversion of the ordinary looms into improved (semi-automatic) looms or into decentralized power looms was introduced. In terms of certain excise regimes, concessions were granted on power-loom cloth, promoting it over mill-made textiles.

In the early 1980s, a prolonged textile strike in Mumbai provided further impetus to the power-loom industry in Surat. As production of textile cloth declined in Mumbai, entrepreneurs began to invest in power looms in Surat. The families that were traditionally engaged in weaving, mainly of the Khatri, Kanbi, and Vania upper and middle castes, played a leading role in the textile boom. Over the years, in addition to using power looms, these families diversified into processing art-silk fabrics, filament sizing, twisting and texturing, manufacturing textile machinery, and wrap knitting. Apart from Khatris and Kanbis, who constitute the largest group in the power-loom sector, Vanias (both Jains and Hindus) and Patidars also have major shares in the industry. Other groups with considerable share in power looms are the Muslim Memons and Khojas. These two groups own around 12 to 15 percent of the power looms. Over the years, migrants from the Punjab and Rajasthan who worked as traders and commission agents in the 1960s have also started investing their capital, generated through usury and commodity exchange, in looms and other processes of clothmaking. With the growth of power looms the processing industry also developed.

A large percentage of the looms function as small or family units. These are run by self-employed local weavers who also maintain direct links with large industries for the continuous supply of yarns and other materials. Alongside these genuine entrepreneurs there also exist units that are designed to circumvent the rules of the Factory Act. In such cases, the ownership of looms is divided among the names of existing or imaginary family members, though in all other respects looms are operated and managed by one family under one roof. This fragmentation system is locally known as *bhagala*. Power looms are installed in what are known as *sheds*, which generally house 8, 12, 16, or 20 looms. There are around 25,000 manufacturers or power-loom owners in and around Surat. Smaller units have 12 looms, and the average-size manufacturing unit has 20 looms.

In comparison to textiles, diamond polishing is a recent industry. Local lore informs that a Surat entrepreneur, returning with a boat laden with diamond cutters from East Africa, started the city's polishing industry in 1901. The systematic rise of the diamond-polishing industry also goes back to the 1950s. The rise was a direct outcome of the rapidly growing demand for small diamonds in the industrial market. The growth in demand for diamonds,



Employees examine and evaluate diamonds on the floor of Sanghvi Exports in Surat, Gujarat, February 2005. Surat has historically been an important port for imports and exports. (Santosh Verma/Bloomberg via Getty Images)

coupled with the scarcity of labor in foreign manufacturing centers, provided the most powerful incentive to the development of the industry.

The municipal government in Surat is as old as Bombay and Ahmedabad municipalities and was established in 1852 under a Government of India Act in 1850. The city was later governed under the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act of 1949, and in 1964, with the rise of the population, the Surat municipality became Surat Municipal Corporation (SMC). The SMC has three wings: the general body, the standing committee, and the municipal commissioner. The general body consists of elected representatives, and it elects the mayor and deputy mayor. The members of the standing committee are elected by the general body from among its members. It is headed by the chairman, who is appointed by the state government and is the executive head of the SMC.

In the second half of the 1950s the De Beers company started an aggressive advertising campaign to persuade every American male to buy diamonds for his sweetheart. This campaign, which was later extended to Europe, proved immensely successful—in fact it is one of the most successful advertising campaigns ever launched. The demand for small, good-quality diamonds skyrocketed. European diamond workshops could not keep up with demand, and European labor was too expensive to get a good profit from the sale of small diamonds.

A turning point came in 1954, when the Import Replenishment Scheme was introduced. Under this scheme diamond traders could import rough diamonds from the

Diamond Trading Company in London and from other sources abroad. Against the exports of cut and polished diamonds to foreign countries, a certain import replenishment entitlement was given under this scheme. This act is regarded as the origin of the "diamond miracle," which was to transform the diamond-cutting sector in India, and Surat in particular, in the coming decades. The act came as a boon when a huge stock of jewelry was unloaded on the Indian market by princes, such as the Nizam of Hyderabad and the maharajas of Darbhanga, Baroda, and Jamnagar. It was against the export of this jewelry that rough diamonds were allowed to be imported. Other reasons for the revival of the Indian diamond industry were a recession in Western Europe and the United States, and the closing of the Suez Canal between 1956 and early 1957.

During the 1960s and early 1970s the international diamond market started booming. The market in the West for small, low-quality diamonds skyrocketed. To promote exports, the government set up the Gems and Jewelry Export Promotion Council in 1966.

The main entrepreneurs of the diamond industry were initially Jain Vanias of north Gujarat. Later Patidars from Saurashtra entered the industry. Since only a small investment is required to buy a lathe machine, or *ghanti,* the scope for upward mobility is quite high. With the growth of the diamond-polishing industry in the 1960s and the early 1970s, Saurastrian Kanbi Patels, who were already in Surat, started inviting families and caste and village relations from Saurastra to come to the city to work in the diamond industry. They came in large numbers—especially after three years of drought and famine in Saurastra from 1972 to 1974. Initially the Patel migrants worked as diamond cutters while the owners were local Surat businessmen and Palanpur Banias. The latter also had a firm control over the local diamond trade. However, in the course of the 1970s, many early Saurastrian pioneers were able to start their own diamond workshops and factories. They rapidly turned into wealthy factory owners and diamond traders. A good part of the industry is still run along caste and kinship lines, and the entire sector is highly unorganized. However, attempts have been made to regulate it.

The Surat diamond industry has a share of 42 percent of the world's total rough diamond cutting and polishing businesses. The industry underwent a severe crisis in 2008 as demand slowed in the wake of the worldwide economic recession. The recession exposed various drawbacks in the system, as workers are paid on the basis of the number of diamonds cut and polished, and units faced an acute shortage of manpower as retrenched workers were skeptical about coming back due to the small amount of money paid them. This forced the units to offer incentives to the workers. With a revival in demand from Western consumers, a section of the industry began its shift to solitaires. The focus on the high-value segment has also increased awareness of the need for skilled workers.

The industry still faces an acute labor shortage, particularly a shortage of skilled labor. In small and cramped units, the working conditions, health issues, and safety standards are

invariably found to be extremely poor. The working area is often reported to be cramped, inadequately lit, lacking proper ventilation, unsafe, and unclean.

Though the wages of power-loom and diamond workers have increased in the last two decades, they do not correspond to the rise in prices, and they have not enjoyed any substantial improvement in their standard of living. Labor laws are constantly flouted, and the threat of workers losing their jobs looms large. In addition, only a tiny percentage of workers receive work throughout the month.

In recent decades a good number of large-scale industries have also come up in Surat, in and around Hazira and Kawas. Some of the major industries include KRIBHCO, Reliance, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited, and ESSAR. Because of this industrial growth, the price of land and the costs of construction, transport, and essential services have all risen. These years have also witnessed a tremendous expansion of the city boundary, and a clear contrast can be observed in urban morphology between the old, or the heart of the city, and newly developed localities that encircle the traditional hub. It has also significantly changed the social composition of the city.

The social fabric of the city comprises communities and subcastes like Parsis, Muslims, Jains, Christians, and Hindus, which are further divided into castes and subcastes (*jnatis*) like the Daudi Bohras and Kanbis (artisans), Khatris (weavers), Golas (rice pounders), Ghanchis (oil pressers), and Suthars (carpenters), to name a few. Along with this cluster, there are communities with a relatively recent arrival in the city, including Marathi-speaking migrants from neighboring regions of Maharastra and a migrant working class from Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh. There is also a sizable and visible presence of migrants (known as *hiraghasus*, or diamond cutters) from the Saurashtra region dominating the diamond and textile sectors, and Marwari traders from neighboring Rajasthan.

By one estimate 30 percent of the total population consists of Surtis who have stayed in the city for more than four generations. Brahmans include Anavil, Nagar, Audichya, and other subcastes. Vania and Jains, who are traditionally in trade and business, lived for generations in localities like Vadifalia, Sonifalia, Gopipura, Nanavat, Chowk, and Haripura. Now these groups have dispersed to the outskirts of recently developed areas of Athwa Lines and Piplod in exclusive localities. Khatris dominate the weaving industry. Scheduled castes of Bhangis and Meghwals are still employed in the work of cleaning. Vankars earlier formed a large section of textile workers. However, with the decline of textile production in recent years, they have moved into different sectors of the economy.

Like Hindu society, Muslim society is also not a monolithic community and is divided along kin-based affiliations. The community is divided mainly into local Muslims, immigrant Muslims, or Sunni Muslims, who claim their genealogy in West Asia (Saiyed, Shaikh, Moghul, and Pathan), and those who are converted from indigenous Hindu groups. While the community of Nawabs establishes its direct linkages with the Mughal nobility, Saiyeds and Shaikhs consider themselves to be at the top of the social hierarchy.

The Parsi population in Surat is estimated to be only around 3,500, yet they have a substantial presence in the cultural and philanthropic activities of the city.

Besides people from Gujarat, Surat has also attracted migration from Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, and Maharashtra. Maharastra, because of its proximity, has traditionally provided a good number of migrants. Surat has been the favorite destination for people from the Khandesh belt of Maharashtra (districts of Dhule, Jalgaon, and Nashik). Along with them, people from the districts of Nagpur, Buldana, Bhandara, and Raigadh have historically migrated to Surat. Migrants from these neighborhood regions of Maharashtra have been settled in Surat for more than two to three generations; their marriages take place in Surat itself, and their second and third generations have been born and brought up in the city. This is not the case with migrants from other parts of nation, who continue to maintain strong social and cultural ties with their native regions. A majority of migrant working-class people from Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh normally come to the city as individuals without their families. Nearly the entire population of migrant workers lives in nearly 300 slums and informal settlements, located within as well as outside the city. Migration from Rajasthan is a relatively recent phenomenon and goes back to the early 1990s. A large number of Rajasthani migrants are in the textile and auxiliary sectors and have also entered into diamond polishing, petty sales, and trading.

A special feature of Surat's social fabric is the proximity and economic interdependence of different social groups. This mutual dependence has contributed significantly to the maintenance of communal harmony in the city; yet, the history of the city is not free from communal outbreaks. In 1969, when Ahmedabad and the rest of Gujarat experienced horrifying riots, communal relations remained on an even keel. Apart from a few skirmishes, Surat remained calm in the 1970s and for a major part of the 1980s. In 1990 rioting took place in a number of localities when Lal Krishna Advani (b. 1927), one of the prominent political leaders of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), founded in 1980, was arrested for his campaign to construct a temple dedicated to the Hindu god, Rama, at the site of the old Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh. The communal tension continued, and clashes were reported from predominantly Muslim localities in 1991 and 1992. Following the demolition of Babri Mosque on December 6, 1992, large-scale communal riots engulfed the entire city, claiming more than 200 lives and damage to the tune of more than a million rupees in less than one month of communal strife.

In August 1994 Surat received another shock with the outbreak of plague, which was reported to be the deadly pneumonic plague. In panic, some 300,000 people fled the city in a matter of 48 hours. There were around 1,000 suspected cases, in which 103 were diagnosed as plague patients; around 80 people died within 15 days between September 18 and October 7. Along with this, nearly 4,000 suspected plague patients, including those who fled from the city, were found in several other parts of the country. This took place almost a century after the previous outbreak.

Since the communal violence of 1992 and the plague of 1994, the city has expanded tremendously both in terms of its physical boundaries as well as in terms of the diversification of capital inflow and social fluidity. New areas like Hazira (an industrial locality) and Pandesara (a working-class locality) are no longer outside the city limits. Similarly, new middle-class localities like Adajan, Piplod, and City Lights came into prominence as residential areas for those in the upwardly mobile service industry as well as for the nouveau riche. These localities also redefine new social orders as they do not house people on the basis of the old traditional social categories of caste and subcaste.

SADAN JHA

See also Gujarat

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✦ SURYA, VASANTHA

Vasantha Surya (b. 1942) is a gifted poet, translator, journalist, and writer in both Tamil and English. Born in New Delhi during the freedom movement, Surya had a patriotic, yet cosmopolitan upbringing. She completed high school in Washington, D.C., where her father was a diplomat at the Indian embassy. After returning to India, she received her B.A. in history from Bombay University. Surya inherited her poetic talent and social consciousness from both her mother and her father. Her fascination for English and American literature was balanced by lessons in Tamil inculcated by her mother. This rich background led Surya to

explore the possibilities of other national literatures and to begin writing herself. Her first piece of writing was a descriptive essay in English on Kerala, for which she won the prestigious National Gold Key award for students. Her return to India expanded her knowledge of Indian history, so that she became a keen observer of India's fledgling democracy and its challenges. Turning to journalism, the theme of social justice became central to her articles for *The Hindu*, *The Indian Express*, and *Frontline*. Surya also began composing poetry, which reflected local concerns, in the idiom of Indian-English. After a few years' residence in Germany, she became proficient in German and cultivated an interest in that nation's poetry. She later translated the poetry of Rainer Maria Rilke (1875–1926) into both Tamil and English. She describes translation as her "passion," but she prefers to use the term "transcreation," as she believes the best translations convey the nuances of the original text into the Indian-English idiom. She refers to Indian languages as the "many chambered" mansions of contemporary consciousness.

Surya's two poetry volumes were well received, especially by the acclaimed veteran poets A. K. Ramanujan (1929–1993) and Keki Daruwala (b. 1937). *The Stalk of Time* (1985), in fact, was short-listed for the Commonwealth Poetry Prize. *A Word Between Us* (2003) is a fierce, trenchant, yet exuberant collection of poems on such contemporary themes as religious fanaticism ("Trident"); exploitation ("Servant"); and women ("Pativrata"). She has also translated *The Ballad of Budhni* into English. This was based on a Bundeli Hindi poem about police atrocities in a Madhya Pradesh village. Her translations of 20th-century Tamil fiction portray women as both victims and agents. Such novels include *Yamini* (1996), which was about a young girl; *Contemporary Tamil Short Fiction* (2000); *A Place to Live* (2005), edited by Dilip Kumar; "Muthumeenakshi," about a child widow in 1912, in *A. Madhaviah: A Biography and a Novella* (2004); *Birthright* (*Kadaisee Varai* in Tamil; 2005), on female feticide; and *The Defiant Jungle*, by Sa. Kandasamy (2009), on the destruction of a virgin forest by developers. Among her English works are sections of *Whose News?*, edited by Ammu Joseph and Kalpana Sharma (1993). She has recently emerged as a writer and illustrator of children's fiction in English and Tamil. She evocatively recreates the imaginary world of children in *Mridu in Madras*, which she has translated into Tamil. Episodes of *Thithilee Tales* have been serialized for *The Hindu*, and she has published a children's *Ramayana* in *Chatterbox*. She combines her writing with activism. She and her husband conduct classes for disadvantaged children, teach English classes for nurses at a Chennai hospital, and organize free health care in villages.

SITA ANANTHA RAMAN

See also Literature

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T



✦ TAMIL NADU

Tamil Nadu, the "country of the Tamils," encompasses over 50,000 square miles on the southeast coast of India. The town of Kanyakumari, where the Indian Ocean meets the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, is at its most southern point. With a population of nearly 70 million people, Tamil Nadu is the seventh most populous state in India; it also has the highest percentage of people, some 45 percent, living in urban areas. Known as Madras until 1969, it is the heartland for the diasporic Tamil community now found in many parts of the world, most notably Malaysia and Singapore, where Tamil is an official language. Tamil is the official language of Tamil Nadu, but English is widely understood as the city of Chennai produces some half-dozen English-language daily and evening newspapers; small percentages of people speak Telegu, Kannada, and Malayalam—like Tamil, Dravidian languages—and Urdu, the language of Muslims. A dry and hot state with temperatures ranging between 55°F and 109°F, it depends on the two monsoon seasons of the southwest monsoon (June–September) and the northeast monsoon (October–December) for its water. It is divided into 32 districts with Chennai, the capital, being the fourth-largest city in India. The governor heads the state but the administration is led by the chief minister and his cabinet. The unicameral Legislative Assembly seats 235 members. It sends 39 members to the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament in New Delhi. The main political parties in the state are the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, the All India Anna Dravid Munnetra Kazhagam, the Congress Party, and the smaller Pattali Makkal Katchi.

Archaeological sites dated to nearly 2000 BCE, where the script Tamil Brahmi was used, attest to the long period of habitation in Tamil Nadu. In 72 CE the apostle Saint Thomas

is believed to have been buried in Chennai after a 20-year mission in southern India. His remains were removed to Italy in the 3rd century although his original tomb, one of only three shrines built over the remains of one of Christ's apostles (the other two are Saint Peter's in Rome and Santiago de Compostela in Spain for Saint James), is located in the Basilica of the National Shrine of Saint Thomas in Chennai. The state encompassed such early dynasties as the Pandhyas (6th–10th centuries), with its capital at Madurai, and the Pallavas (ca. 600–ca. 912) before the Cholas, noted in inscriptions as early as the third century BCE, established a powerful dynasty between the 9th and 13th centuries. The Cholas not only dominated all of southern and eastern India as far as Bengal and Sri Lanka but they also spread Indic culture throughout Southeast Asia as they developed trading ties with Srivijaya in modern Indonesia to protect trade with China. More important, Madurai hosted its academy, or *sangam*, from about the 2nd century, and it produced over 2,000 *sangam* poems written by over 500 poets, many of them women. These were collected in nine anthologies and along with the *Tolkappiyam* are not only a grammar of the Tamil language but also a guide to early Tamil life. The *Silappadikaram* (*The Ankle Bracelet*), a 3rd-century romance and the most celebrated piece of writing from the Sangam period, is, likewise, a great treatise on Tamil civilization. These make up the great works of *sangam* literature and are at the heart of classical Tamil learning. By the middle of the 14th century the whole of southern India was ruled by the Vijayanagara Kingdom until the city of Vijyanagar was sacked in 1565 by Muslims. The British arrived as traders at Madras in 1639 and over the next century and a half became the paramount power in India with Madras being one of the three presidencies of British India.

Due to this rich history Tamil Nadu has numerous historical sites and the city of Chennai is the center of a vibrant cultural life based around Tamil culture and language. The Meenakshi or Sundareshvara Temple dedicated to the Hindu god Shiva and located in the city of Madurai is one of the most remarkable Hindu temple complexes in India. Mahabalipuram, the city of the "Seven Pagodas," located 37 miles south of Chennai and a UNESCO World Heritage Site, is a port city founded in the 7th century by a Pallava king, and it is now a craft center and, like Madurai, a popular tourist site. Tanjavur, the capital of the Cholas, is renowned for its Temple of Brahadisvara, the "Temple of the Big God" and it became the heart of Tamil culture renowned even today for its bronze figurines, handicrafts, metallic inlay plates, and musical instrument, the *veenai*. It was also the birthplace of three 19th-century musicians who established the Karnatak music tradition and the home of the Tanjavur quartet who systematized the Bharatanatyam dance tradition of southern India. Tiruchirappalli, also known as Trichy, is located 200 miles south of Chennai in the center of the state and contains the Rock Fort, which hovers over the city, and Thiruvanaikava Temple. Udagamamandalam, or Ootacamund (Ooty), is one of Tamil Nadu's renowned hill stations located in the Nilgiri hills, or the Blue Mountains, made famous by the British who tried to re-create the landscape and architecture of England in the green and pleasant land 7,500 feet high in the hills.



A lake in the courtyard of the Meenakshi temple in Madurai, Tamil Nadu. Dedicated to the Hindu god Shiva, it is one of the largest temple complexes in India. Although mentioned in ancient Tamil texts, the current buildings are dated to 1600. (Sergey Kushnir/Dreamstime.com)

Chennai, situated on a flat coastal plain and fronted by the magnificent Marina Beach, over seven miles long, is the heart of modern Tamil culture and life. The extended metropolitan area has a population approaching 10 million. It is a thriving industrial area with both a traditional automobile industry and also high tech businesses. It is India's second-largest exporter for the IT service industry, hosting such multinational corporations as Dell, Motorola, Samsung, and Sony, and such Internet-based services as Amazon, eBay, and PayPal. Two rivers, the Koovam and the Adyar, wend their lazy way through the city and they are linked by the 2.5-mile Buckingham Canal. The port of Mylapore was built by the Pallavas and the Portuguese port of São Tome was established after their arrival in 1522. The modern city was built around the British Fort Saint George, which they founded in 1640, and it has been expanding ever since. Chennai has an international airport and it is a major railroad terminus. It is an educational center boasting numerous institutes of higher education with a fine reputation: they include the Indian Institute of Technology; the University of Madras, one of the oldest universities in India, having been established in 1857; the Ramakrishna Vivekanada College; and the Madras Christian College. Cricket is the most popular sport in the city and the M. A. Chidambaram Stadium hosted games for the 2011 Cricket World Cup. The Chennai Super Kings play in the Indian Premier League. In addition to Chennai's rich cultural, social, and intellectual life, the Tamil film industry is located in the district of Kadambakkam and plays a special role in Tamil society. Tamil cinema produces the second-largest number of films in the world after

Bollywood in Mumbai and they are not only shown in India but are exported around the world as well. In a remarkable development, a number of people in the Tamil movie industry have gone on to careers in politics, even leading the state as chief ministers. Above all, however, Chennai is renowned for its six-week-long music festival in December–January. It is a showcase of Karnatak music and dance. Over 1,000 *kutcheris* ("concerts") held either in small halls that hold less than 100 people or large auditoriums that hold 300 people are performed by some 600 singers, dancers, actors, and musicians. The rich intellectual, cultural, and business life of Chennai help make Tamil Nadu one of the most vibrant states in the union and one of several areas of India that have a special cultural identity.

ROGER D. LONG

See also Diaspora, Indian; Dravidian Movement; Dravidian Munnetra Kazhagam Parties; Languages and Scripts; Newspapers, Indian-Language; Sri Lanka, Relations with; Surya, Vasantha.

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✦ TEEN MURTI BHAVAN

Teen Murti Bhavan, the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), was built in 1930 and designed by Robert Tor Russell (1888–1972), chief architect for the Public Works Department of the government of India and famous for designing Connaught Circle (1928–1934) in the center of New Delhi, was originally named Flagstaff House and was the residence of the commander in chief of the British Indian Army. Following independence in 1947, the house became the official residence of India's first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964), who lived there for 16 years until his death on

May 27, 1964. After his death, Teen Murti Bhavan was made into a museum and library promoting modern Indian history and containing an invaluable collection of materials devoted to Nehru and his era. The house gets its name from the Teen Murti ("three statues") Memorial built in memory of Indian soldiers who died in World War I (1914–1918) fighting as part of the Indian Army, which stands in front of its extensive grounds. The Nehru Memorial Museum and Library Society was established in 1966 and is an autonomous institution under the Ministry of Culture. It has a large collection of historical research material and attracts scholars from all over India and the world who visit to consult its extensive materials. It has an agreement with the British Library in London with which it exchanges research materials and this, along with its own voluminous materials, makes it a premier research center for South Asian studies. It has four major constituents: the Memorial Museum, a library on modern India, the Centre for Contemporary Studies, and a planetarium. The Nehru Planetarium has an active educational program and offers programs for students and amateur astronomers. On the grounds of the museum, where entrance is free, is a granite rock inscribed with excerpts from Nehru's historic "Tryst with Destiny" speech delivered during the midnight session of the Indian Constituent Assembly on August 14–15, 1947, at the time of India's independence. An annual Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Foundation lecture delivered by eminent world leaders and academics can cover national and global science or social and economic issues. It is held at the Bhavan annually on April 1. In addition to the annual lecture the library hosts conferences and round tables on the pressing issues of the day; many of the proceedings and findings of the meetings are published by NMML and this activity makes NMML one of the leading intellectual sites in Delhi.

SHEEBA HÄRMÄ

See also Asiatic Society of Bengal; Asiatic Society of Mumbai; New Delhi

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✦ TELANGANA

The term "Telangana" means "region of Telugu" or "land of Telugu" and denotes an ethnonationalist movement by Telugu-speaking people in the south of India to carve out a separate state from territories mostly located in the state of Andhra Pradesh. Telugu is a

Dravidian language and the third most widely used language in India. The term "Telangana," however, is a misnomer since it is applied only to a limited region in Andhra Pradesh, while Telugu is the language of the whole of Andhra Pradesh. In fact, the state of Andhra Pradesh was formed by taking adjacent regions with Telugu-speaking populations from Hyderabad and Tamil Nadu. The term "Telangana" was designated to distinguish the Telugu region from Marathwada (the land of Marathi) as part of the long bygone Hyderabad state. However, this term has come to stay and distinguishes the 10 districts of Andhra Pradesh roughly located in the northwest—Warangal, Adilabad, Khammam, Mahabubnagar, Nalgonda, Rangareddy, Karimnagar, Nizamabad, Medak, and Hyderabad, the present state capital of Andhra Pradesh—that border Madhya Pradesh in the north and Maharashtra in the west. In the new millennium the demand for the creation of Telangana has become a powerful one. Telangana leaders responsible for such separatist agitations have always expressed concern about the lack of regional development when compared with the rest of Andhra Pradesh. Statistical analysis based on the use of resources, industrialization, per capita income, and production have, however, shown such concerns to be baseless, but the arguments persist, especially among adherents of Telangana. On December 9, 2009, the government of India announced that it would begin studying the process of establishing the state of Telangana within the Indian union.

LAVANYA VEMSANI

See also Hyderabad

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Telecommunications. *See* Media and Telecommunications

✦ TELEVISION

After its humble beginnings in 1959 and two decades of unhurried growth, where programming was mainly instructional, television development in India suddenly accelerated in the 1980s, as more and more of the country was brought under the umbrella of national television. In 1976, television was formally separated from All India Radio, which had hitherto overseen its activities, and set up as a discrete entity called Doordarshan (a literal

translation into Hindi of the English word "television"). In 1997, the government established Prasar Bharati to oversee the activities of both Doordarshan and All India Radio and to ensure their autonomy.

The next leap forward came in 1991, with the arrival of the cable and satellite revolution through the intermediary of Star TV, beamed from Hong Kong. The growth figures for cable and satellite television are staggering. In 1991 there was, in addition to the 5 state-owned terrestrial channels, 1 satellite channel: Star TV. With the arrival of the Indian-owned Zee TV in 1992, the number of satellite channels had doubled. But within three years there were 48 terrestrial and satellite channels, and by 2003 the Indian public had a mind-boggling 224 channels to choose from. With total revenues of 111 billion rupees ($2.5 billion) in 2002, expected to rise to 139 billion rupees ($22.5 billion) by 2010, television provides over 60 percent of the revenue from the entertainment sector. Today India is the third-largest market for cable subscribers in the world, after the United States and China.

As for the viewers, in 2003 there were 84 million households with access to terrestrial television, of which 41 million households also had access to cable and satellite. Since each household is calculated as consisting of 5.5 individuals, it translates into a potential daily audience of nearly a half-billion viewers for terrestrial television and a quarter of a billion viewers for cable and satellite.

The most impressive feature of Indian television has been its exponential growth. Despite a late start, television is now the fastest-growing area of entertainment in India, and the forecast for Indian television, particularly regional television, is one of continued growth. As penetration of terrestrial, cable, and satellite television into the rural areas increases, the regional sector is expected to grow considerably.

As of 2006 there were a total of 192 million households in India—56 million in urban areas. Of these, 43 million receive terrestrial television, with 27 million households also subscribing to cable and satellite networks. There is room for growth in urban areas, particularly in cable and satellite television connectivity.

There are 136 million rural households, of which only 39 million receive terrestrial television and 13 million have cable and satellite connections. Cable and satellite penetration in regional hinterlands, away from the main commercial capitals, is particularly low, and the scope for growth in the rural areas is tremendous. However, growth in television connectivity in the hinterland will depend on improved infrastructure, particularly the availability of electricity in the rural areas.

The way toward greater organization of the cable networks may come through large operators, known as multi-system operators (MSOs), who act as middlemen by taking signals from the broadcasters and passing them on to the local *cablewallahs*, or cable operators. MSOs such as InCableNet and Siti-Cable are keen to offer households and businesses broadband Internet connections through cable television. They are therefore seeking to improve the communications infrastructure by upgrading the networks, sometimes even the "last mile," which cable operators usually control.

Direct to home (DTH) technology has been discussed as the future for television in India. DTH refers to the distribution of satellite and cable channels using digital technology in Ku Band, which provides signals directly to the subscriber's premises. The biggest advantage of DTH technology is that it renders the role of the cable operator redundant. Digital technology and signal compression also create savings on transponder services while allowing for greater numbers of channels. However, the more expensive addressable system and aerial dish required for DTH result in increased costs for the subscriber, a very important consideration in mass media diffusion in India.

Although the results of surveys published by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), the *Economic Times*, and other newspapers and magazines, tend to vary, they all agree that the regional channels and general entertainment in Hindi garner over 80 percent of the total viewership and comprise the largest segment of the market. The programs include prime-time soaps, quiz shows, music contests, comedy programs, and talk shows. Star TV's Star Plus channel, which now broadcasts entirely in Hindi, leads the field in entertainment, with 45 of the nation's top 50 programs, followed by Sun TV, Gemini TV, Sony Entertainment, ETV, and Zee TV.

The most watched category of general entertainment is the soap opera. The first Indian "prodevelopment" serial was *Hum Log*, which enjoyed unprecedented success. The serial had 157 episodes and ran for 17 months during 1984 and 1985. It sought its inspiration from Mexico's Televisa. Much of early Indian television serials was prodevelopment programming, consisting of television serials created with the aim of social development. Started in South America, the model, which combines entertainment with education, was considered worth pursuing by public television broadcasters such as Doordarshan.

At any given time, every broadcaster in Hindi and the regional languages has at least one and often more soaps. They are generally about extended families, with the struggle for power among various members of the extended family dominating the action. Central to these conflicts are the vicious power struggles between the mother-in-law (*saas*) and the daughter-in-law (*bahu*). Since most Indians, both in the cities and villages, live in extended families with several generations cohabiting under one roof, these soaps find great resonance with audiences. These *saas-bahu* struggles are epitomized in long-running soaps such as Star TV's Hindi-language *Saas Bhi Kabhi Bahu Thi*. Others include *Kahani Ghar Ghar Ki* (Star), *Des Mein Nikla Hoga Chand*, *Kkoi Dil Mein Hai*, and *Kkusum* (Sony). The leader of the pack is *Kyunki Saas Bhi Kabhi Bahu Thi*, which, in order to keep ahead of the rest, must come up with ever-more innovative and daring ideas. For example, its production company, Balaji Telefilms, was the first to decide to shoot some of its episodes in Australia.

The soaps target female audiences, and most run only on weekdays. Drawing on unrestrained feminine greed and ambition, first introduced to Indian viewers by *The Bold and the Beautiful*, which was screened by Star TV in the early 1990s, Indian soaps are intense family dramas. "Television clearly loves the new nasty [female villain] who seduces husbands, steals boyfriends, exchanges babies and manipulates mothers-in-law," writes critic Kaveree

Bamzai. So popular are negative female characters that when the serial *Des Mein Nikla Hoga Chand* began to slide in the ratings, director Aruna Irani allegedly decided to expand the predatory female's role. The series' subsequent rise to the ranks of the top 15 television shows was proof that nasty women have the best ratings.

The soaps concentrate on affluent, urban, unhappy Indians and unfailingly narrate incidents of rape, divorce, and extramarital relationships. "A good soap asks for the impossible," says television's top writer Manohar Shyam Joshi, who invented the genre with *Hum Log* and *Buniyaad*. "It must be high drama which can masquerade as reality." In the once squeaky clean *Saas Bhi Kabhi Bahu Thi,* Tulsi, the mother-in-law, vows to avenge her pregnant daughter, who was recently raped by her son-in-law and framed her boyfriend for a murder he did not commit; in *Kkoi Dil Mein Hai,* the recently widowed Kajal is forced by the family to marry her brother-in-law, whom she once loved, but he is now married to her best friend; in *Kkusum,* Garv finds that a one-night stand with Kali, whom he once loved, leaves her pregnant, and that now he really loves his wife, Kali's stepsister; and in *Tanav,* everyone lives unhappily ever after—Mrs. Malik has a boy toy, her husband is sleeping with his secretary, her stepdaughter has discovered that her lover is married, and her son, who is gay, has AIDS. Adultery, ambition, AIDS, murder, madness, seduction, betrayal, impotence, rage: these are the subjects that are advanced on a transfixed Indian public. Manohar Shyam Joshi despairs of the contemporary soaps: "Earlier the episode would climax with a stirring dialogue. Now it closes with a slap, a shriek, and a cuss word."

In 2003, as an antidote to the surfeit of *saas-bahu* dramas, Sony introduced a new serial called *Jassi Jaissi Koi Nahin.* Its central character, Jassi, is an earnest but clumsy secretary with braces and thick spectacles. The series was a surprise hit because the ugly duckling role is said to have reassured hundreds of ordinary-looking girls about their self-worth. Secretaries frequently invite Mona Singh, the actress who plays Jassi, as guest of honor to their events. Storywise, it also leaves open the possibility for Jassi to turn into a beautiful swan. To capture the mood of the nation, the Indian postal services have even commemorated a new postal cover and cards in her honor. Imitations of *Jassi Jaissi Koi Nahin,* such as *Yeh Meri Life Hai, Saakshi,* and *Dekho Magar Pyar Se,* have not been as successful as the original.

Quizzes and game shows are also extremely popular on Indian television. The most successful was *Kaun Banega Crorepati?*, an Indian version of *Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?* that aired in the late 1990s and was hosted on Star by a mature Amitabh Bachchan, the biggest star of Hindi cinema. The program is said to have revived the fortunes of the faltering channel. Attempts by other channels to replicate the success with other film stars were not effective, pointing to the newness of format and charisma of the superstar for the extraordinary success of the program.

In 2004, Sony and Star TV's music channel, Channel V, both launched Indian versions of *Pop Idol* with a celebrity panel of judges. Ten Indian cities competed to find a winner on Channel V's *Super Singer,* while Sony's *Indian Idol* limited the search to the four major cities. Music contests have been popular on Indian television for over a decade. *Antakshari,* where



Bollywood actor Shahrukh Khan, who succeeded Amitabh Bachchan as game show host, poses at a press conference for television channel Star Plus's game show, *Kaun Banega Crorepati,* the Indian version of *Who Wants To Be A Millionaire,* in New Delhi, December 2006. Television shows have become as popular in India as they are in many other parts of the world. (AP Photo/Mustafa Quraishi)

each contestant has to sing a song beginning with the final syllable of the previous singer's lyrics, first began on Zee TV in 1993 and has maintained a loyal audience ever since. In 1995 the channel started a second musical contest, *Sa Re Ga Ma.*

In addition to programs on the various general entertainment channels, the two major channels dedicated to music are MTV and Channel V. Initially, MTV broadcast only Western music but found that the only way to penetrate the Indian market was to offer Indian (and Indian film-based) music. International music now constitutes just 2 percent of all music on Indian television, with 98 percent devoted to Indian music delivered by young male and female DJs who speak "Hinglish," a Hindi-English patois most popular with the young. The two channels have revolutionized Indian music and created a whole new genre of Indipop, sung in Hindi, English, and Hinglish. They have also fueled a boom in the music videos market.

Other prime-time programs on Indian-language channels include Simi Garewal's interviews with stars and celebrities and Sanjeev Kapoor's cooking program, *Khana Khazana.*

Detective action series, such as *Ak . . . tion Unlimited Josh,* are largely imitations of *Miami Vice* featuring muscular men fighting crime. They are aimed to interest male audiences fatigued by daily doses of *saas-bahu* extended family traumas. In an Indian version

of *Crimewatch UK*, the city police departments describe certain crimes that actually have been committed and seek public assistance in solving them. Current comedy programs feature writer, director, and producer Aatish Kapadia, whose work includes *Khichdi* and its sequel *Instant Khichdi*. Kapadia is also behind the program *Sarabhai vs. Sarabhai* and *Main Office Tere Angan Ki*, whose titles are spoofs on Hindi films and plays. Other popular comedy programs include *Office Office* and *LOC*. A new channel entirely devoted to comedy, called Smile TV, came on the air in 2004.

Indian television also offers at least three imitations of *Sex and the City: Dil Kya Chahta Hai* on Star TV, *Kuchh Love Kuchh Masti* on Sahara, and *Kabhi Haan Kabhi Naa* on Zee TV. In general, however, copies of Western shows are not particularly popular. An early imitation of *Friends*, remade on Zee TV as *Hello Friends*, failed to excite the public. Reality shows such as *Big Brother*, however, began as early as 1993 and have become popular, with some shows having an Indian formula and others licensed from abroad.

Major companies that provide the content for general entertainment on television include Balaji Telefilms, Cinevista Communications, Padmalaya Telefilms, Sri Adhikari Brothers, Pritish Nandy Communications, Ronnie Screwvala's UTV, and Crest Communications. Entertainment in English, including films, is largely provided by Zee English, Zee MGM, Star World, Star Movies, HBO, AXN, and Hallmark and constitutes just under 2 percent of the total viewership in India. The National Geographic and Discovery channels usually dub their programs into Hindi.

Hindi films attract around 4 percent of total viewership on Indian television. Doordarshan as well as all cable and satellite channels screen feature films in Hindi and in regional languages. There are also channels dedicated to screening Hindi films, such as B4U, Zee Cinema, and Sony Max. Independent cable operators who are not affiliated with MSOs often offer a film channel with films in Hindi, English, and regional languages as a "goodwill gesture" to their subscribers. These screenings are mostly without authorization and include the screening of pirated videos. Some are even said to offer soft porn films late at night.

The rise of dedicated news and news-based channels is a recent phenomenon on Indian television. After decades of total control by Doordarshan on the dissemination of news throughout the nation, the cable and satellite networks first opened the doors to foreign news channels after Star began broadcasting to India in 1991. But it was not long before the cable and satellite networks began to provide national, regional, and local news in regional languages. Today, news channels in Hindi and the regional languages attract the largest percentage of news viewership.

In 2005, there were 32 dedicated news channels offering news and news-based programs, 10 of them in English and the rest in Hindi and all the major languages of India. Of these, 10 channels have recently come on the air, including channels that offer business news in Hindi, such as Zee Biz, Videocon, CNBC-TV18, and NDTV. An additional 20 Indian channels are preparing to enter the market. The planned new arrivals include one produced by Bennett, Coleman & Co. (owners of the English-language newspaper *Times of India*) and Reuters.

The most successful news channel is the Hindi-language Aaj Tak, owned by Living Media India, which also owns the news magazine *India Today*. The company's success can be attributed to its decision to woo the small businesses that had previously been shunned by advertisers as too insignificant or down-market. In doing so, it broke advertising records and showed that dedicated news channels could be lucrative business. The success of Aaj Tak encouraged other broadcast companies to start news channels in regional languages.

Zee News and Star News are the next most-watched news channels. Star News became a serious contender in the business of news services when it switched its services to Hindi in 2003. Until then its Hindi news service was provided by NDTV, a company that previously provided a weekly roundup of news and events for Doordarshan. NDTV is now an independent 24-hour news channel in Hindi. Aaj Tak and NDTV have both started a new English-language service called Headlines Today and NDTV 24x7, respectively. The increased competition among the news channels has resulted in attractive packaging and high production values. The English-language Headlines Today, for instance, is said to have trained its newscasters with CNN.

Sun TV has dedicated news channels in Tamil and English, Udaya TV in Kannada, and Asianet in Malayalam. It will soon have 2 new channels in Telugu and Malayalam. Sahara Samay, which already has 4 dedicated news channels, is set to roll out another 31 city-centric news channels. English-language transnational news channels available in India are CNN and BBC World. CNBC has also launched an Indian channel, CNBC India.

Doordarshan's national and regional channels also carry news in Hindi, English, and most regional languages. Although Doordarshan is the front-runner in the news channels stakes by virtue of its terrestrial monopoly and access to 51 percent of the nation's households, its presentation is perceived as progovernment and dull. In 2004, Doordarshan inaugurated two new dedicated channels to broadcast live all proceedings in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha, the lower and upper houses of the Indian Parliament. It is hoped that the election in 2004 of several former film stars to Parliament might evoke greater interest in watching the Indian legislators at work.

According to the survey published in the *Economic Times*, the cable and satellite news channels' share of viewership, which was just 2 percent a few years ago, has risen to 6–7 percent. Advertising revenues have accordingly increased too. News channels corner 14 percent of the total television advertising revenue. The reason for this disproportionate share of revenue is the perception that the genre mainly attracts men, who are the decision makers for the purchase of high-value goods in most families. Also, news viewers are often perceived as the opinion formers of the nation. Advertisers therefore consider them a significant emerging market.

Cricket dominates sports in India, and it is the most important game on television. To many, cricket inspires a religious fervor akin to that inspired by only one other staple of Indian culture: cinema. No other sport generates the same nationwide interest and excitement.

The yearlong calendar of cricket matches in India and abroad dominates the intense bidding war for the rights among sponsors for the matches. There are a variety of interregional

matches, but more important are the test and one-day international (ODI) matches played among the handful of cricket-playing nations of the world. The most important of all these matches are without doubt the World Cup matches and any match that features India playing Pakistan. They command the highest fees for advertising—about $25,000 for a 10-second spot (as compared with $2 million for the Super Bowl in the United States).

Because of India's abysmal international performance in most sports other than cricket, the national interest in sports channels is not as great as elsewhere in the world. However, field hockey, tennis, and football are growing in popularity. The new Indian sports stars, such as Sania Mirza in tennis and Narain Karthikeyan in Formula One racing, are beginning to emerge on the international stage and may spur more broadcasts of these sports on Indian television.

Star Sports, Zee Sports, Doordarshan's DD Sports, and ESPN are the main sports channels in India.

Religious and mythological soaps have been a perennial feature on Indian television, and all channels have at least one (but usually several) such series on air at any given time. Recently the major religious serials were *Shree Ganesh* and *Shree Krishna* on Sony, *Ma Shakti* on Star Plus, *Jai Ganesh* on Zee TV, *Brahma Vishnu Mahesh* and *Sati Savitri* on SABe, *Draupadi* on Sahara, with Doordarshan's *Ramayan* and *Mahabharat* repeated on Zee and Sony, respectively. In 2004, the toughest fight for audiences was between Sony's *Devi* on the goddess Durga and *Sarrthi* about Lord Krishna from Star Plus.

In addition to the religious and mythological serials, nine channels have emerged over the last five years entirely devoted to spreading the word of God. These are *Aastha, Sanskar, Maharishi, Om Shanti, Maa TV, Sadhna, Jagran* (sponsored by Zee TV), GOD (a Christian channel based in Jerusalem), and Quran TV (for Muslims). The competition among the seven Hindu channels is intense, particularly since many offer similar fare of devotional music, religious discourses, astrology, celebrations of religious festivals, and sometimes fund-raising projects, and programs about the work of nongovernmental organizations. They all cater to an older audience, but the battle for the hearts and minds of younger viewers is always on. Most of the channels depend on a handful of male and female speakers: Sant Morari Bapu, Guru Maa, Sukhbodhanandji, Sudhanshu Maharaj, Asaram Bapu, and the more cosmopolitan Jaya Rao.

An emerging television market is that for children's programs. There are currently six major channels for children: Cartoon Network, Nickelodeon, Splash, Animax, POGO, and Hungama, with the imminent arrival of a seventh, Walt Disney International. Children's programs constitute nearly 10 percent of the broadcasts on Indian television, and nearly 70 percent of these programs feature cartoons.

Sony's Animax, Turner International's POGO, and UTV's Hungama started broadcasting in January 2004. Hungama, an Indian channel launched by UTV with the intention of broadcasting original programs for children as well as interactive game shows made entirely in India, is an entirely new phenomenon and is being watched with great interest by the other media companies. UTV and its owner, Ronnie Screwvala, who produces television programs for Doordarshan, Star TV, Gemini, Vijaya, and Sun TV, are also involved in the

production of Hindi films. For Hungama, UTV has created a governing body entirely made up of children who offer advice on programming.

Indian programs on cable and satellite are popular among the 20 million Indian expatriates living in North America, Europe, Africa, and Southeast Asia. The Zee network, along with Sony, has been the prime mover in the international arena. Sony was the first channel from the subcontinent to be launched in the United States, where the Ethnic American Broadcast Company (EABC) distributed it on the DirecTV DTH platform. Zee beams transmissions to Fiji, the United Kingdom, and mainland Europe, as well as South Africa. It also reaches out to immigrant Indians in Asia and Australia. The network has expanded into a 24-hour telecast in the United States, from its previous 2-hour daily broadcast. Former Indian tennis champion Vijay Amritraj owns the downlinking and distribution rights in North America for Doordarshan's international channel, DD India. Recently the Israeli cable network, Hot, launched a free channel called Hot Bombay, dedicated to Bollywood films.

The international broadcasts include Indian programs and sometimes programs specially made for the immigrant population overseas, which constitutes an important revenue and target for advertising. So lucrative is the overseas market that many Indian programs such as the musical quiz-cum-singing contest *Sa Re Ga Ma* are shot in the United States and the United Kingdom with Asian audiences.

The Indian television scene continues to experience phenomenal growth as we enter the second decade of the 21st century. Several publications provide a running commentary on the growth and character of Indian television. For an up-to-date source for statistics and analysis of the Indian television industry, see televisionpoint.com, whose logo tells it all: Indian TV always. All the way.

ASHA KASBEKAR RICHARDS

See also Bollywood; Doordarshan; Soap Operas

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✦ TERRITORIES

India is divided politically into 29 states and seven Union Territories (including the National Capital Territory of Delhi). The seven Union Territories are Andaman and Nicobar Islands; Chandigarh; Dadra and Nagar Haveli; Daman and Diu; Lakshadweep; New Delhi; and Puducherry. They are administered by the president of India through his or her representative, the administrator. In the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Delhi, and Puducherry the administrators are lieutenant governors. In Chandigarh the governor of the state of the Punjab is the administrator. Daman and Diu are administered by the administrator of Dadra and Nagar Haveli. Lakshwadeep has its own administrator. The national capital territory of Delhi has a Legislative Assembly and a council of administrators, as does Puducherry. Accordingly, the governance of these different territories is flexible and varies from territory to territory. In the case of Delhi and Puducherry, certain bills passed by the respective legislatures must have the assent of the president of India.

ROGER D. LONG

See also Andaman and Nicobar Islands; Chandigarh; Dadra and Nagar Haveli; Daman and Diu; Lakshwadeep; New Delhi; Puducherry

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✦ THACKERAY, BALASAHEB KESHAV

Balasaheb ("Bal") Keshav Thackeray (b. 1923) is the founder and supreme head of the right-wing Hindu nationalist party the Shiv Sena ("Army of Shivaji"), founded on June 19, 1966. The Maratha king Shivaji (1630–1680) was a Hindu king who rebelled against the Muslim rulers of India and is one of Hindu India's most revered figures. He is held in equally high esteem by the Congress Party in Maharashtra. Bal Thackeray is the son of noted writer and social reformer Keshav Sitaram (KC) Thackeray, and he was born in the city of Pune on January 23, 1923. His political philosophy was largely shaped by his father, a leading figure in the Samyukta Maharashtra Movement (SMM), founded in 1956, which advocated the creation of the linguistic state of Maharashtra. It brought together Marathi activists of diverse political persuasions. The senior Thackeray reportedly supported the strategic use of violence but broke from the SMM because of the prominent place of Communists within the movement. The efficacy of violence and a fervent anti-Communist stance would become key elements of Bal Thackeray's beliefs and the Shiv Sena's political platform.

Bal Thackeray began his professional career as a political cartoonist with the English-language daily the *Free Press Journal*. At the *Free Press*, Thackeray wielded the caricature as a political weapon but was forced to temper his biting commentary. In 1960, he left the *Free Press* to start his own political weekly, *Marmik*, where he could exercise complete editorial control. On the pages of *Marmik*, Thackeray openly criticized politicians and voiced his vehement anti-Communism, which grew even stronger during the China-India War of 1962. By this time, *Marmik* had attracted a significant following among Mumbai's lower-middle-class and white-collar Maharashtrians. In the mid-1960s, Thackeray played directly to this audience by publishing lists of corporate executives employed in Mumbai, highlighting how many of them were "outsiders" and South Indians in particular. The implication was that these "outsiders" were taking jobs away from "native" Maharashtrians.

In 1966, Thackeray abandoned his long-standing aversion to party politics and formed the Shiv Sena to advocate more strongly for the place of Maharashtrians in Mumbai's professional and political landscape. His movement gathered momentum after the Shiv Sena's first public meeting was held in October 1966 in Mumbai's Shivaji Park. When larger-than-expected crowds of working- and middle-class Maharashtrians showed up and expressed their support for his pro-Maharashtrian message, Thackeray set about building the Shiv Sena into an organized political movement. Declaring himself the *pramukh* ("chief") of the Shiv Sena, Thackeray employed military metaphors and slogans advocating physical strength to mobilize his followers and to bring in adherents to the party.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Thackeray built the party by forming temporary alliances with nearly all of Maharashtra's political parties. In a controversial move, he came out in support of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984) and the Congress Party (founded in 1885) during the emergency between June 25, 1975, and March 21, 1977. Partly reflecting his support for authoritarian politics and partly a pragmatic move to avoid repression, this support also showed Thackeray's deft political maneuvering. The move, however, was met with dissent from both leaders and rank-and-file members of the Shiv Sena, and Thackeray had to work to repair the damage caused by the alliance.

Ever a controversial figure, Thackeray has attracted significant attention to himself and the party by making statements expressing admiration for Hitler, inciting violence against Muslims, expressing support for the Tamil Tigers, and taking strong stances on aspects of popular culture, including a fervent opposition to the celebration of Valentine's Day. Although he handed the official mantle of the party to his son, Udhav (b. 1960), in 2003, Thackeray remains the party's supreme leader and *senapati*. Suffering from numerous health problems, however, he now makes few public appearances, although his image remains prominently displayed on election posters and he continues to publish editorials in the Shiv Sena daily newspaper, *Saamna*.

LIZA WEINSTEIN

See also Maharashtra; Mumbai; Shiv Sena

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✦ THAPAR, ROMILA

Romila Thapar is an exceptionally gifted Marxist historian and, as of 2010, the most well-known historian in India and someone who enjoys an international reputation as an expert on ancient India. She was one of the pioneers in writing against colonial stereotypes about Indian history and its supposed lack of a sense of time or historical consciousness. Accordingly, she has been in high demand as a speaker and has made numerous broadcasts for the BBC. She was born in India in 1931 in a Punjabi-speaking family and was raised in various parts of India, as her father was in the Indian Army and was transferred from post to post. After completing her undergraduate education at Punjab University she received a PhD from the University of London in 1958. After returning to India she began teaching in the Punjab but ended her long teaching career at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, where she is professor emerita. She also continues to teach and lecture abroad and she has spent time at Cornell University, Dartmouth College, the University of Chicago, the University of California at Berkeley, the University of Michigan, the University of Washington, and the University of Pennsylvania, as well as the Collège de France in Paris, amid a long list of universities where she has been invited to teach and lecture. She is also an honorary fellow of Lady Margaret Hall at the University of Oxford.

The recipient of a long list of honorary degrees from universities around the world, in 2003 she was appointed the first Kluge Chair in Countries and Cultures of the South at the John W. Kluge Center at the Library of Congress. The center was set up to bring together "the world's best thinkers." In 2008 she was awarded the John W. Kluge Prize in the Human Sciences, an award given for lifetime achievement "in the study of humanity."

Thapar is the author of more than 20 books, a number of which have become classics and have remained on the required reading list for undergraduate and graduate students for several decades, and dozens of articles.

Some 50 years after it was originally published in 1961 by Oxford University Press at the Clarendon Press, *Ashoka and the Decline of the Mauryas* remains the single most consulted volume on the súbject, has been continually in print, and is considered required reading on the topic. Generations of students have studied and cherished the volume. In 1999 Oxford University Press reissued the study, for which Thapar offered a new afterword, bibliography, and index.

Her original research on ancient India was incorporated into the first volume of the Penguin history of India, *A History of India I* (1966), a general survey of the history of India from the earliest times to the 1300s. Continually in print and distributed worldwide by Penguin Books, it is widely used as a textbook for undergraduate Indian history classes in India and in the West. She revised this book as *The Penguin History of Early India: From the Origins to 1300* (London: Penguin, 2003). For many people it is the standard guide on ancient India.

Her other renowned studies include *Ancient Indian Social History: Some Interpretations* (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1978); *Interpreting Early India* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); *Śakuntalā Texts, Readings, Histories* (New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1999); *Cultural Pasts: Essays in Early Indian History* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000); *India: Another Millennium?* (New Delhi: Viking, 2000); *Early India: From the Origins to A.D. 1300* (London: Allen Lane, 2002); *Somanatha, the Many Voices of a History* (New Delhi: Viking, 2004); and *The Aryan: Recasting Constructs* (Gurgaon: Three Essays Collective, 2008).

Thapar has performed a long list of services to her profession and was elected president of the Indian History Congress in 1983 and appointed a corresponding fellow of the British Academy in 1999. She became the chancellor of the University of Hyderabad in 1999. She was also a member of the textbook committee of the Indian Council for Historical Research and she has made many contributions to school textbooks.

She has taken a number of controversial stands with regard to a number of issues, such as on the Aryan invasion-migration theory, the sack of Somanath, and the Hindu epics. She declined to accept the Padma Bhushan award given by the government of India in 1992 and then in 2005 on the grounds that she only accepted awards given by academic institutions or by those connected with her professional work. Her decision, however, was not universally well received. She had earlier been criticized for her statements with regard to Babri Masjid, and M. F. Hussain, a controversial painter of India. She also raised controversy in the United States when she joined the California Hindu textbook controversy by signing a petition opposing the revisions proposed by the Indian community of California in 2006.

LAVANYA VEMSANI

See also Secularism

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✦ THEATER

A high risk of oversimplification underlies any attempt to survey Indian theater, primarily because it exists in so many languages. The Indian Constitution at present names 22 official languages, while the Sahitya Akademi (India's national academy of letters) recognizes 24, which in itself proves the impossibility of differentiating between greater and lesser linguistic traditions. All these languages, each with millions of speakers, as well as many others and the hundreds of dialects, possess distinctive histories of theater, some of them several centuries old. Thus, to discuss "Indian" theater is like discussing the theater of Western Europe, which has about as many languages, and which no self-respecting scholar today would undertake because of the variety of literatures involved. Neither can any Indian critic claim to know all the major Indian languages, so how can he justify writing about them? The Indian situation gets further complicated by low literacy, as a result of which folk theaters often do not even use written texts, so the researcher cannot depend on standard methods of literary analysis.

As in other Indian activities, the ancient, medieval, and modern coexist in theater, too. Interested visitors can experience three broad performance traditions: the classical Sanskrit, albeit rare, dating back at least a millennium; the multifarious folk forms, most of which originated several hundred years ago, in the Middle Ages; and the urban drama, a product of the 19th century when colonial models influenced regional literatures. Understandably, Western viewers are more intrigued by the classical and folk theaters, attracted by their exotic otherness, whereas educated Indians tend to concentrate attention on their modern city drama, associating it with secular and social progress. An objective picture of Indian theater, however, must take all varieties into account, especially given the fact that most Indians still live outside urban culture.

In certain Hindu temples in the southern state of Kerala, two ancient forms of Sanskrit theater survive. Some historians believe that Kutiyattam can boast of an unbroken continuity of 2,000 years; if true, it is possibly the world's oldest extant theatrical tradition. Typically, it performs specific scenes from classical plays, especially those by the oldest known Indian dramatist, Bhasa, in a mix of Sanskrit, Prakrit (the local vernacular when Sanskrit was spoken by the elite), and old Malayalam (Kerala's regional language). Staged in purpose-built heritage playhouses called *kuttampalam* within the temple precincts, it features stylized acting with *mudras* (codified hand and facial signs and gestures), adhering to performance manuals carefully preserved and handed down over the centuries.

Similarly devotional in nature and using written scripts, Krishnattam is an even rarer form now seen only at the Guruvayur Temple in Kerala. It may have evolved out of a predecessor

400 years ago, dedicated to the worship of Krishna. Visible similarities with the elaborate costumes and makeup of Kathakali dance-drama suggest that it could have had a hand in the latter's creation, but it certainly looks more graceful and refined in comparison, without Kathakali's greater physical vigor and sound. Its stories, delivered in Sanskrit, come from Krishna mythology.

In villages across the country, many folk theaters continue to flourish—and some languish—in the local dialects. These examples of the oral tradition normally have connections with religious festivities but sometimes, though notionally presented as an offering to the community deity, they incorporate a more democratic outlook, including topical allusions and even political satire. Increasingly, however, this vast section of Indian performance has lost audiences to commercial cinema and come under threat of eventual extinction on account of television's outreach to all corners of the nation. Probably the most endangered are the various puppeteering and shadow-theater forms, facing unbeatable competition from the technological world of lights and shadows. It would be a sad day, indeed, if in the foreseeable future the beautiful shadow puppetry of the southern coasts, the progenitors of their world-famous Indonesian descendants, should have to extinguish their lamps for good due to financial nonviability.

Nevertheless, every state and language has at least one rural genre that remains hugely popular to this day: Bandi Pethir, the Kashmiri slapstick farce; the Naqqal and Swang female impersonators in Punjabi; the annual Ramlila cycle in Hindi, worshipping Rama; the enchantingly musical Nautanki, in Urdu (or Hindustani); the populist Jatra in Bengali and its namesake in Oriya; the classicist Ankiya Nat in Assamese; the lyrical Ras Lila of Manipuri, dedicated to Krishna; collective Kuchipudi dance-drama in Telugu; the acrobatic Terukkuttu in Tamil; Kathakali in Malayalam, now internationally renowned; the spectacular gods and demons of Yakshagana in Kannada; the raucous Tamasha in Marathi; and the satirical Bhavai in Gujarati. All of them, partly because of their open-air locations, but also because realism was only a recent British import, employ loud and declamatory acting, substantial song and dance, colorful costumes, and negligible sets and properties.

Rejecting what they considered their backward and superstitious folk inheritance, English-educated and sophisticated Indians began to write plays imitating Western precepts in the 19th century. Realistic, reformist, socialistic, and protest drama emerged, trends that developed down to present times, regardless of language. As a result of their head start in colonial cultural relations with the British, the cities of Calcutta (now Kolkata) and Bombay (Mumbai) show the most cosmopolitan theater history, followed by New Delhi, the capital of independent India.

As the preindependence professional companies declined, film having seduced their clientele away and full-time theater no longer commercially tenable, strictly amateur groups committed to "serious" theater took over. The groups' members work in daytime careers or freelance on-screen (though, ironically, television viewing has eaten into theatergoing) and in advertising spots but rehearse in the evenings after office hours. Typically, the director



Arya Babbar, second right, portrays an Indian Army soldier in the play *Operation Cloudburst* **directed by his mother Nadira Babbar, wife of Bollywood actor Raj Babbar in Gauhati, August 5, 2005. The play is based on the conflict in Assam. Indian theater has a long and vibrant tradition. (AP Photo/Anupam Nath)**

heads the troupe, frequently acting the lead, unlike in the West. Although the central and state governments provide some subsidies nowadays, the limited budgets available mean that less money gets earmarked for sets, lights, costumes, and sound. Groups usually do not own auditoriums; they book halls in advance and, if successful, tour on invitation.

A zonal overview of urban theater can begin with Bengal, whose capital, Kolkata, has around 200 active groups, the largest number in India. They owe intellectual allegiance to two iconic directors of the 1960s: the poetical Sombhu Mitra, who established the pioneering contribution of Rabindranath Tagore to modern Indian theater; and the political Utpal Dutt, author of witty revolutionary drama. The playwright-director Badal Sircar inspired many across India, as he rejected the proscenium to experiment with flexible studio space, then street theater and performances in villages, innovating a socially conscious "Third Theater" that discarded stage technology and ticket revenue—he passes around a cloth for voluntary donations afterward. Left-wing Brechtian influence remains strong, but many seniors (dramatists Manoj Mitra and Mohit Chattopadhyaya, directors Rudraprasad Sengupta, Bibhash Chakraborty, Ashok Mukhopadhyay, and Arun Mukherjee) question partisan ideology now, a movement much more noticeable among younger directors like Suman Mukhopadhyay, Kaushik Sen, and Bratya Basu. Several women directors focus on gender issues, while children's theater has a growing following.

To the east, Manipuri theater won attention in the 1980s for aesthetically synthesizing folk heritage, tribal ritual, and contemporary stagecraft under Heisnam Kanhailal, Lokendra Arambam, and Ratan Thiyam but is now caught up in the vortex of insurgent violence and debates on the demerits of both politicization and exoticization. Arun Sarma is the main dramatist of neighboring Assam, which boasts a robust traveling "mobile theater" business and increasing interest in neglected folklore, for example of the Bodo and Karbi ethnic groups. In Orissa, commercial "opera" companies still rule the roost, while the foremost author, Manoranjan Das, has moved from concerns of alienation and man's self-destructive nature, regarded as too remote by some critics, to folk roots.

In the southern region, political theater has many different colors. Tamil drama ranges from the Dravidian chauvinism of C. N. Annadurai and M. Karunanidhi to Cho Ramaswamy's unsparing sarcasm and Komal Swaminathan's Marxism. Indira Parthasarathy, the most respected current playwright, is partial to Tamil literary and philosophical history. Among groups, Koothu-p-pattarai formed a pioneering repertory offering traditional physical training, while newer ones promote Dalit (underprivileged castes) and female empowerment. Malayalam theater shifted from the explicitly Communist works of Thoppil Bhasi in the 1950s, to the anti-illusionistic and symbolist drama of C. N. Srikanthan Nair and G. Sankara Pillai, and then to K. N. Panikkar's self-directed plays based on Kerala's innumerable indigenous performing arts.

Telugu theater, in Andhra Pradesh, also saw a phase of realistic protest drama under actor-director Acharya Atreya, while the Praja Natya Mandali combine continues to present rousing leftist folk-based rural and street theater attacking exploitation. Kannada theater, in adjoining Karnataka, shot to fame nationally in the 1970s with the unabashed theatricality of director B. V. Karanth and the complex plays of actor Girish Karnad, folklorist Chandrasekhar Kambar and the angry absurdist P. Lankesh, ably succeeded now by the younger H. S. Shiva Prakash. The rural institute Ninasam and Bangalore's Rangayana run dynamic repertory companies.

Up north, Hindi provides the greatest variety of theater, its linguistic umbrella covering a family of related dialects in half a dozen states, as well as the sister language of Urdu or Hindustani. Habib Tanvir was its chief figurehead, a director, writer, actor, and composer of Brechtian folk parables, at home whether in refined Urdu or rustic Chhattisgarhi. Ebrahim Alkazi, architect of the National School of Drama (NSD) in Delhi, made that city the nucleus of Hindi theater today. But because of Hindi's status as national language, Hindi theater is almost as advanced in such metropolises as Mumbai and Kolkata. Mohan Rakesh trailblazed contemporary Hindi drama in the 1960s, on malfunctioning human communication, but nowadays wide experimentation in form, design, and locale takes place, notably by women directors and scriptwriters such as Amal Allana, Kirti Jain, and Anuradha Kapur, all associated with NSD and its repertory.

Farther north, Punjabi theater has earned attention through the directors Neelam Man Singh Chowdhry, who tours her sensuous productions with Naqqals internationally, and Gursharan Singh, who persevered in taking street theater for social change to peasants in the

face of Sikh separatism. Punjabi drama stretches from Balwant Gargi's Marxist-cum-Freudian takes on passion to C. D. Sidhu's more native sources. Kashmiri theater had faded away in the 1980s under threats from militants, who burned down the venerable Tagore Hall in Srinagar, and artists fled. Fortunately, a revival of folk performances has occurred since 2001, and the efforts of director M. K. Raina to reintroduce theater to Srinagar have borne fruit.

Activities in the west center on Mumbai, which has theater in Marathi, Gujarati, Hindi, and English. The reigning trio of Marathi dramatists included the controversial Vijay Tendulkar, with varied political and psychological themes; Mahesh Elkunchwar, a specialist in charged domestic atmospheres; and Satish Alekar, fond of metatheater. Performance gained considerably from the perfectionism of Vijaya Mehta as director and the naturalism of Shreeram Lagoo as actor. A popular mainstream industry thrives, but so do the groups, with Awishkar in the vanguard. Recently, an influx of talent from interior Maharashtra has resulted in great variety, the younger generation too numerous to name here. The much-derided Gujarati commercial theater in Mumbai produced some interesting plays on Mahatma Gandhi, while Gujarat itself hosts most of the amateur groups in that language, among whom Garage Studio in Ahmadabad has made a name in developmental theater. Madhu Rye is respected as an important dramatist.

English theater in Mumbai has achieved a high standard of technical slickness since the 1980s, though its mixed-lingo "Hinglish" sex farces simply play to the gallery. However, Indians based all over the country have written excellent English drama, from Asif Currimbhoy's topical subjects and Girish Karnad's self-translations (initially staged by the Madras Players) to Mahesh Dattani's family relationships (his winning of the Sahitya Akademi Award in 1994 granted official acceptance to Indian-English drama) and Manjula Padmanabhan's provocative activism. Prime Time Theater, jointly operated from Mumbai and Delhi, has built a reputation for serious content in English theater.

A paucity of theater education affects India today—with only a dozen theater departments in its 250 universities and the NSD the single recognized conservatory (which unfortunately requires fluency in Hindi). A few university theaters, like the Thrissur School of Drama (Kerala), Andhra University and Aurangabad University (Maharashtra), have impacted their states positively, demonstrating the need for more such interventions for the future health of the art.

ANANDA LAL

See also Literature

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✦ THEOSOPHICAL SOCIETY

The Theosophical Society is an organization dedicated to the investigation of spiritual phenomena. It was founded in 1875 in New York by Madame Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (1831–1891) and Henry Steel Olcott (1832–1907). The term "theosophy" means divine wisdom, and its roots can be traced back to neo-Platonist and gnostic traditions in the thought of the fourth-century philosopher Porphyry. Theosophy represents a revival of the *philosophia perennis* ("perennial philosophy"), a belief that everything was derived from an eternal, unitary principle that was essentially spiritual. This principle was manifested most dramatically by individual enlightened beings.

Olcott was an American army colonel who fought in the American Civil War and worked on a commission investigating the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln (1809–1865; president 1861–1865). As a young man, Olcott became interested in spiritualism and investigated psychic phenomena and wrote about his findings. While working as a journalist, he met Blavatsky, a Russian émigré and spiritualist in a farmhouse located in Vermont where he was investigating some supernatural events. He became the first president of the Theosophical Society.

Arriving in America in 1873 after a divorce, Blavatsky published esoteric works: *Isis Unveiled* (1877), a work concerned with the occult, and *The Secret Doctrine* (1888), a work that presented a vision of the universe evolving from its original spiritual form to its present material status. The spiritual evolution included souls that were identical to the universal soul and were reborn depending on their karmic condition. This book rested on three major principles: existence of one absolute reality, the appearance and disappearance of cycles of the universe, and the identity of all souls with the single universal soul. Referring to her work as "Esoteric Buddhism," she also published *The Voice of Silence* (1889) that was alleged to have been originally written in an ancient language which has never been identified. She claimed to have studied with spiritual masters in Tibet and that she could communicate with these masters telepathically during her life.

Olcott and Blavatsky traveled together to India where they established a headquarters in 1879 on the outskirts of the city of Madras, and they also went to Sri Lanka and other Asian countries. While in Sri Lanka, Olcott immersed himself in Buddhism before becoming a promoter of the religion during the era of Western colonialism, and he defended the island's Buddhists from Christian missionaries. Because he was appalled by the Sinhalese ignorance

of their own religion, Olcott's efforts on behalf of Buddhism culminated with his creation of a Buddhist catechism consisting of 14 principles, a work that went through many editions, printings, and languages and was used in many Buddhist countries for the purpose of instruction.

Even though Olcott was a strong advocate for Buddhism, the major principles of the society consisted of an attempt to synthesize Buddhist and Hindu notions in a quest for core beliefs that govern all religions. Olcott and Blavatsky accept the doctrine of karma and rebirth, the existence of astral bodies, and other types of spiritual ideas. They also became involved with the Ārya Samāj, a Hindu reform movement founded in 1875, although they never merged into a single entity. The society was also involved with the Indian National Congress, a political party founded in 1885 that played a major role in the drive for independence.

A couple of additional important figures were Annie Besant (1847–1933) and C. W. Leadbetter (1854–1934). Besant led the Adyar theosophists in India, adopted the cause of Indian nationalism, and played an instrumental role in establishing Central Hindu College in 1898, which later, in 1916, became Benaras Hindu University. Leadbetter, an Englishman born in 1854, became a convert to Buddhism and was considered a gifted clairvoyant, but he fell from grace when it was discovered that he was a pedophile. His forced resignation and later readmittance led to a schism in the organization. Leadbetter discovered Jiddu Krishnamurti (1895–1986), a young boy and son of an associate of the movement, and he was proclaimed to be the next World Teacher, which was equivalent to acclaiming him a messiah. This eventually led to the creation of the Order of the Star, an organization created to promote this new messiah. Krishnamurti later, in 1929, dissolved the Order of the Star and resigned from the Theosophical Society and began a long lecturing and writing career based from his adopted home in Ojai, California.

CARL OLSON

See also Hinduism; Religion

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✦ TIBETAN DIASPORA

Tibet, the "Shangrila" of Western imagination, caught the world's attention in 1959, the year etched as the turning point in the history of Tibet: it witnessed the military invasion of Tibet by the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the consequent flight of the 14th

Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso (b. 1935), and approximately 80,000 Tibetans to northern India. According to the exiled Tibetan government's report, the worldwide distribution of the Tibetan diaspora approximates 145,150 people, of which 119,438 reside in India, Nepal, and Bhutan. A small percentage are scattered in Australia, the Far East, Great Britain, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden with the largest concentration being in Switzerland. In the last 14 years, with the support of the U.S. government, more and more Tibetans have been immigrating to the United States.

In India, Tibetans found a great deal of sympathy. Under the leadership of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan exile administration was first established in the hill station of Mussoorie in Uttarakhand. In 1960, Dharamsala was chosen as the seat of office of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA). The central task of the CTA was the rehabilitation and restoration of the dignity and freedom of Tibetan refugees. Notwithstanding the lack of legal standing, a legislative body known as the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies (ATPD) was established. In 2006, the ATPD was renamed the Tibetan Parliament-in-exile. Of the total 46 members, 43 are elected every five years as representatives of the three provinces of Tibet, the religious sects, and the Tibetans of Europe and North America. The remaining three are nominated by the Dalai Lama. In efforts to further democratize the process, the members of Parliament were empowered to elect members of the Kashag (the Council of Ministers), which is the executive branch of the administration. A constitution, known as the Charter of Tibetans in Exile, and the Tibetan Supreme Justice Commission were also instituted. In 2001, amendments to the charter provided for the direct election of the *kalon tripa* (the highest executive authority) by members of the exile community worldwide. The *kalon tripa* in turn nominates the other *kalons* (cabinet members). Samdhong Rinpoche ("Precious One") Lobsang Tenzin (b. 1939) became the first directly elected *kalon tripa* on September 5, 2001.

The portfolios under the Kashag are the Departments of Religion and Culture, Home, Education, Finance, Security, Information, International Relations, and Health. International offices of the government-in-exile have been set up in New Delhi, Kathmandu, London, Geneva, New York, Moscow, Brussels, Canberra, Tokyo, Pretoria, and Taipei.

From its inception the government-in-exile, with the support of the Indian government, has given the greatest importance to the education of Tibetan refugee children. The Department of Education currently oversees the education of approximately 28,000 students in 83 Tibetan schools in India, Nepal, and Bhutan. The Tibetan Children's Village in Dharamsala and the Tibetan Homes Foundation in Mussoorie are two autonomous bodies under the Department of Education that, with financial aid from foreign organizations, have developed into recognized and reputable schools playing a vital role in the education of Tibetan children.

In the initial years of exile, everything in India was alien for the Tibetan refugees: the people, air, water, heat of the plains, mosquitoes, food, and, of course, the language. Under the aegis of the government of India, the refugees were settled in remote, uninhabited lands. Many were employed in the construction of roads. Many of them died due to the severe heat and hardship. But they persevered. Through trials and tribulations, they learned not only to live

but to adapt successfully to their new environment. However, despite their success, the Tibetan refugees in India are essentially stateless people who hold Indian registration certificates.

Critical to the understanding of the Tibetan diaspora is the influence of China on Tibet. To comprehend the nature of the Tibetan diaspora it is important to scrutinize the world of Tibetan society and civilization inside Tibet today. Because Chinese rule continues to transform Tibet in profound ways, Tibetan life, directly and indirectly, influences Tibetans living in India and elsewhere.

At the center of Tibet and Tibetans stands the Dalai Lama. Revered as the "Boddhisattva of Compassion" and the reincarnation of the 13th Dalai Lama, the current 14th Dalai Lama's legitimacy comes from the faith of his people. His unique position allows him to be the religious and temporal authority of his people. He engenders awe and devotion. In exile he also inspires national will and a sense of mission in his people.

Although the Tibetan diaspora is scattered all over the world, the engine of change in Tibetan identity, outside of Tibet, is driven by the Tibetan community living in India. Occupation and exile created a new consciousness. It created opportunities for Tibetans to recognize their true identity. The Dalai Lama's efforts in 1988 to draw international attention to the Tibetan crisis by addressing the European Parliament in Strasbourg, and his Five-Point Peace Plan for Tibet, was rejected by the PRC, which called his efforts a "disguised form of independence." Since then the Dalai Lama has invalidated the Strasbourg Proposal as the basis for finding a peaceful resolution to the Tibetan crisis. Since 1992, he has constantly reiterated his position of "no independence" in return for "genuine autonomy." But, despite this conciliatory position and despite giving up the quest for independence, China's unwillingness to engage in any direct talk with the Dalai Lama has only served to fuel Tibetan frustrations inside Tibet and in the diaspora. From protest figures fighting against an "unjust" rule, Tibetans have more recently been elevated to the role of human rights victims, endowed with political agency, and tenaciously challenging the PRC.

YOSAY WANGDI

See also Dalai Lama, 14th

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✦ *TIMES OF INDIA, THE*

The *Times of India* is the largest circulating English-language daily newspaper in India. It retains the name of its British publisher and printer, Bennett, Coleman & Co., on its masthead, even though the company passed into Indian hands in 1946. It was first owned by the industrialist Ramkrishna Dalmia (1893–1978) and subsequently by the Sahu Jain industrial family, with the current chairman, publisher, and director all members of the Jain family. In 2008, the newspaper claimed a circulation of 3.1 million, making it also the world's largest-selling newspaper in English and placing it in the top 10 largest-selling newspapers in any language in the world. According to the Indian Readership Survey (2008), it has a readership of 13.3 million.

The *Times of India* began life as a biweekly, the *Bombay Times and Journal of Commerce,* in Bombay (Mumbai) in 1838 and was renamed to its present title in 1861. It built up a steady circulation in Britain and Europe as well as in the Indian subcontinent, becoming a daily in 1850. It was an Anglo-Indian newspaper, British owned and edited, and its last British editor, Ivor S. Jehu (1908–1960), resigned only in 1950. It soon developed a reputation as the premier national newspaper in India and was praised



A reader of *The Times of India* outside his home in Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, October 2010. *The Times of India*, founded in Mumbai in 1838 as a semi-weekly newspaper, is now, with a daily circulation of over three million, the world's largest English-language newspaper across all formats (broadsheet, tabloid, compact, Berliner and online). It is part of the world's biggest, most thriving, and most dynamic newspaper industry. (Deshakalyan Chowdhury/AFP/Getty Images)

as such by successive British colonial governments. Though conservatively run, it reserved its journalistic right to be critical of official policies and successfully managed to retain its editorial independence. It developed overseas editions and its editors covered the subcontinent on behalf of the *Times* of London. The heyday of the paper began when T. J. Bennett (1852–1925) became sole proprietor in 1894 and along with a master printer, F. M. Coleman, whom he brought from England, he set the paper on the road to commercial and journalistic success. He expanded the premises, introduced modern technology, and imported experienced British journalists to write for the paper. Though he returned to England in the early 20th century and became a Conservative member of Parliament where he represented the Sevenoaks Division of Kent from 1918 until 1923, he continued to write for the paper and was alive to the political and economic problems of India and supported Indian demands for eventual self-government. The *Times of India* was among the first British newspapers to employ Indian subeditors on its staff starting in the early 1920s.

The paper has tried to retain some of the same spirit of independence and today may be said to uphold a centrist political stance. It was a profitable concern under British rule and though after independence it continued to be successful, it faced increasing competition from other newspapers, newsmagazines, and different news media. In response, from the 1990s, an aggressive management strategy was introduced that transformed the look of the newspaper as well as its content and coverage, with it now being marketed as a mass-distributed consumer product. It also initiated newspaper price wars with an ever-decreasing cover price. Overall, such measures have had their intended effect on depressing competition and raising sales, making the *Times of India* arguably the most profitable newspaper in the country. However, there is concern in some quarters at the potential impact of this commercialization on its editorial and journalistic quality. The newspaper is now printed from more than 20 different centers, including Ahmedabad, Bhopal, Chandigarh, Chennai, Delhi, Goa, Hyderabad, Kanpur, Kolkata, Lucknow, Patna, Pune, Ranchi, Mumbai, and Nagpur. In keeping with the trend of daily journalism in India, the newspaper comes with several supplements on specific days of the week; for instance, the *Times Wellness* is issued on Saturdays and *Times Life* on Sundays. In addition, each of the city editions has city specific supplements, for example, there is the *Bombay Times, Delhi Times, Kanpur Times,* and *Chennai Times.* The newspaper itself is part of a vast media empire owned by the Times Group, which also includes in its stable the *Economic Times* and the *Mumbai Mirror,* as well as the *Navabharat Times* and the *Maharashtra Times,* and daily newspapers in Hindi and Marathi.

CHANDRIKA KAUL

See also Media and Telecommunications

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✦ TOURISM

Since the end of the Cold War and with the country's increasing focus on development and integration into the global economy, India has come to understand that tourism has the potential to contribute enormously to economic growth and the accumulation of foreign exchange. Traditionally, India has been a destination for culture and heritage; the iconic Taj Mahal represents one of the Seven Wonders of the World. The country's tourism landscape is adorned with palaces, temples, the Himalayan mountain trails, and much, much more in a land of more than 1.1 billion people of different ethnic backgrounds and home to more than 415 different languages.

The government agency concerned with the policy, regulation, and development of tourism is the Ministry of Tourism headed by a union minister. Each state, however, is given considerable autonomy in marketing its heritage either independently or jointly with the Ministry of Tourism. Other key organizations forming national policies and participating privately are the India Tourism Development Corporation Limited, the Indian Institute of Tourism and Travel Management, the Indian Institute of Skiing and Mountaineering, the National Council for Hotel Management and Catering Technology, and the National Institute of Water Sports.

In 2002, the National Tourism Policy was introduced with the primary aim for tourism to be an engine for economic growth and to act as a multiplier effect and deliver employment opportunities and alleviate poverty. One of the benefits of promoting India as a tourist destination is the rapid development of infrastructure projects such as airports, roads, and first-class hotel accommodations. In the five-year plan from 2007 to 2012, India is building more than 4,000 miles of national highways every year with a budget of $78.54 billion and 10 new airports, with an upgrade of 39 existing ports at the cost of $7.7 billion. This infrastructure construction and expansion bodes well for tourism destinations that are rapidly increasing the number of visitors.

The Indian hospitality industry is also greatly improving facilities with both midrange and high-end accommodations springing up in Kolkata, New Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore, and Chennai. International hotel brands such as the Sheraton, Marriott, Hilton, and Hyatt, to name just a few, have increasingly established themselves in major Indian cities as they see vast potential in the Indian tourism industry. Three major domestic chains, the Taj Hotels,

the Oberoi Hotels, and the Leela Hotels, have also expanded their presence over the years within India. The first two have also established a number of fine hotels overseas. People with land and property and in a position to exploit the opportunities in the tourism business have also invested heavily to transform their palaces, farms, and buildings into accommodations and visitor sites. A famous example of this is the renowned former palace, Taj Lake Palace Udaipur, managed by the Taj Hotels group.

Despite being at a nascent stage, Indian medical tourism is expected to grow dramatically, with an expected 1.2 million visitors, and contribute $2.4 billion gross domestic product (GDP) by 2012. The advantages India possesses in this area include low-cost labor and the availability of a wide range of medical treatments, including options to be treated by traditional medical practitioners. One other development in the tourism industry is the development of facilities and the availability of specialists in yoga and ayurvedic medicine. They are promoted in many cities as well as in suburban settings. One of the states at the forefront of ayurvedic spa treatment and tourism promotion is the state of Kerala, which has been on an aggressive drive to promote a range of experiences from ayurveda and Kathakali dance to stays at beach and backwater resorts along one of its famous beaches, canals, lakes, lagoons, or estuaries.

In the promotion of tourism, India's film industry, known as Bollywood, is another key player influencing both outward and inbound markets. More and more films are



Tourists watch domesticated temple elephants that will be used in a procession during the Trichur Pooram Festival in Trichur, about 47 miles from Cochin, Kerala. International visitors and India's growing middle class have created a vast and expanding tourist industry. (AP Photo)

shot with overseas settings and this has in some ways given a stimulus for Indians to explore the world. Indeed, many countries, particularly Singapore, the United States, and European countries have benefited from such productions. Bollywood films are also widely watched in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Pakistan (and also in the diasporic market). Such cultural exports also anchor the admiration for all things Indian both in culture and destination. One recent movie, *Slumdog Millionaire*, has increased India's standing as a destination for international visitors, and there is growing evidence of a new type of tourism: slum tourism.

The 2010 promotion of India as a tourist destination was done with an overarching theme titled "Incredible India." This theme promoted the rich and diverse attractions available in the country. In 2008, the top five countries sending tourists to India, contributing almost 50 percent of the tourists, were the United States, Great Britain, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Canada. Popular destinations for visitors are the capital city New Delhi and the states of Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and Rajasthan. The number of tourists has steadily increased over the decades to about 4.3 million travelers. In 2008, the tourism industry brought in $100 billion, and that figure is expected to more than double to $275 billion by 2018.

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See also Medical Tourism

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Tourism, Medical. *See* Medical Tourism

Tribes, Scheduled. *See* Scheduled Tribes

Tripura. *See* Northeastern States

U



Union Territories. *See* Territories

✦ UNITED NATIONS, RELATIONS WITH

As a founder member of the United Nations (UN), India has been a firm supporter of the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. It has made significant contributions to the furtherance and implementation of the aims of the organization and to the evolution and functioning of its various specialized programs. It stood at the forefront during the UN's tumultuous years of struggle against colonialism and apartheid, its struggle toward global disarmament and ending the arms race, and toward the creation of a more equitable international economic order. At the very first session of the UN, India raised its voice against colonialism and apartheid, two issues that have been among the most significant of the UN's successes in the last half century. India exulted in the UN's triumph and saw in the UN's victory a vindication of the policy relentlessly pursued by it from its initial days at the world forum. On October 25, 1946, the head of the Indian delegation to the UN, Vijayalakshmi Pandit (1900–1990), younger sister of the Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964) made her maiden speech to the UN in which she pledged the support of the government and people of India of its firm commitment to the principles of peace and justice as enshrined in the UN Charter.

India, in fact, reflecting the interests of Nehru in internationalism, has been a founder member of most international organizations, especially of the UN and its specialized

agencies. Consequently, support to and strengthening of the world organization is an important element of India's foreign policy. The principal purpose of India's foreign policy vis-à-vis the UN is to pursue three closely related goals: a significant role in the shaping of international relations in the 21st century, a movement toward a nonviolent and humane international system, and the promotion of conditions for a sustainable and relatively equitable pattern of international development.

Roughly four closely interlinked phases are identifiable in India's association with the UN since World War II. The first phase covers the years up to the late 1940s and includes the last days of the British Raj when India was a participant in the UN Conference on International Organization held in San Francisco between April 25, 1945 and June 26, 1945. The conference resulted in the creation of the United Nations Charter and was readied for signature on the last day of the conference. As a consequence, India was one of the original members of the UN. The second phase of the relationship between India and the UN concerned crisis situations from Korea, such as during and after the Korean War (1950–1953), and the civil war in the Congo when 39 Indians were killed in the peacekeeping and humanitarian mission between 1961 and 1964, and others have been lost since. As part of the third phase and one of India's early concerns in the United Nations was that all states should be represented in the organizations of the UN so that the UN would truly represent a diversity of opinion and serve as a viable instrument for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. In the fourth phase, India plays a consistent and energetic role in the arenas of arms control and disarmament.

India has taken active part in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) on four continents. Its most significant contribution has been to maintain peace and stability in Africa and Asia. It has demonstrated its capacity to commit large numbers of troops over prolonged periods of time under very challenging circumstances, and India is the second-largest contributor of troops to the UN. India provided a paramedical unit to facilitate the withdrawal of the sick and the wounded in Korea during 1950–1953 and after the cease-fire of 1953, India was appointed the chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. One brigade of the Indian Army participated in the operation in Korea that was authorized by the UN General Assembly through the Uniting for Peace resolution, Resolution 377 (V) of November 3, 1950, by providing guards for the prisoners of war of all the belligerent countries.

India also contributed to maintenance and promotion of peace in the Middle East. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was created in 1956 following cessation of hostilities between Egypt and Israel. India provided an infantry battalion, which accounted for the bulk of the UN force. From 1956 to 1967, more than 12,000 Indian troops took part in UNEF. In the UN operation in Namibia in 1967, Indian military observers were responsible for the smooth withdrawal of foreign troops, the peaceful holding of general elections in November 1989, and the subsequent handing over of authority to the local government when Namibia became independent on March 21, 1990. When the UN took steps to restore peace after the civil war and to conduct elections in Mozambique in its United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) between December 1992 and

December 1994, India provided a large contingent of staff officers, military observers, and an independent headquarters company, as well as engineers and a logistics company. One of the biggest UN peacekeeping operations was in war-ravaged Cambodia. In February 1992 the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of an operation, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which would, inter alia, supervise the cease-fire between Cambodia and Vietnam and the withdrawal of foreign troops, control and supervise the administrative structure of the country, and organize and conduct free and fair elections. During the UNTAC operation India provided an infantry battalion, military observers, and a field ambulance unit. India has also regularly sent military observers to various other UN operations including operations in El Salvador in 1991 and in Liberia in 1994. India provided a contingent comprising one infantry battalion and support elements to the UN assistance mission in Rwanda after the UN approved the UN assistance mission to Rwanda on October 5, 1993. It helped to ensure security for refugees and to create conditions for free and fair elections. Also in Africa, the Indian Army has been participating in the successive phases of the UN mission in Angola since 1989. The Indian contingent comprised one infantry battalion group, one engineering unit, staff officers, and military observers. In view of its experience in de-mining, India has, at the urging of the United Nations, made significant contributions to clearing mines in various missions in Rwanda, Mozambique, Somalia, Angola, and Cambodia.

India has been a strong supporter of the UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were devised in September 2000 at the UN Millennium Summit held at the UN Headquarters in New York. The MDGs are eight goals targeted to be achieved by 2015 in response to the world's basic development challenges. The MDGs were adopted by 189 nations and signed by 147 heads of state and governments. The eight MDGs break down into 21 quantifiable targets that are measured by 60 indicators.

Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality
Goal 5: Improve maternal health
Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability
Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development

The MDGs synthesize, in a single package, many of the most important commitments made separately at various international conferences and summits of the 1990s; recognize explicitly the interdependence between inclusive growth, poverty reduction, and sustainable development; acknowledge that development rests on the solid foundations of democratic governance, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and maintenance of peace

and security; are based on time-bound and measurable targets accompanied by specific indicators for monitoring progress; and bring together, in the eighth goal, the responsibilities of developing countries with those of developed countries, founded on a global partnership endorsed at the International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, in March 2002 and again at the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development in August 2002.

In addition to its other UN activities, India is one of the largest contributors to the core resources of the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA) and the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF). India is also a major contributor to the core resources of the World Food Program and its contribution to these funds is higher than that of many of the 30 countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, which was founded in 1961.

India has contributed $100,000 to the UNCTAD Trust Fund for the least developed countries. It has also been contributing $50,000 per annum to the ITC Global Trust Fund since its inception in 1996. It also makes substantial voluntary contributions to a number of other UN organizations such as UNEP, Habitat, the UN Drug Control Program, UNRWA, UNIFEM, and UN Volunteers.

India took an active part in the drafting of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948 when Dr. Hansa Mehta (1897–1995), a Gandhian political activist and social worker who led the Indian delegation, made important contributions, especially in highlighting the need for reflecting gender equality. India is fully committed to the rights proclaimed in the declaration and is a signatory to the six core human rights covenants and also the two Optional Protocols of May 2000 to the Convention of the Rights of the Child signed in New York in 1989.

India has been advocating a holistic and integrated approach that gives equal emphasis to all human rights—based on their interdependence, interrelatedness, indivisibility, and universality—and reinforces the interrelationship between democracy, development, human rights, and international cooperation for development.

India has played an active role as member of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) since its creation in 1947. It was elected in 2006 to be a member of the newly established Human Rights Council (HRC), which replaced the CHR, by securing the highest number of votes among the contested seats. India was reelected in 2007 again by securing the highest number of votes. India attaches great importance to the HRC and is committed to making the council a strong, effective, and efficient body capable of promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

India became the seventh country to ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities after it had participated actively in the deliberations of the ad hoc committee of the UN General Assembly on finalization of the convention in 2009. The enactment in India of the Persons with Disabilities Act (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) in 1995 marked a significant step toward providing equal opportunities

for people with disabilities and its support of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities was an extension of its policy.

India, however, feels disrespected and underappreciated in the UN as it believes it should be a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The rationale behind India's claim for permanent membership of the expanded Security Council is threefold. First, India contributes substantially to the total UN budget and it has made tangible contribution to UN PKOs. Apart from its financial contribution, India has dispatched military personnel to various trouble spots around the globe including the Congo, Korea, Angola, and Bosnia.

Second, when the UN was created in 1945 there were only 51 member states, whereas that number has now quadrupled to 191 states. In order for proper governance and transparent democratic procedures, India feels there should be a greater representational balance. In 1945, 1 member in the Security Council represented about 5 countries, whereas in 2005, 1 member of the Security Council represents 13 countries. In addition, India, along with Japan and Germany, has emerged as one of the world's leading economic powers. Similarly, developing countries such as India and Brazil have carved a niche for themselves by being upper-tier economies achieved through their immense reservoir of manpower and skilled labor.

Third, the end of the Cold War has paved the way for new issues such as international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction to come to the fore. Other causes for concern emanate from nonmilitary threats such as HIV/AIDS, poverty, and environment degradation. The changed geopolitical circumstances demand concerted action in a reformed decision-making body in the form of a widely represented Security Council. India believes an expanded permanent membership would generate vigorous debate ultimately leading to solutions in the spirit of consensus building and ensure what it believes is India's rightful place in the world's most powerful body.

Overall, India has played a very constructive role in the shaping and the evolution of the UN from its inception in 1945 to the present time. It is expected that India will continue to be a significant contributor to UN activities, and India's multifaceted role, as reflected in the UN mission and its objectives, will continue at a high level. In January 2011, for example, India was elected to a two-year term on the Security Council.

MOHAMMED BADRUL ALAM

See also Foreign Policy

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✦ UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH

The United States, the oldest democracy in the world, and India, the largest democracy in the world with 600 million voters, would be expected to have at least friendly relations or be natural allies. However, that was not the case until recently. Relations between India and the United States were ambiguous, fragile, lukewarm, and mutually suspicious during the Cold War. However, the two nations have fostered close diplomatic, economic, and strategic security ties after the Cold War ended in 1991 and especially since September 11, 2001. The image of India as a "basket case" country a generation ago has changed to that of a burgeoning economic giant and a knowledge industry superpower in the making. India is forecasted to emerge among the top five global economies by 2030 and is expected to become one of the most important strategic partners of the United States.

The relations between India and the United States between the 1950s and 1980s were either lukewarm or tense due to Cold War politics. The United States followed the policy of containment—that is, to contain the spread of Communism and the perceived Soviet threat by military, diplomatic, and economic means, especially encircling the Soviet Union with a ring of friendly nations in military alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). It perceived India's independent foreign policy of nonalignment—of reserving the right to side with either bloc in an international crisis based on the merits of each case—as tantamount to alignment with the Soviet Union, especially after 1971, and denounced such policy as "immoral" in an ideologically divided world. Pakistan, which considered India as its number one enemy and a threat to its very existence, joined the American-sponsored alliance system in 1954 and became a major factor in Indo-U.S. relations. Although the United States supported India in the 1962 Sino-Indian War and provided generous food aid in 1966, the relations between the two were tense following the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, in which Pakistan used American arms. The relationship reached an all-time low during and after the Bangladesh crisis of 1971 in which President Richard Nixon (1913–1994; president 1969–1974) adopted the policy of "tilt" toward Pakistan. President Jimmy Carter (b. 1924; president 1977–1981), who took a personal interest in India, visited New Delhi in January 1978, but India's refusal to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty prevented any significant improvement in the relations between two nations. Bilateral relations became tense again in the early 1980s when America resumed military aid to Pakistan in support of anti-Soviet mujahideens who were fighting from Pakistani territory against the 1979 Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.

India's effort to develop its nuclear capability was a major source of tension in its relations with the United States for decades after India conducted its first "peaceful nuclear explosion" in May 1974. The United States responded by enacting legislations to thwart India and Pakistan from acquiring nuclear weapons. India resented the U.S. nonproliferation policy and labeled it as "nuclear apartheid." When India conducted five nuclear tests at Pokharan in May 1998, which were followed by Pakistani nuclear tests, the United States imposed economic sanctions on both nations. However, the thaw in Indo-U.S. relations came about a year later when President Bill Clinton (b. 1946; president 1993–2001) demonstrated America's good faith to India by taking a principled stand on the Kargil War between India and Pakistan in 1999. The Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif (b. 1949; prime minister May–July 1993, 1997–1999) had sought America's help in resolving the conflict and met with Clinton in July 1999. In that meeting Clinton exerted pressure on Nawaz and persuaded him to commit to withdraw all Pakistani forces to their side of the line of control, a politically unpopular decision in Pakistan. Clinton also kept India informed about his stand on this conflict. The United States thereby won India's trust, and it ushered in a new era of cooperation and close relations between the two nations. In March 2000 President Clinton visited India and launched a strategic partnership between the United States and India that culminated in the 2008 nuclear agreement under President George W. Bush (b. 1946; president 2001–2009).

The bilateral civilian nuclear agreement, proposed by President Bush in 2005 and ratified by the Senate in 2008 with the support of Democrats, deepened the trust and cooperation between the two governments. The restriction on nuclear commerce, imposed on India in the 1970s, was thus lifted even though India is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty; India is the only nuclear weapons state granted such exception as a result of the intense lobbying by the Bush administration. The Bush administration sought to help India emerge as a great Asian power to counterbalance the growing power and influence of China. The unprecedented level of cooperation between Washington and New Delhi in many areas, including counterterrorism, defense, and intelligence, continued under the Barak Obama (b. 1961; president 2009–) administration, though there were fears on the part of India that the new administration would downgrade U.S. policy toward India. While there are areas of disagreement between India and the United States such as the Obama administration's anti-outsourcing and limiting of H-1B visas stands, the Obama administration approved the largest military weapons' sale worth $2.1 billion to India—the sale of eight P-8 Poseidons, the most sophisticated antisubmarine aircraft—and, in clear departure from its past policies, India's military has conducted exercises with every branch of the U.S. armed services. President Obama emphasized the enduring bond and continued cooperation between the United States and India, rooted in strong democratic values, at the first state dinner of his presidency at which he honored India's prime minister Manmohan Singh (b. 1932; prime minister 2004–) in November 2009. This was followed by Obama's visit to India in November 2010.

India is an emerging economic power. Propelled by its 1991 liberalization policies, the economy has grown at a fast rate in the first decade of the 21st century (9 percent in 2008);

it is predicted to be among the leading economies of the world by 2020 and the fourth-largest economy by 2050. The United States is India's number one trading partner; their bilateral trade increased almost tenfold between 1988 and 2008, from $4.5 billion to more than $43 billion. With the rapid growth of the Indian middle class, estimated to rise to 650 million in 2025 from 200 million, U.S. companies view India as a lucrative market; the United States has emerged as India's largest investment partner ($9 billion in direct investment). The U.S.-India economic, diplomatic, and military relations are, therefore, likely to deepen based on overlapping interests, shared values, and improved political, economic, and trade relations.

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See also Foreign Policy

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U.S.-Indo Nuclear Deal. *See* Indo-U.S. Nuclear Deal

✦ UTTARAKHAND

Ancient Hindu scriptures refer to the region of Uttarakhand as *Dev Bhoomi* or the "Abode of Gods." The people of Uttarakhand pride themselves on the sanctity of their homeland's high mountains and rivers where many important Hindu pilgrimages take place. On November 9, 2000, the government of India made the region the 27th state in the union but named it Uttaranchal, much to the dismay of the local population. Finally, seven years later in 2007, the people's wishes were granted and Uttaranchal became Uttarakhand. In many ways this seven-year struggle for a place name reflects the various problems faced by the state today.

Uttarakhand is a Sanskrit word meaning the "northern section" but refers specifically to the mountainous regions of Garhwal and Kumaon that form two divisions of the state

of Uttarakhand. It is located in northwestern India with Tibet (China) and Nepal to the north and east, respectively, the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Haryana to the west, and Uttar Pradesh to south. Deciduous and coniferous forests and alpine meadows cover the mountains that make up approximately 93 percent of the 31,767 square miles of state territory fringed by a narrow belt of fertile lowlands. Nanda Devi, Badrinath, Kamet, and Trishul are among the highest peaks in the state, and nestled among these are glaciers such as Gangotri and Yamnotri—sources of the Ganges and Yamuna rivers—that provide sustenance to millions of people living in the north Indian plains. For hundreds of years, these mountains and glaciers have attracted pilgrims from all over India. Haridwar, a city located on the banks of the Ganges where it descends into the plains, is one of four places in India that hosts the three-month-long Kumbh Mela festival celebrated every 12 years by millions of people.

The indigenous people of Uttarakhand call themselves Paharis (hill people) and believe they are culturally distinct from the Maidanis (people of the plains). The folklore of Uttarakhand binds Paharis of Garhwal and Kumaon together, even though they speak different languages and share mutual animosity in their struggle to carve out their own state from India's most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, to which they were arbitrarily assigned after the country's independence from Britain in August 1947. Garhwal and Kumaon had comprised 16 percent of the land area of Uttar Pradesh but accounted for less than 5 percent of its population. For the Paharis the state capital of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, seemed disconnected not only because of its inaccessibility but also because the government could not empathize with the needs of the hill people since representatives were mostly from the plains. This disconnect led to their economic underdevelopment. Neglect by Uttar Pradesh was evident in the lack of transportation infrastructure, electricity, drinking water, and basic health services, as well as employment opportunities in the hills compared to the plains. Forest and water resources were used mainly to benefit people living in the plains.

The Mandal Commission's recommendations in 1994 whereby the government of India declared a 27 percent reservation (affirmative action) for other backward castes triggered a populist movement toward statehood. Although desire for a separate hill state first surfaced in the 1920s and 1930s, it was not until the 1990s that a group of people, mostly students and government workers of the region, actively demanded a separate state. Upper-caste people of the hills, which make up 95 percent of the population, feared they would lose what little they had in terms of government jobs and opportunities for higher education because backward castes from the plains of Uttar Pradesh would gain advantage in these institutions in the hills where backward castes were only 5 percent of the population. Nevertheless, the separatist movement always claimed economic backwardness in the hills and preservation of the environment as being the main reasons behind their demand for statehood.

The latter justification for demanding statehood was not just spin to put the movement into a more noble light. Uttarakhand is known around the world as the place that gave rise to the famous Chipko Movement of the 1970s. It was a spontaneous, nonviolent, grassroots action led by rural women who literally hugged trees to protect them from being cut down by logging companies. Another important environmental action was the Anti-Tehri Dam

Movement led by the octogenarian Sunderlal Bahuguna (b. 1927) that aimed to halt the construction in the Himalayas of one of the largest hydroelectric projects in the world. Despite decades of protest by the people of Tehri, the dam was completed in 2003 at a cost of $1.2 billion. It is estimated that more than 40,000 people lost their homes to the reservoir. Many of those displaced by the dam have yet to be resettled by the state government. This massive investment has robbed the rural population in Tehri of drinking water and electricity that is diverted during many months of the year to Uttar Pradesh and Delhi.

With the formation of a new state comes a new capital. Ironically, the current "interim" capital of Uttarakhand, Dehradun, which is the most congested and polluted city in the region, is far away from the hills and controlled again by people from the plains. The location of the capital in Dehradun also displeases the people of Kumaon because it is located in Garhwal. Plans for a new capital in a remote part of the state on the border of Garhwal and Kumaon have been discussed for the last 10 years; a foundation stone was even placed with much pomp and circumstance by the leaders of the separatist movement, but to no avail.

Ten years after statehood, not much has changed for the hill people of Uttarakhand. The livelihood of the Paharis still depends on raising livestock, bartering homemade crafts, and the meager variety of crops that grow in the temperate climate and poor soil. Even though 65 percent of the state's population is still involved in agriculture, it accounts for less than a quarter of its gross domestic product (GDP). Jobs for the rural educated youth are still scarce in the hills even though literacy rates in the state are well above the national average. Almost half the men in the region have migrated to the plains or joined the military to support families who earn a living from their fragmented land holdings worked mostly by Garhwal and Kumaon women. The Garhwal Regiment and the Kumaon Regiment, both infantry regiments established by the British government in India, continue to be among the largest employers of men. The tourism sector does, however, employ a large number of people. Many come to enjoy the national parks and wildlife sanctuaries within a state 65 percent covered in forests, a remarkable figure considering that only 15 percent of India's total area is forested. The Corbett National Park, the Rajaji National Park, and the Nanda Devi Biosphere Reserve are Uttarakhand's important conservation areas. Yet, with only 217 miles of railroads operating in the plains, two semifunctional airports in the entire state, and the Delhi-Dehradun highway still not completed, it may take some time before tourism reaches an economy of scale in the region. However, much of the revenue gained from current tourism fills the pockets of Delhi-based developers of high-end hotels and resorts. Today, the annual per capita income in Uttarakhand has stagnated at $700.

Recently the government of India announced a multimillion dollar project to establish an Indian Institute of Management (IIM) in Kashipur, a city on the plains, while there has been no apparent drive to build any infrastructure for the proposed capital in the hills. And the state Legislative Assembly currently is housed in a small building with only one exit.

KEN WHALEN

See also Mandal Commission

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✦ UTTAR PRADESH

Uttar Pradesh (UP), situated in the Gangetic heartland, is the most populous state in India. A region with vast tracts of fertile land and some of India's major rivers, it is noted for its flourishing agriculture. Known as the United Provinces in colonial India, it was renamed Uttar Pradesh in 1950. Literally, "Northern Province," Uttar Pradesh aptly refers to the region's geographical location within the Indian nation. UP is located along India's international border in the north that it shares with Nepal, while in various directions it shares borders with eight other Indian states: Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttarakhand, as well as the national capital, Delhi.

The present-day multicultural and social makeup of the state reflects the rich historical legacy it has inherited, particularly the presence of multiple religious traditions. It has been a center of Hindu religion as it contains Varanasi or Benaras, one of the holiest places in India for Hindu pilgrimage, and Mathura and Ayodhya, considered the birthplaces of the Hindu deities Krishna and Rama, respectively; these cities are also destinations for Hindu pilgrims. For followers of Buddhism, Sarnath is where the Buddha (ca. 566–466 BCE) gave his first sermon and Kushinagara is where he died. The UP was one of the first places in India where Muslims settled. Later, Muslim dynasties ruled from Rampur, Lucknow, and Jaunpur, cities that developed and spread Muslim culture in northern India. For the followers of Jainism, Uttar Pradesh houses several Jain sites of historical significance where shrines at Allahabad, Ayodhya, Mathura, and Benaras offer sources to learn about the lives and activities of Jain *tirthankaras* ("fordmakers"), or religious preachers.

In the UP, the existence of different religious traditions is marked by both harmonious living and religious conflict. The UP has seen the coming together of Hindus, Muslims, and

others resulting in the development of a composite and syncretic culture that is clearly visible in the everyday life of its inhabitants. From shared food and clothing and from music to language, this special historical development has created what has been referred to as the "Ganga-Yamuna culture," implying the coexistence of different cultures and faiths for centuries along the banks of the rivers Ganges and Yamuna—the two holiest rivers in northern India. The term "Ganga-Yamuna" is often used to describe India's secular outlook. The strong presence of different cultures, however, has also led to severe conflict, primarily between Hindus and Muslims. Periodically the two communities have clashed over religious symbols. Communal riots on a large scale occurred in 1992 when a 450-year-old mosque, the Babri Mosque at Ayodhya, was razed to the ground by Hindu activists who claimed the site was the birthplace of the Hindu god Rama. This incident was the result of a right-wing nationwide movement and in turn triggered riots across India.

The UP has the second-largest state economy after Maharashtra, which contains the huge and vibrant international city of Mumbai. The main source of livelihood for the people of the UP is agriculture, although the state also contains a number of industries, both heavy industry and light industry. Sugarcane, rice, wheat, pulses, vegetables, and fruits are grown throughout the state. Important industries include textiles, leather goods, paper, machine tools, metal works, and information technology. Cities such as Moradabad and Ferozabad are known for their craftwork in metal and glass. With Kanpur as the traditional financial and industrial hub, Noida, which is an acronym standing for Naveen Okhla Industrial Development Authority, and located on the Yamuna 12 miles from the vast metropolitan area of Delhi, emerged as a major center for information technology and related services owing to its proximity to the capital, New Delhi.

Different cities of Uttar Pradesh represent the spirit of Indian culture and history. Lucknow, the capital city, is known for its courtly manners, its sumptuous cuisine, and its refined language. Also referred to as the "City of Nawabs," it is one of the leading centers of arts and crafts, including Islamic calligraphy, appliqué art, *chikankari* (delicate wispy white embroidery on cotton and muslin), *shahi kaam* (royal work on clothes often involving gold and silver thread), bone craft, needlecraft, and hand stitching. The cities of Agra and Fatehpur Sikri can be found on the itinerary of every global tourist because of the Mughal monuments of the Taj Mahal at Agra and the capital city complex of Fatehpur Sikri of Emperor Akbar (1542–1605; emperor, 1556–1605). Allahabad and Lucknow are fascinating sites for those interested in colonial history. As previously mentioned, UP is also noted for its numerous pilgrimage sites.

The UP also plays an important role in the political life of India. The state has the honor of contributing the largest number of prime ministers to India: Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964), Lal Bahadur Shastri (1904–1966; prime minister 1964–1966), Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984), Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991; prime minister 1984–1989), Chaudhary Charan Singh (1902–1987; prime minister 1979–1980), Chandra Shekhar Singh (1902–2007; prime minister 1990–1991), Vishwanath

Pratap Singh (1931–2008; prime minister 1989–1990), and Atal Bihari Vajpayee (b. 1924; prime minister 1996, 1998–2004). The successors of the Nehru-Gandhi family, Sonia Gandhi (b. 1946) and her son Rahul Gandhi (b. 1970), widely tipped to be a future prime minister of India, represent UP constituencies in the lower house of the Indian Parliament, the Lok Sabha, and hence the state continues to play a central role in Indianpolitics. In addition, trends within UP politics have influenced and shaped national political issues and debates. In the last few decades the caste and religious-based politics of the UP have swayed the rest of the nation as witnessed by the increasing intensity of caste identity and the bitter rivalry between different caste groups.

The significance of the UP is further enhanced when one considers its contribution in the fields of literature and education. Its contribution to Hindi and Urdu literature is simply matchless. With literary stalwarts such as Amir Khusrau (1253–1325) and Munshi Premchand (1880–1936), the UP has seen numerous Urdu and Hindi literary figures emerge and shine. The long list includes Harivansh Rai Bachchan (1907–2003), Jaishankar Prasad (1889–1937), Mir Anis (1803–1874), Mir Taqi Mir (1723–1810), and Mahadevi Varma (1907–1987). The UP also houses some of India's leading educational institutions including the Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur; Benaras Hindu University, Varanasi; Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh; Allahabad University; and the Indian Institute of Management, Lucknow.

As a state rich in tradition, resources, and political influence it also faces a host of problems connected with India's rapid population growth. These problems include poverty, a low literacy rate, casteism, the need for land reforms, and the increasing political hostility between different castes and classes. Nonetheless, the term "UP" has a special resonance among the people of the state, engenders a special pride among its denizens, and carries a special cachet among the people of the rest of India.

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See also Ayodhya; Kanpur

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V



✦ VARANASI

Varanasi (population 1.057 million) is a city in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh. The name is derived from the confluence of two rivers, the Varuna and the Asi. Both flow into the sacred river Ganges, India's holiest river. Varanasi is India's most important pilgrimage city since Hindus believe that to die in Varanasi leads to release (*moksha*) from the endless cycles of reincarnation.

Bathing in the river at dawn and reciting prayers to the setting sun are daily rituals on the river, which flows from west to east, but Varanasi, on the north bank of the river, is located at a spot where the river turns north. Accordingly, it faces east and the view at dawn as the sun rises is spectacular. The banks of the shore of the Ganges at Varanasi are renowned as being the site of dozens of *ghats*, long, wide stairways on which people pray, meditate, wash, and do their laundry. The "burning *ghat*," where cremation of the dead takes place, is of central importance to the city. Many elderly people come to Varanasi to spend their last days near the holy river, as do *sanyasin*, holy men and women who have renounced their wealth and families to devote themselves to prayer and abstinence. Large palaces, once belonging to wealthy landowners and rajas (princes), line the streets above the *ghats*. Most are now *ashrams* ("retreats"), hostels, or hotels where pilgrims and tourists stay.

Situated on the west bank of the Ganges, Varanasi continues its tradition as a trade center famous for muslin and silks, ivory carving, and perfume. The lustrous, complicated silk saris enhanced with gold and silver thread are a major commodity in the city's economy. Varanasi is also an important educational and cultural center, home of four universities but especially the renowned Benaras Hindu University, founded in 1916, and the Sampurnanad Sanskrit



Hindus take an early morning ritual bath in the river Ganges at Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh. Varanasi is considered one of the holiest sites in India and receives more than a million Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain pilgrims and Indian and foreign tourists annually. (Eddy Van Ryckeghem/ Dreamstime.com)

University, established in 1971, which focuses especially on the study and translation of Sanskrit texts. Indian classical music and dance traditions are also taught and performed at schools in the area.

The history of Varanasi dates back at least 3,000 years and is mentioned in ancient texts such as the *Rigveda,* the *Mahabharata,* and in the *Puranas.* The city was once known as Kashi and was perhaps named after a famous legendary king, Kasha. Another interpretation gives its derivation to the Sanskrit word *kash* meaning to look brilliant or beautiful. As the "city of light," Kashi refers to illumination or enlightenment leading to release from reincarnation. Ancient texts speak of the city as the dwelling place of Shiva, the Hindu god of death and destruction, and there are numerous temples dedicated to him. The myth of the marriage of Shiva, the "Auspicious One," to Parvati, daughter of the Himalayas, tells the story of Shiva choosing Varanasi for their home because of its beauty. The city is also associated with Buddhism, as in the early sixth century BCE, around 527 BCE, the Buddha (ca. 563–ca. 483 BCE) came and preached his famous Deer Park Sermon, his first sermon, and outlined the basic tenets of his faith, or set the "wheel of the law" in motion, at Sarnath, only six miles from the city.

Invasions by Mahmud of Ghazni (971–1030) in 1033 followed by Mohammed Ghori (1162–1206) in 1193 led to Muslim rule over the area. Varanasi became the independent

Kingdom of Kashi in the 18th century. Under British rule, it remained a commercial and religious center. During both the Muslim and British periods, the city was known as Banares. After Indian independence in August 1947, Varanasi became the official Sanskrit spelling and became part of the state of Uttar Pradesh.

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See also Hinduism; Uttar Pradesh

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Vedanta Movement. *See* Ramakrishna Mission

✦ VIETNAM, RELATIONS WITH

India's relations with Vietnam began with the Geneva Conference in 1954 when Indian mediation there substantially helped the conclusion of the Geneva Agreements. The implementation of those agreements became India's responsibility in its capacity as the chairman of the three-nation International Control Commission (ICC); Canada and Poland are the other two members. India supported Vietnam's nationalist movement against French colonialism and later sided with Hanoi in its drive for the unification of the country regardless of the Communist coloration of the conflict and its global significance for the Cold War. There was considerable admiration for Vietnam's bravery and tenacity as it successfully vanquished the forces of both France and the United States. That background of the triumph of nationalism over the West helped India's attitude toward the new Vietnam as it emerged on the world scene as a unified nation in the mid-1970s.

There was a convergence of strategic relations between India and the new Vietnam as the two countries, on the one hand, opposed China's urge to dominate Asia and the U.S.-China nexus on Cambodia. On the other hand, both India and Vietnam continued their close relationship with the Soviet Union, buying arms and generally following its anti-China policies. Both countries also supported the Heng Samrin (b. 1934) regime (1979–1993) in Cambodia.

The China factor has continued to weigh heavily in the minds of strategists in Hanoi and New Delhi. Both Vietnam and India share long land frontiers and have had unresolved border disputes with China. In Vietnam's case, it also has to keep a watch on its maritime borders with its northern neighbor, which has had serious altercations with Vietnam's navy in

the Spratly Islands. India, too, has had apprehensions over China's growing interest in the Bay of Bengal and in the Indian Ocean close to India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Therefore, in the view of analysts such as Subhash Kapila, India and Vietnam have "a natural strategic congruence" as to how to restrain China from aggressive actions while keeping it engaged diplomatically.

The new Vietnam openly supported India's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and as Vietnam's participation in the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) became pronounced, it emphasized India's inclusion in ASEAN's deliberations, with an important role in trade matters, notably ASEAN's free trade agreement (FTA).

With the end of its war against the United States, Vietnam improved its trade relations with India. The latter granted Vietnam a most favored nation (MFN) status in 1975 and three years later signed a comprehensive bilateral trade agreement. In 1993, the two countries established the Indo-Vietnam Joint Business Council, which proceeded to propose the removal of legal barriers to increased trade and investment. Four years later, the two countries signed the Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement. Several high-level visits of Indian leaders took place around the new millennium.

Thus, Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh (b. 1938) and Defence Minister George Fernandes (b. 1930) visited Vietnam in 2000 followed by the visit of the Indian prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee (b. 1924; prime minister 1996, 1998–2004) in the following year. In November 2000, the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation was launched in Vientiane, Laos, to develop "strategic cooperation" in tourism, culture, education, and communications with several countries of Southeast Asia; Vietnam was an important member of the new organization.

A high point of mutual cooperation was reached when a series of comprehensive agreements were signed to mark the visit of Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung (b. 1949; prime minister 2006–) to India in 2007. The more notable areas of mutual cooperation were information technology, education, and space and nuclear development.

Measures were approved for increased cooperation in fighting drug trafficking and terrorism by improvements in the legal architecture, notably service of summons, execution of warrants, and confiscating instruments of crime. The two countries approved procedures for investigation of financial crimes including cyber crimes designed to inhibit money laundering. India agreed to establish for Vietnam a cyber forensic laboratory costing 22 million rupees. Some of these measures had already been agreed on in a memorandum of understanding (MOU) during the visit of India's home minister Shivraj Patil (b. 1935; minister for home affairs 2004–2008) to Vietnam in 2003 and the visit of Vietnam's minister for public security Gen. Le Hong Anh (b. 1949; minister for public security 2002–) to India in 2004. In that year, the two countries also established direct air links with 20 direct flights per month and the two countries identified each other as major tourist destinations. To make such travel possible, both countries relaxed their visa rules for the visitors from each other's country.

The quantum of trade between the two countries improved substantially following the economic liberalization policies in Vietnam and India. This was notably so in the new

millennium as trade figures registering an increase of 20 to 30 percent each year after 2001. From a mere $115 million in 2000 they reached $1 billion in 2006. India's imports from Vietnam were mostly in agricultural products, textiles, handicrafts, and electronics while India's exports included heavy machinery and railroad equipment.

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See also Foreign Policy

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✦ VILLAGE EDUCATION COMMITTEES

Village Education Committees (VEC) were developed as part of the decentralized management structure under the District Primary Education Programme (DPEP) in 1994. Their role is to establish a link between the school and the community and be the core structure at the grassroots level for planning, implementing, and coordinating the community-based delivery of primary education. Representation in the VEC aims to be broad, involving all members of the community toward school mapping, community-level monitoring of school programs, and evaluating teacher effectiveness. However, VECs seem to be token institutions with neither teachers nor parents expecting much from them as real participation of the community is depressingly low. One reason for this lack of dynamism is that these committees were formed in a top-down manner based on government directives rather than on the actual needs of the community. Within the DPEP, while VECs are intended to have a pivotal community role, there is no mechanism to regularly collect information and monitor their functioning within specific local contexts. As long as this data is lacking, the representation of women and wider VEC effectiveness is difficult to evaluate. Evidence from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and field workers reveal that VECs are often biased in favor of higher caste groups, with very little women's representation and little stake in improving school effectiveness and improving enrollment from deprived sections of society. According to a 2003 World Bank report, around 230,000 VECs, 170,000 parent-teacher associations, and 61,000 school management committees have been formed. The *Pratchi Education Report*

in 2002, however, notes that while VECs have been formed in many villages, most are yet to become functional.

SHEEBA HÄRMÄ

See also District Primary Education Program; Education, Development

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✦ VISHWA HINDU PARISHAD

The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) was formed in 1964 by Swami Chinmayananda (1916–1993), Shivram Shankar Apte, and Madhav Golwakar (1906–1973) in response to what its founders believed were growing religious and ideological threats to the traditions and values of India (Hindustan). Created at the height of the Cold War, the VHP's initial thrust was to wrest allegiance and power from what they considered to be corrupt forces tearing India apart, including Christianity, Islam, and Communism.

Initially, it was not an all-Hindu movement but sought cooperation and council from the Sikh, Jain, and Buddhist communities, all of whom had representatives present at the foundational meetings. However, in later years, the VHP would take a decidedly more nationalistic position in domestic politics and a more fundamentalist bent in matters of religion, favoring the various religious traditions under the umbrella of Hinduism. This new tone would alienate the leadership and followers of other Bharati (Indian civilization) faiths.

As part of its original mandate the VHP was to serve as a public interest group for advocating the rights of Hindus, both in India and those who were part of the Hindu diaspora. As a result of these activities the movement enjoyed increasing popularity throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and the VHP expanded its outreach to include work among and for the scheduled castes and other oppressed groups within Indian society. Their philanthropic work included building temples for worship, setting up schools for educating the poor, and funding hospital construction to improve health care.

The VHP has not been shy about inviting controversy in matters of political and religious importance to its members. In 1992, the VHP was part of a larger group of Hindu nationalists that destroyed the centuries-old Babri Mosque at Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh, claiming that the mosque had been built by Muslim invaders on the very site where a Hindu temple

once stood. Moreover, many devout Hindus believed the Babri Mosque sat on the birthplace of Lord Rama, one of the human incarnations of the god Vishnu. The destruction of the mosque led to bloodshed of both Muslims and Hindus.

The VHP's more radical activities led to a desire by some in the membership to take an active role in changing the political landscape of India, including challenging the moderate political parties that had controlled Indian politics since independence. Doing this meant that the VHP needed a close ally, and it found one in the right-wing political party known as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which had been founded in 1980. The BJP shared much in common with the VHP both in terms of ideology and political goals. Working together, they successfully won control of India's government in the 1998 elections. Though later defeated by the more moderate Congress Party, founded in 1885, the BJP-VHP alliance remains a powerful force in Indian politics.

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See also Ayodhya; Bharatiya Janata Party

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W



✦ WATER CONFLICT

Water resources in India over the years have been subjected to tremendous pressures of population growth, urbanization, agriculture, industrialization, and growing pollution. The overexploitation of water and improper management practices have set a dangerous trend that imperils the very availability of water resources for future generations. Water riots have occurred in several parts of Indian cities, and water scarcity has forced people to take desperate measures, often leading to the depletion of existing resources. Inequities in water availability and use have been sources of domestic, national, and regional insecurity. Although water wars do not seem plausible in the near future, interstate conflicts and domestic stress and its spillover into neighboring countries of the region are issues of great concern facing policy planners. Rivers flow across borders, and river basins extend beyond territorial limits.

A country of 24 river basins, India has been host to a large number of riparian conflicts whether within or among countries. The Indus water problem began between India and Pakistan, the India-Bangladesh dispute arose over Ganges waters on Farakka, and the Kosi, Gandak, and Mahakali rivers were involved in history of misunderstandings between India and Nepal. Within India, too, disputes within states exist over the Cauvery and Krishna rivers. Conflicts among riparian states seem to arise in the context of water resource development projects undertaken by states to supplement their water needs. Water can be at the root of conflict in multiple ways. Conflict can occur between states when there are issues of access to and availability of water. Under those circumstances when a state threatens to cut off water supplies to another state, tension

may result. Conflict can occur when there are big versus small states or between upper riparian and lower riparian states.

The Indus water system has six rivers: the Indus, the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej. The rivers are so interlinked with a series of canals that in case there is a shortage of water in one, a main link canal can draw water from another. The dispute over these waters arose when India desired that the government of Pakistan replace the supplies that it was receiving from eastern rivers by building link canals from the western rivers. Pakistan refused, as it not only needed the water but also considered itself to be in the right as the lower riparian under international law. It was not until September 19, 1960, that an agreement was signed at Rawalpindi between the prime minister of India and the president of Pakistan. The Indus Water Treaty of 1960 is one of the few examples of successful resolution of a major dispute over an international river basin.

The only unresolved water dispute between the two countries is the Tulbul Navigation Project. Pakistan objects to this Project on the grounds that it violates the Indus Water Treaty by creating storage on the main Jhelum River that has been allocated to Pakistan. The dispute is over the proposed construction by India of the Tulbul Navigation Project, which Pakistan calls Wular Barrage and is located on the Jhelum downstream from Lake Wular. India wants to construct this barrage to control the flow of water in the Jhelum in the lean season (October–February). The flow of water in the Jhelum is about 2,000 cubic feet per second, and its depth is about 30 inches. However, year-round navigability requires the flow and depth of water to be almost 4,000 cubic feet per second.

With multifarious demands of agriculture, navigation, industrialization, fisheries, and inland penetration of seawater in rivers, which are at a very low flow during November–March, the availability of water causes serious problems. A major dispute over water sharing that continued for two decades was the dispute over the Ganges waters. The refusal of India to come to an agreement over the issue of water sharing was seen by Bangladesh as unilateral withdrawal by a big and powerful neighbor. The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna river system falls in a number of countries in South Asia and in China. China contributes solely to the flow of the Brahmaputra, and Nepal contributes to the flow of the Ganges. Both China and Nepal are upper riparian. The remaining two countries, India and Bangladesh, depend heavily on this water system. The dwindling of supplies in the dry season has been a contentious issue between India and Bangladesh, as Bangladeshis receive about 80 percent of their annual freshwater supply through transboundary rivers.

The sharing of Ganges waters in its lean season between India and Pakistan (before 1971) and between India and Bangladesh (after its liberation) has led to confrontation and has remained the biggest cause of conflict between India and Bangladesh. The problems arose due to the construction of a barrage by India, the upper riparian, across the Ganges at a place named Farraka in West Bengal about 10.5 miles upstream from the western border of Bangladesh. The barrage was designed to improve the navigability of the port of Kolkata by flushing out the silt during the lean months by supplying water into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly

River. Despite India's repeated assurances that the barrage would not disturb irrigation schemes and flood control, the Indian government could not convince the Pakistani government of its noble intentions. An Indo-Bangladesh treaty, the Treaty on the Sharing of Ganga Waters at Farakka, was finally signed in 1996 that settled the issue and also covered northern and northeastern states such as Bhutan and Nepal.

India and Nepal have shared a cordial and harmonious relationship in comparison to Bangladesh and Pakistan, but conflicts over the utilization of water resources and riparian rights have occurred between these two nations because of the major rivers originating in Nepal and flowing into India. It is more a matter of harnessing water resources by way of hydropower generation, irrigation, flood control measures, and navigation rather than water sharing. The main rivers—the Ghagra, the Gandak (Kali or Mahakali), and the Kosi—after flowing through Nepal join the great Indian river, the Ganges, in India. The Sarada (1920), Kosi (1954), and Gandak (1959) projects were criticized in Nepal for conferring substantially more benefits to India than to Nepal and resulted in an inequitable treatment under these water resource development projects. These were projects essentially conceived to meet the needs of India with some benefits to Nepal and were designed with Nepal's agreement. Projects suffered from bad planning, poor maintenance, and inefficient implementation, and neither country benefited.

The 1990s saw another major controversy over the Mahakali River in December 1991. Both countries signed a memorandum of understanding to construct a barrage at Tanakpur. India agreed to provide some electricity and water to Nepal.

Interbasin transfers and the sharing of basin water are seen as the means for meeting the steadily increasing needs of a state in terms of irrigation, hydroelectric power, municipal and industrial use, navigation, and transport. Problems have arisen in Punjab over supply sharing, and existing controversy prevails between Tamil Nadu and Karnataka and between Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka.

The river Ravi rises in Himachal Pradesh, enters the plains near Madhopur in Punjab, and then moves along the border between India and Pakistan before merging into the river Chenab. The Beas River flows from its headwaters in Mandi (Himachal Pradesh) and, after flowing for about 285.8 miles, merges into the river Sutlej. Under the Indus Water Treaty of 1960, the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej were given for exclusive use of India except for a transition period of 10 years during which India was to supply water from these rivers to enable Pakistan to develop a canal system in its territory using the three rivers allocated to it. This period ended in March 1970, after which India had exclusive rights to develop and use the waters. In composite Punjab these three rivers—the Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej—provide ample water for its needs. The subsequent partition of the Punjab into Punjab and Haryana under the Punjab Reorganization Act of 1966 sowed the seeds of discord, as sharing of water was now to be bifurcated between the two states.

The act also stated that a provision for the construction of the SYL Canal (Sutlej Yamuna Link Canal) to divert waters of the river Beas should be made for full utilization of Haryana's share. This considerably reduced Punjab's share of water that it considered essential for its

rich agriculture and for its generation of electricity to pump water from tube wells. Prolonged negotiations ultimately resulted in the Rajiv-Longowal Accord, followed by the Ravi Beas Water Tribunal Award.

The Cauvery River is one of the most important rivers of southern India. The river rises in the Western Ghats at an elevation of about 4,399 feet in the state of Karnataka and flows for about 497 miles before flowing into the Bay of Bengal. Tamil Nadu, a small part of the basin of Kerala, the state of Karnataka, and a part of the Union Territory of Puducherry form part of the Cauvery delta, thus making it an interstate river. The discharge in this river basin comes from about 33,900 square miles of catchments from Karnataka and Tamil Nadu.

The upper riparian Karnataka came under severe pressure from these states to release water, and beginning in the 1970s talks between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu went on intermittently for more than two decades but to no effect. The government of India interceded, but the problem remained unsolved. The Supreme Court ordered the establishment of the Cauvery Waters Tribunal, which was established on June 2, 1990. Under an interim award in 1991, the tribunal decided that Tamil Nadu should get 205 thousand million cubic feet (Tmcft) of water every year and asked Karnataka to release waters to Mettur Reservoir in a stipulated pattern. Karnataka expressed its inability to release waters, and Tamil Nadu again appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Court chose not to issue any direction and thought it expedient to ask the prime minister to intervene. The prime minister decided that Karnataka should release 6 Tmcft of water for saving the standing crops of Tamil Nadu and also set up a committee to determine the water needs for saving the standing crops in both states.

In addition to major interstate river water disputes, India has faced other minor interstate disputes over water resources. Disputes over the sharing of waters by the riparian states of the Yamuna River, mainly Delhi and Haryana, with Delhi accusing Haryana of not releasing enough water for the drinking water requirement of the capital's population, has occurred time and again. The list can be exhaustive, with states vying for the river waters in Tamil Nadu–Kerala over the river Bhavani or Orissa and Chhattisgarh vying over the river Indravati as the bone of contention, with the latter alleging that the state was not getting the promised share of its riparian rights.

Apart from riparian conflicts, conflicts over water are also related to socioeconomics and equity. Conflicts occur between people living in the upper catchments and those who live downstream; conflicts also occur because of the social cost of the project through displacement of populations, loss of land by submergence, cultural loss, loss of livelihoods, dispersal of integrated communities, and severance of people's links from the natural resource base. Apart from development, distributional inequality and issues of social inequity are also inherent in the caste and class structure of India. There is a question not only of availability but also of ease of access. Such water-related conflicts also impact ethnic, economic, rural, and urban populations within and across waters.

Apart from the socioeconomic- and equity-related conflicts, there are other potential sources of conflict that can result as pressure over water increases. For example, sectoral



Sardar Sarovar Dam on the Narmada River. Rising in eastern Madhya Pradesh and flowing west for over 800 miles through Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Gujarat, the Narmada River is the traditional boundary between North and South India. The Dam is but one example of the enormous efforts India has made to harness its waters for drinking and especially for irrigation purposes. (AP Photo/Gujarat State Information Department)

demands in irrigation will increase due to the rapidly growing population. There will be a need for more water storage projects for increased food grain production. There is also a predictable rise in urban population by 2025, with more that 40 percent of the population living in urban areas. Depletion and degradation of the resource will affect the livelihood of a large number of people. This will definitely increase the stress on water. Evidence already supports such scenarios, especially in the case of rural versus urban needs. With increasing urbanization and the growing population of metro cities, stress on water has been increasing. Several cities in Rajasthan, Gujarat, Kerala, and Karnataka have witnessed loss of life resulting from protests of the diversion of water from farmlands to metro cities such as Delhi, Bangalore, and Vadodara. Water drives a wedge between urban and rural populations. Water riots are becoming a common occurrence, with people clashing at several places over access to water. Conflicts related to water can be many and varied in other contexts and levels and between uses and areas. Above all, conflict can and does arise between water availability and accessibility in development and sustainability.

Ensuring access to potable and quality drinking water is essential to preventing waterborne diseases, which are prevalent in India. One of the most important causes of mortality and morbidity is poverty, and its various manifestations are seen in communicable diseases caused by the poor quality of drinking water and unhygienic sanitation. Safe drinking water and sanitation directly impact the health of the people, their productivity, and the quality of life. Waterborne diseases are endemic in Indian cities, frequently becoming large-scale epidemics. Villagers use peripheral and often contaminated surface water sources. Due to

lower population density in villages, waterborne diseases are endemic but rarely cause large outbreaks. An estimate shows that diseases spread by Ganges pollution alone deprives the country of nearly 40 million workdays because of ill health. The loss in terms of mortality and economic injury is incalculable.

The depletion, degradation, and inequitable distribution of water resources remains a national security concern, especially when the water in question is in short supply while dependence on it is great and is shared with other often-adversarial states.

VANDANA ASTHANA

See also Water Policy; Water Resources

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✦ WATER POLICY

After centuries of colonial rule and expropriation of resources, national economic objectives in the era immediately following colonization emphasized nationalization of extractive and core industrial sectors of the Indian economy as a strategy for economic development of the country. The first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964), opted for a policy based on centralized planning and development. He envisaged a capital-intensive strategy to achieve both growth and social justice in the country. Thus began an era of large dams and capital-intensive irrigation and agriculture. However, India did not have a national water policy until 1987 even though water management and distribution was allocated to the states in India's quasi-federal structure.

India is a union of states, and as such responsibilities are allocated to the states and the central government in the Indian Constitution. Water is a state subject, with the central government having minimal intervention with regard to water policies unless the water policy becomes a matter of public interest. It was only in 1985 that the Ministry of Water Resources was established due to the growing pressures of diverse water issues. The National Water Resource Council was set up under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991; prime minister 1984–1989), under whom India adopted its first National Water Policy in 1987.

The Union Ministry of Water Resources is responsible for coordination, development, conservation, and management of water as a natural resource. The ministry looks into the general policy on water resource development and management, technical and external assistance to the states for irrigation, multipurpose projects, groundwater exploration and exploitation, command area development, drainage, flood control, waterlogging, sea erosion problems, dam safety, and hydraulic structures for navigation and hydropower. The Ministry of Environment and Forests oversees water pollution and control issues, while the Ministry of Power manages hydropower. The Ministry of Urban Development handles water supplies and sewage disposal in urban areas. Water supply in rural areas is taken care of by the Ministry of Rural Development.

It is the individual state government, however, that is primarily responsible for the management of water resources. The administrative control and responsibility for managing water rests with the various state departments and corporations. Urban water supply is generally the responsibility of the municipal corporations and water boards constituted under an act of the state legislative assembly. These boards function autonomously. Currently water supplies, from bulk production to distribution, are taken care of by these corporations and boards. The cost of water is highly subsidized by the state agencies, as water is perceived to be a public good. The rural water supplies are taken care of by the Panchayats (a village council that is popularly elected). Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) generally receive funds in the form of loans or grants from the central and state governments. These local institutions, which are primarily responsible for urban water and rural supplies, were recognized as a third tier of the government by a constitutional amendment in 1993. Under the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Indian Constitution, these municipal corporations and Panchayats are mandated and empowered to chart out the financial and political character of development on issues such as water supplies and management. Focusing as it did on decentralization in the Indian political system, the amendment was of such a magnitude that it had an impact on the functioning of the political machinery associated with water at the state and substate levels. It is within this administrative setup that policies for water resource management in irrigation as well as rural and urban water supplies are produced, enacted, and implemented. India adopted its first National Water Policy (NWP) in 1987 under the leadership of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in an era when ideas for the transition of the Indian state were actually being germinated.

Over the years, as demands regarding water grew, another draft National Water Policy (1998) was adopted on April 1, 2002. The water policy marks a departure from the 1987 policy in several ways. The policy adopted in 2002 places emphasis on socioeconomic aspects in water policy planning and the needs of the states. The addition to the policy of Sections 11, 12, and 13 reflects the reformist intent of the government in a neoliberal framework and the involvement of the private sector in water source projects.

With the National Water Policy in place, the Ministry of Urban Development went ahead in making major changes to allow 100 percent foreign direct investment (FDI) in urban infrastructure projects. This included development of water supply sources, water distribution,

billing, sewage reclamation and reuse, management of unaccounted-for water, manufacture of water supply equipment, and privatization of solid-waste management systems. At present, the central government offers special incentives for investments such as exemption from customs and excise duties on imported machinery and exemption from all taxes for the first five years of water and sewerage projects. The government has provided these fiscal incentives to encourage partnership with the private sector and to attract foreign investment in urban water supply and sanitation projects. In addition, the government further amended the municipal acts to enable ULBs to collaborate with the private sector and to improve governance and management. The goal for India is to meet the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations (UN), and the Johannesburg goals at the World Summit for Sustainable Development in 2002 commit India to achieving 100 percent coverage in urban water supplies. These supplies are hampered by poor quality of transmission and distribution networks, physical losses ranging from 25 percent to 50 percent, low pressures leading to back siphoning that results in contamination, and water availability ranging from two to eight hours a day.

India has 16 percent of the population of the world and shares 4 percent of the world's water resources and 2.45 percent of the world's land area. Distribution of water resources is highly uneven in time and space, and vast populations live in areas of acute scarcity of water. The country has to grapple with severe critical issues of water because of natural or hydrological conditions and exacerbated human activities. There is leakage of water in the pipelines and irrigation systems due to poor maintenance. In urban areas about a third of all water is lost through leaky pipelines, contributing to the scarcity of water.

Based on per capita renewable water availability, India has enough water to meet the demands of its people. However, despite an estimate of 493,738 gallons of water per person per year, large numbers of people suffer severe water shortages, partially because of uneven availability of water. Floods and droughts are common in the entire country. While national aggregates and average assessments of India's situation in terms of water availability are presently not uncomfortable, there are wide variations, both temporal and spatial, in the availability of water in the country due to extreme floods and absolute scarcity in the region. Apart from hydrological factors, scarcity of water has been exacerbated by bad management and maintenance practices as well as by increasing pollution in the rivers and in the groundwater.

The increase in pollution in river waters is a major concern throughout India. Rivers are the lifeline of water and serve as the primary source of drinking, agricultural, and industrial water. The two major rivers of northern India, the Ganges and the Yamuna, have become highly polluted. Similarly, the Krishna, Cauvery, and Godawari and other rivers in the south and the Brahmaputra in the east are increasingly polluted. Domestic and industrial waste is dumped into rivers. Even where there are waste treatment plants, either they are not operational due to energy shortages or for financial reasons waste is directly dumped into the rivers. The industrial effluents contain hazardous organic and inorganic pollutants. In addition, domestic waste and fecal matter are rich in organic pollutants. During the monsoon,

agricultural washout containing pesticides, insecticides, and fertilizer residues further increase river pollution. The dumping of animal carcasses adds to the pollution. The cremation of dead bodies at riverbanks and the religious practice of throwing unburned bodies of sages, saints, and infants directly into the river make the water unhealthy. There are other religious rituals of submerging often insoluble metal or stone representations of deities in the rivers that increase water pollution. However, the main source of pollution is still sewage and municipal effluents, which account for 75 percent of the pollution load in rivers; the remaining 25 percent is contributed by industrial effluents and other pollution sources.

The water used by industry that contains chemicals and heavy metals ultimately makes its way back to the water cycle. Industrial chemicals increase the temperature of water bodies, which is detrimental for sustenance of life downstream. The control of pollution has not been able to keep pace with urbanization and industrialization. Millions of cubic feet of industrial waste are constantly dumped into the water bodies every day in large cities.

Groundwater is also another source of drinking water and is not spared from pollution. A sampling of the groundwater quality at 138 sampling stations in 22 industrialized zones in India revealed that water in all the zones was not fit for drinking purposes due to high bacteriological and heavy metal contamination. It is also estimated that 1.5 million preschool children in India die every year due to the spread of cholera, dysentery, and gastroenteritis. This constitutes 60 percent of the total death toll. The situation has not improved, and the bad quality of water remains a public health hazard.

In 1985 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi established a plan for the Ganges Basin cleanup, which has been enforced by the Ganga Project Directorate, under the Central Ganga Authority, to oversee pollution control and the consequent cleaning of the Ganges River. The water quality in the middle stretch of the Ganges, which had deteriorated to classes C and D (the worst class is E, the best A), was restored to class B in 1990 after the implementation of the action plan. However, in several stretches the quality of the river water remains in classes C and D. A similar program for the Yamuna River is in the pipeline, and a national river action plan is being drawn up to clean the heavily polluted stretches of the major rivers of the country.

The legal framework for water quality and its protection began with passage of the first comprehensive legislation, known as the Water Prevention and Control of Pollution Act, in 1974 (amended in 1988) supplemented by provisions of the Environmental Protection Act in 1986 and the Water Cess (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act in 1977. The National Water Policy (1987 and 2002) of India was the result of the realization of the growing scarcity of water.

The Water Pollution Act of 1974 was the first serious attempt at controlling pollution. The act was the culmination of more than a decade of deliberations between the state and the central government. Given that water is a state subject, the states passed a resolution under the constitution permitting the central government to pass this act so that a uniform code and an organizational structure could evolve.

In order to partially meet the requirements for funds of the bureaucratic network of the Central and State Water Pollution Control Boards, the central government passed the Water Cess Act in 1977 under which each industry and local body was to pay a nominal cess fee on water consumption. The act also gave a rebate of 70 percent of the cess for firms that installed pollution treatment plants and met pollution control standards. In 1991 this rebate was reduced to 25 percent in the interest of resource conservation. However, the Water Cess Act has not been adequate in meeting the expenses of the board or as an effective economic incentive for inducing the firms to take pollution abatement measures because of its nominal incidence. Paying the full cess fee is cheaper than installing pollution control plants. The regulatory power of the boards has therefore remained the major instrument of environmental policy.

The Environmental Protection Act of 1986, also known as the Umbrella Act, was created by the Indian Parliament. This act empowers the central government to take all necessary measures to protect and improve the quality of the environment and to prevent, control, and abate environmental pollution. The act identifies the Ministry of Environment and Forests as the apex nodal agency to deal with environmental problems of the country so that an integrated and holistic policy can be implemented with regard to the environment. Unlike the earlier acts, the scope of the Environmental Protection Act covers water, air, and land and the interrelationships that exist among them as well as human beings and other living creatures.

The Policy Statement for Abatement of Pollution (1992) emphasizes integration of environmental considerations into decision making at all levels. The statement aims to achieve this through prevention of pollution at its source, implementing the best practical technical solutions, requiring that the polluter pays for the pollution and control arrangement, focusing protection on heavily polluted areas and river stretches, and involving the public in decision making. Thus, water laws and policy have come a long way in regard to the goal of pollution control.

The implementation of water laws involves a complex variety of actors. There is a basic division of power between the central government and the states, reflecting the federal nature of the Indian Constitution. While the mandate of the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB), an agency of the central government, is to set environmental standards for all domestic and industrial plants in India, lay down ambient standards, and coordinate the activities of the State Pollution Control Boards (SPCBs), the oversight, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws is decentralized and is the responsibility of the SPCBs, which are state agencies. The SPCBs have a two-tier administrative structure to carry out their functions under the law.

The Ministry of Environment and Forests does the overall coordination at the national level and also takes direct responsibility for the states that do not have their own ministry or department of environment. The main functions of the ministry relate to coordination of activities of various central and state authorities established under previous acts, determining emission/effluent standards, getting information about industrial processes, and giving

directions for closure or regulation of industries violating pollution standards. The ministry authorizes institutions such as the CPCB and SPCBs to act on its behalf, while the ministry maintains overall control. Under the law and pollution control mechanisms, boards have the necessary powers to enforce pollution standards and compel industries to adopt either clean technologies or cleanup technologies, whichever the industries deem necessary. The other actor in the regulatory process is the industries. The government of India has identified 18 categories of industries as highly polluting, some of which are petrochemical plants, tanneries, paper and pulp plants, dye plants, and pesticide manufacturing. Under the regulatory policy framework, extensive guidelines were set for emission discharges from industries, and minimal national standards were evolved for each specific industry. While the number of highly polluting industries is not predominant in the country, such industries predominate as fuel consumers and consumers of capital.

The government has taken large steps in the constitutional, legal, and administrative fields in order to maintain water quality standards in the surface waters of India. Both the central and state governments have made efforts to contain pollution. But the implementation of laws to maintain water quality standards requires a totally different set of policy contexts: a clear-cut law, a strong and willing bureaucracy, and a long-lasting commitment from the government to provide the needed political and financial support. Implementing water policies represents a great challenge for a vast country. The implementation of regulatory policy has been left to the state boards, whose powers are not limited to advising and information collection but also include the inspection of sewage plants for treatment effluents and the setting up of effluent discharge standards.

VANDANA ASTHANA

See also Water Conflict; Water Resources

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✦ WATER RESOURCES

India is dependent on the southwestern and northeastern monsoons. Rainfall shows great variation in amount and seasonal distributions. The pattern of rainfall in India is greatly

influenced by mountain formations. The Himalayas constitute the major mountain range in the north, extending to about 1,553 miles in length. The Himalayas are divided into three distinct ranges: the Greater and Middle Himalayas and the lower Sivaliks. The major hills in the Indian Peninsula are in the Eastern Ghats, the Western Ghats, the Aravallis, the Vindhyas, and the Satpura ranges.

In the northeastern parts of India there is a break where the Garo, Khasi, and Jaintia hills form the bend ranges of the Himalayas. The alignment of the hills with respect to prevailing winds and their elevation profoundly influences the distribution of rainfall all over India, making some areas abundant with rainfall, while in other areas rainfall is acutely scarce. The average annual rainfall is 41 inches, which is the largest anywhere in the world for a country of comparable size. However, annual rainfall amounts fluctuate widely. Over the Khasi and Jantia hills, rainfall is 394 inches a year, while in the north in the Brahmaputra Valley rainfall is 450 inches a year and as much as 40.9 inches in a day. On the other hand, in the extreme west in Rajasthan annual rainfall is as low as 4–6 inches. On the west coast of India, heavy rainfall occurs annually along the slopes of the Western Ghats up to an average of 236 inches, but in certain nearby areas annual rainfall is as low as 20–24 inches. On the east coast, rainfall is highest near the coastal areas and decreases inland. Mount Abu in the Aravalli range experiences annual rainfall of 63 inches, while in the surrounding plains annual rainfall is barely 24 inches. The Himalayas in the east have annual rainfall of about 197 inches but only about 110 inches on the western side of the high mountain area. Snowfall is restricted to the Himalayan region.

Storms and depressions also have their impact. During August and September the largest number of storms and depressions occur over the Bay of Bengal, ultimately passing inland into West Bengal and the Orissa coast. Rainfall occurs in the regions exposed to these moving storms and is as high as 4–8 inches a day. These monsoon depressions play a very critical role in the distribution of monsoon rain over northern India and the peninsula. Their absence leads to droughts. These traveling disturbances yield copious rain in the entire area from north coastal Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, eastern Uttar Pradesh, and the Punjab hills, varying from 39 to 78 inches. Cyclones also occur on the east coast during the premonsoon (April–May) and postmonsoon (October–November) periods. Some cyclones are of severe intensity and cause havoc and devastation.

Sixty percent of India's water resources are found in the main river systems of India. The Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna river systems cover 33 percent of the country. The Himalayan rivers—the Indus, the Ganges, and the Brahmaputra—are snow-fed and perennial and get large summer flows, while the peninsular rivers are dependent on the monsoons and are seasonal. Rivers such as the Godavari, the Krishna, the Pennar, and the Cauvery pass through large tracts of low rainfall regions and as such carry much less water with low yields than do rivers passing through areas with good rainfall.

The hydrological conditions of complex mountain winds, the orientation of mountains, and the variability of rainfall, storms, and cyclones lead to excessive low rainfall areas.

An example of this is Rajasthan, where the Bay of Bengal monsoon clouds are unable to cross the Himalayan barrier.

The principal water resources of India therefore comprise surface water (through streams and rivers) and groundwater. The river systems of India can be classified into two groups: the perennial rivers of the Himalayan region and the rivers of peninsular India. They are often uncertain in their behavior due to a meandering flow or drastic changes in river courses caused by landslides and seismic activity. The peninsular rivers originate at much lower altitudes and flow through areas that are geologically more stable. They are more predictable in their behavior. The flow patterns of the two groups of river systems are different. In the peninsula, the flow is characterized by heavy discharge during the monsoons followed by low discharge during the dry months. In the Himalayan river systems the seasonal dry weather leads to annual cycles of ice depletion; rivers are then fed by melting snow and glaciers. Even in the lean period during the winter the flow is never reduced very much.

The main Himalayan river systems are those of the Indus, the Ganges, and the Brahmaputra. The Indus River, one of the great rivers of the world, rises north of Mansarover in Tibet and flows through Kashmir for a distance of 403 miles in a northwesterly direction. The river then moves past Nanga Parbat into Pakistan. In the plains, the main tributaries of the Indus are the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej rivers.



Boys playing on the ghats amidst the pollution in the river Ganges at Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh. Water pollution is one of India's biggest environmental problems and the cause of illness. (Steve Allen/Dreamstime.com)

The river Ganges originates at Devprayag, where two rivers—the Alaknanada and Bhagirathi—meet. The Ganges flows in a southwardly direction and later moves southeasterly through the Great Plains of Farakka, forming the apex of the Ganges Delta. In the Ganges's long course of 1,568 miles, numerous tributaries join the river. One of the major tributaries is the Yamuna, which has its source close to the Ganges. The Ghaghara arises in the Himalayas east of the Ganges, and the

Kosi arises in the mountain of Nepal. The Kosi contributes water to about 37 percent of the population and covers a cultivable land area of 196,909 square miles.

The Brahmaputra arises in Tibet, where it is known as the Tsangpo. When it emerges from the foothills in Arunachal Pradesh, it is known as the Siang and Dihang. The river becomes the Brahmaputra after being joined by the Dibang and Lohit rivers in its flow through the Assam Valley. The Brahmaputra has smaller catchments than either the Ganges or the Indus and enters Bangladesh with the waters of many tributaries. Flowing southward to join the Ganges in its course through the plains, the Brahmaputra divides into many channels and forms numerous braids that enclose various islands.

The peninsular rivers fall into two categories: coastal and inland. The coastal rivers are comparatively smaller streams. There are only a handful of these rivers that drain into the sea on the east coast, but around 600 rivers drain into the sea on the west coast. The west coast rivers are particularly important. Although they drain only 3 percent of the basins, as much as 14 percent of the country's water resources are contained in them. The inland rivers are of great antiquity. They are stable and well defined in their courses. The rivers flowing westward such as the Narmada and Tapi have narrow elongated catchments, while the eastward-flowing rivers—the Mahanadi, Godavari, Krishna, and Cauvery—are less turbulent and more predictable than the Himalayan rivers.

During 1966–1967 the Department of Agriculture initiated a centrally sponsored groundwater survey and investigation program. The Central Ground Water Board became the organization tasked with studying groundwater resources. The board periodically estimates the total groundwater draft for the whole country. Groundwater utilization for different years is estimated based on groundwater draft. Return flows from irrigation use are assumed as 10–20 percent of the water diverted from the reservoir for irrigation. In the case of localized use of groundwater for irrigation, the return flow is assumed to be negligible. The return flows from domestic and industrial uses either from groundwater or surface water sources are assumed to be 70–80 percent. Because of the hydrogeological variations in the country, the groundwater development potential also varies widely in different states and regions. Although rainfall has been the principal source of groundwater recharge, the recharge from canal seepage and return flow of irrigation was found to be significant while estimating groundwater recharge in the states of Andhra Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana, and Jammu and Kashmir. Recharge ranges from 43 percent to 49 percent in these states, while in the states of Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh it ranges from 24 percent to 28 percent.

The marine water resource is of considerable importance for navigation, fisheries, industrial and domestic products, seafood, oil, and gas. The national coastline has a cradle of port cities, including Mumbai, Panaji, Cochin, Thiruanthanhpuram, Chennai, Nellore, Vishakhapatanam, and Kolkota. Smaller ports include Okha and Dwarka. These port cities provide livelihoods to millions of people through fishing. In Kolkota the fish catch and dried supplement foods provide sustenance to millions of people in West Bengal. The port cities have either rocky or sandy shores. While sandy shores support beautiful beach resorts, the

rocky shores are known for infinite oceanic wealth in the form of sea products. The marine waters also provide turtle as well as shrimp, lobster, and other arthropods that are packed and sold as edible food. India produces 1.7 million tons of fish, out of which 35 percent is from freshwater.

VANDANA ASTHANA

See also Water Conflict; Water Policy

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Wealth. *See* Poverty and Wealth

✦ WEST BENGAL

West Bengal is an eastern state of India that was born at the time of India's independence from British imperialism in 1947. Independent India was partitioned into Pakistan and India. The province of Bengal, which had a significant Muslim population, was divided into the Hindu-dominated West Bengal, which was included in India, and the Muslim-dominated East Bengal, which was included in Pakistan. In 1971 East Bengal became the nation of Bangladesh.

Although now belonging to two different nations—India and Bangladesh—the two Bengals share the same ethnoracial characteristics. Ruled for the past 3,000 years by kings who were Buddhist (Maurya, Pala), Hindu (Maurya, Gupta, Sena), Muslim (Turkic, Mughal), and Christian (British, Danish, French), Bengal has come to acquire a rich cultural and religious diversity.

History in West Bengal dates back to the Stone Age. Excavations near the ancient town of Sagardighi in the Mushidabad District unearthed evidence of a civilization that could date back 15,000–20,000 years. Closer to recorded history are the findings at Chandraketugarh, near Barasat in the North 24 Parganas District, of relics of several periods, roughly from the 5th century BCE. These discoveries have led to speculation that this could be the city of Gange in the ancient kingdom of Gangahridai (literally meaning the land that has Ganga at its heart) referred to by Ptolemy, Pliny the Elder, Megasthenes, and Virgil.

Peopled by the Austro-Asiatic, Dravidian, and Tibeto-Burman groups, the region of West Bengal was ruled by non-Vedic kings before the coming of the Indo-Aryans. Bengal became part of the Indo-Aryan civilization from around the 7th century BCE, when the

Magadha Empire included western Bengal. Ruled by kings and emperors who were Hindu or Buddhist, Bengal had a social life that was characterized either by an egalitarian Buddhist society or by a hierarchically structured Brahmin-dominated society. Bengal was part of the Nanda, Maurya, and Gupta empires, and the first king who asserted its independence was Shashanka of Gaur in the 7th century CE. The Buddhist Palas who ruled from the 8th century were followers of the Mahayana and Tantric forms of Buddhism. The Hindu Sena kings followed for about a century, to be defeated in 1204 by the Turkish forces led by Bakhtiyar Khilji of the Slave Dynasty. Bengal was the last frontier conquered by the Turko-Mongols in their drive eastward from Central Asia. The Turks ruled for about two centuries until they were defeated in 1576 by the Mughals, whose empire spanned almost the entire Indian subcontinent. This began the reign of the Bengal nawabs who governed Bengal and remained politically subordinate to the Delhi Sultanate but repeatedly challenged the power of the Mughals.

The 13th–18th centuries saw the coming of innumerable Sufi saints to Bengal and mass conversions to Islam along the south and east of Bengal. There was in fact a significant difference between the western and eastern parts of the Bengal province. The degree of urbanization and the population density were far greater in the north and west of Bengal. The agricultural pattern was more settled, and the larger cities encouraged greater social stratification. The continuous immigration of Brahmins from the north of India aligned the west of Bengal with mainland India's Vedic culture to a degree greater than had been possible in the eastern region of Bengal, which was still largely forested and rural. The Gaudiya Vaishnava movement begun by Chaitanya in the 16th century also influenced the society and culture of western Bengal. Chaitanya's message of bhakti (devotion) and prem (love) as the only qualities necessary to reach God played an important role in diminishing the hold of the caste system. In West Bengal today, the population includes Sikhs, Christians, Jains, and Buddhists, and in areas that are remote from the urban center, animistic worship and innumerable syncretic religions and cults flourish.

The west of Bengal for many centuries had a flourishing trade at its river ports and was popular with merchants from all over the world. By the 18th century, the French and the English had established trading bases at Chandannagar and Calcutta, respectively. Tension between these two nations intensified with the Seven Years' War in Europe, and the English began strengthening their fortifications at Calcutta without the permission of the nawab of Bengal. This angered the nawab, leading to the Battle of Plassey between Bengal and the British East India Company in 1757. The English won the battle and replaced Nawab Siraj-ud-daulah with a titular head, thus effectively taking control of Bengal. A few years later with the Battle of Buxar in 1764, the British position was strengthened over a larger part of India, ushering in the 200-year colonization of India by the British Raj.

The colonial rulers made Calcutta the capital of colonial India, and Bengal functioned as the seat of colonial power for the next two centuries. During these years, some areas of West Bengal underwent rapid industrialization and development. The Mission Press was set up at

Serampore, institutes of higher education were set up at Calcutta, and the first railway line in India was established. Many famines, however, also marked this period, two of which were particularly devastating and killed millions; the famine in 1770 wiped out a third of Bengal's population, and the famine in 1943 killed an estimated 3 million people.

Western education was introduced in the early 19th century to create an indigenous group who would act in the European administrative and trade offices, giving rise to the Bengali middle class. This was the time when Bengal witnessed the Bengal Renaissance: an awakening of modern thinking that challenged orthodox concepts. The reform movements against suttee, child marriage, and other evils of Hindu society placed Bengal at the vanguard of India's movement toward modernity and liberalism. The first concerted rebellion against the colonizers in 1857 began from Barrackpore, a suburb of West Bengal, with the soldier Mangal Pandey and spread rapidly across northern India. This event, known variously as India's First War of Independence or as the Sepoy Mutiny, led to the British Crown taking over the administration of British India from the East India Company.

It was in Bengal that the Indian nationalist movement began to concretize in the latter half of the 19th century. Extreme and revolutionary groups such as Jugantar and Anushilan Samiti emerged to fight the British. The first partition of Bengal in 1905 was seen as an attempt to divide and thereby weaken Bengal along religious lines and was strongly resented, giving rise to the Swadeshi Movement. Based on the principle of economic boycott of English goods, the movement aimed at weakening the British economy and was the most successful of the pre-Gandhian movements against colonialism.

In 1947 the declaration of India's partition into India and Pakistan resulted in bloody riots between Hindus and Muslims. As large numbers of Muslims left West Bengal for eastern Pakistan, an equally large influx of Hindus came into West Bengal. Thousands were killed, traumatized, and made destitute, making this one of the darkest chapters in India's history. The governments and people on both sides of the border coped as best they could in providing shelter and relief to the refugees. The influx of refugees into West Bengal has continued over the years.

Apart from the riots during the Partition of 1947, West Bengal has been marked by religious tolerance and amicable coexistence between the many communities that live here. Immigrants from outside the subcontinent who have been in West Bengal for several generations now include Portuguese, Jews, Armenians, Dutch, and Chinese. Years of exposure to religious traditions of Sufi Islam, Gaudiya Vaishnavism, and Ramakrishna's teachings have made religion in West Bengal significantly tolerant. The long political dominance of the Socialist parties has aided this, and class difference is perhaps more keenly felt than religious differences. The state of West Bengal witnessed a violent uprising during the 1960s and 1970s. This group of radicals, the Naxalites, was led by a section of the Far Left group dissatisfied with the socioeconomic structure, which had remained harshly unequal. They led a violent movement that unleashed terror in the state and had to be brutally suppressed by the government. Despite the promise shown by Bengal in the 19th century, the state has been

mired in economic problems of trade unionism, lack of industrialization, and power crises. Since the 1990s, however, the state has begun to show signs of development and economic growth. West Bengal's economy is the third largest in India.

West Bengal is rich in ecology and biodiversity. The state has 1 biosphere reserve, 2 tiger reserves, 5 national parks, and 15 wildlife sanctuaries. There are more than 7,000 species of flora, including bacteria, algae, fungi, bryophytes, pteridophytes, and angiosperms, and more than 10,000 species of fauna. West Bengal has a varied geography. Northern Bengal lies in the foothills of the Himalayas. To the south of this region is the Dooars, an area that has been marked for its ecological diversity, unique in its wealth of flora and fauna. In southern Bengal lie the deltaic region and the mangrove forests known as the Sunderbans, which has a wealth of biological diversity in its wetlands and forests, besides being home to the Royal Bengal Tiger. Crisscrossed by innumerable rivers and rivulets, West Bengal is largely dependent on agriculture, with rice and fish being the preferred diet across the state.

SIPRA MUKHERJEE

See also Kolkata

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✦ WIDOWS

India has a large number of widows. Census data on widows shows that India has 34.3 million widows ages 10 and above in 2001, or 9.1 percent of the corresponding female population of 377.8 million, and a 2010 forecast figure of 42.4 million (total females 467.1 million, ages 10 and above). The 1991 census counted 26.2 million widows. The percentage of 9.1 percent is higher than for all other South Asian countries at around 7 percent (other than Afghanistan at around 27 percent). East Asia, for example, has percentages at around 7–8 percent (ages 15 and above). China has 8.1 percent and is projected to have

43 million widows in 2010, corresponding to a women's population of 532.9 million, ages 15 and above, and countries with war legacies have higher percentages: Japan, 13 percent; the Koreas, 12.3 percent; and Vietnam, 10.4 percent. Child widows exist due to the early age of marriage that is practiced among sizable proportions of Hindus and Muslims. The areas of India that have the highest percentages of widows are in the states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Jharkhand, Orissa in northern India, and Andhra Pradesh in southern India. UNICEF defines child marriage as marriage before the age of 18 and cites Indian data for 2007 that shows that 47 percent of women ages 20–24 were married before age 18. The marriage of girls around ages 12–13 is still common, while according to one estimate 15 percent of girls in India's five poorest states get married at or below the age of 10. In fact, the age cohort distribution of widows, according to the 2001 census, shows 0 percent (ages 0–9 years), .1 percent (ages 10–14), .2 percent (ages 15–19), .7 percent (ages 20–24), 1.4 percent (ages 25–29), 2.6 percent (ages 30–34), 4.5 percent (ages 35–39), 7.7 percent (ages 40–44), 11.3 percent (ages 45–49), and 37.5 percent (ages 50 and above).

The study of the condition of widows in India and the impact of their large numbers is heavily neglected by the government, by policy analysts, and by nongovernmental agencies (NGOs) and researchers. This is unfortunate given the incentive structure created by key aspects of widowhood and their negative impact on others; the incentive structure arises from widows' economic insecurity, which is often characterized by severe deprivation, the lack of physical security, and social stigma. In all of this, pivotal roles are played by key Indian social norms with respect to marriage and sexual respectability, together with the role of government. Widows are sometimes referred to under research and NGO program headings as "female-headed households" and "single women," where the primary focus is on single women as a category. Internationally, the popular image of widows is their association with the custom of suttee, a Hindu practice whereby the widow commits ritual suicide by throwing herself on her deceased husband's funeral pyre, although suttee is no longer systematically practiced. Widow deprivation in concentrated form is on display to the world in the town of Vrindavan (Brindaban) in Uttar Pradesh, where abandoned Hindu widows spend the rest of their lives in refuges. Some of the widows have been there since early childhood. The image of extreme social conservativism toward widows is also fueled by the many widows from the elite segment of Indian society, typically the Hindu Brahmin caste, for which remarriage is socially unacceptable and ritualized norms severely restrict daily behavior for the remainder of their lives. While Hindu high-caste social norms for widows are still practiced to varying degrees, for the wider society, characterized as nonelite, widows' social situation is more varied. For example, in lower social groups, widows' remarriage is a much more common occurrence and is due to the material rigors of life and the social norms restricting female employment in large parts of the country. Country-level data on remarriage in India is rare; data calculated for the 1971 Indian census estimated that 33.7 percent of widows across India remarried, while 62.5 percent of men whose wives had died remarried. There is little material on Indian Muslim widows, but available sources give a picture of fewer constraints than their Hindu counterparts, while Christian widows tend to be still less encumbered by restrictions.

The impact of widows on society is largely unappreciated, but an understanding of it is required to make practical headway on core social and economic development concerns, especially for women and girls. This negative impact operates through four factors, closely related to the core negative aspects of widowhood: lack of a welfare state, a high degree of discrimination against women's paid employment, a completely ineffective legal system across large parts of India, and social stigma. The outcome that these elements produce is the privileging of the institution of marriage and, in effect, the legitimating of women through men as the only dependable source of female economic support. This fact is supported by the near universality of marriage in Indian society and the commensurate broad social understanding of its importance and unavoidability for women in particular. Using the broadest and most commonly used Indian socioeconomic generalizations, the north-south distinction across a range of human development indicators (HDIs) shows that widows typically have higher standards of living in southern India, which systematically deteriorates across most of northern India. For example, in a comparison of women's life expectancy at birth between the severely impoverished state of Uttar Pradesh and the advanced state of Kerala, the difference is almost 20 years, at 76 years for Kerala and 57 years for Uttar Pradesh. The fate of widows closely follows the implications of these statistics. This is shown by fewer remarried widows in southern India compared to northern India; in southern India it is generally not socially unacceptable for women to take up paid employment, unlike in northern India. Evidence shows that in northern India the chance of becoming a widow is lower, but women, once widowed, have a higher risk of mortality, while the opposite is true in southern India. Crucially, there is greater social acceptance in southern India of women living on their own, although this is not at Western levels. Concern, especially in northern India, with independent single women is based on notions of sexual impropriety wherein a single woman's morals are always perceived to be in doubt. Widows' deprivation and poverty are largely a northern outcome of the general inability of women to take up paid employment, which is socially sanctioned, resulting in their consequent reliance on male family members and land for subsistence. Land, given that roughly 70 percent of the Indian population is rural, takes on crucial importance to widowed women, particularly in northern India.

Deprivation for widows frequently results from northern India's effectively nonexistent legal system, facilitating effective land theft by relatives and neighbors because court processes, for low-income widows in particular, are too expensive, too lengthy, and open to corruption. In the event that land is stolen or a widow is from a landless low-income family, also a common experience, the added lack of a welfare state largely guarantees destitution if support from the family is not available. This brings into focus the negative incentives, and thus the crucial nature, of widows' deprivation for development. Due to the reliance on family as the only realistic prospect of assistance for the majority of women and due to the social norms of inheritance practices that place property such as land in the hands of male relatives, women place a high degree of emphasis on male children to the detriment of female children. This has given rise to the term "son preference," which also applies to some East Asian countries. The

son preference effect is where mothers and families do whatever it takes to ensure that sons survive; this is mirrored by an abnormally high degree of mortality among girls under five years of age in India and girls' significantly lower school participation, both of which primarily occur in northern India. The crucial aspects in the creation of these outcomes are males' effectively exclusive access to paid employment and the fact that daughters leave home when they marry. This has resulted in the social norm of sons being responsible for the financial aspects of care for parents, and this is crucial for widows because women generally outlive men. Therefore, until drastic improvements are made in the reform and enforcement of law and a welfare state is instituted with a strong focus on single women, the threat of widows' deprivation will continue to negatively impact not only married women as they try to hedge against the financial and other insecurities of being without a husband in future years, but also girls' very survival.

Other aspects of widowhood are that young widows without children usually find it easy to remarry, while the opposite is true for women with children. One option in rural settings where control of land is a significant issue is to marry a brother of the deceased husband if one is available. Otherwise, widows generally and older widows in particular often have to accept marriage to significantly older men. Where child marriage is practiced, children can and do become widows. This causes significantly greater risks of degrading circumstances arising for the child widow. The mothers of child widows often feel that the best option for their daughters' welfare is to have them remarry even if they are still very young, such as being below the age of 15. Widows with children, however, do not want to remarry and avoid doing so when possible out of fear of the treatment meted out to the widow's existing children by a new husband and often due to the experience of an abusive marriage. Finally, they fear that as previously married women they may not be fully accepted into the new family. Widows can be discriminated against out of the perception of them as sexual predators, and their presence in public contexts brings questions of the integrity of those with whom they are linked, such as in the case of male employers. Alternatively, widows can be sexual victims twice over, first by being attacked by a man for the purposes of sexual gratification and second by being accused of instigating the man's attack. A case exists of a widow who, in a village context, after being attacked on two occasions was accused by the village council of soliciting the sexual attack. She subsequently committed suicide. Widows in India can face very difficult circumstances.

RISTO HÄRMÄ

See also Family; Women, Status of; Women's Reform Movements

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✦ WOMEN, STATUS OF

"You can tell the condition of a nation by looking at the status of its women," said the first prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964; prime minister 1947–1964). Unlike similar developing countries, India produces an elite world-class category of women, epitomized by graduates of the Indian Institute of Technology Science, the Institute of Technology, and the Indian Institute of Management graduates along with health professionals and a range of internationally known academics, writers, athletes, businesswomen, and actors. Among many notable Indian women are Bina Agarwal (b. 1951), Shabana Azmi (b. 1950), Kamala Das (1934–2009), Nandita Das (b. 1969), Kiran Desai (b. 1971), Vandana Shiva (b. 1952), Kiran Mazumdar Shaw (b. 1953), and Sania Mirza (b. 1986). However, while women can also be found in the Indian space program and firms such as Microsoft, the vast majority of Indian women still face high levels of deprivation and severe gender-based discrimination.

At the broadest levels of analysis of female well-being, northern Indian women, with the exception of the two northern pockets of Himachal Pradesh and Mizoram states, do much worse on standard and nonstandard human development indicators (HDIs) than their southern counterparts. In southern India and for the country as a whole, Kerala state represents a model of women's development, although problems exist for women there as well. Northern attitudes and outcomes for women have been characterized by exceptional gender inequality and extreme discrimination, for which variations in poverty provide only part of

the explanation. The evidence suggests that women's status is critically determined by social norms based in cultural beliefs, that is, a synthesis of customary and religious ideas. Many gender deprivation accounts do not fully appreciate this. Notably, while particular forms of Islam practiced in some parts of the world have been implicated in problematic social outcomes as measured by HDIs, the current Indian Hindu society has produced and continues to produce highly detrimental incentives toward gender, with severe outcomes for women. Well-documented accounts exist of widespread girl-child neglect resulting in mortality and low levels of education, wide-scale disinheritance of women, dowry murder, widespread rape and violence against women, and widespread sex-selective abortion against female fetuses mainly in the nonstandard HDIs.

On balance, the Hindu and Muslim societies in India hold equal positions on outcomes for women, with both groups significantly behind other religious denominations. Significantly, Hindu society, due to the caste system, creates the additional dimension of religious class-based discrimination, with negative results for women from the lowest castes. For example, among other problems, they are seen as soft targets for sexual abuse, including rape as a weapon of extortion and as caste discipline by higher-caste men. Custodial rape is common by police. Famous case studies include the renowned cases of Phoolan Devi and Bhanwari Devi, and films have been made about both cases. Women of other religious groups, such as Jain, Christian, and Parsi, do significantly better across all or most HDIs.

Standard HDIs show the following macrotrends for women: literacy has risen from 15 percent in 1960–1961 to 54.2 percent in 2001, mortality for children under age five decreased



Women artisans do appliqué work at a handcrafts business in Orissa. (Samrat/Dreamstime.com)

from 282 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1960 to 90 in 2005, in 2005 there were 86 deaths per 1,000 male births compared to 95 per 1,000 female births, malnutrition manifested in anemia rose from 51.8 to 56.2 percent among all women between 1998–1999 and 2005–2006, female (paid) labor force participation for rural women rose from 31.8 to 32.7 percent (virtually no change) and for urban women from 13.4 to 16.6 percent from 1972–1973 to 2004–2005, and the total fertility rate changed from 5.9 in 1960 to 3.11 children per woman in 2005. Thirty percent of infants at birth would qualify for intensive care if they were born in California. Approximately 70 percent of the population of India is rural. The social distribution shows that 82 percent of household heads are Hindu, 13 percent are Muslim, 3 percent are Christian, 2 percent are Sikh, and 1 percent are Buddhist, with all others less than 1 percent; 19 percent are low castes (Scheduled Caste), and 8 percent are Adivasi (Scheduled Tribes).

Four key social norms affect the overall status of women in India. First, sexual respectability or reputation causes a restrictive attitude toward economic and social activity of women outside the home and toward the mobility of girls from the start of puberty. Northern rural Hindu and Muslim women are governed by social norms restricting them to home-based work, typically unpaid, and pubescent girls are pulled from school and married based on the notion equating sexual promiscuity with freedom of unsupervised movement. Some 45 percent of the population lives in states in northern India—Bihar, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh—where this attitude and related practices exist. The percentages of unmarried women ages 15–49 for 1998–1999 who worked outside the home were 11 percent in Uttar Pradesh, 13 percent in Rajasthan, 17 percent in Bihar, 9 percent in Haryana, 9 percent in Punjab, 23 percent in Orissa, and 31 percent in Madhya Pradesh. In contrast with China, large numbers of Chinese factory workers are unmarried rural teenage girls who have migrated for work purposes.

Second, single women are seen as socially deviant, given the social norm of mandatory marriage, and marriage in India is nearly universal, as marriage and domestic activity are still seen as the main life achievement and role of a woman in all social groups. The failure to marry can cause damage to a family's reputation, thereby inhibiting the marriage of siblings and damaging social capital. This extends in some cases to widows, who in some rural locations are accused of witchcraft and are attacked; evidence for this exists in Bihar, Jharkhand, Rajasthan, and Orissa states.

Third, marriage norms play a significant role in the lives of Indian women in a variety of aspects. Marriage as early as possible is preferred, often just after puberty for rural society, and is common across all social groups. The average age of marriage is 15–16 years of age or on completion of a level of education, while the emphasis on sexual purity means that many rural girls are permanently removed from school, although this mainly occurs in the central and northern states. There is a preference that the education level of the bride be limited. The level of education is based on social class—for example, primary school level for unskilled workers, secondary school level and possibly undergraduate level for urban dwellers, and postgraduate level for elite groups, although generally no higher than a master's degree—and in all cases education level for the wife should be less than that of the husband. Men and women form

marriages that are typically arranged with little input from prospective brides and grooms in most social groups. In northern India, the level of contact permitted between the wife and her parents is limited. Remarriage is effectively prohibited for widows by many segments of Hindu Brahmins (highest caste) and some other Hindu castes, while Muslims do not hold views with punitive outcomes for widows. There are widely held attitudes that effectively prohibit interreligious marriage, while Hindu intrareligious marriage between different castes depends on which sex is of the lower caste and how far apart in the caste hierarchy the two castes are. The giving of dowries is widely practiced by all faith groups.

Fourth, with regard to inheritance, while Hindu women especially are widely disinherited by husbands' relatives and by siblings, there was an improvement in inheritance law for Hindu women in 2005. It should be noted that there are specific faith-based laws covering each religious community with regard to the family.

The cumulative impact of these social norms results in widespread economic dependence of women on men. Compounding this is a nonexistent welfare state, with the government's own admission of the collapsed public primary health care system in several regions for reasons other than underfunding, and the fact that women are ignorant of many areas of legislation. Women depend on husbands and in older age on sons. Otherwise, severe poverty is likely in widowhood. This has led to son preference, which causes the neglect of girls in rural society and mass abortion of female fetuses. Widow deprivation has played a significant role in the girl-child deprivation and female fetus abortion phenomena.

RISTO HÄRMÄ

See also Family; Women's Reform Movements

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✦ WOMEN'S REFORM MOVEMENTS

During the Vedic period in India (2500–1500 BCE) women held a high position in society with the Hindu texts the *Rigveda* and the *Yajurveda* highlighting women's education and role in family and society. In the post-Vedic period, the Laws of Manu as recorded in the *Manusmirti*, composed around 200 CE, gave women a subordinate status to men. This subordinate status was used to impose regressive rules and regulations on women, advocated male supremacy, and dealt with such issues as barring women from public functions; child marriage; and suttee, the funeral practice whereby a widow would immolate herself on her husband's funeral pyre. The concept of womanhood as delineated in the *Manusmirti* contributed directly to the formation of women's reform movements and galvanized 19th-century social reformers to focus their work on women's issues. Between the 1820s and the 1850s reformers set up organizations such as the Brahmo Samaj (founded in 1828) in eastern India in Calcutta, the Prarthana Samaj (founded in 1867) in western India in Bombay, the Arya Samaj (founded in 1875) in northern India at Rajkot, and the Theosophical Society (founded in 1875) in southern India at Madras. In each of these organizations women's issues were raised and discussed. Prior to the reformers, illiterate women such as Rassundari Devi (b. ca. 1809), taught themselves reading and writing. Devi and others went on to write gender-focused accounts of their lives during this timeframe, and Devi wrote the first autobiography by an Indian woman highlighting women's issues. Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1774–1833) of Bengal was the first to initiate the cause of women and denounce the caste system. The Prarthana Samaj was founded by Brahmins to prove that the Hindu religious tradition was not the source of the legitimacy of women's societal roles. The Arya Samaj emphasized the education of both girls and boys. Pandita Ramabai (1858–1922) was the first Indian woman to publicly advocate female education and women's rights by traveling all around India with her brother arguing for the emancipation of women. In 1881 she gave evidence before the Hunter Commission set up by the British to examine the state

of education in India; the commission's report was issued in 1884. Ramabi emphasized the need for the abolition of child marriages and the promotion of women's education. In Bengal in 1905 the Swadeshi Movement, a movement to promote the purchase of indigenous goods and boycott British imported products, gave women a prominent role in nationalist activities on a large scale, but mass mobilization began in 1910 with the Bharat Stri Mahamandal, which opened offices in 11 cities to promote women's issues, especially female education. The Women's Indian Association, founded in 1918 in Andhra Pradesh, was the first organization to unite all women for mutual assistance. Its goal was and is to offer assistance "to distressed women and children." The National Council of Women in India, founded in 1925, strives to remove legal barriers to women. The All India Women's Conference in 1927 became recognized as the most important women's group. Communist and non-Communist groups alike, whatever their political persuasion, also worked to improve women's conditions. The result of all these women's movements in various parts of the country involving women of a number of ideological, class, and social perspectives was that reform movements contributed to significant changes in the law dealing with women's rights, status, and privileges. Among them were acts such as the Hindu Widow Remarriage Act of 1856, the Child Marriage Restraint Act of



Indian activists from the Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA) and other organizations representing workers from the unorganized sector shout slogans during a protest rally in New Delhi, August 2007. The activists were demanding that the Indian government table the bill for "Social Security for Unorganised Workers," which was a promise of the Common Minimum Programme of the United Progressive Alliance government. They were demanding that pension and health insurance be included in the bill. (Manpreet Romana/AFP/Getty Images)

1929, the Hindu Women's Right to Property Act of 1937, the Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, the Hindu Succession Act of 1956, the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act of 1956–1957, and the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961.

These pieces of legislation greatly improved the status of women in India. However, contemporary women's movements in India began in 1972 with the *chipko* movement, an environmental movement in the Himalayan foothills in which women played a prominent part, and people hugged trees to prevent them from being cut down. In 1974 the first feminist women's group, the Progressive Organization of Women, was set up. Inspired by the United Nations (UN) declaration of 1975 as the year of women, many grassroots women's organizations were formed. With the rise of activists such as Medha Patkar (b. 1954), Brinda Karat (b. 1947), and Madhu Kishwar (b. 1959), the contemporary women's movement in India focuses on fighting for educational rights and opportunities for women, gender equality, economic empowerment, the prevention of domestic violence and sexual exploitation, reproductive rights, abortion rights, divorce, and various issues dealing with the cultural stereotyping of women. The Self Employed Women's Association, more commonly known as SEWA and registered in 1972, represents the practical outcome of the reform movement. SEWA is a trade union representing poor self-employed women who earn a living through labor or various sorts, including manual labor, and small businesses.

SHEEBA HÄRMÄ

See also Family; Women, Status of

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✦ WORLD BANK, RELATIONS WITH

India's involvement with the World Bank dates back to its inception at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, after World War II. India was among the 17 countries that met in Atlantic City in June 1944 to prepare the agenda for the Bretton Woods conference and among the 44 countries that signed the final agreement that established the World Bank. In fact, the name "International Bank for Reconstruction and Development" (IBRD) was a suggestion made by India to the drafting committee. The Indian delegation was led by Sir Jeremy Raisman (1892–1978), who served as a finance member of the government of

India during 1939–1945, and included Sir C. D. Deshmukh (1896–1982), governor of the Reserve Bank of India (1943–1950) who later become India's finance minister (1950–1956); Sir Theodore Gregory, the first economic adviser to the government of India; Sir R. K. Shanmukhan Chetty (1892–1953), who later became independent India's first finance minister (1947–1952); A. D. Shroff (1899–1965), one of the architects of the Bombay Plan published in 1944 for the economic development of India after independence; and B. K. Madan (1911–?), later India's executive director in the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

World Bank lending to India started in 1949 when the first loan of $34 million was approved for the Indian railways. In the first decade (1949–1959), the World Bank made about 20 loans to India amounting to a total of $611 million. During 1960–1969, overall loans to India increased to $1.8 billion, about three times the level in the previous decade. The period 1970–1979 was marked by a large increase in the absolute volume of International Development Association (IDA) lending, and the IDA share in total World Bank assistance reached a high of 80 percent. However, in the 1980s India's share in total IDA lending declined to 25 percent and was updated by the more expensive World Bank lending, which increased to $14.7 billion during 1980–1989.

The long-term relationship between the World Bank and India displays certain trends. In the early years, the World Bank closely collaborated with the more active United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to force policy changes. Hence, the World Bank's involvement was not as direct and visible as in the 1980s and 1990s. However, after the 1980s the World Bank, along with the IMF, played a more direct and visible role in India's policymaking.

Despite India's prominence in the World Bank's loan portfolio and the World Bank's importance in India's external borrowings, these were, in aggregate, modest for India's economy. The loans accounted for less than 1 percent of the gross national product and were seldom more than a couple of dollars per capita. However, their relative importance has been greater in certain sectors and time periods. In particular, the World Bank has been one of India's most reliable sources of external financing when the country suffered a balance of payments problems, such as in the 1960s, after the first and second oil shocks, and during 1990–1991.

PARAMITA GUPTA

See also World Economic Forum; World Trade Organization, Relations with

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✦ WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM

The World Economic Forum (WEF) is an independent international organization incorporated as a Swiss not-for-profit foundation. The WEF is committed to improving the state of the world by engaging leaders in partnerships to shape global, regional, and industry agendas. Its objective is to achieve a world-class corporate governance system in which values and rules are equally important. The WEF believes that economic progress and social development are endogenous to business sustainability, hence its motto "entrepreneurship in the global public interest."

Members of the WEF include companies that are driving forces in the world economy. The typical member company is a global enterprise with more than $5 billion in turnover (this may vary by industry and region). Additionally, these enterprises possess the following characteristics: (1) They rank among the top companies within their industry and/or country, and (2) they play a leading role in shaping the future of their industry and/or region.

Over the course of its 38-year history, the WEF has achieved a proud record of accomplishments in advancing progress on key issues of global concern. In 1979 the WEF became the first nongovernmental institution to initiate a partnership with China's economic development commissions, spurring economic reform policies in China.

The WEF's annual meeting in 2010 held in Davos, Switzerland, featured the "India Everywhere" project, which is the largest-ever Indian participation at the WEF. The event was attended by senior representatives from the government and by business leaders from different sectors, including the finance minister, the commerce and industry minister, the deputy chairman of the Planning Commission, the minister of tourism, and the chief ministers of Delhi, Rajasthan, and Kerala.

PARAMITA GUPTA

See also World Bank, Relations with; World Trade Organization, Relations with

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✦ WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, RELATIONS WITH

India is a founding member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947 and its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO), that came into effect in January 1995 after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. The purpose of India's participation in an increasingly rule-based system in the governance of international trade is to ensure more stability and predictability, which ultimately would

lead to more trade and prosperity for itself and the 134 other nations that now comprise the WTO. India also automatically avails of most-favored nation status and national treatment for its exports to all WTO members.

India was an active participant in all rounds of GATT negotiations and in the post-WTO era continues to be an important voice in discussions to launch a new round of multilateral trade negotiations. The focal point of such discussions has been to ensure a fair distribution of rights and obligations between developed and developing countries and to address the developmental concerns of poor countries. India's negotiating strategy has evolved vis-à-vis its overall trade and development strategy and policy orientation. The country's earlier strategy was largely defensive, in line with its import substitution policies. But the initiation of economic reforms following the balance of payments crisis of 1991 altered India's views on the opportunities, benefits, and threats of engaging in the multilateral trading system and has led to the adoption of a more forward-looking negotiating strategy.

PARAMITA GUPTA

See also World Bank, Relations with; World Economic Forum

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
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✦ YADAV, LALU PRASAD

Lalu Prasad Yadav (b. 1948) is the founder and president of Rashtriya Janata Dal (National People's Party), founded in 1997; former union minister of Indian Railways; and a member of the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament. He was born into a poor peasant family in Phulwaria village in Gopalganj in northern Bihar. Due to the generosity of his elder brother, Mukund Rai, Yadav was able to continue his education and earn his law degree from Patna University (founded in 1917). He began his political career early as an active student leader in the 1970s in Patna, organizing protest movements against social injustices meted out to the Dalits (untouchables) and other minorities. He was greatly inspired by the Socialist leader Jayaprakash Nayaran (1902–1979) and participated in all of Narayan's rallies against government policies, especially during the State of Emergency (1975–1977) of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984), for which Yadav was jailed for several months. He contested his first Lok Sabha election in 1977 from the Chapra constituency in Bihar becoming, at 29, one of the youngest members of Parliament. As a result, he became one of the leading figures in Bihari politics. He then became a member of the Bihar Legislative Assembly for two terms and in 1989 became the leader of the opposition at the center by joining the Janata Dal (founded in 1999).

In 1990 Yadav headed the Janata Dal government in Bihar as the chief minister and served in that capacity until 1997. His decision to implement the recommendations of the Mandal Commission (1990) by providing reservations in the state won him accolades from Dalit communities. Yadav also professed close affinities to the plight of the Muslims, and his commitment to communal harmony between the Hindus and the Muslims was tested within a few



The charismatic and controversial Lalu Prasad Yadav, former chief minister of Bihar whose wife, Rabri Devi, followed him as chief minister, enabling him to maintain power and influence behind the scenes. He also served as Indian Railways minister. He was famous for his "caste politics," when he mobilized poor Muslims and Dalits (untouchables) to support his political agenda of favoring the poor and for his remarkable job of making Indian railways more efficient and profitable. (AP Photo/Ajit Kumar)

months of attaining office when he arrested Lal Krishna Advani (b. 1927), the leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party (founded in 1980), as Advani entered the boundary of Bihar on his journey to build the Ram Janmabhoomi Temple in Ayodhya in the United Provinces. Under Yadav's leadership the state of Bihar remained free of communal riots at a time when many other Indian states were dealing with severe interreligious disturbances after the demolition of Babri Masjid in December 1990. Since then Yadav has dominated the politics of Bihar even after resigning from the post of chief minister in 1997 on corruption charges when the state government was charged with the embezzlement of $267 million in the husbandry department. Although Yadav was imprisoned for these charges, he quickly installed his wife as the state's chief minister.

In 1997 Yadav announced the formation of a new political party, the Rashtriya Janata Dal, in order to establish a political party with influence at the center. The Rashtriya Janata Dal lent support to the Indian National Congress Party–led government in 2004 to prevent the Bharatiya Janata Party alliance from obtaining power. Yadav was then appointed the union minister of railways (2004–2009). Indian Railways, Asia's largest rail network, faced severe financial losses and deficits, but Yadav made it a profitable and self-sufficient industry through, among other things, downsizing, outsourcing, introducing innovative products, and increasing freight charges. Subsequently the management of Indian Railways under Yadav has become a case study at the premier Indian Institute of Management. The success of Indian Railways also attracted management students at Harvard University and the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, who visited India and participated in lectures organized at Rail Bhawan, the headquarters of Indian Railways in New Delhi in 2006.

Rashtriya Janata Dal decided not to contest the 15th Lok Sabha elections in 2009 with its present allies, including the Indian National Congress Party, and opted instead for an alliance with Mulayam Singh Yadav (b. 1939) of the Lok Dal (founded in 1974) and Ram Vilas Paswan (b. 1946) of the Lok Janshakti Party (founded in 2000). These parties did poorly in the

elections, and Yadav reiterated his unconditional support to the new government headed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh (b. 1932; prime minister 2004–) after the election defeat.

FATIMA A. IMAM

See also Ayodhya; Bharatiya Janata Party; Bihar; Railroads; Yadav, Mulayam Singh

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✦ YADAV, MULAYAM SINGH

Mulayam Singh Yadav (b. 1939) is a leader of the Samajwadi Party, which he founded in 1992, in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament, from the Mainpuri constituency in Uttar Pradesh. In Uttar Pradesh, Yadav is known for his strong commitment to social justice and secularism. He belongs to the Aheer caste of Etawah and champions the rights of the backward castes or untouchables (Dalits) by advocating reservations (quotas) for them at all levels. As a young man struggling to receive an education in the small village of Sifai in Etawah, Yadav was greatly inspired by Ram Manohar Lohia (1910–1967), a Socialist leader and member of the Indian National Congress (INC), and joined in Lohia's demonstrations against the government. Yadav completed his graduate studies at Jain Inter College, Mainipuri, where he became a lecturer. He started his political career by contesting a Uttar Pradesh state assembly election on a Socialist Party ticket in 1967 and became the youngest member of the assembly. The protest movement against the State of Emergency imposed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1917–1984; prime minister 1966–1977, 1980–1984) established Yadav on the national stage, and he was jailed for his involvement. He served as a Uttar Pradesh state minister during 1977–1980 and then assumed leadership of the Janata Dal (founded in 1977) in 1989.

Although Yadav started his first term (1989–1991) as the chief minister of Uttar Pradesh in 1989 with strong support from the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (founded in 1980), he lost the support of the party when he opposed party president Lal Krishna Advani (b. 1927) and his Ram Janmabhoomi Temple movement in Ayodhya and arrested followers of the movement for instigating communal strife. As a result, in 1992 Yadav formed his own party, the Samajwadi Party, and became the chief minister of the United Provinces for the second time (1993–1995) by allying with the Bahujan Samaj Party (founded in 1984). During his second tenure as chief minister, Yadav was involved in a controversy regarding the demand of separate statehood for Uttarkhand (the northern part of Uttar Pradesh that

became a separate state in 2000). The supporters of the demand for Uttarkhand alleged that Yadav had ordered its activists shot during peaceful demonstrations. Within two years he lost the support of the Bahujan Samaj Party and had to resign from his post. The Bahujan Samaj Party leader Mayawati (b. 1956) accused Yadav of harassing her when the party withdrew its support for his government in 1995.

In 1996 Yadav contested the 11th Lok Sabha elections from the Mainpuri constituency, joined the central government led by Prime Minister H. P. Deve Gowda (b. 1933; prime minister 1996–1997), and was appointed defense minister. The central government collapsed in 1998, and Lok Sabha elections were held. Yadav was inducted into the Union ministry, again with the defense portfolio, in Inder Kumar Gujral's (b. 1919; prime minister 1997–1998) United Front government, although that government too only lasted a year. After the fall of the government, Yadav continued to serve as the leader of the opposition at the center and did not support the governments led by either the Bharatiya Janata Party (1999–2004) or later by the Congress Party (2004–2009). In Uttar Pradesh, however, Yadav remained a powerful leader and served as the state's chief minister for the third time during 2003–2007. Yadav and his party enjoy the support of the backward castes (Dalits) and the Muslims, receiving most of their support from the rural areas, but Bahujan Samaj Party leader Mayawati continues to challenge Yadav by portraying herself as the real leader of the Dalits in the state.

FATIMA A. IMAM

See also Ayodhya; Bharatiya Janata Party; Uttarakhand; Uttar Pradesh

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✦ YOGA

The word "yoga" is derived from *yoke*, which means "union," as the goal of yoga is to create union between the body and the mind. There is, however, no agreement on yoga's origin, definition, or classification, which is considered one of the most complicated multidimensional body and mind practices. Yoga used to be a "Made in India" philosophy and belongs mainly to Indian history and religion, but during India's long history, yoga has moved from religion to philosophy to politics and from a local to a global practice.

Yoga's long history goes back, as does India's, more than 5,000 years. As some steatite seals found in archaeological excavations (3000–2700 and 1750 BCE) show, yoga postures



A young instructor, left, teaches yoga as elderly women practice at a park in Kolkata, West Bengal. Yoga, an ancient Indian practice, is seen as a means to both physiological and spiritual well-being. (AP Photo/Bikas Das)

were being practiced in ancient times. Yoga started as a religious practice for Hindus. In fact, the word "yoga" appears often in the "Bhagavad Gita" ("The Lord's Song"), a section within the Hindu epic *Mahabharata* (ca. 500–400 BCE).

Although most of the research on yoga concludes that it originated in India, others argue that a Neolithic settlement named Mehrgahr (now Afghanistan) had many parallels to early yoga.

Yoga's definitions have changed from time to time and from region to region. Patanjali, who is the systematizer of yoga (ca. 150 BCE), defined yoga as "the restraining of the mind-stuff (*chitta*) from taking various forms (*vritti*s)." The more recent definition set by Paramahansa Yogananda (1893–1952) in the 20th century stated that yoga was a method for restraining the natural turbulence of thoughts, which otherwise impartially prevents all men from glimpsing the true nature of the spirit.

Yoga became more widely known in the West in the late 19th century by Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902), who brought Vedanta and yoga to the United States on September 11, 1893, when he gave his first address to the Parliament of Religions held at the Art Institute of Chicago, where yoga was localized and reshaped to make it belong to the whole world. The philosophy of yoga entered politics, as it was essential to the living philosophy of nonviolence of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948) as he led the Indian National Congress (INC), (founded in 1885), in its fight for independence from Britain.

Despite yoga becoming a part of the cultures of people all around the world, the Indian government still considers yoga to be a part of Indian heritage. The Indian Yoga Association,

sponsored by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, was accredited in October 2008 by the government of India to, among other things, create global standards in yoga education. As a self-regulatory body of renowned yoga schools in India, the Indian Yoga Association, a nonprofit, nonpolitical, and nonreligious body, aims at maintaining and promoting the different Indian yoga traditions.

Yoga is no longer just a physical practice. Extensive research is being conducted that has resulted in the publication of articles trying to reach beyond the typical physical exercise culture of yoga. In doing so, practitioners of yoga are attempting to address the many other dimensions of the practice of yoga while at the same time examining issues that impact the global yoga community as a whole.

Yoga is also no longer a Hindu religious practice. Yoga classes can be found in many non-Hindu countries, including Muslim countries. Yoga continues to be a tool to manage stress, support good health, and develop an individual's spirituality.

NILLY KAMAL EL-AMIR

See also Diet and Health; Hinduism; Religion

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